The French had by this time established a Battery of Horse Artillery on the left of Genappe and upon the opposite bank of the river, from which they opened a brisk fire upon the British Cavalry in support, and several shot struck the main body of the 7th Hussars, upsetting men and horses, and causing great impediments in their rear. The French Lancers now advanced, and drove the 7th Hussars upon their Reserve; but here the 7th rallied, renewed their attack, and forced back the Lancers upon the town. The latter having been reinforced, rallied, in their turn, and drove back the Hussars. These, however, again rallied, and resolutely faced their opponents, with whom they gallantly continued a fierce encounter for some time longer, when to terminate a conflict which was most obstinate and sanguinary without being productive of any favourable result, but in which the bravery of the 7th Hussars shone most conspicuously, and became the theme of admiration of all who witnessed it, LordUxbridgedecided upon withdrawing that Regiment and charging with the 1st Life Guards. As soon as the Hussars went about, in pursuance of the Orders received, the Lancers followed them. In themêléewhich ensued, the French lost quite as many men as did the Hussars; and when at length the latter were able to disengage themselves, the former did not attempt to follow them. The 7th retired through the 23rd Light Dragoons,took the first favourable turn off the road and reformed in the adjoining field.
During this contest, the French, having become sensible of the evil that might arise from the closely wedged state of the Cavalry in the town, began to clear the rear of the most advanced portions of the Column, so as to admit of more freedom of movement in case of disaster. A Battery of British Horse Artillery had taken post close to a house on the Height occupied by the Heavy Cavalry, and on the left of the road; and it was now replying to the French Battery on the opposite bank of the river.
So exceedingly elated were the French with having repulsed the 7th Hussars in this their first serious encounter with the British Cavalry, that immediately on that Regiment retiring, the whole Column that was in Genappe raised the war cry, and rent the air with shouts of "En avant!—En avant!" evincing the greatest impatience to follow up this momentary advantage, and to attack the Supports; for which, indeed, the opportunity appeared very favourable, as the ranks of the latter were suffering considerable annoyance from the well directed and effective fire of the French guns on the opposite bank of the river.
They now abandoned the secure cover to which they had been indebted for their temporary success, and were advancing up the ascent with all the confidence of a fancied superiority, when the Earl ofUxbridge, seizing upon the advantage presented for attacking them while moving up hill, with their Flanks unsupported, and a narrow Defile in their rear, and being also desirous of affording the 1st Life Guards an opportunity of charging, brought forward that Regiment through the 23rd Light Dragoons, who opened out for its passage to the front. The Life Guards now made their charge, most gallantly headed by Colonel SirJohn Elley, Deputy Adjutant General, who, at the moment of contact with the Enemy, began by cutting down two men right and left. It was truly a splendid charge; its rapid rush down into the Enemy's mass, was as terrific in appearance as it was destructive in its effect; for although the French met the attack with firmness, they were utterly unable to hold their ground a single moment, were overthrown with great slaughter, and literally ridden down in such a manner that the road was instantaneously covered with men and horses, scattered in all directions. The Life Guards, pursuing their victorious course, dashed into Genappe, and drove all before them as far as the opposite outlet of the town.
This brilliant and eminently successful charge made a deep impression upon the Enemy, who now conducted his pursuit with extreme caution. The 23rd Light Dragoons, which had supported the 1st Life Guards in their charge, became again the last Regiment in the Rear Guard, and continued so during the remainder of the retreat.Ponsonby's Brigade had deployed to the right of the high road, and the guns were so disposed as to take advantageous positions, retiringen échiquier.
The Enemy, after quitting Genappe, tried to get upon the Flanks of the Centre retiring Column, chiefly upon the Right Flank; but the Royals, Greys, and Inniskillings, manœuvred beautifully; retiring by alternate Squadrons, and covered by their own Skirmishers, who completely beat the French Light Cavalry in that kind of warfare. Finding that from the deep state of the ground, there was not the least danger of his being turned by the Enemy, LordUxbridgegradually withdrewPonsonby's Brigade to the high road. He kept the Light Cavalry, protected by the Household Brigade, as the Rear Guard, and slowly retired into the chosen positionin front of Waterloo, the guns and rockets constantly plying the Enemy's Advance, which, although it pressed forward twice or thrice, and made preparations to attack, never ventured to come to close quarters with its opponents; and the Column received from it no further molestation.
On arriving at the foot of the Anglo-Allied position, the 23rd Light Dragoons moved off to the (Allied) right of the high road, and into the hollow in which lies the Orchard of the Farm of La Haye Sainte. Here they were drawn up, prepared to meet the French Advanced Guard, should it follow them, or to fall upon its Flank, should it venture to continue its march along the road. The latter, however, halted upon the Height which intervenes between La Haye Sainte and La Belle Alliance, and opened a fire upon the Centre of the Duke ofWellington's Line, above the former Farm, from two Batteries of Horse Artillery.
Picton, who was then upon the rising ground in rear of La Haye Sainte, and who was intently watching the Enemy's advance along the high road, perceived Columns of Infantry advancing from La Belle Alliance. He immediately took upon himself to unite the two Batteries nearest at hand, which were those under MajorLloydof the British Artillery, and MajorCleevesof the King's German Legion (although not belonging to his own Division), and to place them in position on the high ground close to the Charleroi road. The guns immediately opened a brisk cannonade upon the French Columns, of which they had obtained a most accurate range just as their leading Divisions had entered the inclosed space between the high banks which line the high road where it is cut through the Height before mentioned as intervening between La Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte. This mass of the Enemy's Infantry suffered severely from the fire, to which it stood exposed about half an hour: forthe head of the Column having been unable to retrograde, in consequence of the pressure from its rear, and prevented by the high bank on either side of the road from filing off to a flank, could not readily extricate itself from so embarrassing a situation.
During the whole of this fire, the Allied Batteries were replied to, though very ineffectually, by the two Batteries of French Horse Artillery posted on the Height in question.
It was now twilight: the approaching darkness was greatly accelerated by the lowering aspect of the sky. Picquets were hastily thrown forward by both Armies, and to so great a height had the mutual spirit of defiance arisen, that the near approach of opposing parties, advancing to take up their ground for the night, led to little Cavalry affairs, which, though unproductive of any useful result to either side, were distinguished, on different points of the Lines, by a chivalrous bravery which seemed to require a prudent restraint.
In one of these affairs, CaptainHeyligerof the 7th Hussars, made a very brilliant charge with his Troop; and when the Duke ofWellingtonsent to check him, his Grace desired to be made acquainted with the name of an Officer who had displayed so much gallantry. A very spirited charge was also made by the Right Troop of the 2nd Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, under LieutenantHugo; who was allowed by his Commanding Officer to volunteer for that service, and who, from the vicinity of Hougomont, boldly rushed up the Height intervening between that point and Mon Plaisir, and gallantly drove back a portion of the French Advanced Guard of Cavalry; recapturing at the same time three carriages filled with British sick and wounded.
The manner in which the Duke ofWellingtonwithdrewhis Army from the position of Quatre Bras to the one of Waterloo, must ever render that retreat a perfect model of operations of this nature, performed in the immediate presence of a powerful Enemy. Those dispositions which have been described as having been made by him for the purpose of masking the retirement of the main body, of affording perfect security to the passage of the Defile in his rear, and of ensuring the orderly and regular assembly of the several Corps on the ground respectively allotted to them in the new position, evince altogether a degree of skill which has never been surpassed.
In such operations, the covering of the Army by its Cavalry and Light Troops necessarily forms an important feature; and a glance at the manner in which this duty was fulfilled by the Earl ofUxbridge, with the Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and a few Light Battalions, at his disposal, is sufficient to show that the exemplification of such feature on this occasion was exceedingly beautiful. Indeed, so orderly and so perfect were all the arrangements connected with this retreat, from its commencement to its close, that the movements partook more of the appearance of a Field Day upon a large scale, than of an operation executed in the actual presence of an Enemy; and this was particularly observable as regarded the protection afforded by the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, which manœuvred to admiration, and in a style that, combined with the brilliant charge by the 1st Life Guards at Genappe, evidently impressed the Enemy with a due sense of the efficiency of the gallant troops immediately in his front. It may here also be remarked, that the judicious dispositions made by LordUxbridgein covering this retreat, and the high degree of confidence with which he inspired the Cavalry, afforded well grounded anticipations of the success likely to attend his measureswhen conducting that Cavalry in the open battle field, on which, it was foreseen, its prowess would so very soon be tested. The British and German portion of the Cavalry was in excellent order, and seemed already to have imbibed, in a high degree, that gallant bearing and chivalrous spirit, which it beheld and admired in its distinguished Chief.
In the course of the evening, the Duke received from PrinceBlüchera reply to the request he had made for his support in the position he was now occupying. It was highly characteristic of the old man, who had written it, in the following terms, without previously conferring with, or addressing himself to, any one:—"I shall not come with two Corps only, but with my whole Army; upon this understanding, however, that should the French not attack us on the 18th, we shall attack them on the 19th."
The Duke, who, as has already been explained, had, from the commencement of the Campaign, considered it very possible thatNapoleonwould advance by the Mons road, still entertained apprehensions of an attempt on the part of his opponent to turn him by Hal, and seize Brussels by acoup de main. For this, however, he was fully prepared, having made his dispositions for the security of that Flank, in the manner pointed out in the following instructions, which he issued to Major General the Hon. SirCharles Colville:—
"17th June 1815."The Army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its present position in front of Waterloo."The Brigades of the Fourth Division, at Braine le Comte, are to retire at daylight tomorrow morning upon Hal."Major GeneralColvillemust be guided by the intelligence he receives of the Enemy's movements in his march to Hal, whether he moves by the direct route or by Enghien."PrinceFrederickof Orange is to occupy with his Corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible."The Army will probably continue in its position in front of Waterloo tomorrow."Lieutenant ColonelTorrenswill inform Lieutenant General SirCharles Colvilleof the position and situation of the Armies."
"17th June 1815.
"The Army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its present position in front of Waterloo.
"The Brigades of the Fourth Division, at Braine le Comte, are to retire at daylight tomorrow morning upon Hal.
"Major GeneralColvillemust be guided by the intelligence he receives of the Enemy's movements in his march to Hal, whether he moves by the direct route or by Enghien.
"PrinceFrederickof Orange is to occupy with his Corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible.
"The Army will probably continue in its position in front of Waterloo tomorrow.
"Lieutenant ColonelTorrenswill inform Lieutenant General SirCharles Colvilleof the position and situation of the Armies."
The respective lines of Picquets and Vedettes had scarcely been taken up along the low ground that skirted the front of the Anglo-Allied position, and the last gun had just boomed from the Heights, when "heaven's artillery," accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, again peeled forth in solemn and awful grandeur; while the rain, pouring down in torrents, imparted the utmost gloom and discomfort to the bivouacs, which the opposing Armies had established for the night, upon the ground destined to become celebrated in history, even to the remotest ages.
CHAPTER VIII.
IT was not until the night of the 16th, afterZieten's andPirch'sCorps d'Arméehad retired to Tilly and Gentinnes, that it was decided the Prussian Army should retreat upon Wavre. This decision was communicated in the Orders then transmitted from the Prussian Head Quarters to the First and SecondCorps d'Armée(Zieten's andPirch's) directing them to bivouac at Bierge and St Anne, in the vicinity of Wavre; as also in the Orders forwarded, on the next morning, to the bivouacs of the Third and Fourth Corps (Thielemann's andBülow's), at Gembloux and Basse Bodecée, directing them to fall back, and bivouac at La Bavette and Dion le Mont near Wavre.
Zieten's andPirch's Corps retired by Mont St Guibert, in rear of which Defile the latter Corps remained a considerable time as Rear Guard, while the former marched on toWavre, where it arrived about midday, crossed the Dyle, and took up its position at Bierge.Pirchfollowed the same route, but took post on the right bank of the Dyle, between St Anne and Aisemont.
With the first glimmering of daylight the troops, which, under the command of GeneralJagow, had continued in full possession of Bry and its immediate vicinity during the night, began to retire, firstly, in the direction of Sombref, and thence to Gembloux, which they reached before the arrival ofThielemann's Corps. After the receipt of the Order pointing out the direction of theretreat,Jagowconducted these troops, in the course of the 17th, towards their respective Brigades.
Lieutenant ColonelSohr, whose Cavalry Brigade with half a Horse Battery, formed the Rear Guard of the line of retreat ofZieten's andPirch's Corps, received Orders to take up a concealed position between Tilly and Gentinnes, thence to watch the movements of the Enemy; and, as soon as he found himself pressed by the latter, to fall back upon the Defile of Mont St Guibert.
Thielemann, who, it will be recollected, had received a message fromGneisenau, leaving it optional with him to retire by Tilly or Gembloux, according to circumstances, decided on falling back upon the latter point; being well aware that the Enemy was in possession of the Villages of St Amand and Ligny, and of the Field of Battle to within a very short distance from Sombref.
He had collected together his widely disseminated Brigades, and drawn in his Advanced Posts; an operation which, executed in the darkness of the night, retarded his departure so much that it was two o'clock in the morning before the Reserve Artillery, which formed the head of the Column, struck into the road which at Point du Jour, leads from the Namurchausséeto Gembloux. The Rear Guard of this line of retreat, which consisted of the Ninth Infantry Brigade, under Major GeneralBorcke, and the Reserve Cavalry, under GeneralHobe, and was drawn up along the Namur road, having in its front the Fleuruschaussée, leading directly towards the Enemy, did not commence its march until after four o'clock, when the sun had risen. The main body of the Corps reached Gembloux at six o'clock in the morning.
On approaching this place,Thielemannlearned thatBülowhad posted the Fourth Corps about three miles inrear of Gembloux, upon the old Roman road; whereupon MajorWeyrach, Aide de Camp to PrinceBlücher, who had continued withThielemannduring the night of the 16th, set off to seek out the Field Marshal, and to report to him the position and attendant circumstances of the Third and FourthCorps d'Armée. He soon succeeded in discovering the Prussian Head Quarters at Mélioreux, and communicated the above important information to CountGneisenau.
Thielemanngave his own Corps a halt on the other side of the town, in order that his troops might obtain rest and refreshment.
The Advance ofBülow's Corps had reached Basse Bodecée, upon the old Roman road, at nightfall of the 16th of June. Here that General became acquainted with the loss of the Battle of Ligny: whereupon he ordered the Brigades of his Corps to be posted at intervals along this road, with the exception of the Thirteenth (under Lieutenant GeneralHake), which was directed to bivouac more to the rear, near Hottoment, where the same road is intersected by that which conducts from Namur to Louvain.
Both Corps remained for some hours in a state of uncertainty as to the direction to be taken for forming a junction with the First and Second Corps.Thielemannwrote toBülowthat he had received no Orders from PrinceBlücher, but that he presumed the retreat was upon St Trond. He also stated that he had not been followed by the Enemy, but that he had heard distant firing on the right, which he concluded was connected with the Duke ofWellington's Army.
At length, about half past nine o'clock, PrinceBlücher's Aide de Camp, MajorWeyrach, arrived atBülow's HeadQuarters, and brought the Orders for the retreat of the Fourth Corps to Dion le Mont, near Wavre, by Walhain and Corbaix. The Orders also required thatBülowshould post the main body of his Rear Guard (which consisted of the Fourteenth Brigade) at Vieux Sart; as also that he should send a Detachment, consisting of one Regiment of Cavalry, two Battalions of Infantry, and two guns of Horse Artillery, to the Defile of Mont St Guibert, to act, in the first instance as a Support to Lieutenant ColonelSohr, who was at Tilly, and then, upon the latter falling back, to act as Rear Guard in this direction. Lieutenant ColonelLedeburwas accordingly detached upon this duty with the 10th Hussars, the Fusilier Battalions of the 11th Regiment of Infantry and 1st Regiment of Pomeranian Landwehr, together with two guns from the Horse Battery No. 12. The Corps itself moved directly upon Dion le Mont, and on reaching the Height near that town, on which is situated the public house ofA tous vents, took up a position close to the intersection of the roads leading to Louvain, Wavre, and Gembloux.
At two o'clock in the afternoon,Thielemanncommenced his march upon Wavre; where the Corps arrived late in the evening, and took up its position at La Bavette, leaving the Ninth Infantry Brigade (GeneralBorcke) and the Cavalry Brigade of Colonel CountLottum, on the right bank of the Dyle. In this position the Corps was now rejoined by ColonelMarwitz' Cavalry Brigade, which had retired by Tilly; as also by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr, and the two Squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, which troops had been left at Dinant. The Squadron of the 7th Uhlans that had been detached to Onoz, also joined, but having fallen in with asuperior force of the Enemy's Cavalry, had experienced a great loss. The two Squadrons of the 9th Hussars, belonging to this Corps, had not yet arrived from Ciney.
The Prussian Head Quarters were established, early on the 17th, at Wavre. The veteran Field Marshal, who was still suffering considerably in consequence of his fall, was obliged to seek rest the moment he arrived there, and did not quit his bed during the remainder of the day.
In the course of the forenoon, LieutenantMassow, who had been despatched with a message to the Duke ofWellington, returned with the one from his Grace, communicating the intention of the latter to fall back upon Waterloo and accept a battle there, provided he received the support of two Prussian Corps. (See page 264.) There was every disposition to enter into this proposal, but some degree of uncertainty existed as to whetherBülow's Corps would join the Army on the 17th, as also a certain misgiving respecting the Park of Ammunition of bothZieten's andPirch's Corps, which had been directed upon Gembloux, a circumstance that excited apprehensions as to the possibility of furnishing the much needed supply of ammunition to these Corps which were at hand. In this state of uncertainty, no other resolution could be adopted than that of holding the position in front and in rear of the Dyle (with the Advanced Guard of the Fourth Corps as far forward as Mont St Guibert), until the required ammunition should be obtained; andBlücherdeferred replying toWellington's communication, in the hope that his Army would very soon be relieved from the unpleasant circumstances above mentioned.
While the Prussians were thus effecting their retreat ingood order, along the cross roads of that part of the country (high road there was none), no corresponding activity manifested itself on the part of the French, whom the morning's dawn found still lying in their bivouac. Their Vedettes stood within half a mile of the Columns ofThielemann's Rear Guard; the retreat of which, not having commenced until after sunrise, might have been easily remarked: and had the French detached but the smallest Patrol, they could not have failed to discover the direction of that retreat—whether towards Namur or Gembloux.
It was not until afterThielemannhad retired a sufficient distance to escape further notice that any disposition for movement occurred to disturb the perfect quietude of their repose. Then,Pajolwith a Division of his Light Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant General BaronSoult, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars, was detached in pursuit of the Prussians. He struck into the Namur road, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant General BaronTeste's Infantry Division ofLobau's Corps (the Sixth), followed in support, and took up a position on the Heights of Mazy.
Pajolhad not proceeded very far when he perceived a Prussian Battery retiring upon Namur, which he lost no time in capturing and forwarding to Head Quarters; where the circumstance strengthened the belief thatBlücherhad retreated by that road. It was the Prussian Horse Battery No. 14, belonging to the Second Corps, which, having towards the end of the Battle expended every shot, had driven off the Field to procure a fresh supply of ammunition, but had not succeeded in falling in with the Reserve Ammunition Waggons. The Battery neither returned to its own Corps, nor did it comply withThielemann's express Order to march upon Gembloux, but consumed much time in uselessly driving first in one direction, and then in another. Itwas accompanied at this moment by a Squadron of the 7th Prussian Uhlans, which the Third Corps had neglected to recall from Onoz. The Squadron retired on the approach of the French Cavalry, and escaped with a loss of 30 men; but all the guns fell into the hands of the Enemy.
Pajol, feeling at last some reason to doubt that Namur was a point in the Prussian retreat, diverged from the high road, and proceeded to St Denis, where he was joined byTeste's Division. A Brigade ofExcelmans' Cavalry Corps had been detached to offer support toPajol, should the latter require it; but in consequence of certain information, gained upon the road, it was subsequently directed to proceed towards Gembloux, on approaching which it discovered traces of the Prussian retreat.
Grouchy, who commanded the Right Wing of the French Army inNapoleon's absence, repaired early in the morning to the Emperor's Quarters at Fleurus, for instructions, according to an Order he had received to that effect on the previous evening. He was desired to wait and accompany the Emperor, who was going to visit the Field of Battle. The latter, however, did not start from Fleurus until between eight and nine o'clock, and on reaching St Amand, he examined the approaches by which this Village had been attacked the day before; then, he rode about the Field, gave directions for the care of the wounded; and, as he passed in front of different Regiments, that were falling in without arms on the ground where they were bivouacked, he was received with loud cheers. He addressed himself to nearly all the Corps, and assured them of the lively satisfaction he had felt on witnessing their conduct in the battle. Having dismounted, he conversed freely, and at great length, withGrouchyandGérard, on the state of public opinion inParis, the different political parties, and on various other subjects quite unconnected with those military operations upon the successful issue of which depended the stability of his present power.
ThatNapoleonshould have neglected to follow up the advantages which fortune had thrown in his way on the morning of the 17th of June, is quite incomprehensible. With the exception of a Prussian Picquet at Gentinnes, his whole front as far as Gembloux, was perfectly clear of an Enemy.Wellingtonwas still in position at Quatre Bras, where his Left had become exposed by the retreat of the Prussians, and in rear of which point was the Defile of Genappe. There was nothing to preventNapoleonfrom marching directly upon that Defile; and supporting, by a vigorous attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left and Rear, a simultaneous movement against the Front by the force underNey. Whither had fled the mighty spirit which had shone forth with such dazzling brilliancy in former Wars, and which had never displayed the energy of its powers of combination, and activity in following up successes, more eminently than in the Campaign of the previous year? When before did he omit pressing every advantage to the utmost, or neglect to seize that moment of time, in which, having defeated one portion of his Enemies, he was enabled to fall with combined force upon another? His Army was not more fatigued than was that ofWellington, which had arrived at Quatre Bras by forced marches. The troops which he subsequently did lead upon that point, when it was too late, consisting chiefly of the Imperial Guard and the Sixth Corps, were comparatively fresh. The former had not been engaged at Ligny until towards the termination of the action, when they suffered scarcely any loss; the latter, which arrived later, had remained intact. The idea offorming a junction withNey, with a view of attackingWellington, was certainly entertained; but its execution was most unaccountably and unnecessarily delayed until its intended effect could not but fall powerless upon a vigilant Enemy, fully prepared, by having improved the precious moments of time, thus lost, to detect the purpose of the movement, and to ward off the intended blow.
With an Army greatly inferior in numbers to the united forces of his adversaries,Napoleon's prospects of success rested exclusively upon his utmost skill and address, not only in preventing that union of force, but also in so planning, arranging, and executing his combinations, that having succeeded in defeating one opponent with a superior mass, he might then precipitate himself in like manner upon another, at the very moment when the latter might be occupied or engaged with one of his Marshals. This would have exacted of him the most untiring energy, the application of all his great resources in strategical science, a lightning-swift decision, and a daring resolution both in adopting and in executing all his movements. It was by the exercise of such powerful mental resources as these, that, unaided by a sufficiently corresponding amount of physical force, he had conducted the Campaign of 1814; but the spirit by which they were conceived, and the genius which instinctively seized the means of their execution, seemed to have abandoned him in this, his last, Campaign: a faint gleam of the old spirit was visible in its opening movements, but it was now rather a wildfire, dazzling him for a moment, on the downward path to his destiny, than the Star which had so often led him to victory. The last flash of his genius was brief, and, on the memorable plains of Fleurus, seemed to disappear, and leave him in utter darkness.
The same fatal inactivity which had marked the FrenchEmperor's proceedings on the evening of the 15th, and during the morning of the 16th, again manifested itself upon the 17th of June: and it was not until nearly noon of this day, upon receiving a report of a reconnaissance, made in the direction of Quatre Bras, and upon learning that a considerable body of Prussians had been discovered at Gembloux, that he made any disposition for the movement of his troops, beyond the previous detaching ofPajol's Light Cavalry in pursuit of the Prussians along the Namur road.
He now ordered the following troops to proceed to occupy a position in advance of Marbais, across the Namur road, facing Quatre Bras:—
Lobau's Infantry Corps (the Sixth), with the exception of the Twenty First Division, under Lieutenant GeneralTeste, which had already been detached in support ofPajol;Milhaud's Corps of Heavy Cavalry (Cuirassiers), Lieutenant General BaronSubervie's Light Cavalry Brigade, fromPajol's Corps;the Third Light Cavalry Division (belonging to the Third Corps), under Lieutenant General BaronDomon; and the Imperial Guard, both Cavalry and Infantry.
Lobau's Infantry Corps (the Sixth), with the exception of the Twenty First Division, under Lieutenant GeneralTeste, which had already been detached in support ofPajol;
Milhaud's Corps of Heavy Cavalry (Cuirassiers), Lieutenant General BaronSubervie's Light Cavalry Brigade, fromPajol's Corps;
the Third Light Cavalry Division (belonging to the Third Corps), under Lieutenant General BaronDomon; and the Imperial Guard, both Cavalry and Infantry.
To MarshalGrouchyhe confided the pursuit of the Prussians, and for this purpose he placed at his disposal as great an extent of force as his limited means would admit: a force, certainly not sufficient to enable that Marshal to confront the whole Prussian Army, should the latter, after having rallied and concentrated its strength, make a stand against him, but quite so to enable him to watch its movements, and to manœuvre so as to maintain his communication with the main Army, and, if pressed by superior numbers, to effect a junction withNapoleon.
The following were the troops thus detached underGrouchy:—
33,765 men and 96 guns.
The Seventh Infantry Division, under Lieutenant GeneralGirard(belonging to the Second Corps) having suffered very severely in the Battle, was left upon the Field.
Napoleon's instructions toGrouchywere extremely simple and concise: "Pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon as you come up with them, and never let them out of your sight. I am going to unite the remainder of this portion of the Army with MarshalNey's Corps, to march against the English, and to fight them if they should hold their ground between this and the Forest of Soignies. You will communicate with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras." No particular direction was prescribed, because the Emperor was totally ignorant of the real line of the Prussian retreat. At the same time he was strongly impressed with the idea thatBlücherhad retired upon Namur and Liege, with a view to occupy the line of the Meuse, whence he might seriously endanger theRight of the French Army, as also its main line of operation, should it advance upon Brussels.
Grouchydid not hesitate to remark to the Emperor, that the Prussians, having commenced their retreat at ten o'clock the previous night, had gained several hours' start of the troops with which he was to follow them; that although the reports received from the Advanced Cavalry conveyed no positive information as to the direction in which the great mass of the Prussian Army had effected its retreat, appearances as yet seemed to justify the supposition thatBlücherhad fallen back upon Namur; and that as he would thus have to pursue in a direction contrary to that whichNapoleonwas himself going to take, with very little chance of being able to prevent the execution of any dispositions the Prussians might have resolved upon when quitting the Field of Battle, he begged to be allowed to follow the Emperor in his projected movement upon Quatre Bras.
Napoleondeclined to entertain this proposition, repeated the Order he had already given to him, adding that it rested with him (Grouchy) to discover the route taken by the Prussians, whose defeat he was to complete by attacking them the moment he came up with them; while he himself would proceed to fight the English.
The Order was immediately given for the advance of the troops previously assembled near Marbais, preceded bySubervie's Division of Light Cavalry, as Advanced Guard. By the time they reached Quatre Bras, which was about two o'clock, the whole ofWellington's Infantry had crossed the Genappe, and was retiring along the high road to Brussels, protected by the Cavalry, which was now pressed by the French, in the manner described in the preceding Chapter.
The march of the French troops through Bry, in the direction of Quatre Bras, became known to the Prussians through Lieutenant ColonelSohr, who still held his Cavalry Brigade, even at this time, posted in rear of Tilly. Shortly afterwards, some of the French Cavalry having approached, he began to retire slowly towards Mont St Guibert, and, as he frequently formed up, in wait for the Enemy, he did not reach that point until the evening of the 17th. Here he found Lieutenant ColonelLedebur, who had arrived with his Detachment, and had received Orders to maintain the Defile.
Upon the departure ofNapoleon,GrouchyorderedVandammeandGérardto get their Corps under arms, and to move them, in the first instance, to the junction of the Gembloux road with that to Namur; and having subsequently received intelligence that a considerable body of Prussians had passed through the former town, he desired that those two Corps should continue their movement upon that point. In the mean time, he repaired to the Advanced Posts ofExcelmans' Dragoons, which were by this time beyond Gembloux. It was part of this Cavalry which followed Lieutenant ColonelSohr, on the left. They merely threw out Skirmishers against him; and, as night set in, they abandoned the pursuit in this direction.
The Corps ofVandammeandGérarddid not reach Gembloux until very late in the evening. The former was posted in advance, the latter, in rear, of the town; near which also, and on the right bank of the Ormeau, was stationed the Sixth Light Cavalry Division, under GeneralVallin, who succeeded to the command, upon Lieutenant GeneralMaurinbeing wounded at the Battle of Ligny. The First Brigade of Lieutenant GeneralChastel's TenthCavalry Division, consisting of the 4th and 12th Dragoons, under GeneralBonnemain, was pushed on to Sart à Wallain, and the 15th Dragoons (from GeneralVincent's Brigade of the Ninth Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General BaronSoult), were detached to Perwès. From both these points, reports were sent into Gembloux that the Prussians had retired upon Wavre.
Pajol, with his Light Cavalry andTeste's Infantry Division, had returned from St Denis, between Namur and Gembloux, to the original position occupied by the latter in the morning, at Mazy, in the immediate vicinity of the Field of Ligny; a movement for which no satisfactory cause has ever been assigned.
The extent of information obtained byGrouchyconcerning the Prussian retreat, and the nature of the dispositions which he adopted in consequence, will be best explained by the following despatch which he addressed to the Emperor:—
Although the information conveyed in this despatch was incorrect on some points, and imperfect on others, inasmuch as it represented that Prussian Columns had retired upon Namur and Perwès, which was not the case, and gave no account of the Columns (First and Second Corps) which had retreated by Tilly and Gentinnes, still it was well calculated to satisfyNapoleon, that at least the spirit of his instructions had been understood by the Marshal. The latter had stated that he suspected a portion of the Prussian troops was proceeding to joinWellington, and that, should he ascertain, through his Cavalry detached to Sart à Wallain and Perwès, that the great mass of the Prussians was retiring upon Wavre, it was his intention to pursue them in that direction, "so as to prevent them from reaching Brussels, and to keep them separated fromWellington."
Four hours afterwards (that is, at two o'clock on the morning of the 18th) he sent off another despatch to the Emperor, reporting that he had decided on marching upon either Corbaix or Wavre.
The retreat of the Prussian Army, after its defeat at Ligny on the 16th of June, was conducted with great skill, and executed in very good order. By detainingThielemann's Corps upon the Field of Battle until the morning of the 17th, ample security was afforded to the line of retreat by Gembloux; and by not withdrawingBülow's Corps from that town untilThielemanndrew near to it, the distance between the main bodies of these two Corps became so limited as to present the ready means of opposing their combined force to a vigorous pursuit should such be attempted.
By the evening of the 17th, the entire Prussian Army (with the exception of the Ninth and Thirteenth Brigades,and the Reserve Cavalry of the Third Corps, which arrived by six o'clock on the following morning) had assembled in the immediate vicinity of Wavre—two Corps on the right, and the remaining two Corps on the left, bank of the Dyle—in perfect order, and fully prepared to resume the offensive. Upon the two lines of retreat, the Rear Guards were well disposed at Vieux Sart and Mont St Guibert; where they continued during that night, and whence they retired leisurely on the following day. On the Prussian Left, Patrols were despatched towards the main road leading from Namur to Louvain. On the Right, a Detachment was sent fromZieten's Corps to Limale, on the left bank of the Dyle, to cover the Flank, and Patrols were pushed higher up the river, to communicate with the Post of Mont St Guibert. MajorFalkenhausenhad been detached, during the day, to Seroulx for the purpose of reconnoitring the country in the vicinity of Genappe, and of the high road to Brussels; and he succeeded in discovering, from the wooded tracts beyond Seroulx, the advance of the French Army along thechaussée. Patrols were also detached towards Lasne, Couture, and Aywiers, to observe the Defiles along the rivulet of the Lasne.
Such were the dispositions of the defeated Prussians on the evening of the 17th, while the victorious French had not advanced beyond Gembloux. The former had fallen back, in good order, upon a line with, and a short distance from, the Anglo-Allied Army on their Right; while their opponents, though encountering no obstacle of importance, had made but little progress, and were widely diverging from, instead of closely co-operating with, the main Army from which they had been detached. These dispositions, so ably planned and so efficiently performed, were well calculated to facilitate the grand operation of the morrow, namely,Blücher's flank movement to the right, to effect a junction withWellington.
The retreat to Wavre did not in any way incapacitate the Prussian Army for the resumption of actively offensive operations. With respect to its material, it so happened that the Park of Reserve Ammunition Waggons had, in the first instance, been directed upon Gembloux; and ColonelRöhl, who superintended the Ordnance Department of the Army, sent his Aide de Camp during the night of the 16th to conduct this Reserve to Wavre; whilst he himself hastened to the latter town, for the purpose of putting the whole of the Artillery, accordingly as it arrived there, again in a fit state for action. The supply of ammunition, however, was necessarily incomplete; but in order to prevent any failure in this respect, should some mishap occur to the Park of Reserve Ammunition Waggons, a Courier was despatched to Maestricht, with directions for the speedy transport of a supply of ammunition from thence to the Army, by means of the common waggons of the country. Similar Orders were conveyed to Cologne, Wesel, and Münster: and, by way of precaution, an express was sent to Liege for the removal of the Battering Train to Maestricht; as also for the destruction, in case of danger, of the iron foundry in the Arsenal of the former place.
Fortunately, however, the Reserve Ammunition Waggons reached Wavre safely at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th. The Corps and Batteries were furnished with a complete supply of ammunition, and the Army was thus placed in a perfectly efficient state for commencing another battle. This turn of affairs was most encouraging, andBlücherdelayed not another moment in despatching toWellingtonthe reply to which allusion has already been made. (See page 285.)
As regards the influence which the defeat at Ligny exercised over themoraleof the Prussian Army, its injurious effects were made manifest amongst the newly raised drafts from the Rhenish and Westphalian Provinces, and from the Duchy of Berg. Of these troops, 8,000 men betook themselves to a flight which admitted of no check until they reached Liege and Aix la Chapelle. Among the Rhenish troops, particularly those from Provinces which had formerly belonged to France, there were many old French soldiers; and although several of them fought with great bravery, others evinced a bad disposition, and there were instances in which they passed over to their former companions in arms. Such, however, was not the case with the troops from the other western districts of the Prussian State: there was scarcely a single man amongst the missing, who belonged to any of the old Westphalian Provinces, Mark, Cleve, Minden, and Ravensberg, whilst several came from that of Münster.
But themoraleof the great mass of the Prussian Army continued unshaken. The spirit of the troops was neither tamed nor broken; and their enthusiasm, though damped, had not been subdued. Unbounded confidence was placed in the firm decision and restless energy of their aged and venerated Chief; who, though suffering from the effects of his fall, by which his whole frame had sustained a severe shock, evinced not the slightest apprehension of fatal consequences to the Campaign resulting from this defeat. His unbending nature led him to cast aside for the moment those purely political interests and theoretically strategical principles, by which a more cautious and less enterprising Commander might have been induced to secure the line of the Meuse, and to preserve his direct communications with the Prussian States, and thus afford but a doubtfuland an inefficient support to his Ally. Placing full reliance on the resources of his own mind, and on the stern, warlike character of his troops; he devoted his whole energies to the attainment of the one grand object—that of crushingNapoleonby combining withWellington. This confidence in himself and in his soldiers was strikingly and characteristically manifested in the concluding words of a General Order which he issued to the Army on the morning of the 17th. "I shall immediately lead you against the Enemy;—we shall beat him, because it is our duty to do so."
Towards midnight of the 17th, a communication reachedBlücherfrom GeneralMüffling(already mentioned as having been attached to the British Head Quarters) to the following effect. "The Anglo-Allied Army is posted with its Right upon Braine l'Alleud, its Centre upon Mont St Jean, and its Left near La Haye; having the Enemy in its front. The Duke awaits the attack, but calculates upon Prussian support."
This intelligence was forwarded, at midnight, to General CountBülow, accompanied by the following Order:—"You will therefore, at daybreak, march with the Fourth Corps from Dion le Mont, through Wavre, taking the direction of Chapelle St Lambert, in which vicinity you will keep your force concealed as much as possible, in case the Enemy should not, by that time, be seriously engaged with the Duke ofWellington; but should it be otherwise, you will make a most vigorous attack upon the Enemy's Right Flank. The Second Corps will follow you as a direct Support: the First and Third Corps will also be held in readiness to move in the same direction if necessary. You will leave a Detachment in observation at Mont St Guibert; which, if pressed, will gradually fall back upon Wavre. All the Baggage Train, and everything notactually required in the Field of Action, will be sent to Louvain."
Instructions, in conformity with the above, were also forwarded to the Commanders of the other Corps; and a communication of these arrangements was despatched to GeneralMüffling, with an explanation that the fatigue of the troops could not possibly admit of earlier support. This General was, at the same time, requested to forward timely intelligence of the attack upon the Duke, and of the nature of that attack, that measures might be adopted accordingly.
At five o'clock on the morning of the 18th,Pajolstarted from Mazy, withSoult's Cavalry Division andTeste's Infantry Division, marching by St Denis and Grand Lez, to Tourinnes; where he was to await further Orders. At about eight o'clock,Excelmans' Corps of Heavy Cavalry, consisting of eight Regiments of Dragoons, was put in motion; and at nine o'clock,Vandamme's andGérard's Infantry Corps began their march along one and the same road, by Sart à Wallain, upon Wavre. The Left of this Column was protected, towards the Dyle, by the advance ofMaurin's Division of Light Cavalry, under GeneralVallin.
It was about half past ten o'clock, whenExcelmans' Advanced Guard came up with the Prussian Rear Guard, on the road to Wavre. He immediately formed his troops in position, resting their Left upon the wooded ravine near the Farm of La Plaquerie, and their Right in the direction of Neuf Sart. While his Skirmishers were engaged with those of the Enemy, he sent theChef d'Escadrond'Estourmel, to inform MarshalGrouchyof what was going on in front, and also to make known to him thatthe Prussian Army had continued its retreat upon Wavre during a part of the night and that morning, for the purpose of forming a closer communication with the Duke ofWellington's forces.
The march of the Third and Fourth Corps was greatly retarded by the bad state of the roads, and frequent halts were occasioned by the narrowness and miry nature of the Defiles.Gérard, having preceded the Column, reached Sart à Wallain at eleven o'clock, where he foundGrouchybreakfasting in the house of M.Hollaërt, a Notary. In about half an hour after his arrival, ColonelSimon Lorière, who was acting as his Chief of the Staff, suddenly heard, while walking in the garden of the house, a distant but violent cannonade, of which he immediately went to apprise his General.Grouchyrepaired at once to the garden, accompanied byGérard,Vandamme,Excelmans, and several other Officers. He immediately called for M.Hollaërt, and asked him in what part of the country he considered this tremendous cannonade to be going on. The latter, pointing to the Forest of Soignies, replied that it must be in the direction of Planchenoit, Mont St Jean, and that vicinity.
Gérardthen declared his opinion to be in favour of the expediency of marching in the direction of the cannonade, in order to connect the movements of the detached force more closely withNapoleon's operations; and offered to lead his own Corps towards the Battle. This measure was opposed by the Marshal, as also by GeneralBaltus, of the Artillery, who represented the difficulties of a march in which this Arm might be compromised. On the other hand, GeneralValaze, Commanding Engineer ofGérard's Corps, after having coincided in the opinion expressed by the latter, observed that he had three Companies of Sappers,by aid of which he could remove many obstacles.Gérardthen gave his assurance that he could at all events move on with the gun carriages and limbers.
Grouchy, however, stated his determination to act in conformity with his instructions; which were, to pursue and attack the Prussians, and never to lose sight of them. It had just been intimated to him that his troops had come up with a Rear Guard of the Enemy's Infantry, and he did not consider his information was sufficient to warrant the conclusion thatBlücherwas drawn up, in expectation of being attacked by him at Wavre; or that he would continue his retreat upon Brussels; or, that if, in manœuvring to effect his junction withWellington, he would do so in front, or in rear, of the Forest of Soignies.
He has since declared, that he did not deem it his duty to follow the counsel given byGérard, but to attack the Prussians; that to effect the proposed movement with the whole of his forces would have been acting contrary to his Orders; that to have detached only a portion of those forces in the direction of the Forest of Soignies, would have been to separate the two Corps of his Army by a river, whose waters were swollen by the rain, and whose banks were swampy, and thus have rendered their mutual support impossible, however essential it might have become; finally, that a war of inspiration appertains alone to the General in Chief, and that his Lieutenants must confine themselves to that of execution. Hence the march to Wavre was continued.
Whilst proceeding to the Advanced Guard,Grouchyreceived the despatch, dated from the Farm of Caillou, the 18th of June, at ten o'clock in the morning, acquainting him that the Emperor was going to attack the Anglo-Allied Army, in its position at Waterloo; desiring him to directhis movements upon Wavre in such a manner as to draw his forces nearer to those ofNapoleon, and, especially, to keep up a close communication with the latter.
The receipt of these instructions was not followed by any immediate change inGrouchy's dispositions. He despatched no Cavalry force—not even a single Patrol—to watch any movements that might be attempted, or actually then in course of execution, by the Prussians, towards the Field on which the Emperor had intimated to him his intention of attacking the force underWellington; and hence it is almost needless to add, that he neglected to establish that close and active communication with the main Army which was so essentially important for the accomplishment of the object of the general plan of operations, and to whichNapoleonhad especially directed his attention in the before mentioned despatch. His sole aim seemed to be a direct advance upon Wavre; and this he carried into execution without at all detaching to, or in any way manœuvring by, his left. On the contrary, upon arriving in person at the position occupied byExcelmans, he desired the latter to move to his right, and take post at Dion le Mont; and the ground thus vacated was shortly afterwards taken up byVallin's Light Cavalry Division.
At daybreak of the 18th of June,Bülow, in conformity with the Order which he had received during the previous night fromBlücher, quitted his position near Dion le Mont, to march through Wavre to St Lambert. This was the commencement of the important flank movement of the Prussians in support of the Anglo-Allied Army in position in front of Waterloo; and every measure of precaution was adopted with a view to its being carried into effect with certainty and safety. The sun had not yet risen whenMajorWitowskywas despatched with a Detachment of the 2nd Silesian Hussars, to Maransart, for the purpose of closely reconnoitring the Defiles of the Lasne, which had already been patrolled the evening before, and to observe the country in front of those Defiles, in the direction of the Enemy's position. MajorFalkenhausen, previously mentioned as having pushed a reconnaissance beyond Seroulx on the 17th, was now directed also to reconnoitre the Lasne. Scouring parties were sent out, which kept up the communication that had been opened the previous day with Lieutenant ColonelLedeburat Mont St Guibert: the whole country between the Dyle and the Charleroi high road was carefully explored; and correct intelligence was continually sent to the rear concerning the French Army.
By means of this vigilant look out, the Prussians secured the important advantage of retarding the communications between the French Emperor and his Marshal, since it compelled the bearer of despatches to pursue a very circuitous route.
At half past nine o'clock, on the morning of the 18th, whilstBülow's Corps was on the march to St Lambert, the following additional despatch was forwarded to GeneralMüffling:—
Wavre, 18th June 1815, at half past nine o'clock."I request you will say to the Duke ofWellington, in my name, that even ill as I am, I shall, nevertheless, put myself at the head of my troops, for the purpose of immediately attacking the Enemy's Right Flank, shouldNapoleonundertake anything against the Duke. If, however, the day should pass over without a hostile attack, it is my opinion that we ought tomorrow, with our combined forces, to attack the French Army. I commission you to communicate this as the result of my inward conviction, and to represent to him that I consider this proposal to be the best and most suitable in our present position."Blücher."
Wavre, 18th June 1815, at half past nine o'clock.
"I request you will say to the Duke ofWellington, in my name, that even ill as I am, I shall, nevertheless, put myself at the head of my troops, for the purpose of immediately attacking the Enemy's Right Flank, shouldNapoleonundertake anything against the Duke. If, however, the day should pass over without a hostile attack, it is my opinion that we ought tomorrow, with our combined forces, to attack the French Army. I commission you to communicate this as the result of my inward conviction, and to represent to him that I consider this proposal to be the best and most suitable in our present position.
"Blücher."
The Prussians very soon discovered that the French had made no disposition whatever for the protection of their Right Flank. MajorWitowskyhad proceeded as far as Maransart before he fell in with an Enemy's Patrol; and MajorFalkenhausenfound the Defiles of the Lasne perfectly free and unobserved. Upon receiving this intelligence,Blücherdecided upon supporting the Anglo-Allied Army, by directing the march of his whole force, or at least of three Corps, towards the Wood of Paris, and debouching from thence upon the Flank and Rear of the Enemy; and MajorLützowwas immediately despatched for the purpose of narrowly watching, from the other side of the above Wood, the French movements directed against the position of the Anglo-Allied Army.
No report as yet had been received from the Rear Guard, concerningGrouchy's advance, and asBlücher's object was now to gain the Defiles of the Lasne without interruption, and to occupy in force the Wood of Paris, he determined to avail himself of the time and opportunity which offered for the projected movement. Being, however, uncertain as to the amount ofGrouchy's force, the Prince deemed it advisable that Wavre should not be abandoned until the greater part of the Army had passed the Defiles of St Lambert; and with this view, he directed that as soon asBülow's Corps should have proceeded beyond Wavre,Zieten's Corps was to commence its march by Fromont and Ohain to join the Left Wing ofWellington's Army near La Haye.Pirch's Corps was ordered to followBülow's in the direction of St Lambert; andThielemann's Corps, after retaining possession of the Defile of Wavre sufficiently long to render the general movement of the Army secure, was then gradually to followZieten's Corps upon Ohain.
An unfortunate incident occurred during the passage ofBülow's Corps, through Wavre, which materially impeded the march of the troops. The Advanced Guard, consisting of the Fifteenth Brigade (under GeneralLosthin), with the 2nd Silesian Hussars, and a twelve pounder Battery, had scarcely passed through the town when a fire broke out in the main street, and extended itself with great rapidity. This not only caused a suspension of the march of the main body of the Corps, but created much alarm, in consequence of the great number of ammunition waggons in the place. Every exertion was made to extinguish the fire. The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, under MajorLöwenfeld, and the 7th Pioneer Company, were ordered upon this duty; and after they had encountered considerable difficulty, their efforts were crowned with success.
In the mean time the Advanced Guard ofBülow's Corps had continued its march, and reached St Lambert by eleven o'clock. The Sixteenth, and then the Thirteenth, Brigade arrived much later; and the Fourteenth Brigade, which formed the Rear Guard, was a long way behind. The Advanced Guard did not wait the arrival of the other Brigades, but proceeded forthwith to cross the Defile of St Lambert. Having effected the passage, which was attended with great difficulty, in consequence of the soft and miry state of the valley, it halted in the Wood of Paris, where it continued a considerable time, waiting for the approach of the main body. Patrols, however, from the 2nd Silesian Hussars, were immediately sent forward to feel for the Anglo-Allied Left, and to reconnoitre the French Right.
Zieten's Corps (the First) commenced its march, upon the left bank of the Dyle, towards Ohain, about noon.
WhilstBülow's Reserve Cavalry, following the Thirteenth Infantry Brigade, was passing through Wavre, French Cavalryhad penetrated between the Rear Guard of this Corps, at Vieux Sart, and the Detachment under Lieutenant ColonelLedeburat Mont St Guibert. The 2nd Pomeranian, and the 1st Silesian, Landwehr Cavalry were immediately detached from the Reserve Cavalry of the Corps, to aid in checking the advance of the Enemy.
The Prussian Lieutenant ColonelLedebur, who was still at Mont St Guibert, having received intelligence of the approach of the French, decided on commencing his retreat towards Wavre. Lieutenant ColonelSohr, who had fallen back early in the morning from Mont St Guibert, sent 150 Cavalry and two guns of Horse Artillery as a reinforcement toLedebur. The latter now succeeded in forming a junction with the two Cavalry Regiments detached from the Reserve, as also, subsequently, with the Cavalry Brigade underSohr, after a slight affair with the Third French Corps (Vandamme's), whilst making good his retreat to Auzel.
Pirch's Corps (the Second) broke up from its position between St Anne and Aisemont, on the right bank of the Dyle, about noon, for the purpose of passing the Defile of Wavre. The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, which occupied this town, was relieved by a Battalion of the 30th Regiment, belonging to the Third Corps (Thielemann's).Pirchhad just put his Corps in motion, with a view to cross the Dyle by the town of Wavre, when the approach of the Enemy was announced. The Defile was crowded with the troops; the progress of their march could not be otherwise than slow; and at this moment Lieutenant ColonelSohr, whose Brigade formed the Rear Guard of the Corps, sent in word, that the Enemy presented a force of six Regiments of Cavalry, ten pieces of Artillery, and two strong Columns of Infantry.
The Wood of Sarats, close to the Farm of Auzel, wasnow occupied by some Battalions of the Eighth Brigade, the command of which had devolved upon ColonelReckow.Pirchplaced the whole of the Rear Guard under the Orders of GeneralBrause, the Commander of the Seventh Brigade, and reinforced Lieutenant ColonelSohrwith the 11th Hussars and four pieces of Horse Artillery.Brauseposted the remaining Battalions of the Eighth Brigade in rear of the Wood, and the three Regiments of Cavalry on the right, with the Foot Battery No. 12 in their front. The Seventh Brigade, deployed into line, remained in reserve.