Chapter 11

FOOTNOTES:[44]The text of this capitulation was drawn up two years before by one of the most able Japanese lawyers.

FOOTNOTES:

[44]The text of this capitulation was drawn up two years before by one of the most able Japanese lawyers.

CONCLUSION[45]

As this book leaves the hands of the printer, the columns of the daily press are conveying to the world the terms of the indictment of the chief characters mentioned in it for their share in the surrender of the Fortress of Port Arthur to the Japanese. As this constitutes an official confirmation of much that I have written, I include it in my book, so that the reader may be in a position to judge if the title of my work is justified.

This indictment, I may add, has been drawn up by three separate Commissions, composed of the highest Government officials and experts in military law.

Official Indictment.

Lieutenant-General Stössel, of the retired list, is charged as follows:

1. In that he, having on July 3, 1904, received an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Manchuria to hand over command of the Fortress of Port Arthur to its Commandant, Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, and to leave the Fortress, disobeyed, and, remaining in the Fortress, retained command of it—an action provided for under Article 255, Book XXII., of the 'Military Code of 1869,' third edition.

2. In that he, in defiance of Order No. 339 of April 27, 1904, by the Viceroy in the Far East, did interfere withthe powers and duties of the Commandant of the Fortress, thus undermining the latter's authority, shaking public confidence in him, and so diminishing the defensive capabilities of the Fortress. The following are instances of such interference:

(a) Granting permission over the Commandant's head, and against his orders, for supplies to be taken out of the Fortress.(b) Appointing Civilian Counsellor Riabinin to the charge of the Medical Department without making him subordinate to the Commandant of the Fortress.(c) Transferring the Dalny Hospital, in opposition to the Commandant's orders and to the detriment of the public service, to a site selected by himself.(d) Removing the Chief of the Fire Brigade, Weykanen, from duty.(e) Sending the Gendarmerie to Liao-tieh-shan.(f) Closing the printing-offices of theNovy Kry, and ordering the arrest of M. Nojine, who was on the staff of that journal.(g) Stopping work on the second and third lines of defence.

(a) Granting permission over the Commandant's head, and against his orders, for supplies to be taken out of the Fortress.

(b) Appointing Civilian Counsellor Riabinin to the charge of the Medical Department without making him subordinate to the Commandant of the Fortress.

(c) Transferring the Dalny Hospital, in opposition to the Commandant's orders and to the detriment of the public service, to a site selected by himself.

(d) Removing the Chief of the Fire Brigade, Weykanen, from duty.

(e) Sending the Gendarmerie to Liao-tieh-shan.

(f) Closing the printing-offices of theNovy Kry, and ordering the arrest of M. Nojine, who was on the staff of that journal.

(g) Stopping work on the second and third lines of defence.

Provided for under, etc.

3. In that he did not in time take proper steps to increase the quantity of supplies in the Fortress, as follows:

(a) By not supplementing the reserve of vegetables, although this was quite possible.(b) By not arranging to requisition horses, in accordance with the Mobilization Regulations, and to increase the number of cattle in the Fortress.(c) By not sanctioning the Commandant's requestthat the rations of horse-flesh might be increased, a course which was absolutely necessary to maintain the strength of the worn-out garrison.Provided for under, etc.

(a) By not supplementing the reserve of vegetables, although this was quite possible.

(b) By not arranging to requisition horses, in accordance with the Mobilization Regulations, and to increase the number of cattle in the Fortress.

(c) By not sanctioning the Commandant's requestthat the rations of horse-flesh might be increased, a course which was absolutely necessary to maintain the strength of the worn-out garrison.

Provided for under, etc.

4. In that he, during the siege, received and read certain 'Memoranda,' written by Lieutenant-General Fock, which were composed in a derisive and offensive spirit, and of a nature calculated to undermine the authority of, and bring odium upon, several of the Commanders, subvert discipline, and lower themoralof the garrison; and, in spite of their harmful influence upon the defence, took no steps to prevent their publication and circulation among the troops.

Provided for under, etc.

5. In that he, for his personal ends, sent reports to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Manchuria on May 27 and 31, and to the Viceroy on May 30, referring to the battle at Kinchou, in which he, in contradiction to the actual facts and to the actions of himself and those present, asserted that 'In this warm corner we fired every shell we had got,' and that 'we retired in perfect order on Nangalin,' and drew up these reports in such a manner as to make it appear that he, General Stössel, had in person acted with great energy and directed operations, while—

(a) During the battle at Kinchou, he—General Stössel—remained in Port Arthur, and personally took no part in the action.(b) There was a large quantity of ammunition at Nangalin Station for the quick-firing guns, as was known to all the artillery units.(c) The retirement on Nangalin was carried out ingreat haste and in complete disorder—so much so that certain units rushed through and broke down the wire entanglement obstacle.Provided for under, etc.

(a) During the battle at Kinchou, he—General Stössel—remained in Port Arthur, and personally took no part in the action.

(b) There was a large quantity of ammunition at Nangalin Station for the quick-firing guns, as was known to all the artillery units.

(c) The retirement on Nangalin was carried out ingreat haste and in complete disorder—so much so that certain units rushed through and broke down the wire entanglement obstacle.

Provided for under, etc.

6. In that he, for his own advantage, and in order to place the actions of his subordinates in the most favourable light, on May 28, 1904, reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Manchuria that the force under Lieutenant-General Fock 'was falling back gradually towards Wolfs Hills'—a statement directly opposed to facts, as the retirement of the force direct on to Wolf's Hills (the last of the advanced positions) was effected in complete disorder and in great haste along a hilly road, blocked with transport and by the inhabitants of Dalny retreating to Port Arthur.

Provided for under, etc.

7. In that he, for his own advantage, and in order to represent himself as taking a part in various actions (which did not take place), on June 14, 1904, reported in writing to the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army as to his own great activity in the conduct of the defence, in which report he stated, in opposition to facts: ' ... I always make a point of being in every possible engagement ...'; while from February 8, 1904, to June 14—i.e., up to the date of his letter to General Kuropatkin—not a single engagement with the Japanese took place (except the battle at Kinchou, in which he—General Stössel—took no part) but the bombardments, during which the whole population of Port Arthur were in equal danger.

Provided for under, etc.

8. In that he, in the hope of justifying the prearranged surrender of the Fortress to the enemy, on December 29, 1904, reported to the Tsar in a telegram that: 'By thecapture of Fort No. 3 the Japanese have become masters of the whole north-east front, and the Fortress can only hold out for a very few days. We have no artillery ammunition ...'—a report which was not in accordance with the facts, as at the Council of War held on that day (December 29), when the members by a large majority declared themselves in favour of holding out to the last moment, both Major-Generals Biely and Nickitin declared that there was sufficient ammunition in hand for a further defence.

Provided for under, etc.

9. In that he intentionally, improperly, and with false statements recommended:

(a) Lieutenant-General Fock for promotion to the Third Class Order of St. George for the battle which he lost at Kinchou, and in which he displayed complete incompetence;(b) Major-General Nadein for promotion to the Third Class Order of St. George for the same battle, in which he in no way distinguished himself;(c) Major-General Reuss for the Fourth Class of the same Order, this officer himself asserting that he had done nothing whatever to merit such a reward.

(a) Lieutenant-General Fock for promotion to the Third Class Order of St. George for the battle which he lost at Kinchou, and in which he displayed complete incompetence;

(b) Major-General Nadein for promotion to the Third Class Order of St. George for the same battle, in which he in no way distinguished himself;

(c) Major-General Reuss for the Fourth Class of the same Order, this officer himself asserting that he had done nothing whatever to merit such a reward.

Provided for under, etc.

10. In that he, while in command of the District, and being the senior officer in a fortress which was being besieged by the Japanese, and of which the Commandant was subordinate to him, decided to surrender the Fortress to the enemy, and, in order to do so, in spite of the opinion of the great majority of the Council of War held on December 29, 1904, in favour of the continuation of the defence (which was in every way possible), and without, in accordance with the Regulations, convening afresh Council of War, did between 3 and 4 p.m. on January 1, 1905, despatch aparlementaireto General Nogi, commanding the besieging army, proposing to enter into negotiations for the surrender of the Fortress, although all means of defence had not been exhausted, as the fighting strength of the garrison and the amount of war material and of supplies permitted of a continuation of it.

In that he, after this, agreed to the proposal of Lieutenant-General Fock, commanding the land defences, to abandon Little Eagle's Nest, Kuropatkin Lunette, and B Battery without a fight, which action greatly diminished the power of resistance of the Fortress.

In that he, on the following day—January 2, 1905—authorized Colonel Reuss, his Chief of the Staff, to conclude definitely the capitulation without giving him any precise instructions as to the terms to be insisted upon on our side, in consequence of which Colonel Reuss signed, in the village of Siu-shuing, to terms which were disadvantageous and derogatory to the dignity of Russia, in which action General Stössel himself failed to perform his duty according to his oath and to the honour of a soldier.

In that he, having surrendered the Fortress to the enemy, did not share the fate of the garrison by accompanying it into military confinement.

Provided for under, etc.

Major-General Reuss is charged as follows:

1. In that he, while Chief of the Staff of the Kwantun District, and being aware of General Stössel's intention to surrender the Fortress of Port Arthur to the Japanese at a time when the fighting strength of the garrison and the quantity of munitions of war and of supplies assured the possibility of a continuance of the defence, concurred in this intention, and assisted General Stössel in the execution of it—for instance:

(a) At the meeting of the Defence Committee on December 8, 1904, and at the Council of War on December 29, 1904, exaggerating the critical state of affairs, and declaring that further opposition was useless, and that the Fortress should be surrendered.(b) Prematurely composing and despatching at General Stössel's direction on January 1, 1905, a letter to General Nogi, commanding the Japanese besieging army, in which proposals were made for negotiations for a capitulation.(c) On the following day, January 2, 1905, without demanding definite instructions from General Stössel regarding the conditions to be insisted on for surrender, going to Siu-shuing village—the place appointed for the negotiations—and raising no objections to the demands put forward by the Japanese representatives, signing that same day to the capitulation of the Fortress upon terms disadvantageous to Russia and derogatory to her dignity, and by such action co-operating with General Stössel in the surrender of the Fortress to the enemy.

(b) Prematurely composing and despatching at General Stössel's direction on January 1, 1905, a letter to General Nogi, commanding the Japanese besieging army, in which proposals were made for negotiations for a capitulation.

(c) On the following day, January 2, 1905, without demanding definite instructions from General Stössel regarding the conditions to be insisted on for surrender, going to Siu-shuing village—the place appointed for the negotiations—and raising no objections to the demands put forward by the Japanese representatives, signing that same day to the capitulation of the Fortress upon terms disadvantageous to Russia and derogatory to her dignity, and by such action co-operating with General Stössel in the surrender of the Fortress to the enemy.

Provided for under, etc.

Lieutenant-General Fock is charged as follows:

1. In that he, having received categorical instructions on February 27 and May 19, 1904, to make an obstinate defence, even to a defence with the bayonet, at the Kinchou position, not only with the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, but with the 13th and 14th Regiments, which were close at hand, and disregarding these orders and the fact that General Stössel had himself undertaken the defence of Inchenzy Bay, which was in rear of the position—

(a) When the battle had begun on the morning of May 26, 1904, instead of taking command, did go away to Inchenzy Bay to select a position there for the 15th Regiment, in case the Japanese should land there, and did not arrive at the attacked position till 2 p.m.(b) Did only send one of the four regiments present at Kinchou into action, and thus did cause its separate destruction.(c) Did not only fail to make any use of his reserves during the battle, but did stop two battalions which were going up into the fighting line, under orders from General Nadein.(d) Without having exhausted every means of defence, and without having recourse to the bayonet, did telegraph to General Stössel in Port Arthur, in order to induce him to order a retirement, as to 'the critical position,' and the complete lack of gun ammunition, there being at the time a large quantity of ammunition at the station of Nangalin.(e) Having, in consequence of this, received instructions from General Stössel to retire at dusk, did commence the retirement in daylight, thus causing many casualties, and ceding to the Japanese the fortified position at Kinchou, without having made use of all the means at his disposal for its protracted defence.

(b) Did only send one of the four regiments present at Kinchou into action, and thus did cause its separate destruction.

(c) Did not only fail to make any use of his reserves during the battle, but did stop two battalions which were going up into the fighting line, under orders from General Nadein.

(d) Without having exhausted every means of defence, and without having recourse to the bayonet, did telegraph to General Stössel in Port Arthur, in order to induce him to order a retirement, as to 'the critical position,' and the complete lack of gun ammunition, there being at the time a large quantity of ammunition at the station of Nangalin.

(e) Having, in consequence of this, received instructions from General Stössel to retire at dusk, did commence the retirement in daylight, thus causing many casualties, and ceding to the Japanese the fortified position at Kinchou, without having made use of all the means at his disposal for its protracted defence.

Provided for under, etc.

2. In that he, during the battle of August 21, 1904, having received an order from his immediate Commanding Officer—the Commandant of the Fortress—to send two battalions of the 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to the advanced forts on the north-east front, did not at once obey the order, but entered into an untimely argumentwith the Commandant, and did not himself accompany the last unit of the reserve under his command.

Provided for under, etc.

3. In that he, having no official position in the defence from August 22, 1904, to December 16, 1904, and going round the positions on his own initiative, under the pretext of assisting the defence, but really in a cowardly desire to prove himself superior in bravery, knowledge and ability to the other commanders, did allow himself to discuss affairs and to issue 'Memoranda,' in which he not only offensively criticized the actions of those who were not under his orders—accusing them of incompetence and cowardice—but also spread abroad the idea that the defence of the forts and fortified positions should not be carried to such a length as to cause many casualties, and did act in such a manner that his views and 'Memoranda' became known to the garrison at large (including the soldiers), by which he shook the belief of the troops in the necessity for, and the possibility of, holding the defences to the very last.

Provided for under, etc.

4. In that he, having on December 16, 1904, taken over the duties of Commander of the Land Defences of the Fortress of Port Arthur, and finding it impossible to hold Fort No. 2 any longer, did report this fact personally to the Officer Commanding the District, and did not report it to the Commandant of the Fortress, to whom he was directly subordinate, and having received General Stössel's permission on December 18, 1904, did order that this fort should be abandoned and blown up without informing the Commandant.

Provided for under, etc.

5. In that he, while Commander of the Land Defences of the Fortress, and being aware of General Stössel'sintention to surrender the Fortress of Port Arthur to the Japanese before all means of defence had been exhausted, as the fighting strength of the garrison and the amount of supplies and munitions of war assured the possibility of a continuance, concurred in this intention, and assisted General Stössel in the execution of it. For instance:

On December 1, 1904,[46]reporting to General Stössel that it was necessary to send aparlementaireat once to General Nogi with proposals to capitulate, and then, after its despatch, upon his own responsibility, and in spite of the orders of the Commandant, ordering, under threats, General Gorbatovsky, who was in command of the defences on the east front, to abandon Little Eagle's Nest, Kuropatkin Lunette, and B Battery without a fight, which works were accordingly in the evening abandoned by our troops, he—Lieutenant-General Fock—knowing full well that by these dispositions of his he had placed the defence of the Fortress under most disadvantageous conditions should the negotiations for surrender be for any reason broken off, and had enabled the Japanese representatives to demand from us most disadvantageous and degrading terms of capitulation.

Provided for under, etc.

Lieutenant-General Smirnoff is charged as follows:

1. In that he, suspecting, after the surrender to the Japanese of Fort No. 2, the existence of an understanding between Generals Stössel and Fock to reduce the Fortress to such a state as to justify capitulation, and in despite of the responsibility resting upon him under the terms of Article 57 of the 'Regulations for the Guidance of Commanders of Fortresses,' did not immediately deprive General Fock of his command, did not take energetic action to prevent the above-named officers carrying out their plan, and confined himself to despatching a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief, in which he requested that he might be either given full power as Commandant or relieved from all responsibility as such for the future defence of the Fortress.

Provided for under, etc.

2. In that he, having learned on January 1, 1905, of the despatch by General Stössel of a letter to General Nogi containing proposals for negotiations for surrender, in spite of Article 69, Book XXII., of the 'Military Code of 1869,' third edition, and Article 57 of the 'Regulations for the Guidance of Commanders of Fortresses,' did not convene a meeting of the Committee of Defence, did not insist that General Stössel should act in accordance with Article 62 of the above 'Regulations,' and did not carry out the resolution of the Council of War of December 29, 1904, to continue a protracted defence of the Fortress.

Provided for under, etc.

FOOTNOTES:[45]Written by the author in October, 1907. This was the official indictment then published, and contains the main charges upon which the officers stood their trial.—E.D.S.[46]? January 1, 1905.—E.D.S.

FOOTNOTES:

[45]Written by the author in October, 1907. This was the official indictment then published, and contains the main charges upon which the officers stood their trial.—E.D.S.

[46]? January 1, 1905.—E.D.S.

APPENDIX I

General Fock's Memorandumrethe Surrender of Fort No. 2. [Chi-kuan-shan.]

Inorder that General Fock's motives may not be misunderstood, the Memorandum written by him, in which he essayed to clear himself of the charge of wrongfully abandoning Fort No. 2, is reproduced. It needs, however some elucidation, both for the sake of clearness and accuracy. Those who are not well acquainted with Fock's proceedings in Port Arthur, both as a General and as an individual, and with all the circumstances of the defence, might possibly misunderstand this document, as the authors possessed a great power of persuasion, both with pen and speech, and even now has a considerable number of adherents and advocates.

Memorandum.

'Fort No. 2 was abandoned on December 18, 1904, with General Stössel's permission and by my order. Next day I had a conversation on the subject with General Smirnoff, who said:'"Why did you surrender the fort? I would have sent you as many reinforcements as you wanted; I have some 30,000 in the Fortress. By abandoning it you have undermined the root of my principle—that no fort should pass into the enemy's hands except after the death of all its defenders."'

'Fort No. 2 was abandoned on December 18, 1904, with General Stössel's permission and by my order. Next day I had a conversation on the subject with General Smirnoff, who said:

'"Why did you surrender the fort? I would have sent you as many reinforcements as you wanted; I have some 30,000 in the Fortress. By abandoning it you have undermined the root of my principle—that no fort should pass into the enemy's hands except after the death of all its defenders."'

In saying this General Smirnoff was quite in the right. Fock did not reinforce the garrison either in time or sufficiently, although quite able so to do. The whole essence of the defence at the end consisted in the use of mobile reserves for the reinforcement of threatened points. It was by his intelligent anticipation of Nogi's tactics and his skillfull movement and employment of reserves that Smirnoff was able so long to check the attack.

' ... Later, when giving evidence before General Roop's Commission, I was asked:'"Did you take any steps to prevent the example of Fort No. 2 being followed, and to ensure that the principle that a garrison should resist to the last should not be forgotten?"'I was amazed at such a question, and that a principle, of which I had never before heard and which is not to be found in any text-book on tactics or field-service manual, should be assumed by the Commission to be an irrefutable axiom, to ignore which was a crime.'But I was still more astonished a short time ago when, in a paper submitted by General Smirnoff to the War Minister and circulated amongst officials and other educated men, I saw the following:'"The surrender of Fort No. 2 struck at the root of the principle that a fort 'dies, but does not surrender'—a principle preached and reiterated by myself and all those in command. By the example of the surrender of this fort the garrisons of the others were shaken in their belief that forts are 'holies of holies,' only to be captured after the death of the whole garrison defending them, and were led to consider them as just ordinary fortified positions which can be freely abandoned as soon as their defence becomes difficult. This was proved by the abandonment within ten days of Fort No. 3."'Only when I became aware of this Note of General Smirnoff's did I understand the drift of the question put to me by the Commission; it was not hard then to see the connexion between the two. It was evident, therefore, that in this important question, as in those which had preceded, the Commission was being guided more by this memorandum of the late Commandant of the Fortress than by the desire for an impartial inquiry into facts.'

' ... Later, when giving evidence before General Roop's Commission, I was asked:

'"Did you take any steps to prevent the example of Fort No. 2 being followed, and to ensure that the principle that a garrison should resist to the last should not be forgotten?"

'I was amazed at such a question, and that a principle, of which I had never before heard and which is not to be found in any text-book on tactics or field-service manual, should be assumed by the Commission to be an irrefutable axiom, to ignore which was a crime.

'But I was still more astonished a short time ago when, in a paper submitted by General Smirnoff to the War Minister and circulated amongst officials and other educated men, I saw the following:

'"The surrender of Fort No. 2 struck at the root of the principle that a fort 'dies, but does not surrender'—a principle preached and reiterated by myself and all those in command. By the example of the surrender of this fort the garrisons of the others were shaken in their belief that forts are 'holies of holies,' only to be captured after the death of the whole garrison defending them, and were led to consider them as just ordinary fortified positions which can be freely abandoned as soon as their defence becomes difficult. This was proved by the abandonment within ten days of Fort No. 3."

'Only when I became aware of this Note of General Smirnoff's did I understand the drift of the question put to me by the Commission; it was not hard then to see the connexion between the two. It was evident, therefore, that in this important question, as in those which had preceded, the Commission was being guided more by this memorandum of the late Commandant of the Fortress than by the desire for an impartial inquiry into facts.'

Though well on in years, General Fock apparently did not know, and was astonished to hear, that 'forts die, but do not surrender,' that 'the bones of a regiment should surround its fallen colours,' that 'a gun must be fought till not a man is left,' etc. Fock did not know this; he had not seen it laid down in any official text-book!

Naturally he did not and could not know it. Knowledge of the sacredness of duty is not acquired by the perusal of manuals and regulations any more than an honourable feeling is acquiredby reading books of a high moral tone. The duty and honour of the citizen soldier has no written code as its guide, but only the long, brilliant list of great deeds extending from far-off olden times to the present day. Upon these legends, matured by time, nations, their armies, and individuals are brought up. A sense of duty and honour is not obtained by reading, but is imbibed with the mother's milk and developed by later teaching. I doubt if there could be found in any European army (naturally not in the Japanese, where officers and generals are brought up on the ethics of the chivalrous spirit 'Bushido') a general officer who would be surprised to hear that a fort should not surrender. How could a Russian general be ignorant of it? Surely such an assertion is a stain on all the general officers of the Russian army!

No, it is not so. For General Fock's ignorance of the rudiments of military duty one must seek deeper reasons. He was, it appears, in theGendarmerie—where the duties were somewhat different to those of the army—for almost five years. Their atmospheres are totally opposed: the work of the one is to fight an external foe: of the other to fight an internal enemy.

One amongst the many surprises so liberally provided for us by the old régime was Fock's sudden reappearance in the army and arrival in the Far East as Officer Commanding the gallant fighting 4th Division, as the friend and adviser of General Stössel, and, indeed, as the sole individual to work out Arthur's destiny. The defence of a fortress is soldiers' and not gendarmes' work.

'... The specific charge against me was framed as follows:'"In that he, while in command of the Land Defences ordered the abandonment of Fort No. 2 without obtaining the Commandant's permission, and without even letting him know of his intention—an act in which he exceeded his powers, and one which is legislated for by Articles 141 and 145, Book XXII. (third edition), S.V.P., 1869."'This charge is curiously worded. I was accused of exceeding my powers, and yet the Commission was at the same time well aware that I did not abandon the fort of my own free-will, but with the permission of General Stössel, who, being senior to General Smirnoff, had appointed me to command the Land Defences and issued orders to me direct. Consequently there can be no question of my exceeding my powers.'

'... The specific charge against me was framed as follows:

'"In that he, while in command of the Land Defences ordered the abandonment of Fort No. 2 without obtaining the Commandant's permission, and without even letting him know of his intention—an act in which he exceeded his powers, and one which is legislated for by Articles 141 and 145, Book XXII. (third edition), S.V.P., 1869."

'This charge is curiously worded. I was accused of exceeding my powers, and yet the Commission was at the same time well aware that I did not abandon the fort of my own free-will, but with the permission of General Stössel, who, being senior to General Smirnoff, had appointed me to command the Land Defences and issued orders to me direct. Consequently there can be no question of my exceeding my powers.'

According to the exact sense of the regulations on the subject, the Officer Commanding the Land Defences is directly subordinate to the Commandant of the Fortress, and has absolutely no right to abandon forts without his sanction, or without that of the Defence Committee. If General Stössel, having usurped the Commandant's authority, interfered with the defence, and his interference was detrimental to the defence, then Fock should not have obeyed his orders, even though proceeding from the senior officer. On the contrary, he should by every means within his power have endeavoured to counteract such detrimental influence in the same way that Kondratenko did during his lifetime: he should have consulted the Commandant with regard to everything, and have carried out his orders alone. The fact was that Stössel issued all his orders at Fock's instigation, and did nothing without him. He knew so little of what went on at the front that he would never have decided to issue any order himself, and especially such a weighty order as the abandonment of the first fort.

'... However, though the legal accusation of itself falls to the ground, I might perhaps be considered morally guilty of abandoning the fort. The above-quoted Articles of War might be strained, and it might be thought something was wrong about the defence of the fort and its abandonment.'This prevents my confining myself merely to a straightforward answer to the charge and compels me to ask, "Could the fort have held out longer or not?"'On going before the Commission for the first time, I was asked:'"Why did you not defend the fort, and why did you abandon it without a fight, without even waiting for General Gorbatovsky?"'I never expected the Commission to accuse me of such a thing, and I was so agitated that I could not reply calmly. How could I keep cool when I heard the defenders of the fort so unjustly accused by General Roop, the very officer whose words, twenty years ago, had been law to me and all other combatant officers, when for hours together we used to listen to his appreciations and criticisms of manœuvres? He still spoke as well as ever, weighing every word, but spoke with a sarcastic smile; and now that I have read or heard the evidence of all the General Officers who have been examined, I understand that it is possible even for him to have been led astray.'The accusation levelled by General Smirnoff against the brave garrison was supported not only by General Officers who took no part in the defence and had not seen it, but even by General Nickitin, to whom the state of the fort was so well known that he refrained from accompanying General Kondratenko along the forts after the Japanese had mined the parapets. (It is to this that we owed his presence in our midst.) As to General Mekhmandaroff, he even asserted that after the explosion of three mines he could still see sentries standing by the parapet. And General Irman, who was at the time on the western front, based his statement on that given by Mekhmandaroff. The evidence given by the other officers was of equal value.'But however varied the evidence, it all pointed to one thing—that the garrison failed to do its duty, that it did not crown the crater in the parapet. This being so, I should point out that it is usually the attackers who crown craters. At Sevastopol our sappers certainly distinguished themselves by themselves crowning the craters of the unsuccessful attack, but they had not been charged with some fifty hundredweight of pyroxyline, as was the case in Fort No. 2.'

'This prevents my confining myself merely to a straightforward answer to the charge and compels me to ask, "Could the fort have held out longer or not?"

'On going before the Commission for the first time, I was asked:

'"Why did you not defend the fort, and why did you abandon it without a fight, without even waiting for General Gorbatovsky?"

'I never expected the Commission to accuse me of such a thing, and I was so agitated that I could not reply calmly. How could I keep cool when I heard the defenders of the fort so unjustly accused by General Roop, the very officer whose words, twenty years ago, had been law to me and all other combatant officers, when for hours together we used to listen to his appreciations and criticisms of manœuvres? He still spoke as well as ever, weighing every word, but spoke with a sarcastic smile; and now that I have read or heard the evidence of all the General Officers who have been examined, I understand that it is possible even for him to have been led astray.

'The accusation levelled by General Smirnoff against the brave garrison was supported not only by General Officers who took no part in the defence and had not seen it, but even by General Nickitin, to whom the state of the fort was so well known that he refrained from accompanying General Kondratenko along the forts after the Japanese had mined the parapets. (It is to this that we owed his presence in our midst.) As to General Mekhmandaroff, he even asserted that after the explosion of three mines he could still see sentries standing by the parapet. And General Irman, who was at the time on the western front, based his statement on that given by Mekhmandaroff. The evidence given by the other officers was of equal value.

'But however varied the evidence, it all pointed to one thing—that the garrison failed to do its duty, that it did not crown the crater in the parapet. This being so, I should point out that it is usually the attackers who crown craters. At Sevastopol our sappers certainly distinguished themselves by themselves crowning the craters of the unsuccessful attack, but they had not been charged with some fifty hundredweight of pyroxyline, as was the case in Fort No. 2.'

Thus to divert the blame on to the garrison of the fort in order to parry the blow against himself was not creditable. The men did their duty gallantly to the last; they fought till they were ordered to withdraw; they did everything possible, and were in no way to blame for the surrender and had no need of Fock to defend or praise them. If they had not been able to crown the crater by five o'clock, it was Fock alone who was to blame; firstly for having weakened the garrison, secondly for not reinforcing it in time.

'The evidence of the Generals above mentioned was, on the whole, so absurd and so little supported by facts that it does not merit serious attention.'

The evidence of the Generals was founded on facts. They were men who throughout the siege were rarely absent from the attacked front. They were men of honour, whose names are the pride of the army; but this is no reason for treating their evidence as undeserving of attention.

'... That of General Gorbatovsky, however, is different. According to him he went to the fort at 11 p.m., and finding the men leaving it, drove them back, sent for Captain Kwats,who was in command, and threatened him with a court-martial for abandoning it on his own responsibility, and only then found out that the withdrawal was being carried out in accordance with orders from me. This evidence is plausible, and upon it the charge is probably based; for how is it possible to disbelieve the testimony of a General who was in command of the eastern front?'To judge from it, one would think that the abandonment of the fort came as a complete surprise to him; that he thought it wrong, and, that had he himself been in the fort, it would never have been evacuated. I was unable to rebut this evidence at the time, and to assert that the abandonment was not a surprise; besides, no one present would have believed me. Fortunately for me, however, I was not caught tripping. I asked to see the telephone messages referring to that time, and in going through them came on one which I, and doubtless General Gorbatovsky also, had forgotten. This message clears me of his charge, and throws much light on the part taken by him in the abandonment of the fort; it was from him to the Staff of the Land Defences, and was dated 9.35 p.m., December 18, 1904:'"From Fort No. 2 it is reported that heavy casualties are occurring from grenades thrown by the enemy. We have not been able to reoccupy the parapet. I therefore propose to avail myself of your permission to blow up the casemates, and I have ordered the garrison to hold out until the sappers have got the mines ready. As a precautionary measure, and to cover the garrison during the retirement, please move a company, temporarily, from the main reserve to the Ice-house. I am just going myself to Colonel Glagoleff to give the necessary instructions on the spot."'Consequently, at 9.35 that night General Gorbatovsky was not only not opposed to the surrender of the fort, but himself gave orders for it to be abandoned; while at 11 p.m. he was, according to his evidence, horrified at his own order, saw that it was wrong, and talked of courts-martial.'I hope that a study of all the papers similar to these produced before the Commission will acquit me of the charges preferred against me by General Roop's Commission.'

'To judge from it, one would think that the abandonment of the fort came as a complete surprise to him; that he thought it wrong, and, that had he himself been in the fort, it would never have been evacuated. I was unable to rebut this evidence at the time, and to assert that the abandonment was not a surprise; besides, no one present would have believed me. Fortunately for me, however, I was not caught tripping. I asked to see the telephone messages referring to that time, and in going through them came on one which I, and doubtless General Gorbatovsky also, had forgotten. This message clears me of his charge, and throws much light on the part taken by him in the abandonment of the fort; it was from him to the Staff of the Land Defences, and was dated 9.35 p.m., December 18, 1904:

'"From Fort No. 2 it is reported that heavy casualties are occurring from grenades thrown by the enemy. We have not been able to reoccupy the parapet. I therefore propose to avail myself of your permission to blow up the casemates, and I have ordered the garrison to hold out until the sappers have got the mines ready. As a precautionary measure, and to cover the garrison during the retirement, please move a company, temporarily, from the main reserve to the Ice-house. I am just going myself to Colonel Glagoleff to give the necessary instructions on the spot."

'Consequently, at 9.35 that night General Gorbatovsky was not only not opposed to the surrender of the fort, but himself gave orders for it to be abandoned; while at 11 p.m. he was, according to his evidence, horrified at his own order, saw that it was wrong, and talked of courts-martial.

'I hope that a study of all the papers similar to these produced before the Commission will acquit me of the charges preferred against me by General Roop's Commission.'

Quite true! That message was sent by General Gorbatovsky, but only after a telephone message had been received from Fock at 7.40 p.m. to the following effect:

'General Stössel has given orders that the casemates of Fort No. 2 are to be mined at once, and then, if the Japanese do not withdraw from the fort—i.e., from the parapet—the garrison is to leave the fort, and the casemates are to beblown up. The enemy are not to be allowed to establish themselves on the parapet, which must be fired on by the guns and the torpedo tube. In view of Captain Stepanoff's report, to the effect that before sunset he and Colonel Mekhmandaroff could see from Big Eagle's Nest only one Japanese officer and three men on the parapet, laying sand-bags, I leave it to you to hold on to the fort as long as you think necessary. In giving this order, based on my report, General Stössel came to this decision only because he thought that under present circumstances no other course was possible. At sunset a sailor came to me and reported that by the explosion of a bomb thrown by the enemy we had had fifteen casualties.'

As the reader can see for himself, it was impossible to tell from this how Fock meant to act or what he meant to do. Knowing from experience that anything might be expected from him, and that directly after the explosion of the mines during the day he had called the fort lost, Gorbatovsky decided to make all arrangements for a well-organized retirement, and so to avert a possible panic and consequent dash through by the enemy. It was only for this reason that he sent the telegram quoted above by Fock, but he gave no order for the fort to be abandoned.

In reply to his message to Fock, sent at 9.35 p.m., he at once received the following from Colonel Dmitrevsky, Chief of Fock's staff, despatched at 9.40 p.m.:

'General Fock fully concurs in your opinion about Fort No. 2. He trusts that you will see that the repairs to Kuropatkin Lunette are energetically carried out.'

And this was immediately followed by a message to him from Lieutenant Kondrasheff, dated 9.45 p.m., December 18, 1904:

'General Fock, commanding the Land Defences, wishes you to see that all the ammunition and other stores are carried away from Fort No. 2, and that the bridge is destroyed.'

When General Gorbatovsky received these messages he went to the fort. Orders had already been received from General Fock to abandon it, and the withdrawal had begun before his arrival. He had gone to find out the exact state of affairs on the spot, and on reaching it after 11 p.m. he met theretreating garrison. It was such a surprise to him that he 'fell upon' Captain Kwats, threatened to have him tried by court-martial for abandoning the fort without orders, and was in reply informed that it was being left upon an order received direct from Fock.

'However, in order to give a more accurate description of the state of affairs, I will describe the fighting just as I saw and reported it. I described the fight in March to General Roop's Commission, but what I said was doubted.'

Unfortunately, a knowledge of the true state of affairs at the withdrawal from the fort shows that Roop's Commission had formed a true opinion of Fock's account.

'According to General Smirnoff, I so demoralized the men, that on December 18, when the explosion took place, no volunteer could be found among them to crown the crater.'... I am ashamed, not on my own account, but on account of the gallant defenders of the fort, to read Smirnoff's slander concerning them. For what did he take Captain Kwats, the commanding officer, and the men? Had it been necessary for the garrison to be on the parapet, Kwats would have had no difficulty in finding volunteers even at that critical moment. He need only have shouted, "Follow me—advance!" and they would have dashed after him. As I have said above, my evidence as to the fall of the fort is considered by many to be untrue, and more credit is attached to the evidence of General Mekhmandaroff, who said he saw a man on the rampart after the explosion, etc.'

'According to General Smirnoff, I so demoralized the men, that on December 18, when the explosion took place, no volunteer could be found among them to crown the crater.

'... I am ashamed, not on my own account, but on account of the gallant defenders of the fort, to read Smirnoff's slander concerning them. For what did he take Captain Kwats, the commanding officer, and the men? Had it been necessary for the garrison to be on the parapet, Kwats would have had no difficulty in finding volunteers even at that critical moment. He need only have shouted, "Follow me—advance!" and they would have dashed after him. As I have said above, my evidence as to the fall of the fort is considered by many to be untrue, and more credit is attached to the evidence of General Mekhmandaroff, who said he saw a man on the rampart after the explosion, etc.'

To say that Fock demoralized the troops would only be to repeat what has frequently been said. In Arthur no one doubted it. It is in vain that he sheds tears for the garrison; it is his own conduct that is questioned, not the gallantry of the men. That Kwats did not dash forward and take men with him to crown the craters is Fock's fault. It required much presence of mind, and the garrison was much upset.

'After the explosion, which took place at noon, the fort was subjected to a heavy fire, and our men ran to the retrenchment and held it. To this timely occupation of the retrenchment I ascribe the death of many of the Japanese "forlorn hope." Having jumped up on to the parapet and seen that we were there to meet them, they hesitated for a moment, but this moment was long enough for them to be wafted into eternity. They were buried under the falling débris of the explosion.At the same time the Japanese guns opened fire on all our near batteries; and when these were silenced, whole regiments of the enemy stormed the parapet, but were repulsed with case shot and rifle-fire. A few men only reached the craters, whence they began throwing grenades, while we, from the glacis and caponier, fired torpedo-heads and bombs.'

The storming by whole Japanese regiments is pure imagination on the part of Fock, who was at the time at least four miles from the scene of action. Mr. Norregaard,[47]who watched the attack, says that, after the destruction of the first party of stormers by the falling débris and the fire of our batteries, the Japs busied themselves clearing the approaches to the fort and did not assault till evening.

'The heroic garrison were almost all annihilated, when a reserve of sailors was sent up to the fort. I regret that I cannot say to what ship they belonged or what officers were with them; I can only say that from first to last they were heroes.'They had to go from the Chinese Wall through Kuropatkin Lunette, and what was this lunette like by now? Stones, planks, sand-bags, corpses were all jumbled together in the trenches, and at the entrance of that communicating from Fort No. 2 there was not a vestige of a parapet. These men at first ran along the trench, and then, seeing that it was filled up, jumped out to right and left, and under a murderous fire doubled along in the open, officers in front. They rushed to where it entered the fort, which was full of killed and wounded. Some crossed the bridge, others went down into the ditch, jumping from heap to heap.'They entered the fort in order to fill the thinned ranks of the defenders, and seventeen of them were at once blown up by a mine. With their arrival one might have felt confident that the fort would not easily be seized by the Japanese; but darkness came on and the shouts of "Banzai" could still be heard, mingling into one continuous and increasing roar.'The wounded now came back less frequently, but those that came told of horrors. From what they said I understood how difficult it was to cross the ditch, and that few would succeed in doing it; and so, fearing that all means of access would be closed, I asked for the bamboo ladders to be sent up, which had been taken from the enemy on November 26, when they tried to storm Fort No. 3.'The position of the garrison got worse and worse. To get an order taken we had to call for volunteers and offer the Crossof St. George to those who succeeded in carrying it. It was clear to me and to every one else present that the fort could not be held longer under such conditions, and so I thought it my duty to withdraw the remnants of that gallant band at night. I reported this to General Stössel and asked his permission to abandon the fort; he agreed.'I then ordered Colonel Glagoleff to hold on till night, when, after removing everything possible in the way of supplies, he was to withdraw the men and blow up the fort.'At 11.30 p.m. the garrison moved out of the fort, which was blown up at 2 a.m., and retired on Kuropatkin Lunette. It had held out for four months, despite the Japanese having seized the caponier in October, and established themselves in the ditch. Military history contains few instances of such a dogged and prolonged defence.'Next day General Smirnoff had the above quoted conversation with me. In reply to his question as to why I had surrendered the fort, etc., I said:'"I did not need your men; they would only have hampered me."'He seemed surprised at this answer and asked, "Why?"'"Because," I said, "the men would never have reached the place, and then what should I have done? They wouldn't have gone because they couldn't have done it."'"Ah, your men are wasters—runaways!" said he, and then began to talk of them in his usual manner.'I quoted a few instances from history to him—among them some of Austerlitz—in order to show him that some things always had been and always would be; and I finished my remarks by saying:'"It was a pity that you were not taught psychology at the Academy."'

'They had to go from the Chinese Wall through Kuropatkin Lunette, and what was this lunette like by now? Stones, planks, sand-bags, corpses were all jumbled together in the trenches, and at the entrance of that communicating from Fort No. 2 there was not a vestige of a parapet. These men at first ran along the trench, and then, seeing that it was filled up, jumped out to right and left, and under a murderous fire doubled along in the open, officers in front. They rushed to where it entered the fort, which was full of killed and wounded. Some crossed the bridge, others went down into the ditch, jumping from heap to heap.

'They entered the fort in order to fill the thinned ranks of the defenders, and seventeen of them were at once blown up by a mine. With their arrival one might have felt confident that the fort would not easily be seized by the Japanese; but darkness came on and the shouts of "Banzai" could still be heard, mingling into one continuous and increasing roar.

'The wounded now came back less frequently, but those that came told of horrors. From what they said I understood how difficult it was to cross the ditch, and that few would succeed in doing it; and so, fearing that all means of access would be closed, I asked for the bamboo ladders to be sent up, which had been taken from the enemy on November 26, when they tried to storm Fort No. 3.

'The position of the garrison got worse and worse. To get an order taken we had to call for volunteers and offer the Crossof St. George to those who succeeded in carrying it. It was clear to me and to every one else present that the fort could not be held longer under such conditions, and so I thought it my duty to withdraw the remnants of that gallant band at night. I reported this to General Stössel and asked his permission to abandon the fort; he agreed.

'I then ordered Colonel Glagoleff to hold on till night, when, after removing everything possible in the way of supplies, he was to withdraw the men and blow up the fort.

'At 11.30 p.m. the garrison moved out of the fort, which was blown up at 2 a.m., and retired on Kuropatkin Lunette. It had held out for four months, despite the Japanese having seized the caponier in October, and established themselves in the ditch. Military history contains few instances of such a dogged and prolonged defence.

'Next day General Smirnoff had the above quoted conversation with me. In reply to his question as to why I had surrendered the fort, etc., I said:

'"I did not need your men; they would only have hampered me."

'He seemed surprised at this answer and asked, "Why?"

'"Because," I said, "the men would never have reached the place, and then what should I have done? They wouldn't have gone because they couldn't have done it."

'"Ah, your men are wasters—runaways!" said he, and then began to talk of them in his usual manner.

'I quoted a few instances from history to him—among them some of Austerlitz—in order to show him that some things always had been and always would be; and I finished my remarks by saying:

'"It was a pity that you were not taught psychology at the Academy."'

No one denies that the fort was in a very bad way, but such conditions are only to be expected in war where the path to glory is not strewn with roses. As soon as the situation became critical the garrison should have been reinforced, and this Fock did not do. He had decided during the day that the fort could not be held, and for this reason abandoned it.

In repeating his conversation with Smirnoff he perverted the facts, which were, as I have already described in detail in a foregoing chapter. Since he touched on the question of psychology, it would be interesting to know what kind of psychology he himself understood—that of police-work service or of war? Smirnoff certainly did occasionally call the men 'runaways' in conversation with his intimate friends, but hewas far from thinking that the troops could be disobedient. In saying that 'the men would never have reached the place, and then what should I have done?' Fock was himself accurately describing the very demoralization of which he was accused of being the cause. During Kondratenko's life there had been no suggestion of such a spirit.

'After this I felt it was useless to attempt to persuade Smirnoff of anything, for the simple reason that both he and Colonel Khvostoff look upon every one who was not a General officer or an officer of the General Staff in the same way that our great-grandmothers looked upon their serf-handmaidens.'

What General Fock meant by this I really cannot tell.

'Our great-grandmothers said and believed that it was impossible for Palashka to fall in love. In the same way General Smirnoff and Colonel Khvostoff believed that the common soldier had no instinct of self-preservation, and that such need not therefore be taken into consideration. It need only, they thought, be reckoned with in Generals and General Staff officers, who alone have a right to possess it.'Colonel Khvostoff preached this doctrine to General Nickitin in the following words: "Officers of the General Staff are of great value to the Empire, and they should, therefore, take care of their lives."''From General Smirnoff's words, "It undermined the root of the principle which I have always insisted on," it is evident that General Stössel did not harass General Smirnoff as much as the latter sometimes makes out. Moreover, all who went through the siege would like to know in what way Smirnoff insisted on the observance of this principle. Principles can be driven into men by orders, speeches, and examples. He did not do it in his orders, for such as he issued were generally taken up with the transfer of nursing-sisters from one hospital to another. And he was wise, for such orders can only be written by leaders like Tsar Peter, Suvoroff, Napoleon, who are well known to their men. He did not attempt it by speeches; for where, when, and to whom could he speak? Church parades were few, and were rarely attended by more than twenty to thirty men per regiment. For a new, unknown man like General Smirnoff there was only one way left—"example"; but this method was out of date, and its uselessness was shown by Gustavus Adolphus, Nakhimoff, Korniloff, Istomin, and therefore it did not find favour with him!'All this proves that he did not inculcate his principle tothe garrison of Arthur, though undoubtedly future generations will know of it through the medium of Roop's Commission.'

'Colonel Khvostoff preached this doctrine to General Nickitin in the following words: "Officers of the General Staff are of great value to the Empire, and they should, therefore, take care of their lives."'

'From General Smirnoff's words, "It undermined the root of the principle which I have always insisted on," it is evident that General Stössel did not harass General Smirnoff as much as the latter sometimes makes out. Moreover, all who went through the siege would like to know in what way Smirnoff insisted on the observance of this principle. Principles can be driven into men by orders, speeches, and examples. He did not do it in his orders, for such as he issued were generally taken up with the transfer of nursing-sisters from one hospital to another. And he was wise, for such orders can only be written by leaders like Tsar Peter, Suvoroff, Napoleon, who are well known to their men. He did not attempt it by speeches; for where, when, and to whom could he speak? Church parades were few, and were rarely attended by more than twenty to thirty men per regiment. For a new, unknown man like General Smirnoff there was only one way left—"example"; but this method was out of date, and its uselessness was shown by Gustavus Adolphus, Nakhimoff, Korniloff, Istomin, and therefore it did not find favour with him!

'All this proves that he did not inculcate his principle tothe garrison of Arthur, though undoubtedly future generations will know of it through the medium of Roop's Commission.'

It is perfectly true that Smirnoff did not take to speechifying. Together with Kondratenko he worked at the fortifying of the place while General Stössel was haranguing the troops at church parades and writing long orders and detailed telegrams. This principle was not published in orders, as it was well understood by all good officers. Of this there could be no two opinions. Generals Smirnoff, Kondratenko, Gorbatovsky, Irman, and Tretiakoff, who stood at the head of their troops in Arthur, supported by their fearless example—fighting desperately for every inch of ground entrusted to them—and not by their words, this principle, which according to Fock was incomprehensible and silly.

The next generation will know through this Commission how well the garrison of Arthur lived up to that principle, and it will, at the same time, know on whom the responsibility of surrender rests.

'He reproaches the garrison of Fort No. 3 for not hurrying out of the casemate when the explosion took place, though I, and all those at Big Eagle's Nest, saw them fighting for a long time, throwing hand-grenades and stones from the retrenchment.'But it is odd that he should make such charges against anyone when he himself not only made no haste, but did not attempt to leave his quarters when the explosion took place in Fort No. 3 and Fortification No. 3, and when the Chinese Wall, Rocky Ridge, and Big Eagle's Nest were being stormed. That he did not leave his quarters and was practically a stranger to his troops is borne out by the fact that when, after the surrender, the Japanese were taking over the garrison as prisoners, and he began talking to some of the men, they made rude remarks, and were heard asking their officers "who is that General?" As it was the first time that the majority of officers had seen him, they had to reply: "I don't know; wait, I'll ask." Only after inquiries were they able to tell their men, "That is General Smirnoff, the Commandant of the Fortress."'

'But it is odd that he should make such charges against anyone when he himself not only made no haste, but did not attempt to leave his quarters when the explosion took place in Fort No. 3 and Fortification No. 3, and when the Chinese Wall, Rocky Ridge, and Big Eagle's Nest were being stormed. That he did not leave his quarters and was practically a stranger to his troops is borne out by the fact that when, after the surrender, the Japanese were taking over the garrison as prisoners, and he began talking to some of the men, they made rude remarks, and were heard asking their officers "who is that General?" As it was the first time that the majority of officers had seen him, they had to reply: "I don't know; wait, I'll ask." Only after inquiries were they able to tell their men, "That is General Smirnoff, the Commandant of the Fortress."'

Fock, of all people, accused Smirnoff of staying in his quarters, and of being a stranger to the men! In the foregoing pages I have shown by facts what Smirnoff was to the Fortress, what he did for its defence, and how he was thwarted at every turn. As far as is in my power I have tried as clearly and truly as possible to draw the picture of the hopelessness of his position. Fock, suddenly appointed Officer Commanding Land Defences, was indeed the autocrat of the Fortress, for Stössel was to all intents and purposes his subordinate, and Smirnoff was ignored. Having telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, Smirnoff awaited the reply, and till it came he was powerless to do anything, for like a wise man he did not want to make bad worse. But had it come, and had it been favourable to him, he would soon have got everything right. Smirnoff invested with authority would have saved Arthur's honour. Very possibly so many sound men, and so many cripples, would not have returned to Russia, so many decorations would not have glittered on the breasts of officers, and the number of widows and orphans might have been greater; but there would have been no need for any Commission such as that of General Roop. The highest tribunal of the nation would have judged those responsible for the lost campaign, but Arthur would have fallen, and not been surrendered.

'I shall be now believed, perhaps, if I say that no one in Arthur knew of the above-quoted principle, and no one heard tell of it from Smirnoff. I only heard it at General Roop's Commission. When asked, "Did you take any steps to prevent the example of Fort No. 2 being followed, and to ensure that the principle that a garrison should resist to the last should not be forgotten?" I at once understood that the defence was degraded to the level of simple treason, and that they were trying to mock me. Was it not mockery indeed to ask me such a question? The Commission knew that the garrison abandoned the fort not of their own free will but by my order. To this insult I replied as follows:'"No steps were taken or could be taken by me, as the fort was abandoned by my order."'It would have meant I was to take steps against myself—cunning question indeed. I am satisfied with the defence of that fort; nay, proud of what constitutes one of the most brilliant pages of the defence, and will be quoted as an example. By it one principle was taught, namely, that no soldier will leave his post without orders, and that the officer in supreme command will never sacrifice lives needlessly.'I wrote this in February or March, before any of us had seen the translations of the books by English authors on the siege of Port Arthur.'My description of the fighting does not in the least agree with that of either Norregaard or James,[48]and no wonder, as I wrote of what happened under my eyes, and they only wrote what they heard from survivors of the horrors of that day. I was not credited, because with us every one wished, and still wishes, only to believe what will besmirch the fair name of Arthur. This was why only generals were examined by the Commission.'

'"No steps were taken or could be taken by me, as the fort was abandoned by my order."

'It would have meant I was to take steps against myself—cunning question indeed. I am satisfied with the defence of that fort; nay, proud of what constitutes one of the most brilliant pages of the defence, and will be quoted as an example. By it one principle was taught, namely, that no soldier will leave his post without orders, and that the officer in supreme command will never sacrifice lives needlessly.

'I wrote this in February or March, before any of us had seen the translations of the books by English authors on the siege of Port Arthur.

'My description of the fighting does not in the least agree with that of either Norregaard or James,[48]and no wonder, as I wrote of what happened under my eyes, and they only wrote what they heard from survivors of the horrors of that day. I was not credited, because with us every one wished, and still wishes, only to believe what will besmirch the fair name of Arthur. This was why only generals were examined by the Commission.'

He was insulted by the question put to him by the Commission, and in his reply stated that in defending that fort he had inculcated the principle that 'no soldier will leave his post without orders, and that the officer in supreme command will never sacrifice lives needlessly'!

To teach this principle in field warfare is right and proper. But in fortress warfare, when the enemy are pressing on the line of defences, when they are storming the forts, when the fall of one fort may bring on the fall of others, and so lead to greater complications, when there is nowhere to retire to (we had the third line made by Smirnoff, but it was ignored by Fock), a fort must indeed 'die and not surrender.' Thus alone can the spirit and strength of the men in the other forts be kept up.

'But I will return once more to the discussion of General Smirnoff's principle. This dogma could only be instilled into the fresh minds of children, and could not be suddenly introduced during war, for, after one fight the bravest troops in the world would refuse to believe in it. The more experienced and braver a man is, the dearer he wants to sell his life.'But General Smirnoff called the troops "wasters" and "runaways" because they did not remain in the wrecked lodgements upon an order issued by him from his snug room, but ran into others that were whole, and continued fighting. That commanding officer who inspires confidence that he will allow no one to perish needlessly will alone be loved by his officers and men, and may God spare them from feeling that any General is sacrificing their lives for such a principle as that for which I was called to answer.'But it deserves to be examined that we may thoroughlyunderstand on what lines we are to act in the next war. If the matter is clearly settled one way or the other it may in the future spare commanders, who may find themselves in the same position I was in, the horror, the torments to which I have been subjected in hearing the reproaches levelled at me by such a weighty Commission—reproaches which did not touch only me, but also the heroic defenders of the fort.'My acquittal, I feel, is due to the fact that the principle was announced by Smirnoff, and not by Suvoroff or by the Tsar Peter, whose nature would have precluded the enunciation of anything so vague, so abstract.'The birth of pure theory amongst us is synchronous with the arrival upon the scene of a certain type of General, whose influence and work I can best describe indirectly, by quoting a remark made upon its results: "We are ourselves to blame for everything. Where the General was, there were no men; where the men were, there was no General." This was said by a lieutenant-colonel at a conference between the Army and Navy, when remarking on a communication of Lieutenant-Colonel Galkin's, of the General Staff.'Such are the Generals—the originators of principles similar to that announced by General Smirnoff. The Japanese Generals were different. It is true that their Commander-in-Chief and Generals Commanding armies, like Oyama, Nogi, and others, did not command battalions and companies; but the subordinate Generals led their troops—even scouting parties—in the attack, as we more than once witnessed in Arthur. I mention this because, when I once spoke of Japanese Generals sitting in the advanced trenches, some of our Generals, hearing of the gallantry of the Japanese men from Smirnoff, told me that I was incorrect, and that "the wonderful Japanese soldier did not need the presence of a General." But in action things were different. Even "the wonderful Japanese soldier" required to be set an example by his General. Our—according to many—very ordinary soldiers were grateful even for the fleeting presence of a General whom they only saw passing by.'Put into simple language, the question asked me by the Commission, as to what steps I had taken to see that the principle that "the garrison of a fort should resist to the last" was not shaken, means that a Commander must not allow a single man to come out of a fort alive.'(a) If regulations permit the surrender of afortressunder certain conditions, how can they be construed to forbid the abandonment of afort, when its defenders might be useful in defending other works of the same fortress?'(b) Is it desirable that a unit told off to the defence of a fort should go to it feeling like men who went across "the Bridge of Sighs" in Venice?'Was it possible for me to literally carry out this principle in practice?'Fort No. 2, according to Norregaard, for some hours resembled a "witch's cauldron," vomiting fire, smoke and flames from the bursting of countless shimose shells, hand-grenades and torpedoes. Behind the sand-bags our handful of men were repelling with rifle and machine-gun the numerous assaults. The Japanese cut off their communication with the Fortress; reinforcements were not received, and the number of defenders dwindled. The enemy pounded them continuously, and the hours of the fort were numbered.'Such was its state at the moment when I had to decide whether to save that handful of brave men, or to sacrifice them for the sake of General Smirnoff's "principle."'I preferred the first alternative—not from feelings of humanity, but because I could not take the other; every one else in my place would have done the same. To judge my action fairly, it must be borne in mind that I was not sitting before a green-topped Committee table when I had to make this decision, nor in General Smirnoff's comfortable quarters, but was near the Chinese Wall.[49]Far from being in comfort and security, I was at a place that would have suffered the next blow after the fall of Fort No. 2.'How I should decide this question was vital to the men—if I should become their executioner or would act as they expected me to. It was by no means immaterial to me either; for I should be judged by my action, and upon it would depend in the future how others fought.'Though General Smirnoff never left his quarters during the fight, it did not prevent him reporting it as follows:'Page 33. "At 11 p.m. I knew that Fort No. 2 had already been abandoned by our troops and its casemates blown up. This was done by Captain Kwats, who had only been appointed to command it that day, under instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Glagoleff commanding the section, who was acting on orders received from General Fock, without even waiting for the arrival of General Gorbatovsky, who was in supreme command on that flank.'Page 34. "Meanwhile General Stössel, feeling that it was a very bad business, issued an order, dated December 27, No. 961, based on untrue reports made to him by Captain Kwats and Colonel Glagoleff, in which he made out that the whole shameful affair was a great exploit.... Ten days later the example of Fort No. 2 was followed by the abandonment of Fort No. 3, which forced the Council of Defence and myself to the conclusion that there was an understandingbetween Generals Stössel and Fock to reduce the Fortress in the shortest possible time to such a condition as would justify a capitulation."'As regards General Smirnoff's opinion that the abandonment of Fort No. 2 was due to treachery on the part of General Stössel and myself, I am silent; but I cannot allow him to call its surrender shameful. This opinion of his bears witness to the fact that between him and the defenders of Arthur there was about as much in common as between the baby and the mother who said, "Divide it," when Solomon had ordered half of the baby to be given to each mother.'

'But General Smirnoff called the troops "wasters" and "runaways" because they did not remain in the wrecked lodgements upon an order issued by him from his snug room, but ran into others that were whole, and continued fighting. That commanding officer who inspires confidence that he will allow no one to perish needlessly will alone be loved by his officers and men, and may God spare them from feeling that any General is sacrificing their lives for such a principle as that for which I was called to answer.

'But it deserves to be examined that we may thoroughlyunderstand on what lines we are to act in the next war. If the matter is clearly settled one way or the other it may in the future spare commanders, who may find themselves in the same position I was in, the horror, the torments to which I have been subjected in hearing the reproaches levelled at me by such a weighty Commission—reproaches which did not touch only me, but also the heroic defenders of the fort.

'My acquittal, I feel, is due to the fact that the principle was announced by Smirnoff, and not by Suvoroff or by the Tsar Peter, whose nature would have precluded the enunciation of anything so vague, so abstract.

'The birth of pure theory amongst us is synchronous with the arrival upon the scene of a certain type of General, whose influence and work I can best describe indirectly, by quoting a remark made upon its results: "We are ourselves to blame for everything. Where the General was, there were no men; where the men were, there was no General." This was said by a lieutenant-colonel at a conference between the Army and Navy, when remarking on a communication of Lieutenant-Colonel Galkin's, of the General Staff.

'Such are the Generals—the originators of principles similar to that announced by General Smirnoff. The Japanese Generals were different. It is true that their Commander-in-Chief and Generals Commanding armies, like Oyama, Nogi, and others, did not command battalions and companies; but the subordinate Generals led their troops—even scouting parties—in the attack, as we more than once witnessed in Arthur. I mention this because, when I once spoke of Japanese Generals sitting in the advanced trenches, some of our Generals, hearing of the gallantry of the Japanese men from Smirnoff, told me that I was incorrect, and that "the wonderful Japanese soldier did not need the presence of a General." But in action things were different. Even "the wonderful Japanese soldier" required to be set an example by his General. Our—according to many—very ordinary soldiers were grateful even for the fleeting presence of a General whom they only saw passing by.

'Put into simple language, the question asked me by the Commission, as to what steps I had taken to see that the principle that "the garrison of a fort should resist to the last" was not shaken, means that a Commander must not allow a single man to come out of a fort alive.

'(a) If regulations permit the surrender of afortressunder certain conditions, how can they be construed to forbid the abandonment of afort, when its defenders might be useful in defending other works of the same fortress?

'(b) Is it desirable that a unit told off to the defence of a fort should go to it feeling like men who went across "the Bridge of Sighs" in Venice?

'Was it possible for me to literally carry out this principle in practice?

'Fort No. 2, according to Norregaard, for some hours resembled a "witch's cauldron," vomiting fire, smoke and flames from the bursting of countless shimose shells, hand-grenades and torpedoes. Behind the sand-bags our handful of men were repelling with rifle and machine-gun the numerous assaults. The Japanese cut off their communication with the Fortress; reinforcements were not received, and the number of defenders dwindled. The enemy pounded them continuously, and the hours of the fort were numbered.

'Such was its state at the moment when I had to decide whether to save that handful of brave men, or to sacrifice them for the sake of General Smirnoff's "principle."

'I preferred the first alternative—not from feelings of humanity, but because I could not take the other; every one else in my place would have done the same. To judge my action fairly, it must be borne in mind that I was not sitting before a green-topped Committee table when I had to make this decision, nor in General Smirnoff's comfortable quarters, but was near the Chinese Wall.[49]Far from being in comfort and security, I was at a place that would have suffered the next blow after the fall of Fort No. 2.

'How I should decide this question was vital to the men—if I should become their executioner or would act as they expected me to. It was by no means immaterial to me either; for I should be judged by my action, and upon it would depend in the future how others fought.

'Though General Smirnoff never left his quarters during the fight, it did not prevent him reporting it as follows:

'Page 33. "At 11 p.m. I knew that Fort No. 2 had already been abandoned by our troops and its casemates blown up. This was done by Captain Kwats, who had only been appointed to command it that day, under instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Glagoleff commanding the section, who was acting on orders received from General Fock, without even waiting for the arrival of General Gorbatovsky, who was in supreme command on that flank.

'Page 34. "Meanwhile General Stössel, feeling that it was a very bad business, issued an order, dated December 27, No. 961, based on untrue reports made to him by Captain Kwats and Colonel Glagoleff, in which he made out that the whole shameful affair was a great exploit.... Ten days later the example of Fort No. 2 was followed by the abandonment of Fort No. 3, which forced the Council of Defence and myself to the conclusion that there was an understandingbetween Generals Stössel and Fock to reduce the Fortress in the shortest possible time to such a condition as would justify a capitulation."

'As regards General Smirnoff's opinion that the abandonment of Fort No. 2 was due to treachery on the part of General Stössel and myself, I am silent; but I cannot allow him to call its surrender shameful. This opinion of his bears witness to the fact that between him and the defenders of Arthur there was about as much in common as between the baby and the mother who said, "Divide it," when Solomon had ordered half of the baby to be given to each mother.'

The principle of the non-surrender of a fort should be instilled into all soldiers from the day they join. A good soldier knows that he must be the first to lay down his life for his country in war, and remembers during the whole of a campaign that success is founded on a clear appreciation of the principle of self-sacrifice by all, from Commander-in-Chief to private soldier.

War is a death summons.

Death is the soldier's crown.

Every soldier—that is, in the true sense of the word, one who is willing to die in the struggle—sees in death the highest end of his calling. By this feeling he exalts themoralof his comrades to an extent which ensures victory in the end.

Under the circumstances of modern war it is more than ever necessary that this spirit should be instilled into the individual as well as into the mass, for the surroundings of a modern battle are more harrowing than they were in old days. Success in war will be to that side in which this feeling is most deep, which is best equipped, and which possesses the most skilful and heroic leaders.

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