"I offer nothing purely theoretical or speculative, and as few opinions and conclusions as can possibly be given in a historical narrative. The work finally reaches aperiod when the Present and the Future become its subject, and when therefore it can no longer relate any events of history which have been completed; and is confined to the simple statement ofthe Factthat opposite opinions exist, and may yet be advanced, concerning the problem of the Future. These opinions are themselves weighed against one another, but their value is not determined by dogmas, or phrases, or declamations, but simply by facts. If the balance incline towards a more liberal form of government, towards democratic institutions, and therefore towards self-government, and the participation of the many rather than of the few in the affairs of the State, I am not to blame, nor is it my ordinance, but that of History and of Providence. My work is only (what all historical narrative should be) a vindication of the decrees of Providence; and to revolt against them appears to me neither pious in a moral point of view, nor wise in a political. That which is proved by the most remarkable facts of History, will not be altered in the smallest degree by the suppression of my work, or by my condemnation. The charge on this head is an absurdity, since no rational end can be attained by it. It aims at the suppression of a truth which, shouldInot tell it, will be ever louder and louder proclaimed by theFacts of History."To believe such a thing possible is a proof how limited an idea exists of the eager inquiry going on after knowledge—and truth, the source and origin of all knowledge. There will always be so eager a demand for a history of the Present time, that, even shouldIbe prevented, ten others would arise, only to proclaim the louder, and to repeat the oftener, the truth which is here suppressed. To believe that the philosophy of History can be silenced by persecution, argues an entire ignorance even of the external mechanism of philosophy. A political pamphlet, intended to serve a particular purpose at a particular period, may be suppressed. The author of such a pamphlet, bent on agitation, can easily console himself for its suppression. It has cost him little time and trouble; it is only a means to an end, one means out of many means, any of which, when this is lost, will serve the author as well. But it is not thus with philosophical works, it is not thus with the work before me. This book is deeply rooted in the vocation of my whole life, and is the end of my philosophical research; I have prepared myself for it by the labor of years, and the labor of years will be necessary for its completion. I have reached a time of life when I can neither change my vocation, nor even cease to labor in this vocation. I am also so imbued with my philosophy, that even if I could change I would not. I may be hindered in the prosecution of this work for four months, but in the fifth I shall return to it. For a judicial sentence cannot arrest (like a mere pamphlet) the philosophical scheme interwoven into a whole existence.""If it is possible that this 'Introduction' can be condemned in Germany, that it can be prohibited, that by these means the work should be strangled in its birth, then the philosophy of history has no longer a place in Germany. The tribunal of Baden will have given the first blow, in pronouncing judgment on a matter which is purely philosophical, and Germany, whose freedom of philosophical research has been her pride and her boast, of which even the various administrations of the nation have never been jealous, will receive a shock such as she never before sustained.""My book is on so strictly a philosophical plan, and treats of such comprehensive historical questions, that, properly, no judgment of any value could be pronounced upon it but by the professed historian, of whom there are not two dozen in all Germany. Among them there has not, to this hour, been found one competent to give an opinion in a few weeks on a book which is the fruit of half a life. On the other hand, there was soon a whole set of fanatical partisans and obstreperous bunglers in a neighboring press, who in eight days had condemned this work, in some instances, by calling it an historical commonplace, and in others, a political pamphlet with 'destructive tendencies.' At the same time, and in a manner easily accounted for, under the influenceof such an expression of public opinion, and almost before any other could make itself heard, accusations were made against the book, and it was confiscated. Let no one take it amiss if, in the urgency of my defence,Ifor a moment lay aside modesty, as far as such modesty might prove injurious to my cause. My work demonstrates a law of historical development, which I do not claim as my property, or as originating in me, but which has been demonstrated more than two thousand years ago by the greatest thinker of all ages, derived from observations on the history of the Grecian State. To repeat a law which has been already demonstrated, ought to appear but a trifling circumstance, and indeed might merit the term of an historical commonplace; we could even suppose that it might be mentioned in a popular as well as in a philosophical book. Nevertheless this law has scarcely been twice repeated in the course of two thousand years, and then only by two imitators, who scarcely understood its whole purport, though they were the most thinking heads of the most thinking nations—Machiavelli in Italy, and Hegel in Germany. I solemnly ask of the whole philosophical world if my words can be gainsaid, and to name for me the third, by whom the Aristotelian law, of which I speak, has been repeated and understood. I have ventured to consider the thought of Aristotle, and to apply it to the history of modern European States, and I found it confirmed by a series of developments which have occupied two thousand years. I also found that the whole series of events confirmatory of this law (itself deduced from experience) are not yet entirely fulfilled. Like the astronomer, who, from a known fraction of the path of a newly discovered planet, calculates its whole course, I ventured to divine that which is still wanting, and which may yet take centuries to complete. I turned silently to those whose profession was the study of history, to prove the justice of my calculations; I handed my book over to coming generations and coming centuries, with the silent demand, when the required series of events shall be fulfilled, then to pronounce the final sentence, whether this law, and its purport as now explained, be just or not. This is the philosophical character, and these the contents of my book—no more than was indispensably necessary to make this calculation. And now comes the charge, and pronounces that in the character of a pamphleteer, I have endeavored to excite a revolution in the Grand Duchy of Baden, or in the German Confederation."
"I offer nothing purely theoretical or speculative, and as few opinions and conclusions as can possibly be given in a historical narrative. The work finally reaches aperiod when the Present and the Future become its subject, and when therefore it can no longer relate any events of history which have been completed; and is confined to the simple statement ofthe Factthat opposite opinions exist, and may yet be advanced, concerning the problem of the Future. These opinions are themselves weighed against one another, but their value is not determined by dogmas, or phrases, or declamations, but simply by facts. If the balance incline towards a more liberal form of government, towards democratic institutions, and therefore towards self-government, and the participation of the many rather than of the few in the affairs of the State, I am not to blame, nor is it my ordinance, but that of History and of Providence. My work is only (what all historical narrative should be) a vindication of the decrees of Providence; and to revolt against them appears to me neither pious in a moral point of view, nor wise in a political. That which is proved by the most remarkable facts of History, will not be altered in the smallest degree by the suppression of my work, or by my condemnation. The charge on this head is an absurdity, since no rational end can be attained by it. It aims at the suppression of a truth which, shouldInot tell it, will be ever louder and louder proclaimed by theFacts of History.
"To believe such a thing possible is a proof how limited an idea exists of the eager inquiry going on after knowledge—and truth, the source and origin of all knowledge. There will always be so eager a demand for a history of the Present time, that, even shouldIbe prevented, ten others would arise, only to proclaim the louder, and to repeat the oftener, the truth which is here suppressed. To believe that the philosophy of History can be silenced by persecution, argues an entire ignorance even of the external mechanism of philosophy. A political pamphlet, intended to serve a particular purpose at a particular period, may be suppressed. The author of such a pamphlet, bent on agitation, can easily console himself for its suppression. It has cost him little time and trouble; it is only a means to an end, one means out of many means, any of which, when this is lost, will serve the author as well. But it is not thus with philosophical works, it is not thus with the work before me. This book is deeply rooted in the vocation of my whole life, and is the end of my philosophical research; I have prepared myself for it by the labor of years, and the labor of years will be necessary for its completion. I have reached a time of life when I can neither change my vocation, nor even cease to labor in this vocation. I am also so imbued with my philosophy, that even if I could change I would not. I may be hindered in the prosecution of this work for four months, but in the fifth I shall return to it. For a judicial sentence cannot arrest (like a mere pamphlet) the philosophical scheme interwoven into a whole existence."
"If it is possible that this 'Introduction' can be condemned in Germany, that it can be prohibited, that by these means the work should be strangled in its birth, then the philosophy of history has no longer a place in Germany. The tribunal of Baden will have given the first blow, in pronouncing judgment on a matter which is purely philosophical, and Germany, whose freedom of philosophical research has been her pride and her boast, of which even the various administrations of the nation have never been jealous, will receive a shock such as she never before sustained."
"My book is on so strictly a philosophical plan, and treats of such comprehensive historical questions, that, properly, no judgment of any value could be pronounced upon it but by the professed historian, of whom there are not two dozen in all Germany. Among them there has not, to this hour, been found one competent to give an opinion in a few weeks on a book which is the fruit of half a life. On the other hand, there was soon a whole set of fanatical partisans and obstreperous bunglers in a neighboring press, who in eight days had condemned this work, in some instances, by calling it an historical commonplace, and in others, a political pamphlet with 'destructive tendencies.' At the same time, and in a manner easily accounted for, under the influenceof such an expression of public opinion, and almost before any other could make itself heard, accusations were made against the book, and it was confiscated. Let no one take it amiss if, in the urgency of my defence,Ifor a moment lay aside modesty, as far as such modesty might prove injurious to my cause. My work demonstrates a law of historical development, which I do not claim as my property, or as originating in me, but which has been demonstrated more than two thousand years ago by the greatest thinker of all ages, derived from observations on the history of the Grecian State. To repeat a law which has been already demonstrated, ought to appear but a trifling circumstance, and indeed might merit the term of an historical commonplace; we could even suppose that it might be mentioned in a popular as well as in a philosophical book. Nevertheless this law has scarcely been twice repeated in the course of two thousand years, and then only by two imitators, who scarcely understood its whole purport, though they were the most thinking heads of the most thinking nations—Machiavelli in Italy, and Hegel in Germany. I solemnly ask of the whole philosophical world if my words can be gainsaid, and to name for me the third, by whom the Aristotelian law, of which I speak, has been repeated and understood. I have ventured to consider the thought of Aristotle, and to apply it to the history of modern European States, and I found it confirmed by a series of developments which have occupied two thousand years. I also found that the whole series of events confirmatory of this law (itself deduced from experience) are not yet entirely fulfilled. Like the astronomer, who, from a known fraction of the path of a newly discovered planet, calculates its whole course, I ventured to divine that which is still wanting, and which may yet take centuries to complete. I turned silently to those whose profession was the study of history, to prove the justice of my calculations; I handed my book over to coming generations and coming centuries, with the silent demand, when the required series of events shall be fulfilled, then to pronounce the final sentence, whether this law, and its purport as now explained, be just or not. This is the philosophical character, and these the contents of my book—no more than was indispensably necessary to make this calculation. And now comes the charge, and pronounces that in the character of a pamphleteer, I have endeavored to excite a revolution in the Grand Duchy of Baden, or in the German Confederation."
On the 8th of March—it should have been thefifth—the thing came to a close. On account of "his hostility to constitutional monarchy, and his declaration of its weakness, his denial of its good-will [towards the people], and his representing that the American Democracy was a universal necessity and a desirable fact," sentence was pronounced against him, condemning him to an imprisonment of four months, and ordering his book to be destroyed. There was no Jury of the People to try him! Here our own Court has an admirable precedent for punishing me for a word.[164]
But even in Massachusetts, within twenty years, an attempt was made to punish a man for his opinions on a matter of history which had no connection with politics, or even with American Slavery. In July, 1834, Rev. George R. Noyes, a Unitarian Minister at Petersham, a retired scholar, a blameless man of fine abilities and verylarge attainments in theological learning, wrote an elaborate article in the Christian Examiner, the organ of the "Liberal Christians" in America, in which he maintained that Jesus of Nazareth is not the Messiah predicted in the Old Testament. "It is difficult," said this accomplished Theologian, "to point out any predictions which have been properly fulfilled in Jesus." Peter and Paul found the death and resurrection of Jesus in the 16th Psalm, but they "were in an error," which should not surprise us, for "the Evangelists and Apostles never claimed to beinspired reasoners and interpreters;" "they partook of the errors and prejudices of their age in things in which Christ had not instructed them." "The commonly received doctrine of the inspiration of all the writings included in the Bible, is a millstone hung round its neck [the neck of Christianity], sufficient to sink it."
The article was written with remarkable candor and moderation, and indicated a devout and holy purpose in the author. The doctrines were by no means new. But Hon. James T. Austin, was then Attorney-General of the State; his attention being called to it by an anonymous writer in a newspaper, he attacked Mr. Noyes's article, thus giving vent to his opinion thereon: "He considers its learning very ill bestowed, its researches worse than useless, and that its tendency is to strike down one of the pillars on which the fabric of Christianity is supported." "Its tendency is to shock the pious,—confound the unlearned,—overwhelm those who are but moderately versed in the recondite investigations of theology, and above all to open an arsenal whence all the small wits of the infidel army may supply themselves with arms. Its greater evil is to disarm the power of public opinion." "It certainly disarms to a great degree the power of the law."[165]
Gentlemen, suppose it had not been necessary to submit the matter to a Jury, what would the right of freedom of conscience be worth in the hands of such a man, "dressed in a little brief authority?" It was said at the time that the author was actually presented to the Grand-Jury, and an attempt made to procure an indictment for Blasphemy, or Misdemeanor. I know not how true the rumor was. The threat of prosecution came to nought, and Dr. Noyes, one of the most scholarly men in America, is now Professor of Theology in the Divinity School at Cambridge, and an honor to the liberal sect which maintains him there.
Gentlemen, when laws are unjustly severe, denouncing a punishment highly excessive, the juries refuse to convict. Examples of thisare very common in trials for capital offences, now that the conscience of moral men has become so justly hostile to the judicial shedding of blood. There is no doubt with the Jurors as to the Fact, none as to the Law; but they say it is unjust to apply such a law to such a fact and hang a man. The Jury exercising their moral discretion, spite of the judge, and spite of the special statute or custom, are yet faithful to their official obligation and manly duty, and serve Justice, the ultimate End and Purpose of Law, whereto the statutes and customs are only provisional means. Foolish judges accuse such juries of "Perjury;" but it is clear enough, Gentlemen, where the falseness is.
"Do you take notice of that juryman dressed in blue?" said one of the judges at the old Bailey to Judge Nares. "Yes." "Well, then, take my word for it, there will not be a single conviction to-day for any capital offence." So it turned out. The "gentleman in blue" thought it unjust and wicked, contrary to the ultimate Purpose of law, to hang men, and he was faithful to his juror's oath in refusing to convict. Of course he did not doubt of the Fact, or the Law, only of the Justice of its Application. One day there will be a good many "gentlemen in blue."
To prevent this moral independence of the jury from defeating the immoral aim of the government, or of the judges, or the legislature—the court questions the jurors beforehand, and drives off from the panel all who think the statute unfit for such application. Gentlemen, that is a piece of wicked tyranny. It would be as unfair to exclude such men from the legislature, or from the polls, as from the jury box. In such cases the defendant is not tried by his "country," but by a jury packed for the purpose of convicting him, spite of the moral feelings of the people.
Sometimes the statute is so framed that the jurors must by their verdict tell an apparent falsehood, or commit a great injustice. When it was a capital offence in England to steal forty shillings, and evidence made it plain that the accused had actually stolen eight or ten times that value, you all know how often the jurors brought in a verdict of "stealing thirty-nine shillings."[166]They preferred to tell what seemed to be a lie, rather than kill a man for stealing fifteen or twenty dollars. The verdict ofnot guiltywould have been perfectly just in form as in substance, and conformable to their official oath.
Gentlemen, tyrannical rulers, and their servants, despotic and corrupt judges, have sought to frighten the juries from the exercise of all discretion—either moral or intellectual. To that end they threatenthem before the verdict, and punish them when they decide contrary to the wish of the tyrant. To make the jurors agree in a unanimous verdict, they were kept without "fire or water or food or bed" until they came to a conclusion; if eleven were of one mind and the twelfth not convinced, the refractory juror was fined or put in jail.[167]If the verdict, when unanimously given, did not satisfy the judge or his master, the jurors were often punished.[168]I have already shown you how the juries were treated—with fine and imprisonment—who acquitted Throckmorton and Penn.[169]When John Lilburne was tried for his life in 1653, he censured the authorities which prosecuted him and appealed to the "honorable Jury, the Keepers of the Liberties of England:" they found him Not Guilty, and were themselves brought before the council of State for punishment. "Thomas Greene of Snow-hill, tallow chandler, Foreman of the Jury, being asked what the grounds and reasons were that moved him to find ... Lilburne not guilty, ... saith 'that he did discharge his conscience in what he then did, and that he will give no further answer to any questions which shall be asked him upon that matter.'"[170]This was in the time of Cromwell; but as the People were indignant at his tyrannical conduct in that matter, and his insolent attempt to punish the jurors, they escaped without fine or imprisonment. Indeed more than a hundred and twenty-five years before, Thomas Smith had declared "such doings to be very violent, tyrannical, and contrary to the liberty and customs of the realm of England." Sir Matthew Hale said at a later day, "It would be a most unhappy case for the judge himself, if the prisoner's fate depended upon his directions; unhappy also for the prisoner; for if the judge's opinion must rule the verdict, the trial by jury would be useless."[171]Judge Kelyng was particularly hostile to the jury, throwing aside "all regard to moderation and decency." He compelled the grand-jury of Somersetshire to find an indictment against their consciences, reproaching Sir Hugh Wyndham, the foreman, as the "Head of a Faction." He told the jury, "You are all my servants, and I will make the best in England stoop!" He said it was a "misdemeanor" for them to discriminate between murder and manslaughter; that was for the court to determine. But, Gentlemen, it does not appear that he had his brother-in-law on that grand-jury. Several persons were indicted for "attending a conventicle;" the jury acquitted them contrary to his wish, and he fined them $334 apiece, and put them in jail till it was paid. On another occasion, this servile creature of Charles II. fined and imprisoned all the jurors because they convicted ofmanslaughtera man whom he wanted to hang. But for this conduct he was accused in the House of Commons, and brought to answer for it at their bar.[172]
In 1680 Chief Justice Scroggs was brought up before the House of Commons for discharging "a refractory grand-jury"—such an one as was discharged in Boston last July: Sir Francis Winnington said, "If the judges instead of acting by law shall be acted by their own ambition, and endeavor to get promotion rather by worshipping the rising sun than doing justice, this nation will soon be reduced to a miserable condition." "As faults committed by judges are of more dangerous consequence than others to the public, so there do not want precedents of severer chastisements for them than for others."[173]
But spite of the continual attempt to destroy the value of the trial by jury, and take from the People their ancient, sevenfold shield, the progress of liberty is perpetual. Now and then there arose lawyers and judges like Sir Matthew Hale, Holt, Vaughan, Somers, Camden, and Erskine, who reached out a helping hand. Nay, politicians came up to its defence. But the great power which has sustained and developed it is the sturdy and unconquerable Love of individual Liberty which is one of the most marked characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon, whether Briton or American. The Common People of England sent Juries, as well as regiments of Ironsides, to do battle for the Right. Gentlemen, let us devoutly thank God for this Safeguard of Freedom, and take heed that it suffers no detriment in our day, but serves always the Higher Law of the Infinite God.
Now, Gentlemen of the Jury, I come to the end.
IV.Of the Circumstances of this Special Case, United States versus Theodore Parker.
Here, Gentlemen, I shall speak of three things.
(I.) Of the Fugitive Slave Bill.
At the close of the Revolution there was a contradiction in the national consciousness: the People were divided between the Idea of Freedom and the Idea of Slavery. There consequently ensued astruggle between the two elements. This has continued ever since the Treaty of Peace in 1783.
Twice the Idea of Freedom has won an important victory: in 1787 Slavery was prohibited in the North-West Territory; in 1808 the African Slave Trade was abolished. Gentlemen, this is all that has been done for seventy-two years; the last triumph of American Freedom over American Slavery was forty-seven years ago!
But the victories of Slavery have been manifold: in 1787 Slavery came into the Constitution,—it was left in the individual States as a part of their "Republican form of government;" the slaves were counted fractions of men, without the personal rights of integral humanity, and so to be represented by their masters; and the rendition of fugitive slaves was provided for. In 1792 out of old territory a new Slave State was made and Kentucky came into the Union. Tennessee followed in 1796, Mississippi in 1817, Alabama in 1819, and thus four Slave States were newly made out of soil which the Declaration of Independence covered with ideal freedom. In 1793 the Federal government took Slavery under its special patronage and passed the first fugitive slave bill for the capture of such as should escape from bondage in one State, and flee to another. In 1803 Louisiana was purchased and Slavery left in that vast territory; thus the first expansion of our borders was an extension of bondage,—out of that soil three great States, Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, have since been made, all despotic, with more than half a million of Americans fettered there to-day. Florida was purchased as slave soil, and in 1845 made a State with perpetual Slavery written in its Constitution. In 1845 Texas was annexed and Slavery extended over nearly four hundred thousand square miles of once free soil; in 1848 Slavery was spread over California, Utah, and New Mexico. Here were seven great victories of Slavery over Freedom.
At first it seemed doubtful which was master in the federal councils; but in 1820, in a great battle—the Missouri Compromise—Slavery triumphed, and has ever since been master. In 1845 Texas was annexed, and Slavery became the open, acknowledged, and most insolent master. The rich, intelligent, and submissive North only registers the decrees of the poor, the ignorant, but the controlling South; accepts for Officers such as the master appoints, for laws what the Slave-driver commands. The Slave-Power became predominant in American politics, business, literature, and "Religion."
Gentlemen of the Jury, do you doubt what I say? Look at this Honorable Court,—at its Judges, its Attorney, at its Marshal, and its Marshal's Guard: they all hold their offices by petty serjeantry of menial service rendered to the Slave-Power. It would be an insult to any one of this august fraternity to hint that he had the faintest respectfor the great Principles of American Liberty, or any love of justice for all men. I shall not be guilty of that "contempt of court." Gentlemen, I had expected that this Court would be solemnly opened with prayer. I knew whom the Slave-Power would select as its priest to "intercede with Heaven." I expected to hear the Rev. Nehemiah Adams, D.D., ask the God he worships and serves to take "a South-side view of American Slavery" in general, and in special of this prosecution of a minister of the Christian Religion for attempting to keep the Golden Rule. Should the Court hereafter indulge its public proclivity to prayer, that eminent divine will doubtless be its advocate—fit mediator for a Court which knows no Higher Law.
Well, Gentlemen, that sevenfold triumph was not enough. Slavery will never be contented so long as there is an inch of free soil in the United States! New victories must be attempted. Mr. Toombs has declared to this noble Advocate of Justice and Defender of Humanity, [John P. Hale] who renews the virtuous glories of his illustrious namesake, Sir Matthew Hale, that, "Before long the master will sit down with his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument." But one thing disturbed our masters at the South—the concubine runs away from her lusty lord, the mulatto slave child from her white father; I have had the "best blood of Virginia," fugitive children of her "first families" in my own house, and have given many a dollar to help the sons and daughters of "Southern Democrats" enjoy a taste of Northern Democracy. The slaves would run away. The law of 1793 was not adequate to keep or catch these African Christians who heeded not the Southern command, "Slaves, obey your masters." The Decision of the Supreme Court in the Prigg case,[174]showed the disposition of the Federal Government, and took out of the hands of the individual States the defence of their own citizens. Still the slaves would run away. In 1849 there were more than five hundred fugitives from Southern Democracy in Boston—and their masters could not catch them. What a misfortune! Boston retained $200,000 of human Property of the Christian and chivalric South! Surely the Union was "in danger."
In 1850 came the fugitive slave bill. When first concocted, its author,—a restless politician, a man of small mind and mean character, with "Plantation manners,"—thought it was "too bad to pass." He designed it not for an actual law, but an insult to the North so aggravating that she must resist the outrage, and then there would be an opportunity for some excitement and agitation at the South—and perhaps some "nullification" in South Carolina and Virginia; and in that general fermentation who knows what scum would be thrownup! Even Mr. Clay "never expected the law would be enforced." "No Northerngentleman," said he, "will ever help return a fugitive slave." It seemed impossible for the bill to pass.
But at that time Massachusetts had in the Senate of the nation a disappointed politician, a man of great understanding, of most mighty powers of speech,—
"Created hugest that swim the ocean stream,"—
and what more than all else contributed to his success in life, the most magnificent and commanding personal appearance. At that time—his ambition nothing abated by the many years which make men venerable,—he was a bankrupt in money, a bankrupt in reputation, and a bankrupt in morals—I speak only of his public morals, not his private,—a bankrupt in political character, pensioned by the Money Power of the North. Thrice disappointed, he was at that time gaming for the Presidency. When the South laid down the fugitive slave bill, on the national Faro-table, Mr. Webster bet his all upon that card. He staked his mind—and it was one of vast compass; his eloquence, which could shake the continent; his position, the senatorial influence of Massachusetts; his wide reputation, which rung with many a noble word for justice and the Rights of man; he staked his conscience and his life. Gentlemen, you know the rest,—the card won, the South took thetrick, and Webster lost all he could lose,—his conscience, his position, his reputation; not his wide-compassing mind, not his earth-shaking eloquence. Finally he lost his—life. Peace to his mighty shade. God be merciful to him that showed no mercy. The warning of his fall is worth more than the guidance of his success. Let us forgive; it were wicked to forget. For fifty years no American has had such opportunity to serve his country in an hour of need. Never has an American so signally betrayed the trust—not once since Benedict Arnold turned a less ignoble traitor!
Gentlemen, you know the speech of the 7th of March. You know it too well. He proposed to support the fugitive slave bill "with all its provisions, to the fullest extent." At that time this bill of abominations was worse than even now; for then it left the liberty of a man to the discretion not only of any judge or commissioner of any Federal court, but to any clerk or marshal thereof, nay, to any collector of the customs and every one of the seventeen thousand postmasters in the United States! It provided that an affidavit made before any officer empowered, by the United States or any State, to administer oaths, should be taken as conclusive evidence to prove a man a slave! So John Smith of some unknown town in Texas, might make affidavit before John Jones, a justice of peace in the same place, that Lewis Hayden, or Wendell Phillips, or his Honor Judge Curtis, was his (Smith's) slave, and had escaped to Boston: might bring hither John Brown, a Postmaster from Texas, or find some collector of the customs or minion of the court in Massachusetts, seize his victim, and swear away his liberty; and any man might be at once consigned to eternal bondage! All that the bill provided for,—and authorized the kidnapper to employ as many persons as he might think proper to accomplish his purpose by force, at the expense of the United States! All this Mr. Webster volunteered to support "to the fullest extent."
The bill was amended, here bettered, there worsened, and came to the final vote. Gentlemen, the Money Power of the North joined the Slave Power of the South to kidnap men in America after 1850, as it had kidnapped them in Africa before 1808. Out of fifty Senators only twelve said, No; while in the House 109 voted Yea. The Hon. Samuel A. Eliot gave the vote of Beacon and State Streets for kidnapping men on the soil of Boston. The one Massachusetts vote for man-stealing must come from the town which once bore a Franklin and an Adams in her bosom; yes, from under the eaves of John Hancock's house! That one vote was not disgrace enough; his successor [Hon. William Appleton] must take a needless delight in reaffirming the infamy. When the bill passed, Gentlemen, you remember how Mr. Webster rejoiced:—
was his public outcry on the housetop! And Boston fired a hundred guns of joy! Do you knowwhofired them? Ask Mr. Attorney Hallett; ask Mr. Justice Curtis. They can "instruct the jury."
Gentlemen, you know the operation of the fugitive slave bill. It subverts the Purposes of the Constitution, it destroys Justice, disturbs domestic Tranquillity, hinders the common Defence and the general Welfare, and annihilates the Blessings of Liberty. It defies the first Principles of the Declaration of Independence,—think of the fugitive slave bill as an appendix to that document! It violates the Idea of Democracy. It contradicts the very substance of the Christian Religion—the two great commandments of Love to God, and Love to man, whereon "hang all the Law and the Prophets." It makes natural humanity a crime; it subjects all the Christian virtues to fine and imprisonment. It is alettre de cachetagainst Philanthropy.
Gentlemen of the Jury, you know the fugitive slave bill is unconstitutional. I need not argue the matter; it is too plain to need proof.See how it opposes Justice, the ultimate purpose of human law; nay, the declared objects of the Constitution itself! But yet its unconstitutionality has been most abundantly shown by our own fellow-citizens. I need not go out of Massachusetts for defenders of Justice and Law. You remember the Speeches of Mr. Phillips, Mr. Sewall, Mr. Rantoul, Mr. Sumner, Mr. Mann, the arguments of Mr. Hildreth. The judges before you by nature are able-minded men, both of them; both also learned as lawyers and otherwise well educated,—I love to honor their natural powers, and their acquired learning; would I could offer higher praise. Now, I will not insult their manly understanding with the supposition that either of them ever thought the fugitive slave bill constitutional. No, Gentlemen, it is not possible that in thepersonalopinion of Mr. Sprague, or even Mr. Curtis, this bill can be held for a constitutional law. But the Court has its official dress: part of it is of silk—or supposed to be,—the gown which decorates the outward figure of the man who wears its ample folds; it is made after a prescribed pattern. But part of it also is made ofopinionwhich hides the ability and learning of the honorable Court. The constitutionality of the fugitive slave bill is a part of the judge's official dress: accordingly, as no federal judge sits without his "silk gown," so none appears without his "opinion" that the fugitive slave bill is constitutional. But if the court should solemnly declare that such was itspersonal opinion—Gentlemen of the Jury, I,—I—should not believe it—any more than if they declared the gown of silk was the natural judicial covering, the actual "true skin" of the judges. No, Gentlemen, these judges are not monsters, not naturally idiotic in their Conscience. This opinion is their official robe, a supplementary cuticle, an artificial epidermis, woven from without, to be thrown off one day, when it shall serve their turn, by political desquamation. Let them wear it; "they have their reward." But you and I, Gentlemen, let us thank God we are not officially barked about with such a leprous elephantiasis as that. You are to judge of its constitutionality for yourselves, not to take thepurchased, official opinionof the judge as veil for your Conscience; let it hide the judges' if they like.
Gentlemen, I lack words to describe the fugitive slave bill; its sins outrun my power of speech. But you know the consequences which follow if it be accepted by the People, submitted to, and enforced: the State of Massachusetts is nothing; her courts nothing; her juries nothing; her laws nothing; her Constitution nothing—the Rights of the State are whistled away by the "opinion" of a fugitive slave bill judge, the rights of the citizen—all gone; his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness lies at the mercy of the meanest man whom this Court shall ever make a Commissioner to kidnap men.Yes, Gentlemen of the Jury, you hold your liberty at the mercy of George T. Curtis and Seth J. Thomas! You are the People, "the Country" to determine whether it shall come to this.
You know the motive which led the South to desire this bill,—it was partly pecuniary, the desire to get the work of men and not pay for it; partly political, the desire to establish Slavery at the North. Mr. Toombs is not the only man who wishes the master to sit down with his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument! You know the motive of the Northern men who supported the bill;—words are idle here!
Gentlemen, I said that Boston fired a hundred jubilant cannon when the fugitive slave bill became a law. It was only apart of Bostonthat fired them. The bill was odious here to all just and honorable men. Massachusetts hated the bill, and was in no haste to "conquer her prejudices" in favor of Justice, Humanity, and the Christian Religion; she did not like the "disagreeable duty" of making a public profession of practical Atheism. At first the yellow fever of the slave-hunters did not extend much beyond the pavements of Boston and Salem; so pains must be taken to spread the malady. The greatest efforts were made to induce the People to renounce their Christianity, to accept and enforce the wicked measure. The cry was raised, "The Union is in danger:" nobody believed it; they least of all who raised the cry. Some clergymen in the Churches of Commerce were coaxed, wheedled, or bought over, and they declared kidnapping would be imputed unto men for "righteousness." The actual man-stealer in Boston was likened to "faithful Abraham" in the Hebrew mythic tale,—"the rendition of a slave was like the sacrifice of Isaac." One Trinitarian minister, a son of Massachusetts, laid Conscience down before the Juggernaut of the fugitive slave bill, another would send his own mother into Slavery; both had their reward. Editors were brought over to the true faith of kidnapping. Alas, there were some in Boston who needed no conversion; who were always on the side of inhumanity. There were "Union meetings" called to save the Nation; and the meanest men in the great towns came to serve as Redeemers in this Salvation unto kidnapping. Mr. Webster outdid himself in giant efforts—and though old and sick, he wrought with mighty strength. So in the great poem the fallen angel, his Paradise of Virtue lost,—
One class of men needed no change, no stimulation. They were ready to execute this unjust, this unconstitutional Act; their lamps were trimmed and burning, their loins girt about, their feet swift to shed blood. Who were they? Ask Philadelphia, ask New York, ask Boston. Look at this bench. The Federal Courts were as ready to betray justice in 1850 as Kelyng and Jeffreys and Scroggs and the other pliant judges of Charles II. or James II. to support his iniquities. I must speak of this.
(II.) Of the conduct of the Federal Courts.
Gentlemen of the Jury, that you may understand the enormity of the conduct of the federal courts and the peril they bring upon their victims, I must refresh your memory with a few facts.
1. I shall begin with the cases in Pennsylvania. In that State four officials of government have acquired great distinction by their zeal in enslaving men, McAllister, Ingraham, Grier, and Kane; the two first are "Commissioners," the latter two "Judges." In one year they had the glory of kidnapping twenty-six Americans and delivering them over to Slavery. Look at a few cases.
(1.) On the 10th of March, 1851, Hannah Dellam was brought before Judge Kane charged with being a fugitive slave. She was far advanced in pregnancy, hourly expecting to give birth to a child. If a convicted murderess is in that condition, the law delays the execution of its ghastly sentence till the baby is born, whom the gallows orphans soon. The poor negro woman's counsel begged for delay that the child might be born in Pennsylvania and so be free,—a poor boon, but too great for a fugitive slave bill judge to grant. The judge who inherits the name of the first murderer, disgraced the family of Cain; he prolonged his court late into night, that he might send the child into Slavery while in the bowels of its mother! Judge Kane held his "court" and gave his decision in the very building where the Declaration of Independence was signed and published to the world. The memorable bell which summons his court, has for motto on its brazen lips, "Proclaim Liberty throughout the Land, to all the inhabitants thereof."
(2.) The same year Rachel Parker, a free colored girl, was seizedin the house of Joseph C. Miller of West-Nottingham, Chester County, by Thomas McCreary of Elkton, Maryland. Mr. Miller pursued the kidnapper and found the girl at Baltimore, and brought a charge of kidnapping against McCreary. But before the matter was decided Mr. Miller was decoyed away and murdered! The man-hunter was set free and the girl kept as a slave, but after long confinement in jail was at last pronounced free—not by the Pennsylvania "judge" but by a Baltimore Jury![175]
(3.) The same year occurred the Christiana Tragedy. Here are the facts.
In Virginia a general law confers a reward of $100 on any man who shall bring back to Virginia a slave that has escaped into another State, and gives him also ten cents for each mile of travel in the chase after a man. Accordingly, beside the officers of the fugitive slave bill courts commissioned for that purpose, there is a body of professional Slave-hunters, who prowl about the borders of Pennsylvania and entrap their prey. In September, 1850, "a colored man, known in the neighborhood around Christiana to be free, was seized and carried away by professional kidnappers, and never afterwards seen by his family." In March, 1851, in the same neighborhood, under the roof of his employer, during the night, another colored man was tied, gagged, and carried away, "marking the road along which he was dragged by his own blood." He was never afterwards heard from. "These and many other acts of a similar kind had so alarmed the neighborhood, that the very name of Kidnapper was sufficient to create a panic."[176]
"On the 11th of September, Edward Gorsuch, of Maryland, his son, Dickerson Gorsuch, with a party of friends, and a United States officer named Kline, who bore the warrant of Commissioner Ingraham, made their appearance in a neighborhood near Christiana, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, in pursuit of a Slave. They lay in wait for their prey near the house of William Parker, a colored man. When discovered and challenged, they approached the house, and Gorsuch demanded his Slave. It was denied that he was there. High words ensued, and two shots were fired by the assailants at the house. The alarm was then given by blowing a horn, and the neighborhood roused. A party of colored men, from thirty to fifty strong, most of them armed in some way, were before long on the ground. Castner Hanway and Elijah Lewis, both white men and Friends, rode up before the engagement began and endeavored to prevent bloodshed by persuading both parties to disperse peaceably. Kline, the Deputy Marshal, ordered them to join theposse, which they, of course, refused to do, but urged upon him the necessity of withdrawing his men for their own safety. This he finally did, as far as he personally was concerned, when satisfied that there was actual danger of bloody resistance. Gorsuch, however, and his party persisted in their attempt, and he and two of his party fired on the colored men, who returned the fire with deadlyeffect. Gorsuch was killed on the spot, his son severely, though not mortally, wounded, and the rest of the party put to flight. The dead and wounded were cared for by the neighbors, mostly Friends and Abolitionists. The Slave, for the capture of whom this enterprise was undertaken, made his escape and reached a land of safety."Judge Grier denounced the act from the Bench as one of Treason. A party of marines were ordered to the ground to keep the peace after the battle had been fought and won. United States Marshal Roberts, Commissioner Ingraham, United States District Attorney Ashmead, with a strong body of police, accompanied them, and kept the seat of war under a kind of martial law for several days. The country was scoured, houses ransacked, and about thirty arrests made. Among those arrested were Castner Hanway and Elijah Lewis, whose only crime had been endeavoring to prevent the effusion of blood. The prisoners were brought to Philadelphia, examined before a Commissioner, and committed on a charge of High Treason. At the next term of the District Court, under a charge from Judge Kane, the Grand-Jury found indictments against all of them for this crime."[177]
"On the 11th of September, Edward Gorsuch, of Maryland, his son, Dickerson Gorsuch, with a party of friends, and a United States officer named Kline, who bore the warrant of Commissioner Ingraham, made their appearance in a neighborhood near Christiana, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, in pursuit of a Slave. They lay in wait for their prey near the house of William Parker, a colored man. When discovered and challenged, they approached the house, and Gorsuch demanded his Slave. It was denied that he was there. High words ensued, and two shots were fired by the assailants at the house. The alarm was then given by blowing a horn, and the neighborhood roused. A party of colored men, from thirty to fifty strong, most of them armed in some way, were before long on the ground. Castner Hanway and Elijah Lewis, both white men and Friends, rode up before the engagement began and endeavored to prevent bloodshed by persuading both parties to disperse peaceably. Kline, the Deputy Marshal, ordered them to join theposse, which they, of course, refused to do, but urged upon him the necessity of withdrawing his men for their own safety. This he finally did, as far as he personally was concerned, when satisfied that there was actual danger of bloody resistance. Gorsuch, however, and his party persisted in their attempt, and he and two of his party fired on the colored men, who returned the fire with deadlyeffect. Gorsuch was killed on the spot, his son severely, though not mortally, wounded, and the rest of the party put to flight. The dead and wounded were cared for by the neighbors, mostly Friends and Abolitionists. The Slave, for the capture of whom this enterprise was undertaken, made his escape and reached a land of safety.
"Judge Grier denounced the act from the Bench as one of Treason. A party of marines were ordered to the ground to keep the peace after the battle had been fought and won. United States Marshal Roberts, Commissioner Ingraham, United States District Attorney Ashmead, with a strong body of police, accompanied them, and kept the seat of war under a kind of martial law for several days. The country was scoured, houses ransacked, and about thirty arrests made. Among those arrested were Castner Hanway and Elijah Lewis, whose only crime had been endeavoring to prevent the effusion of blood. The prisoners were brought to Philadelphia, examined before a Commissioner, and committed on a charge of High Treason. At the next term of the District Court, under a charge from Judge Kane, the Grand-Jury found indictments against all of them for this crime."[177]
Mr. Hanway was brought to trial—for his life, charged with "treason." It appears that this was his overt act.—He was a Quaker, an anti-slavery Quaker, and a "non-resistant;" when he heard of the attack on the colored people, he rode on a sorrel horse to the spot, in his shirt-sleeves, with a broad felt hat on; he advised the colored men not to fire, "For God's sake don't fire;" but when Deputy Marshal Kline ordered him to assist in the kidnapping, he refused and would have nothing to do with it. Some of the colored people fired, and with such effect on the Kidnappers as I have just now shown. It appeared also that Mr. Hanway had said the fugitive slave bill was unconstitutional, and that he would never aid in kidnapping a man—words which I suppose this Honorable Court will consider as a constructive "misdemeanor;" "obstructing an officer."
For this "offence" his case was presented to the grand-jury of the Circuit Court the 29th of September, 1851. Judge Kane charged the jury—laying down the law of treason. Mr. Hanway was indicted for "wickedly devising and intending the peace and tranquillity of the ... United States to disturb;" and that he "wickedly and traitorously did intend to levy war against the said United States." And also that he "with force and arms, maliciously and traitorously did prepare and compose and ... and cause and procure to be prepared and composed, divers books, pamphlets, letters, and declarations, resolutions, addresses, papers, and writings, and did ... maliciously and traitorously publish and disperse ... divers other books ... containing ... incitement, encouragement, and exhortations, to move, induce, and persuade persons held to service in any of the United States ... who had escaped ... to resist, oppose, and prevent, byviolence and intimidation, the execution of the said laws, [that is the law for kidnapping their own persons]."
He was brought to trial at Philadelphia, November 24th 1851, before Honorable Judges Kane and Grier, then and subsequently so eminent for their zeal in perverting law and doing judicial iniquity. Gentlemen of the Jury—it is no slander to say this. It is their great glory that in the cause of Slavery they have struck at the first principles of American Democracy, and set at nought the Christian Religion. It is only their panegyric which I pronounce.
On behalf of the government there appeared six persons as prosecuting officers. One United States Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Cooper), the Attorney-General of Maryland, the District Attorney of Pennsylvania, the Recorder of the City of Philadelphia, and two members of her bar.[178]For Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State, was highly desirous that Maryland should send her Attorney-General, Hon. Mr. Brent, to help the government of the United States prosecute a Quaker miller, a Non-resistant, for the crime of treason. Hon. James Cooper, the Pennsylvania Senator, also appeared on behalf of Maryland, seeking to convict one of his own constituents! Gentlemen, such conduct carries us back to the time of the Stuarts; but despotism is always the same. It was very proper that the United States government should thus outrage the common decencies of judicial process.
This question amongst others was put to each juror:—