52ND(LOWLAND) DIVISIONFirst Line
After a long service on coast defence work in Scotland, the Division, in the last half of May, 1915, sailed for the Mediterranean and arrived at Alexandria early in June. Considerable intervals separated the dates of despatch of the various battalions to the Dardanelles, but the Division had practically all landed there before the first week of July closed.
The 156th Brigade, which disembarked 13th-16th June, was in time to take part in the action of 28th June. The Brigade was attached to the 29th Division and came into action on the right of the 87th Brigade.
The main object of the attack was to give the British more elbow room, our situation being still exceedingly cramped.
Sir Ian Hamilton, in his despatch of 26th August, 1915, states that the assault was entrusted to the VIII. Corps, Lieut.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston. The 29th Division on the left had to carry the greatest extent of ground. “On the right of the 87th Brigade the 4th and 7th Royal Scots captured the further two Turkish trenches allotted to them, but further to the east, near the pivotal point, the remainder of the 156th Brigade was unable to get on.” The ground gained was held against “repeatedcounter-attacks, which for many days and nights afterwards the enemy launched against the trenches they had lost.”
The enemy trenches opposite the right front of the attack, near the pivotal point, had not been seriously bombarded by the artillery owing to shortage of shells. At that time a preliminary bombardment was a mere pretence when contrasted with what it became in 1917 or 1918, while the creeping barrage had not yet been devised. The 8th Battalion Scottish Rifles, the right battalion of the 156th Brigade, supported by the 7th Battalion, found themselves, as soon as they were “over the top,” subjected to a murderous enfilade machine-gun fire from the right flank. Only a few unwounded men reached the opposing trenches, which were 175 yards distant. The 8th Battalion went in about 650 strong, they came out with one officer and 29 other ranks. One man who had reached the enemy position was captured. The ordeal of the battalion, in this its first action, seems to have been as severe as any experienced by an infantry battalion during the war.
The Turkish position at this point, H. 12, was attacked by another brigade soon afterwards. It remained intact, although the attackers suffered a loss of 1700.
In Sir Ian Hamilton’s despatch of 11th December, 1915, he described the battle at Helles on 12th-13th July, and the Suvla Bay fighting in August. The action of 12th-13th July was supplementary to that of 28th June, the object being to push back the Turkish centre.
“On our right the attack was to be entrusted to the French Corps; on the right centre to the 52nd (Lowland) Division. On the 52nd Division’s front the operation was planned to take place in two phases; our right was to attack in the morning, our left in the afternoon.” The 29th Division was to make a diversion on the left. “At 7.35 a.m. after a heavy bombardment, the troops, French and Scottish, dashed out of their trenches, and at once captured two lines of enemy trenches.” The 1st Division of the French Corps pushed forward and carried the whole forward system. “Further to the left the 2nd French Division and our 155th Brigade maintained the two lines of trenches they had gained. But on the left of the 155th Brigade the 4th Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers pressed on too eagerly. They not only carried the third line of trenches, but charged on up the hill and beyond the third line, then advanced indeed until they came under the ‘feu-de-barrage’ of the French Artillery. Nothing could live under so cruel a cross fire from friend and foe, so the King’s Own Scottish Borderers were forced to fall back with heavy losses to the second line of enemy trenches which they had captured in the first rush.”
The second phase of the attack was launched as planned. “The 157th Brigade rushed forward under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and splendidly carried the whole of the enemy trenches allotted as their objective. Here then our line had advanced some 400 yards, while the 155th Brigade and the 2nd French Division had advanced between 200 and 300 yards. At six p.m. the 52nd Divisionwas ordered to make the line good. It seemed to be fairly within our grasp.”
“All night long determined counter-attacks, one after another, were repulsed by the French and the 155th Brigade, but about 7.30 a.m. the right of the 157th Brigade gave way before a party of bombers and our grip upon the enemy began to weaken.” Another attack at 3 p.m. on the 13th, in which the Royal Naval Division and French took part, met with success, and on the whole the line was greatly improved by the operations of the two days. “A solid and enduring advance had been achieved.”[5]
Sir Ian Hamilton said: “The 1/5th Royal Scots Fusiliers commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Pollok McCall; the 1/7th Royal Scots, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Peebles; the 1/5th King’s Own Scottish Borderers, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Millar; and the 1/6th Highland Light Infantry, commanded by Major J. Anderson, are mentioned as having specially distinguished themselves in this engagement.”
In his despatch of 6th March, 1916, which deals with the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, Sir C. C. Monro remarked: “Meanwhile the VIII. Corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they hadestablished the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On the 29th December, the 52nd Division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counter-attacks.”
The commander of the Division, Major-General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence, “was selected to take charge of all embarkation operations.” The evacuation from Helles took place on the night of 8th January, 1916.
The 52nd Division was taken to Egypt. They crossed to the east side of the Suez Canal about the beginning of March, 1916, and they were to spend the ensuing twelve months in the desert of Sinai, their energies being consumed in assisting with railway construction and making and manning defensive posts.
In Sir A. Murray’s despatch, dated 1st June, 1916, as to operations of the Egyptian force, between 10th January and 31st May, 1916, paragraph 8, after describing the attack on the Yeomanry at Oghratina and Qatia in the Sinai Peninsula on 23rd April, he says: “Meanwhile, at 5.30 a.m. a Turkish force, 1000 strong, with one gun, advancing from the south, attacked Dueidar, the most advanced defensible post, which was held by 100 men of the 5th Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, under the command of Captain Roberts, 5th Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers. This officer, who throughout showed conspicuous skill and ability, succeeded in repelling two determined attacks on the position at 6.30 a.m. and 8.30 a.m. respectively.Both attempts cost the enemy dear. At 9.30 a.m. reinforcements of two companies, 4th Royal Scots Fusiliers, under the command of Major Thompson, of that battalion, who had been despatched from Hill 70, seven miles away, on the first news of the attack, arrived at Dueidar. The various posts were strengthened and a counter-attack, delivered at 12.30 p.m. with great spirit, forced the enemy to retire, leaving 30 prisoners in our hands and 70 dead.”
In his despatch of 1st October, 1916, Sir A. Murray dealt with operations in the desert east of the canal, in particular with the fighting on 3rd, 4th and 5th August, 1916, an attack by the Turks, the British counter-attack, etc. Paragraph 5: During the 4th, the enemy made several attacks against the Romani-Mahemdia defences, from the east, south and south-west. “These were repulsed by the garrisons, composed of Scottish and Welsh infantry, with considerable loss, and in spite of heavy artillery fire from the enemy’s heavy howitzers, which in one or two cases inflicted severe casualties on our troops, who behaved with admirable steadiness.” “Vigorous action, to the utmost limits of endurance, was ordered for the next day, and the troops, in spite of the heat, responded nobly. At daybreak the Scottish Territorial infantry, assisted by Australian and New Zealand mounted troops, took the remainder of Wellington Ridge by assault, capturing about 1500 prisoners.”
Paragraph 6: “The Scottish troops, commanded by Major-General W. E. B. Smith, C.M.G., not only showed great steadiness under heavy artilleryfire, but were responsible for the assault which recaptured Wellington Ridge, on 4th August, and for clearing Abu Hamra on the 5th.”
The troops mainly responsible for the recapture of the ridge were the 7th and 8th Scottish Rifles. These moved out from Romani, about two miles from the Ridge, at dusk on the 4th. The 7th, on the left, linked up with a work, 22a, garrisoned by the 5th Royal Scots Fusiliers. The 8th under Colonel Findlay pressed up the hill, and when the leading lines were about 50 yards from the crest they were fired on; they then dug in. The 7th moved forward until in line with the 8th. At dawn mounted troops came up on the right and about the same time a company of the 5th Royal Scots Fusiliers arrived. An assault had been ordered when the Turks surrendered. The 8th Scottish Rifles took 360 prisoners and the mounted troops prevented the remainder from escaping.
The fighting 4th-5th August is now designated the “Battle of Rumani.”
The Division was in reserve in the first Battle of Gaza on 26th March, 1917 (see 53rd Division), but had stiff fighting in the second attempt made by Sir A. Murray’s force to capture Gaza on 17th-19th April, 1917.
The despatch of 28th June, 1917, paragraph 9, shows that on 17th April the 52nd Division was in the centre, the 53rd on the left and the 54th on the right. The Abbas-Mansura ridge was seized by the 157th Brigade of the 52nd Division, with little opposition, and preparation was made for a further advance on the 19th. The arrangement ofthe divisions was as on the 17th. The 52nd in the centre unfortunately found its task too heavy.
“The left brigade of the 52nd Division” (the only one, as stated in paragraph 10, which could with advantage be employed owing to the configuration of the ground) “made good Lees Hill, the nearest point to our line of the enemy defences on the Ali Muntar ridge by 8.15 a.m., but on advancing beyond the Lees Hill this brigade came under very heavy machine-gun fire from Outpost Hill, which checked its progress.” At 10 a.m. a lunette on Outpost Hill was captured.
Later “the left brigade, 52nd Division, was shelled out of its position on Outpost Hill, but the position was most gallantly retaken on his own initiative by Major W. T. Forrest, M.C., K.O.S.B., subsequently killed, who collected a few men for the purpose. All further attempts to launch an attack from Outpost Hill were shattered by fire at their inception.”
Paragraph 10: In the afternoon the position was that the 52nd could not advance. A large area of extremely broken ground had been made exceedingly strong by the enemy, and the nests of machine guns could not be located and destroyed. The attack was eventually abandoned, the British losses being about 7000 men, but all ground gained was consolidated and kept. The “left brigade” was the 155th, the 156th was on the right and the 157th in reserve. The capture of the objectives involved an advance of two miles, with little cover, and only moderate artillery support.
At paragraph 15 Sir A. Murray recorded hisappreciation of what his troops had done. “Particular commendation is due to the infantry—52nd, 53rd and 54th Divisions.” “Under severe trial they have now given ample proof of the finest soldierly qualities.”
Sir E. Allenby took over the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force on 28th June, 1917. In his despatch of 16th December, 1917, he recounts the progress of the operations which culminated in the surrender of Jerusalem. The Army had received increases of strength and this enabled the commander to deal with a wider front and to avoid a direct attack on Gaza. Beersheba at the other end of the line was taken on 31st October. The Lowland Division was second from the left of the British line, opposite Gaza.
The despatch, paragraph 9, states: “As Umbrella Hill flanked the advance against the Turkish works further west, it was decided to capture it by a preliminary operation, to take place four hours previous to the main attack. It was accordingly attacked and captured at 11 p.m. on November 1st, by a portion of the 52nd (Lowland) Division. This attack drew a heavy bombardment of Umbrella Hill itself and our front lines, which lasted for two hours, but ceased in time to allow the main attack, which was timed for 3 a.m., to form up without interference.”
The 7th Scottish Rifles had the principal rôle in the capture of Umbrella Hill.
In the main attack almost all objectives were reached. Between the 1st and the 6th progress was made east of Gaza and on the 7th it was found thatthe fortress had been evacuated. The fighting 27th October-7th November is now the “Third Battle of Gaza.”
The British at once pursued, the 52nd Division following the coast. In paragraph 15, Sir E. Allenby speaks “of the rapidity of our movement along the coast and the determination with which his rearguards on this flank had been pressed.”
“The advanced guard of the 52nd (Lowland) Division had forced its way almost to Burkah on the 11th.”
After describing the position taken up by the Turks the despatch states that an attack for the 13th November was arranged. “This Katrah-El-Mughar line forms a very strong position, and it was here that the enemy made his most determined resistance against the turning movement directed against his right flank. The capture of this position by the 52nd (Lowland) Division, assisted by a most dashing charge of mounted troops, who galloped across the plain under heavy fire and turned the enemy’s position from the north, was a fine feat of arms. Some 1100 prisoners, 3 guns and many machine guns were taken here. After this the enemy resistance weakened, and by the evening his forces were retiring east and north.”
“In fifteen days our force had advanced sixty miles on its right, and about forty on its left. It had driven a Turkish army of nine infantry divisions and one cavalry division out of a position in which it had been entrenched for six months, and had pursued it, giving battle whenever it attempted to stand, and inflicting on it losses amounting probablyto nearly two-thirds of the enemy’s original effectives. Over 9000 prisoners, about 80 guns, more than 100 machine guns, and very large quantities of ammunition and other stores had been captured.”
It is pardonable to point out here that the infantry of Sir E. Allenby’s army was up till April 1918 composed, to the extent of four-fifths, of Territorial Divisions.
Jaffa was occupied on 16th November, 1917.
The despatch, paragraph 17, states that the “52nd Division in nine days covered 69 miles.” Much of this was over heavy sand or very poor tracks.
Paragraph 20 refers to various attacks by the Turks: there was “particularly heavy fighting” towards the close of November near El Burj, “but Yeomanry and Scottish troops successfully resisted all attacks and inflicted severe losses on the enemy.” A large number of prisoners were taken. Officially the fighting, 17th-24th November, is now the “Battle of Nebi Samwil.”
Jerusalem was surrendered to troops of the 53rd and 60th Divisions on 9th December. See also 53rd, 54th and 60th Divisions.
In his despatch of 18th September, 1918, Sir E. Allenby stated that his next operations were designed to increase the security of Jaffa and Jerusalem. To the XXI. Corps, 52nd and 54th Divisions, was assigned the task of increasing the distance, between Jaffa and the enemy, from three miles to eight miles.
Paragraph 3: “The weather was unfavourable. Heavy rains made the roads deep in mud and brought down the streams.”
Paragraph 4: “The chief obstacle lay in thecrossing of the Nahr El Auja. This river is only fordable in places and all approaches to it are overlooked from Sheikh Muannis and Khurbet Hadrah. At these places two spurs running from north to south terminate abruptly in steep slopes some 500 yards from the river.” These two places “and the high ground overlooking the river had to be captured, as a preliminary to the general advance, in order that bridges might be built.
“The chief difficulty lay in concealing the collection and preparation of rafts and bridging material. All preparations were completed, however, without attracting the enemy’s attention, and on the night of December 20th-21st, the 52nd Division crossed the river in three columns. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. The left column, fording the river near its mouth, at this point four feet deep, captured Tell Er Rekkeit, 4000 yards north of the river’s mouth; the centre and right columns crossing on rafts, rushed Sheikh Muannis and Khurbet Hadrah at the point of the bayonet. By dawn a line from Khurbet Hadrah to Tell Er Rekkeit had been consolidated, and the enemy deprived of all observation from the north over the valley of the Nahr El Auja.
“The successful crossing of the Nahr El Auja reflects great credit on the 52nd (Lowland) Division. It involved considerable preparation, the details of which were thought out with care and precision. The sodden state of the ground and, on the night of the crossing, the swollen state of the river added to the difficulties, yet by dawn the whole of the infantry had crossed. The fact thatthe enemy were taken by surprise, and that all resistance was overcome with the bayonet without a shot being fired, bears testimony to the discipline of this Division. Eleven officers, including two battalion commanders, and 305 other ranks, and ten machine guns were captured in this operation.”
Despite “considerable hostile shell fire” bridges were completed, and by dusk on the 21st the whole of the Divisional artillery had crossed. On the 22nd, the 54th captured certain villages, and the 52nd not only reached all their objectives but consolidated a line two miles beyond “to deny direct observation on Jaffa harbour to the enemy.”
For their particularly fine work the 52nd received the congratulations of the Army, Corps and Divisional commanders. All three brigades shared in the work and the distinction it brought. The 155th took Khurbet Hadrah, the 156th Sheikh Muannis, and the 157th, the brigade which forded the river, captured Tell Er Rekkeit.
The fighting 21st-22nd December is now designated the “Battle of Jaffa.”
At the close of the despatch, paragraph 15, Sir Edmund Allenby remarked that the 52nd Division embarked for France in the first week of April 1918. On 7th-8th May the Division took over a portion of the line east of Arras. They were now in the VIII. Corps under Commander Sir A. Hunter Weston, with whom they first fought at the Dardanelles. In the middle of August they moved further south to take a part in the big effort to be made there.
A quotation from Sir Douglas Haig’s telegraphicdespatch of 13th September, 1918, as to good work by various divisions, which contains a reference to the 52nd attacking along with the 56th on 23rd August, is given under the 56th, London, Division.
In the despatch of 21st December, 1918, paragraph 22, Sir Douglas Haig mentioned that the 52nd was employed with the VI. Corps, Third Army, in the main attack on 23rd-24th August, a phase of the “Battle of Albert, 1918,” in the sector north of Albert. “On the left of the 56th, the 52nd Division (Major-General J. Hill) took Hénin-sur-Cojeul and gained a footing in St.-Martin-sur-Cojeul.”
Heavy fighting on 24th August and following days brought the 52nd into the Hindenburg line. On the 26th they made good progress on the north of the Cojeul and took Hénin Hill, getting well into the Hindenburg line, and moving down it on the 27th, they gave assistance to the 56th on their right.
The fighting in this area 26th-30th August is now officially designated the “Battle of the Scarpe, 1918.”
After three days’ rest the 52nd relieved the 56th and, on 1st September, cleared the famous Bullecourt, round which there had been a great struggle; as there was in April 1917. This was a necessary preliminary to a big attack fixed for the 2nd September.
Paragraph 28 of the despatch deals with “The storming of the Drocourt-Quéant line” on 2nd September. “The maze of trenches at the junction of that line and the Hindenburg system was stormed and the enemy was thrown into precipitate retreaton the whole front to the south of it. This gallant feat of arms was carried out by the Canadian Corps of the First Army,” with “the 4th English Division, and the XVII. Corps of the Third Army, employing the 52nd, 57th and 63rd Divisions.”
After referring to the fine work of the Canadian Corps, Sir Douglas Haig said: “On the right the attack of the XVII. Corps, launched, at the same hour by the 52nd and 57th Divisions, directed its main force on the triangle of fortifications, marking the junction of the Hindenburg and Drocourt-Quéant lines, north-west of the village of Quéant. Pressed with equal vigour it met with success equally complete. There was stern fighting in the net-work of trenches, both north and south of Quéant, in which neighbourhood the 52nd (Lowland) Division performed distinguished service, and, by the progress they made, greatly assisted our advance further north. Early in the afternoon our troops had cleared the triangle and the 63rd Division had passed through to exploit the success thus gained.”
The fighting on 2nd-3rd September is now the “Battle of the Drocourt-Quéant line.”
In a telegraphic despatch of 20th September Sir Douglas Haig said: “On the 17th a corporal and six men of the 1/5th Highland Light Infantry, 52nd Division, forming garrison of one of our posts just north of the village, were surrounded and believed to have been captured. During two days Germans held the village this party maintained their position and inflicted many casualties on the enemy. On the night of 19th-20th, when Mœuvreswas retaken, the whole party regained their unit without loss.”
The very gallant N.C.O. was awarded the Victoria Cross. The village was retaken by the 52nd Division.
The XVII. Corps was again employed on 27th September, “the Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg line.” Paragraph 35 of the despatch states: “In the centre the 52nd Division, Major-General F. J. Marshall, passing its troops across the canal by bridgeheads previously established by the 57th Division,[6]on the opening of the assault, carried the German trench lines east of the canal and gained the high ground overlooking Graincourt.”
The advance was continued successfully by the XVII. Corps between 27th September and 1st October, the 52nd doing particularly well, not only at the crossing of the Canal du Nord but in the capture of the heavily wired defences on either side of it.
The designation of the fighting 27th September-1st October, has been altered by the Nomenclature Committee and is now the “Battle of the Canal du Nord.” They have fixed the dates of the “Battle of Cambrai, 1918,” to be 8th and 9th October.
Early in October the Division left the XVII. Corps and later that month took over from the 12th Division in the VIII. Corps, Fifth Army.
With short intervals of rest the Division continued in the line of the advance until Armistice Day. Theycrossed the Belgian frontier south of Péruvelz, and moving eastward by Sirault, were about ten miles north of Mons on 11th November. During these last few weeks there was frequently stubborn opposition which involved sharp fighting.
The 5th King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 8th Scottish Rifles, and 5th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of the 52nd served during the last five months in the 34th Division (Major-General Nicholson), which after suffering heavy losses in the German offensive of March and April was reconstituted largely with battalions from the Palestine Divisions. It served with the French Tenth Army, south of Soissons in July 1918, and was highly complimented by General Mangin, the Army Commander. The battalions from the 52nd seem to have done exceptionally well both south of Soissons and at the capture of Gheluwe in Belgium, 14th October, and Anseghem, 31st October, when the 34th was advancing as part of the X. Corps, Second Army. The 34th Division reached Halluin.
The 5th and 6th battalions, Scottish Rifles, and 9th Highland Light Infantry lost their places in the Division through going to France early in the war. Indeed the 5th Scottish Rifles was one of the first Territorial battalions to be employed in that theatre, the 5th and 6th were eventually amalgamated. The fine work of all three battalions when in the 33rd Division was very frequently praised by unofficial historians.
These three units were replaced by the 4th and 7th Battalions, The Royal Scots, and the 5th Argylland Sutherland Highlanders, all from “Army Troops.”
The following units were selected for the Armies of Occupation on the Western Front: the 5/6th Royal Scots, which served as separate battalions in the Near East, the 5th Battalion landing at Helles with the 29th Division, and, after amalgamation, in France with the 32nd Division; the 1/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers; the 1/5th King’s Own Scottish Borderers; the 5/6th Scottish Rifles; the 1/8th Scottish Rifles; and the 1/9th Highland Light Infantry.
The 32nd Division formed part of the Fourth Army throughout the “Advance to Victory.” In Major-General Montgomery’sStory of the Fourth Armythere are several flattering references to the work of the 5/6th Royal Scots, as at p. 178, 3rd October, where he refers to their capture of Sequehart and its retention after the third time of capture—“partly also to the stubborn manner in which the 5/6th Royal Scots clung to the village it had three times captured.”
FOOTNOTES:[5]InThe Fifth Highland Light Infantry, 1914-18 (MacLehose and Co., 1921, p. 29), there is a statement that Sir Ian Hamilton had been misinformed as to the right of the 157th Brigade giving way before a party of bombers. It is admitted that a portion of trench had been vacated through an order having been misunderstood, but it is stated that another company at once occupied it and was holding it when the afternoon attack commenced. There may have been other incidents of which the “Fifth” were unaware.[6]At page 281 of Messrs. Dent’s edition ofSir Douglas Haig’s Despatchesthe following note occurs at this point: “This is incorrect. There were no bridgeheads at this time and the crossings were forced by the 52nd Division at the opening of their attack.”
[5]InThe Fifth Highland Light Infantry, 1914-18 (MacLehose and Co., 1921, p. 29), there is a statement that Sir Ian Hamilton had been misinformed as to the right of the 157th Brigade giving way before a party of bombers. It is admitted that a portion of trench had been vacated through an order having been misunderstood, but it is stated that another company at once occupied it and was holding it when the afternoon attack commenced. There may have been other incidents of which the “Fifth” were unaware.
[5]InThe Fifth Highland Light Infantry, 1914-18 (MacLehose and Co., 1921, p. 29), there is a statement that Sir Ian Hamilton had been misinformed as to the right of the 157th Brigade giving way before a party of bombers. It is admitted that a portion of trench had been vacated through an order having been misunderstood, but it is stated that another company at once occupied it and was holding it when the afternoon attack commenced. There may have been other incidents of which the “Fifth” were unaware.
[6]At page 281 of Messrs. Dent’s edition ofSir Douglas Haig’s Despatchesthe following note occurs at this point: “This is incorrect. There were no bridgeheads at this time and the crossings were forced by the 52nd Division at the opening of their attack.”
[6]At page 281 of Messrs. Dent’s edition ofSir Douglas Haig’s Despatchesthe following note occurs at this point: “This is incorrect. There were no bridgeheads at this time and the crossings were forced by the 52nd Division at the opening of their attack.”