47:1It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questionsreferingto Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.47:2It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.48:1A very sensible and intelligent article written by MrFritz Hansen, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to notice.48:2N:o 10.49:1N:o 10.50:1This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. SeeN:o 14.50:2N:o 11.51:1Nansendoes not even mention the document in his book.51:2N:o 12.52:1This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction. The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical representatives.52:2N:o 13and14.52:3Nansen(page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as it did not include »the same guarantees we had before». It must nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained fargreaterguarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet, partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince’s programme was far easier to carry out than the programme of the Communiqué, which implied that the Consular question would solve itself.Nansenalso mentions that »the last Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of the Norwegian Commissioners». To this it must be observed that this Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than the Norwegian majority’s proposal had been in the last Union Committee. Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?53:1N:o 15.53:2N:o 16.54:1N:o 17.55:1Page 14.56:1Nansen(pag. 93).58:1Nansenpage 93.58:2There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of the Cabinet.Compare withN:o 19.58:3N:o 18.58:4CompareN:o 27.59:1N:os18,19and21.59:2On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for having given the King a few day’s grace in order to form a new Ministry. The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare withN:o 21) for not having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to the Cabinets open threats (Compare withN:o 19) that the man who, after being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How truly Norwegian!60:1N:o 21.60:2N:o 22.60:3The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same as in the address to the King.60:4N:o 23.60:5N:o 24.60:6N:o 25.60:7Onereeds, for exemple,Nansensarguments in real exaggerated Norwegianlogic.(page 94).61:1CompareN:o 1 § 112andN:o 2 § 12.61:2»The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.»61:3N:o 26.62:1N:o27.62:2N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King’s defence of the legality of his action.63:1Compare, with N:os15and16.
47:1It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questionsreferingto Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.
47:1It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questionsreferingto Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.
47:2It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.
47:2It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.
48:1A very sensible and intelligent article written by MrFritz Hansen, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to notice.
48:1A very sensible and intelligent article written by MrFritz Hansen, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to notice.
48:2N:o 10.
48:2N:o 10.
49:1N:o 10.
49:1N:o 10.
50:1This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. SeeN:o 14.
50:1This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. SeeN:o 14.
50:2N:o 11.
50:2N:o 11.
51:1Nansendoes not even mention the document in his book.
51:1Nansendoes not even mention the document in his book.
51:2N:o 12.
51:2N:o 12.
52:1This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction. The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical representatives.
52:1This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction. The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical representatives.
52:2N:o 13and14.
52:2N:o 13and14.
52:3Nansen(page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as it did not include »the same guarantees we had before». It must nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained fargreaterguarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet, partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince’s programme was far easier to carry out than the programme of the Communiqué, which implied that the Consular question would solve itself.Nansenalso mentions that »the last Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of the Norwegian Commissioners». To this it must be observed that this Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than the Norwegian majority’s proposal had been in the last Union Committee. Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?
52:3Nansen(page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as it did not include »the same guarantees we had before». It must nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained fargreaterguarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet, partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince’s programme was far easier to carry out than the programme of the Communiqué, which implied that the Consular question would solve itself.Nansenalso mentions that »the last Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of the Norwegian Commissioners». To this it must be observed that this Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than the Norwegian majority’s proposal had been in the last Union Committee. Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?
53:1N:o 15.
53:1N:o 15.
53:2N:o 16.
53:2N:o 16.
54:1N:o 17.
54:1N:o 17.
55:1Page 14.
55:1Page 14.
56:1Nansen(pag. 93).
56:1Nansen(pag. 93).
58:1Nansenpage 93.
58:1Nansenpage 93.
58:2There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of the Cabinet.Compare withN:o 19.
58:2There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of the Cabinet.
Compare withN:o 19.
58:3N:o 18.
58:3N:o 18.
58:4CompareN:o 27.
58:4CompareN:o 27.
59:1N:os18,19and21.
59:1N:os18,19and21.
59:2On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for having given the King a few day’s grace in order to form a new Ministry. The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare withN:o 21) for not having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to the Cabinets open threats (Compare withN:o 19) that the man who, after being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How truly Norwegian!
59:2On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for having given the King a few day’s grace in order to form a new Ministry. The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare withN:o 21) for not having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to the Cabinets open threats (Compare withN:o 19) that the man who, after being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How truly Norwegian!
60:1N:o 21.
60:1N:o 21.
60:2N:o 22.
60:2N:o 22.
60:3The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same as in the address to the King.
60:3The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same as in the address to the King.
60:4N:o 23.
60:4N:o 23.
60:5N:o 24.
60:5N:o 24.
60:6N:o 25.
60:6N:o 25.
60:7Onereeds, for exemple,Nansensarguments in real exaggerated Norwegianlogic.(page 94).
60:7Onereeds, for exemple,Nansensarguments in real exaggerated Norwegianlogic.(page 94).
61:1CompareN:o 1 § 112andN:o 2 § 12.
61:1CompareN:o 1 § 112andN:o 2 § 12.
61:2»The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.»
61:2»The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.»
61:3N:o 26.
61:3N:o 26.
62:1N:o27.
62:1N:o27.
62:2N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King’s defence of the legality of his action.
62:2N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King’s defence of the legality of his action.
63:1Compare, with N:os15and16.
63:1Compare, with N:os15and16.
The question of the Justification of the Norwegian Revolution.Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History — even the history of Sweden — records many revolutions, which are said to have been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on the grounds of its having beenthe extreme means of protecting most important interests.
The Swedish »oppression».In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway’s breaking out of the Union, and Sweden’s struggle for freedom from Denmark in the middle ages. Sweden’s way of using its power has been stamped as an intolerableoppression. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to the fact that Norway’s »struggle for freedom» has had for its object the enormously important cause — their own consuls!
Sweden’s loyalty in conducting the Foreign policy of the Union.The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union;in everything else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality with that of Sweden.AnNorway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that in the present day, when the want to prove an antithesis in Norway, they can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the Union — the well known Bodö affair in 1819-1821 — an episode concerning whichNorwegianinvestigations of recent date, have served to place Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years’ uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour ofmaterial and spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian assistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State — the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs — a Norwegian has lately been in office.theposts at the Embassies at Foreign Courts, even the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians. Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers, which even if they did not accede to all Norway’s demands, would, if realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously held.
Has Norway been denied its prerogative.But it has been said on the Norwegian side — and this has been brought forward as the main point — Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a »free and independent Kingdom». If by that, they mean that Norway has been denied equality in the Union, it isnot true.
Sweden’s only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desireon the part of the Norwegians to beabsolutlytheir own masters, that and nothing else. Norway has bragged about her prerogatives without any feeling of responsibility, like an unreasoning whimsical child. It must bedeclared, both on historical and psychological grounds, that it can never be politicallydefended. Norway must already have made the discovery that the great era of universal politics, is entitled, if ever,to political action under a strict sense of responsibility.
Faults on Sweden’s side.By this it is by no means our intention to deny that Sweden herself is to a certain extent to blame for things going as they have done. Looking back over the Union Policy of Sweden, it must, in the first place, be noticeable that there has been, to a certain extent, a lack of firmness and authority. And it cannot either be denied that there have been mistakes that have unnecessarily roused opposition. For instance, in the so-called Stadtholder question, in the sixties, Sweden’s policy was undoubtedly too harsh. But whatever faults may be laid at the door of the Union Policy of Sweden, when the Swedish nation in these days tries to make a searching self examination, opinions are not little likely to be unanimous because Sweden has beentoo conciliatorytowards Norways’ demands.
Swedish opinion.It is said that a foreigner recently travelling in the Scandinavian countries made the observation that Swedes always spoke kindly of the Norwegians, and the Norwegians always spoke ill of the Swedes. The observation doubtless contains a good deal of truth. It is, at least, true that Swedish public opinion, at large, has been distinguished by kindliness both to Norway and its people, and that every honest effort to smooth discussions has had the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of the people of Sweden. Swedes have been very unwilling to listen to the prophets of evil who have pointed to the deficiencies and deformities of Norwegian policy, and prognosticated trouble. It is just on that account that indignation from one end of Sweden to the other is so much the more intense when the veil is so rudely torn aside, and Norwegian politics are shown in theirtrue light, such as they areand — havebeen. The revolutionary act of Norway has like a flash of lightning illuminated the past background of Norwegian politics, and exhibited to the people of Sweden all the unreasonableness, the craftiness and dishonesty which Sweden has had to put up with from Norway during the past decennials.
In this way, the memories of the history of the Union of the latest periods are revived with indignation among the people of Sweden. If the indignation is at times expressed in unnecessarily strong and ill-chosen terms, Norway has in truth no manner of right to complain.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
§ 1. The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, andinalinenablerealm united with Sweden under one King.
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§ 5. The King’s person is sacred. He must not be blamed nor accused. The responsibility is incumbent on His Council.
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§15. — — — — — The Prime Minister reports the matters and is responsible for the documents issued being in accordance with the resolutions adopted.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
§ 30. All matters dealt with in the Cabinet Council should be recorded. Each number of the Cabinet Council is bound to express, fearlessly, his opinion which the King is obliged to listen to. But it is reserved for the latter to take these resolutions according to His own judgment.
If a member of the Cabinet Council should find the Kings’ resolution incongruous with the form of government, or the public laws of the country, or else obviously harmful to the realm, it is his duty to make strenuous remonstrance and to have hisopinonrecorded. He who has not issued a protest in this way, is considered to have agreed with the King and is responsible for it in the way subsequently indicated, and the Odelsthing canproecedagainst him before the Court of impeachment.
§ 31. All orders (ezceptingmatters of military command) issued by the King himself, should be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
§ 76. Each law shall first be moved in the Odelsthing, either by its own members or by the Government through a Cabinet Minister. — — — — —
§ 77. When a resolution passed by the Odelsthing has been approved of by the Lagthing, or by the assembled Storthing, it is sent to the King if present, or else to the Norwegian Government with the request of obtaining the sanction of the King.
§ 78. If the King approves of the resolution he shall attach His signature to it, through which it passes into law. If He does not approve of it, He shall send it back to the Odelsthing with the declaration that He doesnot find it suitable, at present, to sanction it. In this case the resolution must not again be laid before the King by the Storthing then assembled.
§ 79. If a resolution has, in unaltered form, been passed by three ordinary Storthings constituted after three different consecutive general Elections and separated from each other by at least two intermediate ordinary Storthings without that, in the interval between the first and the last adoption of the resolution, a divergent resolution has been passed by a Storthing, and if it is then submitted to the King with the request that His Majesty may be pleased not to negative a resolution regarded as useful by the Storthing after mature consideration, then it passes into law, even if the King’s sanction should not be obtained before the break-up of the Storthing.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
§ 112. If experience should teach that some part of the Constitution of the realm of Norway ought to be altered, the motion for it shall be made at the first ordinary Storthing after a new general election and be issued from the press. But it can only to be one of the ordinary Storthings after the next general election, to decide as to whether the amendment moved should be accepted or not. Such an amendment, however, must never be contrary to the principles of this Constitution, but should only regard a modification of particular regulations, not affecting the spirit of this Constitution, and such an amendment should be seconded by two thirds of the Storthing.
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§ 4. The King shall have the right to concentrate troops, commence war and to conclude peace, enter into and annul alliances, dismiss and receive ambassadors. — — — — —
§ 5. Both the Norwegian Prime Ministers and the two Cabinet Ministersaccompaningthe King shall have a seat and vote in the Swedish Cabinet Council, whenever matters affecting both countries are there transacted. In such cases the opinion of the Government residing in Norway shall be consulted unless such a speedy decision be required that time does not allow of it.
When, in the Norwegian Cabinet Council, matters affecting both countries are transacted, three members of the Swedish Cabinet Council shall there have a seat and vote.
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§ 772:1. — — — — — Matters concerning both the Kingdoms, but which in consequence of their nature, do not belong to the administration of any special Department, are reported by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and are despatchedto each Kingdom, drawn up in its own language; to Sweden by the above mentioned reporter Minister and to Norway by her Prime Minister.
Diplomatic (Cabinet) matters are reported by the Minister for Foreign affairs, and are entered into a separate protocol73:1. — — — — —
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
§ 12. Whereas the regulations contained in this Act of Union partly are copied from the Constitution of the realm of Norway, partly are additions to it, based on the right awarded to the present Storthing by the Constitution, they shall, with regard to Norway, have and retain the same authority as the Constitution of that realm, and they must not be altered but in the way indicated in § 112 of that same Constitution.
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72:1This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional Government.
72:1This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional Government.
72:1This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional Government.
The negotiations carried on in Stockholm during the last months of October, December, and January between the members of the Swedish and the Norwegian Government here subjoined, and regarding the Consular question, have been continued in Christiania during February and March.
During these negotiations the Swedish members maintained that the establishment of a separate Consular service for each of the United Kingdoms did not seem to them desirable in itself, and that they were not convinced that a dissolution of the existing community, in this respect, would convey any important practical advantages to either of the Kingdoms. On the contrary, there were reasons to apprehend lest this arrangement should lead to inconveniences.
Whereas, however, an opposite opinion has long been upheld by Norway and whereas, during the negotiations resulting from the report of the latest Consular committee made up by members from both countries, it has turned out not to be impossible to arrange, on certain conditions, such a system with separate consuls for each Kingdom as could, while it was meant to satisfy the desires expressed by Norway, also remove the principal apprehensions on the part of Sweden, the Swedish negotiators in order to attain the most important advantage of political concord between the two Kingdoms, have found it possible to recommend an agreement on the following terms:
1. Separate Consular services for Sweden and for Norway shall be established. The Consuls of each Kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.
2. The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws ofth seamewording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the authorities, of both Kingdoms.
The Swedish negotiators have added to this that they realise in full and acknowledge that the position held for the present by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, does not correspond to the equality within the Union that Norway is entitled to claim. They have held forth the desirability of this question being made an object of negotiations, which, however, at present has not met with approval on the part of Norway. They have, however, declared themselves prepared to advise the King, whenever such a desire is expressed on the side of Norway, to lay before the Riksdag and the Storthing a proposition about such alterations of the Act of Union as can clear the way for the King to appoint a Swede or a Norwegian-Minister for Foreign affairs and render it possible to institute the minister’s constitutional responsibility before the national assemblies of both Kingdoms.
To this the Norwegian negotiators have answered that they naturally concur in the opinion that the existing arrangement for the administration of Foreign affairs does not agree with Norway’s justified claims on equality within the Union. It was therefore all the more evident that, on the part of Norway, no regulations could be accepted that were meant to bind it to this arrangement. At the same time, however, they wanted to express the hope that the question about a satisfactory arrangement of the administration of Foreign affairs might soon be made an object of negotiations between the Kingdoms.
When the present negotiations had been carried on by Norway under the supposition that the question about a change of this unsatisfactory state of things should be left untouched, it had been done so out of regard to the fact that the opinions about the best way of correcting this state of things were so different in the two countries that, for the present, an agreement could not be expected.
We Swedish and Norwegian negotiators, having thus been confined to try to bring about such an arrangement of the Consular question as will leavestatus quoundisturbed with respect to the position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and of the Embassies, have agreed upon that the relation between the Minister and the Diplomacy on the one hand, and the separate Consular Services on the other, should be regulated by laws of the same wording which cannot be altered by one of the parties alone and which both shall guarantee that the Consuls do not overstep the limits of their authority and at the same time shall add security to the necessary co-operation between the management of foreign affairs and the Consular Services of both Kingdoms.
In conclusion we also want to express the hope that the time shall not be remote when, by conciliatory advances on both sides, the question of arranging the management of Foreign affairs can be made an object of negotiations and find such a solution as can produce satisfaction in both countries and enduringly secure the futurity of the Union.
73:1Theseenactsmentsshow plainly that the Act of Union only recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the Foreign Policy of the Union.
73:1Theseenactsmentsshow plainly that the Act of Union only recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the Foreign Policy of the Union.
73:1Theseenactsmentsshow plainly that the Act of Union only recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the Foreign Policy of the Union.
The Consular administration by which is understood the authority the Consuls are subordinate to, has to inform the Minister for Foreign affairs of:
a) the establishment, the suppression, the alteration, or the division of Consular Services, theappointementor employment of Consuls, their power of attorney, leave of absence, suspension, recall, or discharge:
b) the general regulations and precepts issued with regard to the Consular Service;
c) measures particularly regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, as e. g. regulations to be observed by Consuls in time of war; orders to, or proceedings against Consuls owing to complaints lodged by a Foreign Power against their actions; instructions to Consuls as to the interpretation and the application of international laws or agreements and as to matters simultaneously subject to Diplomatic and to Consular treatment.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Of matters that have assumed or may be anticipated to assume a diplomatic or political aspect and that seem to require a speedy decision, the Consul has to send the Minister for Foreign affairs an exact statement. This proceeding shall particularly be observed in case of an infringement of international agreements; of obstacles raised by the local authorities to the Consul’s discharge of his official duties; of troubles for warships in foreign ports; of illegitimate confiscation of traders; of arbitrary imprisonment of citizens; of difficulties originating from outbreak of war or insurrection; and of reclamations already committed to diplomatic treatment, but requiring a speedy acquirement of additional information.
In matters of this kind where there is reason to apprehend lest a negligence of immediate interference should convey considerable inconveniences,the Minister for Foreign affairs can make directinquiresof, and give direct injunctions to a Consul concerning the diplomatic or political side of the matter.
The Consul must not refuse to submit to an inquiry or an injunction addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign affairs, because of finding the matter in question not to be of the kind alluded to above.
When the interest of the country or its citizens require being looked after, the legation is entitled to gather information from, and to give orders to the Consul concerned. Such orders must not conflict with actual law and statute, nor with instructions or other regulations given by the Home authority.
With regard to a Consul’s duty to obey the injunctions mentioned above, the last passage of § 3 should be applied.
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With regard to the relations between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Consular administration, and in addition to general precepts as to their duty of mutual cooperation and of mutual interchange of information about such resolutions and steps, etc. as may be of importance for them to know it should be directed:
that a new Consulate must not be established until the Minister for Foreign affairs has stated as to whether any obstacles to its establishment are raised on the part of Foreign Powers;
that, before the appointment of a Consul, the Foreign Minister shall have an opportunity of making the remarks he may find appropriate, as to the persons possible to be taken into consideration for the appointment;
that, for obtaining a Foreign Power’s recognition of a Consul, the Consular administration has to make a proposition of it to the Foreign Minister just as is the case when, in other matters belonging to the province of the Consular administration the question arises about applying to the Government of a Foreign Power;
and that if, in matters being dealt with by the Consular administration, the Minister for Foreign affairs has given instructions to a Consul, the Consular administration must not give the Consul an order conflicting with such an instruction.
As to the Foreign Minister’s relation to the Consuls andvice versâ, the law should say that the Consuls are subordinate to the Minister for Foreign affairs in such a way:
that, in matters belonging to his province, he has the right to request information directly from the Consul and to give him instructions;
and that the Consul on his part is bound not only to execute implicitly what he is thus requested to do, but also, in such matters dealt with by him as, owing to their nature and other circumstances, may be supposed to affect the relation to a Foreign Power, to send of his own accord a report of the origination of the matter as well as of its further development.
Besides it should be instituted:
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that, in case a Consul should act in such a way as may have a disturbing effect upon the friendly relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Power concerned, and also in case a Consul should neglect to execute the instructions of the Minister for Foreign affairs or the Legation, the Foreign Minister shall have the right to address a humble request to the King about the Consul’s revocation, whereupon the Consular administration concerned should be informed of the resolution.
In order to regulate the relations between the Legation and the Consuls concerned, it should, apart from the general precept of their duty of mutual cooperation, be laid down in the law:
that the legation is bound to guard the Consul’s rights and to lend him necessary assistance and, in matters belonging to the province of the legation, entitled to demand information from the Consul and to give him instructions;
that the Consul has the same duties towards the Legation as towards the Minister for Foreign affairs;
and that, if the Consul, by participating in political demonstrations or in another way, should openly disregard the consideration he is bound to have for the authorities of the country he is employed in, or if an action affecting his civil repute shouldhebrought against him, the legation has the right to suspend him from his office until further notice.
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2. No approval on the part of Norway can be expected for an arrangement that would give Swedish authorities the possibility of interfering with measures taken by a Norwegian authority. Also in this respect we merely adhere to the Communiqué and the Protocols of December that, as a basisof agreement, give prominence to the establishment of a separate Consular service for Sweden and for Norway, in which case »the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.» This arrangement does not however preclude, as is also presupposed in the Norwegian draft, a certain possibility for the Foreign Minister to address direct requests to the consuls.
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With particular regard to the demand expressed in the »outlines» that the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs shall have the right — this isthe,intention according to your Excellency’s verbal declaration — to discharge in ministerial — consequently in Swedish — Cabinet Council a consul appointed in Norwegian Council, I ventured to point out 1) that this demand was entirely contrary to the Norwegian Constitution, 2) that an arrangement by which a Swedish authority of state might nullify a resolution adopted by a Norwegian authority of state would, according to the general principles of political and international law, impress upon Norway the stamp of a dependency, and 3) that it would therefore from a national point of view signify an enormous retrograde step as compared with the present arrangement of the Consular service.
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§ 8.
If in a matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, the Minister for Foreign affairs has informed that he has taken such a measure as is alluded to in § 9, it is for the Consular administration to observe that, from its side, no such instructions are given to the consul concerned as are conflicting with any reorder relating to this matter given by the Minister for Foreign affairs and known to the Consular administration.
§ 9.
The Minister for Foreign affairs has, in a matter belonging to his province, to request immediate information from the Consul of the country concerned and also give him instructions about what he has to observe in such a matter; and a consul is absolutely bound tofullfillwhat is thus requested of him.
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§ 11.
If the Minister for Foreign Affairs should learn that a Consular employé has not acted with good and worthy behaviour towards the authorities of the country where he is employed, or that he has participated in political demonstrations, orsecretely, or openly encouraged or supported attacks on the existing Government, or else behaves in a way that may have a disturbing effect upon the good relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Power concerned, then the minister has humbly to give notice of it to the King in Joint or in Ministerial Cabinet Council whereupon the matter is submitted to the King’s consideration in the Cabinet Council of the country concerned.
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§ 16.
If a legation should find a Consul guilty of a proceeding or a neglect alluded to in § 11, or if a Consul should be prosecuted for a crime affecting his civil repute, the legation, if finding it justified by circumstances, has to suspend the Consul from his office; and the matter shouldimmedatelybe reported both to the Minister for Foreign affairs and to the Consular administration concerned.
A Consul thus suspended from his office, must not again come into office until the King, after hearing the Minister for Foreign affairs, has resolved upon it.
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To § 8. It is stated here that,when.in a matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, the Foreign Minister has given a Consul an order, it is for the Consular administration to observe that, from its side, no order conflicting with it is given to the Consul. It is difficult to understand what is meant by this paragraph, which is without a parallel in the present Consular statutes which do not direct any similar injunction to the Norwegian Consular department. To judge from reference to § 4, it does not seem to have been intended to give the Foreign Minister the right, in whatever be which matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, to stop the function of the latter and to assert his own authority instead; for this would be equivalent to instituting a relation of subordination that no Governmental department can submit to. The intention, then, can only be supposedto have been the following: — to try, in a consular matter, that has assumed a diplomatic aspect or that is simultaneously subject to a consular and a diplomatic treatment, to prevent the Consular administration from arbitrarily trespassing upon the province of the Foreign Minister. It stands to reason that this must not occur. But just because it stands to reason, the precept is superfluous. And what is of more importance: it is calculated to excite indignation. For, as it is obvious that an interference of the said kind must be a manifestation either of want of judgment or of disloyalty, it should be admitted that it is not very appropriate to give in a law, even in an indirect way, an expression to the thought that such qualities may prevail in the department concerned.
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To § 11. — — — — — We should not however dwell upon these formal considerations which are of a merely secondary importance as compared with the far-reaching question: exclusively Norwegian or partly joint treatment of matters concerning the relations of Norwegian Consulswheteherto the Foreign Minister, or to legations, or to Foreign authorities. In this connection we want to quote a passage from the report of the last Consular Committee made up of members from both countries where we read (Norwegian edition, p. 16): »Furthermore the Norwegian Consular administration has to leave it to the Foreign Minister (and the legations) to receive and reply to reclamations from Foreign Governments in the rare cases when subjects of contention arise by the actions of Norwegian Consuls. For this kind of correspondence, although dealing with the behaviour of Consuls, is owing to its nature diplomatic and not consular, and in as much as the matter has a political moment, the Foreign Minister should continue to keep the management of it; if the matter should become critical so as to grow into a real international conflict, he should report it to the King and procure the instructions necessary for its treatment. It stands to reason that he should not be debarred from influencing the course of the matter by informing the Norwegian Consular administration of his opinion as to the steps suitable to take with regard to the consul Concerned. But the very instructions to the latter or the disciplinary steps occasioned by the matter belong to the home consular management and should therefore be issued from the Norwegian department.» We concur in the opinion expressed here and the demand for an exclusively Norwegian treatment of questions concerning measures against Norwegian Consuls, appears still more justified in the cases when the matter is without a political moment, but the question regards the consul’s relation to the Foreign Minister and the legations. In the last-mentioned respect we want again to refer to the statement of the Consular Committee (Norwegian edition, pp. 25-26), from which it is evident that they did not intend any joint treatment of matters relating to the Consul’s disobedience of instructions or omission of duties; nor was this intention expressed during the negotiations that took place before the appearance of the Communiqué. Such a joint treatment that should precede the treatment from the Norwegian side, canonly imply one of two things. Either it means to be a mere formality only calculated to delay matters perhaps requiring a speedy decision. Or else it means to be a real treatment, in which case, the Foreign Minister is intended to get influence on the settlement of the matter; but in this case it will signify an encroachment upon a department which, as it maintained, should be exclusively reserved for a Norwegian authority of State. Besides, it is self-evident that the Consular administration which may justly be supposed to be equally interested as the Foreign Minister in Norway not being compromised by her agents abroad, cannot forbear, when demands for a Consul’s revocation are made on the part of diplomacy, to make the matter the object of a humble report.
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To § 16. It is proposed here that the legation shall have the right to suspend a Consul guilty of such conduct as is spoken of in § 11, or prosecuted for a crime affecting his civic reputation. In this connection it should be remembered that, according to the present consular statute, the right to suspend a consular official does not lie with the legations, but with the Foreign Minister who, after having taken his measures, has to submit the matter to his Majesty. As to the right to suspend future Norwegian consular officials, this right, just as is done with regard to other state officials, shall according to the Constitution be exercised by the King (see the Constitution, § 22 and Aschehoug, Norges nuværende statsforfatning, ii, 474.) To transfer this right upon the legations would be incongruous with the Constitution. But not even with regard to consular functionaries who are not state officials, and who, during the present community in Consular service, are suspended, by the superior consul concerned, the right of suspension should be granted to the legations. For, the view is held, in accordance with the Consular Committee of the joint Kingdoms (see their report, Norwegian edition, pp. 24, 25) that between consular functionaries exclusively subject to Norwegianauthonityand ambassadors exclusively subject to a Swedish minister, there is no possibility of establishing truly hierarchic relations: — — — — —
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After the considerations made above, it will be obvious that from a Norwegian point of view, these paragraphs appear as unacceptable, partly because they are incongruous with the Constitution of Norway or with the claims that in this country are put upon the contents and the forms ofindependecy, partly because, by this, the aim cannot be gained, that is intended by the whole negotiation,viz— to use the words of the Swedish negotiators — to establish a separate Consular service for Sweden and forNorwayThe Consuls of each Kingdom are subject to the home authority that each country decides for itself. (see theCommuniquéof March 24, 1903).
On this account we recommend to omit from the Swedish draft the paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, and 19. If they should be adhered to, further discussion about the Swedish draft will be futile.
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In the memorandum of the Norwegian Cabinet Council it is suggested that § 8 of the Swedish draft can be interpreted so as to be meant with regard to any matter being treated by the Consular administration, to give the Foreign Minister the right to stop the function of the latter and to assert his own authority instead. But as it is expressly indicated in the draft that the precept concerned is meant to be relevant only to a certain case specially mentioned, the opinion expressed does not seem to be justified. The precept has in view to regulate the relations between the Foreign Minister and the Consular administration, if, in a matter subject to consular treatment, the Foreign Minister, owing to the origination of diplomatic or political circumstances, has found reason to interfere by virtue of the right the laws are meant to bestow upon him. When thus a matter is simultaneously treated by different authorities, that each within its province has to treat it, the possibility of a conflict can hardly be denied, and still less so as the limits between the diplomatic and the consular province, as is generally acknowledged, are extremely uncertain, and as on both sides there is a natural tendency to extend the sphere of activity to departments formerly looked upon as exclusively belonging to the other party. It cannot therefore be incongruous with the laws now being under discussion to insert regulations for the case alluded to; on the contrary, it seems to be entirely in consistency with the basis of these laws and with the end of their institution that such regulations should be given. And it can hardly be denied that in this case that authority, is the Foreign Minister, who represents both countries, and in the present case it must be considered that attention to the interests most important to the joint countries should be preferred.
The precepts of §§ 11 and 16 contain the particular instructions meant toguarranteethat the Consuls shall not transgress the due limits of their province. Such aguarranteecannot be dispensed with in the opinion of the Swedish Cabinet Council. For, cases may be imagined when in a foreign country a Consul behaves in a way threatening to disturb the good relations between the Government of the country and the United Kingdoms. To deprive the representatives of the United Kingdoms, as to their relations to Foreign Powers; i. e. the Foreign Minister and the legations, of all possibility of interfering against the Consul under such circumstances would, in the opinion of the Swedish Cabinet Council, hardly be compatible with the dignity of the United Kingdoms and might, with regard to the Foreign Power, involve a danger that should be escaped. The Norwegian and the Swedishdraft alike contain regulations enjoining upon the Consul the duty of obedience towards the Foreign Minister and the legation. Also in case the Consul should violate his duty of obedience, the proper consideration and regard for the position held by the Foreign Minister and the legation seem to demand the possibility for them to interfere. For this interference, however, such a form has been proposed that the decision of the Consul’s conduct, of his remaining in office or his dismissal would be made by the King in the Cabinet Council of that country represented by the Consul.
In support of his standpoint that »a joint treatment of matters concerning the Consul’s relations whether to the Foreign Minister, or the legations or the Foreign Authorities» must not occur, the Norwegian Cabinet Council refers to the contents of the report of the Consular Committee and quotes especially a passage terminating in these words. »But the very instructions to the latter (i. e. the consul) or the disciplinary steps that may be occasioned by the matter, belong to the internal consular management and must therefore be issued by the Norwegian department.» To this the objection should be made that the opinion of the Consular committee is naturally not binding to the Swedish Cabinet Council, and that besides the Norwegian Cabinet Council has itself given up the same opinion in granting in its draft the Foreign Minister and the legations, the right to address »injunctions» that the Consul cannot forbear to pay heed to. This seems to imply a giving-up of the claim that, in the diplomatic part of a matter, Norwegian consuls shall be exclusively subject to Norwegian authorities.
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From the detailed statement given it may be gathered that the Swedish Cabinet Council considers itself neither bound nor, out of regard to the welfare of the Union, justified to cancel outright, in the way demanded in the Norwegian memorandum, theabovementionedparagraphs of its draft. This does not however imply that from the Swedish side alterations and modifications of the precepts proposed cannot be granted, but what is important in them must however be adhered to; and concerning possible modifications, which can be exactly stated only by continued negotiations, there is at present no occasion for entering into particulars.
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His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave, in all humility, an account of a humble report about terminating the negotiations for the establishment of a separate Consular service for Sweden and for Norway. In answer to the Foreign Minister’s recommendation in Joint Swedish andNorwegian Cabinet Council of the 6th inst., this proposal had been made by Royal Norwegian Government on the same day, and a copy of it has been appended to this Protocol.
After having given an account of the contents of the report of the Norwegian Government, the Minister proceeded to say:
»The report of the Norwegian Government does not lead to any alteration of the recommendation84:1previously made by me. I venture however, to draw attention to the fact that, if it has been impossible to come to terms about the present question, the principal cause of it should be sought in the present arrangement for treating questions affecting the relations between the United Kingdoms and Foreign Powers. That this arrangement does not satisfy the positions of the two countries within the Union, has long been admitted.
In connection with what was expressed by all the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Ministers who signed the above-mentioned document of March 24, 1903, I wanttherfore, to emphasize the desirability that the question as to arranging on other principles the management of Foreign affairs should again be taken up for negotiations between the two countries. I do not, however, find any reason now to make proposal as to taking steps to that end; I only refer to what I have previously advocated».
What the Minister had thus stated and recommended, was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet Council.
The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council referred to the Norwegian Government’s humble report of the 6th inst. and proceeded to state that in its opinion a solution of the question at issue might, in the way expressed by the Swedish Cabinet ministers in the document of March 24, 1903, also have been found with the present arrangement for treating Foreign affairs. The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council naturally agreed upon the opinion that this arrangement did not harmonize with the positions of the two countries within the Union. Whereas, however, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the plea of the document of March 24, 1903, had pointed out the desirability that the question as to arranging on other principles the management of Foreign affairs should again be taken up for negotiation between the two countries, the Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council could not forbear to hold forth, partly that the said document presupposed a solution of the question as an independent case, partly that, after the recent occurrences in the Consular question, the chances of further negotiations between the two countries, concerning the above-mentioned matters, were considerably clouded.
His Majesty the Kingwas hereupon pleased to dictate:
»In the present state of things I find Myself unable to take any other resolution than to assent to what has been recommended to Me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I cannot forbear to express to My peoples My heart-felt desire that the two Kingdoms, united almost a century ago, shall never suffer any differences of opinion to endanger the Union itself. The latter is truly the safest security for the independence, the safety and the happiness of the Scandinavian Peninsula and her two peoples».
Upon this, the Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated that they, in all humility, had ventured to dissuade His Majesty from making this dictate.
In accordance with the recommendations made by the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Council,His Majesty the Kingwas pleased to resolve that the commission entrusted to the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Council inpersuanceof the King’s resolution of December 21, 1903, shall not lead to any further steps, and also to decree that the Protocols of the Cabinet Council regarding this matter shall be published!