If to this loss be added that of the Dutch-Belgian troops—about 4,000—the total number of Noncommissioned Officers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates, killed, wounded and missing, amounted to 14,728.
The losses of the Prussian Army in the Battle were as follows:—
Total Under Officers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates, killed, wounded, and missing, 6,775.
In the absence of all returns it is difficult to estimate the losses of the French Army. They were, however, immense; besides which, the whole of their Artillery, Ammunition Waggons, and Baggage, fell into the possession of the victors. Of the French Generals,MichelandDuhesmewere killed; PrinceJerome,Friant, and several others were wounded; andLobau,Compans, andCambronne, were taken prisoners.
The minuteness of detail with which the foregoing History of the Battle of Waterloo has been written, the gradual development which has been presented of the motives and dispositions of the Commanders, and the circumstantial description which has been afforded of the movements of the troops engaged—of the working, as it were, of the machinery in the hands of the three most renowned Captains of the Age—obviate the necessity of further comment upon those points; but it would be unjust to the honour, the fame, and the glory, of the actors in that memorable scene, to omit putting forth certain important considerations which are essential to enable an impartial public, and an unprejudiced posterity, to arrive at correct and satisfactory conclusions upon other points, hitherto involved in doubt and obscurity.
These refer chiefly to the relative numerical strength of the Combatants, the relative proportions in which the troops of the Anglo-Allied Army were actively engaged with the Enemy, the conduct of these troops respectively while so engaged, and lastly the extent of the actual share taken in the Battle by the Prussians.
The most simple, and at the same time most rational, mode of computing the relative strength of Armies is by placing in juxtaposition their respective numbers of Battalions, Squadrons, and guns. According to this rule, the Anglo-Allied and French Armies, as they stood in front of each other at the commencement of the Battle, were constituted as follows:—
Napoleonhaving, about one o'clock, detached the Light Cavalry Divisions ofDomonandSubervieas a Corps of Observation upon his Right Flank; the opposed forces, from that hour until about six o'clock, stood as follows:—
During this period of the Battle, the Anglo-Allied Army was thus composed:—
Almost all these Battalions were at one time or another in the Front Line, and all conducted themselves in the most courageous and exemplary manner, with the exception of five of the Dutch-Belgian Battalions, which hastily retreated as the French approached, when making their first grandattack upon the Anglo-Allied Centre and Left Wing, and took no further active part in the Battle. The remainder of the above ten Battalions in the service of the King of the Netherlands, were three Battalions forming the 2nd Regiment of the Nassau Contingent, and two Battalions of Orange Nassau, under PrinceBernhardof Saxe Weimar, and occupied the houses and inclosures in the valley in front of the extreme Left of the Allied Line. These troops behaved extremely well.
Of the Squadrons above mentioned, a large proportion, nearly one third, consisted of the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry; but although their numbers serve to augment the amount of the Anglo-Allied Cavalryon paper, the actual value of their services in the Battle was by no means commensurate with their display of strength: and hence it was that the brunt of the Cavalry contest devolved almost exclusively upon the British and German Dragoons. The same observation applies in an equal degree to the Artillery.
About six o'clock, the relative strength of the contending forces was altered, on the part of the French Army, by the detaching ofLobau's Corps and the Young Guard to oppose the Prussians; and on that of the Anglo-Allied Army, though somewhat later, by the bringing into the Field ofChassé's Dutch-Belgian Division; so that they stood about that time as follows:—
Of the assistance derived by the Duke ofWellingtonfrom this augmentation of the twelve Dutch-Belgian Battalions, a sufficient estimate may be deduced from the foregoing History of the Battle—one half of them were with great difficulty prevented from abandoning the Field,although, at the moment, they were not in contact with, nor did they even see, the Enemy; and the other half only joined the Front Line (on the left ofMaitland's Brigade) at the time of the General Advance.
Whatever may have been the cause of the comparative supineness of the Dutch-Belgian troops; whether produced by dislike entertained towards recent political arrangements, which alienated each party from its native country, without, securing to either its national independence; or, by predilections imbibed for the Chief against whose arms they were now opposed, and in whose ranks they had formerly served: the fact of such supineness is too well attested to admit of any doubt respecting the value to be attached to their co-operation in the great struggle so courageously and resolutely sustained by the remainder of the Anglo-Allied Army; and becomes a most important point for consideration in any calculation of the relative strength of the Combatants, when taken into conjunction with the actual proportion of the entire Dutch-Belgian force brought into the Field to that of each of the Allies, as appears by the following table:—
Amount of the Effective Strength of the Anglo-Allied Army at the Battle of Waterloo.
Hence it appears that the Dutch-Belgian Contingent, compared with the British troops alone, consisted, in Infantry, as 13,402 to 15,181; in Cavalry, as 3,205 to 5,843; and, in guns, as 32 to 78.
It is needless now to speculate upon what might have been the result, had this large proportion of force been replaced by a corresponding number of either British or German troops. The fact testifies abundantly, in addition to what has been already related, as to the heroic firmness and enduring courage with which the brave British and Germans stood the brunt of that remarkable contest; and this, too, be it remembered, with unquestionably the finest Army which evenNapoleonhad ever collected together, formed exclusively of one nation—of that nation whose legions had at one time subjugated nearly the whole of Europe—imbued with inveterate hatred against its foes, cherishing the most enthusiastic devotion to its Chief, and filled with the ardent desire of restoring the fallen glory of the Empire.
Of the conduct of the British Infantry, of its heroic valour, its indomitable resistance, its proud defiance, and its admirable discipline, the History of the Battle affords abundant testimony: further comment is superfluous.
The superior prowess of the British Cavalry also shone most conspicuously on this great day. The combined charge of the two Heavy Brigades against the French Cavalry and Infantry which attacked the Centre and Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army between one and two o'clock, whether we regard the brilliancy of its execution, or the magnitude of its success, is perhaps without a parallel in the last War: and when we consider the preponderance of the Enemy in this Arm, the frequency of his charges, and the masses with which he advanced, it is impossible to advert to the heroismof Britain's Cavalry, without at the same time according the praise so pre-eminently due to the skill of the noble and gallant Chief who was the life and soul of its movements throughout the arduous and desperate struggle; and who so judiciously economised its strength, that when at the critical moment its services were required for securing the victory, he was enabled to bring forward two fresh Brigades, which fulfilled those services in a style the most brilliant that can be conceived, and with a success which commanded the admiration of all who witnessed it.
The British Artillery, which had to contend against an immense preponderance of metal, evinced during the whole day, a degree of bravery, zeal, activity, and intelligence, which can never be surpassed; and nobly sustained its long and honourably acquired pre-eminence.
Of the troops of the King's German Legion, whether Cavalry, Infantry, or Artillery, it is impossible to speak in terms of too high praise; suffice it to remark that their conduct was, in every respect, on a par with that of the British.
Of the four Hanoverian Infantry Brigades, that ofKielmansegge, and a part ofHalkett's, were the most actively engaged:Best's stood almost the entire day on the extreme Left of the Front Line of the Anglo-Allied Infantry; andVincke's in Reserve in front of Mont St Jean. They had been but recently and hastily raised; and yet the manner in which such raw soldiers withstood, asKielmansegge's Brigade did, for so great a length of time, the most furious assaults made by the gallant and well disciplined troops of France, would have conferred honour on long tried veterans.
The Brunswickers, who were also composed of young soldiers, performed a glorious part in the Battle; and amplyavenged the death of their Prince. Some of their Battalions were much shaken at the momentAlten's Division was driven back a short distance; but they speedily rallied, and resumed their lost ground. Altogether, their bravery, which was frequently called into action; and their endurance, which was severely tested, merited the strongest commendation.
The troops constituting the Nassau Brigade underKruse(or more properly the 1st Regiment of the Nassau Contingent), were attached toAlten's Division. They were consequently often in the thick of the fight; and though, on the occasion above alluded to, they were thrown into disorder and driven in by a furious onset of the Enemy, they conducted themselves generally throughout the day with great steadiness and bravery.
It is impossible to allude in terms of adequate praise to the services of that most important branch of the Army, the General Staff; the Officers of which distinguished themselves no less by the zeal, the daring, and the activity, with which they carried into execution the commands of their respective Chiefs, than by the alacrity and intelligence which they evinced in catching and imparting the true spirit of their instructions. The constant exposure to which their peculiar duties necessarily subjected them could not but entail upon them severe losses. Few indeed were those who escaped unhurt throughout this arduous conflict.
The co-operation of the Prussians in this Battle has been gradually developed and fully detailed. That the communications whichWellingtonreceived fromBlücherled him to expect that co-operation at a much earlier period, is beyond a doubt; but setting aside all consideration of the causes of the delay which attended the arrival of the Prussian forces, it is equally doubtless that the tardiness ofthat co-operation had a more decided influence on the general result of the Battle than if they had reached the Field at an earlier period.
For, supposing the Prussians to have arrived in force before the French had become so seriously and desperately engaged with the Anglo-Allied Army,Napoleonwas too much a Master of his art to have risked a decisive Battle with the combined forces of his antagonists. In this case he would, in all probability, have fallen back upon his frontier, have called in all available Reserves from the interior, and by means of his Triple Line of Fortresses, as well as by skilful manœuvring, have endeavoured to separate once more the opposing Armies, and to obtain another chance of beating them in detail. As it happened, however, he was too deeply involved in the contest withWellington; he had suffered too severely in his repeated attacks, to admit of a retreat, under such circumstances, being looked upon, even by his friends in Paris, in any other light than that of a defeat: and he knew too well that with a defeat, however it might be produced, would vanish the only tie which yet bound him to the nation—the implied belief in his invincibility, and the firm reliance on his ability to re-establish and maintain the military glory of France. It is to this conviction alone that we can attribute the desperate resolve with which he risked the fate of the Empire and his own political existence upon the issue of his final attack uponWellington's Line, at a moment when the Armies opposed to him had effected their junction; and which, by calling the whole of his force into requisition, deprived him of an adequate Reserve, by aid of which he might have succeeded in effecting an orderly and honourable retreat.
Had the Prussians succeeded in driving the French outof Planchenoit half an hour earlier: such a circumstance, combined with the General Advance of the Anglo-Allied Line, would no doubt have caused the whole ofLobau's Corps, and perhaps alsod'Erlon's, to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion; since their retreat towards Maison du Roi would thus have been cut off, whilst the British Advance would have frustrated any attempt to retire across the Charleroi road. On the other hand, a similar result might have ensued, at least as regardsLobau's Corps, had that General Advance occurred half an hour earlier; while the French Right was engaged with the Prussians at a greater distance from the Charleroi road.
In the former case, however, the final attack was judiciously delayed until, by the arrival of the additional force which was fast approaching, such a simultaneous attack could be made along the whole of the French Right as would insure most decided success: and in the latter case, the final attack could not have been made at a more opportune moment, and with a greater prospect of success, than immediately after the signal defeat of the French Imperial Guard upon the Anglo-Allied position. Indeed, contingencies of this kind might be brought forward with reference to any Battle whatever; and when it is considered that there exists no example in modern warfare of so complete a victory, the result must appear as glorious, as decisive, and as comprehensive, as the most stern and rigid calculator of the chances of Battle could have desired.
As regards the actual share which the Prussians had in the Battle, it may be truly affirmed that the contest maintained betweenBülow's Corps andLobau's troops in conjunction with a portion of the Imperial Guard, was most obstinate and sanguinary. In the Three successive struggles for the possession of Planchenoit, especially, the deadlyanimosity mutually cherished by the troops of both nations, was fearfully exemplified; and the losses sustained by the Prussians in the comparatively brief period during which they were engaged, afforded ample proof of the value of their co-operation. It is undeniably true that the blow which decided the victory was that given byWellington, when, after having completely defeated the grand attack by the French Imperial Guard, he instantly followed up that defeat by boldly attacking and penetrating the Centre of the Enemy's Lines, and sustaining this movement by the General Advance of his whole Army; but it is at the same time, equally true, that the powerful diversion effected by the Prussians diminished the strength of those French Lines by the Corps ofLobauwhich had not hitherto fired a single shot in this Campaign, by twelve Battalions of the Imperial Guard which had suffered scarcely any loss at Ligny, and, finally, by eighteen Squadrons of Cavalry.
The vigorous attack which was made byBülowuponLobau's Line, simultaneously with the last assault upon Planchenoit, contributed most materially to the general and fatal panic which seized upon the whole of the French Army. The Prussians too, by the energetic pursuit which they kept up during the night, under the guidance of the indefatigableGneisenau, rendered the victory still more complete and decisive; and effectually deprived the Enemy of every opportunity of recovering himself on the Belgian side of the frontier.
In short, both Armies admirably and honourably performed the parts respectively assigned to them—the one holding its defensive position with unparalleled bravery and unmitigated perseverance until the moment when its Chief, having defeated the last desperate attempt of his opponent to force his Line, leads it on to victory; theother operating a powerful diversion, by which the effect of that Advance is made still more decisive; and rendering the victory complete by a harassing and vigorous pursuit—and thus was consummated the tactical solution of the plan which had been, with so much skill and foresight, strategically preconcerted by the Allied Commanders.
The Duke, when writing his Despatch descriptive of the Battle, in which he stated that his own Army "never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better," was not unmindful of the important aid he had derived from the Prussians. "I should not," he said, "do justice to my own feelings, or to MarshalBlücherand the Prussian Army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of GeneralBülowupon the Enemy's Flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the Enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded."
On the other hand, the Prince, although, as is manifest upon a perusal of a similar despatch on his part, he was not aware of the circumstances under whichWellingtonhad attacked the very Centre of the French Lines, and had pushed his Advanced Brigades along the rear of those troops to which he himself had been exposed, nevertheless did ample justice to the bravery of the British Army, which, he remarked, "fought with a valour which it is impossible to surpass."
Long may Great Britain and Prussia cherish that mutual amity which was engendered by the zealous and successful co-operation of the Armies of these two great nations inbringing to so prompt and satisfactory a termination a War which (originating in the reassumption of the throne of France by that ambitious soldier and extraordinary man who had once already overrun the Continent with his legions, subjugating Emperors and Kings to the influence of his mighty will) threatened once more to involve the nations in all the calamities and horrors which before had followed in the train of his triumphant but desolating career. The general Peace, which was the ultimate result of their united efforts, still happily continues; and on every successive anniversary do the British and German troops commemorate their glorious and crowning victory; and Europe, grateful for the lasting and inestimable blessings conferred upon her, emblazons forth in the pages of her history, the heroic deeds of the defenders of her liberty and independence.
——"thou fatal Waterloo!Millions of tongues record thee, and anewTheir children's lips shall echo them, and say—Here where the sword united nations drew,Our countrymen were warring on that day!And this is much, and all which will not pass away."
cap
Battle of Wavre
CHAPTER XVI.
IT was explained at the conclusion of the Eighth Chapter thatThielemann, who had been ordered byBlücherto defend the position of Wavre in the event of the Enemy advancing in force, or, if otherwise, to follow the main Army in the direction of Couture, was on the point of fulfilling the instructions appertaining to the latter contingency, whenVandamme's Corps arrived in front of that position, about four o'clock in the afternoon, and its Artillery immediately opened a cannonade upon the Prussian troops.
All the Brigades (the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth) ofThielemann's Corps, had, at that time, received the Order to commence the general movement to the right. A Detachment of only two Battalions (the Fusilier Battalions of the 30th Regiment and of the 1st Kurmark Landwehr), under ColonelZepelin, from the Ninth Brigade, which had not yet crossed the Dyle, was to be left in occupation of Wavre. The Twelfth Brigade was already in full line of march, and the Eleventh had been just put in motion.
When GeneralBorcke, who commanded the Ninth Brigade, fell back upon Wavre, for the purpose of carrying out his instructions, he found the Bridge already barricaded, and therefore proceeded with his Brigade to Bas Wavre: and having crossed the Dyle at this point, left a Detachment there, consisting of the Sharpshooters of the Fusilier Battalion of the 8th Regiment, and of those of the 1st Battalion of the 30th Regiment, under MajorDitfurth; whom he directedto destroy the Bridge immediately. He then detached the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Regiment and his two Squadrons of the Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, as a reinforcement to ColonelZepelinat Wavre; and, with the remainder of his Brigade, continued his march.
In the mean time, FrenchTirailleurswere observed extending along the opposite Heights; and, in their rear, considerable masses of the Enemy's troops appeared advancing. It soon became manifest that they contemplated forcing the passage of the river.
Thielemann, judging by the want of vigour displayed in the French pursuit; and by the Enemy not having attempted to secure the passage of the Dyle at Moustier, Limelette, and Limale, that it was only a weak Detachment of the Enemy that was advancing upon Wavre, confining itself to the design of creating some little uneasiness by its movement along this road to Brussels, had hitherto been of opinion that the occupation of Wavre by a few Battalions, as directed byBlücher, would be quite sufficient: but he now plainly saw that the moment had arrived which required him, in pursuance of his instructions, to maintain the position at Wavre; and he accordingly ordered the halt of his whole Corps for this purpose.
The town of Wavre is situated on the left bank of the Dyle: having a suburb on the opposite side of the river, with which it is connected by two stone Bridges; the principal one leading towards the middle, and a small one towards the upper end, of the Town. Higher up the stream, at the Mill of Bierge, at Limale, and at Limelette; as also below the town at Bas Wavre, there are wooden Bridges. The river is not deep, but at the period of the Battle it was swollen by the recent heavy rain. The low range of Heights on either side of the Valley is covered in many places withwood. The Heights on the right bank are generally more elevated, but those on the left have steeper declivities, and offer a greater command of the river and its passages. The shortest road from Namur to Brussels passes through the town, besides which there are numerous cross roads practicable for the movement of all Arms. The great number of hollow ways forms a prominent feature in the vicinity; and these, being in a miry state from the rain, were unfavourable to the progress of troops passing through them.
The position was thus occupied:—the Twelfth Brigade (ColonelStülpnagel), with the Horse Battery No. 20, was posted on the Height in rear of Bierge. The Bridge in front of this Village was barricaded, and the Mill occupied for the defence of the Bridge. The Tenth Brigade (ColonelKämpfen) stood upon the Height in rear of Wavre, its Right resting on a Wood which lay between it and the Twelfth Brigade. The Eleventh Brigade (ColonelLuck) was formed across the Brussels road. The Reserve Cavalry was drawn up, near La Bavette, in Columns of Squadrons. The Artillery was distributed along the Heights. The Horse Battery No. 18 remained in reserve.
That part of the town of Wavre which lies on the right bank, or, more properly, the suburb, was occupied by Light Troops only. The great Bridge was barricaded as well as time and circumstances would admit. The houses adjoining the left bank of the river were hastily loopholed. The smaller Bridge was left perfectly open. A Detachment of two Companies of Light Infantry, under MajorBornstädtwas detached to reinforce the troops at the Bridge of Bas Wavre.
Thielemannintended that the Ninth Brigade should be posted in rear of this general disposition of his troops, so that its services might be made available according ascircumstances might require; but through some misunderstanding in the transmission of the Order, GeneralBorckewas induced, after having moved along the Brussels road until near La Bavette, thence to turn off to his left, and continue his march, according to his original instructions, in the direction of Fromont, Bourgeois, and St Lambert, towards Couture; being under the impression that the whole Corps had already commenced this march, in pursuance of the general plan, and that his Brigade was destined to cover the movement. The departure of the Brigade was not immediately discovered; and thus, by this misunderstanding,Thielemann's force suffered an unexpected reduction of six Battalions and the Foot Battery No. 18; and consisted, therefore, of only 15,200 men; with which number he had now to contend against MarshalGrouchy's force, amounting altogether to 33,765 men.
Thielemann's position was certainly a very favourable one, and the occupation of it was arranged with great skill. As it was impossible to foresee in what manner the attack upon it would be conducted; whether it would be directed against one particular Bridge, or against all the Bridges, with the design of carrying the whole Line by storm:Thielemannlimited the occupation of the town and of the line of the river to the number of Light Troops which might be sufficient for sustaining any sudden assault; taking care to have Supports close at hand for that purpose: but disposing his Reserves, which comprised his main force, so that they might become available at any point which might be pressed; or, should the Enemy develop greatly superior numbers, as was subsequently the case, serve to guard against any flank attack.
As before explained, it wasVandamme's Corps whicharrived in front of Wavre between three and four o'clock. Two Batteries, of which one consisted of twelve pounders, were drawn up on the right of the road overlooking the valley, and opened the cannonade. These were subsequently reinforced by a third Battery, posted on the left of the road.Excelmans' Cavalry Corps was posted in right rear ofVandamme.Gérard, with the Fourth French Corps, was still in the rear on the march; andPajol, with his Light Cavalry, had only just passed through Tourrines, situated scarcely half way between Gembloux and Wavre. MarshalGrouchysent word to both these Officers to accelerate their march.
Whilst the French Skirmishers were gradually forcing back the Prussian Light Troops into the valley,Grouchy, hearing a powerful cannonade in the distance to his left, rode off a little way in that direction; and concluding thatNapoleonwas closely engaged withWellington, conceived that as he had now reached the Prussians, he would best fulfil his instructions by vigorously attacking them, so as to prevent their detaching reinforcements to the Anglo-Allied Army. He was quite ignorant as to the strength of the Enemy in his front, and was in doubt whether the whole Prussian Army was before him, or merely a strong Detachment. Of the fact that three Prussian Corps were on the march to co-operate withWellington's forces, he of course knew nothing. In this state of uncertainty, and with his troopsaux priseswith the Prussians, he was fearful of detaching to his left; since by so doing, he would expose himself to the risk of his main force becoming overpowered by superior numbers, and his Detachment cut off.
Independently of other considerations which might have assisted in dissuadingGrouchyfrom detaching a portion of his force at this period, such as the length of time his troopshad been upon the march, along bad and miry roads; he was perfectly justified, under all the circumstances of his then position, in adopting this course of proceeding. And even if he had been fully cognisant of the actual disposition of the Prussian Army, he could at this time have rendered no essential service toNapoleon; the opportunity for doing so had been suffered to pass by, as was fully explained in Chapter VIII.
His total ignorance, however, ofBlücher's proceedings, and of all that was then taking place between Wavre and the Field of Waterloo, afforded undeniable proof of his having completely failed in acting up to the spirit of the instructions he had received, not to lose sight of the Prussians, and in exercising that degree of enterprise, energy, and decision, whichNapoleonhad so naturally anticipated from a General ofGrouchy's note and experience; especially when entrusted with so important a command, under such highly critical circumstances.
A message having reachedGrouchyfromPajol, communicating his having fallen into the Marshal's line of operation, he directed that General to move upon Limale. His Right Flank, however, continued to be protected by the 17th Dragoons, detached from GeneralBerton's Cavalry Brigade (ofExcelmans' Corps)en reconnaissance, towards the high road leading from Namur to Louvain.
In the mean time, a vigorous cannonade was maintained betweenVandamme's and the Prussian Batteries across that part of the valley in which lay the town of Wavre. Under cover of the French guns, the Skirmishers pressed down upon that portion of the town situated upon the right bank of the river, and of which they soon gained possession; the Prussians having previously decided upon not making any effort to retain it. On reaching the river, however, theywere met by a most destructive fire of musketry from the opposite houses and the Bridge. The contest now became desperate, and the defence of the Dyle was obstinately maintained by the Prussians. The Skirmishers rapidly extended on either Flank along both banks of the river from Bierge as far as Bas Wavre. All the Prussian Brigades pushed forward their Sharpshooters. Those of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr took up the Line between the Town and Bas Wavre, those of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr took post in the Town, between the two Bridges; on the right of the latter stood the Sharpshooters of the Tenth Brigade; and those of the Twelfth Brigade formed the Right Wing of the whole Line at Bierge.
Thistirailladehad continued about an hour, when GeneralHulot's Division ofGérard'sCorps d'Arméereached the Field; and received Orders to take possession of the Mill at Bierge, and to cross the Dyle at that point. A Battalion ofVandamme's Corps was at the time vainly attempting to effect a passage. Upon the Height opposite Bierge were several guns of the Third Corps, endeavouring to keep down the fire from the Prussian Batteries on the other side of the valley.
GrouchydesiredGérardto relieve the Battalion attacking the Mill at Bierge by one of his own Corps; whereupon the latter directed GeneralHulotto push forward with a Battalion of the 9th Light Infantry for that purpose. The Battalion descended into the valley, covered by the fire from the guns on the Height. Its advance was much impeded by the swampy nature of the ground at the foot of the declivity, and by the numerous broad and deep drains by which the valley is intersected: and its order was still further deranged by the fire from the Artillery on the opposite Heights, as also by that of the PrussianSkirmishers posted along the left bank of the river, and strongly occupying the Mill. The banks of the river at this part, more particularly the left bank, are mostly lined with trees; which tended still further to increase the means of resistance on the part of the Prussians to the advance of the French troops. The latter on reaching the Mill, and relievingVandamme's troops, made an attack; but without success.
Grouchywas on the point of ordering this attack to be renewed, when he received, between six and seven o'clock,Soult's despatch, addressed to him from the Field of Waterloo at one o'clock in the afternoon: and desiring him to manœuvre always in that direction, to maintain a close communication with the main Army, and to lose not a moment in joining the latter, and attackingBülow'sCorps d'Armée; which, it added, could then be seen upon the Heights of St Lambert.
The circumstances in whichGrouchyfound himself at the time this despatch reached him, held out no prospect of his being able to fulfil, even partially, the instructions which it contained.Vandamme's efforts to force the Bridges of Wavre, and to capture the Town, were completely frustrated by the most gallant defence maintained on the part of the Prussians. The issue of the attack upon the Mill of Bierge appeared very doubtful. Neither the main body ofGérard's Corps, nor GeneralTeste's Division of the Sixth Corps, nor evenPajol's Light Cavalry, had as yet arrived.
Grouchy, becoming impatient, rode hastily towards La Baraque, accompanied byGérard, to meet the first mentioned force; and on coming up with the Columns, directed their march upon Limale, his object now being to turn the Right ofThielemann's position, and to prevent the retreat of the latter upon Brussels, and at the same timeopen his direct road to St Lambert. This he might succeed in effecting; but it is sufficiently evident from the above view of his position, at so late an hour of the day, that any important diversion on his part in favour ofNapoleon, was quite out of the question.
On returning withGérardto Wavre,Grouchyfound that notwithstanding the furious assaults that were made in rapid succession upon the Bridges, supported by the vigorous cannonade from the Heights, and the incessant fusillade along the banks of the river, no further progress was effected. As if determined that the passage should be forced, he dismounted from his horse, and placing himself at the head of a Battalion, led on another attack upon the Mill of Bierge. But the bravery of the troops, though so strongly excited by the noble example of the Marshal, could avail nothing against the indomitable resistance of the Prussian defenders of this important Post.Gérard, who had accompanied the Marshal in this attack, fell severely wounded by a shot which struck him in the breast.
Grouchynow decided upon leavingVandamme's Corps andExcelmans' Cavalry in front of Wavre and Bierge; and proceeding himself with that portion ofGérard's troops which was at hand, along the right bank of the Dyle, towards Limale, and uniting them to the remainder of the Corps which had been ordered to march in the direction of that point from La Baraque. This movement occupied considerable time, in consequence of the difficulties opposed to the march of troops along the side of the river. At length, having, arrived in front of Limale, and formed a junction withPajol's Cavalry, preparations were made for an attack.
Limale was at that time occupied by Lieutenant ColonelStengelwith the three Battalions of the 19th PrussianRegiment, two Squadrons of the 6th Uhlans, and one Squadron of the Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry. It was the Detachment left byZietenfor the purpose of covering the Left Flank of the ThirdCorps d'Armée. It had unaccountably neglected to adopt any measures for barricading the Bridge; the defence of which, if conducted with the same energy and resolution by which that of the Bridges lower down the stream had been distinguished, might have been the means of preventing the French from crossing the Dyle at all on that day.
Pajol, having reconnoitred the place and discovered his neglect, succeeded in gaining possession of the Bridge by means of a brisk Cavalry attack.Hulot's Infantry Division ofGérard's Corps reached it shortly afterwards; and it was soon made manifest to Lieutenant ColonelStengelthat he was attacked by a force much superior to his own. Nevertheless he continued to fall gradually back, in good order, untilThielemannpushed forward the Twelfth Brigade to his support. Three Battalions of the Tenth Brigade moved into the position thus vacated by the Twelfth: and a general movement was made to the right by all the troops that could be spared from the defence of Wavre and Bierge. The 4th Kurmark Landwehr, belonging to the Eleventh Brigade, crossed the Brussels road. The Reserve Cavalry was ordered to move upon Limale, in support of the Twelfth Brigade.
When ColonelStülpnagelwas ordered to move his Brigade (the Twelfth) upon Limale, he left three Battalions for the defence of Bierge. With the remaining six Battalions he came up close to the Enemy, who was posted on a Height in advance of Limale, his Left thrown considerably forward and covered by his Cavalry, and his Right resting upon some houses which he had occupied with Infantry. This Line,which was perpendicular to the direction of the original position of the Prussians, had been taken up with great skill byGrouchy, notwithstanding the difficulties with which the movement had been attended. His troops had to ascend the Heights during the obscurity of the night, in rear of Limale, by a narrow, rugged road, in the immediate proximity of the Prussians, whose fire reached the head of the Defile: and he was fully occupied until a very late hour, in posting the Battalions in their proper places, as they filed out of the road, on reaching the Height; whilst, in the mean time,Pajol's Light Cavalry pushed rapidly round by the left.
ColonelStülpnagelposted the Fusilier Battalion of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr, and his Battery, in reserve, in rear of the small Wood on the right of Bierge, and advanced to the attack, late as it was, with his five remaining Battalions, having Lieutenant ColonelStengelwith his Detachment on the right. The darkness of the night prevented the Prussians from correctly ascertaining the position and strength of the French; but nevertheless it was decided that an attempt should be made to regain Limale, and drive back the Enemy across the Dyle.
The attack was thus formed. Two Battalions in front, closely followed by the remaining three Battalions. Both the Brigade Squadrons joined the three Squadrons under Lieutenant ColonelStengel; and the whole of the Reserve Cavalry formed in support. In this movement, however, the mutual connection of the advancing troops was greatly impeded by the darkness of the night. The two Battalions in Front Line were on the point of passing a hollow way when they received a volley from two French Battalions on the opposite side, by which their further advance was checked. The three Battalions of the Second Line hadinclined too much to the left, where they became engaged with FrenchTirailleurs. Lieutenant ColonelStengel's Detachment, in attempting to push forward, was checked by the French Cavalry; and as the latter made a disposition which menaced his Right Flank, that Officer fell back with his Detachment as far as the Wood near Point du Jour.
The decided failure of the attack induced ColonelStülpnagelto withdraw all his troops to the Wood, leaving only the 1st Battalion of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr in support of the chain of Advanced Posts. The Reserve Cavalry bivouacked in rear of the Wood. Thus ended the contest on this part of the Field. The Prussian and French Picquets were so close to one another during the night, that the Patrols were constantly clashing, and the whole Line kept upon thequi vive.
Upon the Prussian Left, the conflict for the possession of the town and Bridges of Wavre continued to be carried on with unabated fury on both sides until late in the night.Vandammedevoted the whole of his Corps to the attack; constantly pushing forward fresh troops to relieve those who had failed in their attempts to dislodge the Prussians. The latter, who exhibited on this occasion an extraordinary degree of bravery and resolution, succeeded in repelling no less than thirteen different assaults; and even dislodged, in five instances, the French from the houses they occupied, from the commencement, on the right bank of the Dyle. At one time the French had already gained possession of the great Bridge and some houses on the left bank, when they were driven back again to their own side of the river by the Prussian Reserves—these having advanced to the relief of their comrades. The struggle was desperate, andapparently interminable. When the French attacked the houses nearest the Bridge they succeeded in bursting open the doors, and by superiority of numbers, in possessing themselves of the ground floors. But even this did not induce the heroic defenders to relax their exertions; on the contrary, with increased fury, they defended the upper storeys of the houses, and held out most gallantly until relieved by the arrival of their Supports.
This brilliant defence of Wavre was distinguished, on the part of the Prussians, not only by the unflinching bravery of the troops, but also by the judicious disposal of the Reserves; by means of which the Enemy was foiled in every attempt to gain a permanent footing in the town. While the Skirmishers and their Supports were posted along the Dyle and the adjacent houses, the Reserves were concealed in the nearest streets, that lay in a direction parallel with that of the river: and at the moment the French Columns of Attack, already crippled by the fire concentrated from the Skirmishers, endeavoured to force the Bridge; these Reserves rushed forward from their cover in the side streets, and presenting themselves in mass before the Enemy, invariably drove them back with great slaughter.
It was in this manner that the Fusilier Battalion of the 30th Regiment, under MajorSprenger, and the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Kurmark Landwehr, under MajorBornstädt, constantly repulsed, with admirable bravery, the attacks made with such superior numbers during the earlier part of the contest. One of these attacks having been attended with a somewhat favourable result, the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Regiment, under MajorBeaufort, was brought forward; and, at a similarly critical moment, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr, underMajorGrolman, came up; when both Battalions succeeded in compelling the Enemy to retire.
These Battalions then took post in the streets lying parallel with the river, in the manner before explained; and, with heroic courage, overcame every renewed attempt on the part of the French to establish themselves in the town. When, finally, it is considered that from four o'clock until night, four Prussian Battalions successfully maintained their ground against a wholeCorps d'Armée, with which they were constantly and desperately engaged during the whole of that period; the merits of ColonelZepelinand his brave troops are beyond all praise, and present one of the brightest examples of the defence of a town and of the passage of a river, recorded in military history.
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Battle of Wavre
Both the Bridges of Wavre remained in the possession of the Prussians, and the smaller one was barricaded during the night.
At a late hour, as the fire on both sides began to slacken, the combatants bivouacked on their respective sides of the river. Upon the Prussian extreme Left at Bas Wavre, the French had only shown one Battalion. This occupied an isolated building, and was supported by two Squadrons and a piece of artillery. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to gain the Bridge; which, at nightfall, continued in the possession of the Prussians.
Grouchywas occupied late in the night in making his preparations for renewing the attack on the following morning. GeneralTeste's Division of the Sixth Corps having at length arrived, his Left Wing, which was thus considerably reinforced, bivouacked upon the Height westward of Bierge; separated by this Village and the Dyle from his Right Wing which lay in front of Wavre. He had not yet received any intelligence ofNapoleon's signal defeat atWaterloo; and was therefore resolved upon following up, at daybreak, the advantages he had already gained, by forcing back the Prussian Right Flank.
Thielemann, on the contrary, having despatched an Officer ofMarwitz's Cavalry Brigadeen reconnaissanceto the right, ascertained through this means that the Allied Armies had gained a complete victory; and he therefore fully expected thatGrouchywould be compelled to effect an immediate retreat.
With the first dawn of the 19th of June, ColonelStengel, whose Detachment was posted on the extreme Right ofThielemann's Corps, took upon himself to march off by St Lambert, to join hisCorps d'Armée(the First); the grounds for which proceeding remain to the present time as unaccountable as his neglect on the previous day to secure the Bridge of Limale. In consequence of this movement, the Twelfth Brigade was necessitated to extend its Line too much to the right and to retain a Reserve of only three weak Battalions upon the road leading through the Wood to Point du Jour. The Wood to the right was occupied by a Battalion and two Companies from each of the remaining Regiments of the Twelfth Brigade. The Left Wing of this Line, which rested upon Bierge, was formed by six Battalions of the Tenth Brigade.
ColonelLuck, commanding the Eleventh Brigade, was directed to support this Division, which was much too weak, with the three Battalions of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr; but to leave the two Battalions of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr, as also the Brigade Squadrons, in rear of Wavre, in a hollow near the Windmill, where they served to cover the twelve pounder Battery No. 7.
The Mill of Bierge was occupied by two Battalions of the Twelfth Brigade: Wavre and Bas Wavre were held by thesame troops which defended those points on the previous day. The barricades and preparations for defence were rendered more complete.
Lieutenant ColonelLedebur, whose Detachment, consisting of the 10th Hussars, a Squadron of Landwehr Cavalry, and two guns from the Horse Battery No. 12, had formed on the 18th the Advance of the Rear Guard whichThielemann's Corps was considered to constitute, having reached St Lambert beforeGrouchy's attack became so decided, remained there during the night.
Early on the 19th,Grouchysent off three Cavalry Regiments to his left to watch these troops. They showed no indication of an intention to attack; and when, later in the day, they retired and disappeared fromLedebur's view, the latter passed the Defile, for the purpose of proceeding to join hisCorps d'Armée(the Fourth), which, however, he did not reach before the 20th.
This, as well as ColonelStengel's Detachment, thus withdrew from the Field, without any apparent necessity, reducingThielemann's numbers, already too weak, and taking up a line of march, along which their services were comparatively useless.
Thielemann, concluding from the account that he had received of the defeat ofNapoleon, that the French would commence a retreat, renewed the combat at daybreak by an attack with his Cavalry. ColonelMarwitzwas sent forward, with the 8th Uhlans and two Squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, towards the plateau above Limale, occupied byGrouchy's Left Wing: whilst GeneralHobefollowed this movement with the 5th and 7th Uhlans, and formed up on the left of the Advanced Cavalry. The 5th Uhlans were immediately afterwards advantageously posted in a hollow in support of ColonelMarwitz.
The Horse Battery No. 20, subsequently reinforced by the Foot Battery No. 18, opened a cannonade upon the Enemy's Columns at the plateau; which displayed a great superiority of numbers, and were supported by a considerable force of Cavalry. The preponderating number of guns in the Enemy's Line answered the fire of the Prussians with great vigour; and as the intervening space was very limited, the numbers of killed and wounded were very great. The Prussian Artillery lost five guns on this occasion.
Grouchydelayed not a moment in making dispositions for an attack on his part. His force on this side of the Field consisted of the three Divisions ofGérard's Corps, and ofTeste's Division of the Sixth Corps. The latter and two of the former were posted in Front Line; the remaining Division, in Reserve. He formed three Columns of Attack. That on the right consisted ofTeste's Division, and was directed upon Bierge; the central Column was put in motion against the Prussian Centre; and that on the left against the Right of the Prussian formation.
The head of each Column was accompanied by a Battery, and preceded by a swarm of Skirmishers. At the same time,Pajolput his Cavalry in motion, and threatened to turn the Prussian Right.
Thielemannresolved upon not only offering to the Enemy a vigorous opposition; but also upon assuming the offensive himself, and immediately gave the necessary Orders for that purpose. He also reinforced his Right with two more Companies, and his Left with an additional Battalion.
It was soon made manifest, however, that this attack failed to check the forward movement of the Enemy. The ten Prussian Battalions were forced to give way to the advance of twenty two French Battalions, which were followed by six more in support. The French gainedpossession of that part of the Wood of Rixansart which was on the right of the Prussian position, and drove back the Twelfth Brigade. The Battalions of the latter collected again immediately in rear of the Wood, under the protection of the three before mentioned Battalions of the Eleventh Brigade and of a Battery of fifteen guns.
GeneralTeste's Division had in the mean time attacked Bierge, which was bravely defended by the two Battalions of the Kurmark Landwehr. Whilst the engagement continued at this point,Thielemanntook up a second position in rear of the first, with four Battalions of the Tenth Brigade, and occupied the small Wood in rear of Bierge. The Prussian Cavalry Brigade, under ColonelsMarwitzand CountLottum, comprising twelve Squadrons, secured the right towards Chambre.
About eight o'clock, just as this position had been taken up,Thielemannreceived, through GeneralPirch, the decisive and authentic intelligence that a great victory had been gained by the Allies on the previous day, as also a communication of the fact of the SecondCorps d'Arméehaving marched to interceptGrouchy's retreat upon the Sambre. Advantage was immediately taken of these joyful tidings to raise the spirits of the troops, and to excite them to a renewed attack. With loud cheers the Prussian Batteries advanced to the attack; which was attended with complete success, and even the Wood of Rixansart was again taken.
The Enemy appeared irresolute, and as if impressed with the idea thatThielemannhad received reinforcements; but observing that no further progress was made, he renewed the attack on his part, and retook the Wood of Rixansart.
It was not until about this time—towards nine o'clock—thatTeste's Division gained possession of the Village ofBierge; on which occasion GeneralPenne, an Officer of considerable distinction in the French Army, was killed. The French were prevented for some time from debouching from the place, by the determined opposition of theTirailleursof the 31st Prussian Regiment, under MajorNatzmer.
Thielemannhad now done all which could possibly have been expected from any General under similar circumstances—with a force not equal to one half of that of the Enemy, he had endeavoured, whenever an opportunity offered, and in defiance of superior numbers, to force back the French Left Wing upon the Dyle; but now that he had failed in effecting this object, and that Bierge, the key of his position, had been taken from him, whilst the French Left was pressing forward with increased numbers to gain the Brussels road, he saw very plainly that to attempt to maintain his ground any longer would be to expose himself to the imminent risk of total overthrow, and that no other course was left to him but to order a general retreat.
It was about ten o'clock in the morning when the Prussian troops began to retire from the Field. The Town of Wavre had not been attacked on the 19th, and ColonelZepelinabandoned it without being much pressed upon his line of retreat. ColonelMarwitzwas ordered to form the Rear Guard, which was furnished from the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and the 3rd and 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry. It was accompanied by three Batteries of Horse, and one of Foot, Artillery. With these troops ColonelMarwitztook Post, at first, in front of the Brussels road; placing three Batteries on his Left, and the remaining one in Reserve.Thielemanngave the Rear Guard an express Order not to march off until Wavre had been completely evacuated.
In the mean time,Gérard'sCorps d'Arméehad crossedthe Dyle both at Bierge and at Wavre. The two Battalions of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr, which had been posted in the hollow in rear of the Town, for the protection of the twelve pounder Battery, became closely pressed in consequence of this movement. One of the Battalions under MajorSchmadehad advanced against an Enemy's Column near the Brussels road; when it unexpectedly received the fire of three French Battalions, which were pushing forward under cover of an eminence, and followed by some Cavalry. The Battalion succeeded in reaching the small Wood near La Bavette; and as the Enemy attempted to turn the latter, it suddenly attacked and drove him back, after which it came up with the Rear Guard. The other Battalion, commanded by MajorSchwerin, attacked a French Battalion which was advancing against it, threw it back in confusion, and then continued its retreat. The gallantry and steadiness displayed in this affair by the Kurmark Landwehr acquired for the latter great and well merited renown.
The French Cavalry debouched from the Wood of Rixansart and drew up, with its Left resting upon Chambre.Vandammenow advanced the Columns of his Corps towards the Heights of La Bavette, and pushed forward some Cavalry along the high road. The latter, however, was driven back by ColonelMarwitz.
It has been explained that GeneralBorcke, instead of posting his remaining six Battalions in rear of the position at Wavre, as intended byThielemann, proceeded on his march to Couture, by St Lambert. This place he reached about nightfall, when he despatched an Officer toBlücherto report his arrival. The latter, in reply, desired him to bivouac on the spot where he was, and to await further Orders on the following morning. The Brigade was still in its bivouac at seven o'clock the next morning, when ColonelStengelpassed through St Lambert with his Detachment. The latter informed GeneralBorckethat he had defended the Bridge of Limale, and had been followed by the Enemy's troops.
Borcke, on hearing this, immediately broke up his bivouac, and decided upon securing the Wood which extends from St Rober as far as Rixansart. He deployed two Battalions of the 8th Regiment along the edge of the Wood, and held the remaining four Battalions of his Brigade, then with him, in reserve. Perceiving French Cavalry, at the time of their first attack, marching into the Wood of Rixansart for the purpose of advancing through it upon Chambre; he opened a fire upon them from his Battery, with the hope of checking their movement. The only effect it produced was that of their detaching three Regiments of Cavalry towards his Brigade. These, however, contented themselves with watching his movements. It is curious that the Ninth Brigade, as if bent upon continuing the blunder committed the previous day of detaching itself from its Corps, should not have attempted, with its six Battalions, to effect a more important diversion upon the Enemy's extreme Left, from which it was not more than three thousand paces distant. It was then eight o'clock, and the Battle was maintained until about eleven; and yet GeneralBorckeallowed the three Cavalry Regiments to move off and join the remainder of the French Cavalry, towards ten o'clock, at Chambre, without even attempting to molest their movement.
Thielemanneffected his retreat, in several Columns, by Ottenburg and St Achtenrode; at which latter place (about half way to Louvain) he took up a position. The French Cavalry followed as far as the Brussels road, and the Infantry occupied the Heights of La Bavette.
Between Wavre and Louvain the country assumes a newcharacter, being covered with hedges, hollow ways, ditches, and gardens, and is altogether much intersected. From Ottenburg as far as St Achtenrode, there is almost one continued defile. In this, Cavalry cannot act with advantage; and it was therefore fortunate for the Prussian Cavalry that it was followed but slowly by the French.
The loss experienced byThielemann'sCorps d'Arméein this Battle of the 18th and 19th of June, amounted to 2,476 men. No returns whatever of the losses sustained byGrouchy's Army are forthcoming, but they could not have been less than those of the Prussians.
Such was the Battle of Wavre; a Battle the result of which was of no advantage toNapoleonon the 18th, and of positive disadvantage to him on the 19th. On the former day it did not prevent the march of the great mass of the Prussian Army towards the Field of Waterloo; and, on the 19th, the continuance of the contest, whileNapoleonwas in full flight, exposed this, the only remaining intact, portion of the French Army, to the imminent risk of being completely cut off from all retreat. Nor can this defeat ofThielemannbe looked upon as having shed additional lustre upon the French arms, when it is considered how long and successfully the Prussians battled against them with less than half their strength.
The errors which led to the circumstance of the force underGrouchy—constituting, asNapoleonhimself has been pleased to term it, the Right Wing of the French Army—becoming exclusively occupied in attacking a single Corps of the Prussian Army; whilst the remaining three Corps of the latter were wending their way unmolested towards the decisive Field of Battle, have already been sufficiently discussed: and now that their result has been fully exhibited,it is scarcely necessary to draw attention to the proof which the latter affords of the entire ignorance of each other's proceedings which characterised the conduct ofNapoleonandGrouchy, great Generals as they were, in this memorable Campaign. The former received intelligence, before he began the Battle withWellington, that the Right Wing was to follow the Prussians to Wavre, and to act in such a manner as to prevent these from detaching towards the Anglo-Allied Army; and therefore felt satisfied that his general plan of operations was in successful progress. But in less than two hours from the commencement of the Battle, the fatal consequence of both Generals having unaccountably neglected to maintain a vigilant reconnaissance and an uninterrupted communication, was made manifest; and the first intimationNapoleonreceived of the advance of the Prussians towards La Belle Alliance was the distant view which he himself had, from his own Field, ofBülow's Corps descending the Heights of St Lambert, at about one o'clock.
The leading principle of the French Emperor's plan was to endeavour, by all means in his power, to beat the Armies opposed to himin detail. It was therefore incumbent on him, in order to insure the success of that plan, to adopt such precautionary measures as should procure for him the earliest and the clearest information concerning the movements of his Enemies. If he found it necessary temporarily to divide his force, and act upon two lines; those measures became still more indispensable, and at the same time admitted the greater facility of execution. Several reconnoitring parties, both upon the Flanks of the Army and in front of the interval between the two lines of operation, under the guidance of experienced, active and intelligent Officers, would have obtained for both Generals that insight into the movements and designs oftheir opponents which was so essential for the attainment of their common object: whilst parties detached from each Wing, for the sole purpose of maintaining a close and direct communication between them, would have afforded the ready means of regulating each other's proceedings according to the circumstances under which they might have found themselves respectively placed.