Chapter 6

Second."The congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."

This power is held, by the supreme court of the United States, to be an exclusive one in the general government; and it obviously must be so, to be effectual—for if the states could also interfere to regulate it, the states could at pleasure defeat the regulations of congress.

Congress, then, having the exclusive power of regulating this commerce, they only (if any body) can say who may, and who may not, carry it on; and probably even they have no power to discriminate arbitrarily between individuals.—But, in no event, have thestategovernments any right to say who may, or who may not, carry on "commerce with foreign nations," or "among the several states," or "with the Indian tribes." Every individual—naturally competent to make contracts—whom the state laws declare to be a slave, probably has, and certainly may have, under the regulations of congress, as perfect a right to carry on "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes," as any other citizen of the United States can have—"any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Yet this right of carrying on commerce is a right entirely inconsistent with the idea of a man's being a slave.

Again. It is a principle of law that the right of traffic is a natural right, and that all commerce (that is intrinsically innocent) is therefore lawful, except what is prohibited by positive legislation. Traffic with the slaves, either by people of foreign nations, or by people belonging to other states than the slaves, has never (so far as I know) been prohibited by congress, which is the only government, (if any,) that has power to prohibit it. Traffic with the slaves is therefore as lawful at this moment, under the constitution of the United States, as is traffic with their masters; and this fact is entirely inconsistent with the idea that their bondage is constitutional.

Third."The congress shall have power to establish post offices and post roads."

Who, but congress, have any right to say who may send, or receive letters by the United States posts? Certainly no one. They have undoubted authority to permit any one to send and receive letters by their posts—"any thing in the constitutions or laws of the states to the contrary notwithstanding." Yet the right to send and receive letters by post, is a right inconsistent with the idea of a man's being a slave.

Fourth."The congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."

Suppose a man, whom a state may pretend to call a slave, should make an invention or discovery—congress have undoubted power to secure to such individual himself, by patent, the "exclusive"—(mark the word)—the "exclusive right" to his invention or discovery. But does not this "exclusive right" in the inventor himself, exclude the right of any man, who, under a state law, may claim to be the owner of the inventor? Certainly it does. Yet the slave code says that whatever is a slave's is his owner's. This power, then, on the part of congress, to secure to an individual the exclusive right to his inventions and discoveries, is a power inconsistent with the idea that that individual himself, and all he may possess, are the property of another.

Fifth."The congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;" also "to raise and support armies;" and "to provide and maintain a navy."

Have not congress authority, under these powers, to enlist soldiers and sailors,by contract with themselves, and to pay them their wages, grant them pensions, and secure their wages and pensions to their own use, without asking the permission either of the state governments, or of any individuals whom the state governments may see fit to recognize as the owners of such soldiers and sailors? Certainly they have, in defiance of all state laws and constitutions whatsoever; and they have already asserted that principle by enacting that pensions, paid by the United States to their soldiers, shall not be liable to be taken for debt, under the laws of the states. Have they not authority also to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to secure the prizes, to a ship's crew of blacks, as well as of whites? To those whom the State governments call slaves, as well as to those whom the state governments call free?—Have not congress authority to make contracts, for the defence of the nation, with any and all the inhabitants of the nation, who may be willing to perform the service? Or are they obliged first to ask and obtain the consent of those private individuals who may pretend to own the inhabitants of this nation? Undoubtedly congress have the power to contract with whom they please, and to secure wages and pensions to such individuals, in contempt of all state authority. Yet this power is inconsistent with the idea that the constitution recognizes or sanctions the legality of slavery.

Sixth."The congress shall have power to provide for the organizing,armingand disciplining themilitia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by congress." Also "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."

Have not congress, under these powers, as undoubted authority to enroll in the militia, and "arm" those whom the states call slaves, and authorize them always to keep their arms by them, even when not on duty, (that they may at all times bereadyto be "called forth" "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions,") as they have thus to enroll and arm those whom the states call free? Can the state governments determine who may, and who may not compose the militia of the "United States?"

Look, too, at this power, in connection with the second amendment to the constitution; which is in these words:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right ofthe peopleto keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

These provisions obviously recognize the natural right of all men "to keep and bear arms" for their personal defence; and prohibit both congress and the state governments from infringing the right of "the people"—that is, ofanyof the people—to do so; and more especially of any whom congress have power to include in their militia. This right of a man "to keep and bear arms," is a right palpably inconsistent with the idea of his being a slave. Yet the right is secured as effectually to those whom the states presume to call slaves, as to any whom the states condescend to acknowledge free.

Under this provision any man has a right either to give or sell arms to those persons whom the states call slaves; and there is noconstitutionalpower, in either the national or state governments, that can punish him for so doing; or that can take those arms from the slaves; or that can make it criminal for the slaves to use them, if, from the inefficiency of the laws, it should become necessary for them to do so, in defence of their own lives or liberties; for this constitutional right to keep arms implies the constitutional right to use them, if need be, for the defence of one's liberty or life.

Seventh.The constitution of the United States declares that "no state shall passanylaw impairing the obligation of contracts."

"The obligation of contracts," here spoken of, is, of necessity, thenatural obligation; for that is the only real or true obligation that any contracts can have. It is also the only obligation, which courts recognize in any case, except where legislatures arbitrarily interfere to impair it. But the prohibition of the constitution is upon the states' passing any law whatever that shall impair the natural obligation of men's contracts. Yet, if slave laws were constitutional, they would effectually impair the obligation of all contracts entered into by those who are made slaves; for the slave laws must necessarily hold that all a slave's contracts are void.

This prohibition upon the states to passanylaw impairing the natural obligation of men's contracts, implies that all men have a constitutional right to enter into all contracts that have a natural obligation. It thereforesecuresthe constitutional right of all men to enter into such contracts, and to have them respected by the state governments. Yet this constitutional right of all men to enter into all contracts that have a natural obligation, and to have those contracts recognized by law as valid, is a right plainly inconsistent with the idea that men can constitutionally be made slaves.

This provision therefore absolutely prohibits the passage of slave laws, because laws that make men slaves must necessarily impair the obligation of all their contracts.

Eighth.Persons, whom some of the state governments recognize as slaves, are made eligible, by the constitution of the United States, to the office of president of the United States. The constitutional provision on this subject is this:

"No person, except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of president; neither shall any person be eligible to that office, who shall not have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident of the United States."

According to this provision,all"persons",[23]who have resided within the United States fourteen years, have attained the age of thirty-five years, and are eithernatural born citizens, or were citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution, are eligible to the office of president. No other qualifications than these being required by the constitution, no others can be legally demanded. The only question, then, that can arise, is as to the word "citizen." Who are the persons that come within this definition, as here used? The clause itself divides them into two classes, to wit, the "natural born," and those who were "citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution." In regard to this latter class, it has before been shown, from the preamble to the constitution, that all who were "people of the United States," (that is, permanent inhabitants,) at the time the constitution was adopted, were made citizens by it. And this clause, describing those eligible to the office of president, implies the same thing. This is evident; for it speaks of those who were "citizens of theUnited Statesat the time of the adoption of the constitution." Now there clearly could have been no "citizens of the United States, at the time of the adoption of the constitution," unless they were made so by the constitution itself; for there wereno"citizens of theUnited States"beforethe adoption of the constitution. The Confederation had no citizens. It was a mere league between the state governments. The separate states belonging to the confederacy had each their own citizens respectively. But the confederation itself, as such, had no citizens. There were, therefore, no "citizens of the United States," (but only citizens of the respective states,) before the adoption of the constitution.—Yet this clause asserts that immediately on the adoption, or "at the time of the adoption of this constitution," therewere"citizens of the United States." Those, then, who were "citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution," were necessarily those, and only those, who had been made so by the adoption of the constitution; because they could have become citizens at that precise "time" in no other way. If, then, any persons were made citizens by the adoption of the constitution, who were theindividualsthat were thus made citizens? They were "the people of the United States," of course—as the preamble to the constitution virtually asserts. And if "the people of the United States" were made citizens by the adoption of the constitution, thenall"the people of the United States" were necessarily made citizens by it—for no discrimination is made by the constitution between different individuals, "people of the United States"—and there is therefore no means of determining who were made citizens by the adoption of the constitution, unlessall"the people of the United States" were so made. Any "person," then, who was one of "the people of the United States" "at the time of the adoption of this constitution," and who is thirty-five years old, and has resided fourteen years within the United States, is eligible to the office of president of the United States. And if every such person be eligible, under the constitution, to the office of president of the United States, the constitution certainly does not recognize them as slaves.

The other class of citizens, mentioned as being eligible to the office of president, consists of the "natural born citizens." Here is an implied assertion thatnatural birthin the country gives the right of citizenship. And if it gives it to one, it necessarily gives it to all—for no discrimination is made; and if all persons, born in the country, are not entitled to citizenship, the constitution has given us no test by which to determine who of them are entitled to it.

Every person, then, born in the country, and that shall have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States, is eligible to the office of president. And if eligible to that office, the constitution certainly does not recognize him as a slave.

Persons, who are "citizens" of the United States, according to the foregoing definitions, are also eligible to the offices of representative and senator of the United States; and therefore cannot be slaves.

Ninth.The constitution declares that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall beby jury."—Also that "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort."

It is obvious that slaves, if we had any, might "levy war against the United States," and might also "adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." It may, however, be doubted whether they could commit the crime of treason—for treason implies a breach of fidelity, trust or allegiance, where fidelity, trust or allegiance is due. And it is very clear that slaves could owe allegiance, trust or fidelity, neither to the United States, nor to the state governments; for allegiance is due to a government only from those who are protected by it. Slaves could owe to our governments nothing but resistance and destruction. If therefore they were to levy war against the United States, they might not perhaps be liable to the technical charge of treason; although there would, in reality, be as much treason in their act, as there would of any other crime—for there would, in truth, be neither legal nor moral crime of any kind in it. Still, the government would be compelled, in order to protect itself against them, to charge them with some crime or other—treason, murder, or something else. And this charge, whatever it might be, would have to be tried by a jury. And what (in criminal cases,) is the "trial by jury?" It is a trial, both of the law and the fact, by the "peers," or equals, of the person tried. Who are the "peers" of a slave? None, evidently, but slaves. If, then, the constitution recognizes any such class of persons, in this country, as slaves, it would follow that for any crime committed by them against the United States, they must be tried, both on the law and the facts, by a jury of slaves. The result of such trials we can readily imagine.

Does this look as if the constitution guarantied, or even recognized the legality of slavery?

Tenth.The constitution declares that "The privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusshall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."

The privilege of this writ, wherever it is allowed, is of itself sufficient to make slavery impossible and illegal. The object and prerogative of this writ are to secure to all persons their natural right to personal liberty, against all restraint except from the government; and even against restraints by the government itself, unless they are imposed in conformity with established general laws, and upon the charge of some legal offence or liability. It accordingly liberates all who are held in custody against their will, (whether by individuals or the government,) unless they are heldon some formal writ or process, authorized by law, issued by the government, according to established principles, and charging the person held by it with some legal offence or liability. The principle of the writ seems to be, that no one shall be restrained of his natural liberty, unless these three things conspire; 1st, that the restraint be imposed byspecial command of the government; 2d, that there be a general law authorizing restraints for specific causes; and, 3d, that the government, previously to issuing process for restraining any particular individual, shall itself, by its proper authorities, take express cognizance of, and inquire cautiously into the facts of each case, and ascertain, by reasonable evidence, that the individual has brought himself within the liabilities of the general law. All these things the writ ofhabeas corpussecures to be done, before it will suffer a man to be restrained of his liberty; for the writ is a mandate to the person holding another in custody, commanding him to bring his prisoner before the court, and show the authority by which it holds him. Unless he then exhibit a legal precept, warrant or writ, issued by, and bearing the seal of the government, specifying a legal ground for restraining the prisoner, and authorizing or requiring him to hold him in custody, he will be ordered to let him go free. Hence all the keepers of prisons, in order to hold their prisoners against the authority of this writ, are required, in the case of each prisoner, to have a written precept or order, bearing the seal of the government, and issued by the proper authority, particularly describing the prisoner by name or otherwise, and setting forth the legal grounds of his imprisonment, and requiring the keeper of the prison to hold him in his custody.

Now the master does not hold his slave in custody by virtue of any formal or legal writ or process, either authorized by law, or issued by the government, or that charges the slave with any legal offence or liability. A slave is incapable of incurring any legal liability, or obligation to his master. And the government could, with no more consistency, grant a writ or process to the master, to enable him to hold his slave, than it could to enable him to hold his horse. It simply recognizes his right of property in his slave, and then leaves him at liberty to hold him by brute force, if he can, as he holds his ox, or his horse—and not otherwise. If the slave escape, or refuse to labor, the slave code no more authorizes the government to issue legal process against the slave, to authorize the master to catch him, or compel him to labor, than it does against a horse for the same purpose.—The slave is held simply as property, by individual force, without legal process. But the writ ofhabeas corpusacknowledges no such principle as the right of property in man. If it did, it would be perfectly impotent in all cases whatsoever; because it is a principle of law, in regard to property, that simple possession isprima facieevidence of ownership; and therefore any man, who was holding another in custody, could defeat the writ by pleading that he owned his prisoner, and by giving, as proof of ownership, the simple fact that he was in possession of him. If, therefore, the writ ofhabeas corpusdid not, of itself, involve a denial of the right of property in man, the fact stated in it, that one man was holding another in custody, would beprima facieevidence that he owned him, and had a right to hold him; and the writ would therefore carry an absurdity in its face.

The writ ofhabeas corpus, then,necessarilydenies the right of property in man. And the constitution, by declaring, without any discrimination of persons, that "the privilege of this writ shall not be suspended,"—that is, shall not be denied to any human being—has declared that, under the constitution, there can be no right of property in man.

This writ was unquestionably intended as a great constitutional guaranty of personal liberty. But unless it denies the right of property in man, it in reality affords no protection to any of us against being made slaves. If it does deny the right of property in man, the slave is entitled to the privilege of the writ; for he is held in custody by his master, simply on the ground of property.

Mr. Christian, one of Blackstone's editors, says that it is this writ that makes slavery impossible in England. It was on this writ, that Somerset was liberated. The writ, in fact, asserts, as a great constitutional principle, the natural right of personal liberty. And the privilege of the writ is not confined to citizens, but extends to all human beings.[24]And it is probably the only absolute guaranty, that our national constitution gives to foreigners and aliens, that they shall not, on their arrival here, be enslaved by those of our state governments that exhibit such propensities for enslaving their fellow-men. For this purpose, it is a perfect guaranty to people who come here from any part of the world. And if it be such a guaranty to foreigners and aliens, is it no guaranty to those born under the constitution? Especially when the constitution makes no discrimination of persons?

Eleventh."The United States shall guaranty to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence."

Mark the strength and explicitness of the first clause of this section, to wit, "The United Statesshall guaranteeto every state in this union a republican form of government." Mark also especially that this guaranty is one of liberty, and not of slavery.

We have all of us heretofore been compelled to hear, from individuals of slaveholding principles, many arrogant and bombastic assertions, touching the constitutional "guaranties" given toslavery; and persons, who are in the habit of taking their constitutional law from other men's mouths, instead of looking at the constitution for themselves, have probably been led to imagine that the constitution had really given such guaranties in some explicit and tangible form. We have, nevertheless, seen that all those pretended guaranties are at most nothing but certain vague hints, insinuations, ciphers and innuendoes, that are imagined to be covered up under language which legally means nothing of the kind. But, in the clause now cited, we do have an explicit and peremptory "guaranty," depending upon no implications, inferences or conjectures, and couched in no uncertain or ambiguous terms. And what is this guaranty? Is it a guaranty of slavery? No. It is a guaranty of something flatly incompatible with slavery: a guaranty of "a republican form of government to every state in this union."

And what is "a republican form of government?" It is where the government is a commonwealth—the property of the public, of the mass of the people, or of the entire people. It is where the government is made up of, and controlled by the combined will and power of the public, or the mass of the people—and where, of natural consequence, it will have, for its object, the protection of the rights of all. It is indispensable to a republican form of government, that the public, the mass of the people, if not the entire people, participate in the grant of powers to the government, and in the protection afforded by the government. It is impossible, therefore, that a government, under which any considerable number of the people, (if indeed any number of the people,) are disfranchised and enslaved, can be a republic. A slave government is an oligarchy; and one too of the most arbitrary and criminal character.

Strange that men, who have eyes capable of discovering in the constitution so many covert, implied and insinuated guaranties of crime and slavery, should be blind to the legal import of so open, explicit and peremptory a guaranty of freedom, equality and right.

Even if there had really been, in the constitution, two such contradictory guaranties, as one of liberty or republicanism in every state of the Union, and another of slavery in every state where one portion of the people might succeed in enslaving the rest, one of these guaranties must have given way to the other—for, being plainly inconsistent with each other, they could not have stood together. And it might safely have been left either to legal or to moral rules to determine which of the two should prevail—whether a provision to perpetuate slavery should triumph over a guaranty of freedom.

But it is constantly asserted, in substance, that there is "no propriety" in the general government's interfering in the local governments of the states. Those who make this assertion appear to regard a state as a single individual, capable of managing his own affairs, and of course unwilling to tolerate the intermeddling of others. But a state is not an individual. It is made up of large numbers of individuals, each and all of whom, amid the intestine mutations and strifes to which states are subject, are liable, at some time or other, to be trampled upon by the strongest party, and may therefore reasonably choose to secure, in advance, some external protection against such emergencies, by making reciprocal contracts with other people similarly exposed in the neighboring states. Such contracts for mutual succor and protection, are perfectly fit and proper for any people who are so situated as to be able to contribute to each other's security. They are as fit and proper as any other political contracts whatever; and are founded on precisely the same principle of combination for mutual defence—for what are any of our political contracts and forms of government, but contracts between man and man for mutual protection against those who may conspire to injure either or all of them? But these contracts, fit and proper between all men, are peculiarly appropriate to those, who, while they are members of various local and subordinate associations, are, at the same time, united for specific purposes, under one general government. Such a mutual contract, between the people of all the states, is contained in this clause of the constitution. And it gives to them all an additional guaranty for their liberties.

Those who object to this guaranty, however, choose to overlook all these considerations, and then appear to imagine that their notions of "propriety" on this point, can effectually expunge the guaranty itself from the constitution. In indulging this fancy, however, they undoubtedly overrate the legal, and perhaps also the moral effect of such superlative fastidiousness; for even if there were "no propriety" in the interference of the general government to maintain a republican form of government in the states, still, the unequivocal pledge to that effect, given in the constitution, would nevertheless remain an irresistible rebutter to the allegation that the constitution intended to guaranty its opposite, slavery, an oligarchy, or a despotism. It would, therefore, entirely forbid all those inferences and implications, drawn by slaveholders, from those other phrases, which they quote as guaranties of slavery.[25]

But the "propriety," and not only the propriety, but the necessity of this guaranty, may be maintained on still other grounds.

One of these grounds is, that it would be impossible, consistently with the other provisions of the constitution, that the general government itself could be republican, unless the state governments were republican also. For example. The constitution provides, in regard to the choice of congressional representatives, that "the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature." It was indispensable to the internal quiet of each state, that the same body of electors, who should participate in the suffrage of the state governments, should participate also in the suffrage of the national one—andvice versa, that those who should participate in the national suffrage, should also participate in that of the state. If the general and state constitutions had each a different body of electors within each state, it would obviously give rise at once to implacable and irreconcilable feuds, that would result in the overthrow of one or the other of the governments within the state. Harmony or inveterate conflict was the only alternative. As conflict would necessarily result in the destruction of one of the governments, harmony was the only mode by which both could be preserved. And this harmony could be secured only by giving to the same body of electors, suffrage in both the governments.

If, then, it was indispensable to the existence and authority of both governments, within the territory of each state, that the same body, and only the same body of electors, that were represented in one of the governments, should be represented in the other, it was clearly indispensable, in order that the national one should be republican, that the state governments should be republican also. Hence the interest which the nation at large have in the republicanism of each of the state governments.

It being necessary that the suffrage under the national government, within each state, should be the same as for the state government, it is apparent that unless the several state governments were all formed on one general plan, or unless the electors of all the states were united in the acknowledgement of some general controlling principle, applicable to both governments, it would be impossible that they could unite in the maintenance of a general government that should act in harmony with the state governments; because the same body of electors, that should support a despotic government in the state, could not consistently or cordially unite, or even unite at all, in the support of a republican government for the nation. If one portion of the state governments should be republican, like Vermont, where suffrage is open to all—and another portion should be oligarchies, like South Carolina, and the other slave states—another portion limited monarchies, like England—another portion ecclesiastical, like that of the Pope of Rome, or that of the ancient Jews—and another portion absolute despotisms, like that of Nicholas, in Russia, or that of Francia, in Paraguay,—and the same body, and only the same body, of electors, that sustained each of these governments at home, should be represented in the national government, each state would send into the national legislature the representatives of its own peculiar system of government; and the national legislature, instead of being composed of the representatives of any one theory, or principle of government, would be made up of the representatives of all the various theories of government that prevailed in the different states—from the extreme of democracy to the extreme of despotism. And each of these various representatives would be obliged to carry his local principles into the national legislature, else he could not retain the confidence of his peculiar constituents. The consequence would be, that the national legislature would present the spectacle of a perfect Babel of discordant tongues, elements, passions, interests and purposes, instead of an assembly united for the accomplishment of any agreed or distinct object.

Without some distinct and agreed object as a bond of union, it would obviously be impracticable for any general union of the whole people to subsist; and that bond of union, whatever it be, must also harmonize with the principles of each of the state governments, else there would be a collision between the general and state governments.

Now the great bond of union, agreed upon in the general government, was "the rights of man"—expressed in the national constitution by the terms "liberty and justice." What other bond could have been agreed upon? On what other principle of government could they all have united? Could they have united to sustain the divine right of kings? The feudal privileges of nobles? Or the supremacy of the Christian, Mahometan, or any other church? No. They all denied the divine right of kings, and the feudal rights of nobles; and they were of all creeds in religion. But they were agreed that all men had certain natural, inherent, essential and inalienable rights, among which were life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and that the preservation of these rights was the legitimate purpose of governments among men. They had avowed this principle before the world, had fought for it, and successfully defended it, against the mightiest power in the world. They had filled the world with its glory; and it, in turn, had filled the world with theirs. It had also gathered, and was then gathering, choice spirits, and large numbers of the oppressed from other nations unto them. And this principle—in which were involved the safety, interests and rights of each and every one of "the people," who were to unite for the formation of the government—now furnished a bond of union, that was at once sufficient, legitimate, consistent, honorable, of universal application, and having more general power over the hearts and heads of all of them, than any other that could be found to hold them together. It comported with their theory of the true objects of government. This principle, therefore, they adopted as the corner-stone of their national government; and, as a matter of necessity, all other things, on which this new government was in any degree to depend, or which was to depend in any degree upon this government, were then made to conform to this principle. Hence the propriety of the power given to the general government, of "guaranteeing to every state in the Union a republican form of government." Had not this power been given to the general government, the majorities in each state might have converted the state governments into oligarchies, aristocracies, monarchies or despotisms, that should not only have trampled upon the minorities, and defeated their enjoyment of the national constitution, but also introduced such factions and feuds into the national governments, as would have distracted its councils, and prostrated its power.

But there were also motives of a pecuniary and social, as well as political nature, that made it proper that the nation should guarantee to the states a republican form of government.

Commerce was to be established between the people of the different states. The commerce of a free people is many times more valuable than that of slaves. Freemen produce and consume vastly more than slaves. They have therefore more to buy and more to sell. Hence the free states have a direct pecuniary interest in the civil freedom of all the other states. Commerce between free and slave states is not reciprocal or equal. Who can measure the increase that would have been made to the industry and prosperity of the free states, if all the slaves in the country had been freemen, with all the wants and energies of freemen? And their masters had had all the thrift, industry, frugality and enterprise of men who depend upon their own labor, instead of the labor of slaves, for their prosperity? Great Britain thought it policy to carry on a seven years' war against us principally to secure to herself the control and benefits of the commerce of three millions of people and their posterity. But we now have nearly or quite the same number of slaves within our borders, and yet we think that commerce with them and their posterity is a matter with which we have no concern; that there is "no propriety" in that provision of the national constitution, which requires that the general government—which we have invested with the exclusive control of all commerce among the several states—should secure to these three millions the right of traffic with their fellow men, and to their fellow men the right of traffic with them, against the impertinent usurpations and tyranny of subordinate governments, that have no constitutional right to interfere in the matter.

Again. The slave states, in proportion to their population, contribute nothing like an equal or equitable share to the aggregate of national wealth. It would probably be within the truth to say that, in proportion to numbers, the people of the free states have contributed ten times as much to the national wealth as the people of the slave states. Even for such wealth as the culture of their great staple, cotton, has added to the nation, the south are indebted principally, if not entirely, to the inventive genius of a single northern man.[26]The agriculture of the slave states is carried on with rude and clumsy implements; by listless, spiritless and thriftless laborers; and in a manner speedily to wear out the natural fertility of the soil, which fertility slave cultivation seldom or never replaces. The mechanic arts are comparatively dead among them. Invention is utterly dormant. It is doubtful whether either a slave or a slave holder has ever invented a single important article of labor-saving machinery since the foundation of the government. And they have hardly had the skill or enterprise to apply any of those invented by others. Who can estimate the loss of wealth to the nation from these causes alone? Yet we of the free states give to the south a share in the incalculable wealth produced by our inventions and labor-saving machinery, our steam engines, and cotton gins, and manufacturing machinery of all sorts, and yet say at the same time that we have no interest, and that there is "no propriety" in the constitutional guaranty of that personal freedom to the people of the south, which would enable them to return us some equivalent in kind.

For the want, too, of an enforcement of this guaranty of a republican form of government to each of the states, the population of the country, by the immigration of foreigners, has no doubt been greatly hindered. Multitudes almost innumerable, who would have come here, either from a love of liberty, or to better their conditions, and given the country the benefit of their talents, industry and wealth, have no doubt been dissuaded or deterred by the hideous tyranny that rides triumphant in one half of the nation, and extends its pestiferous and detested influence over the other half.

Socially, also, we have an interest in the freedom of all the states. We have an interest in free personal intercourse with all the people living under a common government with ourselves. We wish to be free to discuss, with any and all of them, all the principles of liberty and all the interests of humanity. We wish, when we meet a fellow man, to be at liberty to speak freely with him of his and our condition; to be at liberty to do him a service; to advise with him as to the means of improving his condition; and, if need be, to ask a kindness at his hands. But all these things are incompatible with slavery. Is this such an union as we bargained for? Was it "nominated in the bond," that we should be cut off from these the common rights of human nature? If so, point to the line and letter, where it is so written. Neither of them are to be found. But the contrary is expressly guarantied against the power of both the governments, state and national; for the national government is prohibited from passing any law abridging the freedom of speech and the press, and the state governments are prohibited from maintaining any other than a republican form of government, which of course implies the same freedom.

The nation at large have still another interest in the republicanism of each of the states; an interest, too, that is indicated in the same section in which this republicanism is guarantied. This interest results from the fact that the nation are pledged to "protect" each of the states "against domestic violence." Was there no account taken—in reference either to the cost or the principle of this undertaking—as to what might be the character of the state governments, which we are thus pledged to defend against the risings of the people? Did we covenant, in this clause, to wage war against the rights of man? Did we pledge ourselves that those, however few, who might ever succeed in getting the government of a state into their hands, should thenceforth be recognized as the legitimate power of the state, and be entitled to the whole force of the general government to aid them in subjecting the remainder of the people to the degradation and injustice of slavery? Or did the nation undertake only to guarantee the preservation of "a republican form of government" against the violence of those who might prove its enemies? The reason of the thing, and the connexion, in which the two provisions stand in the constitution, give the answer.

We have yet another interest still, and that no trivial one, in the republicanism of the state governments; an interest indicated, too, like the one last mentioned, in the very section in which this republicanism is assured. It relates to the defence against invasion. The general government is pledged to defend each of the states against invasion. Is it a thing of no moment, whether we have given such a pledge to free or to slave states? Is there no difference in the cost and hazard of defending one or the other? Is it of no consequence to the expense of life and money, involved in this undertaking, whether the people of the state invaded shall be united, as freemen naturally will be, as one man against the enemy? Or whether, as in slave states, half of them shall be burning to join the enemy, with the purpose of satisfying with blood the long account of wrong that shall have accrued against their oppressors? Did Massachusetts—who during the war of the revolution furnished more men for the common defence, than all the six southern states together—did she, immediately on the close of that war, pledge herself, as the slave holders would have it, that she would lavish her life in like manner again, for the defence of those whose wickedness and tyranny in peace should necessarily multiply their enemies and make them defenceless in war? If so, on what principle, or for what equivalent, did she do it? Did she not rather take care that the guaranty for a republican government should be inserted in the same paragraph with that for protection against invasion, in order that both the principle and the extent of the liability she incurred, might distinctly appear?

The nation at large, then, as a political community under the constitution, have both interests and rights, and both of the most vital character, in the republicanism of each of the state governments. The guaranty given by the national constitution, securing such a government to each of the states, is therefore neither officious nor impertinent. On the contrary, this guaranty was asine qua nonto any national contract of union; and the enforcement of it is equally indispensable, if not to the continuance of the union at all, certainly to its continuance on any terms that are either safe, honorable or equitable for the north.

This guaranty, then, is not idle verbiage. It is full of meaning. And that meaning is not only fatal to slavery itself, but it is fatal also to all those pretences, constructions, surmises and implications, by which it is claimed that the national constitution sanctions, legalizes, or even tolerates slavery.

[18]This language of the Supreme Court contains an admission of the truth of the charge just made against judges, viz: that rather than lose their offices, they will violate what they know to be law, in subserviency to the legislatures on whom they depend; for it admits, 1st, that the preservation of men'srightsis the vital principle of law, and, 2d, that courts, (and the Supreme Court of the United States in particular,) will trample upon that principle at the bidding of the legislature, when the mandate comes in the shape of a statute of such "irresistible clearness," that its meaning cannot be evaded.

[19]"Laws are construed strictly to save a right."—Whitney et al.vs.Emmett et al., 1 Baldwin, C.C.R.316."No law will make a construction do wrong; and there are some things which the law favors, and some it dislikes; it favoreth those things that come from the order of nature."—Jacob's Law Dictionary, title Law.

[19]"Laws are construed strictly to save a right."—Whitney et al.vs.Emmett et al., 1 Baldwin, C.C.R.316.

"No law will make a construction do wrong; and there are some things which the law favors, and some it dislikes; it favoreth those things that come from the order of nature."—Jacob's Law Dictionary, title Law.

[20]In the convention that framed the constitution, when this clause was under discussion, "servants" were spoken of as a distinct class from "slaves." For instance, "Mr. Butler and Mr. Pickney moved to require 'fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals.'" Mr. Sherman objected to delivering up either slaves or servants. He said he "saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant, than a horse."—Madison Papers, p. 1447-8.The language finally adopted shows that they at last agreed to deliver up "servants," butnot "slaves"—for as the word "servant" does not mean "slave," the word "service" does not mean slavery.These remarks in the convention are quoted, not because the intentions of the convention are of the least legal consequence whatever; but to rebut the silly arguments of those who pretend that the convention, and not the people, adopted the constitution—and that the convention did not understand the legal difference between the word "servant" and "slave," and therefore used the word "service," in this clause, as meaning slavery.

The language finally adopted shows that they at last agreed to deliver up "servants," butnot "slaves"—for as the word "servant" does not mean "slave," the word "service" does not mean slavery.

These remarks in the convention are quoted, not because the intentions of the convention are of the least legal consequence whatever; but to rebut the silly arguments of those who pretend that the convention, and not the people, adopted the constitution—and that the convention did not understand the legal difference between the word "servant" and "slave," and therefore used the word "service," in this clause, as meaning slavery.

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