III
ARGUMENTS WHICH TAKE THE FORM OF"COUNSELS OF PERFECTION" AD-DRESSED TO MAN
Argument that Woman Requires a Vote for her Protec-tion--Argument that Woman ought to be Investedwith the Responsibilities of Voting in Order thatShe May Attain Her Full Intellectual Stature.
THERE, however, remains still a further classof arguments. I have in view here argumentswhich have nothing to do with elementarynatural rights, nor yet with woundedamourpropre.They concern ethics, and sympathy,and charitable feelings.The suffragist here gives to man "counselsof perfection."It will be enough to consider here two ofthese:--thefirst, the argument that woman,being the weaker vessel, needs, more than man,the suffrage for herprotection; thesecond, 72that woman, being less than man in relationto public life, ought to be given the vote forinstructional purposes.The first of these appeals will, for instance,take the following form:--"Consider the poorsweated East End woman worker. Sheknows best where the shoe pinches. You mencan't know. Give her a vote; and you shall seethat she will very soon better her condition."When I hear that argument I consider:--We will suppose that woman was ill. Shouldwe go to her and say: "You know best, knowbetter than any man, what is wrong with you.Here are all the medicines and remedies.Make your own selection, for that will assur-edly provide what will be the most likely tohelp."If this would be both futile and inhuman,much more would it be so to seek out thiswoman who is sick in fortune and say to her,"Go and vote for the parliamentary candidatewho will be likely to influence the trend oflegislation in a direction which will help." 73What would really help the sweated womanlabourer would, of course, be to have the bestintellect brought to bear, not specially uponthe problem of indigent woman, but upon thewhole social problem.But the aspect of the question which is, fromour present point of view, the fundamentallyimportant one is the following: Granting thatthe extension of the suffrage to woman wouldenable her, as the suffragist contends, to bringpressure upon her parliamentary representa-tive, man, while anxious to do his very bestfor woman, might very reasonably refuse togo about it in this particular way.If a man has a wife whom he desires to treatindulgently, he does not necessarily open ajoint account with her at his bankers.If he wants to contribute to a charity hedoes not give to the managers of that charitya power of attorney over his property.And if he is a philanthropical director of agreat business he does not, when a patheticcase of poverty among his staff is brought 74to his notice, imperil the fortunes of his under-taking by giving to his workmen shares and avote in the management.Moreover, he would perhaps regard it as alittle suspect if a group of those who wereclaiming this as a right came and told him that"it was veryselfishof him" not to grant theirrequest.Precious above rubies to the suffragist andevery other woman who wants to apply thescrew to man is that wordselfish. It furnishesher with thepetitio principiithat man is underan ethical obligation to give anything shechooses to ask.We come next--and this is the last of allthe arguments we have to consider--to theargument that the suffrage ought to be givento woman for instructional purposes.Now it would be futile to attempt to denythat we have ready to hand in the politics of theBritish Empire--that Empire which is sweptalong in "the too vast orb of her fate"--an idealpolitical training-ground in which we might 75put woman to school. The woman voter wouldthere be able to make any experiment sheliked.But one wonders why it has not been pro-posed to carry woman's instruction further,and for instructional purposes to make of awoman let us say a judge, or an ambassador,or a Prime Minister.There would--if only it were legitimate tosacrifice vital national interests--be not alittle to say in favour of such a course. Onemight at any rate hope by these means oncefor all to bring home to man the limitationsof woman. 76
PART II
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONCESSION OF THEPARLIAMENTARY SUFFRAGE TO WOMAN
I
WOMAN'S DISABILITY IN THE MATTER OFPHYSICAL FORCE
International Position of State would be Imperilled byWoman's Suffrage--Internal Equilibrium of Statewould be Imperilled.
THEwoman suffrage movement has nowgone too far to be disposed of by the over-throw of its arguments, and by a mere indica-tion of those which could be advanced on theother side. The situation demands the bring-ing forward of the case against woman's suf-frage; and it must be the full and quite unex-purgated case.I shall endeavour to do this in the fewest pos-sible words, and to be more especially briefwhere I have to pass again over ground whichI have previously traversed in dealing with thearguments of the suffragists.I may begin with what is fundamental. 79It is an axiom that we should in legislatingguide ourselves directly by considerations ofutility and expediency. For abstract princi-ples--I have in view hererights, justice, egali-tarian equity, equality, liberty, chivalry, logi-cality,and such like--are not all of themguides to utility; and each of these is, as wehave seen, open to all manner of private mis-interpretation.Applying the above axiom to the issue be-fore us, it is clear that we ought to confineourselves here to the discussion of the ques-tion as to whether the State would, or wouldnot, suffer from the admission of women tothe electorate.We can arrive at a judgment upon this byconsidering, on the one hand, the class-char-acters of women so far as these may be rele-vant to the question of the suffrage; and, onthe other hand, the legislative programmesput forward by the female legislative re-former and the feminist.In connexion with the class-characters of 80woman, it will be well, before attempting toindicate them, to interpolate here the generalconsideration that the practical statesman,who has to deal with things as they are, is notrequired to decide whether the characters ofwomen which will here be considered are, asthe physiologist (who knows that the sexualproducts influence every tissue of the body)cannot doubt, "secondary sexual characters";or, as the suffragist contends, "acquired char-acters." It will be plain that whether defectsare "secondary sexual characters" (and there-fore as irremediable as "racial characters"); orwhether they are "acquired characters" (andas such theoretically remediable) they arerelevant to the question of the concession ofthe suffrage just so long as they continue tobe exhibited.1
1This is a question on which Mill (videSubjection of Women,last third of Chapter I) has endeavoured to confuse the issuesfor his reader, first, by representing that by no possibility canman know anything of the "nature,"i.e., of the "secondarysexual characters" of woman; and, secondly, by distracting at-tention from the fact that "acquired characters" may produceunfitness for the suffrage.81
The primordial argument against givingwoman the vote is that that vote would notrepresent physical force.Now it is by physical force alone and byprestige--which represents physical force inthe background--that a nation protects itselfagainst foreign interference, upholds its ruleover subject populations, and enforces its ownlaws. And nothing could in the end more cer-tainly lead to war and revolt than the declineof the military spirit and loss of prestige whichwould inevitably follow if man admittedwoman into political co-partnership.While it is arguable that such a partnershipwith woman in government as obtains in Aus-tralia and New Zealand is sufficiently unrealto be endurable, there cannot be two opinionson the question that a virile and imperial racewill not brook any attempt at forcible controlby women.Again, no military foreign nation or nativerace would ever believe in the stamina and 82firmness of purpose of any nation that submit-ted even to the semblance of such control.The internal equilibrium of the State alsowould be endangered by the admission to theregister of millions of electors whose vote wouldnot be endorsed by the authority of physicalforce.Regarded from this point of view aWoman's Suffrage measure stands on an ab-solutely different basis to any other extensionof the suffrage. An extension which takes inmore men--whatever else it may do--makesfor stability in the respect that it makes thedecrees of the legislature more irresistible.An extension which takes in any womenundermines the physical sanction of thelaws.We can see indications of the evil that wouldfollow such an event in the profound dissatis-faction which is felt when--in violation of thedemocratic principle that every man shallcount for one, and no man for more than one 83--the political wishes of the large constituen-cies which return relatively few members toParliament, are overborne by those of con-stituencies which, with a smaller aggregatepopulation, return more members.And we see what such evil finally culminatesin when the over-representation of one part ofa country and the corresponding under-rep-resentation of other portions has led a largesection of the people to pledge themselves todisregard the eventual ordinances of Parlia-ment.If ever the question as to whether the willof Ulster or that of the Nationalists is to pre-vail is brought to the arbitrament of physicalforce, it will be due to the inequalities of parlia-mentary representation as between Englandand Ireland, and as between the Unionist andNationalist population of Ulster.The general lesson that all governmentalaction ought to be backed by force, is fur-ther brought home to the conscience when wetake note of the fact that every one feels that 84public morality is affronted when senile, in-firm, and bedridden men are brought to thepoll to turn the scale in hotly contested elec-tions.For electoral decisions are felt to have moralprestige only when the electoral figures quan-titatively represent the physical forces whichare engaged on either side. And where vitalinterests are involved, no class of men can beexpected to accept any decision other than onewhich rests upon theultima ratio.Now all the evils which are the outcome ofdisparities between the parliamentary powerand the organised physical force of contend-ing parties would "grow" a hundredfold ifwomen were admitted to the suffrage.There would after that be no electoral orparliamentary decision which would not beopen to challenge on the ground that it wasimpossible to tell whether the party whichcame out the winner had a majority whichcould enforce its will, or only a majority ob-tained by the inclusion of women. And no 85measure of redistribution could ever set thatright.There may find place here also the considera-tion that the voting of women would be an un-settling element in the government of theState, forasmuch as they would, by reason of ageneral lack of interest in public affairs, onlyvery; seldom come to the poll: would, in fact,come to the poll in full strength only whensome special appeal had come home to theiremotions.Now an electorate which includes a verylarge proportion of quite uninterested voterswould be in the same case as a legislaturewhich included a very large proportion ofmembers who made a practice of staying away.It would be in the same case, because the ab-sentees, who would not have acquired the train-ing which comes from consecutive attentionto public affairs, might at any moment stepin and upset the stability of State by votingfor some quite unconsidered measure.Coming back in conclusion to our main is- 86sue, I would re-emphasise an aspect of thequestion upon which I have already elsewhereinsisted.1I have in view the fact that womandoes, and should, stand to physical violence ina fundamentally different relation to man.Nothing can alter the fact that, the very mo-ment woman resorts to violence, she placesherself within the jurisdiction of an ethicallaw, which is as old as civilisation, and whichwas framed in its interests.
1VideAppendix, pp. 176-179.87
II
WOMAN'S DISABILITY IN THE MATTER OFINTELLECT
Characteristics of the Feminine Mind--Suffragist Il-lusions with Regard to the Equality of Man andWoman as Workers--Prospect for the IntellectualFuture of Woman--Has Woman Advanced?
THEwoman voter would be pernicious tothe State not only because she could not backher vote by physical force, but also by reasonof her intellectual defects.Woman's mind attends in appraising a state-ment primarily to the mental images which itevokes, and only secondarily--and sometimesnot at all--to what is predicated in the state-ment. It is over-influenced by individual in-stances; arrives at conclusions on incompleteevidence; has a very imperfect sense of pro-portion; accepts the congenial as true, and re-jects the uncongenial as false; takes the imagi- 88nary which is desired for reality, and treats theundesired reality which is out of sight as non-existent---building up for itself in this way,when biased by predilections and aversions, avery unreal picture of the external world.The explanation of this is to be found in allthe physiological attachments of woman'smind:1in the fact that mental images are inher over-intimately linked up with emotionalreflex responses; that yielding to such reflexresponses gives gratification; that intellec-tual analysis and suspense of judgment involvean inhibition of reflex responses which is felt asneural distress; that precipitate judgmentbrings relief from this physiological strain;and that woman looks upon her mind not as animplement for the pursuit of truth, but as aninstrument for providing her with creaturecomforts in the form of agreeable mental im-ages.In order to satisfy the physical yearning
1Certain of these have already been referred to in the letterprinted in the Appendix (videp.167infra).89
for such comforts, a considerable sectionof intelligent and virtuous women insiston picturing to themselves that the reign ofphysical force is over, or as good as over; thatdistinctions based upon physical and intellec-tual force may be reckoned as non-existent;that male supremacy as resting upon these is athing of the past; and that Justice meansEgalitarian Equity--means equating theweaklings with the strong and the incapablewith the capable.All this because these particular ideas arecongenial to the woman of refinement, and be-cause it is to her, when she is a suffragist, un-congenial that there should exist another prin-ciple of justice which demands from the phys-ically and intellectually capable that they shallretain the reins of government in their ownhands; and specially uncongenial that in allman-governed States the ideas of justice ofthe more forceful should have worked out somuch to the advantage of women, that alarge majority of these are indifferent or ac- 90tively hostile to the Woman's Suffrage Move-ment.In further illustration of what has been saidabove, it may be pointed out that woman, evenintelligent woman, nurses all sorts of miscon-ceptions about herself. She, for instance, isconstantly picturing to herself that she canas a worker lay claim to the same all-roundefficiency as a man--forgetting that womanis notoriously unadapted to tasks in which se-vere physical hardships have to be con-fronted; and that hardly any one would, ifother alternative offered, employ a womanin any work which imposed upon her a com-bined physical and mental strain, or in anywork where emergencies might have to befaced.In like manner the suffragist is fond ofpicturing to herself that woman is for allordinary purposes the intellectual equal, andthat the intelligent woman is the superior ofthe ordinary man.These results are arrived at by fixing the at- 91tention upon the fact that an ordinary manand an ordinary woman are, from the point ofview of memory and apprehension, very muchon a level; and that a highly intelligent womanhas a quicker memory and a more rapid powerof apprehension than the ordinary man; andfurther, by leaving out of regard that it is notso much a quick memory or a rapid power ofapprehension which is required for effectiveintellectual work, as originality, or at any rateindependence of thought, a faculty of fel-icitious generalisations and diacritical judg-ment, long-sustained intellectual effort, an un-selective mirroring of the world in the mind,and that relative immunity to fallacy whichgoes together with a stable and comparativelyunresponsive nervous system.When we consider that the intellect of thequite ungifted man works with this last-mentioned physiological advantage, we cansee that the male intellect must be, and--pace [with the permission of]the woman suffragist---it in point of factis, within its range, a better instrument for 92dealing with the practical affairs of life thanthat of the intelligent woman.How far off we are in the case of womanfrom an unselective mirroring of the world inthe mind is shown by the fact that large andimportant factors of life may be representedin woman's mind by lacunæ [gaps] of which she istotally unconscious.Thus, for instance, that not very unusualtype of spinster who is in a condition of re-tarded development (and you will find thiskind of woman even on County Council's), iscompletely unconscious of the sexual elementin herself and in human nature generally.Nay, though one went from the dead, he couldnot bring it home to her that unsatisfied sex-uality is an intellectual disability.Sufficient illustration will now have beengiven of woman's incapacity to take a com-plete or objective view of any matter in whichshe has a personal, or any kind of emotionalinterest; and this would now be the place todiscuss those other aspects of her mind which 93are relevant to her claim to the suffrage. Irefer to her logical endowment and her politicalsagacity.All that I might have been required to sayhere on these issues has, however, already beensaid by me in dealing with the arguments ofthe suffragist. I have there carefully writ-ten it in between the lines.One thing only remains over.--We must,before we pass on, consider whether womanhas really, as she tells us, given earnest for thefuture weeding out of these her secondary sex-ual characters, by making quite phenomenaladvances within the lifetime of the present gen-eration; and, above all, whether there is anybasis for woman's confident assurance that,when for a few generations she shall have en-joyed educational advantages, she will at anyrate pull up level with man.The vision of the future may first engageour attention; for only this roseate prospectmakes of any man a feminist.Now the basis that all this hope rests upon 94is the belief that it is a law of heredity that ac-quired characteristics are handed down; and,let it be observed, that whereas this theoryfound, not many decades ago, under the in-fluence of Darwin, thousands of adherentsamong scientific men, it finds to-day only hereand there an adherent.But let that pass, for we have to considerhere, not only whether acquired characteristicsare handed down, but further whether, "if weheld that doctrine true," it would furnish scien-tific basis for the belief that educational ad-vantages carried on from generation to gen-eration would level up woman's intellect toman's; and whether, as the suffragist also be-lieves, the narrow education of past genera-tions of women can be held responsible for theirpresent intellectual shortcomings.A moment's consideration will show--forwe may here fix our eyes only on the future---that woman could not hope to advance rela-tively to man except upon the condition thatthe acquired characteristics of woman, instead 95of being handed down equally to her male andfemale descendants, were accumulated uponher daughters.Now if that be a law of heredity, it is a lawwhich is as yet unheard of outside the sphereof the woman suffrage societies. Moreover,one is accustomed to hear women, when theyare not arguing on the suffrage, allege thatclever mothers make clever sons.It must, as it will have come home to us, beclear to every thoughtful mind that woman'sbelief that she will, through education and thecumulation of its effects upon her throughgenerations, become a more glorious being,rests, not upon any rational basis, but only onthe physiological fact that what is congenialto woman impresses itself upon her as true.All that sober science in the form of historyand physiology would seem to entitle us tohope from the future of woman is that she willdeveloppari passu[step by step]with man; and that educa-tion will teach her not to retard him overmuchby her lagging in the rear. 96In view of this larger issue, the question asto whether woman has, in any real sense of theword, been making progress in the course ofthe present generation, loses much of interest.If to move about more freely, to read morefreely, to speak out her mind more freely, andto have emancipated herself from traditionarybeliefs--and, I would add, traditionary ethics--is to have advanced, woman has indubitablyadvanced.But the educated native too has advancedin all these respects; and he also tells us thathe is pulling up level with the white man.Let us at any rate, when the suffragistis congratulating herself on her own progress,meditate also upon that dictum of Nietzsche,"Progress is writ large on all woman's ban-ners and bannerets; but one can actually seeher going back." 97
III
WOMAN'S DISABILITY IN THE MATTER OFPUBLIC MORALITY
Standards by which Morality can be Appraised--Con-flict between Different Moralities--The CorrectStandard of Morality--Moral Psychology of Menand Woman--Difference between Man and Womanin Matters of Public Morality.
YETa third point has to come into considera-tion in connexion with the woman voter. Thisis, that she would be pernicious to the Statealso by virtue of her defective moral equip-ment.Let me make clear what is the nature of thedefect of morality which is here imputed towoman.Conduct may be appraised by very differ-ent standards.We may appraise it by reference to a trans-cendental religious ideal which demands that 98the physical shall be subordinated to the spirit-ual, and that the fetters of self should be flungaside.Or again, we may bring into applicationpurely mundane utilitarian standards, andmay account conduct as immoral or moral ac-cording as it seeks only the happiness of theagent, or the happiness of the narrow circleof humanity which includes along with himalso his relatives and intimate friends, or again,the welfare of the wider circle which includesall those with whom he may have come into con-tact, or whom he may affect through his work;or again, the welfare of the whole body-politicof which we are members; or lastly, that of thegeneral body of mankind.Now it might be contended that all these dif-ferent moralities are in their essence one andthe same; and that one cannot comply with therequirements of any one of these systems ofmorality without fulfilling in a measure the re-quirements of all the other moralities.It might, for example, be urged that if a 99man strive after the achievement of a trans-cendental ideal in which self shall be annulled,he willpro tanto[to such extent]be bringing welfare to his do-mestic circle; or again, that it would be im-possible to promote domestic welfare without,through this, promoting the welfare of thenation, and through that the general welfareof the world.In like manner it might be argued that allwork done for abstract principles of moralitylike liberty and justice, for the advancementof knowledge, and for whatever else goes tothe building up of a higher civilisation, will,by promoting the welfare of the general bodyof mankind, redound to the advantage of eachseveral nation, and ultimately to the advantageof each domestic circle.But all this would be true only in a verysuperficial and strictly qualified sense. In re-ality, just as there is eternal conflict betweenegoism and altruism, so there is conflict be-tween the different moralities.To take examples, the attempt to actualise 100the transcendental religious ideal may, whenpursued with ardour, very easily conflict withthe morality which makes domestic felicity itsend. And again--as we see in the anti-mili-tarist movement in France, in the history ofthe early Christian Church, in the case of theQuakers and in the teachings of Tolstoy--itmay quite well set itself in conflict with na-tional ideals, and dictate a line of conductwhich is, from the point of view of the State,immoral.We need no further witness of the divorcebetween idealistic and national morality thanthat which is supplied in the memorable utter-ance of Bishop Magee, "No state which wasconducted on truly Christian principles couldhold together for a week."And domestic morality will constantly comeinto conflict with public morality.To do everything in one's power to advanceone's relatives and friends irrespectively of allconsiderations of merit would, no doubt, bequite sound domestic morality; it could, how- 101ever, not always be reconciled with publicmorality. In the same way, to take one'scountry's part in all eventualities would bepatriotic, but it might quite well conflict withthe higher interests of humanity.Now, the point towards which we have beenwinning our way is that each man's moral sta-tion and degree will be determined by the elec-tion which he makes where egoism and altru-ism, and where a narrower and a wider codeof morality, conflict.That the moral law forbids yielding to thepromptings of egoism or to those of the nar-rower moralities when this involves a violationof the precepts of the wider morality is axio-matic. Criminal and anti-social actions arenot excused by the fact that motives which im-pelled their commission were not purely ego-istic.But the ethical law demands more than ab-stention from definitely anti-social actions.It demands from every individual that heshall recognise the precepts of public mor- 102ality as of superior obligation to those of ego-ism and domestic morality.By the fact that her public men recognisedthis ethical law Rome won for herself in theancient world spectacular grandeur. By anunexampled national obedience to it glory hasin our time accrued to Japan. And, in truth,there is not anywhere any honour or renownbut such as comes from casting away the bondsof self and of the narrower moralities tocarry out the behests of the wider morality.Even in the strongholds of transcendentalreligion where it was axiomatic that mor-ality began and was summed up in personalmorality, it is gradually coming to be rec-ognised that, where we have two competingmoralities, it is always the wider moralitywhich has the prior claim upon our allegiance.Kingsley's protest against the morality of"saving one's dirty soul" marked a step in ad-vance. And we find full recognition of thesuperior claim of the larger morality in thatother virile dictum of Bishop Magee, "I would 103rather have England free, than Englandsober." That is, "I would maintain the con-ditions which make for the highest civilisationeven at the price of a certain number of lapsesin personal and domestic morality."What is here new, let it be noted, is onlythe acknowledgment by those whose officialallegiance is to a transcendental ideal of per-sonal morality that they are called upon toobey a higher allegiance. For there has al-ways existed, in the doctrine that guilty mancould not be pardoned and taken back intofavour until the claims of eternal justice hadbeen satisfied, theoretical recognition of theprinciple that one must conform to the pre-cepts of abstract morality before one mayethically indulge oneself in the lower moral-ities of philanthropy and personal benevo-lence.The view point from which I would pro-pose to survey the morality of woman has nowbeen reached. It has, however, still to bepointed out that we may appropriately, in com- 104paring the morals of man and woman, confineour survey to a comparatively narrow field.That is to say, we may here rule out all thatrelates to purely personal and domestic mor-ality--for this is not relevant to the suffrage.And we may also rule out all that relates tooffences against the police laws--such as publicdrunkenness and offences against the criminallaw--for these would come into considerationonly in connexion with an absolutely inappre-ciable fraction of voters.It will be well to begin by signalising certainpoints in the moral psychology of man.When morality takes up its abode in aman who belongs to the intellectual caste itwill show itself in his becoming mindful of hispublic obligations. He will consider the qual-ity of his work as affecting the interest of thosewho have to place dependence upon it; be-haviour to those who are casually brought intorelations with him; the discharge of his in-debtedness to the community; and the properconduct of public affairs. 105In particular, it will be to him a matter ofconcern that the law shall be established uponclassifications which are just (in the sense ofbeing conformable to public advantage); andthat the laws shall everywhere be justly, thatis to say rigorously and impartially, adminis-tered.If we now turn to the man in the street weshall not find him especially sensible to theappeals of morality. But when the specialcall comes it will generally be possible to trusthim: as an elector, to vote uninfluenced by con-siderations of private advantage; and, whencalled to serve on a jury, to apply legal class-ifications without distinction of person.Furthermore, in all times of crisis he may becounted upon to apply the principles of com-munal morality which have been handed downin the race.TheTitanicdisaster, for example, showedin a conspicuous manner that the ordinary manwill, "letting his own life go," obey the com-munal law which lays it upon him, when in- 106volved in a catastrophe, to save first the wo-men and children.Lastly, we come to the man who is intoler-ant of all the ordinary restraints of personaland domestic morality. Even in him the seedsof communal morality will often be founddeeply implanted.Time and again a regiment of scallawags,who have let all other morality go hang, have,when the proper chord has been made to vi-brate in them, heard the call of communalmorality, and done deeds which make the earsof whosoever heareth of them to tingle.We come into an entirely different landwhen we come to the morality of woman. Itis personal and domestic, not public, moralitywhich is instinctive in her.In other words, when egoism givesground to altruism, that altruism is exercisedtowards those who are linked up to her by abond of sexual affection, or a community inblood, or failing this, by a relation of personalfriendship, or by some other personal relation. 107And even when altruism has had her perfectwork, woman feels no interest in, and no re-sponsibility towards, any abstract moral ideal.And though the suffragist may protest, in-stancing in disproof of this her own burningenthusiasm for justice, we, for our part, maylegitimately ask whether evidence of a moralenthusiasm for justice would be furnished bya desire to render to others their due, or byvehement insistence upon one's own rights,and systematic attempts to extort, under thecover of the word "justice," advantages foroneself.But it will be well to dwell a little longeron, and to bring out more clearly, the pointthat woman's moral ideals are personal anddomestic, as distinguished from impersonaland public.Let us note in this connexion that it wouldbe difficult to conceive of a woman who hadbecome deaf to the appeal of personal and do-mestic morality making it a matter ofamourpropreto respond to a call of public morality; 108and difficult to conceive of a woman recover-ing lost self-respect by fulfilling such an obli-gation.But one knows that woman will rise and re-spond to the call of any strong human or trans-cendental personal affection.Again, it is only a very exceptional womanwho would, when put to her election betweenthe claims of a narrow and domestic and awider or public morality, subordinate theformer to the latter.In ordinary life, at any rate, one finds herfollowing in such a case the suggestions ofdomestic--I had almost called it animal--mor-ality.It would be difficult to find any one whowould trust a woman to be just to the rightsof others in the case where the material in-terests of her children, or of a devoted hus-band, were involved. And even to considerthe question of being in such a case intellec-tually just to any one who came into competi-tion with personal belongings like husband and 109child would, of course, lie quite beyond themoral horizon of ordinary woman.It is not only the fact that the ideals ofabstract justice and truth would inevitablybe brushed aside by woman in the interests ofthose she loves which comes into considerationhere; it is also the fact that woman is almostwithout a moral sense in the matter of execut-ing a public trust such as voting or attachingherself to a political association with a viewto influencing votes.There is between man and woman here acharacteristic difference.While it is, of course, not a secret to any-body that the baser sort of man can at anytime be diverted from the path of public mor-ality by a monetary bribe or other personaladvantage, he will not, at any rate, set atnaught all public morality by doing so for apeppercorn. He will, for instance, not join,for the sake of a daughter, a political move-ment in which he has no belief; nor vote for thisor that candidate just to please a son; or cen- 110sure a member of Parliament who has in vot-ing on female suffrage failed to consider thepredilections of his wife.But woman, whether she be politically en-franchised as in Australasia, or unenfran-chised as at home; whether she be immoral inthe sense of being purely egoistic, or moral inthe sense of being altruistic, very rarely makesany secret or any shame of doing these things.In this matter one would not be very farfrom the truth if one alleged that there are nogood women, but only women who have livedunder the influence of good men.Even more serious than this postponementof public to private morality is the fact thateven reputedly ethical women will, in the in-terests of what they take to be idealistic causes,violate laws which are universally accepted asbeing of moral obligation.I here pass over the recent epidemic of polit-ical crime among women to advert to the wantof conscience which permits, in connexion withprofessedly idealistic causes, not only misrepre- 111sentations, but the making of deliberately falsestatements on matters of public concern.It is, for example, an illustration of the pro-foundly different moral atmospheres in whichmen and women live that when a public womanrecently made, for what was to her an idealisticpurpose, a deliberately false statement of factinThe Times, she quite naïvely confessed toit, seeing nothing whatever amiss in her ac-tion.And it did not appear that any other womansuffragist could discern any kind of immoral-ity in it. The worst thing they could find tosay was that it perhaps was a littlegaucheto confess to making a deliberately false state-ment on a public question when it was for themoment particularly desirable that womanshould show up to best advantage before theeyes of man.We may now for a moment put aside thequestion of woman's public morality and con-sider a question which is inextricably mixed up 112with the question of the admission of womanto the suffrage. This is the mental attitudeand the programme of the female legislativereformer. 113
IV
MENTAL OUTLOOK AND PROGRAMME OFTHE FEMALE LEGISLATIVE REFORMER
THEsuffragist woman, when she is the kindof woman who piques herself upon her ethicalimpulses, will, even when she is intellectuallyvery poorly equipped, and there is no imprintof altruism upon her life, assure you that noth-ing except the moral influence of woman, ex-erted through the legislation, which her prac-tical mind would be capable of initiating, willever avail to abate existing social evils, and toeffect the moral redemption of the world.It will not be amiss first to try to introducea little clearness and order into our ideas uponthose formidably difficult problems which thefemale legislative reformer desires to attack,and then to consider how a rational reformingmind would go to work in the matter of pro-posing legislation for these. 114Firstwould come those evils which resultfrom individuals seeking advantage to them-selves by the direct infliction of injury uponothers. Violations of the criminal law and thevarious forms of sweating and fleecing one'sfellow-men come under this category.Thenwould come the evils which arise out ofpurveying physiological and psychological re-freshments and excitements, which are, ac-cording as they are indulged in temperately orintemperately, grateful and innocuous, orsources of disaster and ruin. The evils whichare associated with the drink traffic and thebetting industry are typical examples.Finally,there would come into considerationthe evils of death or physical suffering deliber-ately inflicted by man upon man with a view topreventing worse evils. The evil of war wouldcome under this category. In this same cate-gory might also come the much lesser evil ofpunitive measures inflicted upon criminals.And with this might be coupled the evil of 115killing and inflicting physical suffering uponanimals for the advantage of man.We may now consider how the rational legis-lative reformer would in each case go towork.He would not start with the assumption thatitmustbe possible by some alteration of thelaw to abolish or conspicuously reduce any ofthe afore-mentioned evils; nor yet with the as-sumption that, if a particular alteration of thelaw would avail to bring about this result, thatalteration ought necessarily to be made. Hewould recognise that many things which aretheoretically desirable are unattainable; andthat many legislative measures which couldperfectly well be enforced would be barred bythe fact that they would entail deplorable un-intended consequences.The rational legislator whom we have herein view would accordingly always take expertadvice as to whether the desired object couldbe achieved by legal compulsion; and as to 116whether a projected law which satisfied thecondition of being workable would give a bal-ance of advantages over disadvantages.In connexion with a proposal for the pre-vention of sweating he would, for instance,take expert advice as to whether its provisionscould be enforced; and whether, if enforce-able, they would impose added hardships onany class of employees or penalties on any in-nocent class of employers.In like manner in connexion with a pro-posed modification in criminal procedure, therational reformer would defer to the experton the question as to whether such modificationwould secure greater certainty of punishmentfor the guilty without increasing the risk ofconvicting the innocent.In connexion with the second category ofevils--the category under which would comethose of drinking and betting--the rationallegislative reformer would recognise the com-plete impracticability of abolishing by legis- 117lative prohibition physiological indulgencesand the evils which sometimes attend uponthem.He would consider instead whether these at-tendant evils could be reduced by making theregulating laws more stringent; and whethermore stringent restrictions--in addition tothe fact that they would filch from the all toosmall stock of human happiness--would not,by paving the way for further invasions of per-sonal liberty, cripple the free development ofthe community.On the former question, which only expertscould properly answer, the reasonable reformerwould defer to their advice. The answer tothe last question he would think out for him-self.In connexion with the evils which are de-liberately inflicted by man with a view to reap-ing either personal profit, or profit for the na-tion, or profit for humanity, the reasonablereformer would begin by making clear tohimself that the world we live in is not such 118a world as idealism might conjure up, but aworld of violence, in which life must be takenand physical suffering be inflicted.And he would recognise that the vitalmaterial interests of the nation can be pro-tected only by armed force; that civilisationcan be safeguarded only by punishing viola-tions of the criminal law; and that the takingof animal life and the infliction of a certainamount of physical suffering upon animals isessential to human well-being, comfort, andrecreation; and essential also to the achieve-ment of the knowledge which is required tocombat disease.And the reasonable reformer will, in con-formity with this, direct his efforts, not to thetotal abolition of war, but to the prevention ofsuch wars as are not waged for really vitalmaterial interests, and to the abatement of theferocities of warfare.In the case of punishment for criminals hewould similarly devote his efforts not to theabrogation of punishments, but to the relin- 119quishment of any that are not reformatory, orreally deterrent.In like manner the reasonable reformerwould not seek to prohibit the slaughtering ofanimals for food, or the killing off of animalpests, or the trapping, shooting, or hunting ofanimals for sport or profit, nor yet would heseek to prevent their utilisation of animals forthe acquirement of knowledge.He would direct his efforts to reducing thepain which is inflicted, and to preserving every-where measure and scale--not sentimentallyforbidding in connexion with one form ofutilisation of animals what is freely allowedin connexion with another--but differentia-ting, if differentiating at all in favour of per-mitting the infliction of proportionately greatersuffering in the case where national and hu-manitarian interests, than in the case wheremere recreation and luxury and personalprofit, are at stake.Having recognised what reason would pre-scribe to the legislative reformer, we have next 120to inquire how far the man voter conforms tothese prescriptions of reason, and how far thewoman reformer would do so if she becamea voter.Let it be noted that the man in the streetmakes no question about falling in with thefact that he is born into a world of violence,and he acquiesces in the principle that theState, and, failing the State, the individual,may employ force and take life in defenceof vital material interests. And he franklyfalls in with it being a matter of dailyroutine to kill and inflict suffering upon ani-mals for human profit or advantage.Even if these principles are not formulatedby the man in the street in quite such plainterms, he not only carries them out in practice,but he conducts all his thinking upon these pre-suppositions.He, for instance, would fall in with the prop-osition that morality does not require fromman that he should give up taking lifeor inflicting physical suffering. And he would 121not cavil with the statement that man shouldput reasonable limits to the amount of suffer-ing he inflicts, and confine this within as nar-row a range as possible--always requiring forthe death or suffering inflicted some tangibleadvantage.Moreover, if the question should be raisedas to whether such advantage will result, theordinary man will as a rule, where the matterlies beyond his personal ken, take expert opin-ion before intervening.He will, for instance, be prepared to be soguided in connexion with such questions aswhether disease could, if more knowledge wereavailable, be to a large extent prevented andcured; as to how far animal experiments wouldcontribute to the acquirement of that knowl-edge; and as to how far the physical suffer-ing which might be involved in these experi-ments can be minimised or abolished.But not every man is prepared to fall inwith this programme of inflicting physical suf-fering for the relief of physical suffering. 122There is also a type of spiritually-minded manwho in this world of violence sets his face un-compromisingly against the taking of anylife and the infliction of any physical suffer-ing--refusing to make himself a partaker ofevil.An idealist of this type will, like Tolstoy,be an anti-militarist. He will advocate a gen-eral gaol delivery for criminals. He will be avegetarian. He will not allow an animal'slife to be taken in his house, though the micescamper over his floors. And he will, consist-ently with his conviction that it is immoral toresort to force, refuse to take any part in legis-lation or government.This attitude, which is that commended bythe Hindoo and the Buddhist religions, is, ofcourse, a quite unpractical attitude towardslife. It is, in fact, a self-destructive attitude,unless a man's fellow-citizens are prepared byforcible means to secure to him the enjoymentof the work of his hands or of his inheritedproperty, or unless those who refuse to desist 123from the exercise of force are prepared to un-take the support of idealists.We have not only these two classes of men--the ordinary man who has no compunction inresorting to force when the requirements of lifedemand it, and the idealist who refuses to haveany lot or part in violence; there is also a hy-brid. This male hybrid will descant on thegeneral iniquity of violence, and then not onlyconnive at those forms of violence which min-ister to his personal comforts, but also makea virtue of trying to abate by legal violencesome particular form of physical sufferingwhich happens to offend in a quite special man-ner his individual sensibility.There is absolutely nothing to be said aboutthis kind of reforming crank, except only thatanything which may be said in relation to thefemale legislative reformer may be appositelysaid of him; and perhaps also this, that theordinary man holds him both in intellectualand in moral contempt, and is resolved not to 124allow him to do any really serious injury tothe community.To become formidable this quasi-male per-son must, as he recognises, ally himself withthe female legislative reformer.Passing on to deal with her, it imports us firstto realise that while the male voter has--ex-cept where important constitutional issueswere in question--been accustomed to leaveactual legislation to the expert, the female re-former gives notice beforehand that she will,as soon as ever she gets the suffrage, insiston pressing forward by her vote her reform-ing schemes.What would result from the ordinary voterlegislating on matters which require expertknowledge will be plain to every one who willconsider the evolution of law.There stand over against each other here, asan example and a warning, the Roman Law,which was the creation of legal experts: theprætor and the jurisconsult; and the legal 125system of the Greeks, which was the creationof a popular assembly--and it was a popu-lar assembly which was quite ideally intelli-gent.Upon the Roman Law has been built the lawof the greater part of the civilised world. TheGreek is a by-word for inconsequence.How can one, then, without cold shuddersthink of that legal system which the femaleamateur legal reformer would bring to thebirth?Let us consider her qualifications. Let usfirst take cognisance of the fact that the re-forming woman will neither stand to the prin-ciple that man may, where this gives a balanceof advantage, inflict on his fellow-man, andafortioriupon animals, death and physical suf-fering; nor yet will she stand to the principlethat it is ethically unlawful to do deeds of vio-lence.She spends her life halting between thesetwo opinions, eternally shilly-shallying.She will, for instance, begin by announcing 126that it can never be lawful to do evil that goodmay come; and that killing and inflicting suf-fering is an evil. (In reality the precept ofnot doing evil that good may come has rela-tion only to breaking for idealistic purposesmoral laws of higher obligation.) She willthen go back upon that and concede that warmay sometimes be lawful, and that the punish-ment of criminals is not an evil. But if heremotions are touched by the forcible feedingof a criminal militant suffragist, she will againgo back upon that and declare that the appli-cation of force is an intolerable evil.Or, again, she will concede that the slaugh-tering of animals for food is not an evil, butthat what is really unforgivable is the inflictionof physical suffering on animals. And all thetime for her, as well as for man, calves andlambs are being emasculated to make her meatsucculent; wild animals are painfully done todeath to provide her table with delicacies;birds with young in the nest are shot so thatshe may parade in their plumage; or fur-bear- 127ing animals are for her comfort and adorn-ment massacred and tortured in traps.When a man crank who is co-responsiblefor these things begins to talk idealistic re-forms, the ordinary decent man refuses tohave anything more to say to him.But when a woman crank holds this lan-guage, the man merely shrugs his shoulders."It is," he tells himself, "after all, the womanwhom God gave him."It must be confessed that the problem as tohow man with a dual nature may best accom-modate himself to a world of violence pre-sents a very difficult problem.It would obviously be no solution to followout everywhere a programme of violence.Not even the predatory animals do that.Tigers do not savage their cubs; hawks do notpluck hawks' eyes; and dogs do not fightbitches.Nor would, as has been shown, the solutionof the problem be arrived at by everywheresurrendering--if we had been given the grace 128to do this--to the compunctious visitings ofnature.What is required is to find the proper com-promise. As to what that would be there is,as between the ordinary man and woman onthe one side, and the male crank and thebattalions of sentimental women on the other,a conflict which is, to all intents and purposes,a sex war.The compromise which ordinary human na-ture had fixed upon--and it is one which, min-istering as it does to the survival of the race,has been adopted through the whole range ofnature--is that of making within the world inwhich violence rules a series of enclaves inwhich the application of violence is progres-sively restricted and limited.Outside the outermost of the series of ringfences thus constituted would be the realm ofuncompromising violence such as exists whenhuman life is endangered by wild animals, ormurderous criminals, or savages. Just withinthis outermost fence would be civilised war-- 129for in civilised war non-combatants and prison-ers and wounded are excluded from the appli-cation of violence. In like manner we bringhumanity in general within a more shelteredenclosure than animals--pet animals within amore sheltered enclosure than other animals.Again, we bring those who belong to the whiterace within a narrower protecting circle thanmankind in general, and those of our own na-tion within a still narrower one.Following out the same principle, we in-clude women and children within a narrowershelter fence than our adult fellow-male; andwe use the weapon of force more reluctantlywhen we are dealing with our relatives andfriends than when we are dealing with thosewho are not personally known to us; andfinally, we lay it aside more completely whenwe are dealing with the women of our house-holds than when we are dealing with themales.The cause of civilisation and of the amenities,and the welfare of the nation, of the family, 130and of woman, are all intimately bound up witha faithful adherence to this compromise.But this policy imposes upon those whomit shelters from violence corresponding obliga-tions.In war non-combatants--not to speak of thewounded on the battlefield--must desist fromhostile action on the pain of being shot downlike wild beasts. And though an individualnon-combatant might think it a patriotic actionfor him to take part in war, the thoughtfulman would recognise that such action was aviolation of a well-understood covenant madein the interest of civilisation, and that to breakthrough this covenant was to abrogate a hu-manitarian arrangement by which the generalbody of non-combatants immensely benefits.Exactly the same principle finds, as alreadypointed out, application when a woman em-ploys direct violence, or aspires to exercise byvoting indirect violence.One always wonders if the suffragist appre-ciates all that woman stands to lose and all 131that she imperils by resort to physical force.One ought not to have to tell her that, if shehad to fight for her position, her status wouldbe that which is assigned to her among theKaffirs--not that which civilised man concedesto her.From considering the compromise by whichman adapts his dual nature to violence in theworld, we turn to that which the female legis-lative reformer would seek to impose by theaid of her vote.Her proposal, as the reader will have dis-cerned, would be that all those evils which makeappeal to the feminine emotions should belegally prohibited, and that all those which failto make this appeal shall be tolerated.In the former class would be included thosewhich come directly under woman's ken, orhave been brought vividly before the eyes ofher imagination by emotional description.And the specially intolerable evils will be thosewhich, owing to the fact that they fall uponwoman or her immediate belongings, induce 132in the female legislative reformer pangs ofsympathetic discomfort.In the class of evils which the suffragist iscontent to tolerate, or say nothing about, wouldbe those which are incapable of evoking in hersuch sympathetic pangs, and she concerns her-self very little with those evils which do notfurnish her with a text for recriminationsagainst man.Conspicuous in this programme is the ab-sence of any sense of proportion. One wouldhave imagined that it would have been plainto everybody that the evils which individualwomen suffer at the hands of man are very farfrom being the most serious ills of humanity.One would have imagined that the sufferinginflicted by disease and by bad social condi-tions--suffering which falls upon man andwoman alike--deserved a first place in thethoughts of every reformer. And one mighthave expected it to be common knowledge thatthe wrongs individual men inflict upon womenhave a full counterpart in the wrongs which 133individual women inflict upon men. It mayquite well be that there are mists which here"blot and fill the perspective" of the femalelegislative reformer. But to look only uponone's own things, and not also upon the thingsof others, is not for that morally innocent.There is further to be noted in connexionwith the female legislative reformer that shehas never been able to see why she should berequired to put her aspirations into practicalshape, or to consider ways and means, or tosubmit the practicability of her schemes to ex-pert opinion. One also recognises that froma purely human point of view such tactics arejudicious. For if the schemes of the fe-male legislative reformer were once to be re-viewed from the point of view of their prac-ticability, her utility as a legislator would comeinto question, and the suffragist could nolonger give out that there has been committedto her from on High a mission to draw waterfor man-kind out of the wells of salvation.Lastly, we have to reflect in connection with 134the female legislative reformer that to go aboutproposing to reform the laws means to aban-don that special field of usefulness which liesopen to woman in alleviating misery and re-dressing those hard cases which will, under alllaws and regulations of human manufactureand under all social dispositions, inevitablyoccur. Now when a woman leaves a socialtask which is commensurate with her abilities,and which asks from her personal effort andself-sacrifice, for a task which is quite beyondher abilities, but which, she thinks, will bringher personal kudos, shall we impute it to herfor righteousness? 135
V
ULTERIOR ENDS WHICH THE WOMAN'S SUF-FRAGE MOVEMENT HAS IN VIEW
WEhave now sufficiently considered thesuffragist's humanitarian schemes, and wemay lead up to the consideration of her furtherprojects by contrasting woman's suffrage as itpresents itself under colonial conditions--i.e.woman's suffrage without the female legisla-tive reformer and the feminist--with thewoman suffrage which is being agitated for inEngland--i.e.woman suffrage with the fe-male legislative reformer and the feminist.In the colonies and undeveloped countriesgenerally where women are in a minority, andwhere owing to the fact that practically allhave an opportunity of marrying, there are notfor woman any difficult economic and physio-logical conditions, there is no woman's ques- 136tion; and by consequence no female legislativereformer or feminist. The woman voter fol-lows, as the opportunist politicians who en-franchised her intended, the lead of her men-folk--serving only a pawn in the game of pol-itics. Under such conditions woman's suf-frage leaves things as they are, except onlythat it undermines the logical foundations ofthe law, and still further debases the standardof public efficiency and public morality.In countries, such as England, where an ex-cess female population1has made economicdifficulties for woman, and where the severesexual restrictions, which here obtains, havebred in her sex-hostility, the suffrage move-ment has as its avowed ulterior object the abro-gation of all distinctions which depend uponsex; and the achievement of the economic inde-pendence of woman.To secure this economic independence everypost, occupation, and Government service is to