M.Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head.Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time.M.No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not219.Magnitude when barely taken for theratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wthdistance & position) they are determin'd, are resoluble into those points.Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.M.Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wtthe body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated.[pg 068]M.Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?Moon wnhorizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.Allpotentiæalike indifferent.A. B. Wtdoes he mean by hispotentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other?No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.Wedo not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.Mo. S.A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.S.Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.Wtjudgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wchwill onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.[pg 069]S.By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.S.In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wchfreedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties220.Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.If anything is meant by thepotentiaof A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wthe desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.Qu. concerning the procession of Willsin infinitum.Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to yelearner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.M.The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for ytabout mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose221, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down with most.[pg 070]Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.S. Mo.Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wchdepend on the Will, wchis determin'd by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wchis finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t'other.In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.Why the horizontal moon greater?Why objects seen erect?N.To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wthother perceptions?Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1stcould not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing thepunctum visibilebelow 30 minutes?I. S.Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.S.The grand mistake is that we think we haveideasof the[pg 071]operations of our minds222. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35223.G.The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them224.M.The substancewooda collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wchare now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be nonecessaryconnexion between those thoughts?Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves?P.N.Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.M. P.Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly225.M. P.Colours in yedark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?Convex speculums have the same effect wthconcave glasses.[pg 072]Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wthconvex glasses?The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know.Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides persons226.N.As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts move wthlocal motion as immaterial spirit.On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings.S.Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension.Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension perceiv'd by sight?Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex speculum as another?Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of wtI then[pg 073]did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same, for ought we know.Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be properly &per seperceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.The greatnessper seperceivable by the sight is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by reasoning.This is all the greatness the pictures haveper se.Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical surface except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point may subtend the same angle wtha mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles.Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might have been connected wthsmallness, and vice versâ: there being no necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and confusion227.My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.228Qu. Whetherper seproportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be[pg 074]as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly.Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as possible—to avoid giving handle.If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining.The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly andtoto cælodifferent—the one the proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wthit, wchis proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.Qu. wtwould happen if the sphæræ of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd?We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do not.Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.As long as the same angle determines theminimum visibileto two persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account of their eyes.If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V.Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and[pg 075]were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so ytposito uno, ponitur alterumby the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension229?All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect & adæquate230.M. P.Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c.We know many things wchwe want words to express. Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wchdivers men have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds; wchfoundering them, they thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same?WtI see is onely variety of colours & light. WtI feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wtresemblance have these thoughts with those?A picture painted wthgreat variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wththe tangible ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wththe tangible head231?[pg 076]M.All things by us conceivable are—1st, thoughts;2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wchcan possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wtha glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle.S.Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted232.I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or distance.Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd?Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant, and greaterness?N.My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind.Lines thought divisiblead infinitum, because they are suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked eye, & wnview'd thro' magnifying glasses.They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibilityad infinitum.No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in ethiques.Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended.Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas?[pg 077]Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv'd.Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence heterogeneous extension.Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in proportion to the faintness233?Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.That wchseems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise. Hence nonecessaryconnexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones.In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisiblead infinitum.Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, for these are not divisiblead infinitum.Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a diameter may be found betwixt wch& the true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in ytcase there is ('tis true) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom234.Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wtmakes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are perhaps apt to think.The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown away.Mem. To press wtlast precedes more homely, & so think on't again.A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does[pg 078]not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour without extension235.Mem. A great difference betweenconsideringlength wthout breadth, & having anideaof, orimagining, length without breadth236.Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation tosphæra visualis, or to the m. v. (wchis all that I would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view little objects near the eye.Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.Diagonal of particular square commensurable wthits side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wchwould prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 of yemile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of a mile.Particular determin'd lines are not divisiblead infinitum, but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisiblead infinitum.A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis[pg 079]true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible change of place.Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being divisiblead infinitum, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being divisiblead infinitum(unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is apetitio principii?The diagonal is commensurable with the side.
M.Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head.Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time.M.No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not219.Magnitude when barely taken for theratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wthdistance & position) they are determin'd, are resoluble into those points.Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.M.Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wtthe body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated.[pg 068]M.Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?Moon wnhorizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.Allpotentiæalike indifferent.A. B. Wtdoes he mean by hispotentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other?No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.Wedo not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.Mo. S.A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.S.Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.Wtjudgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wchwill onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.[pg 069]S.By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.S.In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wchfreedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties220.Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.If anything is meant by thepotentiaof A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wthe desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.Qu. concerning the procession of Willsin infinitum.Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to yelearner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.M.The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for ytabout mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose221, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down with most.[pg 070]Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.S. Mo.Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wchdepend on the Will, wchis determin'd by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wchis finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t'other.In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.Why the horizontal moon greater?Why objects seen erect?N.To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wthother perceptions?Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1stcould not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing thepunctum visibilebelow 30 minutes?I. S.Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.S.The grand mistake is that we think we haveideasof the[pg 071]operations of our minds222. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35223.G.The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them224.M.The substancewooda collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wchare now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be nonecessaryconnexion between those thoughts?Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves?P.N.Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.M. P.Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly225.M. P.Colours in yedark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?Convex speculums have the same effect wthconcave glasses.[pg 072]Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wthconvex glasses?The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know.Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides persons226.N.As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts move wthlocal motion as immaterial spirit.On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings.S.Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension.Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension perceiv'd by sight?Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex speculum as another?Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of wtI then[pg 073]did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same, for ought we know.Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be properly &per seperceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.The greatnessper seperceivable by the sight is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by reasoning.This is all the greatness the pictures haveper se.Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical surface except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point may subtend the same angle wtha mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles.Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might have been connected wthsmallness, and vice versâ: there being no necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and confusion227.My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.228Qu. Whetherper seproportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be[pg 074]as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly.Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as possible—to avoid giving handle.If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining.The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly andtoto cælodifferent—the one the proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wthit, wchis proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.Qu. wtwould happen if the sphæræ of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd?We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do not.Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.As long as the same angle determines theminimum visibileto two persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account of their eyes.If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V.Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and[pg 075]were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so ytposito uno, ponitur alterumby the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension229?All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect & adæquate230.M. P.Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c.We know many things wchwe want words to express. Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wchdivers men have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds; wchfoundering them, they thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same?WtI see is onely variety of colours & light. WtI feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wtresemblance have these thoughts with those?A picture painted wthgreat variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wththe tangible ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wththe tangible head231?[pg 076]M.All things by us conceivable are—1st, thoughts;2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wchcan possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wtha glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle.S.Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted232.I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or distance.Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd?Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant, and greaterness?N.My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind.Lines thought divisiblead infinitum, because they are suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked eye, & wnview'd thro' magnifying glasses.They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibilityad infinitum.No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in ethiques.Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended.Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas?[pg 077]Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv'd.Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence heterogeneous extension.Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in proportion to the faintness233?Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.That wchseems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise. Hence nonecessaryconnexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones.In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisiblead infinitum.Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, for these are not divisiblead infinitum.Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a diameter may be found betwixt wch& the true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in ytcase there is ('tis true) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom234.Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wtmakes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are perhaps apt to think.The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown away.Mem. To press wtlast precedes more homely, & so think on't again.A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does[pg 078]not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour without extension235.Mem. A great difference betweenconsideringlength wthout breadth, & having anideaof, orimagining, length without breadth236.Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation tosphæra visualis, or to the m. v. (wchis all that I would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view little objects near the eye.Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.Diagonal of particular square commensurable wthits side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wchwould prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 of yemile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of a mile.Particular determin'd lines are not divisiblead infinitum, but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisiblead infinitum.A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis[pg 079]true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible change of place.Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being divisiblead infinitum, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being divisiblead infinitum(unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is apetitio principii?The diagonal is commensurable with the side.
M.Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head.Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time.M.No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not219.Magnitude when barely taken for theratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wthdistance & position) they are determin'd, are resoluble into those points.Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.M.Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wtthe body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated.[pg 068]M.Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?Moon wnhorizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.Allpotentiæalike indifferent.A. B. Wtdoes he mean by hispotentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other?No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.Wedo not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.Mo. S.A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.S.Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.Wtjudgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wchwill onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.[pg 069]S.By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.S.In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wchfreedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties220.Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.If anything is meant by thepotentiaof A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wthe desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.Qu. concerning the procession of Willsin infinitum.Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to yelearner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.M.The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for ytabout mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose221, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down with most.[pg 070]Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.S. Mo.Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wchdepend on the Will, wchis determin'd by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wchis finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t'other.In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.Why the horizontal moon greater?Why objects seen erect?N.To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wthother perceptions?Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1stcould not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing thepunctum visibilebelow 30 minutes?I. S.Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.S.The grand mistake is that we think we haveideasof the[pg 071]operations of our minds222. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35223.G.The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them224.M.The substancewooda collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wchare now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be nonecessaryconnexion between those thoughts?Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves?P.N.Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.M. P.Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly225.M. P.Colours in yedark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?Convex speculums have the same effect wthconcave glasses.[pg 072]Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wthconvex glasses?The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know.Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides persons226.N.As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts move wthlocal motion as immaterial spirit.On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings.S.Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension.Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension perceiv'd by sight?Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex speculum as another?Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of wtI then[pg 073]did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same, for ought we know.Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be properly &per seperceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.The greatnessper seperceivable by the sight is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by reasoning.This is all the greatness the pictures haveper se.Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical surface except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point may subtend the same angle wtha mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles.Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might have been connected wthsmallness, and vice versâ: there being no necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and confusion227.My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.228Qu. Whetherper seproportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be[pg 074]as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly.Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as possible—to avoid giving handle.If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining.The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly andtoto cælodifferent—the one the proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wthit, wchis proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.Qu. wtwould happen if the sphæræ of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd?We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do not.Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.As long as the same angle determines theminimum visibileto two persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account of their eyes.If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V.Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and[pg 075]were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so ytposito uno, ponitur alterumby the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension229?All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect & adæquate230.M. P.Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c.We know many things wchwe want words to express. Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wchdivers men have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds; wchfoundering them, they thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same?WtI see is onely variety of colours & light. WtI feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wtresemblance have these thoughts with those?A picture painted wthgreat variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wththe tangible ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wththe tangible head231?[pg 076]M.All things by us conceivable are—1st, thoughts;2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wchcan possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wtha glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle.S.Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted232.I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or distance.Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd?Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant, and greaterness?N.My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind.Lines thought divisiblead infinitum, because they are suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked eye, & wnview'd thro' magnifying glasses.They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibilityad infinitum.No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in ethiques.Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended.Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas?[pg 077]Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv'd.Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence heterogeneous extension.Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in proportion to the faintness233?Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.That wchseems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise. Hence nonecessaryconnexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones.In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisiblead infinitum.Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, for these are not divisiblead infinitum.Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a diameter may be found betwixt wch& the true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in ytcase there is ('tis true) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom234.Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wtmakes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are perhaps apt to think.The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown away.Mem. To press wtlast precedes more homely, & so think on't again.A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does[pg 078]not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour without extension235.Mem. A great difference betweenconsideringlength wthout breadth, & having anideaof, orimagining, length without breadth236.Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation tosphæra visualis, or to the m. v. (wchis all that I would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view little objects near the eye.Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.Diagonal of particular square commensurable wthits side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wchwould prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 of yemile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of a mile.Particular determin'd lines are not divisiblead infinitum, but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisiblead infinitum.A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis[pg 079]true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible change of place.Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being divisiblead infinitum, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being divisiblead infinitum(unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is apetitio principii?The diagonal is commensurable with the side.
M.Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head.Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time.M.No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not219.Magnitude when barely taken for theratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wthdistance & position) they are determin'd, are resoluble into those points.Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.M.Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wtthe body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated.[pg 068]M.Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?Moon wnhorizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.Allpotentiæalike indifferent.A. B. Wtdoes he mean by hispotentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other?No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.Wedo not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.Mo. S.A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.S.Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.Wtjudgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wchwill onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.[pg 069]S.By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.S.In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wchfreedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties220.Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.If anything is meant by thepotentiaof A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wthe desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.Qu. concerning the procession of Willsin infinitum.Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to yelearner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.M.The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for ytabout mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose221, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down with most.[pg 070]Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.S. Mo.Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wchdepend on the Will, wchis determin'd by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wchis finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t'other.In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.Why the horizontal moon greater?Why objects seen erect?N.To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wthother perceptions?Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1stcould not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing thepunctum visibilebelow 30 minutes?I. S.Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.S.The grand mistake is that we think we haveideasof the[pg 071]operations of our minds222. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35223.G.The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them224.M.The substancewooda collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wchare now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be nonecessaryconnexion between those thoughts?Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves?P.N.Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.M. P.Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly225.M. P.Colours in yedark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?Convex speculums have the same effect wthconcave glasses.[pg 072]Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wthconvex glasses?The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know.Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides persons226.N.As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts move wthlocal motion as immaterial spirit.On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings.S.Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension.Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension perceiv'd by sight?Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex speculum as another?Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of wtI then[pg 073]did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same, for ought we know.Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be properly &per seperceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.The greatnessper seperceivable by the sight is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by reasoning.This is all the greatness the pictures haveper se.Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical surface except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point may subtend the same angle wtha mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles.Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might have been connected wthsmallness, and vice versâ: there being no necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and confusion227.My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.228Qu. Whetherper seproportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be[pg 074]as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly.Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as possible—to avoid giving handle.If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining.The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly andtoto cælodifferent—the one the proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wthit, wchis proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.Qu. wtwould happen if the sphæræ of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd?We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do not.Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.As long as the same angle determines theminimum visibileto two persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account of their eyes.If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V.Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and[pg 075]were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so ytposito uno, ponitur alterumby the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension229?All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect & adæquate230.M. P.Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c.We know many things wchwe want words to express. Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wchdivers men have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds; wchfoundering them, they thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same?WtI see is onely variety of colours & light. WtI feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wtresemblance have these thoughts with those?A picture painted wthgreat variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wththe tangible ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wththe tangible head231?[pg 076]M.All things by us conceivable are—1st, thoughts;2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wchcan possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wtha glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle.S.Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted232.I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or distance.Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd?Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant, and greaterness?N.My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind.Lines thought divisiblead infinitum, because they are suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked eye, & wnview'd thro' magnifying glasses.They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibilityad infinitum.No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in ethiques.Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended.Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas?[pg 077]Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv'd.Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence heterogeneous extension.Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in proportion to the faintness233?Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.That wchseems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise. Hence nonecessaryconnexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones.In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisiblead infinitum.Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, for these are not divisiblead infinitum.Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a diameter may be found betwixt wch& the true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in ytcase there is ('tis true) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom234.Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wtmakes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are perhaps apt to think.The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown away.Mem. To press wtlast precedes more homely, & so think on't again.A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does[pg 078]not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour without extension235.Mem. A great difference betweenconsideringlength wthout breadth, & having anideaof, orimagining, length without breadth236.Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation tosphæra visualis, or to the m. v. (wchis all that I would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view little objects near the eye.Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.Diagonal of particular square commensurable wthits side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wchwould prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 of yemile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of a mile.Particular determin'd lines are not divisiblead infinitum, but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisiblead infinitum.A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis[pg 079]true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible change of place.Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being divisiblead infinitum, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being divisiblead infinitum(unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is apetitio principii?The diagonal is commensurable with the side.
M.
M.
Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head.
Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.
Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time.
M.
M.
No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not219.
Magnitude when barely taken for theratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wthdistance & position) they are determin'd, are resoluble into those points.
Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.
Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.
M.
M.
Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wtthe body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated.
M.
M.
Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?
Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?
Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?
Moon wnhorizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.
Allpotentiæalike indifferent.
A. B. Wtdoes he mean by hispotentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other?
No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.
Wedo not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.
Mo. S.
Mo. S.
A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.
S.
S.
Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.
Wtjudgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?
All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.
We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.
Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wchwill onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.
Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.
S.
S.
By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.
We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.
S.
S.
In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wchfreedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties220.
Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.
This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.
If anything is meant by thepotentiaof A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wthe desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.
Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.
Qu. concerning the procession of Willsin infinitum.
Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to yelearner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.
M.
M.
The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for ytabout mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose221, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down with most.
Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.
Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.
S. Mo.
S. Mo.
Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wchdepend on the Will, wchis determin'd by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wchis finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.
Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.
Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.
The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t'other.
In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.
Why the horizontal moon greater?
Why objects seen erect?
N.
N.
To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wthother perceptions?
Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1stcould not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.
Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing thepunctum visibilebelow 30 minutes?
I. S.
I. S.
Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.
S.
S.
The grand mistake is that we think we haveideasof the[pg 071]operations of our minds222. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.
Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35223.
G.
G.
The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them224.
M.
M.
The substancewooda collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.
Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.
Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wchare now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be nonecessaryconnexion between those thoughts?
Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.
Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves?
P.N.
P.N.
Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.
M. P.
M. P.
Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly225.
M. P.
M. P.
Colours in yedark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.
How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?
Convex speculums have the same effect wthconcave glasses.
Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wthconvex glasses?
The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know.
Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?
Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?
No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides persons226.
N.
N.
As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts move wthlocal motion as immaterial spirit.
On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings.
S.
S.
Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?
No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension.
Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension perceiv'd by sight?
Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.
Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.
Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex speculum as another?
Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of wtI then[pg 073]did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same, for ought we know.
Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.
Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.
If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be properly &per seperceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.
The greatnessper seperceivable by the sight is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by reasoning.
This is all the greatness the pictures haveper se.
Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical surface except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point may subtend the same angle wtha mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.
Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles.
Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might have been connected wthsmallness, and vice versâ: there being no necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and confusion227.
My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.228
Qu. Whetherper seproportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be[pg 074]as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly.
Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as possible—to avoid giving handle.
If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining.
The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.
Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.
Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly andtoto cælodifferent—the one the proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wthit, wchis proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.
Qu. wtwould happen if the sphæræ of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd?
We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.
Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do not.
Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.
As long as the same angle determines theminimum visibileto two persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account of their eyes.
If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V.
Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and[pg 075]were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so ytposito uno, ponitur alterumby the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension229?
All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect & adæquate230.
M. P.
M. P.
Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c.
We know many things wchwe want words to express. Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wchdivers men have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds; wchfoundering them, they thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.
Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?
Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same?
WtI see is onely variety of colours & light. WtI feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wtresemblance have these thoughts with those?
A picture painted wthgreat variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wththe tangible ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wththe tangible head231?
M.
M.
All things by us conceivable are—
1st, thoughts;
2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;
3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wchcan possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.
An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wtha glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle.
S.
S.
Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted232.
I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or distance.
Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd?
Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant, and greaterness?
N.
N.
My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.
Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind.
Lines thought divisiblead infinitum, because they are suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked eye, & wnview'd thro' magnifying glasses.
They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibilityad infinitum.
No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.
Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in ethiques.
Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended.
Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas?
Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv'd.
Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence heterogeneous extension.
Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in proportion to the faintness233?
Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.
That wchseems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise. Hence nonecessaryconnexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones.
In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisiblead infinitum.
Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, for these are not divisiblead infinitum.
Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a diameter may be found betwixt wch& the true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in ytcase there is ('tis true) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom234.
Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wtmakes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are perhaps apt to think.
The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown away.
Mem. To press wtlast precedes more homely, & so think on't again.
A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does[pg 078]not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour without extension235.
Mem. A great difference betweenconsideringlength wthout breadth, & having anideaof, orimagining, length without breadth236.
Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.
'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation tosphæra visualis, or to the m. v. (wchis all that I would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view little objects near the eye.
Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.
Diagonal of particular square commensurable wthits side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.
I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wchwould prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.
Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 of yemile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of a mile.
Particular determin'd lines are not divisiblead infinitum, but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisiblead infinitum.
A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis[pg 079]true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible change of place.
Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being divisiblead infinitum, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being divisiblead infinitum(unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is apetitio principii?
The diagonal is commensurable with the side.