M. P.Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist without the mind; taking the mind for the active thing wchI call“I,”“myself”—ytseems to be distinct from the understanding254?P.The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible & visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to be without the mind.I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere Nihilarians.The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.M.Keill's filling the world with a mite255. This follows from the divisibility of extensionad infinitum.Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 points256. It seems to consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically?Sir Isaac257owns his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of indivisibles.M.Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis wtany one of[pg 089]common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I &c.Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew not how to employ their parts.The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em258. I see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind.BythingI either mean ideas or that wchhas ideas259.Nullum præclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger260.A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they consider.1.261All significant words stand for ideas262.2. All knowledge about our ideas.3. All ideas come from without or from within.4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd sensations263.5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are called thoughts.6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing.7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts264, by 3, 4, 5.9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wchis both thoughtless & senseless265, by 6, 7, 8.10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.[pg 090]12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.13. That thing wchis like unto another thing must agree wthit in one or more simple ideas.14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing.16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar'd.17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking wtthey agree in and wtthey disagree in.18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18.N. B. Other arguments innumerable, botha priori&a posteriori, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing266.N. B. Not one argument of any kind wtsoever, certain or probable,a prioriora posteriori, from any art or science, from either sense or reason, against it.Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisiblead infinitum.We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences.We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon truer principles than himself267.Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue it—so far as it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But forthe nothings, I'll leave them to their admirers.[pg 091]I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the time that another will.Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.P.Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion.I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. Wchgoes on the best principles?The Billys268use a finite visible line for an 1/m.T.Marsilius Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of time269.M.The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray wtdo the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still270.N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain271.P.There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths.The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisiblead infinitum. We Irishmen can conceive no such lines.The mathematicians talk of wtthey call a point. This, they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something272& nothing are next neighbours.Engagements to P.273on account of yeTreatise that grew up under his eye; on account also of his approving my[pg 092]harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths.How could I venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of use to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas?I publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own particular.My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction.Passing through all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth.He that would bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking274.From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way.It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain.The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears 1st, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; 2dly, from cutting off the useless labour of sciences, and so forth.
M. P.Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist without the mind; taking the mind for the active thing wchI call“I,”“myself”—ytseems to be distinct from the understanding254?P.The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible & visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to be without the mind.I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere Nihilarians.The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.M.Keill's filling the world with a mite255. This follows from the divisibility of extensionad infinitum.Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 points256. It seems to consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically?Sir Isaac257owns his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of indivisibles.M.Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis wtany one of[pg 089]common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I &c.Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew not how to employ their parts.The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em258. I see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind.BythingI either mean ideas or that wchhas ideas259.Nullum præclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger260.A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they consider.1.261All significant words stand for ideas262.2. All knowledge about our ideas.3. All ideas come from without or from within.4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd sensations263.5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are called thoughts.6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing.7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts264, by 3, 4, 5.9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wchis both thoughtless & senseless265, by 6, 7, 8.10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.[pg 090]12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.13. That thing wchis like unto another thing must agree wthit in one or more simple ideas.14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing.16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar'd.17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking wtthey agree in and wtthey disagree in.18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18.N. B. Other arguments innumerable, botha priori&a posteriori, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing266.N. B. Not one argument of any kind wtsoever, certain or probable,a prioriora posteriori, from any art or science, from either sense or reason, against it.Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisiblead infinitum.We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences.We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon truer principles than himself267.Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue it—so far as it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But forthe nothings, I'll leave them to their admirers.[pg 091]I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the time that another will.Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.P.Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion.I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. Wchgoes on the best principles?The Billys268use a finite visible line for an 1/m.T.Marsilius Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of time269.M.The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray wtdo the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still270.N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain271.P.There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths.The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisiblead infinitum. We Irishmen can conceive no such lines.The mathematicians talk of wtthey call a point. This, they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something272& nothing are next neighbours.Engagements to P.273on account of yeTreatise that grew up under his eye; on account also of his approving my[pg 092]harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths.How could I venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of use to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas?I publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own particular.My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction.Passing through all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth.He that would bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking274.From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way.It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain.The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears 1st, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; 2dly, from cutting off the useless labour of sciences, and so forth.
M. P.Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist without the mind; taking the mind for the active thing wchI call“I,”“myself”—ytseems to be distinct from the understanding254?P.The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible & visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to be without the mind.I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere Nihilarians.The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.M.Keill's filling the world with a mite255. This follows from the divisibility of extensionad infinitum.Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 points256. It seems to consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically?Sir Isaac257owns his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of indivisibles.M.Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis wtany one of[pg 089]common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I &c.Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew not how to employ their parts.The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em258. I see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind.BythingI either mean ideas or that wchhas ideas259.Nullum præclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger260.A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they consider.1.261All significant words stand for ideas262.2. All knowledge about our ideas.3. All ideas come from without or from within.4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd sensations263.5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are called thoughts.6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing.7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts264, by 3, 4, 5.9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wchis both thoughtless & senseless265, by 6, 7, 8.10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.[pg 090]12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.13. That thing wchis like unto another thing must agree wthit in one or more simple ideas.14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing.16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar'd.17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking wtthey agree in and wtthey disagree in.18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18.N. B. Other arguments innumerable, botha priori&a posteriori, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing266.N. B. Not one argument of any kind wtsoever, certain or probable,a prioriora posteriori, from any art or science, from either sense or reason, against it.Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisiblead infinitum.We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences.We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon truer principles than himself267.Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue it—so far as it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But forthe nothings, I'll leave them to their admirers.[pg 091]I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the time that another will.Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.P.Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion.I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. Wchgoes on the best principles?The Billys268use a finite visible line for an 1/m.T.Marsilius Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of time269.M.The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray wtdo the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still270.N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain271.P.There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths.The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisiblead infinitum. We Irishmen can conceive no such lines.The mathematicians talk of wtthey call a point. This, they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something272& nothing are next neighbours.Engagements to P.273on account of yeTreatise that grew up under his eye; on account also of his approving my[pg 092]harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths.How could I venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of use to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas?I publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own particular.My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction.Passing through all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth.He that would bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking274.From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way.It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain.The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears 1st, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; 2dly, from cutting off the useless labour of sciences, and so forth.
M. P.Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist without the mind; taking the mind for the active thing wchI call“I,”“myself”—ytseems to be distinct from the understanding254?P.The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible & visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to be without the mind.I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere Nihilarians.The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.M.Keill's filling the world with a mite255. This follows from the divisibility of extensionad infinitum.Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 points256. It seems to consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically?Sir Isaac257owns his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of indivisibles.M.Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis wtany one of[pg 089]common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I &c.Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew not how to employ their parts.The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em258. I see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind.BythingI either mean ideas or that wchhas ideas259.Nullum præclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger260.A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they consider.1.261All significant words stand for ideas262.2. All knowledge about our ideas.3. All ideas come from without or from within.4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd sensations263.5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are called thoughts.6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing.7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts264, by 3, 4, 5.9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wchis both thoughtless & senseless265, by 6, 7, 8.10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.[pg 090]12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.13. That thing wchis like unto another thing must agree wthit in one or more simple ideas.14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing.16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar'd.17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking wtthey agree in and wtthey disagree in.18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18.N. B. Other arguments innumerable, botha priori&a posteriori, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing266.N. B. Not one argument of any kind wtsoever, certain or probable,a prioriora posteriori, from any art or science, from either sense or reason, against it.Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisiblead infinitum.We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences.We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon truer principles than himself267.Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue it—so far as it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But forthe nothings, I'll leave them to their admirers.[pg 091]I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the time that another will.Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.P.Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion.I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. Wchgoes on the best principles?The Billys268use a finite visible line for an 1/m.T.Marsilius Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of time269.M.The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray wtdo the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still270.N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain271.P.There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths.The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisiblead infinitum. We Irishmen can conceive no such lines.The mathematicians talk of wtthey call a point. This, they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something272& nothing are next neighbours.Engagements to P.273on account of yeTreatise that grew up under his eye; on account also of his approving my[pg 092]harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths.How could I venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of use to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas?I publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own particular.My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction.Passing through all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth.He that would bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking274.From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way.It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain.The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears 1st, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; 2dly, from cutting off the useless labour of sciences, and so forth.
M. P.
M. P.
Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist without the mind; taking the mind for the active thing wchI call“I,”“myself”—ytseems to be distinct from the understanding254?
P.
P.
The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible & visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to be without the mind.
I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere Nihilarians.
The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.
M.
M.
Keill's filling the world with a mite255. This follows from the divisibility of extensionad infinitum.
Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 points256. It seems to consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.
To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically?
Sir Isaac257owns his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of indivisibles.
M.
M.
Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.
I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis wtany one of[pg 089]common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I &c.
Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew not how to employ their parts.
The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em258. I see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind.
BythingI either mean ideas or that wchhas ideas259.
Nullum præclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger260.
A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they consider.
1.261All significant words stand for ideas262.
2. All knowledge about our ideas.
3. All ideas come from without or from within.
4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd sensations263.
5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are called thoughts.
6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing.
7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.
8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts264, by 3, 4, 5.
9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wchis both thoughtless & senseless265, by 6, 7, 8.
10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.
11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.
12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.
13. That thing wchis like unto another thing must agree wthit in one or more simple ideas.
14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.
15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing.
16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar'd.
17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking wtthey agree in and wtthey disagree in.
18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.
19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18.
N. B. Other arguments innumerable, botha priori&a posteriori, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing266.
N. B. Not one argument of any kind wtsoever, certain or probable,a prioriora posteriori, from any art or science, from either sense or reason, against it.
Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisiblead infinitum.
We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences.
We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon truer principles than himself267.
Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue it—so far as it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But forthe nothings, I'll leave them to their admirers.
I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the time that another will.
Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.
P.
P.
Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion.
I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. Wchgoes on the best principles?
The Billys268use a finite visible line for an 1/m.
T.
T.
Marsilius Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of time269.
M.
M.
The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray wtdo the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still270.
N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain271.
P.
P.
There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths.
The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisiblead infinitum. We Irishmen can conceive no such lines.
The mathematicians talk of wtthey call a point. This, they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something272& nothing are next neighbours.
Engagements to P.273on account of yeTreatise that grew up under his eye; on account also of his approving my[pg 092]harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths.
How could I venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of use to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas?
I publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own particular.
My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction.
Passing through all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth.
He that would bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking274.
From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way.
It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain.
The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears 1st, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; 2dly, from cutting off the useless labour of sciences, and so forth.