I.I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception.E.Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians.They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wtmean they by this? Wtwould they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?S.We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.S.Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul95.S.Consciousness96, perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.Consult, ransack yrunderstanding. Wtfind you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wtmean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or ytyou do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.Mind is a congeries of perceptions97. Take away perceptions[pg 028]and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words“that a thing.”These are vague and empty words with us.S.The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception.M.That wchextreamly strengthens us in prejudice is ytwe think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book98.There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be establishedjure Divinoto demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.S.Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men....I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction99. In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wchI say we have not nor can have.S.The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?E.A good proof that Existence is nothing without or[pg 029]distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company100.E.There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.T.No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas.I.We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.I.“A stone is a stone.”This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this:“The whole is equal to its parts,”&c.E.Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.I.If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.Wtmeans Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.I.N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language101.M.But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wnI come to treat more particularly of Existence.Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.S.Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery,[pg 030]viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wnnothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wnthey have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present?I.'Tis not to be imagin'd wta marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.M.Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.I.Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.M.The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles102, strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind.E.I am persuaded, would men but examine wtthey mean by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me.c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.M.The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas103.I.Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.S.The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances104.S.That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest[pg 031]argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.S.The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.S.Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.S.Also from uneasiness and idea together.The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.The Will not distinct from particular volitions.S.It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from yewill.This allow'd hereafter.S.To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the wordcanpresupposes volition.N.Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish105.M.Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all106.Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections107.S.To say yeWill is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.Wtmakes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.[pg 032]An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....M.Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter108.S.Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the wordfree—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.S.We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.S.Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.S.Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.S.Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth& constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.S.You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wtyou mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you109.N.Qu. Wtdo men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whchnow seem to touch.Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wththe utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.N. B. To rein in yesatyrical nature.Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis wtcannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language[pg 033]that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wchperceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas110. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea111. Certainly we shall find that wtever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.G.We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater112difference.G.We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wchis unknown. But I am embrangled113in words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words114. This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.S.The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in[pg 034]truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tistoto cælodifferent from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy115in the wordthing, wnapply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive116.S.Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas117.S.There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?E.Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish'd therefrom.T.N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—oristime itself.Wtwould the solitary man think of number?S.There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us118.S.Locke seems to be mistaken wnhe says thought is not essential to the mind119.S.Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mindexists not—there is no time, no succession of ideas120.S.To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.S.Folly to inquire wtdetermines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will121.[pg 035]S.Again, wtmean you by determine?N.T.For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.
I.I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception.E.Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians.They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wtmean they by this? Wtwould they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?S.We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.S.Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul95.S.Consciousness96, perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.Consult, ransack yrunderstanding. Wtfind you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wtmean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or ytyou do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.Mind is a congeries of perceptions97. Take away perceptions[pg 028]and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words“that a thing.”These are vague and empty words with us.S.The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception.M.That wchextreamly strengthens us in prejudice is ytwe think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book98.There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be establishedjure Divinoto demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.S.Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men....I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction99. In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wchI say we have not nor can have.S.The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?E.A good proof that Existence is nothing without or[pg 029]distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company100.E.There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.T.No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas.I.We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.I.“A stone is a stone.”This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this:“The whole is equal to its parts,”&c.E.Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.I.If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.Wtmeans Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.I.N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language101.M.But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wnI come to treat more particularly of Existence.Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.S.Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery,[pg 030]viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wnnothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wnthey have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present?I.'Tis not to be imagin'd wta marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.M.Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.I.Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.M.The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles102, strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind.E.I am persuaded, would men but examine wtthey mean by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me.c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.M.The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas103.I.Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.S.The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances104.S.That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest[pg 031]argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.S.The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.S.Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.S.Also from uneasiness and idea together.The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.The Will not distinct from particular volitions.S.It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from yewill.This allow'd hereafter.S.To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the wordcanpresupposes volition.N.Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish105.M.Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all106.Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections107.S.To say yeWill is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.Wtmakes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.[pg 032]An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....M.Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter108.S.Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the wordfree—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.S.We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.S.Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.S.Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.S.Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth& constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.S.You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wtyou mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you109.N.Qu. Wtdo men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whchnow seem to touch.Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wththe utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.N. B. To rein in yesatyrical nature.Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis wtcannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language[pg 033]that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wchperceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas110. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea111. Certainly we shall find that wtever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.G.We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater112difference.G.We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wchis unknown. But I am embrangled113in words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words114. This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.S.The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in[pg 034]truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tistoto cælodifferent from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy115in the wordthing, wnapply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive116.S.Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas117.S.There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?E.Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish'd therefrom.T.N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—oristime itself.Wtwould the solitary man think of number?S.There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us118.S.Locke seems to be mistaken wnhe says thought is not essential to the mind119.S.Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mindexists not—there is no time, no succession of ideas120.S.To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.S.Folly to inquire wtdetermines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will121.[pg 035]S.Again, wtmean you by determine?N.T.For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.
I.I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception.E.Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians.They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wtmean they by this? Wtwould they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?S.We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.S.Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul95.S.Consciousness96, perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.Consult, ransack yrunderstanding. Wtfind you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wtmean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or ytyou do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.Mind is a congeries of perceptions97. Take away perceptions[pg 028]and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words“that a thing.”These are vague and empty words with us.S.The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception.M.That wchextreamly strengthens us in prejudice is ytwe think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book98.There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be establishedjure Divinoto demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.S.Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men....I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction99. In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wchI say we have not nor can have.S.The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?E.A good proof that Existence is nothing without or[pg 029]distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company100.E.There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.T.No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas.I.We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.I.“A stone is a stone.”This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this:“The whole is equal to its parts,”&c.E.Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.I.If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.Wtmeans Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.I.N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language101.M.But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wnI come to treat more particularly of Existence.Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.S.Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery,[pg 030]viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wnnothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wnthey have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present?I.'Tis not to be imagin'd wta marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.M.Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.I.Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.M.The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles102, strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind.E.I am persuaded, would men but examine wtthey mean by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me.c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.M.The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas103.I.Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.S.The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances104.S.That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest[pg 031]argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.S.The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.S.Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.S.Also from uneasiness and idea together.The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.The Will not distinct from particular volitions.S.It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from yewill.This allow'd hereafter.S.To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the wordcanpresupposes volition.N.Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish105.M.Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all106.Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections107.S.To say yeWill is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.Wtmakes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.[pg 032]An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....M.Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter108.S.Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the wordfree—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.S.We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.S.Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.S.Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.S.Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth& constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.S.You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wtyou mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you109.N.Qu. Wtdo men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whchnow seem to touch.Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wththe utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.N. B. To rein in yesatyrical nature.Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis wtcannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language[pg 033]that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wchperceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas110. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea111. Certainly we shall find that wtever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.G.We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater112difference.G.We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wchis unknown. But I am embrangled113in words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words114. This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.S.The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in[pg 034]truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tistoto cælodifferent from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy115in the wordthing, wnapply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive116.S.Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas117.S.There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?E.Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish'd therefrom.T.N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—oristime itself.Wtwould the solitary man think of number?S.There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us118.S.Locke seems to be mistaken wnhe says thought is not essential to the mind119.S.Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mindexists not—there is no time, no succession of ideas120.S.To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.S.Folly to inquire wtdetermines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will121.[pg 035]S.Again, wtmean you by determine?N.T.For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.
I.I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception.E.Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians.They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wtmean they by this? Wtwould they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?S.We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.S.Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul95.S.Consciousness96, perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.Consult, ransack yrunderstanding. Wtfind you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wtmean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or ytyou do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.Mind is a congeries of perceptions97. Take away perceptions[pg 028]and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words“that a thing.”These are vague and empty words with us.S.The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception.M.That wchextreamly strengthens us in prejudice is ytwe think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book98.There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be establishedjure Divinoto demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.S.Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men....I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction99. In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wchI say we have not nor can have.S.The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?E.A good proof that Existence is nothing without or[pg 029]distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company100.E.There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.T.No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas.I.We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.I.“A stone is a stone.”This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this:“The whole is equal to its parts,”&c.E.Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.I.If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.Wtmeans Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.I.N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language101.M.But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wnI come to treat more particularly of Existence.Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.S.Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery,[pg 030]viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wnnothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wnthey have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present?I.'Tis not to be imagin'd wta marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.M.Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.I.Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.M.The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles102, strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind.E.I am persuaded, would men but examine wtthey mean by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me.c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.M.The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas103.I.Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.S.The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances104.S.That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest[pg 031]argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.S.The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.S.Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.S.Also from uneasiness and idea together.The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.The Will not distinct from particular volitions.S.It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from yewill.This allow'd hereafter.S.To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the wordcanpresupposes volition.N.Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish105.M.Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all106.Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections107.S.To say yeWill is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.Wtmakes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.[pg 032]An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....M.Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter108.S.Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the wordfree—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.S.We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.S.Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.S.Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.S.Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth& constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.S.You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wtyou mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you109.N.Qu. Wtdo men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whchnow seem to touch.Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wththe utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.N. B. To rein in yesatyrical nature.Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis wtcannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language[pg 033]that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wchperceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas110. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea111. Certainly we shall find that wtever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.G.We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater112difference.G.We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wchis unknown. But I am embrangled113in words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words114. This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.S.The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in[pg 034]truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tistoto cælodifferent from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy115in the wordthing, wnapply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive116.S.Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas117.S.There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?E.Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish'd therefrom.T.N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—oristime itself.Wtwould the solitary man think of number?S.There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us118.S.Locke seems to be mistaken wnhe says thought is not essential to the mind119.S.Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mindexists not—there is no time, no succession of ideas120.S.To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.S.Folly to inquire wtdetermines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will121.[pg 035]S.Again, wtmean you by determine?N.T.For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.
I.
I.
I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception.
E.
E.
Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.
Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians.
They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wtmean they by this? Wtwould they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?
S.
S.
We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.
S.
S.
Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.
The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul95.
S.
S.
Consciousness96, perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.
Consult, ransack yrunderstanding. Wtfind you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wtmean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or ytyou do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.
Mind is a congeries of perceptions97. Take away perceptions[pg 028]and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.
Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words“that a thing.”These are vague and empty words with us.
S.
S.
The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception.
M.
M.
That wchextreamly strengthens us in prejudice is ytwe think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book98.
There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be establishedjure Divinoto demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.
S.
S.
Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men....
I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction99. In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wchI say we have not nor can have.
S.
S.
The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?
E.
E.
A good proof that Existence is nothing without or[pg 029]distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company100.
E.
E.
There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.
T.
T.
No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas.
I.
I.
We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.
I.
I.
“A stone is a stone.”This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this:“The whole is equal to its parts,”&c.
E.
E.
Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.
I.
I.
If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.
Wtmeans Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.
I.
I.
N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language101.
M.
M.
But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wnI come to treat more particularly of Existence.
Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.
S.
S.
Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery,[pg 030]viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wnnothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wnthey have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present?
I.
I.
'Tis not to be imagin'd wta marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.
M.
M.
Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.
I.
I.
Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.
M.
M.
The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles102, strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind.
E.
E.
I am persuaded, would men but examine wtthey mean by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me.
c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.
M.
M.
The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas103.
I.
I.
Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.
We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.
S.
S.
The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances104.
S.
S.
That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest[pg 031]argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.
S.
S.
The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.
S.
S.
Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.
S.
S.
Also from uneasiness and idea together.
The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.
The Will not distinct from particular volitions.
S.
S.
It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.
The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from yewill.
This allow'd hereafter.
S.
S.
To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the wordcanpresupposes volition.
N.
N.
Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish105.
M.
M.
Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all106.
Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?
Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections107.
S.
S.
To say yeWill is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.
Wtmakes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.
An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.
There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....
M.
M.
Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter108.
S.
S.
Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the wordfree—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.
S.
S.
We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.
S.
S.
Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.
S.
S.
Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.
S.
S.
Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth& constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.
S.
S.
You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wtyou mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you109.
N.
N.
Qu. Wtdo men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whchnow seem to touch.
Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wththe utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.
N. B. To rein in yesatyrical nature.
Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis wtcannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language[pg 033]that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.
Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wchperceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas110. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.
I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea111. Certainly we shall find that wtever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.
'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.
G.
G.
We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater112difference.
G.
G.
We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wchis unknown. But I am embrangled113in words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.
The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words114. This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.
S.
S.
The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in[pg 034]truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tistoto cælodifferent from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy115in the wordthing, wnapply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive116.
S.
S.
Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas117.
S.
S.
There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?
E.
E.
Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish'd therefrom.
T.
T.
N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—oristime itself.
Wtwould the solitary man think of number?
S.
S.
There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us118.
S.
S.
Locke seems to be mistaken wnhe says thought is not essential to the mind119.
S.
S.
Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mindexists not—there is no time, no succession of ideas120.
S.
S.
To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.
S.
S.
Folly to inquire wtdetermines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will121.
S.
S.
Again, wtmean you by determine?
N.
N.
T.
T.
For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.