1.66Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76, 83 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 289.76Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. Stevens, Campaigns, 22. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 192. Nebel and Kendall, 5, 6. Apuntes, 58.
2.Apuntes, 59.Monitor Repub., Oct. 31 (Berra). Nebel and Kendall, 6.Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 20. J. Davis inCong. Globe, 31, 1, app., 1034–41.Picayune, Oct. 4; Nov. 13.221Hill, diary. Smith, To Mexico, 73–4.69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15A.M.147Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 25, 36. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth).
The Federation 9-pdrs. were classed by the Mexicans as 8-pdrs. The half-moon battery was designed to come into play after the capture of the city, annoying the captors and defending the line of retreat to Saltillo.
3.76Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20.69Worth to Bliss, Aug. 28.76Ampudia, Sept. 19, res.
4.221Hill, diary.277Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26. Robertson, Remins., 130. Nebel and Kendall, 6. Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth).76Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20.Picayune, Nov. 13.245Hays to Henderson, undated.Pennsylvanian, Nov. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 133.Metropol. Mag., Dec, 1907 (Hamilton).Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7. (Worth) Robertson, Remins., Sept. 20;185J. Van Buren, oration; Chase, Polk Admin., 156;185W. to Duncan, Apr. 15; Jacksonville (Ala.)Republican, Nov. 25; Grone, Briefe, 83; Semmes, Service, 282;327Sutherland to father, Aug. —.
A part of Hays’s four hundred did not march until a little later. It seems clear, although neither Taylor nor Worth mentions the fact, that a party of dragoons accompanied the expedition (Chamberlain, diary; Haskin, First Artillery, 307). It will be recalled that most of our “artillery” served as infantry. Blanchard’s company was made up of men who did not wish to leave when most of the Louisiana infantry was ordered home (p. 205).
Worth’s movement was in principle extremely hazardous (Halleck, Mil. Art, 414). Napoleon (Maxims, p. 24): “Nothing is more rash or more opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march in the presence of an army in position, especially when that army occupies heights at the foot of which you must defile.” This maxim seems to fit the case precisely. Stevens (Campaigns, 28) defended the movement on the ground that Taylor knew what could be expected of Worth’s command and of the Mexicans; but as Ampudia had shown no conspicuous want of ability and courage on May 8 and 9, Taylor had no reason to suppose he would act here as badly as he did. Indeed the struggle at Monterey showed that if Taylor assumed the Mexicans would not fight, he erred. It was doubtless realized by Taylor and Worth that the small American army, without siege artillery or adequate supplies, could escape ruin only through extreme boldness. Apparently the plan originated with Worth, for he knew more about the terrain than Taylor did. Wilhelm so states, and the N. Y.Sunalso, the editor of which was close to Worth, gave him that credit (Aug. 14, 1847). Bragg (210to Hammond, May 4, 1848) ascribed the plan to Taylor; but, as Taylor was the commander-in-chief, this was the natural presumption.
5.Meade, Letters, i, 133. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 83 (Taylor).Picayune, Nov. 13.Monitor Repub., Oct. 29 (Jáuregui), 31 (Berra).245Hays toHenderson, undated. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 152.218Henshaw narrative. Ampudia, Manifiesto. Robertson, Remins., 130–1.69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 20, 9:30P.M.
6.Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth).Monitor Repub., Oct. 29.76Vázquez, Sept. 23. Balbontín, Invasión, 27.69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 20, 9:30p.m.Meade, Letters, i, 133. Robertson, Remins., 131–2.
7.Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth).185Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Henshaw narrative. Chamberlain, diary. Apuntes, 59. González, Aguascalientes, 152.185Worth to Marcy, July 14, 1847.69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15a.m.; 3:40p.m.Picayune, Nov. 13, 1846; Feb. 17, 1847. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Wash.Union, Nov. 20.252Mackall to father, Sept. 27. N. Y.Sun, Oct. 14.Monitor Repub., Oct. 17, 31; Nov. 15.245Hays to Henderson, undated. Haskin, First Artillery, 309.180C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30.277Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201. Prieto, Memorias, 205. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 157–9.
McCulloch, being in advance, did not receive the order to take post behind the fence, and hence fought in the road.
8.The operations on Federation Ridge.69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 3:40P.M. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth).245Hays to Henderson, undated.180C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30.277P. F. Smith toId., Sept. 27.Monitor Repub., Oct. 31 (Berra).252Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201–3. Nebel and Kendall, 6–7.Hist. Mag., Mar., 1874, p. 138. Wash.Union, Nov. 12, 20. Chamberlain, diary and recolls.278Niehenke, statement. Meade, Letters, i, 134.Picayune, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. Henshaw narrative. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 162–6. Hill, diary.
Meade (Letters, i, 88) wrote: Worth “has the great misfortune of being most rash and impetuous, and of constantly doing things which cooler reflection causes him to repent. This infirmity, in my opinion, renders him unfit to command, but on the field of battle, under another, his gallantry and bravery are well known and most conspicuous.” U. S. Grant (Mems., i, 123) said: Worth “was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him.”
Miles set out about forty-five minutes later than C. F. Smith. On reaching the ridge he sent off detachments in order to divert attention from Smith. Still restless, Worth sent Col. Hays and more Texans to the ridge, but these did not arrive in time to do anything of consequence. Gen. Smith’s attack upon El Soldado, made on his own responsibility, had a very important bearing upon the movement against Independence Hill and the Bishop’s Palace. Hitchcock said Gen. Smith not only aided Worth materially but saved his reputation (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). The summit and El Soldado continued to be held by the Americans. Scott and Blanchard (who was under Scott’s orders) were recalled from No. 3 to El Soldado the next morning to coöperate in the attack on the Palace. According to some Americans three guns were captured. This mistake probably arose because one piece was used by the Americans at the summit and then moved to El Soldado. According to the Mexicans there seem to have been only 175 of them on the ridge. On both sides the loss of men on Federation Ridge was insignificant. Worth had 15 or 20 killed and wounded. Some thought the summit of Federation Ridge not less than 800 feet high. As the Monterey plans are unavoidably based toa large extent upon sketches and estimates, it has not been thought best to give a scale of miles.
9.The capture of Independence Hill.Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth). Ampudia, Manifiesto.69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 22, 8:30a.m., 5p.m.French, Two Wars, 64–5.147Chamberlain, diary.148Id., recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 38–9. Apuntes, 61–2.190Ewing, diary.218Henshaw narrative;221Hill, diary.Picayune, Nov. 13.252Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 135–6. Wash.Union, Nov. 20.Diario, Sept. 30.Monitor Repub., Oct. 31 (Berra).245Hays to Henderson, undated. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 205. Nebel and Kendall, 6.185Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 183–5. Ampudia to the People. Some officers thought the hill nearly 600 feet high, Ampudia tardily ordered reinforcements to the hill, but they did not arrive. Worth’s loss, Sept. 22, was only about a dozen killed and wounded.
10.Taylor’s and Ampudia’s operations, Sept. 20–3;Worth’s, Sept. 23. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76–109 (reports of Taylor and officers). Ho. 17; 30, 1 (reports of officers).169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9, 1846; Jan. 26, 1847.190Ewing, diary.218Henshaw narrative. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 309. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 303–7.221Hill, diary. Numerous reports and letters in174and176. Smith, Chile con Carne, 82–97. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 55, 59. Ampudia, Manifiesto.Id.to Fellow-citizens. Robertson, Reminiscences, 136–50.61Graham to Polk, April —, [1847].61Quitman to Hamer, Sept. 28.69Capt. Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. Taylor, gen. orders 115.69Worth to Bliss, Sept. 23, 11p.m.69Trowbridge to Stewart, Feb. 8, 1848. French, Two Wars, 62, 64–6.66Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847.69Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848.147Chamberlain, diary.148Id., recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 24, 27–35, 40–3. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 72. Apuntes, 53, 60–4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 419 (Worth), 424 (Taylor). Roberts, diary.Hist. Mag., Jan., 1874, pp. 8–9.Picayune, Oct. 23; Nov. 4, 13. Meade, Letters, i, 134–5, 137–8, 163–5.185Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28.242Kingsbury to mother, Oct. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 29, 30. Stevens, Camps., 23–9.73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 371, res., 1846.Hist. Mag., x, 207–13, 255–7. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 136–40. J. Davis: note 2.Pennsylvanian, Nov. 2 (Peyton). Wash.Union, Nov. 20, 1846; Mar. 2, 1847. Balt.Sun, Nov. 6.Monitor Repub., Nov. 15.Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7, 28, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847.245Wood to Henderson, Sept. 24.245Hays toId., undated.Niles, Nov. 28, p. 201.244Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23.175Russell, to Davis, Sept. 26; Oct. 18.175Cooper to Davis, Sept. —. Wilcox, Mex. War, 119. Kenly, Md. Vol., 77, 107–27, etc.139W. B. to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 2, 9, 1846; Feb. 19, 1847. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 193–201, 203–4, 206–12, 221.130Brichta, Letter. Nebel and Kendall, 7–10.139Campbell to Quitman, Sept. 27; to wife, Oct. 1.150Cheatham to son, Oct. 6; to sister, Oct. 16.277P. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 27. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 108, 152, 170, 173, 190.76Ampudia, Sept. 22, 25.76Id.to comte. gen. S. L. P., Sept. 28.76Head of Ampudia’s medical service, Sept. 24. The author of the verse was C. F. Hoffman.Remarks.Taylor’s lack of interest in studying the topography and fortifications is illustrated by the fact that Butler, second in command, does not seem to have been shown the map drawn by Meade from information obtained by Worth, though Taylor certainly saw it (Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, ii, 283). Butler stated officially that when he attacked the city he knew nothing about the locality. Capt. Henry said Garland’scharge was made in “utter ignorance” regarding it (Camp. Sketches, 194). It has been said that Taylor lacked entrenching tools; but he had tools for building roads, planting the mortar and howitzers, and erecting new defences at the Tenería redoubt. Stevens (Campaigns, 29) undertook to defend Taylor’s operations on Sept. 21 by saying that the ardor of Garland’s men brought them into action before Mansfield’s reconnaissance had been completed; but (1) Garland was virtually instructed to follow Mansfield’s directions and did so, and (2) Oct. 24 Taylor said he would have pursued the same course, had he known all that he learned later about the situation—i.e.Garland executed Taylor’s ideas and wishes (61Graham to Polk, Apr. —, [1847]). Waiting for a fuller reconnaissance, therefore, would have consumed time without giving any advantage. It follows, too, from this statement of Taylor’s that he would not have excused Mansfield, had Mansfield instructed Garland not to charge. Taylor did not recommend a brevet for Garland. This was an implied censure. Capt. G. M. Graham of Garland’s command therefore addressed a letter to Polk, giving a full account of Garland’s proceedings. This letter was presented to Polk by Gen. George Gibson, who gave the writer “a high character.” It may be added, that it was impossible for Mansfield to make a complete reconnaissance under the circumstances. He would not have lived to finish it.
The Fourth Infantry, having been detached to cover the battery, was not in Garland’s charge. The mortar does not seem to have been effective on Sept. 21 (Giddings, Sketches, 202); had it been so, it would not have been put out of commission for a considerable time by being sent to Worth, who does not seem to have asked for it. It appears to have been used by Taylor only twenty minutes, which suggests that its inefficiency was speedily discovered. Had the cause been merely the lack of a platform (Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 206), it could have been removed. There was timber enough at Walnut Grove. The statements regarding the number of guns in Tenería redoubt cannot be wholly reconciled. This may arise from the fact that not all the pieces could be used. The statement in the text seems to be safe.
The author feels some scepticism about the doings of Backus. No unanimity prevailed then about him. He is rather too precise in his own statement. He says (Historical Magazine, x, 255) that the distance from the building he occupied to the tannery was found to be 117–3/4 yards. One can hardly understand how so exact a measurement can have been made in such a locality. The distance from his position to Tenería redoubt was considerably more than this. Henry estimated it at 130 yards (Campaign Sketches, 195). Muskets were not reliable at this distance. His claims were not accepted by all at the time. Still, many believed that he contributed materially to the capture of the redoubt. After the capture of this redoubt Col. Davis undertook to storm El Diablo, but was recalled. There was a sharp clash between Taylor and Butler in the course of the operations, Sept. 21. Taylor should, of course, have kept out of the street fighting (Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187). There was sufficient demand for head work at that time to absorb his full attention. It was stated that after the repulse of the Americans, Sept. 21, Mejía asked to have both infantry and cavalry charge them. Had this been done the results might have been very serious.
The American artillery when in the town was handled as cautiously as possible. For example, a gun would be loaded and leveled behind acorner, drawn out by ropes, fired, and drawn back by the ropes (French, Two Wars, 66). Yet even in a case of this kind four out of the five gunners were killed. Taylor does not mention the presence of the Fourth Infantry, Sept. 23, but U. S. Grant does (Mems., i, 115–6); and as he belonged to that corps, it seems hardly possible that he was mistaken. It had been so much reduced the day before, that perhaps Taylor did not think it worth mention. According to Taylor’s report the reason for withdrawing his men from the city on the afternoon of Sept. 23 was to prepare for a general assault. But considerable time would have been necessary to do this in concert with Worth, and it is hard to see why they were withdrawn under fire when they were doing good work in safety, and night was not far distant. Apparently the best way to arrange for such concerted operations would have been to leave these troops where they were, and open a line of communication through the northern part of the city (Ripley,op. cit., i, 264). The rumors that Mexican forces were approaching by the Saltillo road were correct, but Ampudia sent them an order to retire. They were not strong enough to accomplish anything.
When Worth attacked the city, Sept. 23, his right-hand column, headed by Texan riflemen, dismounted, under Col. Hays, took the Calle de Monterey; the left-hand column, headed by similar troops under Lieut. Col. Walker, took the Calle de Itúrbide. Besides the Texans and the field batteries, the Seventh and Eighth Infantry and the Artillery Battalion joined in the attack. The detachment that had been sent up the Saltillo road was recalled and acted as a reserve. The American shells thrown during the night of Sept. 23 seem to have injured nothing except Ampudia’s courage. Purísima Bridge was about 2300 feet from the cathedral.
It is probably true that Taylor’s operations at the eastern end of the town and the disregard of life exhibited by his troops tended to dismay Ampudia. But Taylor had no reason to suppose that operations so badly planned, so ineffective and so costly would have that effect; they were wasteful; and they demoralized his own men. The Mexicans fought in most cases with a courage and tenacity deserving of high praise (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 209). So far as one can see, nothing saved Taylor from a disaster that would have meant the ruin of his army but the poltroonery of one man, Ampudia; and as we have remarked, he had no reason to expect that. The head of Ampudia’s medical service reported, Sept. 24, that only sixty privates had been seriously wounded.
11.Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78 (Taylor).364Worth to S., Oct. 2. García, Revolución, 16. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 262–9. Ampudia, Manifiesto. Apuntes, 64.13Pakenham, no. 122, 1846. Balbontín, Invasión, 50–2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 348 (Ampudia), 348 (Taylor), 349 (terms).76Ampudia, Sept. 29.Nat. Intelligencer, Oct. 26; Nov. 7. Wash.Union, Jan. 18 (Ampudia); Feb. 18, 1847.Niles, Nov. 28, p. 197.Epoca, Feb. 9, 1847 (Ampudia).Observador Zacatecano, Dec. 27, 1846, supplement (Requena).Diario, Oct. 2 (Ampudia).Republicano, May 28, 1847.
Worth’s cannon were prevented by a fog from opening fire early Thursday morning. Worth’s364reasons, as explained privately to a friend, for giving liberal terms were: (1) Owing to the feelings of the Texans and resentment occasioned by the American losses in the battle, an assault would have been attended with the slaughter of many women; (2) The numbers and the position of the Mexicans rendered them formidable; (3) “Neither myself nor many others had the slightest confidence in theintelligence that directed” the American operations; (4) Our government wanted peace. The Mexicans were allowed twenty-one rounds for their battery.
The principal excuses alleged by Ampudia for surrendering were the failure to injure the Americans on their march, the lack of the Fourth Brigade, a want of funds, provisions and artillery ammunition, the inefficiency and cowardice of a part of his army, the hostility of the superior officers, and their failure to support him. According to a Mexican letter from S. Luis Potosí dated October 3, 1846, the loss of the city was attributed wholly to his cowardice. A number of his chief officers appear to have been no more courageous than he, but the decision did not rest with them. Perhaps he thought it necessary to save the one veteran army of Mexico, but a successful or even heroic defence of Monterey would have probably been more beneficial to his cause. There were provisions enough and a large stock of ammunition; but we are not sure that his supply of artillery ammunition was adequate. The commission consisted of Worth, Henderson, J. Davis, Requena, Ortega, Llano. The Mexicans actually carried away three 12-pounders and three 8-pounders (Requena). The British minister at Washington reported: The armistice seems to be “in direct opposition to the rule laid down in Mr. Buchanan’s letter to Commodore Conner of the 27th July” [Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3], by which it was determined that no armistice should be agreed to until a treaty of peace should have been actually concluded (13Pakenham, no. 122, Oct. 16, 1846). San Fernando de Presas was east of Linares near the Gulf. See note 12.
12.Polk, Diary, Oct. 11, 12. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 79 (Taylor), 106 (Worth). (Instructions) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 333, 355 (Marcy). Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 62.364Worth to S., Oct. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 138. Taylor, Letter to Gaines.Pennsylvanian, Nov. 2 (Peyton).139W. B. to D. Campbell, Nov. 2. Robertson, Remins., 157.13Pakenham, no. 127, 1846 (Taylor’s ammunition would not have lasted many hours longer).Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 316 (Clayton).
Worth: Twiggs’s division and the volunteers “were taken into action without order, direction, support, or command; in fact murdered” (364to S., Oct. 2). Col. Campbell: Taylor showed little generalship in the handling of my regiment; took too great a risk in coming to Monterey without more transportation (139to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 9). Capt. Cheatham (Campbell’s regiment): “I consider, that old Taylor committed one of the greatest blunders that ever a General was guilty of, in coming here to attack one of the strongest fortified towns in Mexico, with nothing in the world but small Artillery, for open field fighting” (50to son, Oct. 6).Id.: “We were rushed headlong into the fight and our Generals did not know where we were going” (150to sister, Oct. 16). Capt. Henry (Garland’s brigade): “I look upon the exposure of the field artillery in the streets as perfectly useless” (Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7). Capt. Backus (Garland’s brigade): The Third and Fourth Infantry were “entirely inadequate to the duty required” of them; “this hazardous and useless enterprize” (Hist. Mag., x, 212). Baltimore Captain: Sept. 21 I was under first one general and then another till I and my men “became completely worn out” (Picayune, Nov. 7). Engineer Stevens: The eastern attack was marked by rash and headlong movements; the mortar, instead of being sent to Worth, should have been placed in Tenería redoubt;Taylor should not have withdrawn his troops on Wednesday, etc. (Campaigns, 27). Officer: Garland’s charge a fatal mistake (Balt.Sun, Nov. 6). Officer: The eastern attack very injudicious (Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 20). Lieut. Hamilton (West Pointer): The officers who fell at the east end were “a sacrifice to the blind folly and ignorance of our general-in-chief” (Metrop. Mag., Dec., 1907, p. 321). C. M. Wilcox, who arrived at Monterey not long after the battle: “Harsh and unfavorable criticism” of the operations at the east end was “universal” there (Mex. War, 120). Robertson: The lack of a siege train was due to Taylor’s misunderstanding the intentions of the enemy; the cannon could easily have been transported (Remins., 129, 160). Smith: Only Ampudia’s personal unfitness saved Taylor from deserved ruin (Remins., 18). Monterey letter, Oct. 11: 6-pounders were sent to batter down fortifications that 24-pounders would not have affected. Gen. Requena, probably the best Mexican officer: Worth made the real attack; Taylor blundered (Observador Zacatecano, Dec. 27, supplem.). G. Ferry: Prudence forbade Taylor, in view of the too evident discouragement of his army, to press his advantage; by negotiating he changed almost certain defeat into victory (Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, 410). An editorial inNiles’ Registerof July 18, 1846, is curiously interesting: “Owing to an error in estimating the capacities of the enemy” Taylor “made a narrow escape from almost utter annihilation” in May. “One lesson of this kind, we venture to predict, will be a sufficient admonition to” Taylor.... “He will be cautious to keep his troops within reach of supplies, and to have at hand the means of transportation.” The editor proved to be mistaken in every point.
One of Taylor’s excuses for the terms was consideration for the non-combatants (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9), and it may have counted for something; but he had just refused these non-combatants permission to leave the town (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78). Another (ibid.) was the propinquity of the citadel, and the impossibility of taking it without a siege of twenty or thirty days or else a large expenditure of life; but the citadel had not been able to injure the Americans materially while they were fighting in the town, and could not injure them at all in Walnut Grove; and, as Taylor admitted that he would hardly be able to advance for six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), there was no lack of time. In point of fact, as could easily have been surmised, the citadel had neither water nor provisions enough to stand a siege (Balbontín, Invasión, 46).
The gallant defence of the city was another excuse (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 79; Bixby coll., 61); but while that is a just reason for doing honor to a garrison, it is none for relinquishing the substantial fruits of a dearly bought victory. It would have cost the lives of fifty or one hundred soldiers, besides the wounded, to take the city by storm, said Taylor (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9). But this would have been a low price for the elimination of an army that he said was rated at 7200 besides 2000 irregulars (Bixby coll., 61)—the only army possessed by Mexico—with its arms, accoutrements, artillery and horses. The moral effect of such a victory would probably, in the unanimous opinion of Polk and his Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), have ended the war; and the desperate fury displayed by Santa Anna when he supposed that such had been the outcome (52Black, Sept. 26;76S. Anna, Sept. 29) tends to support this view. The Mexicans could have escaped, “done what we might,” Taylor urged (cf.Ho. 60; 30, 1, 359). But if he could have captured the city so easily, entrenched as the garrison were in the strong buildings near themain plaza, he could certainly have scattered them and captured a large number, had they attempted to flee with artillery, ammunition and provisions through those narrow streets commanded by low, flat houses; and indeed no road available for artillery crossed the mountains except the one (held by Worth) through Rinconada Pass. Ampudia wrote to his government that even if he could have cut his way out, his forces would have been dispersed and his military material captured (Sept. 25). (Taylor seems to have taken no steps to prevent the Mexicans from escaping during the night of the twenty-fourth, though their protracting the negotiations until late in the day might have suggested a design to do this.) But, suggested Taylor, magnanimous terms were favorable to peace (Bixby coll., 61). On the other hand the United States had used in vain with Mexico every method except hostilities; our national authorities had now instructed him to try vigorous warfare (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 324); and it was for them to say whether this deliberately adopted policy should—on a political ground—be abandoned. To meet this obvious view the General said that a change of régime had occurred at Mexico since the date of his orders. That was true; but it would be singular indeed if a political change in the enemy’s country—of which nothing definite was heard except from an enemy notorious for subterfuges—could authorize a general in the field to violate his instructions. Taylor himself stated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360) that his “grand motive” in advancing from the Rio Grande was “to increase the inducements of the Mexican government to negotiate for peace”—i.e.by showing that otherwise it would suffer the rigors of war; how then could he believe that acting gently and indulgently would have the desired effect?
Finally, and upon this aspect of the matter Taylor laid great stress (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360), Ampudia stated that his government was now favorable to peace. But Ampudia transmitted no official proposition, could present no evidence; and it is impossible to believe that a shrewd American like Taylor can have taken this argument seriously. Taylor seems to have had no respect for the Mexicans, and therefore had no confidence in them; and what he must have heard about Ampudia was calculated to make him distrust that man peculiarly. Besides, Scott’s letters of June 12 and 15 had intimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 326, 328) that he was not to grant even a short armistice unless met with a definite formal offer of the Mexicans to treat; and on July 27 Marcy instructed Taylor to pursue, under similar circumstances, the course recommended at that time to Conner (Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3)—i.e.not to grant an armistice even should the Mexican government consent to negotiate (256to Taylor confid.). If a knowledge of Mackenzie’s negotiations with Santa Anna was enough to justify Taylor for violating such instructions, he should not have attacked Monterey. Moreover, he did not consider the government of Mexico stable enough to treat with (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9). Taylor defended the armistice on the ground also that he needed time to bring up cannon, ammunition and provisions (169to Crittenden, Oct. 9); but had he captured or dispersed the Mexican army he would have had time, cannon, ammunition and provisions enough. Col. Davis and Taylor also argued that the explosion of the cathedral by an American shell would have caused great loss of life (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but if Taylor knew the cathedral was liable to explode, this was a reason for pressing unconditional surrender upon Ampudia, since the Mexicans would have been the principal sufferers.
All the arguments put forth in Taylor’s despatches to the government were formally pronounced unsatisfactory by Polk and the Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), since the terms made it possible for a Mexican army, which Taylor said he could have beaten completely without severe loss, to reorganize and make another stand. The simple facts were that, in order to escape from the blame due to his inefficiency, Taylor advanced from Camargo with an inadequate expedition, and, when the result convicted him of bad judgment, endeavored to excuse himself without letting the truth be known.
A particularly imprudent point in the terms was that they did not require the Mexicans to retire well beyond Rinconada Pass. It was left possible for them to fortify the pass, which was supposed to be impregnable or almost so, and thus make an advance from Monterey to Saltillo costly, if not impracticable. Taylor’s course in this matter was not due to an expectation that Wool’s column (chap.xiii) would render Rinconada Pass untenable, for he wrote on Oct. 15 that it formed “no element” in his calculations (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 351). There was another singular oversight. Taylor argued in favor of the armistice that it bound the hands of the Mexicans during the time needed by him for preparations to advance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but in fact, since either government could disallow the armistice and the Mexican authorities were within easy reach, its terms bound him for six weeks but bound them for only, say, a fortnight or, as he admitted (Bixby coll., 62), twenty days. Scott said privately—and one can easily believe him—that only Taylor’s popularity saved him from removal at this time (169to Crittenden, Oct. 19).
When Monterey yielded, according to Taylor, his provisions were sufficient for “not more” than ten days; but Worth had written privately on Sept. 16 (four days after the advance from Cerralvo began) that the army had provisions then for only about ten days (364to S.). According to the Washington correspondent of the BostonAtlas(Feb. 8, 1847) Clayton stated in the Senate, February 3, 1847, that Taylor had provisions for but three days when Monterey fell. A letter, probably from Gen. P. F. Smith, said that the provisions would have lasted only through Sept. 26, and that during the engagement Taylor had to send to Cerralvo for supplies, of which a sufficient quantity could scarcely have arrived in time (Littell’s Living Age, no. 141, p. 191). Col. Davis stated later that the hope of supplies, when Monterey yielded, rested on the return of the mule-teams already despatched north for this purpose (73Address). Col. Campbell wrote privately that on the morning of Sept. 21 Taylor’s supply of ammunition was very limited and the supply of provisions still more so (139to D. C, Nov. 2).
The loss of men that Taylor admitted was 488 killed and wounded (later 487: Ho. 24; 31,1), but it must have been considerably more. Lieut. Hill said in his diary that the losses would never be revealed; but the inaccuracy of the official statement is evident. A writer quoted inNiles, Nov. 7, 1846, p. 148, said it was “generally supposed” at Washington that Taylor might have lost more than 1000. A South Carolina officer, who must have had many opportunities to talk with men who had been at Monterey, gave the loss as about 950 (Cowan, Cond. Hist., 7). Kendall, editor of the New OrleansPicayune, who was on the ground, wrote that about 300 (including wounded men finished by the Mexicans) were killed or mortally wounded, Haile, a trustworthy correspondent of the same paper, expressed the same opinion. A letter inNiles, Oct. 17, 1846, p. 104 gives nearly the samefigures. A Tennessee captain reported the number of killed as 200. To look at the matter more in detail, Meade (Letters, i, 165) wrote that Garland lost some 265 killed and wounded. Butler admitted his own division lost about 250. A. S. Johnston (Johnston, Johnston, 138) wrote that its loss was “perhaps many more” than that. Bliss admitted that it lost 225, killed, wounded and missing, on Sept. 21 alone (McCall, Letters, 461). Worth’s loss seems to have been about 70. The Texas division lost not less than 27 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Here we get at least 612. But Garland did not have the Fourth Infantry (303 officers and men), which Bliss stated was “almost destroyed” (McCall, Letters, 461). This must mean a loss (killed and wounded) of at least one half; yet the official return was 36 (Ho. 24; 31, 1).
Taylor began the fighting with nearly 250 sick, and after three such days of excitement, fatigue and hardship, this number was probably quite 400. The guard at the camp—one company from each infantry regiment—probably amounted to at least 300, and, as some Mexican cavalry were looking for a chance to strike there, could not safely be reduced. A considerable number of men were needed to hold the captured forts, escort supplies of provisions and ammunition and perform other special services. If we call Taylor’s loss 800, deduct 350 for the sick and allow 400 for guards and others detached on duty, we have about 4650 tired and considerably demoralized men (many of them horse and many without bayonets) as perhaps available for an assault.
The simple fact that Taylor himself believed he could not, in less than about six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), be in a condition to resume his advance, indicated what his situation now was. Finally, it should be mentioned, he entertained still the false idea of strategy shown at Matamoros. He only cared to get Monterey, he said, for he could beat the Mexicans at any time (Coleman, Crittenden, 309). The fact that it would cost the lives of soldiers to beat the Mexicans did not appear to signify.
13.147Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 82 (Taylor), 106 (Worth).169Scott to Crittenden, Oct. 19.Delta, Feb. 14, 1847.169Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 2. Grant, Mems., i, 117–8. Welles papers. Griffis, Perry, 218. Smith, Chile con Carne, 97. Lane, Adventures, 42.Spirit of the Times, Nov. 7. (Hardly) Ripley, War, 268–9.76Ampudia, Sept. 28.
As Welles remarked, the people took delight in thinking and talking about the details of the fight. The capture of Monterey had no strategic bearing on the aim of the war (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). The demonstration of our fighting ability (which, however, had already been proved) had a moral value; but one may well question whether this was not fully offset by the blundering of Taylor and other officers, our losses and the terms granted to Ampudia. Many of superior intelligence in the United States criticised Taylor sharply.
1. Probably he did not include Wool’s troops. A Mexican reported that on Oct. 14 Taylor had not over 4000 in camp near Monterey, 600 regulars in that city and 1080 men in the hospitals there, and that 600 volunteers, who had arrived Oct. 15, marched with 400 from the camp to other points. According to Gen. Patterson, commanding, there were in the Camargo region, Oct. 8, about 7000 effectives, but by Oct. 31 these numbered only 5700, viz., Second Dragoons, 150; Second Infantry andMounted Rifles, 500; Kentucky horse, 450; Tennessee horse, 450; Second Kentucky, 400; Second Ohio, 500; First Indiana, 550; Second Indiana, 600; Third Indiana, 650; Second Tennessee, 350; Alabama, 400; Third Illinois, 370; Fourth Illinois, 330. The Mounted Rifles were classed as cavalry, but had no horses. Nov. 10 the sick at Camargo numbered 1400 or 1500, said a letter. Below Camargo there were troops now at Reynosa, Matamoros, Camp Belknap, mouth of the river, Point Isabel and Brazos Island. Nov. 2 Capt. W. S. Henry, a very good regular officer, doubted whether Taylor had more than 10,000 effectives (Camp. Sketches, 239). The returns showed only 13,000, he said.
2.It was stated, Dec. 1, that fully 120 had deserted. (Priests) Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240; Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. The Mexican government went so far as to pay the expense of sending a British subject named Sinnott to the north for the express purpose of seducing Taylor’s Irish (Roman Catholic) soldiers (76Sinnott, Oct. 12;76Guerra to Santa Anna, Dec. 5;76to Hacienda, Dec. 2;76S. Anna, Jan. 1, 1847).
3.61July 21, 1846, Patterson wrote to the war department that he was born in Ireland and entered the army as a first lieutenant in 1813. He was then hardly more than a boy. Apparently he did not see much service. Later he became rather active in the Philadelphia militia.
4.Taylor protested twice, and demanded that his subordinates should be compelled “to keep in their proper places.” Due retribution soon followed. He sent an order to Col. Baker, one of Patterson’s officers, upon which that general demanded sharply that correspondence with his subordinates should go by the usual channel (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 381, 384). Nov. 5 Taylor wrote a long and studied letter to Gen. Gaines, defending himself and attacking the administration, and this was published in the N. Y.Herald, Jan. 24, 1847. Evidently it was not a mere bit of friendly correspondence. To many it seemed to be the opening gun of a Presidential campaign, and certainty it was improper, for the writer presented information and opinions about the American military operations, and said that success would be worth little to the United States—a view evidently calculated to discourage the Americans and stimulate the enemy. Taylor was neatly punished for this imprudence by a public revival of paragraph 650 of the army regulations of March 1, 1825, which forbade private letters or reports from officers regarding military operations. Doubtless Polk was to a large extent right in believing that Taylor was now in the hands of political tutors, and he regarded him as “a vindictive and ignorant political partisan.” See Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 27, 1847, and reply (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 391, 809);108Marcy to Bancroft, April 28;256Id.to Wetmore, Apr. 25; adj. gen., gen. orders 3, 1847; Polk, Diary, Jan. 25–7; Phila.Pub. Ledger, Jan. 26–7; Ho. 37; 30, 1.
5.A pleasanter outcome of the correspondence was the release of seven American and a number of Mexican prisoners.
6.Preliminary incidents.Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 424 (Wool); 341, 344, 355, 367, 369, 391 (Marcy); 472–3 (Jones); 635 (Jesup); 325, 1270 (Scott); 682 (Whiting); 386, 439, 442 (S. Anna); 350–1, 358, 361, 381, 424, 437–40, 444, 526, 809 (Taylor); 384 (Patterson).69Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8; to Bliss, Oct. 8, 31; Nov. 23. Meade, Letters, i, 145–6, 152.Morning News, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240.307Roberts, diary, Nov. 27.69Wool to Bliss, Nov. 2.69Riley to Bliss, Dec. 14, 1846.Niles, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 290.65Patterson,orders 1, 6, Sept. 5, 29.169Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26.169Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Wash.Union, Sept. 26. Polk, Diary, May 14; Sept. 19–22, 24, 26; Oct. 12, 13, 20; Nov. 21.69Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8.234A. Johnson to —–, Dec. 2. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273–4. Marcy, report in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 48.205Graham, mem. book.Diario, Nov. 14, 29; Dec. 15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178.65Id., gen. orders, no. 139, Nov. 8.69González, Sept. —. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 346, 354, 356. Also the following from76: Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Dec. 3. Circular, Nov. 28. S. Anna to Taylor, Dec. 17. S. Anna, Nov. 28; Dec. 12. Sinnott, Oct. 12. Ordóñez to Worth, Nov. 12; to P. F. Smith, Nov. 20, Worth to Ordóñez, Nov. 12. Smith to O., Nov. 20. Ampudia, Oct. 4. J. F. Rada, Oct. 17. Parrodi, Sept. 16. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 5. On the origin of the proposed Tamaulipas expedition see chap. xxvii,note 4.
7.Lieut. Mackall’s battery, the Seventh Infantry, and one company of the Artillery Battalion were left at Monterey under P. F. Smith.
8.The maguey (agave Americana) is the century plant, and produces the liquid known aspulquewhich, after it ferments, is about as intoxicating as beer, and is consumed liberally by the common people of Mexico. The stiff, thick, wide-spreading leaves are protected with thorns.
9.The governor expected a reply, and on finding that none was to be made he retired to Parras.
10.The occupation of Saltillo.65Gen. orders 139. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 361, 374, 377, 436, 543, 545 (Taylor); 362–3 (Marcy); 378 (Aguirre). Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45.364Worth to S., Nov. 20. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71.267Memo. (probably from Major Smith). Meade, Letters, i, 144, 152, 155, 157–8. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, 295–9. Balbontín, Invasión, 24. Apuntes, 65. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 59. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847.69Worth to Arnold and Deas, Nov. 19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 175, 192, 195. Henry, Campaign Sketches, 245. Smith, To Mexico, 77. Eyewitness, Complete History, 48.299Posey to Gordon, Feb. 19, 1847. The following are from76. S. Anna to Ampudia, Sept. 30. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Oct. 3; Nov. 21. González, Nov. 19.Id.to R. Vázquez, Saltillo, Nov. 16; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; to Mejía, May 27. Mejía, June 9.Id.to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 17. Memo., dated Nov. 22, of a conference with Taylor. Wool’s advance may have helped to cause Ampudia’s abandonment of Rinconada Pass. The distance from Monterey to Saltillo by the railroad is about 68 miles, and that by road must be about the same. (Marcy, Oct. 22) see p. 350.
11.The celebrated military writer, Clausewitz, on whose work our present views of strategy are principally founded, recognized two distinct kinds of war: that aiming to overthrow the enemy’s forces, and that aiming to make conquests on the frontier, either to be held permanently or to be used in exchanges on the settlement of peace (Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, nachricht, par. 1; Donat, Strat. Science, 112). Polk aimed to accomplish both ends by having the main army bring Mexico to terms, and at the same time taking possession of territory; but he did not apply the principle understandingly. He overrated the influence that the occupation of the northern provinces would have on the Mexican government; he thought peace was near at hand, and was figuring on the terms of a treaty when he should have been taking steps to bring Mexico speedily to the point of making a treaty; and he ordered this expedition without knowing the conditions under which it would have to be conducted inMexico, and without asking proper expert advice. The occupation of the frontier provinces would have been sagacious had it been part of a strong coercive military policy. Quotation at the end of the second paragraph: Meade, Letters, i, 152.
12.La Vaca, now Port Lavaca, is on Matagorda Bay.
13.In view of the Mexican charge that the Americans incited the Indians to ravage the southern side of the border, it should be mentioned that not only Taylor, but Wool, exerted himself to prevent such raids (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 425).
14.Harney committed a further impropriety by raising a company of Indians for the U. S. service. It was not our policy to employ Indian troops.
15.The author’s description of Wool is based largely on the147diary and148recollections of Gen. S. E. Chamberlain, who served as his orderly for a time in the Mexican War; also on257Hughes to Markoe, Dec. 13, 1847;Niles, May 8, 1847, p. 156;61Horton, Dec. 3; Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes);371Mitchell, statement;316Bragg to Sherman, March 1, 1848. Wool was a spare man of medium height, light complexion and brown hair. His manner was reserved and gentlemanly.
16.Buhoup says this section set out with 1244 effectives. Wool soon joined it with 144 men. At the Rio Grande, Oct. 12, eight companies (aggregate, 574) of the First Illinois came up. The second section (not over 1200) did not leave San Antonio until Oct. 14, and some of the men were detained there still longer. The whole force consisted of Washington’s six-gun battery, to which were attached two small guns taken by the Texans from the Mexicans years before and destined to be lost at Buena Vista and recovered at Contreras; a squadron of the First Dragoons, a squadron of the Second Dragoons, a regiment of Arkansas horse, three companies of the Sixth Infantry, one company of Kentucky foot and the First and Second Illinois regiments. The aggregate was given by Capt. Hughes of the Topog. Engineers as 3400, of whom about 600 were regulars. Wool’s route to Monclova was in general that of the So. Pacific and Mexican International railroads.
17.Shields, Irish by birth, practised law in Illinois, became a judge of the state supreme court and was then appointed commissioner of the General Land Office, Washington. He became discontented under Wool’s command, and sent Davis, his aide, to Washington in the hope of obtaining command of the Illinois regiments or possibly of displacing Wool.
18.Frequently not all of the troops arrived at a place on the same date.
19.Possibly news of the restoration of the constitution had reached Monclova but not Santa Rosa.
20.The authorities of Monclova stated that Wool kept every pledge, and they complained only that the Americans ate up provisions needed for the people. The officers who criticised Wool most appear to have been Shields, who—besides being notably egotistical (Ill. State Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, pp. 36–8)—had been appointed by Polk on a confidential basis (Davis, Autobiog., 96) and therefore felt entitled to be ambitious; Harney, whose characteristics have been explained; Bonneville, who proved himself later incompetent or worse; and Yell, whose men were soon to disgrace themselves at Buena Vista in consequence of lacking discipline. Nov. 10 Taylor issued orders detaching Shields and Harney from Wool’s command (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 542). This change doubtless tended to promote harmony. In December Harney brought chargesagainst Wool, asserting that his “extreme imbecility and manifest incapacity” ruined the expedition. The judge advocate general advised that the charges should be ignored (61Horton, Dec. 3).
21.Just after leaving Parras Wool learned that 2700 Mexicans with four guns had moved from Zacatecas against him. One fault of the expedition was that it could neither support nor be supported by Taylor’s army (see Halleck, Mil. Art, 410 and chap. xi,note 5, of this history). One asks why Ampudia was not ordered to attack Wool. With Blanco’s irregulars he would have been formidable. The explanation probably is that Santa Anna wished to build up at S. L. Potosí as large an army as possible under his own command. Besides, he expected Wool to turn west.
22.Wool received on Nov. 14 Taylor’s instructions to give up the expedition, and on Nov. 26 his instructions to go to Parras and await orders (61Wool, Jan. 17, 1847). He moved, however, in anticipation of the latter instructions (61Wool, Dec. 7). Nov. 16 he reported that he expected three mounted and two infantry companies as escorts to the last wagons, and after their arrival would have about 2750 in all.60Marcy to Taylor, May 6, 1847: It is not important to hold Chihuahua, for you are in advance of it. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 337), probably to have a fling at Wool, says Wool “only” wished to give up the expedition in order to go toward Durango and Zacatecas in pursuit of glory; but the document he cites does not so state, and Taylor wrote that Wool proposed to join him (Bixby coll., 71).
23.In chap.xix.
24.July 2 Taylor had expressed the opinion that the expedition might prove very important (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329), but suggested that only mounted men should be employed.
25.Marcy said that the expedition prevented a considerable part of Mexico from sharing in the campaign against Scott, and to some extent this was doubtless true.
26.Wool’s expedition.Polk, Diary, May 14, 16; Oct. 20.164Conner to Bancroft, May 31. N. Orl.Commerc. Bulletin, Aug. 17. Meade, Letters, i, 152. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 363 (Marcy); 325 (Scott); 458 (Freeman); 328, 454, 466 (Jones); 424, 426 (Wool); 428 (Thomas); 305, 329, 351, 361, 374, 377, 400, 409, 418, 424, 433 (Taylor); 410 (Bliss); 567 (Jesup).254Mansfield, report, Apr. 19.61Wool, July 28; Aug. 5, 15; Sept. 2, 15, 28; Oct. 15, 19; Nov. 4; Dec. 16.256Wool, July 29. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 545. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes and others).65Adj. gen., gen. orders 19. Wash.Union, Oct. 19; Nov. 20, 21, 28, 1846 Feb. 8; Mar. 23, 1847.61Maynadier, Aug. 25.61Horton, June 23; Aug. 8; Oct. 20; Dec. 3.69Harney, Aug. 12. Reavis, Harney, 155. Sen. 178; 29, 2.Diario, Sept. 11.68P. F. Smith, Oct. 2.245Duvall to Lamar, June 27. Buhoup, Narrative. Davis, Autobiog., 105–19.61Shields, Aug. 28.Niles, Oct. 24, p. 118; Dec. 26, p. 263; May 8, 1847, p. 156.61Kingsbury to Wool, Oct. 13. Sen. 64; 31, 1.National Intelligencer, Nov. 3, 21. Carleton, Buena Vista, 161–76. Balbontín, Invasión, 76.65Wool, orders 89, 117, 121, 126, 143, 144, 148, 155.61Wool to Taylor, Jan. 17, 1847. N. Y.Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1849.180McDowell to Newton, Sept. 16, 1846.132Butler, Dec. 10. Wool in Ceremonies. Bishop, Journal.69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71.63Marcy to Kearny, Dec. 10.Picayune, Mar. 4, 6, 17, 1847.69Wood to Taylor, Dec. 7.66Lee to Totten, Dec. 5. Donnavan, Adventures, 41. Wallace, Wallace, 21–9.69Wool to Taylor, Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 20, 1847Baylies, Wool’s Camp.Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xiv, 443. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, 301.82S. Anna to comte. gen. Zacatecas, Dec. 6. Neville, diary. The following are from76: Gov. Coahuila, Sept. 7, Oct. 8. Gefe Partido del Rio Grande, Aug. 28; Oct. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to comte. gen. Durango, Oct. 14; to S. Anna, Oct. 21. Gefe político, Monclova, to Wool, Oct. 24; reply, Oct. 26. Comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 11. Heredia to comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 10. Gov. Coahuila toId., Nov. 30. R. Vázquez to S. Anna, Oct. 1. Castañeda to Vázquez, Sept. 24. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Nov. 4; Dec. 19, 24. Wool to Arziniegaet al., Oct. 9. Aldrete to Mejía, Aug. 30. Ugarte, Sept. 26. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, Dec. 31. Lobo to R. Vázquez, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to S. Anna, Dec. 17. Gov. Coahuila toId., Nov. 30. Comte. gen. Coahuila, Sept. 7. Gefe político, Parras, to S. Anna, Dec. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 25. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 208) places Polk in a rather absurd position with reference to the expedition. He misunderstands a statement in Polk’s Diary, May 28, 1846. The orders to Wool there mentioned had prime reference to getting volunteers in motion to Taylor (Military Historian and Economist, ii, 32 and note on p. 33).
27.The idea that the occupation of Tampico would mask and aid the expedition against Vera Cruz came forward a little later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 949).
28.This is inferred from the fact that Marcy’s letter, which was published in theDiarioof Oct. 6, would naturally have met Santa Anna about Oct. 3, and from the character of Santa Anna’s letter of that date.
29.None of these statements should be taken too literally. The various accounts, which come mainly from Parrodi and Santa Anna, differ considerably though not essentially, and both men had reasons for exaggerating the weakness of Tampico.
30.Parrodi and the court that tried him declared that he threw away nothing of value. But many did not believe this, and it is hard to see why he should have taken the trouble, when in such haste, to transport a large quantity of material to the river, if it was worthless. The government naturally wished the evacuation to appear inexpensive.
31.This sentence is inferential. Writing to his wife, Nov. 17,162Conner stated that he was much surprised to find the city evacuated, and that, had the garrison been there, he would have had hard work. Why Mrs. Chase did not give notice of the evacuation cannot be explained. No doubt there was a high state of popular excitement and, as she had been suspected of playing the spy, the people perhaps cut her off more effectually than the military men had done. Later she presented a claim to Congress, and it was supported by letters from some of Conner’s officers but by none from himself. This fact may be a hint that he was not pleased with her course. It seems to have been from her that Parrodi heard the imaginary tale of Conner’s heavy landing force, which probably counted for a great deal in bringing about the evacuation. Chase had sent a sketch of Tampico to Conner in June, and later his wife forwarded a plan with a description of the forts, the number of guns, etc. We do not know, however, that Conner received these papers. Taylor belittled the capture of Tampico, saying that Santa Anna’s order to evacuate the town had been printed in the Mexican papers, and that Conner must have been aware of the fact; but Conner was on a ship at some distance from any town, and his letter of Nov. 17 shows that he was not aware of it. The names of the captured gunboats wereNonata,BonitaandReefer.
32.Signed by Tattnall and Ingraham; approved by Conner; accepted by the deputation of the ayuntamiento. The Americans felt that formal terms would bind them yet could be repudiated by the Mexican government.
33.Two merchant vessels also were captured.
34.According to Apuntes, pp. 82–6, Dr. Francisco Marchante of the Mexican medical service, who had charge of other public property, was not far away, but the Mexicans persuaded Tattnall that he could not be overtaken. On Tattnall’s return to the port, however, a Mexican declared this could not have been true, and hence a second expedition set out in all haste. It was unavoidably delayed; and finally, as the Americans learned that a Mexican force had been sent forward to protect Marchante, the chase was abandoned. A large amount of ammunition was thrown into the river at Pánuco by Marchante. The total loss of material was thus of considerable moment. Some of the ammunition was saved by sending it to Tuxpán.