“We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We are opposed to Emir Feisal’s declaration of independence only for this reason—that Arabia, throughout the history of Islam, has up till now remained under the direct control of the Khalifa. This is the first time in the history of Islam that anyone who is not the Khalifa has set up any claim over Arabia. That is why there is, from the Muslim point of view, a conflict of religious obligations with actual facts. We are not opposed to Arabian independence. On the contrary, we wish very much for complete autonomy in that region,but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with the Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both Arabs and Turks are Muslims.”
“We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We are opposed to Emir Feisal’s declaration of independence only for this reason—that Arabia, throughout the history of Islam, has up till now remained under the direct control of the Khalifa. This is the first time in the history of Islam that anyone who is not the Khalifa has set up any claim over Arabia. That is why there is, from the Muslim point of view, a conflict of religious obligations with actual facts. We are not opposed to Arabian independence. On the contrary, we wish very much for complete autonomy in that region,but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with the Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both Arabs and Turks are Muslims.”
Naturally the concentration of the French troops, during the Cilician troubles, had made the action of the Syrian Nationalists popular among the Moslem masses. On the other hand, an anti-Zionist agitation had gained ground in Palestine and quickly developed into a propaganda in favour of the union of Palestine and Syria under one sovereign. All these facts, which point to the existence in Syria of a movement in favour of an independent State, explain how it turned out that the Emir Feisal, who favoured the scheme of a confederate Arabian Empire, was proclaimed King.
General Noury Pasha, sent by the Emir Feisal to London at the beginning of April, handed to the Foreign Office and to the representative of the French Foreign Office who happened to be in that city, three letters written in the Emir’s own hand in which he is said to have asked both Governments to recognise and support the independence of his country, and informed them that the measures taken by the Damascus Congress concerning Mesopotamia merely aimed at putting an end to Turkish anarchy and the riots of Mosul.
The proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria brought about much discontent in Lebanon.
A meeting was held on March 22 at Baabda, where the General Government of Lebanon resided, to protest against the decision of the Damascus Congress. About a thousand people werepresent, and the following motions were passed unanimously:
“1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the Syrian Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of laying down its frontiers, of restricting its independence, and of forbidding it to collaborate with France.“2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon. In the demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made for its vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed by the populations.“3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions taken by the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the latter Congress was never regularly constituted.“4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the delegates sent by Lebanon who are now in Paris.“5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater Lebanon with the collaboration of France.“6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission consisting of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation of the future constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the protocol of 1860.“7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France; the national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the white part.”
“1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the Syrian Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of laying down its frontiers, of restricting its independence, and of forbidding it to collaborate with France.
“2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon. In the demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made for its vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed by the populations.
“3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions taken by the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the latter Congress was never regularly constituted.
“4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the delegates sent by Lebanon who are now in Paris.
“5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater Lebanon with the collaboration of France.
“6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission consisting of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation of the future constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the protocol of 1860.
“7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France; the national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the white part.”
This opposition was supported by the Maronite archbishops of the sanjak of Tripolis, Latakia, Hama, and Homs, who sent a telegram of protest from Tripolis to Syria on March 13. Thus the Arabian movement also met with Christian opposition.
Khyatin Saffita Tabez Abbas, chief of the Alawite tribe, sent the following protest from Tartus to the Peace Conference:
“Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir Feisal has had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We protest energetically against such illegal proceedings. We want an Alawite Confederation established under the direct and exclusive protectorate of France.”
“Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir Feisal has had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We protest energetically against such illegal proceedings. We want an Alawite Confederation established under the direct and exclusive protectorate of France.”
Of course, it was urged that the Assembly of the Syrian Congress at Damascus included only extremistswho worked hand in hand with the Turkish Nationalists; it seems, nevertheless, that it represented the opinions of most Syrians, who wanted to restore the unity of Syria; and their wish was no doubt connected with the wish that was gaining ground to restore the unity of Arabia.
On the other hand, the Anglo-French treaty, which aimed at a partition of Ottoman Arabia so as to balance French and English interests, but disregarded the wishes of the peoples, could not but rouse a feeling of discontent. Moreover, some Anglo-Egyptian agents and some British officers had foolishly supported this movement in order to cripple French influence, feeling quite confident they could check this movement later on and put Syria under their own suzerainty. But they were soon thrust aside by the movement, which had been fostered by them in India and now logically was turning against them.
The Arabs of the interior of Arabia also addressed a proclamation to General Gouraud stating they welcomed the French as friends, but did not want them as masters and conquerors.
The Arabian opposition to France which made itself felt far beyond the boundaries of independent Syria, the difficulties raised by the Emir Feisal in the coast area, and the agitation stirred up by the Damascus Government in Syria since the French troops had relieved the English in those parts in October, 1919, induced General Gouraud to occupy the railway stations of Maalhakah and Rayak, the latter being at the junction of the railway line from Aleppo with the Beyrut-Damascus line leading to the Hejaz. Atthe same time, by way of reprisal for the capture of Mejel-Anjar in the plain of Bukaa lying between Libanus and Anti-Libanus by the Sherifian troops, he gathered his forces in the rear of that town at Zahleh and decided to occupy all this area, which was within the zone put under French control by the 1916 treaty.
On July 20 the Emir Feisal held a war council at Damascus and issued a decree of general mobilisation.
According to the Memoirs of Liman von Sanders, who commanded the Turkish troops in Syria-Palestine, doubts may be raised as to the Emir Feisal’s straightforwardness in his dealings first with the Turks during the war, and later with both the English and the French after the cessation of hostilities.
“The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, informed me in the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal was willing to hold the front occupied by the fourth army along the Jordan on his own account and with his own troops, if guarantees were given him by the Turkish Government as to the creation of an Arabian State. According to the Sherif Feisal an important British attack was being prepared in the coast zone, and in this way it would be possible to reinforce the front between the sea and the Jordan with the troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-general I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into negotiations with the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged Enver to give the guarantees that were demanded.“I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on this point. So I cannot say to what extent Feisal’s offer could be relied upon. According to what I heard from my brigadier-general, I fancy the Turks mistrusted his offer, which they considered as a mere decoy to put our positions along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs, while the main English attack was to take place in the coast zone or between the sea and the Jordan.”42
“The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, informed me in the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal was willing to hold the front occupied by the fourth army along the Jordan on his own account and with his own troops, if guarantees were given him by the Turkish Government as to the creation of an Arabian State. According to the Sherif Feisal an important British attack was being prepared in the coast zone, and in this way it would be possible to reinforce the front between the sea and the Jordan with the troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-general I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into negotiations with the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged Enver to give the guarantees that were demanded.
“I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on this point. So I cannot say to what extent Feisal’s offer could be relied upon. According to what I heard from my brigadier-general, I fancy the Turks mistrusted his offer, which they considered as a mere decoy to put our positions along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs, while the main English attack was to take place in the coast zone or between the sea and the Jordan.”42
As was pointed out by theJournal des Débats, which quoted the preceding lines on July 21, 1920, the opinion of Liman von Sanders was quite plausible; yet the recent events on the French front may also have had an influence on the Emir Feisal. Most likely, if we bear in mind the intrigues he carried on afterwards, his first proposal was a consequence of the German advance on the Western front in spring, 1918, but the Allies’ victorious offensive on the Somme on August 8, 1918, caused him to alter his plans. It is noteworthy that in his proposals he disclosed where the first English attack was to take place. At any rate, both suppositions, which corroborate each other, increase the suspicions that might already be entertained about his sincerity; and, since then he has obviously taken advantage of every opportunity to play a double game, or at least to turn all the differences between the Powers to the advantage of Arabian independence.
We criticise him the more severely, as we fully understand the Arabs’ aspirations. We disapprove of his policy and blame his attitude, because we believe Arabian aspirations cannot be lawfully fulfilled at the Turks’ expense, and the Arabs cannot expect they will safeguard their liberty by supporting the English policy in the East in every particular, especially with regard to the Turks, at a time when India and Egypt are seeking to shake off that policy.
Let us add that the Pan-Arabian movement owes the development it has now taken to Colonel Lawrence’s manœuvres, who diverted it from its original aim to make use of it, and became the Emir Feisal’scounsellor in order to influence him in favour of England. Miss Bell, too, played an influential part in that movement.
Though the Emir was the leader of a movement which, on the whole, was hostile to Turkey, and though he asked for English support, he had no objection to co-operating with the Nationalists, who, being threatened by the Allies, offered their support in order to conciliate him. Thus things had come to a more and more confused state. According to the information given byLe Tempson July 20, 1920, it appeared that as early as January, 1919—
“The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey, and the Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with the Turkish Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey has several times travelled from Anatolia to Damascus andvice versato carry instructions.“At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an appeal to the population of Anatolia in which he said: ‘The Arabian Government relies or will rely on us.’“The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising difficulties to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or supplies to Cilicia by rail.”
“The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey, and the Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with the Turkish Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey has several times travelled from Anatolia to Damascus andvice versato carry instructions.
“At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an appeal to the population of Anatolia in which he said: ‘The Arabian Government relies or will rely on us.’
“The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising difficulties to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or supplies to Cilicia by rail.”
In view of the exactions of all sorts the Emir Feisal indulged in, such as the capture of revenue lawfully belonging to the administration of the Ottoman debt and the proscription of French currency, to say nothing of such acts of aggression as attacks on French outposts and the closing of the railways, General Gouraud on Wednesday, July 14, addressed to the Arabian chief the following ultimatum, which expired on the 18th:
“Recognition of the French mandate for Syria.“Liberty to make use of the Rayak-Aleppo railway.“The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between Aleppo and Rayak.“The immediate abolition of forced recruiting.“Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December, 1919.“Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency.“Punishment of the authors of crimes against French soldiers.“Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within four days. If these conditions are not complied with, they shall be enforced by arms.”
“Recognition of the French mandate for Syria.
“Liberty to make use of the Rayak-Aleppo railway.
“The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between Aleppo and Rayak.
“The immediate abolition of forced recruiting.
“Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December, 1919.
“Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency.
“Punishment of the authors of crimes against French soldiers.
“Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within four days. If these conditions are not complied with, they shall be enforced by arms.”
Syria, too, was in quite a perturbed state, owing to the discontent prevailing among the population and the differences between the various factions which were striving to get the upper hand in the country. Two towns, Hasbeiya and Rashaya, situated on the slopes of Mount Hermon, had rebelled against the Sherifian Government and wanted to become parts of Lebanon.
An important debate began on July 19 in the House of Commons about the condition of affairs in Asia Minor and the possible consequences the French ultimatum addressed to the Emir Feisal might have for British interests in that region.
Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Stafford, C.U.) asked the Prime Minister whether he could give any information regarding the new military action of France in Syria; whether the twenty-four hours’ ultimatum issued by the French to the Arab Government in Damascus was submitted to and approved by the Supreme Council; whether the terms of the mandate for Syria had yet been submitted to the Allied and Associated Powers; and whether His Majesty’s Government would use their influence with the French and Arab Governments to secure the suspension of further hostilities pending the decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the termsof the Syrian mandate. To this Mr. Bonar Law answered:
“The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme Council. The terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet been submitted to the Allied Powers. As regards the last part of the question, His Majesty’s Government, who had for some time, but unsuccessfully, been urging the Emir Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the outstanding questions with the Supreme Council, do not consider that they can usefully act upon the information at present at their disposal, but they are in communication with the French Government on the matter.”
“The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme Council. The terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet been submitted to the Allied Powers. As regards the last part of the question, His Majesty’s Government, who had for some time, but unsuccessfully, been urging the Emir Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the outstanding questions with the Supreme Council, do not consider that they can usefully act upon the information at present at their disposal, but they are in communication with the French Government on the matter.”
Then Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked again:
“Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted from this, and that the French have advanced over the line agreed upon between the British and French Governments last year, and that they have advanced from Jerablus to Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at Rayak; and has he any information with regard to the progress of hostilities in another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates?”
“Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted from this, and that the French have advanced over the line agreed upon between the British and French Governments last year, and that they have advanced from Jerablus to Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at Rayak; and has he any information with regard to the progress of hostilities in another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates?”
Mr. Bonar Law having replied that he had not received the information, Lord Robert Cecil intervened in the discussion, and asked in his turn:
“Have the Government considered the very serious effect of these proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor, particularly with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether, in view of the fact that these proceedings were apparently in absolute contravention of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, he would cause representations to be made to our French Allies on the subject?”
“Have the Government considered the very serious effect of these proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor, particularly with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether, in view of the fact that these proceedings were apparently in absolute contravention of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, he would cause representations to be made to our French Allies on the subject?”
Of course, Mr. Bonar Law could only reply:
“We are in communication with the French Government, but I do not accept the statement of my noble friend that what has happened is against the Treaty of Versailles. It is very difficult for us here to judge action which is taken on the responsibility of the French Government.”
“We are in communication with the French Government, but I do not accept the statement of my noble friend that what has happened is against the Treaty of Versailles. It is very difficult for us here to judge action which is taken on the responsibility of the French Government.”
Finally, to Lord Hugh Cecil’s inquiry whether theBritish Government was bound by promises made to the Emir Feisal, Mr. Bonar Law answered:
“The Government are certainly bound by their pledge. In my opinion the fact that the mandate was given to France to cover that area was not inconsistent with that pledge.”
“The Government are certainly bound by their pledge. In my opinion the fact that the mandate was given to France to cover that area was not inconsistent with that pledge.”
Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to the immediate danger to British interests in the Middle East arising from the threatened new hostilities in Syria. He said that first—
“He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and commission committed by the British Government, and more particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia, unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the mandate for Syria had been approved by the Councilof the League of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established there should be no disturbance of thestatus quowithout the willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe. The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of British diplomacy.”
“He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and commission committed by the British Government, and more particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia, unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the mandate for Syria had been approved by the Councilof the League of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established there should be no disturbance of thestatus quowithout the willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe. The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of British diplomacy.”
Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the defence of the Emir and suggested that Great Britain should act as mediator between France and the Arabs:
“As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now that the war was over having a row with France for their sake.... Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based, on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the Government was to make representations at once to both the French and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.”
“As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now that the war was over having a row with France for their sake.... Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based, on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the Government was to make representations at once to both the French and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.”
Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose, and owned that under the terms of the treaty with Turkey, France had got a force in Syria, but the whole difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum without consulting Great Britain. According to the three speakers, England was interested in the question, owing to her engagements with the Emir Feisal,and the after-effects which French action might have in Syria and the neighbouring regions.
Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account both the section of public opinion on behalf of which the three speakers had spoken, and the feelings of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the arrangements which had just been concluded, that France had the same mandate for Syria as Great Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to prove that the situation of England in Mesopotamia was very much the same as the situation of France in Syria. He expressly said:
“The real question before the House was whether the British Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915, the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the interests of her ally France.’ ...“It was said that the independence of the Arab people was incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in, and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have thestatus quo. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories, and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of occupation of territories in which later we should have no interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that territory.“We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies, and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It was said that this action of the French Government was contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State. That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated, ‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say, ‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’?“The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any other independent body....“Had we that justification? He thought we had a right at least to assume that the French Government had something of a case for the action they were taking. He had the actual words in which the French described the necessity of their taking this action. They pointed out that a large number of French soldiers had been massacred by Arabs. They did not say that the Emir Feisal was responsible for that—he did not think the Emir was—but that whether it was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it the situation was one which the French Government couldnot allow to continue. With regard to the railway, on which they said they depended absolutely under present conditions for the support of their forces in dealing with the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal in Cilicia, they complained that they had tried over and over again to get from the Emir the use of that railway for the purpose of the supply of their troops, but had failed. They said that that was a condition of things which they could not allow to continue if they were to be responsible for the mandate. He thought that was a very good case.”
“The real question before the House was whether the British Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915, the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the interests of her ally France.’ ...
“It was said that the independence of the Arab people was incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in, and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have thestatus quo. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories, and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of occupation of territories in which later we should have no interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that territory.
“We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies, and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It was said that this action of the French Government was contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State. That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated, ‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say, ‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’?
“The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any other independent body....
“Had we that justification? He thought we had a right at least to assume that the French Government had something of a case for the action they were taking. He had the actual words in which the French described the necessity of their taking this action. They pointed out that a large number of French soldiers had been massacred by Arabs. They did not say that the Emir Feisal was responsible for that—he did not think the Emir was—but that whether it was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it the situation was one which the French Government couldnot allow to continue. With regard to the railway, on which they said they depended absolutely under present conditions for the support of their forces in dealing with the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal in Cilicia, they complained that they had tried over and over again to get from the Emir the use of that railway for the purpose of the supply of their troops, but had failed. They said that that was a condition of things which they could not allow to continue if they were to be responsible for the mandate. He thought that was a very good case.”
On Lord Winterton exclaiming: “Then the French have a mandate for Damascus! But neither the Arabs nor the Supreme Council have ever admitted such a mandate,” Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the Government, answered:
“They had been in communication with the French Government on that point, and their reply was to this effect: ‘There is no intention of permanent military occupation. As soon as the mandate has been accepted and order has been restored the troops will be withdrawn.’“A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir Feisal. No one would recognise them more readily than His Majesty’s Government. They knew that he and his tribesmen did gallant service in the war, but he asked the House to remember that but for the sacrifices both of the French and ourselves, there would have been no possibility of King Hussein having any authority in his country....“They met him over and over again in London and Paris, and when the question came of giving the mandate, on two occasions the British and French Governments sent a joint invitation to the Emir Feisal to come to Europe and discuss the question with them. The Emir Feisal was not able to come for one reason or another on either occasion; but he did say that no case of any ally or anyone in connection with the Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly than his, or with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House must be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble in the Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble, and what happened in Syria must have reflex action in Mesopotamia. If it was assumed, as some hon. members were ready to assume, that we in Mesopotamia were pursuing solely selfish aims with no other object, and if they assumed that the French were pursuing imperialistic aims in Syria with no other object, then, of course, the case was hopeless. Therewas no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind and a greater readiness to grasp the position of other people than General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French Government in this matter was a very serious thing.”
“They had been in communication with the French Government on that point, and their reply was to this effect: ‘There is no intention of permanent military occupation. As soon as the mandate has been accepted and order has been restored the troops will be withdrawn.’
“A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir Feisal. No one would recognise them more readily than His Majesty’s Government. They knew that he and his tribesmen did gallant service in the war, but he asked the House to remember that but for the sacrifices both of the French and ourselves, there would have been no possibility of King Hussein having any authority in his country....
“They met him over and over again in London and Paris, and when the question came of giving the mandate, on two occasions the British and French Governments sent a joint invitation to the Emir Feisal to come to Europe and discuss the question with them. The Emir Feisal was not able to come for one reason or another on either occasion; but he did say that no case of any ally or anyone in connection with the Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly than his, or with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House must be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble in the Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble, and what happened in Syria must have reflex action in Mesopotamia. If it was assumed, as some hon. members were ready to assume, that we in Mesopotamia were pursuing solely selfish aims with no other object, and if they assumed that the French were pursuing imperialistic aims in Syria with no other object, then, of course, the case was hopeless. Therewas no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind and a greater readiness to grasp the position of other people than General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French Government in this matter was a very serious thing.”
The time seemed very badly chosen indeed for such a debate in the English Parliament, as Mr. Winston Churchill, War Secretary, had just informed the Commons that important reinforcements coming from India had recently been dispatched to Mesopotamia, and the Commander-in-Chief had been given full powers to take any measures the situation might require.
It was the policy of England in the East which stood responsible for such a state of things. Though the bulk of public opinion in France was averse to any military action in the East, either in Syria or in Turkey, yet France was driven to fight, as it were, by England—though both Governments were supposed to act jointly in the East—in order to prevent her ally from undermining her influence. Such was the outcome of England’s ill-omened policy, who first had supported the Arabian movement and now seemed to forsake it, and thus had roused all the East against Europe through the resentment caused by her attitude towards Turkey and Persia. Perhaps England was not very sorry, after all, that France should divert against herself part of the Arabian forces from the Mesopotamian front, where the British effectives were insufficient in number.
M. Millerand corroborated Mr. Bonar Law’s statements before the French Chamber, disclosed some of the agreements made with England, and apologised for being unable to say more; he also declared England had officially recognised she had no rightto meddle with Syrian affairs; and finally declared that whoever should feel tempted—he meant the Emir who had just submitted to General Gouraud’s ultimatum—to oppose France to Great Britain in Asia Minor would now know it would have France alone in front of him. And yet if one day Great Britain rules over Mesopotamia, she is not likely to give France a free hand in Syria.
Just at the same time—on July 20—the Cairo correspondent ofThe Timeswrote that he understood the King of the Hejaz had telegraphed to Mr. Lloyd George how surprised and disappointed he was at the French policy in Syria, and asked him to interfere. King Hussein also declared he could not exert his influence on the Emir Feisal’s brothers or prevent them from coming to his help.
The English Government circles, on the other hand, seemed at last inclined to favour a scheme that would put Syria and Mesopotamia, respectively under the sovereignty of the Emir Feisal and the Emir Abdullah, under a French mandate in Syria and a British one in Mesopotamia. But theDaily Expressof July 17 seemed apprehensive lest the French expedition aimed at overthrowing the Emir Feisal and replacing him by the Emir Said, who had been expelled from Syria during the British occupation. Let it be said, incidentally, that the Arabs of the Emir Feisal possessed 100,000 rifles, the very arms taken from the Turks by the English and left by the latter in the hands of the Arabian leader.
General Gouraud’s ultimatum had naturally been accepted by the Emir Feisal, but a few days after its expiration, and so military action had beenstarted. General Gouraud, according to his communiqué, had, on July 22, at the Emir’s request, stopped the column that was on its way from Zaleh to Damascus. Feisal had alleged that his answer had been sent in due time, but untoward circumstances had prevented it from coming to hand the appointed day.
The French General had consented to give him the benefit of the doubt and halt his troops on certain conditions, one of which was that his soldiers should not be attacked. Now the French column that guarded the country between Homs and Tripolis, some distance to the east of the post of Tel-Kelah, was attacked by Sherifian regulars. Under these circumstances, and to prevent another attack which seemed to be preparing between Damascus and Beyrut, the southern French column that guarded the railway in case of an attack coming from Damascus, dislodged the Sherifian troops whose headquarters were at Khan-Meiseloun, in the mountain range which divides the plain of the Bukaa from the plain of Damascus, and thus the way was open to the latter town.
France, who otherwise would not have been obliged to fight in order to maintain her influence in Syria, was compelled to do so by the policy in which she was involved. But this policy, which drove her to inaugurate a Syrian campaign at the very time when by the side of England she enforced on Turkey a treaty that no Turk could accept, might have brought about, as Pierre Loti said in an article of theŒuvre, July 22, “the death of France in the East.”
Even the Christians43—the Armenians excepted—wished the French to leave Antioch in order to be able to come to an understanding with the Moslems who maintained order in the four great towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus, occupied by the Sherifian troops. A delegation of eight members representing the Christian element wanted to go to France, but the Patriarch of Lebanon handed General Gouraud a protest to be forwarded to the French Government; he inveighed against what he called “the shameful conduct of some members of the administrative Council of Lebanon,” and charged them, just as they were about to leave for Europe, with receiving important sums of money from the Emir Feisal to carry on an anti-French propaganda. After this protest, they were imprisoned by the French authorities: all of which shows the state of deep unrest then prevailing in Lebanon and our utter lack of reliable information from the East.
On July 23 a French column entered Aleppo, after a skirmish north of Muslemieh, and a reconnoitring body of cavalry which had pushed on as far as Homs bridge was greeted by some Sherifian officers, who informed them that the Sherifian troops had left the town. On the 25th, in the afternoon, the French troops entered Damascus without encountering any resistance. A new Government was formed after the downfall of the Sherifian Government, and General Gobet formally notified them on behalf of General Gouraud that the Emir Feisal was no longer King of the country. He demanded a war contribution of 10 million francs on account of thedamage done by the war bands in the western zone; general disarmament should be proceeded with at once; the army should be reduced and converted into a body of police; all war material should be handed over to the French authorities, and the chief war criminals tried by military courts. All these conditions were, of course, assented to by the new Government, who expressed their sincere wish to collaborate with the French.
The Emir Feisal, who had come back to Damascus, was requested to leave the country with his family. He set off to England soon after and sought to meet Mr. Lloyd George at Lucerne.
Without considering the future relations between Lebanon and Syria or turning its attention to the future mode of government of Syria and its four great towns Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, the French Government decided to restore Greater Lebanon. M. Millerand informed Mgr. Abdallah Kouri, Maronite Archbishop of Arca, president of the delegation of Lebanon, of this by a letter dated August 24, 1920. The new State was to extend from the Nahr-el-Litani, which flows along the frontier of Palestine, to another State, called “Territoire des Alaonites,” or, in Arabic, Alawiya, coming between the Lebanon and Antioch, and to the crests of Anti-Libanus, including the Bukaa area, with the towns of Rayak and Baalbek. The ports of Beyrut and Tripolis in Syria were to enjoy local autonomy, but to keep in close connection with the new State. Beyrut was to be the seat of the new Government; Tripolis and its suburbs were to be grouped into a municipality. In this way Greater Lebanon would have recoveredall its former territories, as it was before 1860, in conformity with the promises made by M. Clémenceau and confirmed by M. Millerand, and with the claims set forth in 1919 at the Peace Conference by the delegates of Lebanon.
Was it not a mistake in Syria, a country over which France had a mandate and where the proportion of Moslems is three to one, to start with a policy that favoured Lebanon and consequently the Christians? The question was all the more important as the discontent brought about by the Powers’ decisions was far from subsiding in these and the neighbouring regions.
Indeed, the Ansarieh tribes, living in the mountainous regions to the east of Antioch and Alexandretta, and in the Jebel Ansarieh between Latakia and Tartus, which had persistently kept aloof from us in the past, made their submission after the downfall of the Emir Feisal, and several Ansarieh chiefs—Ismail Pasha, Inad, and Ismail Bey Yaouah—accepted the conditions imposed on them. Yet dissatisfaction was still rampant in the Hauran area, and the train in which ed Rubi Pasha, the Syrian Premier, and other Ministers were going to Deraa was attacked on Friday, August 20, at Kerbet-Ghazeleh by Arabian bands. Ed Rubi Pasha and Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha were murdered. The railway line was recaptured later on, but the contingents sent to Deraa had to fight with Arabian bands at Mosmieh.
Farther north, in the part of Cilicia entirely occupied by Kemalist troops, Colonel Brémond, commanding a group of 3,000 to 4,000 men consisting of French troops and native recruits, afterbeing blockaded at Adana for six weeks, had to sign a truce in August because he was short of water, and the provisioning of Adana could only be ensured by establishing a base in the former Roman port of Karatash. Mersina, where the French had enlisted all the Armenian and Greek manhood, was also besieged and blockaded, except along the coast where a French warship overawed the rebels. Lastly, Tarsus, the third place occupied by French troops, was in the same predicament, and was cut off from the other two towns. Under these circumstances whoever could flee sailed to Cyprus, and the few boats which called at Mersina took away crowds of fugitives.
In Mesopotamia the situation was quite as bad, and everywhere the Arabs evinced much discontent. In the zone of the lower Euphrates and Lake Hamar, as well as in the Muntefik area, many disturbances occurred.
TheSunday Timesof August 21, 1920, in an article in which the attitude of the British Government was severely criticised, wondered whether it was not too late to atone for the mistakes of England, even by expending large sums of money, and concluded thus:
“Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up meddling with the affairs of three million Arabs who want but one thing, to be allowed to decide their own fate? After all, Rome was not ruined when Hadrian gave up the conquests made by Trajan.”
“Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up meddling with the affairs of three million Arabs who want but one thing, to be allowed to decide their own fate? After all, Rome was not ruined when Hadrian gave up the conquests made by Trajan.”
TheObservertoo asked whether a heavy expenditure of men and money could restore the situation, and added:
“The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too, when we realise that so much blood and money has beenwasted for a lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ‘to pacify,’ and when we remember that our ultimate aim is to impose our sovereignty on people who plainly show they do not want it.”
“The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too, when we realise that so much blood and money has beenwasted for a lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ‘to pacify,’ and when we remember that our ultimate aim is to impose our sovereignty on people who plainly show they do not want it.”
The diversity of creeds among the various Moslem sects had also, from the beginning, imperilled the unity of the Arabian world within the Ottoman Empire by endangering its religious unity. By the side of the Sunnis, or Orthodox Moslems, the Shia—viz., the rebels or heretics, belonging to a schism which is almost as old as Islam itself—recognise nobody but Ali as the lawful successor of Mohammed. According to them, the title of Caliph should not go outside the Prophet’s family, and his spiritual powers can only be conferred upon his descendants; so, from a religious point of view, they do not recognise the power of the other dynasties of Caliphs—for instance, that of the Ottoman Sultans. As Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, was killed at Kufa in Mesopotamia, and as Ali’s sons, Hassan and Hossein, were also massacred at Kerbela, near the ruins of Babylon, together with some of their descendants who had a lawful right to the title of Imam, Mesopotamia is looked upon by the Shia as their Holy Places.
Many wealthy Persians, to whom the worship of the members of Ali’s family has become a symbol and who consider their death as a religious sacrifice, have their own coffins carried to Mesopotamia that their bodies may lie in the holy necropolis of Kerbela or of Nejef, to the north-east of Mecca and Medina; and as a great many Arabs of Mesopotamia are stillShia, this schism practically divides the Persian world from the Turkish world.
But though the Persians, who have never recognised any Caliph, and for the last thirteen hundred years have been waiting till the Khilafat should revert to the lineal descent of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, to acknowledge a Caliph’s authority, do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate, yet their monarchs do not seek to deprive the Sultan of his title of Caliph to assume it themselves.
So their case is entirely different from that of the people of Morocco, who do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate because their own sovereigns, as descendants of the Prophet, profess they have an hereditary right to hold the office of Caliph within the frontiers of their State.
The Shia faith has even spread as far as India and the Sunda Isles; and so the opposition between Shia and Sunnis may play an important part in freeing Mesopotamia from the Turkish influence of Constantinople.
Yet the English occupation has been so bitterly resented in Mesopotamia that the Shia Mujtahids, or imams of Nejef and Kerbela, have lately asked for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over these towns, where are the two famous holy shrines of Islam. Moreover, the controversy on the question whether the Sultans of Turkey have a right to the Caliphate, because they do not belong to the tribe of Koreish, in which the Prophet was born, seems to have come to an end among the Moslems, or at least to have been laid aside in view of the present events.
Moreover, the Prophet, when he advised the Faithful to choose his successor in the tribe of Koreish, doesnot seem at all, according to the best Moslem authorities, to have wished to confer the supreme spiritual power for ever upon a particular section of the community related to him by ties of blood, and to have reserved the Caliphate to this tribe. It seems more likely that, as Islam at that time had not yet given birth to powerful States, he chose this tribe because it was the best organised and the strongest, and thus considered it as the fittest to maintain the independence of the Caliphate and defend the interests of Islam. Besides, within half a century after the Prophet’s death the Caliphate passed from Mohammed’s four immediate successors to the Omayyids for the reason indicated above, and in contradiction to the theory of lineal descent. It is obvious that, had Mohammed been guided by family considerations, he would not have merely given the Faithful some directions about the election of his successor, but he would have chosen one of his relations himself to inherit his office, and would have made it hereditary in the latter’s family.
The Wahhabis, who are connected with the Shia, are likewise a political and religious sect which was founded in the eighteenth century in Nejed, a region of Central Arabia conterminous with the north of Syria. The Wahhabi doctrine aims at turning Islam into a kind of deism, a rational creed, looking upon all the traditions of Islam as superstitions, and discarding all religious observances. Since the assassination of Ibn el Rashid in May, 1920, the present leaders of the Wahhabis are Abdullah ibn Mitah and Ibn Saud, over whom the Ottomans have a merely nominal power.
When King Hussein planned to join the Hejaz and Nejd to Syria, Ibn Saud refused to let Nejd fall under the suzerainty of the King of the Hejaz, who was powerful merely because he was supported by Europe and because Syria is a rich country. Most likely the religious question had something to do with this conflict. In August, 1919, the Wahhabis, who had asked the Emir Ibn Saud for his support, suddenly attacked the troops of the sons of the King of the Hejaz which were in the Taif area, and defeated them at Tarabad. The Wahhabi Emir gained a few more victories, and was about to threaten the Holy Cities when the rising of the Orthodox Moslem tribes compelled him to retreat.
So the hostility of the Wahhabis, whose independence was threatened by the Sunnis of the Hejaz, whom they look upon as heretics, still embittered the dissensions in the Arab world.
It has been asserted that this Wahhabi movement was at first started by the Turks, which would not have been unlikely at a time when it was Turkey’s interest to divide Arabia in order to raise difficulties to the Allies after the Sherif’s treason; but now it was no longer her interest—and it was beyond her power—to stir up an agitation.
The Ishmaelites, who laid waste Persia and Syria in the eighth century, and played an important part in the East till the twelfth century, have also broken off with the Shia.
Lastly, the Druses, who inhabit the slopes of Lebanon and the greater part of Anti-Lebanon between Jebeil and Saida along the Mediterranean, profess the creed of the Caliph Al-Hakem, who lived at thebeginning of the eleventh century. They had withdrawn to Lebanon and long repelled the attacks of the Turks, whose suzerainty they acknowledged only in 1588. In 1842 the Porte gave them a chief, but practically they have remained almost independent. They have often fought with the Maronite Christians living to the north, especially in 1860, and there is still much hostility between them.
Moreover, all Moslem communities, without exception—whether the communities governed by independent national sovereigns such as Afghanistan; or by sovereigns owing allegiance to non-Moslem Powers such as Egypt, India, Tunis, Khiva, Bokhara; or the communities living under a non-Moslem rule, as is the case with those of Algeria, Russia, and also India and China—give their allegiance to the Sultan as Caliph, though they are always at liberty to refuse it. Even the Moslem communities of Algeria and Tunis, which are connected with those of Morocco by their common origin and language, and live close by them, do not deem it a sufficient reason to recognise the Emir of Morocco as Caliph that he is a descendant of the Prophet.
An even more striking argument is that the community of the Hejaz, which rebelled against Turkish sovereignty during the war and has made itself politically independent, still maintains its religious allegiance to the Sultan; and the present King, Hussein, who is the most authentic descendant of the Prophet, and who rules over the two holiest towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, soon after the armistice addressed the Sultan a telegram of religious allegiance drawn up in the most deferential terms.The possession of Mecca and Medina being one of the attributes of the Caliph, and these towns having a great religious and political importance owing to the great annual pilgrimage, King Hussein might have taken advantage of this to dispute with the Sultan the title of Caliph. England had strongly urged him to do so, but King Hussein obstinately refused. Then the British Government, giving up all hope of bringing about the transference of the Caliphate from the Ottoman dynasty to another sovereign, concluded a secret alliance with Vahid ed Din.
Considering the intricate situation in the East due to the variety of races and religions, and the movements of all sorts by which the populations of those countries are swayed, it seems most unwise to increase the general restlessness by a vain intervention of the Powers, and to dismember what remains of Turkey in Europe and Aria Minor, a dismemberment which would necessarily have violent repercussions throughout the deeply perturbed Moslem world. Though the recent movements of emancipation in the East to a certain extent meet the legitimate wishes of the peoples and have somewhat cleared the situation in Asia Minor, yet it is obviously most perilous to infringe upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, to endeavour to drive away the Turks into Asia, and to set up a kind of fictitious official Islam by compelling the Moslem peoples of the East to give up their cherished independence and submit to an Arab imperialism which would soon become British imperialism. At the present moment all the Moslem elements are determined to unite together against any enemy of their liberty; and all Moslems,without any distinction of creed or race, might very well one day flock to the standard of a bold leader who should take up arms in the name of Islam, in order to safeguard their independence.
These movements, and many other similar ones, were encouraged and strengthened by the development of the principle of nationalities and the support given to it by Mr. Wilson, who was bent upon carrying it out to its strictly logical consequences, without paying heed to the limitations imposed by the present material and political conditions. But we do not think it is true to say, as has been urged, that the assertion of the right of self-determination of peoples was the initial cause of these movements. The movement in favour of the rights of nationalities originated long before Mr. Wilson’s declarations, which merely hurried on this powerful movement, and also caused it to swerve somewhat from its original direction.
This movement, on the whole, seems chiefly to proceed—though other factors have intervened in it—from a kind of reaction against the standardising tendency, from a material and moral point of view, of modern Western civilisation, especially the Anglo-Saxon civilisation, and also from a reaction against the extreme unification aimed at by russifying the numerous peoples living within the Russian Empire. Modern civilisation, having reached its present climax, has aimed—and its political and social repercussions have had the same influence—at doing away with all differences between human minds and making the world homogeneous; thus all men wouldhave been brought to live in the same way, to have the same manners, and their requirements would have been met in the same way—to the very great advantage of its enormous industrial development. Of course, all this proved an idle dream; human nature soon asserted itself, amidst the commotions and perturbations experienced by the States, and a reaction set in among those who hitherto only aimed at enslaving various human groups, or linked them together politically in a most artificial way. Then the same feeling spread among all those peoples.
All this enables us to see to what extent this movement is legitimate, and to know exactly what proportions of good and evil it contains.
It rightly asserts that various peoples have different natures, and by protecting their freedom, it aims at ensuring the development of their peculiar abilities. For let us not forget that the characters of peoples depend on physical conditions, that even the features we may not like in some peoples are due to the race, and that if, by blending and mixing populations nowadays these features are modified, they are generally altered only from bad to worse.
But this principle is true only so far as it frees and enables to shape their own destinies peoples who have distinctive qualities of their own and are able to provide for themselves. It cannot be extended—as has been attempted in some cases—to States within which men descending from various races or having belonged in the course of centuries to different nationalities have long been united, and through a long common history and a centuries-old co-operation have formed one nation. This is oneof the erroneous aspects of Mr. Wilson’s conception, and one of the bad consequences it has entailed.
The eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, which the British wished for but which they dared not carry into effect, does not thwart the scheme of the Turkish Nationalists; it can only bring about a reaction of the Moslem populations against foreign intervention, and thus strengthen the Pan-Turanian movement. Though this movement cannot carry out all its aims, the eviction of the Turks obviously must urge those populations to constitute a State based both on the community of religion and the community of race of its various elements, and from which all alien ethnic elements would be expelled—viz., Slavs, Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, who were all an inherent source of weakness to the Turkish Empire. This new State would include Anatolia, Russian Azerbaïjan, and Persian Azerbaïjan, the Russian territories in Central Asia—viz., Russian Turkistan, Khiva, Bokhara—the whole of the region of the Steppes; and towards it the Tatar populations of the Volga, Afghanistan, and Chinese Turkistan would necessarily be attracted.
As to the Arabs, the Turks have never been able to gain their friendship, though they have done their best to do so, and have drawn but little profit from the money squandered plentifully in their vast deserts. And the Russians have always stood in the way of an understanding between Turkey and the Arabian territories, because it would have benefited the cause of Islam and therefore would have hindered both their own designs on the territories of Asia Minor and the ambitions of the OrthodoxChurch. Yet to the Turks as well as the Arabs—and even to the Europeans—it would be a great advantage not to injure the understanding and goodwill that Islam engenders among these peoples, since its creed has both a religious and a political aspect.
The maintenance of this Islamic union has been wrongly called—in the disparaging sense of the word—Pan-Islamism. Yet its ideal has nothing in common with such doctrines as those of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Polism, Pan-Hellenism, etc., which are all imperialistic doctrines aiming at territorial conquests by military or economic means, and also by the diffusion of their own religious creeds and the extension of the influence of their Churches. While Pan-Germanism aims at the hegemony of the world; while Pan-Americanism wants to control the whole of America; while Pan-Slavism wishes to gather together all the Slavonic elements—which is defensible—but also means to supplant the old civilisation of Western Europe, which it considers as “rotten,” and to renovate the world; while Pan-Polism, which has not such ambitious aims, merely seeks, like Pan-Hellenism, to conquer wider territories in order to restore Greater Poland or Greater Greece—Islam, which does not try to make any proselytes, has no other ambition than to group all Moslem elements according to the commandments of the Koran. Yet, Islam having both a political and a religious purpose, a Pan-Islamic concept might be defensible, and would be legitimate from the Moslem point of view, whereas it cannot be so from the Christian point of view. Pan-Catholicism, on the contrary, is an impossible thing,because Christianity does not imply a political doctrine, and is distinct from temporal power—though such a doctrine has sometimes been advocated. For in the doctrine of monarchy, especially in France, religion has always been held merely as a help, a support, and the monarch, though he has often been a defender of the Faith, has never looked upon his power as dependent on the Papacy or bound up with it. Islam, however, does not want to assert itself in, and give birth to, a huge political movement—a Pan-Islamic movement in the imperialistic sense of the word—aiming at constituting a huge theocratic State, including all the 300 million Moslems who are now living. But there is between all Moslems a deep moral solidarity, a mighty religious bond which accounts for their sympathetic feeling towards Turkey, and owing to which even the Moslem inhabitants of countries which have lost their independence still earnestly defend and jealously maintain the privileges and dignity of the Caliph.
So it is a mistake to speak of the ambitious designs of Islam, and the mistake has been made wilfully. Those who profess such an opinion are Pan-Slavic Russians who want to deceive public opinion in the world as to their true intent, and thus prepare for territorial annexations, because Pan-Slavism is the enemy of Islamism. As this Pan-Slavism has always been, and is still more than ever, a danger to Europe, it is the interest of the latter, in order to defend its civilisation, not to fight against Islamism, but even to support it. This necessity has been understood by many Catholics who have always been favourable to Turkey and by the Mussulmans, which accountsfor the long friendly intercourse between Moslems and Catholics, and the Moslems’ tolerance toward the devotees of a religion which, on the whole, is in complete contradiction to their own faith. On the other hand, Islam appears as counterbalancing Protestantism in the East, and it seems the future of thought and morality and of any culture would be endangered if the 60 million Indian Moslems and the 220 million Indian Brahminists, Buddhists, and the members of other sects ever listened to Mr. Lloyd George and were connected with Protestantism.
Moreover, King Hussein, in the course of the audience that he granted in July, 1920, to Prince Ruffo, the leader of the Italian mission to Arabia, before his departure, after saying that the Moslem world resented the hostile attitude of the Powers towards the Sultan of Constantinople, declared that the Moslems are not actuated by any feeling of conquest or proselytism, but simply claim the right to preserve their independence.
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