"Rebellion! foul, dishonoring word,Whose wrongful blight so oft has stainedThe holiest cause that tongue or swordOf mortal ever lost or gained.How many a spirit, born to bless,Hath sunk beneath that withering name,Whom but a day's, an hour's successHad wafted to eternal fame!As exhalations, when they burstFrom the warm earth, if chilled at first,If checked in soaring from the plain,Darken to fogs and sink again;—But if they once triumphant spreadTheir wings above the mountain-head,Become enthroned in upper air,And turn to sun-bright glories there!"
This success, so necessary to earn for the patriot or reformer the fame to which he is so justly entitled, is too often able to win admiration and respect also for the successful enemies of mankind.
Few members of the human race ever deserved less praise from posterity (unlessindeed, as a tribute to great but misdirected abilities) than Julius Cæsar; but, nevertheless, many tributes have been laid before the tomb of this destroyer of his country's liberties. For example, the historian Mommsen, thus eulogizes Cæsar:
"Cæsar, from the outset and as it were by hereditary right the head of the popular party, had for thirty years borne aloft its banner without ever changing or even so much as concealing his colors; he remained democrat even when monarch. As he accepted without limitation, apart of course from the preposterous projects of Catiline and Clodius, the heritage of his party; as he displayed the bitterest, even personal, hatred to the aristocracy and the genuine aristocrats; and as he retained unchanged the essential ideas of Roman democracy, viz., alleviation of the burdens of debtors, transmarine colonization, gradual equalization of the differences of rights among the classes belonging to the State, emancipation of the executive power from the Senate; his monarchy was so little at variance with democracy, that democracy on the contrary only attained its completion and fulfillment by means of that monarchy. For his monarchy was not the Oriental despotism of divine right, but a monarchy such as Gaius Gracchus wished to found, such as Pericles and Cromwell founded—the representation of the nation by the man in whom it puts supreme and unlimited confidence. The ideas which lay at the foundation of Cæsar's work were so far not strictlynew; but to him belongs their realization, which after all is everywhere the main matter; and to him pertains the grandeur of execution, which would probably have surprised the brilliant projector himself if he could have seen it, and which has impressed, and will always impress, every one to whom it has been presented in the living reality or in the mirror of history—to whatever historical epoch or whatever shade of politics he may belong—according to the measure of his ability to comprehend human and historical greatness, with deep and ever-deepening admiration."
"Cæsar, from the outset and as it were by hereditary right the head of the popular party, had for thirty years borne aloft its banner without ever changing or even so much as concealing his colors; he remained democrat even when monarch. As he accepted without limitation, apart of course from the preposterous projects of Catiline and Clodius, the heritage of his party; as he displayed the bitterest, even personal, hatred to the aristocracy and the genuine aristocrats; and as he retained unchanged the essential ideas of Roman democracy, viz., alleviation of the burdens of debtors, transmarine colonization, gradual equalization of the differences of rights among the classes belonging to the State, emancipation of the executive power from the Senate; his monarchy was so little at variance with democracy, that democracy on the contrary only attained its completion and fulfillment by means of that monarchy. For his monarchy was not the Oriental despotism of divine right, but a monarchy such as Gaius Gracchus wished to found, such as Pericles and Cromwell founded—the representation of the nation by the man in whom it puts supreme and unlimited confidence. The ideas which lay at the foundation of Cæsar's work were so far not strictlynew; but to him belongs their realization, which after all is everywhere the main matter; and to him pertains the grandeur of execution, which would probably have surprised the brilliant projector himself if he could have seen it, and which has impressed, and will always impress, every one to whom it has been presented in the living reality or in the mirror of history—to whatever historical epoch or whatever shade of politics he may belong—according to the measure of his ability to comprehend human and historical greatness, with deep and ever-deepening admiration."
The laudations of Cæsar, it is perhaps needless to say, are always from men like Mommsen who are absolutely devoid of any true sympathy for free government or popular rights. No more striking commentary on such men can be found than from comparing Mommsen's attack upon the revolutionary methods of Tiberius Gracchus with his defense of Cæsar, given above.
The truth of the matter is that Cæsar was never at any time in his career a sincere member of the popular party. The people were his dupes, by whose aid he raised himself to the imperial power and destroyed the political liberties of his native state. His almost blasphemous use of the names of the great dead leaders and martyrs of the popularcause as cloaks to cover his own selfish and unpatriotic schemes is not the least of the indictments against him in the eyes of the true advocate of popular rights. In such actions, however, Cæsar does not stand alone. In our politics of to-day nothing is more common for a politician than to try to cover his corruption by throwing over himself the mantle of some great national hero. The cloak of Jefferson in one political party, and of Lincoln in the other, are striven for by men who desire to use them solely for the purpose of covering their opposition to everything for which these men stood.
Nor has Cæsar been without imitators in every age, and in every republic, who, if the opportunity would only permit, desire above all else to imitate his life and success. The ability of Cæsar, however, is seldom or never to be found in his imitators; but the ambition itself is to be found somewhere among the politicians of every republic. There is also generally a strong influential class that would prefer the strong settled rule of one man to the constant political controversies with "their unsettled effect upon business." And the reality of a republic can always be destroyedwithout affecting its form, as was done in Rome by the centering of the powers of the different officials in Cæsar, or more recently, in Mexico, by the many successive elections of Diaz to the presidency.
The early and violent death of Cæsar came before his plans were completed, and before he had assumed the title, as well as the authority, of a king or emperor. The ancient historian Appianus Alexandrinus has left a vivid account of the closing scene of Cæsar's life, some extracts from which are here inserted:
"A rumor was spread that there was an oracle of the Sibyls which declared that the Parthians could not be subdued by the Romans, unless they were commanded by a king. This made some talk publicly that in regard of other nations taxed under the Roman empire, there needed no scruple be made at the giving Cæsar that title. He, having still refused it, hastened all he could to get out of the city where many envied him. But four days before the day appointed for his departure he was slain by his enemies in the palace, either out of malice to see him raised to such supreme felicity and height of command, or else (as themselves said) out of a desire to restore the commonwealth to its first estate; for they feared that, after having overcome these other nations, nothing could hinder him from making himself king; yet as it appears tome it was only for the name's sake they attempted all things; for in the thing itself there is no difference between dictator and king."There were two chiefs of this conspiracy, the son of that Brutus whom Sulla put to death, M. Brutus Cæpio, who came for refuge to Cæsar himself after the battle of Pharsalus, and C. Cassius, who yielded to him the galleys in the Hellespont, both of Pompey's party, and with them was joined one of Cæsar's most intimate friends, Decimus Brutus Albinus."Having all decreed the palace the place of execution, there were divers opinions concerning the manner of doing it; some being of opinion that they should likewise make away with Antony, Cæsar's colleague, the most powerful of his friends, and well beloved of the soldiery. But Brutus opposed that, saying that it was only by killing Cæsar, who was as a king, that they ought to seek for the glory of destroying tyrants; and that if they killed his friends too, men would impute the action to private enmity, and the faction of Pompey. This advice prevailing, they only expected the assembling of the Senate. Now the day before, Cæsar being invited to sup with Lepidus, carried along with him Decimus Brutus Albinus; and during supper the question being proposed what death was best for man, some desiring one kind, and some another, he alone preferred the suddenest and most unexpected. Thus divining for himself, they fell to discourse of the morrow's affairs."At the same time that Cæsar went to the palace in his litter, one of his domestics, who had understoodsomething of the conspiracy, came to find Calpurnia; but without saying anything to her but that he must speak with Cæsar about affairs of importance, he stayed, expecting his return from the Senate, because he did not know all the particulars; his host of Cnidus, called Artemidorus, running to the palace to give him notice of it, came just at the moment of his being killed; another, as he sacrificed before the gate of the senate house, gave him a note of all the conspiracy; but he going in without reading it, it was after death found in his hands. As he came out of his litter, Lænas, the same who before had spoken to Cassius, came to him, and entertained him a long time in private; which struck a damp into the chiefs of the conspiracy, the more because their conference was long; they already began to make signs to one another that they must now kill him before he arrested them; but in the sequel of the discourse, observing Lænas to use rather the gesture of suppliant than accuser, they deferred it; till in the end, seeing him return thanks to Cæsar, they took courage."They left Trebonius at the gate to stop Antony under the pretense of discoursing some business with him; and as soon as Cæsar was seated, the other conspirators surrounded him according to custom, as friends, having each his dagger concealed. At the same time Attilius Cimber standing before him began to entreat him to grant the return of his brother who was an exile; and upon his refusal, under pretence of begging it with more humility, he took him by the robe, and, drawing it to him, hung about his neck,crying out, 'Why do you delay, my friends?' Thereupon Casca first of all reaching over his head, thought to strike his dagger into his throat, but wounded him only in the breast. Cæsar, having disengaged himself from Cimber, caught hold of Casca's hand, leaped from his seat, and threw himself upon Casca with a wonderful force; but being at handy grips with him, another struck his dagger into his side, Cassius gave him a wound in the face, Brutus struck him quite through the thigh, Bucolianus wounded him behind the head, and he, like one enraged, and roaring like a savage beast, turned sometimes to one and sometimes to another; till strength failing him after the wound received from Brutus, he threw the skirt of his robe over his face and suffered himself gently to fall before Pompey's statue. They forebore not to give him many stabs after he was down; so that there were three and twenty wounds found in his body. And those that slew him were so eager that some of them, through vehemence, without thinking of it, wounded each other."
"A rumor was spread that there was an oracle of the Sibyls which declared that the Parthians could not be subdued by the Romans, unless they were commanded by a king. This made some talk publicly that in regard of other nations taxed under the Roman empire, there needed no scruple be made at the giving Cæsar that title. He, having still refused it, hastened all he could to get out of the city where many envied him. But four days before the day appointed for his departure he was slain by his enemies in the palace, either out of malice to see him raised to such supreme felicity and height of command, or else (as themselves said) out of a desire to restore the commonwealth to its first estate; for they feared that, after having overcome these other nations, nothing could hinder him from making himself king; yet as it appears tome it was only for the name's sake they attempted all things; for in the thing itself there is no difference between dictator and king.
"There were two chiefs of this conspiracy, the son of that Brutus whom Sulla put to death, M. Brutus Cæpio, who came for refuge to Cæsar himself after the battle of Pharsalus, and C. Cassius, who yielded to him the galleys in the Hellespont, both of Pompey's party, and with them was joined one of Cæsar's most intimate friends, Decimus Brutus Albinus.
"Having all decreed the palace the place of execution, there were divers opinions concerning the manner of doing it; some being of opinion that they should likewise make away with Antony, Cæsar's colleague, the most powerful of his friends, and well beloved of the soldiery. But Brutus opposed that, saying that it was only by killing Cæsar, who was as a king, that they ought to seek for the glory of destroying tyrants; and that if they killed his friends too, men would impute the action to private enmity, and the faction of Pompey. This advice prevailing, they only expected the assembling of the Senate. Now the day before, Cæsar being invited to sup with Lepidus, carried along with him Decimus Brutus Albinus; and during supper the question being proposed what death was best for man, some desiring one kind, and some another, he alone preferred the suddenest and most unexpected. Thus divining for himself, they fell to discourse of the morrow's affairs.
"At the same time that Cæsar went to the palace in his litter, one of his domestics, who had understoodsomething of the conspiracy, came to find Calpurnia; but without saying anything to her but that he must speak with Cæsar about affairs of importance, he stayed, expecting his return from the Senate, because he did not know all the particulars; his host of Cnidus, called Artemidorus, running to the palace to give him notice of it, came just at the moment of his being killed; another, as he sacrificed before the gate of the senate house, gave him a note of all the conspiracy; but he going in without reading it, it was after death found in his hands. As he came out of his litter, Lænas, the same who before had spoken to Cassius, came to him, and entertained him a long time in private; which struck a damp into the chiefs of the conspiracy, the more because their conference was long; they already began to make signs to one another that they must now kill him before he arrested them; but in the sequel of the discourse, observing Lænas to use rather the gesture of suppliant than accuser, they deferred it; till in the end, seeing him return thanks to Cæsar, they took courage.
"They left Trebonius at the gate to stop Antony under the pretense of discoursing some business with him; and as soon as Cæsar was seated, the other conspirators surrounded him according to custom, as friends, having each his dagger concealed. At the same time Attilius Cimber standing before him began to entreat him to grant the return of his brother who was an exile; and upon his refusal, under pretence of begging it with more humility, he took him by the robe, and, drawing it to him, hung about his neck,crying out, 'Why do you delay, my friends?' Thereupon Casca first of all reaching over his head, thought to strike his dagger into his throat, but wounded him only in the breast. Cæsar, having disengaged himself from Cimber, caught hold of Casca's hand, leaped from his seat, and threw himself upon Casca with a wonderful force; but being at handy grips with him, another struck his dagger into his side, Cassius gave him a wound in the face, Brutus struck him quite through the thigh, Bucolianus wounded him behind the head, and he, like one enraged, and roaring like a savage beast, turned sometimes to one and sometimes to another; till strength failing him after the wound received from Brutus, he threw the skirt of his robe over his face and suffered himself gently to fall before Pompey's statue. They forebore not to give him many stabs after he was down; so that there were three and twenty wounds found in his body. And those that slew him were so eager that some of them, through vehemence, without thinking of it, wounded each other."
The daggers of Brutus, Cassius, and their allies, on the Ides of March, 44B.C., avenged the republic which they were too late to save. It thus chanced that the details of the new imperial government were in the main arranged not by Julius Cæsar but by his great-nephew, Gaius Octavius Cæsar, who succeeded both to the private fortune and the public office of the usurper. It was, however, only after another period of civil warfare that the new Cæsar came into his possessions.
The story of this civil war belongs to the history of the Roman empire rather than to that of the Roman republic, and will be referred to only briefly. Octavius Cæsar was in Illyricum at the time of the assassination of his uncle. Hastening to Rome, he found the city divided into two factions, one led by Brutus and Cassius, composed of those who desired to restore the republic; and the other, the old adherents of Cæsar, under the leadership of Mark Antony.
Octavius had perhaps more to fear from the friends of his uncle than from his assassinators, as the latter, while they would have prevented him from assuming the political powers of his uncle, would probably not have opposed his taking possession of the latter's private fortune; while Mark Antony, who had possession of Cæsar's papers and money, was probably intending to seize both the powers and property of Julius Cæsar. Octavius Cæsar, however, was possessed of a fair share both of his uncle's ability and perfidy, and proved himself more than a match for all his enemies, both in open warfare and in secret treachery.
At first Octavius seemed inclined to enter into an alliance with Cicero and some of the other senators against Antony, but finding that Cicero sought to restore the republic and could not be used as his tool, Octavius reached an agreement with Antony, and the two, together with Lepidus, formed the second triumvirate.
The immediate result of this coalition was another proscription, recalling the days of Sulla; the condemnation of all the assassinators of Cæsar by the Senate; and extensivemilitary preparations to overthrow the armies which they had collected.
The ancient historian Appian of Alexandria thus describes the terrors of the proscriptions:
"The proscription being published, guards were forthwith placed at the gates and all the avenues of the city, at the seaports, and in the marshes, and in all places where there was any likelihood an unhappy man might shelter himself; besides, centurions were commanded abroad, to make search in the country, which was done all at an instant; so that both within and without the city many persons died suddenly several kinds of deaths. The streets were filled with the sad spectacle of heads carrying to the triumvirs, to receive the reward; and every step some person of quality, endeavoring to save himself, was met shamefully disguised; some running down into wells, and others into privies; some hiding themselves in the tops of the chimneys, or under the tiles, where they durst not utter a sigh or a groan; for they stood in more fear of their wives, or children, or freedmen, or slaves, or debtors, or neighbours that coveted some of their goods, than of the murderers themselves."All private grudges were now discovered; and it was a strange change to see the prime men of the senate, consulars, prætors, tribunes, or pretenders to these dignities cast themselves at the feet of their slaves with tears in their eyes, begging and caressing them, calling them their saviours and patrons; and, which is most deplorable, not to be able with all thesesubmissions to obtain the least favour. The most pernicious seditions and cruellest of wars never had anything in them so terrible as the calamities wherewith the city was now affrighted; for in war and tumult none but enemies were feared, and domestics were confided in; whereas now domestics were more dreaded than enemies, because having no cause to fear for themselves, as in war or tumult, from familiars they became of a sudden persecutors; either out of a dissembled hate, or out of the hope of recompense publicly proposed, or because of some silver or gold hid in the house; so that no person found himself secure in his house, servants being ordinarily more sensible of profit than of the affection they owe to their masters; and though some might be found faithful and kind, yet they durst not assist a proscript, nor conceal him, nor so much as stay with him, for fear of falling into the same misfortune."There was now much more danger than when the seventeen first proscribed were fallen upon; for then no person being publicly proscribed when on a sudden they saw some killed, one man defended another, for fear lest the same should happen to him. But after the proscription was published those comprised in it were presently forsaken by all the world; some that thought themselves secure, having their minds bent on profit, sought them to deliver them to the murderers, that they might have the reward; others pillaged the houses of those that had been killed, and with the present gain comforted themselves against the public misery."The most prudent and moderate, surprised at a thing so extraordinary, stood like men astonished, considering that other cities turmoiled with divisions were re-established by the concord of their citizens; whereas the Romans, already afflicted with civil dissensions, completed their ruin by this reconciliation. Some were killed defending themselves; others, who thought themselves not condemned, without any defence; some let themselves die with hunger, or hanged, or drowned themselves, or threw themselves headlong from the tops of houses, or cast themselves into the fire, or ran to meet their murderers; others again sought to protract the time; and either hid themselves, or begged shamefully, or fled, or offered money to save their lives. Many likewise were slain contrary to the intention of the triumvirs, either by mistake, or out of some particular grudge; but the bodies of the proscripts might be known from the others, because they wanted the head, which was cut off, and carried before the tribunal for orations, where they paid the reward. On the other side, wonderful examples were to be seen of the affection of wives, children, brethren and slaves; who found out a thousand inventions to save their husbands, fathers, brethren, or masters; died with them when they were discovered, or killed themselves upon those bodies they were not able to defend."Of those that escaped the proscription, some pursued by their ill fortune, perished by shipwreck; others saved beyond all probability, came afterwards to exercise dignities in the city, to have command of armies and arrive at the honour of triumph. Such wonderfulthings were to be seen in those days which do not happen in an ordinary city, or in a small kingdom but in the mistress of the world, as well by sea as land; Providence disposing it so to reduce things to that excellent order wherein you now see them. Not but that Rome felt the same miseries under Sulla, and before him under Marius; and we have in writing of them reported many actions of cruelty, even to the depriving their enemies of burial; but what passed under the triumvirs made much more noise, because of the height of their reputations; and particularly the valour and good fortune of him, who having fixed the foundations of this empire, has left it to those of his race and name, even to this present."
"The proscription being published, guards were forthwith placed at the gates and all the avenues of the city, at the seaports, and in the marshes, and in all places where there was any likelihood an unhappy man might shelter himself; besides, centurions were commanded abroad, to make search in the country, which was done all at an instant; so that both within and without the city many persons died suddenly several kinds of deaths. The streets were filled with the sad spectacle of heads carrying to the triumvirs, to receive the reward; and every step some person of quality, endeavoring to save himself, was met shamefully disguised; some running down into wells, and others into privies; some hiding themselves in the tops of the chimneys, or under the tiles, where they durst not utter a sigh or a groan; for they stood in more fear of their wives, or children, or freedmen, or slaves, or debtors, or neighbours that coveted some of their goods, than of the murderers themselves.
"All private grudges were now discovered; and it was a strange change to see the prime men of the senate, consulars, prætors, tribunes, or pretenders to these dignities cast themselves at the feet of their slaves with tears in their eyes, begging and caressing them, calling them their saviours and patrons; and, which is most deplorable, not to be able with all thesesubmissions to obtain the least favour. The most pernicious seditions and cruellest of wars never had anything in them so terrible as the calamities wherewith the city was now affrighted; for in war and tumult none but enemies were feared, and domestics were confided in; whereas now domestics were more dreaded than enemies, because having no cause to fear for themselves, as in war or tumult, from familiars they became of a sudden persecutors; either out of a dissembled hate, or out of the hope of recompense publicly proposed, or because of some silver or gold hid in the house; so that no person found himself secure in his house, servants being ordinarily more sensible of profit than of the affection they owe to their masters; and though some might be found faithful and kind, yet they durst not assist a proscript, nor conceal him, nor so much as stay with him, for fear of falling into the same misfortune.
"There was now much more danger than when the seventeen first proscribed were fallen upon; for then no person being publicly proscribed when on a sudden they saw some killed, one man defended another, for fear lest the same should happen to him. But after the proscription was published those comprised in it were presently forsaken by all the world; some that thought themselves secure, having their minds bent on profit, sought them to deliver them to the murderers, that they might have the reward; others pillaged the houses of those that had been killed, and with the present gain comforted themselves against the public misery.
"The most prudent and moderate, surprised at a thing so extraordinary, stood like men astonished, considering that other cities turmoiled with divisions were re-established by the concord of their citizens; whereas the Romans, already afflicted with civil dissensions, completed their ruin by this reconciliation. Some were killed defending themselves; others, who thought themselves not condemned, without any defence; some let themselves die with hunger, or hanged, or drowned themselves, or threw themselves headlong from the tops of houses, or cast themselves into the fire, or ran to meet their murderers; others again sought to protract the time; and either hid themselves, or begged shamefully, or fled, or offered money to save their lives. Many likewise were slain contrary to the intention of the triumvirs, either by mistake, or out of some particular grudge; but the bodies of the proscripts might be known from the others, because they wanted the head, which was cut off, and carried before the tribunal for orations, where they paid the reward. On the other side, wonderful examples were to be seen of the affection of wives, children, brethren and slaves; who found out a thousand inventions to save their husbands, fathers, brethren, or masters; died with them when they were discovered, or killed themselves upon those bodies they were not able to defend.
"Of those that escaped the proscription, some pursued by their ill fortune, perished by shipwreck; others saved beyond all probability, came afterwards to exercise dignities in the city, to have command of armies and arrive at the honour of triumph. Such wonderfulthings were to be seen in those days which do not happen in an ordinary city, or in a small kingdom but in the mistress of the world, as well by sea as land; Providence disposing it so to reduce things to that excellent order wherein you now see them. Not but that Rome felt the same miseries under Sulla, and before him under Marius; and we have in writing of them reported many actions of cruelty, even to the depriving their enemies of burial; but what passed under the triumvirs made much more noise, because of the height of their reputations; and particularly the valour and good fortune of him, who having fixed the foundations of this empire, has left it to those of his race and name, even to this present."
Among those murdered at this time was the greatest of all Roman orators, Marcus Tullius Cicero.
An interesting incident connected with the raising of the money for the campaign against Brutus and Cassius was the refusal of the Roman women at this time to pay their share of the taxes demanded of the Roman citizens for the support of the armies to be raised against Brutus and Cassius.
Hortensia, the daughter of a great orator, was their spokesman. The burden of her plea was that this was a family quarrel, a civil war, not one for the defense of Rome."Let war with the Gauls or the Parthians come," she said, "and we shall not be inferior to our mothers in zeal for the common safety, but for civil wars may we never contribute nor even assist you against one another. Why should we pay taxes, when we have no part in the honors, the commands, the statecraft for which you contend against one another with such harmful results?"
The campaign resulted in the complete destruction of all the armies opposed to the triumvirate, the most decisive battle of the campaign being that at Philippi. How Antony and Octavius again quarreled after their common enemy had been overthrown, how the destruction of Antony resulted from his infatuation for Cleopatra, and how Octavius at length secured the undisputed rule of the Roman world need not here be described.
The date of the beginning of the reign of Octavius Cæsar as Emperor of Rome is generally taken as 31B.C.Like his predecessor, Octavius Cæsar endeavored to preserve as far as possible the empty forms of republican rule.
In the overthrow of the early Roman kingdom the power of the kings had mainly passed to the consuls, but partially to otherofficials, and some of the powers possessed by the early consuls had been gradually taken away from them and given to other newly created officials, such as the censors and prætors. For centuries there had been a continued policy of division of powers; this policy was now suddenly reversed, and governmental powers of all kinds reunited in a single official. This was accomplished by conferring upon Octavius Cæsar, for life, each of the various offices known in the government of the Roman republic. Octavius Cæsar became life censor, life consul, and life tribune. The appointment of his colleagues in all these offices was likewise in his power. The cycle of governmental change had now been completed, and the Roman emperor possessed all the old powers of the Roman kings. In the field of legislation it is indeed probable that the power of the emperor was greater than that of his early predecessors.
"The old popular assemblies for a period after the establishment of the Empire still went through the form of passing acts, which had been prepared by the real governing power, but in addition to this the Emperor was given the power of direct legislation by his own authority."Laws which owed their force to the authority of the Emperor were known as Constitutiones and may be divided into four principal classes, as follows:"1. Edicts, which were public ordinances, of universal application throughout the Empire. These had the authority of laws, inasmuch as they were generally enforced and applied to all. In the earlier reigns they were frequently renewed, and they derived their authority from the Emperor as the prætorian edict did from the prætor. Gradually they came to be held as permanently binding the real ground of their permanent force, custom was overlooked, and the imperial authority was regarded as such ground."2. Decrees, which were decisions in judicial cases brought before the Emperor as final court of appeal. Inasmuch as they were interpretations of law, they were regarded as binding upon all courts."3. Rescripts, which were decisions upon questions of law submitted by courts and private persons. They were closely connected with the pontifical interpretations."4. Mandates, which were directions to officials in the exercise of their offices. These, by repetition in the various instructions sent out from time to time by the Emperor, became a source of general law. They were theoretically in force only during the lifetime of the Emperor from which they proceeded; but they became of permanent force because of repetition and custom." (Lee'sHistorical Jurisprudence.)
"The old popular assemblies for a period after the establishment of the Empire still went through the form of passing acts, which had been prepared by the real governing power, but in addition to this the Emperor was given the power of direct legislation by his own authority.
"Laws which owed their force to the authority of the Emperor were known as Constitutiones and may be divided into four principal classes, as follows:
"1. Edicts, which were public ordinances, of universal application throughout the Empire. These had the authority of laws, inasmuch as they were generally enforced and applied to all. In the earlier reigns they were frequently renewed, and they derived their authority from the Emperor as the prætorian edict did from the prætor. Gradually they came to be held as permanently binding the real ground of their permanent force, custom was overlooked, and the imperial authority was regarded as such ground.
"2. Decrees, which were decisions in judicial cases brought before the Emperor as final court of appeal. Inasmuch as they were interpretations of law, they were regarded as binding upon all courts.
"3. Rescripts, which were decisions upon questions of law submitted by courts and private persons. They were closely connected with the pontifical interpretations.
"4. Mandates, which were directions to officials in the exercise of their offices. These, by repetition in the various instructions sent out from time to time by the Emperor, became a source of general law. They were theoretically in force only during the lifetime of the Emperor from which they proceeded; but they became of permanent force because of repetition and custom." (Lee'sHistorical Jurisprudence.)
There are writers who look with favor upon this establishment of the Roman empire,just as there are those of the same caliber who, if some form of a dictatorship should be substituted for our present republican form of government, would be loudest in their approval of the change. Dr. Hirschfeld, of the University of Berlin, gives us the following roseate picture of the benefits which Rome received from the change:
"The reorganization of the government by Augustus, open to criticism as it is in many respects, was a blessing to the Roman empire. The view which prevailed under the republic, that the provinces had been conquered only to be sucked dry by senators and knights, governors, and tax-farmers in league or in rivalry of greed (we have one example out of hundreds in Verres, condemned to immortality by the eloquence of Cicero), this view was laid aside with the advent of the empire, and even if extortion did not wholly cease in the senatorial provinces, yet the provincial administration of the first two centuriesA.D.is infinitely superior to the systematic spoliation of the republic. The governors are no longer masters armed with absolute authority, constrained to extort money as fast as possible from the provincials committed to their charge in order to meet debts contracted by their own extravagance and, more especially, by that bribery of the populace which was indispensable to their advancement. They are officials under strict control, drawing from the government salaries fully sufficient to their needs. It was ameasure imperatively called for by the altered circumstances of the time and fraught with most important consequences to create, as Augustus did, a class of salaried imperial officials and definitely break with the high-minded but wrong-minded principle of the republic by which the higher posts were bestowed as honorary appointments, and none but subordinate officials were paid, thus branding the latter with the stigma of servitude."It is true that the cautious reformer adopted into his new system of government the old names and the offices which had come down from republican times, with the exception of the censorship and the dictatorship, which last had long been obsolete. But these were intended from the outset to lead but a phantom existence and to take no part in the great task of imperial administration. Augustus drew his own body of officials from the knightly class, and under the unpretentious titles of procurator and præfect practically committed the whole administration of the empire to their hands, reserving, apart from certain distinguished sinecures in Rome, and Italy, for the senators the præfecture of the city, all the great governorships except Egypt, and the highest commands in the army. The handsome salaries—varying in the later days of the empire from £600 to £3,600 ($3,000 to $18,000)—and the great influence attached to the procuratorial career, which opened the way to the lofty positions of præfect of Egypt and commander of the prætorian guards at Rome, rendered the service very desirable and highly esteemed."While the high-born magistrates of the republic entered upon their one year's tenure of office without any training whatsoever, and were, of course, obliged to rely upon the knowledge and trustworthiness of the permanent staff of clerks, recorders and cashiers in their department, there grew up under the empire a professional class of government officials who, schooled by years of experience and continuance in office and supported by a numerous staff recruited from the imperial freedmen and slaves, were in a position to cope with the requirements of a world-wide empire. These procurators, some as governors-in-chief of the smaller imperial provinces, some as assistants to the governors of the greater, watched over the interests of the public exchequer and the emperor's private property, or looked after the imperial buildings and aqueducts, the imperial games, the mint, the corn supply of Rome, and the alimentary institutions, the legacies left to the emperors, their castles and demesnes in Italy and abroad,—in short, everything that fell within the vast and ever widening sphere of imperial government. Meanwhile the exchequer of the senate dwindled and dwindled, till it finally came to be merely the exchequer of the city of Rome."
"The reorganization of the government by Augustus, open to criticism as it is in many respects, was a blessing to the Roman empire. The view which prevailed under the republic, that the provinces had been conquered only to be sucked dry by senators and knights, governors, and tax-farmers in league or in rivalry of greed (we have one example out of hundreds in Verres, condemned to immortality by the eloquence of Cicero), this view was laid aside with the advent of the empire, and even if extortion did not wholly cease in the senatorial provinces, yet the provincial administration of the first two centuriesA.D.is infinitely superior to the systematic spoliation of the republic. The governors are no longer masters armed with absolute authority, constrained to extort money as fast as possible from the provincials committed to their charge in order to meet debts contracted by their own extravagance and, more especially, by that bribery of the populace which was indispensable to their advancement. They are officials under strict control, drawing from the government salaries fully sufficient to their needs. It was ameasure imperatively called for by the altered circumstances of the time and fraught with most important consequences to create, as Augustus did, a class of salaried imperial officials and definitely break with the high-minded but wrong-minded principle of the republic by which the higher posts were bestowed as honorary appointments, and none but subordinate officials were paid, thus branding the latter with the stigma of servitude.
"It is true that the cautious reformer adopted into his new system of government the old names and the offices which had come down from republican times, with the exception of the censorship and the dictatorship, which last had long been obsolete. But these were intended from the outset to lead but a phantom existence and to take no part in the great task of imperial administration. Augustus drew his own body of officials from the knightly class, and under the unpretentious titles of procurator and præfect practically committed the whole administration of the empire to their hands, reserving, apart from certain distinguished sinecures in Rome, and Italy, for the senators the præfecture of the city, all the great governorships except Egypt, and the highest commands in the army. The handsome salaries—varying in the later days of the empire from £600 to £3,600 ($3,000 to $18,000)—and the great influence attached to the procuratorial career, which opened the way to the lofty positions of præfect of Egypt and commander of the prætorian guards at Rome, rendered the service very desirable and highly esteemed.
"While the high-born magistrates of the republic entered upon their one year's tenure of office without any training whatsoever, and were, of course, obliged to rely upon the knowledge and trustworthiness of the permanent staff of clerks, recorders and cashiers in their department, there grew up under the empire a professional class of government officials who, schooled by years of experience and continuance in office and supported by a numerous staff recruited from the imperial freedmen and slaves, were in a position to cope with the requirements of a world-wide empire. These procurators, some as governors-in-chief of the smaller imperial provinces, some as assistants to the governors of the greater, watched over the interests of the public exchequer and the emperor's private property, or looked after the imperial buildings and aqueducts, the imperial games, the mint, the corn supply of Rome, and the alimentary institutions, the legacies left to the emperors, their castles and demesnes in Italy and abroad,—in short, everything that fell within the vast and ever widening sphere of imperial government. Meanwhile the exchequer of the senate dwindled and dwindled, till it finally came to be merely the exchequer of the city of Rome."
There is scarcely any event which takes place upon this earth which produces unmixed evil or unmixed good. There is some slight element of truth in some of the statements of the last quotation. There was some temporary restraint placed upon the dishonestyand cruelty of the Roman tax collectors; and there was undoubtedly a permanent improvement in the ability of the men holding the minor positions under the Roman government, through the introduction of what may be called a civil-service system. But the contention that the establishment of the empire was for the benefit either of the Roman citizens or of the Roman subjects is too ridiculous to merit even a denial. To show the ridiculousness of such a statement it is only necessary to point to the history of the Roman empire during the half century following the death of Octavius Cæsar. Corrupt as the administration of the government often was under the republic, and cruel as were the successful factional leaders on a few occasions, such conditions as existed in Rome under the emperors Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero could never have existed under the republic.
The character of the Roman empire was a most anomalous one. In the history of the empire we find the unparalleled situation of an absolute despotism without any hereditary nobility and even without any well-established principle as to the descent of the royal power to the children of the deceasedemperor. Under the most despotic days of the empire any Roman citizen might rise to any position of power or dignity under the emperor; nay, more than this, any subject of the Roman empire, no matter how low his origin or condition in society, might be thrust, by a lucky turn of the wheel of fortune, into the imperial purple itself.
The Roman emperors came from every strata of society, and from every portion of the Roman empire. At different times we see the son of a slave, a Syrian sun priest, a Dacian peasant, seated in the chair of the Cæsars; but this state of affairs in no way alleviated or excused the evils which the empire brought upon its subjects. The exploitation of the millions at the hands of a favored few is not rendered more defensible by the fact that any individual has the chance, by extraordinary ability, extraordinary dishonesty, or extraordinary good fortune, to raise himself out of the ranks of the exploited into those of the exploiters.
The history of Rome, therefore, cannot be so perverted as to teach the lesson which some seem to draw from it, that the substitution of a despotism for popular rule may,under some circumstances, be a benefit to the community. It is never by the destruction of liberty that the evils of popular rule can be eliminated. In the past, in the present, and in the future, the only remedy for the evils of liberty is more liberty; and the lesson which should be learned from the fall of the Roman republic is that any country, where the privileged classes are suffered to retain their unjust privileges at the expense of the community, must in the end suffer some such terrible penalty as that paid by Rome under the tyranny and misrule of the Roman empire.
The comparisons between the history and problems of the Roman republic and those of our own country have been sometimes directly referred to, sometimes merely indicated, in the course of this book. While it is hoped that the reader has been able to follow the train of ideas suggested by the author, and to apply the lessons taught by the story of the fall of the Roman republic to aid in the solution of the American problems of to-day, it is thought advisable, in this final chapter of the book, to combine and summarize the difficult problems of economics, civics, and politics anticipated in Roman experience.
First of all comes the lesson, so often taught by Roman history, so often already referred to in this book, that political equality is never by itself sufficient to secure either the protection of the weaker members of society or the general welfare of the community. Political equality means nothing unless supplemented by laws which secure economic justice.
The oft-repeated cry that politics and business should be kept separate is the product of a shallow, unreasoning, or hypocritical mind—generally the latter. This cry is the argument of the stand-patter, of the man who trembles for the existence of the United States Constitution and of American institutions when any proposal is made to pass a law in the interests of the mass of the community, but who can view with complacency the enactment of statutes for the benefit of certain favored classes. Economic problems and special privileges were among the greatest problems and dangers in the Roman republic, as they are in America to-day.
When we come to the exact form of the economic questions, differences, of course, begin to appear. Tariffs, trusts, regulation of commerce, were never great political questions in the days of the Roman republic. The greatest source of scandal and class favoritism at Rome was to be found in the management and distribution of the public lands. This particular problem was one which our country, for nearly a century of national existence, was able to handle, in the main, wisely and honestly. The great body of that vastexpanse of rich farming land, which was once the greatest asset of the United States, was disposed of to actual settlers, who have played an important part in the development of our wonderful West. Recently, however, corruption even along this line has begun to manifest itself in America. Passing over the numerous charges of actual corruption which have been made, it is to be regretted that the United States government has of late shown a decided disposition to favor great interests rather than ordinary individuals in the management of the public resources. An extremely indefensible discrimination is to be found in the act of July 1, 1902, which established the form of civil government for the Philippine Islands. Section 15 of this act, in providing for the management of the public lands, provided that no more than sixteen hectares of such land can be disposed of to any one individual, while a corporation may acquire as much as 1,024 hectares.
From the standpoint of pure governmental science the most interesting comparison between Rome and the United States lies in the elaborate and complicated system of checks and balances to be found in each government.The framers of each system seem generally to have been thinking more of securing perfect brakes than of installing sufficient operating power. It is a mere hackneyed remark to say that the most prominent characteristic of the work of the Federal Constitutional Convention was the system of checks and balances it developed, while this same principle was carried to such an extreme in the organization of the Roman government that it almost seems strange to an outside observer that at times the resisting power of the "brakes" did not prove more powerful than the operating power of the government, with the result of a total failure of all government, and chaos, or anarchy.
The most interesting of the "checks" in the Roman government was the veto power of the tribunes—interesting alike for its contemporary importance at Rome, and perhaps even more so for the great and strangely directed influence which it has had upon the later development of governmental institutions throughout the world.
The veto power of the Roman tribune was an innovation in government. It was, however, a political idea which was destined totake deep root, and to be copied by countries whose very beginnings were, as yet, far in the future. There is to-day no constitutional government in whose organization the veto power is not found in some form; in the great majority of modern governments the veto power occupies a most prominent place.
The modern veto power has departed far from that of the Roman tribune, both in practice and theory. The veto power of the latter was merely a check upon power; the modern veto power is both a check upon power and a positive power in the hands of the official to whom it is given.
The Roman veto was given to an officer who had no power except of a negative character; it could be interposed against executive acts and judicial proceedings as well as against legislative enactments.
The modern veto power is directed solely against legislative acts and is put in the hands of the executive department of the government. Against the legislative department it is a check, but to the executive department it is a grant of positive power. In the United States the veto is more a club in the hands of the executive department than a check uponthe legislative. The veto power also tends to break down the dividing line between the executive and the legislative departments. In the United States the President and the governors of the different states in reality constitute a third branch of the respective legislative departments.
The story of the Gracchi is replete with suggestions of comparisons with modern conditions. The failure of these reformers was primarily due to the lack of steadfast perseverance on the part of the mass of their followers. It is this same phenomenon which does more than any other to bring about the failure of needed and widely supported reforms at the present time in our country. It is always much easier to win the support of a majority of voters to a reform measure than it is to retain such majority during the tedious delays which the opponents of reform are so adept in producing. Delay is always the great weapon of the supporters of any special interest which is attacked. The beneficiaries from unfair discriminations or special interests, and their allies, never desert the fight from weariness, no matter how long it may be continued; but once the first spell ofenthusiasm has passed away, the supporters of the reform gradually drop by the wayside. How many times have we seen the people vote time after time in support of a certain reform only to weaken at the crisis, and allow the ultimate victory to rest with the supporters of special interests! For illustration we need only cite the long contest in the metropolis of the West for a fair deal to the people from the street-car companies, where after nine years of contest the majority of the voters, at the critical contest, deserted the mayor, who had resolutely stood for the principles for which the voters had declared year after year, and gave to the companies a contract giving them all that they had even dared to hope for.
The deposition of the tribune Marcus Octavius is without question the first historical application of the principle of the recall of public officials. This precedent was never again followed at Rome, and the recall of public officers never became a part of the Roman political system. Such an expedient, in fact, could never have been necessary at Rome, except in very extreme cases, on account of the very short terms of office for which all Roman officials were elected. Theonly states of this country which follow the Roman example in this respect are some of the New England states.
The actions of the Roman proletariat in so consistently supporting the grain laws of Gaius Gracchus, and in so soon disregarding his proposals for the allotment of the public land, are very typical of the attitude of a vast element in every community. The too great concern for the present and the too great disregard for the future are among the greatest obstacles to be overcome by those who attempt to line up the people of any community in the support of true constructive reforms.
Side by side with the lack of true proportion in the view taken by the majority of men, of the relative importance of different measures, stand the constant errors made by the people in their judgment of the character and objects of different politicians.
The tribune Carbo, the successor of Tiberius Gracchus as the leader of the popular party, may stand as a typical representative of a never-changing type of politician.
No one can read of this life without being inevitably reminded of some politician of hisown acquaintance or locality. It is but another proof of how slowly human nature changes, despite the vast changes in the external conditions with which mankind is surrounded.
The law proposed by Carbo furnished an illustration of that class of laws directed against the rich, so often brought forward by demagogues, not because of any justice in the law, not even because of any benefit which the law will confer upon the people at large, but merely for the purpose of winning popular favor and political office. Such laws are generally supported by unrestrained and indiscriminating abuse. It is the proposed laws and attacks of this character which generally lead to a reaction, and in the end work to the benefit of the classes against which they are directed.
The whole story of Carbo is one well calculated to present in vivid colors all that is lowest and most despicable. To the faults and errors already referred to must be added the charge of absolute insincerity. To Carbo the rights of the people and the popular cause were dear only as a means by which he could acquire power and money for himself. Whenit was for his interest, he became the servile tool of the senatorial party. America to-day has her full share of politicians who use popular measures only as a ladder for their own rise; or, even worse, who seek the leadership of a popular cause with the premeditated purpose of betraying it, at the proper moment, to the special interests. Where the purpose at first is sincere, the advocate of the object frequently deserts the cause when greater gain to him may be had by a surrender.
The impossibility of the voters being able to discriminate between the true reformer and the unscrupulous demagogue is shown time and again in the political history both of Rome and the United States. There has always been a class of politicians without character, without honesty, without any pretense of truthfulness, without any ability of a kind to be of value to the public, but possessed of an almost superhuman ability to deceive the public and to advertise themselves. Examples of this class may be found in Roman history in such men as Carbo and Cæsar; striking examples in recent American history will readily occur to every one. Notably in municipal politics in thegreat American cities, this aspect often appears.
It is not only in great but also in smaller things that we see the ever-recurring resemblances between Roman and American conditions. Cicero's complaint, "Let me tell you that there is no class of people so harassed by every kind of unreasonable difficulty as candidates for office," finds a responsive chord in every modern American politician. His account of his campaign for the consulship at Rome, as well as the historical record of other Roman political contests, shows many points of similarity between the details of the problems and methods of ancient and modern political battles.
Political expenditures, in the latter days of the Roman republic, had become an even greater evil than is the case in the United States to-day. It is interesting, though alarming, to note that the greater political freedom became at Rome, the greater became the amount of political expenditures and the greater the power of money in elections. A similar alarming phenomenon has recently been noticed in this country in the greater increase of political expenditures which havefollowed the introduction of the direct primaries, and the consequent greater difficulties of the candidate for office not possessed of a large fortune.
Innumerable other points of resemblance might be mentioned to complete the comparison between Roman and American political conditions. A strong point in the Roman character (at least during the greater part of the republican period) is found in the fact that foreign hostilities always produced a cessation, or at least a laxation, of domestic political hostilities. This was in striking contrast with the general rule in Grecian cities, where one political faction or another would generally seize the opportunity offered by the external difficulties of their state to advance their selfish individual interests at the expense of the public. The public attitude in America has always resembled the Roman rather than the Grecian attitude. Perhaps this attitude in America has sometimes been carried too far, and resulted in too great a degree of credit and support being given to the party in power, for victories won by the united efforts of members of all political parties in the country.
The effect of a mere name, both in Rome and in the United States, has always been unduly great. The charge (even when entirely unsupported) that a Roman politician was aiming to make himself a king was generally sufficient to drive him from power; though the Romans finally calmly submitted to the rule of an absolute ruler under the new title of emperor. The efficiency of denunciation by calling names, instead of by argument, is known and made use of in American politics.
The pretense of patriotism in America assumed by having one's self designated by a name of patriotic appellation—such as "Honest" John Doe, "Brave" Richard Roe, and the "Patriot" John Stiles—is but a parallel to the schemes of the ancient tricksters. Truly, there is nothing new under the sun, and as man so are republics of men—both alike in greatness and in littleness.
There is slight opportunity for comparison between the Roman colonial system and that of our own country. It is true that of both alike it may be said the beginning of foreign conquest came as an accident, and the acquisition of territory beyond the seas foundthem unprepared for its government. Here, it is to be hoped, the resemblance will be found to have ceased. When Rome had once tasted the fruits of foreign conquest, the extension of such conquests became the great object of Roman ambition. It was not by accident but by deliberately planned wars of conquest that the so-called world empire of the Romans was acquired.
With the United States the comparatively few and unimportant insular possessions are still a matter of secondary concern. But few of the citizens of this country give any thought or attention to these possessions, and many even favor their abandonment.
Both Rome and the United States found the problem of reconciling foreign colonies with republican institutions a difficult one. The Roman administration of her colonies was always tinged with corruption and injustice; and, unfortunately, our own insular rule has not been entirely free from these evils. A great trouble in the case of each republic was that she failed or refused to make any real effort to introduce her own principles of government into the government of her provinces. There is much more excuse forthis failure in the case of Rome than in that of our own country. As was shown in the chapter on Roman legislative assemblies, her ignorance of the principle of representative legislative assemblies made the extension of free government over extended areas impossible, or at least very difficult. But our own system of local self-government is one adapted to any country, and capable of indefinite expansion. The highly centered bureaucracy of the Philippine government is one without precedent in our own country, and without any fitness for the Philippines or any other colony. The slight self-government given to the Filipinos is merely enough to call attention to that which is refused them. No successful government of these Islands, either by our country or by the Filipinos themselves, will ever be secured while all questions of government for so many diverse races are settled by a few high government officials at the capital—Manila. Particularly will this objectionable condition continue so long as the places of authority are filled by men named from every portion of the country except that part most nearly associated with the destiny of the Islands.The system of rewarding political service—and that ofttimes of a questionable character—given in America to men who served ballot-box emergencies, and to men who hope to reward themselves by fruitful opportunity, must cease, or government in these outlying possessions will lead to internal revolt or external military imperialism.
It is plainly to be seen that conditions in the United States of America have tended toward those of Rome which preceded the latter's downfall. Particularly true is this of latter-day conditions in the United States. The monopoly of Crassus in town lots in Rome—and the exclusive right to dictate the price of farm products by the Fabii and their successors, which produced riots in the country and uprisings in the cities—have their parallel in the "corners" of the stock exchanges and grain houses of America, and in the monopoly in oil and its elements. These methods and the domination of legislative bodies by these massive interests, the corrupting of the assemblies of the people and the defiling of the courts, have created a revolt in the hearts of the Americans and awakened an insurrection among the citizenship.These, if not abated by the government's action in controlling these agencies or restraining with plenary punishment the perpetrators of the wrong, will surely reproduce a parallel in the results which befell the Roman republic. Cicero has well said, "Governments, like all organized creations, have their time to perish and to fade. The same conduct of persecution or protection work on each alike in the final results"—a sure continuance of life, or a sure result of certain death.
Let it be remembered that man is ever himself and mankind ever human. No ill will be borne that can be overthrown. It will all return to the first principle of force—Byron puts it well—as the moral of all human tales: