[4]Cf. Disraeli inTancred:"Self-respect, too, is a superstition of past ages.... It is not suited to these times; it is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap. v.).—Tr.
[4]Cf. Disraeli inTancred:"Self-respect, too, is a superstition of past ages.... It is not suited to these times; it is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap. v.).—Tr.
920.
"I will have this or that"; "I would that this or that were so"; "I know that this or that is so the degrees of power: the man ofwill,the man ofdesire,the man offate.
921.
The means by which a strong species maintains itself:—
It grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the power of self-control and of freedom.
It abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be anything else than a barbarian.
It tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism.
It is not expansive, it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to all charms.
It learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of self-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard to points of honour.
It never argues, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,"—but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay, as a privilege, as a distinction.
It does not covetotherpeople's virtues.
922.
The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery over barbarians.
923.
Warlike and peaceful people.—Art thou a man who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, freedom, "equal rights": these things are but names and steps for one and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary for them to defend themselves,—such men become discontented with themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain create circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are better than waging war—thus does the Christian's instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities, weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised by the former.
What expedients and what virtues do the unarmed and the undefended require in order to survive—and even to conquer?
924.
What will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either defence or attack? What will remain of hispassionswhen he has lost those which form his defence and his weapons?
925.
A marginal note to aniaiserie anglaise: "Do not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you." This stands for wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very basis of morality as "a golden maxim." John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what Englishman does not?).... But the maxim does not bear investigation. The argument, Do not as you would not be done by, forbids action which produce harmful results; the thought behind always is that an action is invariably requited. What if some one came forward with the"Principe"in his hands, and said: "We must do those actions alone which enable us to steal a march on others,—and which deprive others of the power of doing the same to us"?—On the other hand, let us remember the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the probability of getting one, does not deter him fromvindicating his honour.... And in all really decent actions are we not intentionally indifferent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which might have harmful results,—that would be tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in general.
Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a certaintype of man: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates itself through him,—we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as I am to thee so art thou to me.—In this community equivalence of actions is really believed in—an equivalence which never under any circumstances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital." ... When I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do anything at all like it: the action belongs to me.... Nobody can pay me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the victim of another action.
926.
Against John Stuart Mill.—I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says: "What is right for one man is right for another"; "Do not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you. Such principles would fain establish the whole of human trafficupon mutual services,so that every action would appear to be a cash payment for something done to us. The hypothesishere is ignoble to the last degree: it is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value between my actions and thine; the most personal value Of an action is simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no equivalent and which cannot be remunerated). "Reciprocity" is a piece of egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I docannotandmaynot be done by another, that there isno such thing as equivalence(except in thosevery select circleswhere one actually has one's equal,inter pares), that in a really profound sense a man never requites because he is somethinguniquein himself and can only douniquethings,—this fundamental conviction contains the cause ofaristocratic aloofness from the mob, because the latter believes in equality, andconsequentlyin the feasibility of equivalence and "reciprocity."
927.
The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts "useful" and "harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of view of a community which is only able to see and surveyimmediate and proximateconsequences. TheStateand thepolitical manare already in need of a moresuper-moralattitude of mind: because they have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue of consequences. An economic policy for the whole world should be possible which could look at things in such broad perspective that all its isolated demands would seem for the moment not only unjust, but arbitrary.
928.
"Should one follow one's feelings?"—To set one's life at stake on the impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has little worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in being capable of this—and in behaving in this way with determination, the criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the honest man.
A higher degree of excellence would be to overcome this impulse, and to refrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding—and to remain cold,raisonnable, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant sensations of delight.... The same holds good of pity: it must first besifted throughreason; without this it becomes just as dangerous as any other passion.
Theblind yieldingto a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these passions—on the contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them by the bridle.. and even this he should not do out of love of control, but merely because....
929.
"To give up one's life for a cause"—very effective. But there are many things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger, or to revenge—it matters not fromthe point of view of value. How many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls—and even what is worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively chooses the most dangerous things: if one is a philosopher, for instance, one chooses the adventures of speculation; if one is virtuous, one chooses immorality. One kind of man will risk nothing, another kind will risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the contrary, what we seek is life raised to a higher power, life in danger.... But, let me repeat, we do not, on that account, wish to be more virtuous than others, Pascal, for instance, wished to risk nothing, and remained a Christian. That perhaps was virtuous.——A man always sacrifices something.
930.
How manyadvantagesdoes not a man sacrifice! To how small an extent does he seek his own profit! All his emotions and passions wish to assert their rights, and how remote a passion is From that cautious utility which consists in personal profit!
A man doesnotstrive after "happiness"; one must be an Englishman to be able to believe that a man is always seeking his own advantage. Our desires long to violate things with passion—their overflowing strength seeks obstacles.
931.
All passions are generallyuseful,some directly, others indirectly; in regard to utility it is absolutelyimpossible to fix upon any gradation of values,—however certainly the forces of nature in general may be regarded as good (i.e.useful), from an economic point of view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger sources of power exist.
932.
All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind havenotcome to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they are the conditions peculiar torich soulswho are able to bestow and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of self-denial, of hatred of self, of Pascalism.
933.
In short,what we require is to dominate the passions and not to weaken or to extirpate them!—The greater the dominating power of the will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions.
The "great man" is so, owing to the free scope which he gives to his desires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these magnificent monsters into its service.
The "good man" in every stage of civilisation is at one and the same time theleast dangerousand themost useful:a sort of medium; the idea formed of such a man by the common mind is that he is some onewhom one has no reason to fear, but whom one must not therefore despise.
Education: essentially a means ofruiningexceptions in favour of the rule. Culture: essentially the means of directing taste against the exceptions in favour of the mediocre.
Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow of force, is it capable of being a hothouse for the luxurious culture of the exception, of the experiment, of the danger, of thenuance: thisis the tendency ofeveryaristocratic culture.
934.
All questions of strength: to what extent ought one to try and prevail against the preservative measures of society and the latter's prejudices?—to what extent ought one to unfetterone's terrible qualities,through which so many go to the dogs?—to what extent ought one to run counter totruth,and take up sides with its most questionable aspects?—to what extent ought one to oppose suffering, self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when it is always open to question whether one can ever master them (what does not kill us makes usstronger....)?—and, finally, to what extent ought one to acknowledge the rights of the rule, of the common-place, of the petty, of the good, of the upright, in fact of the average man, without thereby allowing one's self to become vulgar? ... The strongest test of character is to resist beingruined by the seductiveness of goodness.Goodnessmust be regarded as a luxury, as a refinement, as avice.
3. The Noble Man.
935.
Type.real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, as the result of vital wealth: which does not give in order to receive—and which has no desire toelevateitself by being good,squanderingis typical of genuine goodness, vitalpersonalwealth is its prerequisite.
936.
Aristocracy.—Gregarious ideals at present culminating in the highest standard of value for society. It has been attempted to give them a cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value.—I defendaristocracyagainst them.
Any society which would of itself preserve a feeling of respect anddélicatessein regard to freedom, must consider itself as an exception, and have a force against it from which it distinguishes itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility.
The more rights I surrender and the more I level myself down to others, the more deeply do I sink into the average and ultimately into the greatest number. The first condition which an aristocratic society must have in order to maintain a high degree of freedom among its members, is that extreme tension which arises from the presenceof the mostantagonisticinstincts in all its units: from their will to dominate....
If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts and differences of rank, ye will also abolish, strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the feeling of individuality.
***
Concerning theactualpsychology of societies based upon freedom and equality.—What is it that tends todiminishin such a society?
The will to beresponsible for ones self(the loss of this is a sign of the decline of autonomy); the ability to defend and to attack, even in spiritual matters; the power of command; the sense of reverence, of subservience, the ability to be silent,great passion,great achievements, tragedy and cheerfulness.
937.
In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Montlosier had said in his work,De la Monarchie française:he answered with a cry of indignation, and set himself to his task. That emigrant had said:
"Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos mains, peuple tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous fut octroyée d'être libres, et non pas à nous d'être nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout est de grâce, nous ne sommes point de votre communauté; nous sommes un tout par nous mêmes."
938.
How constantly the aristocratic world shears and weakens itself ever more and more! Bymeans of its noble instincts it abandons its privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive culture, it takes an interest in the people, the weak, the poor, and the poetry of the lowly, etc.
939.
There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of carelessness, which allows of profound conclusions and insight: the carelessness of the self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has nevertroubleditself about friends, but which knows only hospitality and knows how to practise it; whose heart and house are open to all who will enter—beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability: he who is capable of it has hundreds of "friends," but probably not one friend.
940.
The teaching μηδὲν ἄγαν applies to men with overflowing strength,—not to the mediocre, ἐγκράτεια and ἄσκησις are only steps to higher things. Above them stands "golden Nature."
"Thou shalt"—unconditional obedience in Stoics, in Christian and Arabian Orders, in Kant's philosophy (it is immaterial whether this obedience is shown to a superior or to a concept).
Higher than "Thou shalt" stands "I will" (the heroes); higher than "I will" stands "I am" (the gods of the Greeks).
Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of restraint,—they are neither simple, nor light-hearted, nor moderate.
941.
The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to the same extent the essence of all yearning after riches) isthe desire to rid the eye of disorder and vulgarity, and to build a home for our soul's nobility.
The majority of people certainly believe that they will develop higher natures when those beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon them: hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travelling, etc., and all reading and visits to theatres.People want to be formed—that is the kernel of their labours for culture! But the strong, the mighty, would themselveshave a hand in the forming, and would fain have nothing strange about them!
It is for this reason, too, that men go to open Nature, not to find themselves, but to lose themselves and to forget themselves. The desire "to get away from one's self" is proper to all weaklings, and to all those who are discontented with themselves.
942.
The only nobility is that of birth and blood. (I do not refer here to the prefix "Lord" andL'almanac de Gotha: this is a parenthesis for donkeys.) Wherever people speak of the "aristocracy of intellect," reasons are generally not lacking for concealing something, it is known to be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does not ennoble; on the contrary, something is always neededto ennoble intellect.—What then is needed?—Blood.
943.
What is noble?
—External punctiliousness; because this punctiliousness hedges a man about, keeps him at a distance, saves him from being confounded with somebody else.
A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and bearing, with which stoical hardness and self-control protect themselves from all prying inquisitiveness or curiosity.
—A slow step and a slow glance. There are not too many valuable things on earth: and these come and wish to come of themselves to him who has value. We are not quick to admire.
—We know how to bear poverty, want, and even illness.
—We avoid small honours owing to our mistrust of all who are over-ready to praise: for the man who praises believes he understands what he praises: but to understand—Balzac, that typical man of ambition, betrayed the factcomprendre c'est égaler.
—Our doubt concerning the communicativeness of our hearts goes very deep; to us, loneliness is not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon us.
—We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we do as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among equals (alas! this will not be realised for some time to come),
—We are ironical towards the "gifted"; we hold the belief that no morality is possible without good birth.
—We always feel as if we were those who had to dispense honours: while he is not found too frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.
—We are always disguised: the higher a man's nature the more is he in need of remaining incognito. If there be a God, then out of sheer decency He ought only to show Himself on earth in the form of a man.
—We are capable ofotium,of the unconditional conviction that although a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly reduces one's rank. However much we may respect "industry," and know how to give it its due, we do not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense, or after the manner of those insatiable and cackling artists who, like hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.
—We protect artists and poets and any one who happens to be a master in something; but as creatures of a higher order than those, who only know how to do something, who are only "productive men," we do not confound ourselves with them.
—We find joy in allformsand ceremonies; we would fain foster everything formal, and we are convinced that courtesy is one of the greatest virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind oflaisser aller,including the freedom of the press and of thought; because, under such conditions, the intellect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches its limbs.
—We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate, and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet creatureswho have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their minds! They have always been the delight of every tense and profound male soul, whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.
—We take pleasure in princes and in priests, because in big things, as in small, they actually uphold the belief in the difference of human values, even in the estimation of the past, and at least symbolically.
—We are able to keep silenceibut we do not breathe a word of this in the presence of listeners.
—We are able to endure long enmities: we lack the power of easy reconciliations.
—We have a loathing of demagogism, of enlightenment, of amiability, and plebeian familiarity.
—We collect precious things, the needs of higher and fastidious souls; we wish to possess nothing in common. We want to have our own books, ourownlandscapes.
—We protest against evil and fine experiences, and take care not to generalise too quickly. The individual case: how ironically we regard it when it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule!
—We love that which isnaïf,andnaïfpeople, but as spectators and higher creatures; we think Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.
—We have a low estimation of good people, because they are gregarious animals: we know how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most malicious, and the hardest exterior, and that this single grain outweighs all the mere goody-goodiness of milk-and-watery souls.
—We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted by his vices, nor by his tomfooleries. We are well aware that we are not recognised with ease, and that we have every reason to make our foreground very prominent.
944.
What is noble?—The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing a part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one is forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to thegreatest number:the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue, of comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness,à laSpencer. That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsibilities. That one knows how to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That one contradicts thegreatest number,not in words at all, but by continually behaving differently from them.
945.
Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) isourmost noble and most dangerous luxury. We must not decline the disadvantages which it brings in its train.
946.
We refuse to bepraised:we do what serves our purpose, what gives us pleasure, or what we are obliged to do.
947.
What is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained noble; thatin eroticishe likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor the clever.
948.
The concept of honour is founded upon the belief in select society, in knightly excellences, in the obligation of having continually to play a part. In essentials it means that one does not take one's life too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally to the most dignified manners in one's dealings with everybody (at least in so far as they do not belong to "us"); that one is neither familiar, nor good-natured, nor hearty, nor modest, exceptinter pares; that one isalways playing a part.
949.
The fact that one sets one's life, one's health, and one's honour at stake, is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and spendthrift will: it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact that every danger kindles our curiosity concerning the measure of our strength, and provokes our courage.
950.
Eagles swoop down straight nobility of soul is best revealed by the magnificent and proud foolishness with which it makes itsattacks.
951.
War should be made against all namby-pamby ideas ofnobility!—A certain modicum of brutalitycannot be dispensed with: no more than we can do without a certain approximation to criminality. "Self-satisfaction" mustnotbe allowed; a man should look upon himself with an adventurous spirit; he should experiment with himself and run risks with himself—no beautiful soul-quackery should be tolerated. I want to givea more robust ideala chance of prevailing.
952.
"Paradise is under the shadow of a swordsman"—this is also a symbol and a test-word by which souls with noble and warrior-like origin betray and discover themselves.
953.
The two paths.—There comes a period when man has a surplus amount of power at his disposal. Science aims at establishing theslavery of nature.
Then man acquires theleisurein which to develop himself into something new and more lofty.A new aristocracy.It is then that a large number of virtues which are nowconditions of existenceare superseded.—Qualities which are no longer needed are on that account lost. We no longer need virtues:consequentlywe are losing them (likewise the morality of "one thing is needful," of the salvation of the soul, and of immortality: these were means wherewith to make man capable of enormous self-tyranny, through the emotion of great fear!!!).
The different kinds of needs by means of whosediscipline man is formed: need teaches work, thought, and self-control.
***
Physiologicalpurification and strengthening. The new aristocracy is in need of an opposing body which it may combat: it must be driven to extremities in order to maintain itself.
The two futures of mankind: (1) the consequence of a levelling-down to mediocrity, (2) conscious aloofness and self-development.
A doctrine which would cleave agulf:it maintains thehighest and the lowest species(it destroys the intermediate).
The aristocracies, both spiritual and temporal, which have existed hitherto prove nothingagainstthe necessity of a new aristocracy.
4. The Lords of the Earth.
954.
A certain question constantly recurs to us; it is perhaps a seductive and evil question; may it be whispered into the ears of those who have a right to such doubtful problems—those strong souls of to-day whose dominion over themselves is unswerving: is it not high time, now that the type "gregarious animal" is developing ever more and more in Europe, to set about rearing, thoroughly, artificially, and consciously, an opposite type, and to attempt to establish the latter's virtues? And would not the democratic movement itself find forthe first time a sort of goal, salvation, and justification, if some one appeared who availed himself of it—so that at last, beside its new and sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European democracy), that higher species of ruling and Cæsarian spirits might also be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would elevate themselves through it? This new race would climb aloft to new and hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on earth.
955.
The aspect of the European of to-day makes me very hopeful. A daring and ruling race is here building itself up upon the foundation of an extremely intelligent, gregarious mass. It is obvious that the educational movements for the latter are not alone prominent nowadays.
956.
The same conditions which go to develop the gregarious animal also force the development of the leaders.
957.
The question, and at the same time the task, is approaching with hesitation, terrible as Fate, but nevertheless inevitable: how shall the earth as a whole be ruled? And to what end shall man as a whole—no longer as a people or as a race—be reared and trained?
Legislative moralities are the principal meansby which one can form mankind, according to the fancy of a creative and profound will: provided, of course, that such an artistic will of the first order gets the power into its own hands, and can make its creative will prevail over long periods in the form of legislation, religions, and morals. At present, and probably for some time to come, one will seek such colossally creative men, such really great men, as I understand them, in vain: they will be lacking, until, after many disappointments, we are forced to begin to understand why it is they are lacking, and that nothing bars with greater hostility their rise and development, at present and for some time to come, than that which is now calledthemorality in Europe. Just as if there were no other kind of morality, and could be no other kind, than the one we have already characterised as herd-morality. It is this morality which is now striving with all its power to attain to that green-meadow happiness on earth, which consists in security, absence of danger, ease, facilities for livelihood, and, last but not least, "if all goes well," even hopes to dispense with all kinds of shepherds and bell-wethers. The two doctrines which it preaches most universally are "equality of rights" and "pity for all sufferers"—and it even regards suffering itself as something which must be got rid of absolutely. That such ideas may be modern leads one to think very poorly of modernity. He, however, who has reflected deeply concerning the question, how and where the plant man has hitherto grown most vigorously, is forced to believe that this hasalways taken place under the opposite conditions; that to this end the danger of the situation has to increase enormously, his inventive faculty and dissembling powers have to fight their way up under long oppression and compulsion, and his will to life has to be increased to the unconditioned will to power, to over-power: he believes that danger, severity, violence, peril in the street and in the heart, inequality of rights, secrecy, stoicism, seductive art, and devilry of every kind—in short, the opposite of all gregarious desiderata—are necessary for the elevation of man. Such a morality with opposite designs, which would rear man upwards instead of to comfort and mediocrity; such a morality, with the intention of producing a ruling caste—the future lords of the earth—must, in order to be taught at all, introduce itself as if it were in some way correlated to the prevailing moral law, and must come forward under the cover of the latter's words and forms. But seeing that, to this end, a host of transitionary and deceptive measures must be discovered, and that the life of a single individual stands for almost nothing in view of the accomplishment of such lengthy tasks and aims, the first thing that must be done is to reara new kindof man in whom the duration of the necessary will and the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many generations. This must be a new kind of ruling species and caste—this ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat lengthy and not easily expressed consequences of this thought. The aim should be to prepare atransvaluation of valuesfor a particularly strong kind ofman, most highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to this end, slowly and cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of slandered instincts hitherto held in check: whoever meditates about this problem belongs to us, the free spirits—certainly not to that kind of "free spirit" which has existed hitherto: for these desired practically the reverse. To this order, it seems to me, belong, above all, the pessimists of Europe, the poets and thinkers of a revolted idealism, in so far as their discontent with existence in general mustconsistentlyat least have led them to be dissatisfied with the man of the present; the same applies to certain insatiably ambitious artists who courageously and unconditionally fight against the gregarious animal for the special rights of higher men, and subdue all herd-instincts and precautions of more exceptional minds by their seductive art. Thirdly and lastly, we should include in this group all those critics and historians by whom the discovery of the Old World, which has begun so happily—this was the work of thenewColumbus, of German intellect—will be courageouslycontinued(for we still stand in the very first stages of this conquest). For in the Old World, as a matter of fact, a different and more lordly morality ruled than that of to-day; and the man of antiquity, under the educational ban of his morality, was a stronger and deeper man than the man of to-day—up to the present he has been the only well-constituted man. The temptation, however, which from antiquity to the present day has always exercised its power on such luckystrokes of Nature,i.e.on strong and enterprising souls, is, even at the present day, the most subtle and most effective of anti-democratic and anti-Christian powers, just as it was in the time of the Renaissance.
958.
I am writing for a race of men which does not yet exist: for "the lords of the earth."
In Plato'sTheagesthe following passage will be found: "Every one of us would like if possible to be master of mankind; if possible, aGod!" Thisattitude of mind must be reinstated in our midst.
Englishmen, Americans, and Russians.
959.
That primeval forest-plant Man always appears where the struggle for power has been waged longest.Greatmen.
Primeval forest creatures, theRomans.
960.
From now henceforward there will be such favourable first conditions for greater ruling powers as have never yet been found on earth. And this is by no means the most important point. The establishment has been made possible of international race unions which will set themselves the task of rearing a ruling race, the future "lords of the earth"—a new, vast aristocracy based upon the most severe self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants willbe stamped upon thousands of years: a higher species of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, knowledge, riches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic Europe as the most suitable and supple instrument they can have for taking the fate of the earth into their own hands, and working as artists upon man himself. Enough! The time is coming for us to transform all our views on politics.
5. The Great Man.
961.
I will endeavour to see at which periods in history great men arise. The significance of despotic moralities that have lasted a long time: they strain the bow, provided they do not break it.
962.
A great man,—a man whom Nature has built up and invented in a grand style,—What is such a man?First,in his general course of action his consistency is so broad that owing to its very breadth it can be surveyed only with difficulty, and consequently misleads; he possesses the capacity of extending his will over great stretches of his life, and of despising and rejecting all small things, whatever most beautiful and "divine" things of the world there may be among them.Secondly,he iscolder, harder, less cautious and more free from the fear of "public opinion";he does notpossess the virtues which are compatible with respectability and with being respected, nor any of those things which are counted among the "virtues of the herd." If he is unable tolead, he walks alone; he may then perchance grunt at many things which he meets on his way.Thirdly, he asks for no "compassionate" heart, but servants, instruments; in his dealings with men his one aim isto makesomething out of them. He knows that he cannot reveal himself to anybody: he thinks it bad taste to become familiar; and as a rule he is not familiar when people think he is. When he is not talking to his soul, he wears a mask. He would rather lie than tell the truth, because lying requires more spirit andwill. There is a loneliness within his heart which neither praise nor blame can reach, because he is his own judge from whom is no appeal.
963.
The great man is necessarily a sceptic (I do not mean to say by this that he must appear to be one), provided that greatness consists in this: towillsomething great, together with the means thereto. Freedom from any kind of conviction is a factor in hisstrength of will. And thus it is in keeping with that "enlightened form of despotism" which every great passion exercises. Such a passion enlists intellect in its service; it even has the courage for unholy means; it creates without hesitation; it allows itself convictions, it evenusesthem, but it never submitsto them. The need of faith and of anything unconditionally negative or affirmative is a proof of weakness; all weakness is weakness of will. The man of faith, the believer, is necessarily an inferior species of man. From this it follows that "all freedom of spirit,"i.e.instinctive scepticism, is the prerequisite of greatness.
964.
The great man is conscious of his power over a people, and of the fact that he coincides temporarily with a people or with a century—thismagnifyingof his self-consciousness ascausaandvoluntasismisunderstoodas "altruism": he feels driven tomeansof communication: all great men areinventivein such means. They want to form great communities in their own image; they would fain give multiformity and disorder definite shape; it stimulates them to behold chaos.
The misunderstanding of love. There is aslavishlove which subordinates itself and gives itself away—which idealises and deceives itself; there is adivinespecies of love which despises and loves at the same time, and whichremodelsandelevatesthe thing it loves.
The object is to attain that enormousenergy of greatnesswhich can model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which can yet avoidgoing to ruinat the sight of the sufferingcreatedthereby, the like of which has never been seen before.
965.
The revolution, confusion, and distress of whole peoples is in my opinion of less importance thanthe misfortunes which attend great individuals in their development.We must not allow ourselves to be deceived: the many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings ofmightymen.—To think of one's self in moments of great danger, and to draw ones own advantage from the calamities of thousands in the case of the man who differs very much from the common ruck—may be a sign of a great character which is able to master its feeling of pity and justice.
966.
In contradistinction to the animal, man has developed such a host ofantagonisticinstincts and impulses in himself, that he has become master of the earth by means of this synthesis.—Moralities are only the expression of local and limitedorders of rank inthis multifarious world of instincts which prevent man from perishing through theirantagonism.Thus a masterful instinct so weakens and subtilises the instinct which opposes it that it becomes animpulsewhich provides thestimulusfor the activity of the principal instinct.
The highest man would have the greatest multifariousness in his instincts, and he wouldpossessthese in the relatively strongest degree in which he is able to endure them. As a matter of fact, wherever the plant, man, is found strong,mighty instincts are to be found opposing each other (e.g.Shakespeare), but they are subdued.
967.
Would one not be justified in reckoning all great men among thewicked?This is not so easy to demonstrate in the case of individuals. They are so frequently capable of masterly dissimulation that they very often assume the airs and forms of great virtues. Often, too, they seriously reverence virtues, and in such a way as to be passionately hard towards themselves; but as the result of cruelty. Seen from a distance such things are liable to deceive. Many, on the other hand, misunderstand themselves; not infrequently, too, a great mission will call forth great qualities,e.g.justice. The essential fact is: the greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, but then they also have the opposites of these virtues. I believe that it is precisely out of the presence of these opposites and of the feelings they suscitate, that the great man arises,—for the great man is the broad arch which spans two banks lying far apart.
968.
Ingreat menwe find the specific qualities of life in their highest manifestation: injustice, falsehood, exploitation. But inasmuch as their effect has always beenoverwhelming,their essential nature has been most thoroughly misunderstood,and interpreted as goodness. The type of such an interpreter would be Carlyle.[5]