This depends chiefly on man's future destiny.(A.) The Immortality of Man.By this is meant the personal immortality of man's spirit, and there are four chief arguments in its favour:(1.) From his unique position.(2.) From his unjust treatment.(3.) From his vast capabilities.(4.) From his inherent belief.(5.) Counter-arguments.(B.) The Probability of a Revelation.(1.) From God's character; since He would be likely to benefit man.(2.) From man's character; since he desires it, and his unique position makes him not altogether unworthy of it.(3.) Two difficulties: a revelation is said to be unjust, if only given to certain men; and anyhow incredible unless quite convincing. But neither of these can be maintained.
This depends chiefly on man's future destiny.(A.) The Immortality of Man.By this is meant the personal immortality of man's spirit, and there are four chief arguments in its favour:(1.) From his unique position.(2.) From his unjust treatment.(3.) From his vast capabilities.(4.) From his inherent belief.(5.) Counter-arguments.(B.) The Probability of a Revelation.(1.) From God's character; since He would be likely to benefit man.(2.) From man's character; since he desires it, and his unique position makes him not altogether unworthy of it.(3.) Two difficulties: a revelation is said to be unjust, if only given to certain men; and anyhow incredible unless quite convincing. But neither of these can be maintained.
This depends chiefly on man's future destiny.
(A.) The Immortality of Man.
By this is meant the personal immortality of man's spirit, and there are four chief arguments in its favour:
(1.) From his unique position.
(2.) From his unjust treatment.
(3.) From his vast capabilities.
(4.) From his inherent belief.
(5.) Counter-arguments.
(B.) The Probability of a Revelation.
(1.) From God's character; since He would be likely to benefit man.
(2.) From man's character; since he desires it, and his unique position makes him not altogether unworthy of it.
(3.) Two difficulties: a revelation is said to be unjust, if only given to certain men; and anyhow incredible unless quite convincing. But neither of these can be maintained.
We decided in the last two chapters that man is a free and responsible being, and that God takes an interest in his welfare. We now come to the subject of aRevelation, by which is meant any superhuman knowledge directly imparted by God to man. And bysuperhumanknowledge is meant any knowledge which man could not obtain for himself; such as God's object in creating him, His wishes in regard to his conduct, orany past or future events of which he would otherwise be ignorant. And that God could, if He chose, impart such knowledge, either by visions, or dreams, or in some other way, can scarcely be disputed. Nor will anyone affirm (least of all an Agnostic) that we know enough about God to be quite sure that He never would choose to do so. Therefore a revelation is certainlypossible; but is it at allprobable? This is what we have to examine. And as the answer to it will depend to a great extent on man's future destiny, we will first consider the question of hisImmortality, and then the probability, or otherwise, of God's making aRevelationto him.
By this is meant the immortality of man'sspirit. And if we admit (as was admitted inIV.) that man is a compound being, consisting of a free and partly supernatural spirit, his realself, which controls his body and mind; what becomes of this spirit at death? We know what becomes of the body: the various molecules are arranged in other groups, and the natural forces are changed into other natural forces. Nothing is lost or annihilated. But what becomes of the spirit? If this is a free supernatural force, the idea that it should perish altogether, when the accompanying natural forces are re-arranged at death, is most unlikely. Indeed the apparent indestructibility of matter points to a corresponding immortality of spirit.
No doubt God could,if He chose, destroy either, just as He could create either; but without some supernatural interference, the creation or destruction ofeither seems incredible. Yet if a man's spirit is not destroyed, it must survive; for it does not seem to have any separate parts into which it can be split up like a man's body. Therefore, as it cannot undergo the only kind of death of which we have any knowledge (which is this re-arrangement of separate parts), it may survive for ever. And there are four chief arguments in favour of this personal immortality of man;—those derived from hisunique position; hisunjust treatment; hisvast capabilities; and hisinherent belief. We will consider each in turn, and then see what can be said on the other side.
The first argument is from man'sunique position, more especially when we regard him as the last and noblest result of the vast scheme of evolution, which has been in progress here for so many thousands of years. For such a vast scheme, like everything else, requires not only acause, but apurpose; and however much evolution can explain, it cannot explain itself. Why should there have been any evolution at all? Why should a universe of dead matter have ever produced life? There must have been some motive in all this, and what adequate motive can be suggested?
We can only look for an answer inman, who is not only the highest creature on this planet, but as far as we know on any planet; so here if anywhere we must find the explanation. Evolution would then haveGodfor its Cause, andmanfor its purpose—an undoubtedly adequateCause, but is it an adequatepurpose? Forthe human race cannot exist for ever as it is. Everything points to this earth sooner or later falling into the sun, when all forms of life must cease. Therefore, if man is not immortal, the whole of evolution which has led up to him as its final end will still have had nopermanentresult. And no result which is not permanent seems altogether worthy of the Eternal God, the Author of this evolution.
But if, on the other hand, man is immortal; and if this earth, with its strange mixture of good and evil, is a suitable place in which to test and form his character; and if perhaps God wishes hereafter to be surrounded by men who have stood the test, and have formed their character in accordance with His Will; then it may lead to apermanentresult. And then its creation would not be such a hopeless mystery as on the opposite theory; for the perfecting of immortal beings seems an object worthy even of God.
Thus if we deny the immortality of man, the whole of evolution becomes meaningless, and nature is a riddle without a solution. But if we admit it, there is at least the possibility of a satisfactory answer. For then, as just said, nature is seen to be onlya means to an end—a temporary (though perhaps necessary) means to a permanent end—the end being to produceman(a free being), and then to provide a suitable place for his moral training. And this will enable him, if he wishes, from being afreeman, to become also arighteousman, that is, a man who acts right, though he might act wrong, and thus to some extent worthy to share in his Maker's immortality.And we must remember, man could not have been created righteous, using the word in its strict sense. He might have been createdperfect(like a machine), orinnocent(like a child), but to berighteousrequires, as just said, his own co-operation—his continually choosing to act right, though he might act wrong. And this of necessity is a slow process, with some failures. But the end aimed at is a permanent, and therefore perhaps an adequate, end; and the present world seems exactly suited to attain this end, as it affords a man boundless opportunities (every day, if he likes to use them) of acting right, though he might act wrong.
We thus seem forced to the conclusion—however strange it may appear—that the gradual training and perfecting ofmanis the only adequate explanation of the world, the real object of its long evolution. Yet, if he is notimmortal, this object can never be attained, for no one reaches moral perfection here; while even if they did, it would only last for a short time. And we may ask, is it likely that such a vast scheme should end in failure, or at most in only a temporary success? Is it not rather probable that if man is the end of evolution, then God, the Author of evolution, must value him; and if God values him, He is not likely to let him perish for ever. In short (as it has been well put), such vast progress from such small beginnings points to an end proportionately great, and this involves the immortality of man. On the whole, then, we may say in the words of Romanes, one of the great champions of evolution, that 'only by means of this theory ofprobation is it possible to give any meaning to the world,i.e., anyraison d'êtreof human existence.'[8]
[8]Thoughts on Religion, 1895, p. 142.
[8]Thoughts on Religion, 1895, p. 142.
The second argument is from man'sunjust treatmentin this world. For as we saw in the last chapter, God is a Moral Being, able to distinguish right from wrong; and, as far as we can judge, He is One Who will always act right Himself. Yet His treatment of men in this world seems most unjust. Wicked men are allowed to prosper by their wickedness, good men suffer unjustly, while some men's lives seem to be nothing but suffering; and how is this to be accounted for?
There is here again one, and only one, satisfactory explanation, which is that this life is not the whole of man's existence, but only a preparation for afuture life—a short trial for a long hereafter. And, looked at from this point of view, the most apparently miserable lives may afford as valuable training, perhaps more so, than the outwardly happy ones. The temptation to dishonesty, for example, can be as well resisted by a poor man who is only tempted to steal sixpence, as by a rich man who is tempted to embezzle a thousand pounds.
And if resisting such a temptation helps to form a man's character, as it certainly does, and hence, perhaps, to fit him for a better life hereafter, this can be as well done in the one case as in the other. And the same principle applies universally; even a child has his temptations, which are very realto the child, though they may seem ridiculous to us. So if this life isintended as a time of probation in which to form a man's character, we cannot imagine a better system or one more admirably adapted to the end in view. And we must remember a man'scharacteris the thing most worth forming, since (as far as we can judge) it is his onlypermanentpossession. All else will be surrendered at death, but his character will last as long as the man himself, and hence perhaps for ever.
Nor is this all, for these trials and sufferings themselves may be the very means of adding to man's future happiness. The joy of having resisted temptation, for instance, would be impossible if men were never tempted; and the joy of rescuing others from suffering and sin, and thus perhaps making everlasting friendships, would be impossible if there were no suffering, and no sin. And the same applies in other cases. So man's probation in this life, with its incessant battle against evil, may (for all we know) increase his future happiness in a way which nothing else could possibly do, and to an extent of which we can form no conception. No pain or suffering, then, can be looked upon as useless, and no position in this world as one to be despised; in short, to anyone who believes in a future state, life is always worth living. And we may be sure that in a future state every injustice will be made good, and all wrongs will be righted.
The third argument is from man'svast capabilities. For he does not seem adapted to this life only, but has aspirations and longings far beyond it. His powersseem capable of continual and almost endless development. Nearly all men wish for immortality. This life does not seem to satisfy them entirely. For instance, men, especially scientific men, have a longing after knowledge which can never be fully realised in this world. A man's capacities are thus out of all proportion to his destiny, if this life is all; and to many it seems improbable that the Creator should have endowed men with such needless and useless capacities.
And this is strongly confirmed by the analogy of nature. For example, a bird in an egg shows rudimentary organs which cannot be used as long as it remains in the egg; and this of itself is a proof that it is intended some day to leave the egg. On the other hand, a full-grown bird seems to be entirely adapted to its present state, and not to have any longing after, or capacity for, any higher state; therefore we may infer that no higher state is intended for it. And by the same reasoning we may infer that some higher state is intended for man, as his mental and spiritual nature is not entirely satisfied by his present life. In short, all animals seem made for this world alone, and man is the only unsatisfied being in the universe.
Moreover, the period of preparation in a man's life seems out of all proportion to the time prepared for, if death ends all. The development in a man's moral character often continues till nearly the close of his life. His character has then reached maturity. But for what is it matured? Surely not for immediate destruction. Must not the wise Creator, Who designed everythingelse with such marvellous skill, have intended something better for His noblest creatures than mere boundless capabilities, unsatisfied longings, and a lifelong preparation all for nothing?
The fourth argument is from man'sbeliefin immortality. For such a belief has existed among men in nearly every age and country, learned and ignorant, civilised and uncivilised. It was implied by the pre-historic men who buried food and weapons with their dead, and it was maintained by such philosophers as Socrates and Plato, and how are we to account for it? It cannot have arisen from experience; and the attempts to explain it as due to the desire which men have for immortality, or to someone occasionally dreaming that he sees a departed friend, are quite inadequate. Desire is not conviction, and dreams are notoriously untrustworthy. They might account for an individual here and there entertaining this belief, but not for mankind always and everywhere doing so; especially in face of the apparent contradiction afforded by every grave.
The belief, then, seems intuitive, and an inherent part of human nature; and we may ask, is it likely that God should have implanted such a strange belief in man if it were erroneous?
These, then, are the four great arguments in favour of man's immortality—those derived from his unique position; his unjust treatment; his vast capabilities; and his inherent belief. And with the doubtful exception of the second, not one of them applies toanimals; so the common objection, that if man is immortal, animals must be so too, is quite untenable.
On the other hand, the great and only important argumentagainstman's immortality is that his spirit seems to be inseparably connected with his body. As far as we can judge, it is born with the body; it often inherits the moral character of its parents, just as the body inherits bodily diseases; it certainly develops and matures with the body; and in most cases it seems to gradually decay with the body; therefore it is inferred the two perish together.
But this does not follow; since, as said inChapter IV., it is not thesamebody (in the sense of the same material particles) with which the spirit is united, even in this life. It is united to a continually changing body, yet it always survives. So it is not unlikely that it may survive the still greater change at death. Moreover, it is united to the body as itsmaster, not its servant. It is, as already shown, afreespirit; and it decides to a great extent what the body shall say, and what it shall do. It thus uses the body as a means, or instrument, by which to act in the outer world; and therefore, of course, when the instrument gets out of order, its actions will become confused, but without implying that the spirit itself is so. In the same way, if we shut up a clerk in a telegraph office, as soon as his instruments get out of order, the messages he sends, which are his only means of communicating with the outer world, will become confused, and finallycease, but without implying that there is anything wrong with the clerk himself.
And this is confirmed by the fact that instances are known in which a man's intellect and will have remained quite vigorous all through a mortal sickness, and up to the very moment of death; so the gradual decay of the body does not necessarily involve that of the mind and spirit. While in states which somewhat resemble death, when, for instance, the body is fast asleep, or rendered unconscious by an accident, the mind and spirit are often peculiarly active, as in dreams. Therefore, when the body is really dead, the spirit may (for all we know) not only survive, but be endowed with still greater powers.
On the whole, then, this is not an insuperable difficulty; while the previous arguments render the idea of a future lifedistinctly probable. And this has, of course, a most important bearing on our next question; indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that the probability of a revelation depends on that of a future life. For if death ends all, man's existence is so short that a revelation can scarcely be thought probable; but if he is to live for ever, the case is very different.
Now (assuming man to be immortal) a revelation, from whichever side we regard it, appears to be somewhatprobable. For God is a Being, Who seems likely to make a revelation; and man is a being exactly fitted to receive one; so we will consider these points first, and then the chief difficulties.
Now we have already shown that God takes an interest in man's welfare, being not only beneficent, butrighteous; and that He apparently wishes to train and develop man's character, so that he may be righteous also. And from this we may infer that if a revelation would benefit man, and thushelphim to be righteous also, it would not be improbable for God to make one. And that the knowledge given by a revelation might influence him in this way cannot be denied; for, as a matter of fact, such knowledge, either real or pretended, has had precisely this effect on millions of men.
We may also infer from God's methods in nature, which are those of slow development, that if He made a revelation at all it would be donegradually. At first it would be very simple, and such as could be transmitted orally. Then when man acquired the art of writing, and could thus hand it on accurately, a more definite revelation might be given. And this again might become more and more perfect, as man himself became more perfect. We obviously do not know enough to speak with confidence, but still God's character, so far as we can judge of it, seems to be in favour of His making some revelation—and that aprogressiverevelation—to man.
Passing on now to man's character, we find that he has been given a nature exactly fitted to receive a revelation. For religion of some kind is, and always has been, practically universal; and nearly all importantreligions have rested on real or pretended revelations from God, and have been accepted in consequence. In other words the nature of man has everywhere led him to seek for, demand, and, if need be, imagine a revelation from God. Nor is this in any way surprising, for a thoughtful man cannot helpwishingto know why he is placed in this world; why he is given free will; how he is meant to use his freedom; and what future, if any, is in store for him hereafter: in short, what was God's object in creating him. It seems of all knowledge to be the highest, the noblest, the most worth knowing.
And therefore as this result of man's nature was not only brought about by God, but must have been foreknown, and intended by Him, it is not improbable that He should satisfy it; especially as it cannot be satisfied in any other way, for the knowledge being superhuman, is out of man's own reach. And it may be added, the more we realise this, and feel that God isUnknowable, in the sense that we can gain no satisfactory knowledge about Him by human science and reasoning, so much the more likely does it seem that He should give us such knowledge by revelation.
And all this is strengthened when we consider man'sunique positionto which we have already alluded. For if we admit that the creation and perfecting of man is the chief object the Creator had in view for so many thousands of years, it does not seem unlikely that He might wish to hold some communication with him. In fact, as the whole of nature shows design or purpose; and as man occupies a special place in nature; we mayfairly conclude that God has some special purpose in regard to man, and, for all we know, He may have something special to tell him about it.
We conclude then that man's character, and the unique position he occupies on this earth, is a strong argument in favour of his receiving some revelation from God.
But now for the other side. There are two chief difficulties. The first is on the ground ofinjustice; since any revelation, it is said, would imply a partiality to the men or nation to whom it was given, and would therefore be unjust to the rest of mankind. But this is quite untenable, for God's other benefits are not bestowed impartially. On the contrary, pleasure and pain, good and evil, are never equally distributed in this world. What seems to be partiality and favouritism is the rule everywhere, and this without any apparent merit on the part of the men concerned. Moreover, the advantages of a revelation may not concern this world only. And all who believe in a future life are convinced of God's justice, and that men will only be judged according to the knowledge of His Will which they possessed, or might have possessed had they chosen, and not according to any higher standard which was out of their reach.
The other and more important difficulty is, that if God gave a revelation at all, it would be absolutelyconvincing. Everything that God does He does well; and we cannot, it is urged, imagine His making a revelation to man, and yet doing it so imperfectly asto leave men in doubt as to whether He had done it or not. For this would imply that He either could not, or would not, make the evidence sufficient to ensure conviction, neither of which is credible.
Now, though all this seems very probable, a moment's reflection will show that it is not conclusive; for exactly the same may be said in regard to the whole of Natural Religion. Is it likely, for instance, that God should create free and responsible men, and yet give them such insufficient evidence about it, that while many are fully convinced, others deny not only their own freedom and responsibility, but even the existence of the God Who made them? Yet He has done so. Therefore there is nothing improbable in the evidence for a revelation, if one were given, being of a similar character.
Indeed, there is much to be said in favour of its being so, since in most other matters man is left a free choice. He is often able to find out how he ought to think and how he ought to act, but he is not forced to do either. And God may have wished that the same rule should be followed in regard to a revelation, and that man should be left free to believe it or not, just as he is left free to act on it or not, if he does believe it, and just as he is left free to choose right or wrong in other cases. Therefore we cannot say that no revelation can come from God unless the evidence for it is overwhelming. It would doubtless be sufficient to convince a man if he took the trouble to examine it carefully; only it need not be such as to compel conviction. What kind of evidence we may expect will be considered in the next chapter.
Neither of these difficulties, then, is at all serious; and we are forced back to the conclusion that, provided man is immortal, a revelation seems for several reasons to be somewhat probable. To put it shortly, if God is good and really cares for man's welfare, it seems unlikely that He should withhold from him that knowledge which is the highest, the noblest, and the most longed for;—the knowledge of Himself. While, if man is a free and immortal being, occupying a unique position in the world, and intended to live for ever, it seems unlikely that he should be told nothing, and therefore know nothing, as to why he was created, or what is his future destiny. Thus when we consider both God's character and man's character, it seems on the whole to be somewhatprobable, that God would make a revelation to man; telling him how he ought to use his freedom in this world, and possibly what future is in store for him hereafter.
A Divine messenger would probably have credentials.(A.) Superhuman Signs.These include superhumanknowledge, afterwards verified (such as prophecy), and superhumancoincidences; and there is nothing incredible in either.(B.) Supernatural Signs,or Miracles.These are 'marvels specially worked by God as signs to confirm a revelation.' This definition is threefold, referring to their outward appearance, cause, and purpose.(1.)Miracles as marvels: though they seem to be contrary to experience, they are not really so, for we have no experience of the proper kind to refer to.(2.)Miracles as special works of God: they only interfere with the uniformity of nature in the same way that human works interfere with it.(3.)Miracles as signs: there is nothing to show that they are inconsistent with God's Character.
A Divine messenger would probably have credentials.(A.) Superhuman Signs.These include superhumanknowledge, afterwards verified (such as prophecy), and superhumancoincidences; and there is nothing incredible in either.(B.) Supernatural Signs,or Miracles.These are 'marvels specially worked by God as signs to confirm a revelation.' This definition is threefold, referring to their outward appearance, cause, and purpose.(1.)Miracles as marvels: though they seem to be contrary to experience, they are not really so, for we have no experience of the proper kind to refer to.(2.)Miracles as special works of God: they only interfere with the uniformity of nature in the same way that human works interfere with it.(3.)Miracles as signs: there is nothing to show that they are inconsistent with God's Character.
A Divine messenger would probably have credentials.
(A.) Superhuman Signs.
These include superhumanknowledge, afterwards verified (such as prophecy), and superhumancoincidences; and there is nothing incredible in either.
(B.) Supernatural Signs,or Miracles.
These are 'marvels specially worked by God as signs to confirm a revelation.' This definition is threefold, referring to their outward appearance, cause, and purpose.
(1.)Miracles as marvels: though they seem to be contrary to experience, they are not really so, for we have no experience of the proper kind to refer to.
(2.)Miracles as special works of God: they only interfere with the uniformity of nature in the same way that human works interfere with it.
(3.)Miracles as signs: there is nothing to show that they are inconsistent with God's Character.
We decided in the last chapter that it was somewhat probable for God to make a revelation to man, that is to say, to certain men, for them to make known to others. And if so, it is also probable that these men would have some means of showing that the knowledge had come from God and not from themselves. In other words, if God sends a message to man, it is probable that the messenger would havecredentials. Andthis is especially so when we remember that men have often appeared in the world's history who professed to have a revelation from God, and have misled mankind in consequence. Is it not probable, then, that if God really did give a revelation, He would take care that His true messengers should have credentials which would distinguish them from all the others?
These credentials, then, orsigns, must plainly be such as could not be imitated by man; and must therefore of necessity besuperhuman, if notsupernatural. So we may divide them into these two classes; and we have now to consider whether they arecredible. By this is meant something more than merely possible; for the possibility of such signs follows at once from the existence of God. But are they credible? is there, that is, at least a slight chance that they would occur?
These include, to begin with, superhumanknowledge, which can be afterwards verified, such asprophecy. And there is no difficulty here, provided we admit a revelation at all. The only possible objection refers to prophecies regarding human conduct; which it may be said would interfere with man's freedom. But this is only part of the more general objection that any foreknowledge on God's part would interfere with man's freedom, which we have already considered inChapter II.; and there is no special difficulty in regard to prophecies. In every case, as said before, God merely foreknows the use man will make of his freedom. Therefore the event will not occurbecauseitwas foretold, but rather it was foretold because God knew that it would occur.
Superhumancoincidencesform another, and very important class of superhuman signs. In these a man's acts or sayings are confirmed by natural eventscoincidingwith them in a remarkable manner. For example, suppose a prophet claimed to have a revelation from God; and, as a proof of this, invited the people to witness a sacrifice on a cloudless day. He then killed an animal, and placed it on an altar of stones, but put no fire under it, and even threw water over it. Suddenly, however, a thunderstorm arose, and the sacrifice was struck by lightning. Now the thunderstorm might have arisen and the lightning might have struck on that particular spot, in strict accordance with natural laws. Yet thecoincidenceof this occurring just when and where the prophet wanted it, would tend strongly to show that God, Who must have foreknown and designed the coincidence, meant to confirm what the prophet said.
Or, to put the argument in other words, the lightning would seem to have struck the sacrificeon purpose; and therefore such events have been popularly described asnatural forces acting rationally. Of course, as a rule, the forces of nature do not act rationally. A falling meteorite, for instance, does not go a yard out of its way to kill anyone, or to spare him. Man, on the other hand, does act rationally. His acts are directed for a purpose, and thus show design. And, in the events we are considering, the forces of nature seem also to act with a purpose; and this makes itprobable that the Author of these forces was really acting with this purpose. In short, the events seem to have been not onlysuperhuman, butdesignedcoincidences. And they present no difficulty whatever from a scientific point of view, as they are part of the ordinary course of nature.
Of course, the value of such coincidences varies greatly according to whether the event is of a usual or unusual character. In the latter case, more especially if the event is very unusual or the coincidence very striking, they are popularly called miracles. And they may have considerable value, though there is always a slight chance of the agreement being, as we might say, accidental.
We pass on now to supernatural signs orMiraclesin the strict sense; which we will define asmarvels specially worked by God as signs to confirm a revelation. This definition has, of course, been chosen so as to suit the miracles recorded in the Bible, and it is really threefold. In the first place, a miracle is described as to its outwardappearance. It is a marvel—that is to say, a strange and unusual event, which we cannot account for, and which thus attracts attention. Secondly, it is described as to itscause. This marvel is said to have been specially worked by God—that is to say, by some action on His part different from His usual action in nature. While, lastly, it is described as to itspurpose; it is a marvel worked by God as a sign to confirm a revelation.
The first of these aspects is expressed in the OldTestament by the wordwonder, the second by such phrases as God'smighty handoroutstretched arm, and the third by the wordsign; all these terms being often used together. While in the New Testament the words used arewonders,mighty works, andsigns, which again exactly correspond to these three aspects of the miracles. And it should be noticed these aspects are not chosen merely to suit the present argument, since other events can and ought to be looked at in the same way, not as mere facts, but also with reference to their alleged cause and purpose. And to show the great importance of this, we will consider an event from modern history; and select the well-known example of the Mont Cenis Tunnel.
Suppose, then, that anyone heard of this as amarvelonly, the cause and purpose being left out of account. Suppose, that is, he heard that a small straight cavity of uniform size, and several miles long, had been formed under a range of mountains; and that it had begun as two cavities, one from each end, which after years of growth, had exactly met in the middle. He would at once pronounce the event incredible, for the cavity is quite unlike all natural cavities.
But now suppose the next point, as to itscause, to be introduced. It is said to be something more than a natural cavity, and to be the work of man. All previous difficulties would now vanish, but fresh ones would arise. For numbers of men must have worked together for years to excavate such a cavity, and from what we know of human nature, men will only do this for commercial or profitable ends, and not for boringuseless holes through mountains; so the event is still practically incredible.
But now suppose the last point ofpurposeto be introduced. It is said that this is not a mere useless hole bored through a mountain; but a hole bored for a particular purpose; it is, in fact, a railway tunnel. Then all difficulties would disappear. Of course, whether we believe the tunnel was actually made depends upon what evidence we have; but it is clear that when we consider thecauseby which, and thepurposefor which, it is said to have been made, there is nothing incredible about it.
Now a similar method must be adopted in regard to miracles. They must not be regarded simply asmarvels, but as marvels said to have been brought about by an adequatecause, and for a sufficientpurpose. And it is just these elements of cause and purpose which may make the marvels credible. We will consider these points in turn.
The first aspect of miracles is that of marvels. As such, they are events which seem to becontrary to our experience—contrary, that is, to what our experience of apparently similar events would lead us to expect. Suppose, for instance, it were stated that on one occasion three men were thrown into a furnace, but instead of being burnt to death they walked about, and in a few minutes came out alive and unhurt.
Such a marvel would be contrary to our experience, and that it would be thereforevery improbableis obvious. But is this improbability sufficient in allcases to make the event incredible, no matter what testimony there may be in its favour? Hume's argument that it is sufficient is well known. He says we can only judge of the probability of anything, whether it be the occurrence of an event, or the truthfulness of the narrator, byexperience. And as it is contrary to experience for miracles to be true, but not contrary to experience for testimony to be false, the balance of probability must always be against the miracle.
But of course this reasoning, if true, must apply to all alleged events which are contrary to experience; and yet such events have occurred by the thousand. Let us take a single example. Everyone has had some experience as to how far it is possible to hear the human voice distinctly, and till the last half century, the limit has always been fixed at a few hundred yards. Now, suppose anyone were told for the first time that it was possible to speak right across England, he would justly say that it was utterly contrary to experience. No one, he would think, could possibly speak loud enough to be heard even twenty miles away. But ought he to add that it was therefore incredible?
From this it is clear that there must be some flaw in Hume's argument; and it is easily discovered. For the argument regards the event only as a marvel, andwithout reference to its cause. But we have no right to leave this out of account, nor do we in ordinary affairs. When anyone first hears of a marvel, he does not merely compare it with his previous experience, and then come to a decision; in which case, as Hume supposes, it might be always against the marvel. Buthe first inquires how this strange event is said to have been brought about. For if any cause is stated to have been at work as to the influence of which he knows nothing, then he has no experience of the proper kind to appeal to. There is the testimony in favour of the event as before; and if he disbelieves it, he does so, not because it is contrary to his experience, but because he thinks the supposed cause either did not exist, or would not have had the effect asserted.
A reference to the previous example will make this quite plain. When the man first heard of persons talking across England, instead of at once declaring it incredible, he would, if a reasonable man, inquire as to thecauseof this. He would then be told that a wire was stretched across England with an instrument called a telephone at each end. Now, as to the possibility or adequacy of such a contrivance he might doubt a good deal; but one thing would be quite clear, that this was a case to which his experience, however large, did not apply.
Here, then, is the explanation of Hume's argument. So long as a marvel, contrary to experience, is regardedonlyas a marvel, the probability must be always against its truth. But if we inquire as to how it was brought about, and find that somecauseis said to have been at work, as to the influence of which we are ignorant, then the argument is no longer applicable. We have simply no experience of the proper kind to appeal to.
Now this is precisely the case with regard to miracles. As marvels they seem contrary to experience; but theyclaim to have a specialcause, to be specially worked by God—that is to say, by some action on His part different from His usual action in nature; and of the influence of this cause we have no experience whatever. We may, of course, deny its existence or doubt its adequacy; but the argument, that the event is contrary to experience, vanishes.
It is clear then that the fact of miracles appearing to be contrary to experience is no reason for disbelievingthem, though it might be a reason for disbelieving other alleged marvels, because they claim to have a special cause, by which to account for this special character. We have now to examine whether this special cause really existed—that is to say, we pass on to the second aspect of the miracles; our conclusion thus far being that they are credible asmarvels, if it be credible that they werespecially worked by God.
Now, any special action on God's part is often thought to present great difficulties, as interfering with the uniformity of nature. But, as we shall see, it would only interfere with it in the same way that human action interferes with it. Neither of them violates the laws of nature, though both are able to bring about results which nature of itself could not have brought about.
In the case of human action this is quite obvious. Suppose, for example, a clock with an iron pendulum is placed on a table and keeps perfect time. Suddenly, without anyone touching it, it begins to gain rapidly,and then, after a short time, goes on as before. To anyone unacquainted with the cause, this would appear amarvel: and might even be thought incredible, as (assuming the clock to be properly constructed) it would seem to imply some alteration in the laws of motion, or the force of gravity. Yet we know a man can easily produce such a marvel by holding a magnet under the table. The disturbing cause, it will be noticed, was not really the magnet, which always acts according to law; nor the hand which held it; but the action of thehuman willon matter. This took place in the man's brain, and enabled him to move first his hand, and then the magnet. Thus we may say the marvel was produced bynatural means supernaturally applied; for the magnet was undoubtedly a natural means, yet nature of itself would never have used it in the way described. It required somethingabovenature (somethingsuper-natural) and this was the free will of man.
Now, miracles claim to have been produced in a somewhat similar, though to us unknown, manner by the action of God's Will on matter, that is to say, by natural means supernaturally applied; and, if so, they are certainly credible, under this head. For we know that God has the power of acting on matter, and that He used it once in creating the universe, so He might use it again if He thought fit.
Moreover, God's knowledge of the laws of nature is complete, while man's is only partial. As, then, man, with his limited power over nature and partial knowledge of its laws, can produce marvels so unlikenature's ordinary course (a steam engine, for instance), yet without violating any of its laws; still more can God, Who has complete power over nature, and complete knowledge of its laws. For to deny this would be to deny to God the power which we concede to man; and which we must remember, God Himself has given to man. And this would lead to the strange conclusion that God has enabled man to do what He cannot do Himself. No doubt we cannot imaginehowGod can exert His Will over matter, but neither can we imagine how we can do it ourselves. The difficulty is as great in the one case as in the other.
From this it is clear that miracles need not violate natural laws. And though at first one might be inclined to dispute this with regard to particular miracles; the statement is quite correct, provided we make due allowance for our own ignorance. Take, for example, the supposed case of the men in the furnace. We certainly do not know how their bodies were kept cool, but we cannot say it was impossible. For extreme heat, and evenextremecold, may be very close together, as is shown by the well-known experiment of freezing mercury inside a red-hot crucible. As a mere marvel this is quite as wonderful as the men in the furnace; and an ignorant man would probably pronounce both to be equally incredible.
Or, to take another example, suppose it were said that on one occasion a few loaves of bread were miraculously increased so as to feed some thousands of persons: could we say that this must have violated natural laws? Certainly not, for bread is composed of carbon,and other elements, which were in abundance all round. And though we only know one way of forming them into bread, which is by means of a living plant, we cannot say that this is the only method. Indeed, there is nothing incredible in substances like bread being made artificially some day. Of course in all marvels produced byman, we know the special cause at work, but this does not justify us in saying that in a miracle, merely because we do not know it, the laws of nature must be violated.
Moreover there is much to be said in favour of what is usually called God'simmanencein nature, but which would perhaps be better described asnature's immanence in God.[9]This means that all natural forces are due to the present and immediate action of God's Will; and if it is correct, it greatly lessens the difficulty as to miracles. For then there would be no interference with nature at all, leave alone violating its laws, God would be working there all the time, only in a miracle He would not be working in exactly the same way as in ordinary events.
[9]Acts 17. 28; Col. 1. 17.
[9]Acts 17. 28; Col. 1. 17.
But in any case there is, as we have shown, nothing incredible in the way in which miracles are said to becaused, provided it is credible that God should wish to use His power over nature in the assumed manner; for natural forces are anyhow His servants, not His masters. And this brings us to the third aspect of the miracles; for whether God would wish to act in a certain way depends of course on whatpurposeHe had in doing so.
Now the purpose for which miracles are said to be worked is assigns to confirm a revelation. Therefore, since we have already shown that it is somewhat probable that God would make a revelation, we have now only to inquire whether miracles are suitable means for confirming it. And they appear to be the most suitable means possible; for they would both attract men's attention to the revelation, and also convince them of its superhuman character; which are precisely the two points required.
It may still be objected, however, that God's character, as shown by nature, isUnchangeable; and therefore it is most improbable that He would at times act in a special manner with regard to natural events. And the more nature is studied the stronger does this objection appear; since there are thousands of cases, such as storms and earthquakes, when it seems to us that a slight interference with nature would be most beneficial to man, yet it never occurs. Or the objection may be otherwise expressed by saying that a miracle would reflect on either the Wisdom or the Power of God; since, if All-Wise, He would have foreseen the occasion, and if All-Powerful, He would have provided for it; so any subsequent interference with nature is something like having to remedy a fault.
This is no doubt the most serious objection to miracles, but it is by no means insuperable. For, to begin with, God is aFree Being, Who does not always act the same (Chapter I.). And when we turn to the only other free being we know of, which is man himself,what do we find? A man may, as a rule, act uniformly, yet on some special occasion, and for some special reason, he may, and often does, act differently; and why should not God do the same? Indeed the only changelessness in a man which we could admire, would be that ofmoral character, always and invariably acting right. And for all we know the changelessness of God may be only of such a kind, and this certainly would not prevent Him from acting in some special manner, in order to obtain some special purpose.
Secondly, in the case before us, it is even probable that He would do so, since the chief object of the miracles could not have been obtained by the ordinary course of nature, though their immediate effects might have been. For example, instead of healing men miraculously, they might be healed naturally; but then there would be no evidence that the healer was sent by God, and was speaking in His name. In short, the messenger would be withoutcredentials; and, as we have already shown, this seems unlikely.
Thirdly, though miracles do not show God's changelessness in the same manner as the unchanging course of nature, they are not inconsistent with it. For no one supposes them to beafter-thoughtswith God, but to have been planned from the very beginning. And if God always intended to make a revelation to man, and always intended that when He did so, He would confirm it by miracles, they would involve no inconsistency or change on His part.
Fourthly, there may be someotherattributes of God which miracles show, and which the ordinarycourse of nature does not; such as His superiority over nature itself on the one hand, and the interest He takes in man on the other. One object of a revelation might be to convince man that though God was the Ruler of the Universe, He yet cared for man's happiness and valued his affections. And how could such a revelationas this, be better confirmed than by an (apparent) interference with nature for the benefit of man. For this would show, as nothing else could show, both that there was a Beingabovenature, and that He cared for manmorethan He cared for nature.
And it entirely agrees with what we decided in the last chapter, that the whole of nature seems to be only a means to an end, the end being the moral training of man, enabling, that is, a free man to become arighteousman. And if so, it is out of the question to think thatin order to further this end—the very end for which nature itself exists—God might not, if He thought fit, interfere with the course of nature. We may therefore answer the objection in one sentence, God isAll-Good, as well as All-Wise, and All-Powerful; and His Goodness might induce Him to use miracles, though by His Wisdom and Power He might have dispensed with them.
We may now sum up the present argument. We showed that miracles are credible both asmarvelsand asspecial works of God, if it be credible that they were brought about assigns to confirm a revelation. And we have now shown that, supposing God to make a revelation, which we have already admitted, there is nothing inconsistent with His character as far as weknow it, and therefore nothing in the slightest degree incredible, in His using such signs, as one of the means of confirming its truth. On the whole, then, we conclude that a Miraculous Revelation is certainlycredible. Whether one has ever been made will be discussed in the following chapters.