"The present value of a railroad property is necessarily very largely a matter of opinion only; it depends upon a vast number of contingencies and uncertainties, a road apparently of great value to-day may soon become worthless by the opening of a competing line having superior advantages or by the competitive struggles of other lines which operate to reduce the income of all; the value of a railroad largely results from the personal characteristics of its officials; the policy pursued by directors for the conservative and economical or progressive and daring, is a great factor in the determination of the current value of the property; a railroad property is not necessarily worth what it would cost to replace it and, on the other hand, it may be worth very much more than that."[34]
"The bill in question makes use of the phrase 'fair value.' Unless there is some legislative necessity, which we do not perceive, we question the advisability of using this phrase.
"It would seem to us preferable to substitute a phrase which indicates the fact that Congress desires an inventory valuation of railway property. By inventory valuation is meant that the property of the several railways shall be listed in detail, and that each kind or class of property so listed shall have assigned to it a valuation to be determined from thepoint of view of the contracting engineer, and not from the point of view of a court or board of arbitration which, from the nature of the case, cannot judge of what is 'fair value' except in the light of some specific use to be made of the valuation."[35]
As has already been noted herein, and amply verified by quotations, Mr. Riggs is fully aware that replacement cost and real value can rarely, if ever, coincide, and therefore plainly agrees, as to that elementary and essential point, with the writer and disagrees with Professor Adams, who would ignore or destroy every non-physical element of value in the property of all public service corporations. Mr. Riggs' recognition of the inadequacy of mere replacement cost is shown also by the excellent and convincing example which he cites[36]of competitive railway routes between two Michigan cities which were built and are maintained and operated under such conditions that the far more costly of the two, which inferentially has correspondingly higher replacement cost, has much lower earning capacity, both as to gross and net, and is therefore actually worth much less than its less costly competitor. Mr. Riggs explicitly favors full recognition of the non-physical elements in every valuation; and, therefore, may be ranked as an opponent of any such scheme of valuation as that advocated by Professor Adams before the American Economic Association, or in the letter of the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, hereinbefore quoted.
Mr. Riggs, however, believes that the determination of the cost of replacement is an essential first step toward the ascertainment of real value. He says:
"The worth of the physical property is primarily that on which the value of the whole property rests."
The thought which the writer would place in opposition to the foregoing is that: Physical property has no value which is not an expression of its adaptation to economic needs. This is only another way of expressing the inevitable economic law, from which there is no escape, either in theory or in practice, that has been stated and sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, as follows:
"But the value of property results from the use to which it is put, and varies with the profitableness of that use, present and prospective,actual and anticipated. There is no pecuniary value outside of that which results from such use."[37]
Mr. Riggs' own definition of value is not inconsistent with the foregoing. He says:
"The value of a property is its estimated worth at a given time, measured in money, taking into account all the elements which add to its usefulness or desirability as a business or profit-earning proposition."
The view of Mr. Riggs is that:
"While ... the worth of the physical property, being the cost of reproduction less depreciation, is not necessarily the value of the property, ... the physical worth must bear some very definite relation to value...."
And he is, further:
"Strongly of the conviction that this relation is such that 'value' cannot be ascertained without a determination of physical worth."
It is exceedingly difficult to comprehend just what Mr. Riggs means when he describes the relation between real value (which he recognizes so clearly as value in use) and cost of replacement as "very definite." Certainly, he does not mean that it is a constant relation, or one which can be ascertained until there has been independent determination of both of the aggregates whose relation it expresses. In fact, the emphasis which Mr. Riggs places on replacement cost has led him into the grotesque fallacy of arguing that a correct estimate of real value is only to be attained by ascertaining: (first) cost of replacement, (second) real value, and (third) correcting the aggregate first obtained by applying whatever "very definite" relation (ratio) is necessary to make it agree with the second aggregate, which was from the beginning the only aggregate really wanted. The accuracy of this characterization of his proposed procedure is made perfectly clear by the following quotation:
"... the true method of valuing a corporate property is first to determine the cost of reproduction of the property and its depreciation, and modify this figure by any applicable positive or negative non-physical elements of value."
It is submitted that the clear meaning of the foregoing is that both replacement cost and real value as derived from use must be separately and independently ascertained, and that, these aggregates having been compared, the former is to be corrected by whatever allowance for non-physical value may be required to make it agree precisely with the latter. The obvious suggestion flowing from this discovery of his theory is that only value in use is wanted, as that is the only real value, and as it must be separately ascertained in anyevent, no other andpseudovalue need be taken. The essential character of the method is as described, even when it is applied through determination of the annual value of the use and the assignment of one portion of such annual value to return on the capital value of the physical property and another portion to return on the capital value of non-physical property. The real nature of the method is not even effectually concealed by the capitalization of the income assigned to physical property at one rate and the income assigned to non-physical property at a different and higher rate. In fact, if it is necessary to conclude that a portion of the net annual income of railway property is normally paid to, or in respect of, a portion of capital entitled to a lower rate of return, and the remainder to or in respect of a remainder of capital entitled to a higher rate, the appraisal of the physical property is an excessively costly, cumbersome, and inaccurate expedient for determining the amount or value of either portion of the capital. Yet that is exactly what was done in Michigan by Professor Adams, the "valuation" he then made being completed before he altered his view by deciding that the non-physical elements of value are entitled to no consideration whatever, and that only cost of replacement is worthy of inclusion in an official "valuation."
But is there any real distinction between the "physical properties" and the "immaterial elements," such as the foregoing extract seems to assume? Is not the superficial appearance of such a distinction plausible but deceptive? A locomotive is an entity; so is a railway. The separate parts of a locomotive are most of them independently valuable; so are the separate parts of a railway; but a large share of the value of the locomotive is the result of the nice adjustment of these separate parts to each other and to the work to be done.
Take a hundred different-sized locomotives, each adapted to different work under different conditions, and separate each piece of metal; it would be possible to value all these parts, but the aggregate would be far less than the value of the locomotives from which they were taken. Again, it would be possible to construct from these parts a hundred locomotives of such poor design, their respective parts so out of adjustment and balance, that they would be worth even less than the parts out of which they were assembled. The highest paid intelligence has not yet contrived the perfectly balanced locomotive, but a large part of the so-called "physical value" of every locomotive represents this sort of highly paid intelligence put forth at every stage from the opening of the mine where the ore was obtained to the delivery of the completed locomotive. Take ten railways of a thousand miles each, every one of them efficiently constructed, and equipped with proper terminals, stations, signals, rolling stock, and trained employees, and each properly adapted to the requirements of its territory and traffic; separate them into piles of ties and rails, groups of locomotives and cars,acres of land, unorganized bodies of men of varied capacity and training; what sort of intelligence will it require to build up out of these masses ten railways as efficient and useful as those that originally existed? Why, then, should the "physical value" of the locomotive include the assembling of its parts in proper balance and the "physical value" of the railway exclude the cost of the much more complicated adjustment of its elements of machinery and labor and location to each other?
At an early point in his discussion, Mr. Riggs makes an announcement, highly becoming on the part of one who proposes to deal with the problem solely from the point of view of a civil engineer, that he does not intend to argue the public utility of any sort of valuation, but only the method by which it may best be made, should one be determined upon. He says:
"This paper is confined to a discussion of the methods which should be used in arriving at a correct figure of cost of reproduction and depreciation—it does not take up questions involving the propriety of those figures when reached. The propriety or legality of using such figures as a basis for an assessed valuation, as a basis for rate-making (rate-making being an art in itself involving complications as great as those encountered in valuation), or any arguments as to the justice or injustice of legislation restricting issues of stocks or bonds, will be conceded no place in this paper. It is assumed that all these questions would have been taken up and a satisfactory answer reached before a valuation could have been ordered."
Two pages after the foregoing paragraph, under the sub-heading "The Relation of Public Service, or Quasi-Public Corporations, to the People," Mr. Riggs proceeds to violate the wise, though self-imposed restriction, and devotes no less than eleven pages to a defense of the project on grounds of alleged public policy. In these pages he concludes that such a valuation as he proposes—not a mere determination of replacement costs, but a real valuation, with proper allowance for all elements of value in use—would be of service in connection with (a) taxation, (b) public control of rates, and (c) public control of issues of capital securities.
In supporting valuation as an expedient in taxation of railway property, Mr. Riggs seems to rely on a table made up from Professor Adams' Bulletin No. 21, as expert employed by the Federal Bureau of the Census, which table shows that the assessment of the railways of Wyoming for taxation purposes in 1904 was but 7.5% of their commercial valuation, as estimated by Professor Adams, and that this ratio varied greatly throughout the different States, running as high as 114.4 in Connecticut. Of course, nearly every one knows, even if Mr. Riggs does not, that the relation between the real value and the assessed value of all other kinds of property varies greatly from State to State, and even in different portions of the same State. On accountof this variation, no table such as that offered by Mr. Riggs in support of his argument can have any value unless supplemented and explained by data covering the assessment of other kinds of property. It is worth noting,en passant, that the so-called "Commercial Valuation," on which Mr. Riggs rests this part of his argument, assigns a value equivalent to $32,054 per mile to the railways of Michigan and one of $45,211 per mile to the railways of the prairie State of Nebraska. Possibly this variation in the estimate of value is partly expressed in the conclusion that Michigan railways are assessed at 70.9% of their value and Nebraska railways at but 18.5 per cent. Obviously, there is no more need of uniformity among the States in the taxation of railway property than in their methods of deriving revenue from other kinds of property.
Also, Mr. Riggs admits that, when the Michigan valuation for taxation was made, it was not diminished, as it should have been, by the use of negative, non-physical value. This is fully equivalent to an admission that the method was unjust to every railway not capable of earning the full return on its replacement cost. He says:
"The use of a negative or subtractive non-physical value was considered, and advised by Professor Adams....
"Professor Adams and his associates, therefore, applied only positive values, where any such were found, although advocating the use of negative values."
And, of the method then used, he says:
"... it fails, in the form in which it was used in 1900 and 1902, to bring out those negative or subtractive elements which may be determined from the income accounts, in the case of properties which do not earn a fair return on the investment."
And again:
"... where the earnings have been fairly uniform and stationary for a period of years, and the property does not earn a sufficient sum to care for depreciation and annuity, it is clear that the value as an earning investment is less than the determined physical value, and that the physical valuation should be reduced by some amount to arrive at the 'fair value.'"
In his argument favoring the use of a valuation in rate-making, Mr. Riggs affords no support to Professor Adams' contention that, for that purpose, only replacement cost should be considered, and that, after fixing the rates on the basis of the least favorably located and least efficient line, so as to afford it a bare return on its replacement cost, the surplus earnings at the same rates of its more favorably located or better operated competitors should be confiscated under the guise of a special tax. This extraordinary proposal, the character of which is so illuminating as to the attitude toward railway property and investments of the most prominent and persistent advocate ofso-called "physical valuation," is best stated in Professor Adams' own words, which are as follows:
"I cannot evade the conclusion that equity, as between various classes of roads, can never be attained until all the excess of revenue over the Constitutional limit be made a contribution to the public treasury, and that this contribution be made as a substitute for all taxes of all kinds and all sorts."[38]
On the contrary, Mr. Riggs distinctly upholds the right to earnings in excess of the bare return, at the minimum rate of interest, upon the cost of replacement, saying,inter alia:
"It is contended that the determination of rates that will be just and fair to all competing companies involves other consideration than the valuation of either physical or intangible properties, and that when all these rate-making problems are properly solved, there will remain large intangible values on the well-designed plants."
Professor Adams has himself admitted that there is no possibility of utilizing any valuation for the purpose of fixing specific rates, as such a task is far beyond the capacity of any conceivable system of cost accounting. Supplementing this admission, Mr. Riggs' opposition to the plan proposed by the former and its gross injustice, so apparent to every one but its author, destroys the last element of plausibility in the suggestion that any sort of valuation could be of utility in that connection. The writer is not overlooking the fact that the Courts, when under the necessity of repelling efforts to confiscate railway properties under the guise of rate regulation, and in view of the form in which this necessity has commonly presented itself, have accepted "fair value" as an element of importance in their inquiries; but if the railways are entitled to charge rates based on the value of the services they perform, it is clear that the question whether a rate or a schedule of rates is reasonably adjusted to the value of the service or services is very different from the question whether a fair return upon fair value has been allowed. Assuming, however, the need of an appraisement in every litigated case involving railway schedules, it is evident that each case would have to have its own appraisement, for value is ever changing and unstable. Mr. Riggs himself says:
"It is true that the 'value' of a property is an unstable figure, subject to fluctuations due to natural or artificial causes, and that a material change in value may occur suddenly...."
Professor Adams proposed to keep his replacement cost up to date by annual accretions equal to annual expenditures for extensions and betterments; but this plan is illogical and inconsistent, for it proposes to ignore that very essential difference between original cost (less a proportionate allowance for wear and tear) and present worth, whichis the very basis of the argument in favor of any valuation at all. Equally obvious objections, growing out of the instability of the ascertained value of any particular date, apply to any plan which does not provide for a re-appraisement every time the aggregate is to be used.
The objections to the use of any valuation for rate-making which have been cited are valid, and should be convincing, but they are insignificant by the side of the fundamental objection that, as Mr. Riggs says, "as a business proposition, the value of any property depends on its earnings," while those who would thus utilize a valuation are attempting to reverse the fact and make earnings depend on the value. Such a reversal is impossible. Ascertain real value and you have a consequence of earnings, past, present, and prospective, nothing else; use this as a basis for a rate schedule and you get, as a mathematical result, the present rates. The only way to derive any other result from this method would be to use as the basis some figure other than the real value, a method which would only be resorted to through moral turpitude or intellectual incapacity. One might almost assume that Mr. Riggs knows this, for he says:
"Value is given to a property, either by reason of the fact that it is an instrument for earning profit, or that it does earn profit or gives promise of profit."
The substance of Mr. Riggs' argument on capitalization control is that American railways are not often over-capitalized, but such evils do obtain in other industries, and therefore railway issues of capital securities ought to be restricted.[39]Unfortunately, he gives no clue to the methods he would have applied, nor as to how far he would go in interference with the normal action and interaction of commercial forces in determining what securities can and ought to be issued. Railways are not over-capitalized. Table 9, a comparison of official valuations and capitalization, originally compiled by Mr. Slason Thompson, is instructive.
TABLE 9.
TABLE 9.
TABLE 9.
In view of frequent suggestions, in the public press and elsewhere, which indicate that there is a widespread opinion that the securities of railways have generally been watered, Table 10 is given. It is an analysis of the consolidated balance sheet as given in the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 1908 and 1890.
Table 11 shows the length, in miles, of main and other tracks in 1908 and 1890.
The Commission, in its annual report, shows the securities issued per mile of road (first main track), but does not show the results per mile of main track (i. e., 1st main track, 2d, 3d, 4th, and other main tracks), nor does it show the results per mile of all tracks (i. e., main tracks, yard tracks, passing tracks, and industrial tracks). From the consolidated balance sheet, it will be noted that the securities per mile of road have increased 29%, while per mile of main track they have increased only 24%, and per mile of all tracks they have increased but 14 per cent. However, deducting the investments in stocks and bonds of other corporations, and showing the results only for the securities issued on account of the cost of road and 12% equipment, we have an average per mile of road of $62,388, an increase of 12%; and an average per mile of all main tracks of $56,166, an increase of 8%; and an average per mile of all tracks of $42,864, or a decrease of 0.7 per cent. It will be noted that a considerable part of these increases is due to increased cost of equipment, and the advantageous results obtained from such investment have been clearly shown. Of the investment in the track itself (cost of road), it will be noted that the cost per mile of main track has increased only 5%, while the cost per mile of all tracks shows a slight decrease in 1908 as compared with 1890.
These comparisons are more significant and convincing in the light of the large expenditures since 1890 for the reduction of grades, revision of line, interlocking towers, automatic block signals, increased weight of rail, increased capacity of bridges, improved stations and terminals, elevation of tracks, and the many other items going to make up the additions and betterments, and increasing the book cost of the property. The figures plainly prove that there has been no general practice on the part of the railroads of the country, from 1890 to date, of issuing capital securities without securing full value for the vast amount referred to. Why, then, should any restriction be placed on the form or manner of their future appeal for the very large volume of capital necessary to keep abreast of American industrial development? Why should they be limited as to what form of security they may offer in return for the cash capital which they must obtain if they are to serve the public adequately and properly?
TABLE 10.—Consolidated Balance Sheet for Railroads of the United States. Exclusive of Terminal and Switching Roads.
TABLE 10.—Consolidated Balance Sheet for Railroads of the United States. Exclusive of Terminal and Switching Roads.
TABLE 10.—Consolidated Balance Sheet for Railroads of the United States. Exclusive of Terminal and Switching Roads.
It ought also to be borne in mind, in this connection, that, while there could be no lawful mode for the revision of existing capitalization, should it in any instance be found to be too small or too great when measured by the results of such a valuation, the future issue of securities must be controlled by the necessities of the carriers and the state of the market, and is also practically restricted by the Interstate Commerce Commission's accounting system, which declares what expenditures may and what may not be carried into the capital account. The law cannot compel any company to repudiate any existing security, and if it could it is not to be supposed that Congress would compel such an impairment of contract rights; public policy will not permit in practice restrictions that would prevent the issue of securities to meet the actual needs of the public and the carriers; the accounting system prevents issues of any other sort. Further restrictions would be cumulative and superfluous.
TABLE 11.
TABLE 11.
TABLE 11.
"The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1908 report that their Balance Sheet covers 'miles of road' aggregating 213,888.36 miles, whereas their statement of mileage represents all roads reporting to the Commission whether or not they furnished a Balance Sheet.
"To analyze the Consolidated Balance Sheet, we have revised the statement of mileage to cover same roads as are included in the General Balance Sheet. The 'miles of road,'i. e., miles of first main track, are actual. The Commission's report not showing separately for each line the miles of other main tracks or yard tracks and sidings, the figures shown in the statement of mileage areapproximate. It includes mileage of all second, third and fourth tracks. Undoubtedly, practically all of the second tracks, third tracks and fourth tracks are owned, or operated by, roads furnishing the Commission with a Balance Sheet. Mileage of Yard Tracks and Sidings is based on the proportion which the single-track mileage of roads represented in the Balance Sheet bears to the total single-track mileage of roads reporting to the Commission."
Mr. Riggs considersseriatimnine objections to the ordinary methods of estimating cost of replacement which were mentioned specifically by the writer, as among the most important commonly omitted items, in an address before the New York Traffic Club, delivered during January, 1909. He concedes that the writer is correct in urging that allowances for "working capital with which to carry on the business" and for "impact and adaptation" ought to be included, and were omitted in Michigan and have been usually omitted. These are two of the nine objections specifically raised. As to five others, Mr. Riggs seems to be in considerable doubt. Concerning the objection that an allowance of 3% for interest during construction is too low, he contends that it was justified in Michigan by the "assumption," that the whole work of replacement would be accomplished inone year, and also "that on long roads partial operation would commence as various sections of the line were completed." He admits that these assumptions "clearly would not be proper" under different conditions, but appears to hold that they were warranted as to the Michigan work.
Another of the writer's objections was the absence of an allowance for "wear and tear of materials during the period of construction." As to this, Mr. Riggs says:
"This deterioration is a necessary incident to any construction work. It has not been customary or usual to take account of it. To add to the amount capitalized on account of this item would be manifestly improper. The only way in which this could be cared for would be in an adjustment of the depreciation reserve when raised to cover that which takes place during the construction period."
Of course, the depreciation account, when there is one, is a charge to operation. Therefore, Mr. Riggs' anxiety to disagree with the writer has led him into a frame of mind in which he is prepared to find that it is "manifestly improper" to charge to capital the real cost of construction, but is quite proper to charge to operation a part of the cost of construction, even though this results in carrying into the operating account items of expense incurred long before operation began or could have begun.
Mr. Riggs thinks that the writer was incorrect in objecting that "a uniform price for earthwork was used, thus ignoring the varying character of soil and length of haul," but he admits that there was "practically no classification in the Southern Peninsula of Michigan, or, in fact, on 90% of the mileage of the State," and his defense goes no further than to assert that "the price * * * was not much out of the way when considered as a fair average for the territory."
His criticism of the objection to the use of a uniform price list for materials, and ignoring the source of supply and the cost of delivery at the point of use, is equally forced, for it admits that "no effort was made to use different unit prices as between counties," and only contends that "in a number of cases" differences in prices were made.
The absence of an allowance for interference by labor troubles, weather conditions (which he admits are "a frequent source of annoyance, delay, and sometimes of expense"), Mr. Riggs defends on the ground that it is "an expense difficult to separate and set up," and therefore ought to be covered by an allowance for contingencies. On the same ground, he could easily carry every item of cost of replacement into the contingent account.
The two remaining objections specifically raised by the writer are squarely attacked by Mr. Riggs. As to one of them, the propriety of an allowance for carrying charges up to the time of attaining a revenue basis, has been admitted by the Railroad Commission of Wisconsin,but it is a broader question than ought here to be discussed. The writer will only suggest, at present, that in some form or other, these charges must be on the whole and in the long run met out of net operating income, and that the cheapest way, for the user of the services supplied, is to carry them into the capital account—otherwise there must be an early amortization of this item, which cannot do otherwise than to throw a heavy burden on the early schedules of charges. The language of the Wisconsin Railroad Commission on this subject merits quotation, and is as follows:[40]
"But new plants are seldom paying at the start. Several years are usually required before they obtain a sufficient amount of business or earnings to cover operating expenses, including depreciation and a reasonable rate of interest upon the investment. The amount by which the earnings fail to meet these requirements may thus be regarded as deficits from the operation. These deficits constitute the cost of building up the business of the plant. They are as much a part of the cost of building up the business as loss of interest during the construction of the plant is a part of the cost of its construction. They are taken into account by those who enter upon such undertakings, and if they cannot be recovered in some way, the plant fails by that much to yield reasonable returns upon the amount that has been expended upon it and its business. Such deficits may be covered either by being regarded as a part of the investment and included in the capital upon which interest is allowed, or they may be carried until they can be written off when the earnings have so grown as to leave a surplus above a reasonable return on the investment that is large enough to permit it. When capitalized, they become a permanent charge on the consumers. When charged off from the surplus, they are gradually extinguished. (These facts alone, however, do not always furnish the best or most equitable basis for the disposal of such deficits.) Whether they should go into the capital account, or whether they should be written off, as indicated, are questions that largely depend on the circumstances in each particular case."
The other objection that is squarely opposed by Mr. Riggs is the refusal to allow for unavoidable discounts on the securities sold. Here he quotes with complete approval an unnamed writer, who contends that the impropriety of such an allowance is proven because, as between an issue of $10,000,000 in bonds (par value) at 4% and at 4½%, the 4% bonds bringing 90 and the 4½% selling at par, there is an annual saving, in issuing the 4% of $50,000 in interest, and that, if the issue is to be for fifty years, this saving is $2,500,000, or $1,500,000 in excess of the discount. Of course, these figures are correct, but both Mr. Riggs and his unnamed authority seem strangely to have overlooked the fact that if a railway construction requires $10,000,000, it cannot be obtained by issuing $10,000,000 in par value at 90. The comparison,of course, ought to be based on the issue of enough bonds at each rate to obtain equal sums of money. As $10,000,000 in par value of bonds sold at 90 would produce $9,000,000, the following comparison is based on the issue of enough bonds at each rate payable in fifty years to secure that sum.
Of course, the foregoing figures are not absolutely accurate, for the real net loss in the issue of the 4% rather than the 4½% bonds at these prices would be the difference between the $5,000 annual saving in interest and the amounts which would have to be set aside annually for fifty years to produce $1,000,000, the amount of the discount, at the end of that period. But the table is sufficiently accurate to expose the curious error into which Mr. Riggs has fallen. Perhaps it will convince him that it would be better, hereafter, not to stray so far outside the field of civil engineering.
Mr. Riggs has little sympathy with those railway men who venture to express the opinion that regulation ought not to extend so far as to render it impossible to conduct the railway business in a business-like way. His animadversions on railway men in general have already been illustrated herein. He finds nothing worse with which to characterize a previous utterance of the writer's than to say of it:
"The manifest impatience with all forms of governmental interference with corporations, which so often characterizes the utterances of prominent railway officials, appears in this paper to a marked degree."
At the risk of incurring further displeasure, the writer will not omit now to observe that, in his judgment, the whole question whether railways shall be generally and officially valued, and how and by whom the task shall be performed, is primarily conditioned by the country's need of managing its legislative control of railway methods so as not to restrict unduly the flow of capital into that industry. The steady pressure for legislation during the last five years has so extended legislative regulation that, for the first time, the sturdy, frugal, conservative, "small investor" stands in the forefront of the problem. Hisviews of the stability and future prosperity of the American railway industry now dominate the situation. What they are may be read in the facts attending recent efforts to finance necessary improvements of old and prosperous railways. It developed before the Interstate Commerce Commission during the recent hearings in connection with the proposed partial adjustment of rates to the diminished purchasing power of the money in which they are paid, that one of the greatest of Eastern railway systems, paying 8% annual dividends on its stock, which is very widely distributed, had offered new shares to its stockholders at a premium of 25%, and had found them unsalable at that figure, so that it was obliged to recall the offer and put them out at par. Other testimony disclosed the failure of one great company to obtain an offer of more than 85 for its 4% bonds, while another had been forced to go to France to raise $10,000,000, and many others have been forced to the expedient of issuing short-term notes at relatively high rates of interest. It also appeared that extensive proposals for new branch lines had been abandoned or postponed, in view of the impossibility of obtaining funds on reasonable terms.
Other testimony shows that locomotive shops and car builders are putting out not more than half of their capacity; that the supply trade is receiving no new orders. Never, since the beginnings of the American railway industry, has the American and foreign investor been so reluctant to supply necessary capital, or so doubtful of the future of railway enterprises. This fact is not due to absence of confidence in the industrial future of the American people, but is directly attributable to the unanswered inquiry as to how far the policy of legislative control is to extend. Either this question must be answered in a manner satisfactory to the investor, or the credit of the Government must be made available for the extension and improvement of railway facilities, either through Governmental guaranties of adequate returns to capital, or through Government ownership; for adequate and properly constructed and equipped railways the public must and will have. Thus far, the American public is ready neither for Federal guaranties nor for Federal ownership; it is to be hoped that it will never be ready for either. In this situation, if a Federal valuation is to be undertaken, it is primarily important that it should be under such auspices and by such methods that the investor will not be alarmed as to its consequences. This is not a suitable occasion to attempt to lay down all the considerations applicable to such a valuation, but it ought to be perfectly clear that it must relate to value in use, not to some concept of value limited to replacement cost which excludes some of the most important elements of value (which are also those most worthy of a return, because they represent the highest and most difficult social and industrial services), in order to obtain a means of excluding these same elements from possibilities of adequate reward.
One of the most important items to be considered is the "cost of progress," which is sometimes referred to as "abandoned property," or as "obsolescence." For illustration, in the revision of the grade and line of a road, whereby the capacity of existing track is doubled, the present instructions of the Interstate Commerce Commission require the charge to operating expenses of the cost of that portion of the old line no longer continued in use. If, however, the doubling of the capacity of the line be secured by the construction of a second main track, the entire cost of the new work can be charged to capital account and paid for from the proceeds of the sale of capital securities. The latter method becomes the easier to finance, but what of the comparative results? Say, for example, the original cost of material of existing property, including equipment, stations, yards, etc., was $10,000,000, that the first main track cost $1,000,000, and that to double the capacity of the main track would require a present expenditure of $1,000,000, either for (1) a reduction of the grades and curves of the first main track, or (2) for the construction of a second main track. The increase in capacity is identical, but in the first case the cost of train service to handle the tonnage is decreased 50%, and some reduction in maintenance is secured, while in the second case no economies of operation are effected, but the expenses may be increased. Undoubtedly, Road (1) would be much more favorable than Road (2), yet the Commission says a portion of the cost of perfecting Road (1) must be charged to operating expenses, and cannot be capitalized. What general manager will dare recommend such extensive improvements when the charging of a portion of the cost to operating expenses will show the dividend as unearned, and thus render the securities of the company no longer legal investments for savings banks, trustees of trust funds, etc.? As an alternative, he might permit the old line to remain, and by placing thereon a few cars occasionally, could consider it as still in use, and carry it in his capital account, thus avoiding the charge to operating expenses. Thus, again, is it the method and not the result that is controlled by these instructions. What should be done is to permit the cost to be charged against the surplus accumulated during the years in which the property to be abandoned was used. This would not affect adversely the operating income of the year, and would not impair the credit of the Company.
Plainly, the instructions of the Commission tend to compel a method that is contrary to the economic law.
Obviously, any requirement as to valuation which would impose on the carrier such a result as that shown would compel the continuance of the less efficient service and prevent the progress which such replacements express. The railway business is a continuing one, and an improvement ought to be made whenever it can earn income, not only on its own cost, but on that of the property abandoned, eventhough it cannot afford income sufficient to wipe out the whole capital charge for the latter in a single year. There is no reason for requiring each item of capital to earn its cost in addition to its interest during its individual life. Such a requirement would cry halt to progress. It is reasonable and proper that such charges to operation should be made as far as the rapid development of the art of transportation permits, and such is the practice of every well-managed railway; but, to make the practice uniform and compulsory, permitting no exceptions and allowing no scope for individual judgment, is quite another thing. When the conditions warrant such a course, the railway ought to be permitted to adjust its accounts in a manner of which the following is typical:
A valuation adjusted in recognition of this developmental need would include, in addition to the item of $15,000 for the replacement cost of the new locomotive, an item representing "cost of progress" of $4,750 for the former locomotive. It is not to be overlooked that in actual practice it would be easy to obtain this allowance by cumbering the yards and round-houses with obsolete and superfluous equipment. The plan of Professor Adams places a premium on such a course, and there are many conditions under which it could and would be followed where it would be less obvious and more detrimental. For example, it might be that an additional track over a steep grade and a new alignment which would avoid it would cost the same. The new alignment would give greater operating efficiency, but it would require the charging off of the old line; the new track over the grade would be more costly to operate, but would leave the apparent capital unimpaired. It is such possibilities as this that are giving pause to the investors who would otherwise supply funds for the needed development of the American railway system. How far this development has so far required the abandonment of property capable of further use and having genuine capital value is indicated by available records. The aggregate capacity of all equipment has increased much faster than the increase in number of locomotives and cars. The reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission only show this information for the years 1902 to 1908, both inclusive. The average tractive power of locomotives in 1908 was 26,356 lb., as compared with 20,485 lb. in 1902, being anincrease of 5,871 lb., or 28.7% per locomotive. The average capacity of freight cars in 1908 was 35 tons, as compared with 28 tons in 1902, an increase of 7 tons, or 25 per cent. Undoubtedly, the average capacity of locomotives and the average capacity of freight cars in 1908 was not less than 60% above the average capacity of 1890.
L. F. Loree, M. Am. Soc. C. E., President of The Delaware and Hudson Company, as Reporter (For United States) to the International Railway Congress, held in Paris in 1900, communicated with all roads in the United States then operating 500 miles of line, or more, relative to the capacity of cars actually in service. The result is shown in Table 12.
As a result of these improvements in roadway and equipment, the average number of tons of freight handled per freight train in 1908 was 351.80 tons, as compared with 296.47 tons in 1902, an increase of 55.33 tons, or 18.6 per cent. The average tons per freight train in 1908 was 351.80, as compared with 175.12 in 1890, an increase of 176.68 tons, or 100.8 per cent.
These improvements have not been solely or mainly for the benefit of the carriers, though there is no question that they have been prompted by railway self-interest. The new car of 40 tons capacity is but 20% longer than the old car of 13 tons, which means a great augmentation of the efficiency of the private sidings and tracks of the manufacturers, as well as the side tracks and terminals of the railway. Who would retrace the steps of progress of the last decade or of the last two decades? Yet the project to tie railway earnings to replacement cost, which makes no allowance for the costly steps in such progress, is in reality a project to tie them to their present state of development and to prohibit future progress. Nor can it be forgotten that it is an inviolable law of Nature that that which does not go forward must go backward—nothing can remain stationary.
The story of the crude millionaire who wanted to know the value of the "plant" of Oxford University, in order that he might duplicate it, is not inappropriate, and ought to have some significance to those who imagine that replacement cost would tell the story of railway values. Do they imagine, because they are ignorant of them, that a great railway organization carries no traditions of loyalty, of persistence in the face of overwhelming difficulty, of generous recognition of public needs and rights, of courageous adherence to the real interests of its shareholders that inspire its personnel and provide a genuineesprit du corps? Do they find no superiority in one organization over another, no systematic economies of method, no especial adaptation to economic needs that has value more genuine than any replaceable element, and is at least equally worthy of compensatory return?