CHAPTER III

[55]Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 412.

[56]"Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, p. 458. Bagot's reports of interviews with Adams.

[57]Hamilton, "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 323-325.

[58]Ford, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. X, pp. 277-278.

[59]Hamilton, "Writings of James Madison," Vol. IX, pp. 161-162.

[60]W. C. Ford, "Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," in Mass. Hist. Soc.Proceedings, second series, Vol. XV, p. 392.

[61]See especially G. L. Beer, "The English-Speaking Peoples," p. 79.

[62]Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 419.

[63]Ibid., pp. 429, 443.

[64]"Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 26.

[65]Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 448.

[66]"Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 33.

[67]"Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 209.

[68]"Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 218.

[69]"Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276.

[70]"Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272.

[71]"Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 42.

[72]"Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 54.

[73]"Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to Granville. On the general question of recognition, see "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, pp. 297-304.

[74]"Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 1.

[75]Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and Vol. VI, pp. 1006-1014.

[76]Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff.

The Cuban question had its origin in the series of events that have been narrated in the two preceding chapters—the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The declaration of President Monroe, enforced by the well-known attitude of England, dealt the death-blow to Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern continent. Hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had remained loyal to the king, were clung to with all the greater tenacity as the sole remains of the imperial possessions over which the successors of Ferdinand and Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The "Ever-faithful Island of Cuba" was rewarded for her loyalty by the concession of certain liberties of trade and invited to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes—a privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain was now too weak to protect her two West Indian dependencies—the remains of her former glory, but her very weakness secured their possession to her. The naval and commercial importance of Cuba, "the pearl of the Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be acquired by any one of the great maritime powers without exciting the jealousy and opposition of the others. Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary journalist, Cuba was to be the trans-Atlantic Turkey,trembling to its fall, but sustained by the jealousies of those who were eager to share the spoils.

The strategic importance of Cuba, commanding to a large extent the commerce of the West Indies and of the Central American states, and, what was of vital interest to us, the traffic of the Mississippi valley, attracted at an early period the attention of American as well as of European statesmen. In a letter to President Madison in 1809, Jefferson, in speaking of Napoleon's policy in regard to the Spanish-American colonies, said:

That he would give up the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. But that is no price; because they are ours in the first moment of the first war; and until a war they are of no particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it ane plus ultraas to us in that direction.[77]

President Madison expressed his views on the Cuban question in a letter to William Pinkney, October 30, 1810:

The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government, which might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce and security of the United States.[78]

This was the first statement in the evolution of a Cuban policy consistently adhered to by the United States until the successes of the Mexican war super-induced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the Union.

As early as 1817 fears as to the fate of Cuba were raised in the minds of the American public by newspaper reports to the effect that England had proposed a relinquishment of her claim against Spain for the maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular campaign, amounting to £15,000,000, in return for the cession of the island.[79]Reports of this nature were circulated for several months on both sides of the Atlantic, but the question did not assume any very great importance until 1819, when the treaty for the cession of the Floridas to the United States was being negotiated with Spain. It was then insisted by the British press that the acquisition of the Floridas would give the United States such a preponderating influence in West Indian affairs as to render necessary the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain as the natural and only offset.[80]The Florida treaty was ratified after some delay, which, however, does not appear to have been caused by the British government, as was supposed at the time. The British papers, nevertheless, continued to condemn in strong terms the treaty as well as the inaction of their government in not making it a pretext for the seizure of Cuba.

As the preparations of France for the invasion of Spain in 1823 progressed the fate of Cuba became aquestion of absorbing interest in America. There was little hope that the island would continue a dependency of Spain. It was rumored that Great Britain had engaged to supply the constitutional government of Spain with money in her struggle with France and would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment. Both Spanish and French journals spoke of British occupation of Cuba as a matter no longer to be doubted, and the presence in the West Indies of a large British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose of suppressing piracy, seemed to lend color to the reports.[81]The British press was clamoring for the acquisition of Cuba. ThePacketdeclared: "The question then comes to this, shall England occupy Cuba, or by permitting its acquisition by the United States (which they have long desired) sacrifice her whole West India trade? There can be no hesitation as to the answer."

The British government, however, officially disclaimed all designs upon Cuba, but this disclaimer did not fully reassure the American government, and our representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and England. In the spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was succeeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of Madrid. In his instructions to the new minister, which went much beyond the usual length and were occupied almost exclusively with a discussion of the Cuban question, John Quincy Adams used the following remarkable words:

"In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that theannexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." We were not then prepared for annexation, he continued, "but there are laws of political as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom."[82]

President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject of Spanish-American affairs and the entanglements with European powers likely to arise therefrom. Jefferson replied, June 11, 1823:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so.[83]

During the summer of 1825 a large French squadron visited the West Indies and hovered for several weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This action on the part of the French government, without explanation, excited the alarm of both England and the United States and drew forth strong protests from Mr. Canning and from Mr. Clay. Canning wrote toGranville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not consent to the occupation of Havana by France, even as a measure of protection against possible attacks from Mexico and Colombia.[84]Again some two months later he wrote:

As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, of course, represent to Villèle the impossibility of our allowing France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with the mother-country. Next to that I wish it independent, either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime power should get possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of this matter just as I do.[85]

The expressions of the United States, as to the designs of France, were as emphatic as those of England. Mr. Clay declared "that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever."[86]

In this connection Canning wished to bring about the signature, by England, France, and the United States, of "ministerial notes, one between France and the United States, and one between France and Great Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaiming each for themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba, and protesting against such occupation by either of the others."[87]The government of the United States held this proposal under advisement, but on France declining, it was dropped.[88]In 1826 when an attackupon Portugal was feared Canning advised, in case of such an attack, the immediate seizure of Cuba by Great Britain as more effective than half a dozen Peninsular campaigns.[89]

The Cuban question was involved in the long debate on the proposal of the executive of the United States to send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American republics assembled at Panama in 1826. This debate occupied the attention of Congress during the winter and spring of 1826, and was engaged in with great earnestness. One of the chief objections to the proposed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba and Porto Rico would come up and that the United States government had already committed itself to the foreign powers on that subject. The report of the Senate committee on foreign relations declared that,

The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes the strongest inducement to the United States not to take a place at the contemplated congress, since, by so doing, they must be considered as changing the attitude in which they hitherto have stood as impartial spectators of the passing scenes, and identifying themselves with the new republics.[90]

The Southern members were united in their opposition to the Panama mission, and in fact to any closer alliance with the new republics, for the reason that the latter had adopted the principle of emancipation and any further extension of their influence would jeopardize the institution of slavery in the United States. For the same reason they were opposed to the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If a change from its connection with Spain werenecessary they favored annexation by the United States, and meantime they were strongly opposed to the government entering into any engagement with foreign powers or in any way committing itself on the Cuban question.[91]

The declaration of Mr. Clay against the interference of England and France in the affairs of Cuba was consistently adhered to under the administrations of Jackson and Van Buren.

In 1838-39, the British government dispatched special commissioners to Cuba and Porto Rico to report on the condition of the slave trade. The presence of these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great Britain contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at least occupying it for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. The United States gave Spain to understand that we would not consent to British control in whatever way it might be brought about. Mr. Forsyth wrote to Mr. Vail, our representative at Madrid, July 15, 1840:

You are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[92]

Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr. Campbell, United States consul at Havana:

The Spanish government has long been in possession of the policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba,which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told that the United States never would permit the occupation of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[93]

A copy of this letter was also sent to Washington Irving, our representative at Madrid to make such use of as circumstances might require.[94]

During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the efforts of this government were directed toward preventing the acquisition of the island, or the establishment of a protectorate over it, by Great Britain or France. With the Mexican war, however, and the growing conviction of "manifest destiny," our foreign policy assumed a much bolder and more aggressive character, and during the next fifteen years all manner of schemes for the southward extension of our territory were suggested and many of them actually undertaken. Cuba became an object of desire, not only in the eyes of the slave-holding population of the South as an acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of the nation, because of its strategic importance in relation to the inter-oceanic transit routes of Central America, which seemed the only feasible line of communication with our rapidly developing interests in California. Consequently various attempts were made to annex the island to the United States, both by purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering expeditions.

In June, 1848, under the administration of President Polk, Mr. Buchanan, secretary of state, wrote to our minister at Madrid, directing him to open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba. After referring to the dangers of British occupation and to the advantages of annexation, he said: "Desirable, however, as this island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor would be too dearly purchased." He stated that the President would stipulate for the payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price.[95]This offer was rejected by the Spanish government. The minister of state after several months' delay finally replied "that it was more than any minister dare to entertain any such proposition; that he believed such to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean."

Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fillmore no effort was made for the purchase of Cuba. On August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr. Barringer that the government did not desire to renew the negotiation for the purchase of Cuba made by the late administration, since the proposition had been considered by the Spanish government as a national indignity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba, the proposal must come from her.

About this time active preparations were going on for the invasion of Cuba by an armed expedition under the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez. On August11, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation warning all citizens of the United States against taking part in such expedition and saying, "No such persons must expect the interference of this government in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct."[96]A few days later the entire force of Lopez was arrested by the United States marshal just as it was on the point of leaving New York.

Nothing daunted, Lopez traveled through the southern and southwestern states secretly enlisting men and making arrangements for their transportation to Cuba. Many men of prominence at the South were in open and avowed sympathy with the enterprise. In the spring of 1850, Lopez called upon Gen. John A. Quitman, governor of Mississippi, who had served with great distinction in the Mexican war, and offered him, in the name of his compatriots, the leadership of the revolution and the supreme command of the army. Quitman's sympathies were thoroughly enlisted in the movement, but he declined the honor on account of the serious aspect of political affairs, particularly what he considered the encroachments of the federal government upon the rights of the states. He made liberal contributions of money, however, and gave Lopez sound advice about his undertaking, insisting that he must have an advance column of at least 2,000 men to maintain a footing on the island until reinforcements could go to their aid.[97]

Unfortunately for Lopez he did not follow the advice of Quitman. A company of volunteers altogether inadequate for the successful accomplishment of the enterprise was collected at New Orleans. There Lopez chartered a steamer, theCreole, and two barks, theGeorgianaand theSusan Loud. Three-fourths of the volunteers had served in the Mexican war. The first detachment comprising 250 men left New Orleans in the barkGeorgiana, April 25, 1850, under the command of Col. Theodore O'Hara. They proceeded to the island of Contoy off the coast of Yucatan in the territory of Mexico. There they were joined three weeks later by Lopez and 450 followers in theCreole. The entire command, with the exception of the crews of the two barks and a few others to guard the stores, embarked in theCreoleand effected a landing at Cardenas, but the natives did not come to the aid of Lopez and after holding the town for twelve hours he reluctantly reëmbarked and headed for Key West. TheCreolewas pursued by thePizarro, a Spanish war vessel, which steamed into the harbor just as she cast anchor. For a few moments the Spaniards seemed to be on the point of preparing to open fire on theCreole, but when they saw the United States custom-houseofficers take possession of her they changed their minds and left the harbor.

The two barks, which had been left with a small guard at the island of Contoy, were captured by Spanish warships, taken to Havana, condemned as prizes and the men put on trial for participation in the Lopez expedition. As these men had committed no act of hostility against Spain, and had, moreover, been seized on neutral territory, the United States government at once issued its protest and demanded their release. The Spanish government replied that these men had been described as pirates by the President of the United States in his proclamation warning citizens against joining the expedition and were, therefore, beyond the pale of the protection of the United States. After heated negotiations which lasted several months and seriously threatened the peace of the two countries, the prisoners were released, but it was declared to be an act of grace on the part of the Queen and not a concession to the demands of the United States.[98]

Lopez was prosecuted by the United States government for violation of the neutrality laws, but escaped conviction and at once set about organizing another expedition. On August 3, 1851, the third and last expedition of Lopez, consisting of over 400 men, left New Orleans. After touching at Key West the steamer proceeded to the coast of Cuba and landed the expedition at Bahia Honda. The main body under Lopez proceeded into the country where they had been led to expect a general uprising of the Cubans. Col. W. S. Crittenden, who had served with bravery in the Mexican war, was left in command of a smallerbody to bring up the baggage. This detachment was attacked on the 13th and forced to retreat to the place where they had landed, where about fifty of them obtained boats and tried to escape. They were, however, intercepted off the coast, taken to Havana, sentenced before a military court, and executed on the 16th.

The main body under Lopez was overcome and dispersed by Spanish troops on the 24th. Lopez was taken prisoner, tried, and executed. Many of his followers were killed or died of hunger and fatigue and the rest made prisoners. Upon receipt of this news Commodore Parker was at once ordered to proceed in a frigate to Havana to inquire into the charges against the prisoners executed, and the circumstances of their capture, trial, and sentence. To these inquiries the captain-general replied that he considered those executed as pirates, that they had been so denounced by the President of the United States in his proclamation, that he was not at liberty to furnish a copy of the court records, but would send them to Madrid and to the Spanish minister at Washington.[99]

When the news of the executions at Havana reached New Orleans the excitement was intense. The office of the Spanish consul was broken into, portraits of the Queen and Captain-General of Cuba defaced, the Spanish flag torn in pieces, and the consul burned in effigy in LaFayette Square. The consul had to flee from the city for safety and the property of certain Spaniards residing in New Orleans was destroyed. A long correspondence ensued between the two governments. The United States agreed to pay an indemnityfor injuries to the public property of Spain, but not for the destruction of property belonging to Spanish residents, who were entitled only to the same protection afforded our own citizens.[100]

A few weeks after the last Lopez expedition the British and French representatives at Washington notified our government that orders had been issued to their squadrons in the West Indies to repel by force any attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quarter. Our government replied that such action on the part of England and France could "not but be regarded by the United States with grave disapproval, as involving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of protectorship over American waters."[101]

In order to allay the uneasiness caused by the attempts of filibusters, supposed to be encouraged or at least connived at by the government of the United States, the Spanish government requested Great Britain and France, in January, 1852, to secure the signature by the American government in conjunction with them of an abnegatory declaration with respect to Cuba.[102]Accordingly in April, 1852, the British and French ministers at Washington brought the subject to the attention of this government in notes of the same date, suggesting a tripartite convention for the guarantee of Cuba to Spain.[103]

To this proposal Mr. Webster replied in part as follows:

It has been stated and often repeated to the government ofSpain by this government, under various administrations, not only that the United States have no design upon Cuba themselves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a voluntary cession of the island to any other European power, she might rely on the countenance and friendship of the United States to assist her in the defense and preservation of that island. At the same time it has always been declared to Spain that the government of the United States could not be expected to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to an European power.

He reminded them, furthermore, that "the policy of the United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far as possible, alliances or agreements with other states, and to keep itself free from national obligations, except such as affect directly the interests of the United States themselves."[104]

The matter was again urged upon the United States by the British and French governments in notes to Mr. Webster, dated July 9, 1852, in which the indefensibility of the Spanish title to the island and its bearings upon the neutrality of the proposed Central American canals were dwelt upon. The death of Mr. Webster postponed for some time the answer of the United States, but the proposal was finally rejected in a notable dispatch prepared by Webster's successor, Edward Everett.

With the growth of the slavery conflict, which had now become paramount to all other questions, the annexation of Cuba had become a party issue, and the return of the Democratic party to power, in 1853, was hailed by the southern extremists as a signal for theacquisition of the long coveted prize. This expectation was further heightened by the declaration of President Pierce, in his inaugural address, that the policy of his administration would "not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion," and that the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction was "eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world."

William L. Marcy, of New York, was appointed secretary of state and for the mission to Spain the President selected Pierre Soulé of Louisiana, a Frenchman by birth and education, who had been exiled for political reasons. His appointment under the circumstances created unfavorable comment both in this country and in Europe, and his sojourn of several days at Paris on the way to his post at Madrid caused the French government some annoyance. Louis Napoleon advised the court of Madrid not to receive him, as his views on the Cuban question were well known to be of a radical character.

In his instructions to Mr. Soulé, July 23, 1853, Mr. Marcy emphasized the importance of our relations with Spain in view of the rumors of contemplated changes in the internal affairs of Cuba and of the recent interposition of England and France. He directed him to try to negotiate a commercial treaty with Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba, and pointed out the urgent necessity of allowing a "qualified diplomatic intercourse between the captain-general of that island and our consul at Havana, in order to prevent difficulties and preserve a good understandingbetween the two countries."[105]The difficulty of settling disputes arising in Cuba had been the subject of frequent remonstrances on the part of the United States. The captain-general was clothed with almost "unlimited powers for aggression, but with none for reparation." He exercised no diplomatic functions and was in no way subject to the authority of the Spanish minister at Washington.

Upon the arrival of Mr. Soulé in Spain, he found that Mr. Calderon, the head of the cabinet, was strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or agreement which would promote intercourse between the United States and the dependencies of Spain, and equally averse to allowing the captain-general any diplomatic powers.[106]Mr. Soulé was by nature hot-headed and impetuous and could suffer anything sooner than enforced inactivity. Whatever may have been the intentions of the executive in sending him, he had come to Madrid for the purpose of consummating the long cherished scheme of acquiring Cuba. Accordingly, on February 23, 1854, he wrote to Mr. Marcy that the affairs of the Spanish government were about to reach a crisis, that a change of ministry was imminent, and that contingencies involving the fate of Cuba were likely to arise which might be of great interest to the United States. He, therefore, asked for definite instructions. Relying upon these representations and upon Mr. Soulé's judgment, Mr. Marcy transmitted in due time the necessary powers, authorizing him to negotiate with Spain for the purchase of Cuba, or for its independence, if such anarrangement would be more agreeable to Spanish pride, in which event the United States would be willing to contribute substantial aid to the result.

In the meantime, however, theBlack Warrioraffair had strained the relations of the two countries almost to the point of rupture. This case, involving the seizure of an American steamer by Spanish officials at Havana for an unintentional violation or neglect of custom-house regulations, was of an unusually exasperating character.

As soon as the department at Washington was fully informed of this outrage, Mr. Marcy forwarded all the documents in the case to Mr. Soulé and directed him to demand of the Spanish government a prompt disavowal of the act and the payment of an indemnity to the owners of the vessel and of the cargo, the extent of the injury being estimated at $300,000. On April 8 Mr. Soulé presented a formal demand on the part of his government. No answer to this note having been received, on the 11th he repeated his demands much more emphatically, calling for an indemnity of $300,000, insisting that all persons, whatever their rank or importance, who were concerned in the perpetration of the wrong, be dismissed from her majesty's service, and finally declaring that non-compliance with these demands within forty-eight hours would be considered by the government of the United States as equivalent to a declaration that her majesty's government was determined to uphold the conduct of its officers.

Mr. Calderon replied, on the 12th, that whenever her majesty's government should have before it the authentic and complete data, which it then lacked, areply would be given to the demand of the United States conformable to justice and right; that the peremptory tone of Mr. Soulé's note suggested to the government of her majesty "a suspicion that it was not so much the manifestation of a lively interest in the defense of pretended injuries, as an incomprehensible pretext for exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel between two friendly powers." To this note Mr. Soulé replied that the suggestion made as to the motives of the United States in seeking redress was "but little creditable to the candor of her Catholic majesty's government, and comes in very bad grace from one who, like your excellency, cannot but be aware that the records of this legation, as well as those of her Catholic majesty's department of state, are loaded with reclamations bearing on grievances most flagrant, which have never been earnestly attended to and were met at their inception with precisely the same dilatory excuses through which the present one is sought to be evaded."

Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether changed by a private agreement between the Havana officials and the owners of theBlack Warrior, by which the ship and her cargo were released. Mr. Soulé continued, however, according to instructions from Washington, to demand compensation for the damages sustained by the owners and passengers not compensated for by the return of the ship and cargo, and also reparation for the insult to the United States flag. The Spanish government, however, refused to recognize any ground for reparation after the restitution of the ship and cargo, and persisted in contradicting, without the support of any evidence whatever, the facts aspresented by the United States, although they were all certified to in proper legal form.

On June 24 Mr. Marcy wrote that the President was far from satisfied with the manner in which our demands were treated by the Spanish government, but that before resorting to extreme measures he was determined to make a final appeal to Spain for the adjustment of past difficulties and for the guarantee of more friendly relations in the future. Although satisfied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soulé had performed the duties of his mission, the President was considering the expediency of reinforcing the demands of the United States by the appointment of an extraordinary commission of two distinguished citizens to act in conjunction with him. He instructed him, therefore, not to press the affair of theBlack Warrior, but to wait until the question of the special commission could be laid before Congress.

During the summer there was a change of ministry in the Spanish government, which, as was not infrequently the case, was attended with more or less serious disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in view of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and for other reasons not stated, the purpose of sending a special mission had, for the present at least, been abandoned. Without pressing matters Mr. Soulé was, nevertheless, to avail himself of any opportunity which might be presented, of settling the affairs in dispute and of negotiating for the purchase of Cuba.

Under the same date he proposed to Mr. Soulé the plan of consulting with Mr. Mason and Mr. Buchanan, our ministers at Paris and London, for the purpose of overcoming any obstacles that England and Francemight interpose. This suggestion led to the celebrated meeting at Ostend and the so-called manifesto.

In accordance with the instructions of the President, Messrs. Soulé, Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to make arrangements for the proposed conference, which was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10, 11, 1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for a week, where the reports of their proceedings were prepared.

The greater part of the report is taken up with an enumeration of the advantages that would accrue to the United States from the acquisition of Cuba, and an elaborate exposition of the ways in which the interests of Spain would be promoted by the sale. The only specific recommendation of the report was that a proposal should be made through the proper diplomatic channel to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble, to purchase Cuba from Spain, the maximum price to be $120,000,000. The report then proceeds to discuss the question, what ought to be the course of the American government should Spain refuse to sell Cuba? The ministers declared:

After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

The report also recommended that all proceedings in reference to the negotiations with Spain "ought to be open, frank, and public." This recommendation, together with the general character of the report, indicates that its authors were rather bent on making political capital of the affair at home than on seriously furthering negotiations at Madrid. As a matter of fact the Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan an acceptable presidential candidate to the southern wing of the Democratic party and played no small part in securing for him the nomination in 1856.[107]

The objectionable features of the report were politely but firmly repudiated by the administration in Marcy's reply to Soulé and Soulé promptly resigned his mission. This fact was generally overlooked at the time, while the unfortunate publicity given to the proceedings at Ostend brought endless censure upon President Pierce and Secretary Marcy.

In spite of the "jingo" policy attributed to the Pierce administration, the complications arising out of the seizure of theBlack Warriorwere not made acasus belli, as might easily have been done. After Mr. Soulé's return to the United States the negotiations were continued by his successor. The conduct of the officials concerned in the seizure was disavowed, and the indemnity claimed by the American citizens concerned was paid. The administration closed on terms of comparative friendship with Spain, although there were numbers of claims still unadjusted. The Cuban question figured conspicuously in the campaign of 1856. The platform of the Democratic party wasstrongly in favor of acquisition, while the new Republican platform stigmatized the Ostend manifesto as the highwayman's plea.

Until the Buchanan administration all negotiations for the purchase of Cuba had been undertaken on the authority of the executive alone. An effort was now made to get the two houses of Congress to concur in an appropriation for this purpose. It was thought that united action on the part of the legislative and executive branches of the government would produce some impression on Spain. Accordingly, in his second, third and fourth annual messages, President Buchanan brought the matter to the attention of Congress, but his appeal met with little encouragement. In January, 1859, Senator Slidell, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill carrying $30,000,000, to be placed at the disposal of the President as a preliminary sum for the purchase of Cuba.[108]

This report created violent opposition, and in February the bill was withdrawn by Mr. Slidell at the urgent request of his friends.

The annexationist and filibustering schemes of the decade immediately preceding the War of Secession were prompted by two motives. The one was the extension of slave territory, or at least the thwarting of the schemes of emancipation for Cuba which Great Britain was urging upon the Spanish government. The other was to secure, by the occupation of this strong strategic position, undisputed control over the proposed interoceanic canal routes of Central America and communication by this means with the new states on the Pacific coast. These motives for annexationwere removed, the one by the abolition of slavery in the United States, and the other by the construction of the great transcontinental railroads which established direct overland communication with the Pacific states. During the period following the civil war, therefore, our policy was mainly concerned in urging upon the Spanish government the abolition of slavery in Cuba, the establishment of a more liberal form of government through independence or autonomy, and the promotion of more untrammelled commercial intercourse with the United States.

The abolition of slavery in the southern states left the Spanish Antilles in the enjoyment of a monopoly of slave labor, which in the production of sugar, especially, gave them advantages which overcame all competition. This led to the formation of a strong Spanish party, for whom the cause of slavery and that of Spanish dominion were identical. These were known as Peninsulars or Spanish immigrants. They were the official class, the wealthy planters and slave-owners and the real rulers of Cuba. On the other hand there was a party composed of Creoles, or native Cubans, whose cry was "Cuba for the Cubans!" and who hoped to effect the complete separation of the island from Spain, either through their own efforts or through the assistance of the United States. Not infrequently in the same family, the father, born and brought up in the Peninsula, was an ardent loyalist, while the son, born in Cuba, was an insurgent at heart, if not actually enlisted in the ranks.

The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the signal for an uprising of the native or Creole party in the eastern part of the island. This movement wasnot at first ostensibly for independence, but for the revolution in Spain, the cries being "Hurrah for Prim!" "Hurrah for the Revolution!" Its real character was, however, apparent from the first and its supporters continued for a period of ten years, without regard to the numerous vicissitudes through which the Spanish government passed—the provisional government, the regency, the elective monarchy, the republic, and the restored Bourbon dynasty—to wage a dogged, though desultory warfare against the constituted authorities of the island. This struggle was almost coterminous with President Grant's administration of eight years.

At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authorities conceived it to be necessary to issue certain decrees which were contrary to public law and, in so far as they affected citizens of the United States, in violation of treaty obligations. On March 24, 1869, the captain-general issued a decree authorizing the capture on the high seas of vessels carrying men, arms, munitions, or effects in aid of the insurgents, and declaring that "all persons captured in such vessels without regard to their number will be immediately executed."[109]By another decree the estates of American citizens suspected of sympathy with the insurgents were confiscated.[110]Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against these decrees so far as they affected citizens of the United States, as they were in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1795.

On July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued another decree closing certain ports, declaring voyages witharms, ammunition, or crew for the insurgents illegal, and directing cruisers on the high seas to bring into port all vessels found to be enemies. On July 16 Mr. Fish called the attention of the Spanish minister to this decree, saying that it assumed powers over the commerce of the United States that could be permitted only in time of war; that the United States would not yield the right to carry contraband of war in time of peace, and would not permit their vessels to be interfered with on the high seas except in time of war; that if Spain was at war she should give notice to the United States to that effect, and that a continuance of the decree or any attempt to enforce it would be regarded as a recognition by Spain of a state of war in Cuba. This declaration produced a prompt modification of the decree so far as it concerned the search of vessels on the high seas.

As our commercial interests at large, as well as the interests of individual citizens, were deeply affected by the condition of the island, President Grant determined at the beginning of his administration to offer to mediate between Spain and the insurgents. General Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain and his instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, directed him to offer to the cabinet at Madrid the good offices of the United States for the purpose of bringing to a close the civil war then ravaging the island and establishing the independence of Cuba. Mr. Fish instructed General Sickles to explain to the Spanish government that he used the term civil war advisedly, not as implying any public recognition of belligerent rights, but a condition of affairs that might not justify withholding much longer those rights from theinsurgents.[111]In reply Spain agreed to accept the good offices of the United States, but on conditions that were impracticable and unsatisfactory. At the same time the Spanish government allowed the purport of General Sickles's note tendering the good offices of the United States to get out, and it was accepted by the press as indicating the purpose of the United States to recognize the Cubans as belligerents if its offer of mediation were refused. No Spanish cabinet could possibly endure the odium of having made a concession to the Cubans under a threat from an outside power. The Spanish government therefore requested the withdrawal of the American note.

After the rejection of the offer of mediation President Grant decided to recognize the Cuban insurgents and in August, 1869, while on his way from New York to New England on the Fall River boat he signed a proclamation of Cuban belligerency which he forwarded to Washington with a note to Secretary Fish, requesting him to sign, seal, and issue it. Mr. Fish disapproved of this step, and while he affixed the seal and signed the document, he did not issue it, but kept it in a safe place to await further developments. Grant's attention was diverted by Wall Street speculations in gold and the crisis that followed on "Black Friday." He failed to notice at the time that the secretary of state did not carry out his instructions, and later he thanked Mr. Fish for having saved him from a serious mistake.[112]

For some time the United States had been urging upon Spain the importance of abolishing slavery inCuba as a necessary condition to the complete pacification of the island. During the fall of 1869 Spain gave repeated assurances to the United States of her readiness to effect emancipation in Cuba as soon as hostilities should cease, but the Spanish government could never be brought to enter into any definite engagement on the subject. In fact as regarded the slavery question the cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to choose between the horns of the dilemma. The United States and Great Britain were urging the immediate abolition of slavery, while the most influential upholders of Spanish rule in Porto Rico as well as in Cuba were the slaveholders themselves. The insurgents on the other hand had abolished slavery by a decree of the assembly of February 26, 1869, promising indemnity to the owners in due time and providing for the enrolment of liberated slaves in the army.[113]On January 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General Sickles:

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