“It was only fair—and it was also a right recognised by all nations nowadays—that Turkey should be set on an equal footing with her former allies. The flagrant inequality proffered by the draft of the treaty will be bitterly resented not only by 12 million Turks, but throughout the Moslem world.“Nothing, indeed, can equal the rigour of the draft of the Turkish treaty. As a matter of fact, it is a dismemberment.“Not only do the Allies, in the name of the principle of nationalities, detach important provinces from the Ottoman Empire which they erect to the rank of free, independent States (Armenia and the Hejaz), or independent States under the protection of a mandatory Power (Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria); not only do they wrench from it Egypt, Suez, and Cyprus, which are to be ceded to Great Britain; not only do they require Turkey to give up all her rights and titles to Libya and the States of the Ægean Sea: they even mean to strip her, notwithstanding the said principle of nationalities, of Eastern Thrace and the zone of Smyrna, which countries, in a most iniquitous way, would be handed over to Greece, who wants to be set on an equal footing with the victors, though she has not even been at war with Turkey.“Further, they are preparing to take Kurdistan and in an indirect way to slice the rest of the country into zones of influence.“In this way more than two-thirds of the extent of the Ottoman Empire would already be taken from it. With regard to the number of inhabitants, it would be at least two-thirds. If we consider the economic wealth and natural resources of the country, the proportion would be greater still.“But that is not all. To this spoliation, the draft of the treaty adds a notorious infringement on the sovereignty of the Ottoman State. Even at Constantinople Turkey would not be her own mistress. Side by side with His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish Government—or even above them in some cases—a ‘Commission of the Straits’ would rule over the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles. Turkey would not even be represented in this Commission, whereas Bulgaria would send a representative to it.“In addition to these two powers, there would be a third one—the military power exercised by the troops of occupation of three States, whose headquarters would have the upper hand even of the Ottoman gendarmerie.“Any possibility of mere defence against an attack would thus be taken away from Turkey, whose capital would henceforth be within the range of her enemies’ guns.“The sovereignty of the State would also be deeply infringed upon in all matters relating to legislation, international treaties, finance, administration, jurisdiction, trade, etc., so that finally the crippled Ottoman Empire would be stripped of every attribute of sovereignty both at home and abroad, but would be held responsible all the same for the execution of the Peace Treaty and the international obligations pertaining to every State.“Such a situation, which would be an utter denial of justice, would constitute both a logical impossibility and a judicial anomaly. For, on the one hand, it is impossible to maintain a State and at the same time divest it of all that is an essential judicial condition of its existence; and, on the other hand, there cannot be any responsibility where there is no liberty.“Either the Allied Powers are of opinion that Turkey should continue to exist, in which case they should make it possible for her to live and fulfil her engagements by paying due regard to her rights as a free, responsible State.“Or the Allied Powers want Turkey to die. They should then execute their own sentence themselves, without asking the culprit—to whom they did not even give a hearing—to append his signature to it and bring them his co-operation.”
“It was only fair—and it was also a right recognised by all nations nowadays—that Turkey should be set on an equal footing with her former allies. The flagrant inequality proffered by the draft of the treaty will be bitterly resented not only by 12 million Turks, but throughout the Moslem world.
“Nothing, indeed, can equal the rigour of the draft of the Turkish treaty. As a matter of fact, it is a dismemberment.
“Not only do the Allies, in the name of the principle of nationalities, detach important provinces from the Ottoman Empire which they erect to the rank of free, independent States (Armenia and the Hejaz), or independent States under the protection of a mandatory Power (Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria); not only do they wrench from it Egypt, Suez, and Cyprus, which are to be ceded to Great Britain; not only do they require Turkey to give up all her rights and titles to Libya and the States of the Ægean Sea: they even mean to strip her, notwithstanding the said principle of nationalities, of Eastern Thrace and the zone of Smyrna, which countries, in a most iniquitous way, would be handed over to Greece, who wants to be set on an equal footing with the victors, though she has not even been at war with Turkey.
“Further, they are preparing to take Kurdistan and in an indirect way to slice the rest of the country into zones of influence.
“In this way more than two-thirds of the extent of the Ottoman Empire would already be taken from it. With regard to the number of inhabitants, it would be at least two-thirds. If we consider the economic wealth and natural resources of the country, the proportion would be greater still.
“But that is not all. To this spoliation, the draft of the treaty adds a notorious infringement on the sovereignty of the Ottoman State. Even at Constantinople Turkey would not be her own mistress. Side by side with His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish Government—or even above them in some cases—a ‘Commission of the Straits’ would rule over the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles. Turkey would not even be represented in this Commission, whereas Bulgaria would send a representative to it.
“In addition to these two powers, there would be a third one—the military power exercised by the troops of occupation of three States, whose headquarters would have the upper hand even of the Ottoman gendarmerie.
“Any possibility of mere defence against an attack would thus be taken away from Turkey, whose capital would henceforth be within the range of her enemies’ guns.
“The sovereignty of the State would also be deeply infringed upon in all matters relating to legislation, international treaties, finance, administration, jurisdiction, trade, etc., so that finally the crippled Ottoman Empire would be stripped of every attribute of sovereignty both at home and abroad, but would be held responsible all the same for the execution of the Peace Treaty and the international obligations pertaining to every State.
“Such a situation, which would be an utter denial of justice, would constitute both a logical impossibility and a judicial anomaly. For, on the one hand, it is impossible to maintain a State and at the same time divest it of all that is an essential judicial condition of its existence; and, on the other hand, there cannot be any responsibility where there is no liberty.
“Either the Allied Powers are of opinion that Turkey should continue to exist, in which case they should make it possible for her to live and fulfil her engagements by paying due regard to her rights as a free, responsible State.
“Or the Allied Powers want Turkey to die. They should then execute their own sentence themselves, without asking the culprit—to whom they did not even give a hearing—to append his signature to it and bring them his co-operation.”
After these general considerations and some remarks as to the responsibility of Turkey, the fundamental rights of the State, and the right of free disposal of peoples, the Ottoman Government made counter-proposals which were quite legitimate, and at the same time bore witness to its goodwill.
This document, to which we refer the reader for further particulars, may be summed up as follows: The Turkish Government recognises the new States of Poland, Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, and Czecho-Slovakia. It confirms the recognition made by Turkey in 1918 of Armenia as a free, independent State. It also recognises the Hejaz as a free, independent State. It recognises the French protectorate over Tunis. It accepts all economic, commercial, and other consequences of the French protectorate over Morocco, which was not a Turkish province. It renounces all rights and privileges over Libya and the isles and islets of the Ægean Sea. It recognises Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, as independent States. It recognises the British protectorate over Egypt, the free passage of the Suez Canal, the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Soudan, the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain.
In regard to Constantinople and the régime of the zone of the Straits, the Ottoman delegation remarked that according to the terms of the treaty there would be together in that town—
“First, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish Government, whose rights and titles shall be maintained.“Secondly, the Commission of the Straits.“Thirdly, the military powers of occupation.“Fourthly, the diplomatic representatives of France, Britain, and Italy, deliberating in a kind of council with themilitary and naval commanders of the Franco-Anglo-Italian forces.”
“First, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish Government, whose rights and titles shall be maintained.
“Secondly, the Commission of the Straits.
“Thirdly, the military powers of occupation.
“Fourthly, the diplomatic representatives of France, Britain, and Italy, deliberating in a kind of council with themilitary and naval commanders of the Franco-Anglo-Italian forces.”
With them would be—
“Fifthly, the Inter-Allied Commissioners of Control and Military Organisation.“Sixthly, the Commission of Finance.“Seventhly, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.“Eighthly, the consuls’ jurisdictions.”
“Fifthly, the Inter-Allied Commissioners of Control and Military Organisation.
“Sixthly, the Commission of Finance.
“Seventhly, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.
“Eighthly, the consuls’ jurisdictions.”
After going over all the objections raised by the coexistence of these various bodies, whose powers would encroach upon each other or would be exactly similar, and the impossibility that foreign agents accredited to the Sultan should hold such functions, the memorandum opposed the following reasons to the decisions of the Conference:
“First, the draft of the treaty does not in any way institutean international judicial and political organisationof the Straits.“Secondly, it institutes a political and military power on behalf ofsomeStates, attended with all the international risks pertaining to it.“Thirdly, with regard to Turkey it would constitutea direct and deep infringement on her rights of sovereignty, preservation, and security, which infringements are not necessary to safeguard the freedom of passageof the Straits.“Fourthly, from an international point of view the intended régime would create a kind ofinternational moral person by the side of the States, which would not represent the League of Nations.“Fifthly, the new international condition of Turkey would in some respects be inferior to that of the new States consisting of territories detached from Turkey, for these new States would be placed under the mandate of a Powerappointed by the League of Nationsmainly in accordance withthe wishes of the populations concerned, and bound to give a periodical account to the League of Nations of the exercise of its mandate.“Sixthly, far from ensuring the internationalisation of the Straits, which was aimed at by the Powers, the régime institutedby the draft of the treaty wouldfavour their nationalisation by another State.“The internationalisation of the Straits could only be realised by means of an international organisation—viz.,a judicial organisation representing all the Powers.”
“First, the draft of the treaty does not in any way institutean international judicial and political organisationof the Straits.
“Secondly, it institutes a political and military power on behalf ofsomeStates, attended with all the international risks pertaining to it.
“Thirdly, with regard to Turkey it would constitutea direct and deep infringement on her rights of sovereignty, preservation, and security, which infringements are not necessary to safeguard the freedom of passageof the Straits.
“Fourthly, from an international point of view the intended régime would create a kind ofinternational moral person by the side of the States, which would not represent the League of Nations.
“Fifthly, the new international condition of Turkey would in some respects be inferior to that of the new States consisting of territories detached from Turkey, for these new States would be placed under the mandate of a Powerappointed by the League of Nationsmainly in accordance withthe wishes of the populations concerned, and bound to give a periodical account to the League of Nations of the exercise of its mandate.
“Sixthly, far from ensuring the internationalisation of the Straits, which was aimed at by the Powers, the régime institutedby the draft of the treaty wouldfavour their nationalisation by another State.
“The internationalisation of the Straits could only be realised by means of an international organisation—viz.,a judicial organisation representing all the Powers.”
Therefore, the Government allows the free passage of the Straits, but asks that they should be controlled only by the League of Nations, and that the Straits zones mentioned in the scheme of internationalisation “should be reduced territorially to what is necessary to guarantee the free passage of the Straits.” Turkey declares herself ready to accept “this scheme, if restricted to the Straits zone, whose frontiers were fixed as follows”:
“(a) In Europe the Sharkeui-Karachali line, thus including all the Gallipoli Peninsula.“(b) In Asia a line passing through Kara-Bigha (on the Sea of Marmora), Bigha, Ezine, and Behramkeui.”
“(a) In Europe the Sharkeui-Karachali line, thus including all the Gallipoli Peninsula.
“(b) In Asia a line passing through Kara-Bigha (on the Sea of Marmora), Bigha, Ezine, and Behramkeui.”
She thus agrees to “all restrictions to her sovereignty over the Straits that are necessary to control the navigation and ensure their opening to all flags on a footing of complete equality between the States.”
Further,
“As regards all matters concerning the region of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, the Ottoman Government is willing to discuss a convention instituting for these waters a régime of the same kind as the one established for the Suez Canal by the Constantinople treaty of October 29, 1888, the very régime advocated by Great Britain (Art. 109).”
“As regards all matters concerning the region of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, the Ottoman Government is willing to discuss a convention instituting for these waters a régime of the same kind as the one established for the Suez Canal by the Constantinople treaty of October 29, 1888, the very régime advocated by Great Britain (Art. 109).”
The Ottoman Government—this article, together with the one concerning the Hejaz that will be mentioned later on, was the most important addition in the revised answer drawn up at Constantinople—wishes the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, lying before the entrance to the Dardanelles, to be includedin the zone of the Straits—that is to say, to remain Ottoman territories under inter-Allied occupation. The Allies intended to give these islands to Greece, and it was feared in Constantinople the latter might hand them over to another Power—England, for instance—that would cede her Cyprus in exchange.
Among a great many measures intended for ensuring the security of Constantinople, the Ottoman Government chiefly asks for the limitation of the number of foreign warships allowed to stay in Turkish waters.
It wants to maintain, under Ottoman sovereignty, Eastern Thrace within its pre-war boundaries, and Smyrna with the surrounding area, which shall be evacuated by Hellenic troops, and may be occupied for three years at the utmost by troops of the chief Allied Powers.
The Ottoman Government asks for an international inquiry to fix the frontiers of Kurdistan according to the principle of nationalities, in case the Kurds—who, it firmly believes, are “indissolubly attached to His Majesty the Sultan,” and who “have never wished, and will never have the least desire, to be completely independent or even to relax the bonds that link them with the Turkish people”—should express the wish to enjoy local autonomy. The intended frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia should also be altered, for otherwise it would cut off from the Ottoman Empire a predominantly Turkish population; “an international commission should make a thorough inquiry with a view to ascertain facts from an ethnic point of view.”
It also wants the King of the Hejaz to pledge himselfto respect the titles and prerogatives of the Sultan as Caliph over the holy cities and places of Mecca and Medina.
Lastly, it declares itself ready to accept, without asking for reciprocity, the clauses concerning the protection of minorities.
Meanwhile the Greeks seemed eager to carry on their campaign in Asia Minor, without even waiting for the definite settlement of the treaty. According to information sent from Greece,33the Hellenic army, having reached all its objectives, was waiting for the decisions of the Spa Conference, and if the latter wished her to carry on her operations in Asia Minor, her fourth objective would probably be Eskishehr, the nucleus of the Anatolian railways, which commands all the traffic and revictualling of Asia Minor, and whose fall would perhaps bring the war to an end.
The Allied answer to the Turkish request for further delays and to the Turkish remarks was handed to the Ottoman delegation on July 17.
In this answer, the main lines or perhaps even the very words of which had been settled at Spa, the Allies only repeated their previous arguments—some of which were ineffective and others unfounded; and both the letter and the spirit of the answer were most unconciliatory.
The assertion that “Turkey entered into the war without the shadow of an excuse or provocation,” recurred again in it and was fully enlarged upon. The events that had taken place lately and thecharacter they had assumed since the end of hostilities did not seem to have taught the writers or instigators of the answer anything at all. We do not wish here to mitigate in any way the responsibilities of Turkey or her wrongs to the Allies; yet we should not overlook the most legitimate reasons that drove her to act thus, and we must own she had a right to mistrust the promises made to her. For the policy that the Allies pursued at that time and that they have not wholly repudiated obviously proved that they would give a free hand to Russia to carry out her ambitious schemes on Constantinople and Turkey-in-Asia, as a reward for her energetic share in the war.
Besides, a fact helps us to understand how Turkey was driven to enter into the war and accounts for her apprehension of England and the Anglo-Hellenic policy pursued by England in relation with her later on, both in the working out of the Sèvres treaty and after the signature of this treaty; it is the proposition made by England to Greece to attack Turkey. According to the letter that M. Venizelos addressed to King Constantine on September 7, 1914, sending in his resignation, which was not accepted by the King, Admiral Kerr, the very man whom later on, in 1920, the British Government was to entrust with a mission to the Hellenic King while he was at Lucerne, formally waited upon the latter to urge him to attack Turkey. The King is said to have laid down as a necessary condition to his consent that Britain should guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria and should contrive to bring Turkey to afford him a pretext for opening hostilities. Admiral Kerr, speaking on behalf ofthe British Government, is reported to have given him full guarantee on the first point; but with reference to the second point he hinted that he thought it unnecessary to seek for a pretext or wait for a provocation as the Hellenic policy constantly evinced a feeling of hostility towards Turkey.34
In this answer the Allies again reproached the Turks with their atrocities—without mentioning the atrocities committed by the Armenians against the Turks; and yet at that time Mr. Lloyd George seemed to have wholly forgotten the German atrocities, for he did not say a word about the punishment of the war criminals, and seemed ready to make concessions as to the reparations stipulated in the treaty with Germany. Why should the Turks be chastised—as was said at the time—if the other criminals were not punished? Was it merely because they were weaker and less guilty than the Germans?
Though it was a palpable falsehood, it was asserted again in this document that in Thrace the Moslems were not in a majority.
The Powers also gravely affirmed they contemplated for Smyrna “about the same régime as for Dantzig,” which could not greatly please either the Greeks or the Turks, judging from the condition of the Poles in the Baltic port; but they did not add that perhaps in this case too England would finally control the port.
“With regard to the control of the Straits,” said the document, “the Powers must unhesitatingly takeadequate measures to prevent the Turkish Government from treacherously trampling upon the cause of civilisation.” It seemed to be forgotten that Turkey insisted upon keeping them in order to prevent Russia from seizing them; and at the very time when the note was drawn up some newspapers declared—which might have sufficed to justify the Turkish claim—that the passage of the Straits must be free in order to allow the Allies to send munitions to Wrangel’s army.
The Allies, however, decided to grant to “Turkey, as a riparian Power and in the same manner and on the same conditions as to Bulgaria, the right to appoint a delegate to the Commission and the suppression of the clause through which Turkey was to surrender to the Allied Governments all steamers of 1,600 tons upwards.” These were the only two concessions made to Turkey.
The Allies’ answer laid great stress upon the advantages offered by the organisation of a financial control of Turkey, which, to quote the document itself, “was introduced for no other purpose than to protect Turkey against the corruption and speculation which had ruined her in the past.” As a matter of fact, that corruption and speculation had been let loose in Turkey by the Great Powers themselves, under cover of the privileges given by the Capitulations.
Judging from the very words of the clause which left Constantinople in the hands of the Turks, the Allies seemed to allow this merely out of condescension, and even alleged that the territory left to Turkey as a sovereign State was “a large and productive territory.”
Finally, the note concluded with the following threat:
“If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace, still more if it finds itself unable to re-establish its sovereignty in Anatolia or to give effect to the treaty, the Allies, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider the arrangement by ejecting the Turks from Europe once and for all.”
“If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace, still more if it finds itself unable to re-establish its sovereignty in Anatolia or to give effect to the treaty, the Allies, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider the arrangement by ejecting the Turks from Europe once and for all.”
These lines plainly show that some Powers had not given up the idea of ejecting the Turks from Europe, and were only awaiting an opportunity that might warrant another European intervention to carry out their plans and satisfy their ambition; and yet this policy, as will be seen later on, went against their own interests and those of Old Europe.
The idea that the British Premier entertained of the important strategic and commercial consequences that would ensue if the Near East were taken away from Turkish sovereignty was obviously contradictory to the historical part played by Turkey; and by disregarding the influence of Turkey in European affairs in the past and the present, he made a grievous political mistake. If one day Germany, having become a strong nation again, should offer her support to Turkey, cut to pieces by England, all the Turks in Asia might remember Mr. Lloyd George’s policy, especially as M. Venizelos might then have been replaced by Constantine or the like.
Turkey was granted a period of ten days, expiring on July 27 at 12 midnight, to let the Allies definitely know whether she accepted the clauses of the treaty and intended to sign it.
This comminatory answer did not come as a surprise. Mr. Lloyd George openly said he wasconvinced the Greeks would be as successful in Thrace as they had been in Asia Minor, which was easy to foresee but did not mean much for the future; and he thought he was justified in declaring with some self-satisfaction before the Commons on July 21, 1920—
“The Great Powers had kept the Turk together not because of any particular confidence they had in him, but because they were afraid of what might happen if he disappeared.“The late war has completely put an end to that state of things. Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point of view we have no reason to regret it.”
“The Great Powers had kept the Turk together not because of any particular confidence they had in him, but because they were afraid of what might happen if he disappeared.
“The late war has completely put an end to that state of things. Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point of view we have no reason to regret it.”
The Greek troops, supported by an Anglo-Hellenic naval group, including two British dreadnoughts, effected a landing in the ports of Erekli, Sultan Keui (where they met with no resistance), and Rodosto, which was occupied in the afternoon.
The Hellenic forces landed on the coasts of the Marmora reached the Chorlu-Muradli line on the railway, and their immediate objective was the occupation of the Adrianople-Constantinople railway in order to cut off all communications between Jafer Tayar’s troops and the Nationalist elements of the capital, and capture Lule Burgas. From this position they would be able to threaten Jafer Tayar and Huhi ed Din on their flanks and rear in order to compel them to withdraw their troops from the Maritza, or run the risk of being encircled if they did not cross the Bulgarian frontier.
The Greek operations against Adrianople began on July 20. The Turkish Nationalists had dug a network of trenches on the right bank of the Tunja, which flows by Adrianople; they offered some resistance, and bombarded the bridgeheads of Kuleli Burgas and of the suburbs of Karagatch, threemiles from Adrianople, where the Greeks had taken their stand for over a month. But on Saturday, July 24, the confident spirit of the Turkish civilians and officers suddenly broke down when it was known that the Greeks had landed on the shores of the Marmora, had reached Lule Burgas, and threatened to encircle the troops that defended Adrianople. In the absence of Jafer Tayar, who had repaired to the front, the officers suddenly left the town without letting it be known whether they were going to Northern Thrace or withdrawing to Bulgaria, and the soldiers, leaving the trenches in their turn, scattered all over Adrianople. The white flag was hoisted during the night, and the next day at daybreak a delegation, including Shevket Bey, mayor of the town, the mufti, the heads of the Orthodox and Jewish religious communities, repaired to the Hellenic outposts, at Karagatch, to ask the Greeks to occupy the town at once. At 10 o’clock the troops marched into the town, and by 12 they occupied the Konak, the prefect’s mansion, where the Turks had left everything—archives, furniture, carpets, and so on.
Meanwhile, it was reported that 12,000 Turks who had refused to surrender and accept Greek domination crossed the Bulgarian frontier.
As soon as the Grand Vizier came back to Constantinople a conflict arose between the latter, who maintained Turkey was compelled to sign the treaty, and some members of the Cabinet. As the Grand Vizier, who was in favour of the ratification, hesitated to summon the Crown Council, the Minister of Public Works, Fakhr ed Din, Minister of Public Education,Reshid, Minister of Finance and provisional Minister of the Interior, and the Sheik-ul-Islam, who all wanted the Council to be summoned, are said to have offered their resignation, which was not accepted by the Sultan—or at any rate was no more heard of.
On July 20 the Sultan summoned a Council of the Imperial Family, including the Sultanas, and on July 22 the Crown Council, consisting of fifty-five of the most prominent men in Turkey, among whom were five generals, a few senators, the members of the Cabinet, and some members of the former Government. The Grand Vizier spoke first, and declared Turkey could not do otherwise than sign the treaty. All the members of the Council supported the Government’s decision, with the exception of Marshal Fuad, who had already used his influence with the Sultan in favour of the Nationalists and who said the Turks should die rather than sign such a peace, and of Riza Pasha, who had commanded the artillery before the war, who said Turkey did not deserve such a grievous punishment and refused to vote. Turkey had been at war for ten years, which partly accounts for the decision taken. Therefore the order to sign the treaty of peace was officially given, and, as had already been announced, General Hadi Pasha, of Arabian descent, Dr. Riza Tewfik Bey, and Reshad Halis Bey, ambassador at Berne, were appointed Turkish plenipotentiaries.
The Grand Vizier in an appeal to Jafer Tayar, the Nationalist leader in Thrace, begged of him “to surrender at once and leave Thrace to the Greek army.” He concluded with these words: “We fully recognise your patriotism, but protracting the warwould be detrimental to the interests of the nation. You must submit.”
Then the question arose how the treaty—which now admitted of no discussion—after being enforced and carried out by arms, before the delay for acceptance granted to the Ottoman Government had come to an end, against all rules of international law and diplomatic precedents, could solve the Eastern question.
Of course it was alleged that the Greek offensive in Anatolia had nothing to do with the treaty of peace presented to Turkey, that it only constituted a preventive measure in support of the treaty and it was not directed against the Stambul Government, but against Mustafa Kemal’s troops, which had broken the armistice by attacking the British troops on the Ismid line. Yet this was but a poor reason, and how was it possible to justify the Greek attack in Thrace, which took place immediately after? The fact was that England and Greece, being afraid of losing their prey, were in a hurry to take hold of it, and neither Mr. Lloyd George nor M. Venizelos shrank from shedding more blood to enforce a treaty which could not bring about peace.
Now that the Allies had driven a Government which no longer represented Turkey to accept the treaty, and the latter had been signed, under English compulsion, by some aged politicians, while the Greeks and the British partitioned the Ottoman Empire between themselves, was it possible to say that all the difficulties were settled? The signature of the treaty could but weaken the tottering power of the Sultan. Moreover, England, eager to derive the utmost benefitfrom the weakness of Turkey, raised the question of the Caliphate; it was learned from an English source that the title of Caliph had been offered to the Emir of Afghanistan, but the latter had declined the offer. On the other hand, how could Mustafa Kemal be expected to adhere to the decisions taken in Constantinople? It was to be feared, therefore, the agitation would be protracted, for an Anatolian campaign would offer far greater difficulties than those the Greek army had had to overcome on the low plains along the sea; and at Balikesri, standing at an altitude of 400 feet, begin the first slopes of the Anatolian uplands. As a matter of fact, Turkey was not dead, as Mr. Lloyd George believed, but the policy of the British Premier was doomed to failure—the same policy which the Soviets were trifling with, which was paving the way to the secession of Ireland, and may one day cost Great Britain the loss of India and Egypt.
It has even been said the Bolshevists themselves advised Turkey to sign the treaty in order to gain time, and thus organise a campaign in which the Bolshevist forces and the Nationalist forces in Turkey and Asia Minor would fight side by side.
The Ottoman delegation, consisting of General Hadi Pasha, Riza Tewfik Bey, a senator, and the Turkish ambassador at Berne, Reshad Halis Bey, arrived in Paris on Friday, July 30. The signature of the treaty, which was first to take place on July 27 and had been put off till the next Thursday or Saturday because the delegates could not arrive in time, was at the last moment postponed indefinitely.
Some difficulties had arisen between Italy andGreece concerning the “Twelve Islands,” or Dodecanese, and this Italo-Greek incident prevented the signature of the treaty. For it was stipulated in Article 122 of the treaty:
“Turkey cedes to Italy all her rights and titles to the islands of the Ægean Sea—viz., Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos, Piscopis, Nisyros, Calimnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Symi, and Cos, now occupied by Italy, and the islets pertaining thereunto, together with the Island of Castellorizzo.”
“Turkey cedes to Italy all her rights and titles to the islands of the Ægean Sea—viz., Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos, Piscopis, Nisyros, Calimnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Symi, and Cos, now occupied by Italy, and the islets pertaining thereunto, together with the Island of Castellorizzo.”
The thirteen islands mentioned here constitute what is called the Dodecanese, and Italy had taken possession of them in 1912, during the war with the Ottoman Empire. But in July, 1919, an agreement, which has already been mentioned, had been concluded between the Italian Government, represented by M. Tittoni, and the Greek Government, represented by M. Venizelos, according to which Italy ceded to Greece the Dodecanese, except Rhodes, which was to share the fate of Cyprus, and pledged herself not to object to Greece setting foot in Southern Albania. Of course, Italy in return was to have advantages in Asia Minor and the Adriatic Sea.
At the meeting of the Supreme Council held in London before the San Remo Conference to draw up the Turkish treaty, M. Venizelos had stated that Greece could not accept Article 122, if the Italo-Greek agreement did not compel Italy to cede the Dodecanese to Greece. M. Scialoja, the Italian delegate, had answered that on the day of the signature of the Turkish treaty an agreement would be signed between Italy and Greece, through which Italy transferred to Greece the sovereignty of the aforesaid islands.
Now Italy, in 1920, considered that the agreement which was binding on both parties had become null and void, as she had not obtained any of the compensations stipulated in it, and so she thought she had a right now not to cede the islands—Castellorizzo, though inhabited by 12,000 Greeks, not being included in the agreement. As to Rhodes, that was to share the fate of Cyprus: England did not seem willing now to cede it to Greece; so that was out of the question for the moment. Moreover, the Italian Government insisted upon keeping the Island of Halki, or Karki, lying near Rhodes. Lastly, as Italy, after the solemn proclamation of the autonomy and independence of Albania, had been obliged to evacuate nearly the whole of Albania, the cession to Greece of part of Southern Albania could not be tolerated by Italian public opinion and had now become an utter impossibility.
Under such circumstances the Greek Government had stated it was no longer willing to sign the Turkish treaty, which, if the previous agreement alone is taken into account, assigns the Dodecanese to Italy. This incident at the last moment prevented the signature of the treaty which had been so laboriously drawn up, and put the Powers in an awkward situation since the regions occupied by the Greek armies in Asia Minor were five times as large as the Smyrna area assigned to Greece, and obviously could not be evacuated by the Greeks before a state of peace was restored between them and Turkey.
The signature of the treaty, which had been put off at first, as has just been mentioned, till the end of July, was, after various delays, arranged for Thursday,August 5, then postponed till the next Saturday, and finally took place only three days later.
Meanwhile, the Armenian delegation raised another objection, and informed the Allies that as their president, Nubar Pasha, had been admitted by the Allied Governments to the signature of the Peace Treaty, as representing the Armenians of Turkey and the Armenian colonies, they thought it unfair not to let him sign the Turkish treaty too, merely because he represented the Turkish Armenians. The Allies advised the Armenians for their own sake not to insist, in order to avoid an official protest of Turkey against the treaty after its signature, under the pretext that it had not been signed regularly.
In the House of Lords the treaty was sharply criticised by Lord Wemyss, especially in regard to the condition of Smyrna and the cession of Eastern Thrace to Greece.
In the speech he delivered on Friday, August 6, at Montecitorio, Count Sforza, coming to the question of the Dodecanese, summed up the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement of July 29, 1919, as follows:
“Italy pledged herself to support at the Conference the Greek claims on Eastern and Western Thrace; she even pledged herself to support the Greek demand of annexing Southern Albania. Greece, in return for this, pledged herself to give Italy a free zone in the port of Santi Quaranta, and to give Italian industry a right of preference for the eventual building of a railway line beginning at this port.“Greece pledged herself to support at the Conference the Italian mandate over Albania, to recognise Italian sovereignty over Valona, and confirm the neutralisation of the Corfu Canal already prescribed by the London Conference in 1913-14, when Greece had promised not to build any military works on the coast between Cape Stilo and Aspriruga.“Greece pledged herself, in case she should have satisfaction in Thrace and Southern Albania, to give up, in favourof Italy, all her territorial claims in Asia Minor which hindered Italian interests.“The Italian and Greek Governments promised to support each other at the Conference concerning their claims in Asia Minor.“Italy had already pledged herself to cede to Greece the sovereignty of the isles of the Ægean Sea, except Rhodes, to which the Italian Government promised to grant a liberal administrative autonomy.“Italy also pledged herself to respect the religious liberty of the Greeks who were going to be more under her rule in Asia Minor, and Greece took a similar engagement with respect to the Italians.“Article 7 dealt with what would happen if the two countries wished to resume their full liberty of action.“Italy pledged herself to insert a clause in the treaty, in which she promised to let the people of Rhodes freely decide their own fate, on condition that the plebiscite should not be taken before five years after the signature of the Peace Treaty.”
“Italy pledged herself to support at the Conference the Greek claims on Eastern and Western Thrace; she even pledged herself to support the Greek demand of annexing Southern Albania. Greece, in return for this, pledged herself to give Italy a free zone in the port of Santi Quaranta, and to give Italian industry a right of preference for the eventual building of a railway line beginning at this port.
“Greece pledged herself to support at the Conference the Italian mandate over Albania, to recognise Italian sovereignty over Valona, and confirm the neutralisation of the Corfu Canal already prescribed by the London Conference in 1913-14, when Greece had promised not to build any military works on the coast between Cape Stilo and Aspriruga.
“Greece pledged herself, in case she should have satisfaction in Thrace and Southern Albania, to give up, in favourof Italy, all her territorial claims in Asia Minor which hindered Italian interests.
“The Italian and Greek Governments promised to support each other at the Conference concerning their claims in Asia Minor.
“Italy had already pledged herself to cede to Greece the sovereignty of the isles of the Ægean Sea, except Rhodes, to which the Italian Government promised to grant a liberal administrative autonomy.
“Italy also pledged herself to respect the religious liberty of the Greeks who were going to be more under her rule in Asia Minor, and Greece took a similar engagement with respect to the Italians.
“Article 7 dealt with what would happen if the two countries wished to resume their full liberty of action.
“Italy pledged herself to insert a clause in the treaty, in which she promised to let the people of Rhodes freely decide their own fate, on condition that the plebiscite should not be taken before five years after the signature of the Peace Treaty.”
Count Sforza proceeded to say that on July 22, after coming back from Spa, he had addressed M. Venizelos a note to let him know that the Allies’ decisions concerning Asia Minor and the aspirations of the Albanian people compelled the Italian Government to alter their policy in order to safeguard the Italian interests in those regions:
“Under the circumstances, the situation based on the agreement of July 29, 1919, as to the line of conduct to be followed at the Conference was substantially modified.“Therefore Italy, in conformity with Article 7 of the agreement, now resumes her full liberty of action. Yet the Italian Government, urged by a conciliatory spirit, intends to consider the situation afresh, as it earnestly wishes to arrive at a satisfactory and complete understanding.“The desire to maintain friendly relations with Greece is most deeply felt in Italy. Greece is a vital force to the East. When I tried to get better conditions of peace for Turkey, I felt convinced I was safeguarding the independence and the territorial integrity which the Turkish people is entitled to, and at the same time I was serving the true interests of Hellenism.”
“Under the circumstances, the situation based on the agreement of July 29, 1919, as to the line of conduct to be followed at the Conference was substantially modified.
“Therefore Italy, in conformity with Article 7 of the agreement, now resumes her full liberty of action. Yet the Italian Government, urged by a conciliatory spirit, intends to consider the situation afresh, as it earnestly wishes to arrive at a satisfactory and complete understanding.
“The desire to maintain friendly relations with Greece is most deeply felt in Italy. Greece is a vital force to the East. When I tried to get better conditions of peace for Turkey, I felt convinced I was safeguarding the independence and the territorial integrity which the Turkish people is entitled to, and at the same time I was serving the true interests of Hellenism.”
In an interview published by theStampa, M. Tittoni on his side declared, concerning the Dodecanese and the arrangement he had negotiated with M. Venizelos, that, as circumstances had changed, the clauses of the agreement had become null and void.
Alluding to the note handed by him on coming to Paris to M. Clémenceau and Mr. Lloyd George and recently read to the Senate by M. Scialoja, he complained that the Allies supported the Greek claims in Asia Minor, and overlooked the Italian interests in the same region. As Greece had got all she wanted and Italy’s hopes in Asia Minor had been frustrated, the agreement with M. Venizelos was no longer valid, according to him, and he concluded thus: “The agreement became null and void on the day when at San Remo the draft of the Turkish treaty was definitely drawn up.” Finally, on August 9 Greece and Italy came to an agreement, and a protocol was signed. The Dodecanese, according to the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement, were given up to Greece, with the exception of Rhodes, which, for the present, remained in the hands of Italy. In case England should cede Cyprus to Greece, a plebiscite was to be taken at Rhodes within fifteen years, instead of five years as had been settled before. There was no reason why Italy should give up Rhodes if England, which had ruled over Cyprus since 1878, did not hand it over to Greece. The League of Nations was to decide in what manner this plebiscite was to be taken; meanwhile Italy would grant Rhodes a wide autonomy. According to the account given of the Italo-Greek agreement, it includes some stipulationsconcerning Smyrna, and at the request of the Italian Government the Italian schools, museums, and subjects enjoy a special treatment. Italy keeps her privilege for the archæological excavations at Kos.
Not a word was said of Albania, though there had been some clauses about it in the 1919 agreement. Italy and Greece were to make separate arrangements with the Albanians.
Yugo-Slavia in its turn protested in regard to the share of the Turkish debt that was assigned to her and complained that the charges inherent in the Turkish territories she had received in 1913 were too heavy.
King Hussein too was dissatisfied with the Syrian events and the attitude of France. So he refused to adhere to the treaty, though it indirectly acknowledged the independence of his States and his own sovereignty. He thus showed he really aimed at setting up a huge Arabian Kingdom where his sons would have only been his lieutenants in Syria and Mesopotamia. Besides, King Hussein earnestly begged that the Kingdom of Mesopotamia, which had hitherto been promised to his son Abdullah, should be given to the Emir Feisal as a compensation for Syria, and a hint was given that England would not object to this.
Then the Turkish delegates, seeing the Allies at variance, raised objections to the treaty, and on the morning of August 10 Hadi Pasha informed the Conference he could not sign the treaty if the Allies could not agree together. However, at the earnest request of a high official of the Foreign Office and after he had been repeatedly urged to do so, he consented to sign the treaty in the afternoon at Sèvres.
Together with the Turkish treaty seven treaties or agreements were also signed—namely:
“A treaty in regard to Thrace; sanctioning the cession to Greece of some territories given up by Bulgaria in accordance with the Versailles treaty, and giving Bulgaria a free outlet to the sea at the port of Dedeagatch.“A tripartite convention between England, France, and Italy, settling the zones of economic influence of France and Italy in the Ottoman territory of Asia Minor.“A Greco-Italian convention assigning the ‘Twelve Islands’ to Greece—a plebiscite was to be taken in regard to the sovereignty over Rhodes.“A treaty between Armenia and the Great Powers, settling the question of the minorities in the future Armenian State.“A treaty in regard to the Greek minorities, ensuring them protection in the territories that had newly been occupied by Greece.“A treaty concerning the New States, settling administrative questions between Italy and the States which occupied territories formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary.“A treaty fixing various frontiers in Central Europe at some places where they had not yet been definitely laid down.”
“A treaty in regard to Thrace; sanctioning the cession to Greece of some territories given up by Bulgaria in accordance with the Versailles treaty, and giving Bulgaria a free outlet to the sea at the port of Dedeagatch.
“A tripartite convention between England, France, and Italy, settling the zones of economic influence of France and Italy in the Ottoman territory of Asia Minor.
“A Greco-Italian convention assigning the ‘Twelve Islands’ to Greece—a plebiscite was to be taken in regard to the sovereignty over Rhodes.
“A treaty between Armenia and the Great Powers, settling the question of the minorities in the future Armenian State.
“A treaty in regard to the Greek minorities, ensuring them protection in the territories that had newly been occupied by Greece.
“A treaty concerning the New States, settling administrative questions between Italy and the States which occupied territories formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary.
“A treaty fixing various frontiers in Central Europe at some places where they had not yet been definitely laid down.”
According to the terms of the agreement concerning the protection of minorities, Greece pledged herself to grant to Greek subjects belonging to minorities in language, race, or religion the same civil and political rights, the same consideration and protection as to the other Greek subjects, on the strength of which France and Great Britain gave up their rights of control over Greece, established by the London treaty of 1832, their right of control over the Ionian Islands established by the London treaty of 1864, and their right of protection of religious freedom conferred by the London Conference of 1830.
Greece pledged herself also to present for the approval of the League of Nations within a year a scheme of organisation of Adrianople, including a municipal council in which the various races shouldbe represented. All the clauses of the treaty for the protection of minorities were under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Greece also pledged herself to give the Allies the benefit of the “most favoured nation” clause till a general commercial agreement had been concluded, within five years, under the patronage of the League of Nations.
All these delays and incidents bore witness to the difficulty of arriving at a solution of the Eastern question in the way the Allies had set to work, and to the frailty of the stipulations inserted in the treaty.
They also testified to the lack of skill and political acuteness of Mr. Lloyd George. Of course, the British Premier, owing to the large concessions he had made to Greece, had managed to ensure the preponderance of British influence in Constantinople and the zone of the Straits, and by seeking to set up a large Arabian Empire he had secured to his country the chief trunk of the Baghdad Railway.
But the laborious negotiations which had painfully arrived at the settlement proposed by the Conference did not seem likely to solve the Eastern question definitely. It still remained a burning question, and the treaty signed by the Ottoman delegates was still most precarious. Accordingly Count Sforza, in the Chamber of Deputies in Rome, made the following statement with regard to Anatolia:
“Everybody asserts the war has created a new world; but practically everybody thinks and feels as if nothing had occurred. The Moslem East wants to live and develop. It, too, wants to have an influence of its own in to-morrow’s world. To the Anatolian Turks it has been our wish to offer a hearty and earnest collaboration on economic and moral grounds by respecting the independence and sovereignty of Turkey.”
“Everybody asserts the war has created a new world; but practically everybody thinks and feels as if nothing had occurred. The Moslem East wants to live and develop. It, too, wants to have an influence of its own in to-morrow’s world. To the Anatolian Turks it has been our wish to offer a hearty and earnest collaboration on economic and moral grounds by respecting the independence and sovereignty of Turkey.”
The signatures of plenipotentiaries sent by a Government which remained in office merely because its head, Damad Ferid, was a tool in the hands of England, were no guarantee for the future, and the failure of the revolutionary movement indefinitely postponed the settlement of the Eastern question which for half a century has been disturbing European policy.
Islam remains, notwithstanding, a spiritual force that will survive all measures taken against the Sublime Porte, and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire does not solve any of the numerous questions raised by the intercourse of the various races that were formerly under the Sultan’s rule. Russia has not given up her ambitious designs on the Straits, and one day or another she will try to carry them out; and it is to be feared that German influence may benefit by the resentment of the Turkish people. These are some of the numerous sources of future conflicts.
On the day that followed the signature of the treaty all the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople were in mourning and announced it as a day of mourning for the Turkish nation.
At Stambul all public entertainments were prohibited, all shops and public buildings were closed. Many Turks went to the mosques to pray for the welfare of the country, the people who seek nothing but peace and quietude looked weary and downcast.
A few organs of the Turkish Press violently attacked the delegates who had signed “the death-warrant of Turkey and laid the foundations of a necessary policy of revenge.”
Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres.Larger image(201 kB)
Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres.
Larger image(201 kB)
Schematic Map of the Territories lost by Turkey since 1699, and of the Territories left to Turkey by the Sèvres Treaty.Larger image(204 kB)
Schematic Map of the Territories lost by Turkey since 1699, and of the Territories left to Turkey by the Sèvres Treaty.
Larger image(204 kB)
Others hoped the Great Powers would take into account the goodwill of Turkey, and would gradually give up some of their intolerable demands.
Others, finally, bewailing the direful downfall of the Turkish Empire and insisting upon the lesson taught by this historical event for the future, hoped that the future would forcibly bring on a revision of that “iniquitous and impracticable” treaty of peace.
In France, M. Pierre Loti devoted one of his last articles to the treaty, which he called “the silliest of all the silly blunders of our Eastern policy.”35
The map on p.269shows the area left to the Turks in Europe and in Asia Minor by the Treaty of Sèvres. There will be seen the territories of Mesopotamia under English mandate, those of Syria under French mandate, and those which have been added to Palestine and are practically under English control. There will also be seen the regions on which France and Italy, in virtue of the tripartite agreement signed on August 10, 1920, enjoy preferential claims to supply the staff required for the assistance of the Porte in organising the local administration and the police. The contracting Powers in that agreement have undertaken not to apply, nor to make or support applications, on behalf of their nationals, for industrial concessions in areas allotted to another Power.
The map on p.270is a scheme of the territories lost by Turkey from 1699 down to the Sèvres Treaty; it shows that, by completing the dismemberment of Turkey, the treaty aimed at her annihilation.
Footnotes: