CHAPTER XXIII.

“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, Destiny!”

Then, having this for thy business, if some little matter of eloquence please thee, or certain speculations, wilt thou stay and abide in them, and elect to settle in them, forgetting all that is at home? and wilt thou say,These things are admirable? Who saith they are not admirable? but for passing through, like inns. What should hinder one that spoke like Demosthenes to be unfortunate? or one that could resolve syllogisms like Chrysippus to be miserable, to grieve, to envy; in a word, to be troubled and unhappy? Nothing. Thou seest now that all these things are but inns, and of no worth; but our business was another thing. WhenI say these things to certain persons, they think I am rejecting all care about language or speculation. But I do not reject this; I reject the endless occupation with them, the putting our hopes in them. If a man by this teaching injureth those who hear him, reckon me also among those who do this injury. For I cannot, in order to please you, see that one thing is best and chief of all, and say that another is.5

Abide in the precepts as in laws which it were impious to transgress. And whatsoever any man may say of thee, regard it not; for neither is this anything of thine own.

1.Howlong wilt thou delay to hold thyself worthy of the best things, and to transgress in nothing the decrees of Reason? Thou hast received the maxims by which it behooves thee to live; and dost thou live bythem? What teacher dost thou still look for to whom to hand over the task of thy correction? Thou art no longer a boy, but already a man full grown. If, then, thou art neglectful and sluggish, and ever making resolve after resolve, and fixing one day after another on which thou wilt begin to attend to thyself, thou wilt forget that thou art making no advance, but wilt go on as one of the vulgar sort, both living and dying.

2. Now, at last, therefore hold thyself worthy to live as a man of full age and one who is pressing forward, and let everything that appeareth the best be to thee as an inviolable law. And if any toil or pleasure or reputation or the loss of it be laid upon thee, remember that now is the contest, here already are the Olympian games, and there is no deferring them any longer, and that in a single day and in a single trial ground is to be lost or gained.

3. It was thus that Socrates made himself what he was, in all things that befell him having regard to no other thing than Reason. But thou, albeit thou be yet no Socrates, yet as one that would be Socrates, so it behooveth thee to live.

1.Thefirst and most necessary point in philosophy is the use of the precepts, for example, not to lie. The second is the proof of these, as, Whence it comes that it is wrong to lie? The third is that which giveth confirmation and coherence to the others, such as, Whence it comes that this is proof? for what is proof? what is consequence? what is contradiction? what is truth? what is falsehood?

2. Thus the third point is necessary through the second, and the second through the first. But the most necessary of all, and that when we should rest, is the first, But we do the contrary. For we linger on the third point, and spend all our zeal on that, while of the first we are utterly neglectful, and thus we are liars; but the explanation of how it is shown to be wrong to lie we have ever ready to hand.

Hold in readiness for every need, these—

“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, Destiny, whithersoever ye have appointed me to go, and may I follow fearlessly. But if in an evil mind I be unwilling, still must I follow.”

“That man is wise among us, and hath understanding of things divine, who hath nobly agreed with Necessity.”

But the third also—

“O Crito, if so it seem good to the Gods so let it be. Anytus and Meletus are able to kill me indeed, but to harm me, never.”

1.Professor Mahaffy, in hisGreek Life and Thought, quotes the full text of this noble Hymn, which, he thinks, “would alone redeem the Hellenistic age, as it stands before us, from the charge of mere artificiality and pedantry.”

2.ἰῆς μίμημα λαχόντες μοῦνον. This is Zeller’s reading, but not Professor Mahaffy’s who has ἑνὸς μίμημα.

1.“Enter by the door” (cf.S. John, x. 1). The parallelisms in thought and expression between Epictetus and the New Testament have often been noticed, and the reader will discover many others, to which I have not thought it necessary to draw attention.

2.“Conceit:” οἴησις,Einbildung.

3.“To be elated:” ἐπαίρεσθαι. One might translate, “to be puffed up,” except that that expression is only used in a bad sense, and one may be “elated” in anything that is truly of the nature of the good. The Stoics distinguished between χαρά, joy, and ἡδονή, pleasure; not rejecting or despising the former.

1.τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. A fundamental distinction in the Epictetean system, which hesometimes expresses by the phrases, τὰ ἡμέτερα and τὰ τῶν ἄλλων—things that are our own and things that belong to others; or τὰ ἴδια and τὰ ἀλλότρια—things that are our proper concern, and things that are alien to us.

2.On the Mons Palatinus in Rome there stood a temple to Fever. Upton quotes from Gruter, p. xcvii., an interesting inscription to this divinity: Febri. Divæ. Febri. Sanctæ. Febri. Magnæ. Camilla. Amata. Pro. Filio. Male. Affecto. P.

1.There is excellent MS. authority for this reading of the passage, which, however, is not Schweighäuser’s. The latter reads: “Be content with them, and pray to the Gods.”

2.“Steward of the winds.” A quotation from Homer,Od.x. 21.

1.“Through not being dazzled,” etc. Ἂν τὰς ὕλας μὴ θαυμάσῃ.

1.Note that in this passage “God” and “the Gods” and “the Divine” are all synonymous terms.

2.Or “of names.”

3.Some texts add “such as Good or Evil.”

1.Apparently a proverb, which maybe paralleled in its present application by Luther’s “Pecca fortiter.”

2.A complex or conjunctive proposition is one which contains several assertions so united as to form a single statement which will be false if any one of its parts isfalse—e.g., “Brutus was the lover and destroyer both of Cæsar and of his country.” The disjunctive is when alternative propositions are made, as “Pleasure is either good or bad, or neither good nor bad.”

3.I have followed Lord Shaftesbury’s explanation of this passage, which the other commentators have given up as corrupt. It seems clear that whether the passage can stand exactly in the form in which we have it, or not, Lord Shaftesbury’s rendering represents what Epictetus originally conveyed.

4.According to the usual reading, a scornful exclamation—“Thouexhort them!” I have followed the reading recommended by Schw. in his notes, although he does not adopt it in his text.

1.The founder of the Cynic school was Antisthenes, who taught in the gymnasium named the Cynosarges, at Athens; whence the name of his school. Zeller takes this striking chapter to exhibit Epictetus’s “philosophisches Ideal,” the Cynic being the “wahrer Philosoph,” or perfect Stoic. (Phil. d. Gr. iii. S. 752.) This view seems to me no more true than that the missionary or monk is to be considered the ideal Christian. Epictetus takes pains to make it clear that the Cynic is a Stoic with a special and separate vocation, which all Stoics are by no means called upon to take up. Like Thoreau, that modern Stoic, when he went to live at Walden, the Cynic tries the extreme of abnegation in order to demonstrate practically that man has resources within himself which make him equal to any fate that circumstances can inflict.

2.τριβώνιον, a coarse garment especially affected by the Cynics, as also by the early Christian ascetics.

3.“Nor pity.” Upton, in a note onDiss.i. 18. 3. (Schw.), refers to various passages in Epictetus wherepity and envy are mentioned together as though they were related emotions, and aptly quotes Virgil (Georg.ii. 499):—“Aut doluit miserans inopem, aut invidit habenti.”It will be clear to any careful reader that when Epictetus asserts that certain emotions or acts are unworthy of a man, he constantly means the “man” to be understood as his highest spiritual faculty, his deepest sense of reason, his soul. That we are not to pity or grieve means that that side of us which is related to the divine and eternal is not to be affected by emotions produced by calamities in mere outward and material things. St. Augustine corroborates this view in an interesting passage bearing on the Stoic doctrine of pity (De Civ. Dei.ix. 5;Schw.iv. 132):—“Misericordiam Cicero non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos inter vitia numerare non pudet, qui tamen, ut docuit liber Epicteti nobilissimi Stoici ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, qui hujus sectæ primas partes habuerunt, hujuscemodi passiones in animum Sapientis admittunt, quem vitiis omnibus liberam esse volunt. Unde fit consequens, ut hæc ipsa non putent vitia, quando Sapienti sic accidunt, ut contra virtutem mentis rationemque nihil possunt.”The particular utterances of Epictetus here alluded to by St. Augustine must have been contained in some of the lost books of theDissertations, as nothing like them is to be found explicitly in those which survive, although the latter afford us abundant means for deducing the conclusion which St. Augustine confirms.

“Aut doluit miserans inopem, aut invidit habenti.”

It will be clear to any careful reader that when Epictetus asserts that certain emotions or acts are unworthy of a man, he constantly means the “man” to be understood as his highest spiritual faculty, his deepest sense of reason, his soul. That we are not to pity or grieve means that that side of us which is related to the divine and eternal is not to be affected by emotions produced by calamities in mere outward and material things. St. Augustine corroborates this view in an interesting passage bearing on the Stoic doctrine of pity (De Civ. Dei.ix. 5;Schw.iv. 132):—

“Misericordiam Cicero non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos inter vitia numerare non pudet, qui tamen, ut docuit liber Epicteti nobilissimi Stoici ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, qui hujus sectæ primas partes habuerunt, hujuscemodi passiones in animum Sapientis admittunt, quem vitiis omnibus liberam esse volunt. Unde fit consequens, ut hæc ipsa non putent vitia, quando Sapienti sic accidunt, ut contra virtutem mentis rationemque nihil possunt.”

The particular utterances of Epictetus here alluded to by St. Augustine must have been contained in some of the lost books of theDissertations, as nothing like them is to be found explicitly in those which survive, although the latter afford us abundant means for deducing the conclusion which St. Augustine confirms.

4.This cake seems to form a ridiculous anti-climax. But it appears to have been a vexed question in antiquity whether an ascetic philosopher might indulge in this particular luxury (πλακοῦς). Upton quotes Lucian and Diogenes Laertius for instances of this question being propounded, and an affirmative answer given (in one instance by the Cynic, Diogenes). The youth in the text is being addressed as a novice who must not use the freedom of an adept.

5Upton quotes from Cymbeline:—“Hath Britain all the sun that shines? Day, night,Art they not, but in Britain? Prythee, think,There’s living out of Britain!”But Epictetus means more than this in his allusion to sun and stars.—See Preface, xxiv. This passage would lead us to suppose that Epictetus believed in a personal existence continued for some time after death. In the end, however, even sun and stars shall vanish.—Seeii. 13, 4.

5Upton quotes from Cymbeline:—

“Hath Britain all the sun that shines? Day, night,Art they not, but in Britain? Prythee, think,There’s living out of Britain!”

But Epictetus means more than this in his allusion to sun and stars.—See Preface, xxiv. This passage would lead us to suppose that Epictetus believed in a personal existence continued for some time after death. In the end, however, even sun and stars shall vanish.—Seeii. 13, 4.

6.Being arrested by Philip’s people, and asked if he were a spy, Diogenes replied, “Certainly I am, O Philip; a spy of thine ill-counsel and folly, who for no necessity canst set thy life and kingdom on the chances of an hour.”

7.According to Upton’s conjecture, these were gladiators famous for bodily strength; and also, one would suspect, for some remarkable calamity.

8.This highly crude view of the Trojan war might have been refuted out of the mouth of Epictetus himself. Evil-doers are not to be allowed their way because they are unable to hurt our souls, but the hurt may be in the cowardice or sloth that will not punish them.

9.By wearing his cloak half falling off, in negligent fashion. Nothing is finer or more characteristic in Epictetus than his angry scorn of the pseudo-Stoics of his day.

10.ἀνάκρινον τὸ δαιμόνιον. The allusion evidently is to the genius or divine spirit by which Socrates felt himself guided.

11.Crates was a disciple of Diogenes. His wife was named Hipparchia. Upton quotes Menander (apud Diog. L.), “Thou wilt walk about with me in a cloak as once did his wife with Crates the Cynic.”

12.Danaus, father of the fifty Danaidæ. Æolus is mentioned inOd.x. as having six sons and six daughters.

13.τραπεζῆας πυλαωρούς.Il.xxi. 69.

14.That is, he capped the quotation by quoting the following line (Il.ii. 24, 25). Not a very striking intellectual effort; but Epictetus evidently considered it a meritorious thing to know Homer well enough to quote him in one’s sleep, and he was right.

15.From a poem of Cleanthes.

1.According to the view of James Harris, in a long and valuable note communicated to Upton, the “master-argument” was so called from the supreme importance of the issues with which it dealt. On these issues different leaders of the Stoics took different sides, Diodorus holding both future and past things to benecessary, Cleanthes bothcontingent, and Chrysippus past things to be necessary and future contingent. Any two of the three propositions mentioned in the text exclude the third. For modern philosophy the distinction between the possible and the certain in the phenomenal world has, of course, no real existence; the possible being simply that of which we do not know whether it will come to pass or not.

2.Of course Epictetus here speaks ironically; all this is just what itisthe business of a thinker to do.

3.Epictetus, I suppose, means to complain that the current phrases of philosophy are dealt out in glib answer to great ethical questions, just as Homer might be quoted for an event in the life of Odysseus, by persons who in neither case think of gaining that vital convictionwhich only the strenuous exercise of one’s own reason can produce. A little later he represents Hellanicus, the historian, as quoted on the distinction between good and evil, who never treated that subject. If it is to be a mere question ofauthority, onenameis as good as another, since none is any use at all.“Indifferent,” be it observed, ismorallyindifferent—that which has initselfno bearing on our moral state. See Chap.II. 2.

“Indifferent,” be it observed, ismorallyindifferent—that which has initselfno bearing on our moral state. See Chap.II. 2.

4.The followers of Aristotle called themselves Peripatetics.

1.The word in the Greek is περιστάσεις, literallycircumstances, but the word is evidently used in a bad sense, as equivalent to afflictions. Doom is likewise etymologically a neutral word, but one which has received an evil meaning.

2.Socrates’s faith in his genius or “Dæmon” was well known. In this passage from hisApologia(which Epictetus gives from a bad text), it is doubtless the manner only that conveyed the idea of mockery. Neither Socrates nor any one else ever had better evidence of God’s existence than His voice in our conscience.

1.Briefly, the three divisions seem to be Action, Character, and Judgment. The last is to be approached through training in logic, in the penetration of fallacies, etc., by which means a man is to arrive at such an inward and vital conviction of the truth that he can never for a moment be taken off his guard by the delusion of Appearance.

2.Passions, passionless, τὰ πάθη, ἀπαθής.—SeeIndexof Philosophic Terms.

1.Euripides.—Musonius Rufus, the teacher of Epictetus, is reported to have said, “Take the chance of dying nobly when thou canst, lest after a little death indeed come to thee, but a noble death no more.”

2.This phrase of the “open door” occurs frequently in Epictetus, usually when, as here, he is telling the average non-philosophic man that it is unmanly to complain of a life which he can at any time relinquish. The philosopher has no need of such exhortation, for he does not complain, and as for death, is content to wait God’s time. But the Stoics taught that the arrival of this time might be indicated by some disaster or affliction which rendered a natural and wholesome life impossible. Self-destruction was in such cases permissible, and is recorded to have been adopted by several leaders of the Stoics, generally when old age had begun to render them a burden to their friends.

3.Nay, thou shalt exist, etc.—This is the sense given by Zeller’s punctuation. Schweighäuser’s text would be rendered, “Thou shalt not exist, but something else will,” etc. Upton changes the text (on his own authority) by transposing an οὐκ. “Thou shalt exist, but as something else, whereof the universe has now no need.”

4.This does not appear to have been the law in Epictetus’s time, for he himself was educated while a slave. But it was a common provision in antique states.

5.The ceremony in manumitting a slave.

1.Chap. VI. i. is a passage from the lost Fifth Book of the Discourses, preserved for us in a rather obscure Latin translation by Aulus Gellius. During a storm at sea, a certain Stoic on board was observed by him tolook pale and anxious, though not indeed showing the signs of panic exhibited by the other passengers. Questioned afterwards by Gellius on this apparent feebleness in his professed faith, the Stoic produced the Fifth Book of Epictetus, and read this passage.

2.The third Earl of Shaftesbury, an enthusiastic student of Epictetus, had this dish of water and ray of light engraved, and placed, with the inscription, πάντα ὑπόληψις—All is Opinion—as an emblem at the front of hisCharacteristics. The passage, though interesting, is obscure. At one time the “appearances,” φαντασίαι, are compared to the ray of light; at another, the doctrines (literally “arts,”i. e., arts of life taught by philosophy) and virtues. Probably the explanation is to be found in the view of the Stoics that at birth the human soul is atabula rasa, or blank sheet; all our knowledge coming from without; that is, from the “appearances” which surround us. Moral and philosophic convictions are thus, like all other mental states, the result of external impressions.

1.The school of Plato was continued at Athens under the title of the Academy. In its later days it produced little except logical puzzles.

2.“Friend, if indeed, escaping from this war, we were destined thereafter to an ageless and deathless life, then neither would I fight in the van nor set thee in the press of glorious battle. But now, since death in a thousand kinds stands everywhere against us, which no man shall fly from nor elude, we go; either we shall give glory to another, or he to us.”—Sarpedon’s speech,Iliad, xii. 322-8.

3.General consent.—The well-known philosophic doctrine, that what all men unite in believing must be true, which has so often been made the basis of arguments against Skepticism in various forms.

1.See Chap.IV. i.

2.He drew water by night for his gardens, and studied philosophy in the day.—Diog. Laert.[Upton.]

3.A most characteristic feature of the whole Stoic school was its treatment of ancient mythology and legend. These things were closely and earnestly studied, with a constant view to the deeper meanings that underlay the vesture of fable, an attitude which contrasts very favorably with Plato’s banishment of the poets from his Republic for “teaching false notions about the Gods.”

1.Gyara, an island in the Ægean, used as a penal settlement.

1.The captain ... the driver—literally, “to him who has knowledge” (of the given art).

2.Liberator—καρπιστής. The person appointed by law to carry out the ceremony of the manumission of slaves.

1.This chapter seems to me to contain a truth expressed so baldly and crudely as to appear a falsehood. The reader’s mind will be fixed upon the truth or falsehood according as he is or is not capable of reading Epictetus with understanding.

2.This earthen lamp was sold, according to Lucian, at the death of Epictetus for 3,000 drachmæ (about £120).—Adv. Indoct.13.

1.Parodying a verse of Euripides on the stream of Dirce in Bœotia. The Marcian aqueduct brought water to Rome.

2.I adopt Upton’s conjecture for the inexplicable ἐν βοὸς κοιλίᾳ.

1.An eminent Cynic (also mentioned by Seneca and Tacitus).

1.This is the reading of one of the Christian Paraphrases. The other versions add the words πρὸς ἀλλήλους after ἐξ ὧν ὀυ διαφερόμεθα, giving the sense “from things in which we do not differ from each other.” It is no uncommon thing for all the versions of Epictetus to unite in a manifestly corrupt reading, and though in this case the received text is not an impossible one, I have thought myself justified in following the variant of the Paraphrase.

1.There is an allusion to this curious feature of the Olympic contests in the Fourth Idyll of Theocritus. Casaubon (Lect. Theocr.ad Idyll. 4) quoted by Schweighäuser, in his note on this passage (Diss.III. xv. 4), shows from Festus Pompeius that there was a statue in the Capitol of a youth bearing a spade after the manner of the Olympic combatants.

2.Euphrates, a Stoic philosopher, and contemporary of Epictetus. He was tutor of Pliny, the younger.

3.The pentathlos contended in five athletic exercises—viz., running, leaping, throwing the quoit, throwing the javelin, wrestling.

4.Much of this must refer to the period of probationor discipleship, for Epictetus is clear that the ordinary Stoic (who had not embraced the special mission of Cynicism) was not required to forsake his family, or his affairs, or his duties as a citizen, nor even justified in doing so.

1.The husk is, of course, the body. If it is maintained that Nature has made the ease of this our only proper pursuit, of course the altruistic, or social instincts have to be rejected and denied.

2.The text is here almost certainly corrupt. It runs πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσική ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργία. All the MSS. agree in ὑπονοητικοί, for which Schweighäuser desires to read προνοητικοί, and Wolf, ἔτι κοινωνικοί. Salmasius declares emphatically for πῶς οὖν ἐπινοεῖς ὅτι κοινωνικοί ἐσμεν, and this, with a slight alteration suggested to me by an eminent living scholar, is the reading I have adopted: Let us suppose that Epictetus said πῶς οὖν ὑπονοεῖς ὅτι κ.ε., and that this was written in the short lines common in Greek MSS.:—ΠΩΣΟΥΝΥΠΟΝΟΕΙΣΟΤΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΟΙThe second line, beginning with the same letter as the third, might easily be dropped by a transcriber, and the next transcriber would certainly change the resulting ὑπονωνικοί to ὑπονοητικοί. The existing reading might give the sense, “How are we, then, suspicious of those (if any there be) to whom Nature has given no affection for their offspring?”

ΠΩΣΟΥΝΥΠΟΝΟΕΙΣΟΤΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΟΙ

The second line, beginning with the same letter as the third, might easily be dropped by a transcriber, and the next transcriber would certainly change the resulting ὑπονωνικοί to ὑπονοητικοί. The existing reading might give the sense, “How are we, then, suspicious of those (if any there be) to whom Nature has given no affection for their offspring?”

3.Outward things—such as making provision for one’s family, serving the State, etc.,—actions which are not directly concerned with our spiritual good.

1.Phrygia, the birthplace of Epictetus, was one of the great centers of the wild and fearful cult of Cybele, whose priests gashed and mutilated themselves in the excitement of the orgie.

2.Philosophy is brought upon the scene, speaking first through the mouth of a Stoic, afterwards through that of an Epicurean, and the practical results of each system are exhibited.

3.The Athenians, rather than submit to Xerxes, abandoned their city to be plundered, and took to their fleet, the victory at Salamis rewarding their resolve.Those who died at Thermopylæ were the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas, who held the pass against the Persian host till all were slain. Often as their heroism has been celebrated, perhaps nothing more worthy of their valor has been written than the truly laconic epitaph composed for them by Simonides:“Stranger, the Spartans bade us die:Go, tell them, thou, that here we lie.”

3.The Athenians, rather than submit to Xerxes, abandoned their city to be plundered, and took to their fleet, the victory at Salamis rewarding their resolve.

Those who died at Thermopylæ were the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas, who held the pass against the Persian host till all were slain. Often as their heroism has been celebrated, perhaps nothing more worthy of their valor has been written than the truly laconic epitaph composed for them by Simonides:

“Stranger, the Spartans bade us die:Go, tell them, thou, that here we lie.”

1.The sense of human dignity was strong in Epictetus, and he would have it practically observed in men’s relations with each other. Compare Ch. v. 7. Zeller must have overlooked these Fragments of Epictetus when he asserted (p. 301) that no Stoic philosopher had ever condemned slavery. So far as we know, however, this is the only condemnation of that institution ever uttered by any Pagan thinker. The usual Stoic view was laid down by Chrysippus, who defined the slave very much as Carlyle does, as a “perpetuus mercenarius”—a man “hired for life, from whom work was to be required, a just return for it being accorded (operam exegendam, justa prœbenda)”. This utterance of Epictetus, as of one who knew slavery from within, and certainly was not inclined to exaggerate its discomforts, is noteworthy enough.

1.Administrator, διορθωτής; in Latin,Corrector—a State officer of whom inscriptions, etc., make frequent mention, but of whose functions not much appears to be known beyond what the present chapter of Epictetus reveals.

2.Cassiope was a port of Epirus, not far from Nicopolis, where Epictetus taught. Schw. conjectures that Maximus was sending his son to study philosophy at Nicopolis under Epictetus.

3.“For a correct view of these matters will reduce every movement of preference and avoidance to health of body and tranquillity of soul; for this is the perfection of a happy life.”—Epicurus,Diog. Laert.x. 128. Epictetus’s analysis of the Epicurean theory amounts to this, that the pleasure of the soul is the chief good, but that it is only felt through the body and its conditions.

4.The overseer of youth.—An officer in certain Greek cities. See Mahaffy’sGreek Life and Thought, ch. xvii., on the organization of theephebi.

5.Aid in works that are according to Nature.—The Greek is—ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔργοις παρακρατῆ. There is some difference of opinion among commentators as to the meaning of παρακρατῆ. Wolf translates, “hold the chief place” in natural works. Upton, Schw., and Long render it by “keep us constant,” “sustain us,” in such works. I do not see why we should not take the word in its plainest sense—that pleasure shouldact together with other forcesin leading us to do well.

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