It is not on this occasion necessary to form minute calculations, or to compute the expense of every company of soldiers and squadron of ships; it is only necessary to assert, what will, I hope, not be very readily denied, even by those whom daily practice of absurd apologies has rendered impregnable by the force of truth, that such expenses as have neither contributed to our own defence, nor to the disadvantage of the Spaniards, have been thrown away.
If this be granted, my lords, it will appear, that no nation ever beheld its treasures so profusely squandered, ever paid taxes so willingly, and so patiently saw them perverted; for it cannot, my lords, be proved, that any part of our preparations has produced a proportionate effect; but it may be readily shown how many fleets have been equipped only that the merchants might want sailors, and that the public stores might be consumed.
As to our ill success in America, which has been imputed only to the chance of war, it will be reasonable, my lords, to ascribe to other causes, so much of it as might have been prevented by a more speedy reinforcement of Vernon, or may be supposed to have arisen from the inexperience of our troops, and the escape of the Spaniards from Ferrol.
If our fleets had been sent more early into that part of the world, the Spaniards would have had no time to strengthen their garrisons; had our troops been acquainted with discipline, the attack would have been made with greater judgment; and had not the Spaniards escaped from Ferrol, we should have had no enemy in America to encounter. Had all our ministers and all our admirals done their duty, it is evident that not only Carthagena had been taken, but that half the dominions of Spain might now have owned the sovereignty of the crown of Britain.
This, my lords, may be observed of the only enterprise, which it is reasonable to believe was in reality intended against the Spaniards, if even of this our ministers had not before contrived the defeat. But of all the rest of our armaments it does not appear that any effect has been felt but by ourselves, it cannot be discovered that they even raised any alarms or anxiety either in our enemies or their allies, by whom perhaps it was known that they were only designed as punishments for the merchants of Britain.
That our merchants have already been severely chastised for their insolence in complaining of their losses, and their temerity in raising in the nation a regard for its commerce, its honour, and its rights, is evident from a dreadful list of three hundred ships taken by the Spaniards, some of which were abandoned by their convoys, and others seized within sight of the coasts of Britain.
It may be urged, my lords, that the Spaniards have likewise lost a great number of vessels; but what else could they expect when they engaged in a war against the greatest naval power of the universe? And it is to be remembered, that the Spaniards have this consolation in their misfortunes, that of their ships none have been deserted by their convoys, or wilfully exposed to capture by being robbed of their crews, to supply ships of war with idle hands.
The Spaniards will likewise consider, that they have not harassed their subjects for the protection of their trade; that they have not fitted out fleets only to amuse the populace. They comfort themselves with the hope, that the Britons will soon be reduced to a state of weakness below themselves, and wait patiently for the time in which the masters of the sea shall receive from them the regulation of their commerce and the limits of their navigation.
Nor can it be doubted, my lords, but that by adhering to these measures, our ministers will in a short time gratify their hopes; for whatsoever be the difference between the power of two contending nations, if the richer spends its treasures without effect, and exposes its troops to unhealthy climates and impracticable expeditions, while the weaker is parsimonious and prudent, they must soon be brought to an equality; and by continuing the same conduct, the weaker power must at length prevail.
That this has been hitherto the state of the war between Britain and Spain, it is not necessary to prove to your lordships; it is apparent, that the expenses of the Spaniards have been far less than those of Britain; and, therefore, if we should suppose the actual losses of war equal, we are only wearing out our force in useless efforts, and our enemies grow every day comparatively stronger.
But, my lords, let us not flatter ourselves that our actual losses have been equal; let us, before we determine this question, accurately compare the number and the value of our ships and cargoes with those of the Spaniards, and see on which side the loss will fall.
And let us not forget, what in all the calculations which I have yet seen on either part has been totally overlooked, the number of men killed, or captives in the British and Spanish dominions. Men, my lords, are at once strength and riches; and, therefore, it is to be considered, that the most irreparable loss which any nation can sustain is the diminution of its people: money may be repaid, and commerce may be recovered; even liberty may be regained, but the loss of people can never be retrieved. Even the twentieth generation may have reason to exclaim, How much more numerous and more powerful would this nation have been, had our ancestors not been betrayed in the expedition to Carthagena!
What loss, my lords, have the Spaniards sustained which can be put in balance with that of our army in America, an army given up to the vultures of an unhealthy climate, and of which those who perished by the sword, were in reality rescued from more lingering torments?
What equivalent can be mentioned for the liberty of multitudes of Britons, now languishing in the prisons of Spain, or obliged by hardships and desperation to assist the enemies of their country? What have the Spaniards suffered that can be opposed to the detriment which the commerce of this nation feels from the detention of our sailors?
These, my lords, are losses not to be paralleled by the destruction of Porto Bello, even though that expedition should be ascribed to the ministry. These are losses which may extend their consequences to many ages, which may long impede our commerce, and diminish our shipping.
It is not to be imagined, my lords, that in this time of peculiar danger, parents will destine their children to maritime employments, or that any man will engage in naval business who can exercise any other profession; and therefore the death or captivity of a sailor leaves a vacuity in our commerce, since no other will be ready to supply his place. Thus, by degrees, the continuance of the war will contract our trade, and those parts of it which we cannot occupy, will be snatched by the French or Dutch, from whom it is not probable that they will ever be recovered.
This, my lords, is another circumstance of disadvantage to which the Spaniards are not exposed; for their traffick being only from one part of their dominions to another, cannot be destroyed, but will, after the short interruption of a war, be again equally certain and equally profitable.
It appears, therefore, my lords, that we have hitherto suffered more than the Spaniards, more than the nation which we have so much reason to despise; it appears that our fleets have been useless, and that our troops have been only sent out to be destroyed; and it will, therefore, surely be allowed me to assert, that the war has not been hitherto successful.
I am, therefore, of opinion, my lords, that as the address now proposed, cannot but be understood both by his majesty and the nation, to imply, in some degree, a commendation of that conduct which cannot be commended, which ought never to be mentioned but with detestation and contempt, it will be unworthy of this house, offensive to the whole nation, and unjust to his majesty.
His majesty, my lords, has summoned us to advise him in this important juncture, and the nation expects from our determinations its relief or its destruction: nor will either have much to hope from our counsels, if, in our first publick act, we endeavour to deceive them.
It seems, therefore, proper to change the common form of our addresses to the throne, to do once, at least, what his majesty demands and the people expect, and to remember that no characters are more inconsistent, than those of a counsellor of the king, and a flatterer of the ministry.
Then lord ABINGDON spoke to this effect:—My lords, I have always observed that debates are prolonged, and inquiries perplexed, by the neglect of method; and therefore think it necessary to move, That the question may be read, that the noble lords who shall be inclined to explain their sentiments upon it, may have always the chief point in view, and not deviate into foreign considerations.
[It was read accordingly.]
Lord CARTERET spoke next, to the purpose following:—My lords, I am convinced of the propriety of the last motion by the advantage which it has afforded me of viewing more deliberately and distinctly the question before us; the consideration of which has confirmed me in my own opinion, that the address now proposed is only a flattering repetition of the speech, and that the speech was drawn up only to betray us into an encomium on the ministry; who, as they certainly have not deserved any commendations, will, I hope, not receive them from your lordships. For what has been the result of all their measures, but a general confusion, the depression of our own nation and our allies, and the exaltation of the house of Bourbon?
It is universally allowed, my lords, and therefore it would be superfluous to prove, that the liberties of Europe are now in the utmost danger; that the house of Bourbon has arrived almost at that exalted pinnacle of authority, from whence it will look down with contempt upon all other powers, to which it will henceforward prescribe laws at pleasure, whose dominions will be limited by its direction, and whose armies will march at its command.
That Britain will be long exempted from the general servitude, that we shall be able to stand alone against the whole power of Europe, which the French may then bring down upon us, and preserve ourselves independent, while every other nation acknowledges the authority of an arbitrary conqueror, is by no means likely, and might be, perhaps, demonstrated to be not possible.
How long we might be able to retain our liberty, it is beyond the reach of policy to determine, but as it is evident, that when the empire is subdued, the Dutch will quickly fall under the same dominion, and that all their ports and all their commerce will then be in the hands of the French, it cannot be denied that our commerce will quickly be at an end. We shall then lose the dominion of the sea, and all our distant colonies and settlements, and be shut up in our own island, where the continuance of our liberties can be determined only by the resolution with which we shall defend them.
That this, my lords, must probably, in a few years, be our state, if the schemes of the house of Bourbon should succeed, is certain beyond all controversy; and therefore it is evident, that no man to whom such a condition does not appear eligible, can look unconcerned at the confusion of the continent, or consider the destruction of the house of Austria, without endeavouring to prevent it.
But, my lords, though such endeavours are the duty of all who are engaged in the transaction of publick affairs, though the importance of the cause of the queen of Hungary be acknowledged in the speech to which we are to return an address, it does not appear that the ministers of Britain have once attempted to assist her, or have even forborne any thing which might aggravate her distress.
The only effectual methods by which any efficacious relief could have been procured, were that of reconciling her with the king of Prussia, or that of prevailing upon the Muscovites to succour her.
A reconciliation with the king of Prussia would have been my first care, if the honour of advising on this occasion had fallen to my lot. To have mediated successfully between them could surely have been no difficult task, because each party could not but know how much it was their common interest to exclude the French from the empire, and how certainly this untimely discord must expose them both to their ancient enemy.
As in private life, my lords, when two friends carry any dispute between them to improper degrees of anger or resentment, it is the province of a third to moderate the passion of each, and to restore that benevolence which a difference of interest or opinion had impaired; so in alliances, or the friendships of nations, whenever it unhappily falls out that two of them forget the general good, and lay themselves open to those evils from which a strict union only can preserve them, it is necessary that some other power should interpose, and prevent the dangers of a perpetual discord.
Whether this was attempted, my lords, I know not; but if any such design was in appearance prosecuted, it may be reasonably imagined from the event, that the negotiators were defective either in skill or in diligence; for how can it be conceived that any man should act contrary to his own interest, to whom the state of his affairs is truly represented?
But not to suppress what I cannot doubt, I am convinced, my lords, that there is in reality no design of assisting the queen of Hungary; either our ministers have not yet recovered from their apprehensions of the exorbitant power of the house of Austria, by which they were frighted some years ago into the bosom of France for shelter, and which left them no expedient but the treaty of Hanover; or they are now equally afraid of France, and expect thepretenderto be forced upon them by the power whom they so lately solicited to secure them from him.
Whatever is the motive of their conduct, it is evident, my lords, that they are at present to the unfortunate queen of Hungary, either professed enemies, or treacherous allies; for they have permitted the invasion of her Italian dominions, when they might have prevented it without a blow, only by commanding the Spaniards not to transport their troops.
To argue that our fleet in the Mediterranean was not of strength sufficient to oppose their passage, is a subterfuge to which they can only be driven by the necessity of making some apology, and an absolute inability to produce any which will not immediately be discovered to be groundless.
It is known, my lords, to all Europe, that Haddock had then under his command thirteen ships of the line, and nine frigates, and that the Spanish convoy consisted only of three ships; and yet they sailed before his eyes with a degree of security which nothing could have produced but a passport from the court of Britain, and an assured exemption from the danger of an attack.
It may be urged, that they were protected by the French squadron, and that Haddock durst not attack them, because he was unable to contend with the united fleets; but my lords, even this is known to be false: it is known that they bore no proportion to the strength of the British squadron, that they could not have made even the appearance of a battle, and that our commanders could have been only employed in pursuit and captures.
This, my lords, was well known to our ministers, who were afraid only of destroying the French squadron, and were very far from apprehending any danger from it; but being determined to purchase, on any terms, the continuance of the friendship of their old protectors, consented to the invasion of Italy, and procured a squadron to sail out, under pretence of defending the Spanish transports, that their compliance might not be discovered.
All this, my lords, may reasonably be suspected at the first view of their proceedings; for how could an inferiour force venture into the way of an enemy, unless upon security that they should not be attacked? But the late treaty of neutrality has changed suspicion into certainty, has discovered the source of all their measures, and shown that the invasion of Italy is permitted to preserve Hanover from the like calamity.
There is great danger, my lords, lest this last treaty of Hanover should give the decisive blow to the liberties of Europe. How much it embarrasses the queen of Hungary, by making it necessary for her to divide her forces, is obvious at the first view; but this is not, in my opinion, its most fatal consequence. The other powers will be incited, by the example of our ministry, to conclude treaties of neutrality in the same manner. They will distrust every appearance of our zeal for the house of Austria, and imagine that we intend only an hypocritical assistance, and that our generals, our ambassadors, and our admirals, have, in reality, the same orders.
Nothing, my lords, is more dangerous than to weaken the publick faith. When a nation can be no longer trusted, it loses all its influence, because none can fear its menaces, or depend on its alliance. A nation no longer trusted, must stand alone and unsupported; and it is certain that the nation which is justly suspected of holding with its open enemies a secret intercourse to the prejudice of its allies, can be no longer trusted.
This suspicion, my lords, this hateful, this reproachful character, is now fixed upon the court of Britain; nor does it take its rise only from the forbearance of our admiral, but has received new confirmation from the behaviour of our ambassador, who denied the treaty of neutrality, when the French minister declared it to the Dutch. Such now, my lords, is the reputation of the British court, a reputation produced by the most flagrant and notorious instances of cowardice and falsehood, which cannot but make all our endeavours ineffectual, and discourage all those powers whose conjunction we might have promoted, from entering into any other engagements than such as we may purchase for stated subsidies. For who, upon any other motive than immediate interest, would form an alliance with a power which, upon the first appearance of danger, gives up a confederate, to purchase, not a large extent of territory, not a new field of commerce, not a port or a citadel, but an abject neutrality!
But however mean may be a supplication for peace, or however infamous the desertion of an ally, I wish, my lords, that the liberty of invading the queen of Hungary's dominions without opposition, had been the most culpable concession of our illustrious ministers, of whom it is reasonable to believe, that they have stipulated with the Spaniards, that they shall be repaid the expense of the war by the plunder of our merchants.
That our commerce has been unnecessarily exposed to the ravages of privateers, from which a very small degree of caution might have preserved it; that three hundred trading ships have been taken, and that three thousand British sailors are now in captivity, is a consideration too melancholy to be long dwelt upon, and a truth too certain to be suppressed or denied.
How such havock could have been made, had not our ships of war concluded a treaty of neutrality with the Spaniards, and left the war to be carried on only by the merchants, it is not easy to conceive; for surely it will not be pretended, that all these losses were the necessary consequence of our situation with regard to Spain, which, if it exposed the Portugal traders to hazard, did not hinder us from guarding our own coasts.
And yet on our own coasts, my lords, have multitudes of our ships been taken by the Spaniards; they have been seized by petty vessels as they were entering our ports, and congratulating themselves upon their escape from danger.
In the late war with France, an enemy much more formidable both for power and situation, methods were discovered by which our trade was more efficaciously protected: by stationing a squadron at the mouth of the Channel, of which two or three ships at a time cruized at a proper distance on the neighbouring seas, the privateers were kept in awe, and confined to their own harbours, or seized if they ventured to leave them.
But of such useful regulations in the present war there is little hope; for if the publick papers are of any credit, the king of Spain considers the captures of our merchants as a standing revenue, and has laid an indulto upon them as upon other parts of the Spanish trade.
It is, therefore, to little purpose that measures are proposed in this house, or schemes presented by the merchants for the preservation of our commerce; for the merchants are considered as the determined enemies of our minister, who therefore resolved that they should repent of the war into which he was forced by them, contrary to those favourite schemes and established maxims, which he has pursued till the liberties of mankind are almost extinguished.
There are, indeed, some hopes, my lords, that new measures, resolutely pursued, might yet repair the mischiefs of this absurd and cowardly conduct, and that by resolution and dexterity, the ambition of France might once more be disappointed. The king of Prussia appears, at length, convinced that he has not altogether pursued his real interest, and that his own family must fall in the ruin of the house of Austria. The king of Sardinia appears firm in his determination to adhere to the queen of Hungary, and has therefore refused a passage through his dominions to the Spanish troops. The States of Holland seem to have taken the alarm, and nothing but their distrust of our sincerity can hinder them from uniting against the house of Bourbon.
This distrust, my lords, we may probably remove, by reviving, on this occasion, our ancient forms of address, and declaring at once to his majesty, and to all the powers of Europe, that we are far from approving the late measures.
There is another reason why the short addresses of our ancestors may be preferred to the modern forms, in which a great number of particular facts are often comprehended. It is evident, that the addresses are presented, before there can be time to examine whether the facts contained in them are justly stated; and they must, therefore, lose their efficacy with the people, who are sufficiently sagacious to distinguish servile compliance from real approbation, and who will not easily mistake the incense of flattery for the tribute of gratitude.
With regard to the propriety of the address proposed to your lordships, which is, like others, only a repetition of the speech, there is, at least, one objection to it too important to be suppressed.
It is affirmed in the speech, in what particular words I cannot exactly remember, that since the death of the late German emperour, the interest of the queen of Hungary has been diligently and invariably promoted; an assertion which his majesty is too wise, too equitable, and too generous to have uttered, but at the persuasion of his ministers.
His majesty well knows, that no important assistance has been hitherto given to that unhappy princess; he knows that the twelve thousand men, who are said to have been raised for the defence of the empire, those mighty troops, by whose assistance the enemies of Austria were to be scattered, never marched beyond the territory of Hanover, nor left that blissful country for a single day. And is it probable that the queen would have preferred money for troops, had she not been informed that it would be more easily obtained?
Nor was even this pecuniary assistance, though compatible with the security of Hanover, granted her without reluctance and difficulty; of which no other proof is necessary, than the distance between the promise and the performance of it. The money, my lords, is not yet all paid, though the last payment was very lately fixed. Such is the assistance which the united influence of justice and compassion has yet procured from the court of Britain.
Our ministers have been, therefore, hitherto, my lords, so far from acting with vigour in favour of the house of Austria, that they have never solicited the court of Muscovy, almost the only court now independent on France, to engage in her defence. How wisely that mighty power distinguishes her real interest, and how ardently she pursues it, the whole world was convinced in her alliance with the late emperour; nor is it unlikely, that she might have been easily persuaded to have protected his daughter with equal zeal. But we never asked her alliance lest we should obtain it, and yet we boast of our good offices.
Our governours thought it more nearly concerned them to humble our merchants than to succour our allies, and therefore admitted the Spaniards into Italy; by which prudent conduct they dexterously at once gratified the house of Bourbon, embarrassed the queen of Hungary, and endangered the effects of the British merchants, lying at Leghorn; effects which were lately valued at six hundred thousand pounds, but which, by the seasonable arrival of the Spaniards, are happily reduced to half their price.
I hope, therefore, I need not urge to your lordships the necessity of confining our address to thanks and congratulations, because it is not necessary to say how inconsistent it must be thought with the dignity of this house to echo falsehood, and to countenance perfidy.
Then the duke of NEWCASTLE spoke to the following effect:—My lords, the manner in which the noble lord who spoke last expresses his sentiments, never fails to give pleasure, even where his arguments produce no conviction; and his eloquence always receives its praise, though it may sometimes be disappointed of its more important effects.
In the present debate, my lords, I have heard no argument, by which I am inclined to change the usual forms of address, or to reject the motion which has been made to us.
The address which has been proposed, is not, in my opinion, justly chargeable either with flattery to the ministers, or with disingenuity with respect to the people; nor can I discover in it any of those positions which have been represented so fallacious and dangerous. It contains only a general declaration of our gratitude, and an assertion of our zeal; a declaration and assertion to which I hope no lord in this assembly will be unwilling to subscribe.
As an inquiry into the propriety of this address has produced, whether necessarily or not, many observations on the present state of Europe, and many animadversions upon the late conduct, it cannot be improper for me to offer to your lordships my opinion of the measures which have been pursued by us, as well in the war with Spain, as with regard to the queen of Hungary, and to propose my conjectures concerning the events which may probably be produced by the distractions on the continent.
This deviation from the question before us, will at least be as easily pardoned in me as in the noble lords who have exhibited so gloomy a representation of our approaching condition, who have lamented the slavery with which they imagine all the states of Europe about to be harassed, and described the insolence and ravages of those oppressors to whom their apprehensions have already given the empire of the world. For surely, my lords, it is an endeavour no less laudable to dispel terrour, than to excite it; and he who brings us such accounts as we desire to receive, is generally listened to with indulgence, however unelegant may be his expressions, or however irregular his narration.
That the power of the family of Bourbon is arrived at a very dangerous and formidable extent; that it never was hitherto employed but to disturb the happiness of the universe; that the same schemes which our ancestors laboured so ardently and so successfully to destroy, are now formed afresh, and intended to be put in immediate execution; that the empire is designed to be held henceforward in dependence on France; and that the house of Austria, by which the common rights of mankind have been so long supported, is now marked out for destruction, is too evident to be contested.
It is allowed, my lords, that the power of the house of Austria, which there was once reason to dread, lest it might have been employed against us, is now almost extinguished; and that name, which has for so many ages filled the histories of Europe, is in danger of being forgotten. It is allowed, that the house of Austria cannot fall without exposing all those who have hitherto been supported by its alliance, to the utmost danger; and I need not add, that they ought, therefore, to assist it with the utmost expedition, and the most vigorous measures.
It may be suggested, my lords, that this assistance has been already delayed till it is become useless, that the utmost expedition will be too slow, and the most vigorous measures too weak to stop the torrent of the conquests of France: that the fatal blow will be struck, before we shall have an opportunity to ward it off, and that our regard for the house of Austria will be only compassion for the dead.
But these, my lords, I hope, are only the apprehensions of a mind overborne with sudden terrours, and perplexed by a confused survey of complicated danger; for if we consider more distinctly the powers which may be brought in opposition to France, we shall find no reason for despairing that we may once more stand up with success in defence of our religion and the liberty of mankind, and once more reduce those troublers of the world to the necessity of abandoning their destructive designs.
The noble lord has already mentioned the present disposition of three powerful states, as a motive for vigorous resolutions, and a consideration that may, at least, preserve us from despair; and it is no small satisfaction to me to observe, that his penetration and experience incline him to hope upon the prospect of affairs as they now appear; because I doubt not but that hope will be improved into confidence, by the account which I can now give your lordships of the intention of another power, yet more formidable, to engage with us in the great design of repressing the insolence of France.
A treaty of alliance, my lords, has been for some time concerted with the emperour of Muscovy, and has been negotiated with such diligence, that it is now completed, and I doubt not but the last ratifications will arrive at this court in a few days; by which it will appear to your lordships, that the interest of this nation has been vigilantly regarded, and to our allies, that the faith of Britain has never yet been shaken. It will appear to the French, that they have precipitated their triumphs, that they have imagined themselves masters of nations by whom they will be in a short time driven back to their own confines, and that, perhaps, they have parcelled out kingdoms which they are never likely to possess.
It was affirmed, and with just discernment, that applications ought to be made to this powerful court, as the professed adversary of France; and if it was not hitherto known that their assistance had been assiduously solicited, our endeavours were kept secret only that their success might be more certain, and that they might surprise more powerfully by their effects.
Nor have the two other princes, which were mentioned by the noble lord, been forgotten, whose concurrence is at this time so necessary to us: and I doubt not but that the representations which have been made with all the force of truth, and all the zeal that is awakened by interest and by danger, will in time produce the effects for which they were intended; by convincing those princes that they endanger themselves by flattering the French ambition, that they are divesting themselves of that defence of which they will quickly regret the loss, and that they are only not attacked at present, that they may be destroyed more easily hereafter.
But it is always to be remembered, my lords, that in publick transactions, as in private life, interest acts with less force as it is at greater distance, and that the immediate motive will generally prevail. Futurity impairs the influence of the most important objects of consideration, even when it does not lessen their certainty; and with regard to events only probable, events which a thousand accidents may obviate, they are almost annihilated, with regard to the human mind, by being placed at a distance from us. Wherever imagination can exert its power, we easily dwell upon the most pleasing views, and flatter ourselves with those consequences, which though perhaps least to be expected, are most desired. Wherever different events may arise, which is the state of all human transactions, we naturally promote our hopes, and repress our fears; and in time so far deceive ourselves, as to quiet all our suspicions, lay all our terrours asleep, and believe what at first we only wished.
This, my lords, must be the delusion by which some states are induced to favour, and others to neglect the encroachments of France. Men are impolitick, as they are wicked; because they prefer the gratification of the present hour to the assurance of solid and permanent, but distant happiness. The French take advantage of this general weakness of the human mind, and by magnificent promises to one prince, and petty grants to another, reconcile them to their designs. Each finds that he shall gain more by contracting an alliance with them, than with another state which has no view besides that of preserving to every sovereign his just rights, and which, therefore, as it plunders none, will have nothing to bestow.
This, my lords, is the disadvantage under which our negotiators labour against those of France; we have no kingdoms to parcel out among those whose confederacy we solicit; we can promise them no superiority above the neighbouring princes which they do not now possess; we assume not the province of adjusting the boundaries of dominion, or of deciding contested titles: we promise only the preservation of quiet, and the establishment of safety.
But the French, my lords, oppose us with other arguments, arguments which, indeed, receive their force from folly and credulity; but what more powerful assistance can be desired? They promise not mere negative advantages, not an exemption from remote oppression, or an escape from slavery, which, as it was yet never felt, is very little dreaded; they offer an immediate augmentation of dominion, and an extension of power; they propose new tracts of commerce, and open new sources of wealth; they invite confederacies, not for defence, but for conquests; for conquests to be divided among the powers by whose union they shall be made.
Let it not, therefore, be objected, my lords, to our ministers, or our negotiators, that the French obtain more influence than they; that they are more easily listened to, or more readily believed: for while such is the condition of mankind, that what is desired is easily credited, while profit is more powerful than reason, the French eloquence will frequently prevail.
Whether, my lords, our seeming want of success in the war with Spain admits of as easy a solution, my degree of knowledge in military affairs, does not enable me to determine. An account of this part of our conduct is to be expected from the commissioners of the admiralty, by whom, I doubt not, but such reasons will be assigned for all the operations of our naval forces, and such vindications offered of all those measures, which have been hitherto imputed too precipitately to negligence, cowardice, or treachery, as will satisfy those who have been most vehement in their censures.
But because it does not seem to me very difficult to apologize for those miscarriages which have occasioned the loudest complaints, I will lay before your lordships what I have been able to collect from inquiry, or to conjecture from observation; and doubt not but it will easily appear, that nothing has been omitted from any apparent design of betraying our country, and that our ministers and commanders will deserve, at least, to be heard before they are condemned.
That great numbers of our trading vessels have been seized by the Spaniards, and that our commerce has, therefore, been very much embarrassed and interrupted, is sufficiently manifest; but to me, my lords, this appears one of the certain and necessary consequences of war, which are always to be expected, and to be set in our consultations against the advantages which we propose to obtain. It is as rational to expect, that of an army sent against our enemies, every man should return unhurt to his acquaintances, as that every merchant should see his ship and cargo sail safely into port.
If we examine, my lords, the late war, of which the conduct has been so lavishly applauded, in which the victories which we obtained have been so loudly celebrated, and which has been proposed to the imitation of all future ministers, it will appear, that our losses of the same kind were then very frequent, and, perhaps, not less complained of, though the murmurs are now forgotten, and the acclamations transmitted to posterity, because we naturally relate what has given us satisfaction, and suppress what we cannot recollect without uneasiness.
If we look farther backward, my lords, and inquire into the event of any other war in which we engaged since commerce has constituted so large a part of the interest of this nation, I doubt not but in proportion to our trade will be found our losses; and in all future wars, as in the present, I shall expect the same calamities and the same complaints. For the escape of any number of ships raises no transport, nor produces any gratitude; but the loss of a few will always give occasion to clamours and discontent. For vigilance, however diligent, can never produce more safety than will be naturally expected from our incontestable superiority at sea, by which a great part of the nation is so far deceived as to imagine, that because we cannot be conquered, we cannot be molested.
Nor do I see how it is possible to employ our power more effectually for the protection of our trade than by the method now pursued of covering the ocean with our fleets, and stationing our ships of war in every place where danger can be apprehended. If it be urged, that the inefficacy of our measures is a sufficient proof of their impropriety, it will be proper to substitute another plan of operation, of which the success may be more probable. To me, my lords, the loss of some of our mercantile vessels shows only the disproportion between the number of our ships of war, and the extent of the sea, which is a region too vast to be completely garrisoned, and of which the frequenters must inevitably be subject to the sudden incursions of subtle rovers.
The disposition of our squadrons has been such, as was doubtless dictated by the most acute sagacity, and the most enlightened experience. The squadron which was appointed to guard our coasts has been ridiculed as an useless expense; and its frequent excursions and returns, without any memorable attempt, have given occasion to endless raillery, and incessant exclamations of wonder and contempt. But it is to be considered, my lords, that the enemies of this nation, either secret or declared, had powerful squadrons in many ports of the Mediterranean, which, had they known that our coasts were without defence, might have issued out on a sudden, and have appeared unexpectedly in our Channel, from whence they might have laid our towns in ruin, entered our docks, burnt up all our preparations for future expeditions, carried into slavery the inhabitants of our villages, and left the maritime provinces of this kingdom in a state of general desolation.
Out of this squadron, however necessary, there was yet a reinforcement of five ships ordered to assist Haddock, that he might be enabled to oppose the designs of the Spaniards, though assisted by their French confederates, whom it is known that he was so far from favouring, that he was stationed before Barcelona to block them up. Why he departed from that port, and upon what motives of policy, or maxims of war, he suffered the Spaniards to prosecute their scheme, he only is able to inform us.
That the Spaniards have not at least been spared by design, is evident from their sufferings in this war, which have been much greater than ours. Many of our ships have, indeed, been snatched up by the rapacity of private adventurers, whom the ardour of interest had made vigilant, and whose celerity of pursuit as well as flight, enables them to take the advantage of the situation of their own ports, and those of their friends. But as none of our ships have been denied convoys, I know not how the loss of them can be imputed to the ministry; and if any of those who sailed under the protection of ships of war have been lost, the commanders may be required to vindicate themselves from the charge of negligence or treachery.
But this inquiry, my lords, must be, in my opinion, reserved for another day, when it may become the immediate subject of our consultations, with which it has at present no coherence, or to which, at least, it is very remotely related. For I am not able, upon the most impartial and the most attentive consideration of the address now proposed to your lordships, to perceive any necessity of a previous inquiry into the conduct of the war, the transaction of our negotiations, or the state of the kingdom, in order to our compliance with this motion, by which we shall be far from sheltering any crime from punishment, or any doubtful conduct from inquiry; shall be far from obstructing the course of national justice, or approving what we do not understand.
The chief tendency of his majesty's speech is to ask our advice on this extraordinary conjuncture of affairs; a conduct undoubtedly worthy of a British monarch, and which we ought not to requite with disrespect; but what less can be inferred from an alteration of our established forms of address, by an omission of any part of the speech? For what will be imagined by his majesty, by the nation, and by the whole world, but that we did not approve what we did not answer?
The duke of ARGYLE spoke to the following purpose:—My lords, it is with great reason that the present time has been represented to us from the throne as a time of uncommon danger and disturbance, a time in which the barriers of kingdoms are broken down, in contempt of every law of heaven and of earth, and in which ambition, rapine, and oppression, seem to be let loose upon mankind; a time in which some nations send out armies and invade the territories of their neighbours, in opposition to the most solemn treaties, of which others, with equal perfidy, silently suffer, or secretly favour the violation.
At a time like this, when treaties are considered only as momentary expedients, and alliances confer no security, it is evident that the preservation of our rights, our interest, and our commerce, must depend only on our natural strength; and that instead of cultivating the friendship of foreign powers, which we must purchase upon disadvantageous conditions, and which will be withdrawn from us whenever we shall need it; we ought, therefore, to collect our own force, and show the world how little we stand in need of assistance, and how little we have to fear from the most powerful of our enemies.
Our country, my lords, seems designed by nature to subsist without any dependence on other nations, and by a steady and resolute improvement of these advantages with which providence has blessed it, may bid defiance to mankind; it might become, by the extension of our commerce, the general centre at which the wealth of the whole earth might be collected together, and from whence it might be issued upon proper occasions, for the diffusion of liberty, the repression of insolence, and the preservation of peace.
But this glory, and this influence, my lords, must arise from domestick felicity; and domestick felicity can only be produced by a mutual confidence between the government and the people. Where the governours distrust the affections of their subjects, they will not be very solicitous to advance their happiness; for who will endeavour to increase that wealth which will, as he believes, be employed against him? Nor will the subjects cheerfully concur even with the necessary measures of their governours, whose general designs they conceive to be contrary to the publick interest; because any temporary success or accidental reputation, will only dazzle the eyes of the multitude, while their liberties are stolen away.
This confidence, my lords, must be promoted where it exists, and regained where it is lost, by the open administration of justice, by impartial inquiries into publick transactions, by the exaltation of those whose wisdom and bravery has advanced the publick reputation, or increased the happiness of the nation, and the censure of those, however elate with dignities, or surrounded with dependants, who by their unskilfulness or dishonesty, have either embarrassed their country or betrayed it.
For this reason, my lords, it is, in my opinion, necessary to gratify the nation, at the present juncture, with the prospect of those measures, without which no people can reasonably be satisfied; and to pacify their resentment of past injuries, and quiet their apprehensions of future miseries, by a possibility, at least, that they may see the authors of all our miscarriages called to a trial in open day, and the merit of those men acknowledged and rewarded, by whose resolution and integrity they imagine that the final ruin of themselves and posterity has been hitherto prevented.
That the present discontent of the British nation is almost universal, that suspicion has infused itself into every rank and denomination of men, that complaints of the neglect of our commerce, the misapplication of our treasure, and the unsuccessfulness of our arms, are to be heard from every mouth, and in every place, where men dare utter their sentiments, I suppose, my lords, no man will deny; for whoever should stand up in opposition to the truth of a fact so generally known, would distinguish himself, even in this age of effrontery and corruption, by a contempt of reputation, not yet known amongst mankind.
And indeed, my lords, it must be confessed that these discontents and clamours are produced by such an appearance of folly, or of treachery, as few ages or nations have ever known; by such an obstinate perseverance in bad measures, as shame has hitherto prevented in those upon whom nobler motives, fidelity to their trust, and love of their country, had lost their influence.
Other ministers, when they have formed designs of sacrificing the publick interest to their own, have been compelled to better measures by timely discoveries, and just representations; they have been criminal only because they hoped for secrecy, and have vindicated their conduct no longer than while they had hopes that their apologies might deceive.
But our heroick ministers, my lords, have set themselves free from the shackles of circumspection, they have disburdened themselves of the embarrassments of caution, and claim an exemption from the necessity of supporting their measures by laborious deductions and artful reasonings; they defy the publick when they can no longer delude it, and prosecute, in the face of the sun, those measures which they have not been able to support, and of which the fatal consequences are foreseen by the whole nation.
When they have been detected in one absurdity, they take shelter in another; when experience has shown that one of their attempts was designed only to injure their country, they propose a second of the same kind with equal confidence, boast again of their integrity, and again require the concurrence of the legislature, and the support of the people.
When they had for a long time suffered our trading vessels to be seized in sight of our own ports, when they had despatched fleets into the Mediterranean, only to lie exposed to the injuries of the weather, and to sail from one coast to another, only to show that they had no hostile intentions, and that they were fitted out by the friends of the Spaniards, only to amuse and exhaust the nation, they at length thought it necessary to lull the impatience of the people, who began to discover that they had hitherto been harassed with taxes and impresses to no purpose, by the appearance of a new effort for the subjection of the enemy, and to divert, by the expectations which an army and a fleet naturally raise, any clamours at their past conduct'.
For this end, having entered into their usual consultations, they projected an expedition into America, for which they raised forces and procured transports, with all the pomp of preparation for the conquest of half the continent, not so much to alarm the Spaniards, which I conceive but a secondary view, as to fill the people of Britain with amusing prospects of great achievements, of the addition of new dominions to this empire, and an ample reparation for all their damages.
Thus provided with forces sufficient, in appearance, for this mighty enterprise, they embarked them after many delays, and dismissed them to their fate, having first disposed their regulations in such a manner, that it was impossible that they should meet with success.
I can call your lordships to witness, that this impossibility was not discovered by me after the event, for I foretold in this house, that their designs, so conducted, must evidently miscarry.
Nor was this prediction, my lords, the effect of any uncommon sagacity, or any accidental conjecture on future consequences which happened to be right; for to any man who has had opportunities of observing that knowledge in war is necessary to success, and experience is the foundation of knowledge, it was sufficiently plain that our forces must be repulsed.
The forces sent into America, my lords, were newly raised, placed under the direction of officers not less ignorant than themselves, and commanded by a man who never had commanded any troops before; and who, however laudable he might have discharged the duty of a captain, was wholly unacquainted with the province of a general.
Yet was this man, my lords, preferred, not only to a multitude of other officers, to whom experience must have been of small advantage, if it did not furnish them with knowledge far superiour to his, but to five and forty generals, of whom I hope the nation has no reason to suspect that any of them would not gladly have served it on an occasion of so great importance, and willingly have conducted an expedition intended to retrieve the honour of the British name, the terrour of our arms, and the security of our commerce.
When raw troops, my lords, with young officers, are to act under the command of an unskilful general, what is it reasonable to expect, but what has happened—overthrow, slaughter, and ignominy? What but that cheap victories should heighten the insolence, and harden the obstinacy of our enemies; and that we should not only be weakened by our loss, but dispirited by our disgrace; by the disgrace of being overthrown by those whom we have despised, and with whom nothing but our own folly could have reduced us to a level.
The other conjecture which I ventured to propose to your lordships, with regard to the queen of Hungary, was not founded on facts equally evident with the former, though experience has discovered that it was equally true. It was then asserted, both by other lords and myself, that money would be chosen by that princess as an assistance more useful than forces; an opinion, which the lords who are engaged in the administration vigorously opposed. In consequence of their determination, forces were hired, for what purpose—let them now declare, since none but themselves have yet known.
That at least they were not taken into our pay for the service for which they were required, the succour of the house of Austria, is most evident, unless the name of armies is imagined sufficient to intimidate the French, as the Spaniards are to be subdued by the sight of fleets. They never marched towards her frontiers, never opposed her enemies, or afforded her the least assistance, but stood idle and unconcerned in the territories of Hanover; nor was it known that they existed by any other proof than that remittances were made for their pay.
Such, my lords, was the assistance, asked with so much solicitude, and levied with so much expedition, for the queen of Hungary; such were the effects of the zeal of our illustrious ministers for the preservation of that august house, to whose alliance we are perhaps indebted for the preservation of our religion and our liberties, and to which all Europe must have recourse for shelter from the oppression of France.
When this formidable body of men was assembled, my lords, and reviewed, they were perhaps found too graceful and too well sorted to be exposed to the dangers of a battle; and the same tenderness that has so long preserved our own forces from any other field than the park, might rescue them from the fatigues of accompanying the active hussars in their incursions, or the steady Austrians in their conflicts.
Whatever was the reason, my lords, it is certain that they have been reserved for other opportunities of signalizing their courage; and they slept in quiet, and fattened upon the wealth of Britain, while the enemies of our illustrious, magnanimous, and unfortunate ally, entered her territories without opposition, marched through them uninterrupted, and rather took possession than made conquests.
That in this condition of her affairs, the queen would refuse an offer of twelve thousand men; that when she was driven from one country to another, attended by an army scarcely sufficient to form a flying camp, she would not gladly have accepted a reinforcement so powerful, let those believe, my lords, who have yet never been deceived by ministerial faith.
The real designs of the ministry, my lords, are sufficiently obvious, nor is any thing more certain, than that they had, in requiring this mock assistance for the queen of Hungary, no other design than that of raising her expectations only to deceive them; and to divert her, by confidence in their preparations, from having recourse to more efficacious expedients, that she might become, without resistance, the slave of France.
For this purpose they determined to succour her with forces rather than with money, because many reasons might be pretended, by which the march of the forces might be retarded; but the money, my lords, when granted, must have been more speedily remitted.
At last the queen, weary with delays, and undoubtedly sufficiently informed of those designs, which are now, however generally discovered, confidently denied, desired a supply of money, which might be granted without leaving Hanover exposed to an invasion. With this demand, which they had no pretence to deny, they have yet found expedients to delay their compliance. For it does not appear that the whole sum granted has yet been paid; and it would well become those noble lords, whose offices give them an opportunity of observing the distribution of the publick money, to justify themselves from the suspicions of the nation, by declaring openly what has been remitted, and what yet remains to be disbursed for some other purpose.
Is it not, therefore, evident, my lords, that by promising assistance to this unhappy princess, the ministry intended to deceive her? That when they flattered her with the approach of auxiliary forces, they designed only to station them where they might garrison the frontiers of Hanover? And that when they forced her to solicit for pecuniary aid, they delayed the payment of the subsidy, that it might not be received till it could produce no effect?
This, my lords, is not only evident from the manifest absurdity of their conduct upon any other supposition, but from the general scheme which has always been pursued by the man whose dictatorial instructions regulate the opinions of all those that constitute the ministry, and of whom it is well known, that it has been the great purpose of his life to aggrandize France, by applying to her for assistance in imaginary distresses from fictitious confederacies, and by sacrificing to her in return the house of Austria, and the commerce of Britain.
How then, my lords, can it be asserted by us, that the house of Austria has been vigilantly supported? How can we approve measures, of which we discover no effect but the expense of the nation? A double expense, produced first by raising troops, which though granted for the assistance of the Austrians, have been made use of only for the protection of Hanover, and by the grant of money in the place of these troops, which were thus fallaciously obtained, and thus unprofitably employed!
For what purpose these forces were in reality raised, I suppose no man can be ignorant, and no man to whom it is known can possibly approve it. How then, my lords, can we concur in an address by which the people must be persuaded, that we either are deceived ourselves, or endeavour to impose upon them; that we either dare not condemn any measures, however destructive, or that, at least, we are in haste to approve them, lest inquiry should discover their tendency too plainly to leave us the power of applauding them, without an open declaration of our own impotence, or disregard for the welfare of the publick.
The complaints of the people are already clamorous, and their discontent open and universal; and surely the voice of the people ought, at least, to awake us to an examination of their condition. And though we should not immediately condemn those whom they censure and detest, as the authors of their miseries, we ought, at least, to pay so much regard to the accusation of the whole community, as not to reject it without inquiry, as a suspicion merely chimerical.
Whether these complaints and suspicions, my lords, proceed from real injuries and imminent dangers, or from false accusations and groundless terrours, they equally deserve the attention of this house, whose great care is the happiness of the people: people equally worthy of your tenderness and regard, whether they are betrayed by one party or another; whether they are plundered by the advocates of the administration, under pretence of supporting the government, or affrighted with unreasonable clamours by the opponents of the court, under the specious appearance of protecting liberty. The people, my lords, are in either case equally miserable, and deserve equally to be rescued from distress.
By what method, my lords, can this be effected, but by some publick assurance from this house, that the transactions of the nation shall no longer be concealed in impenetrable secrecy; that measures shall be no longer approved without examination; that publick evils shall be traced to their causes; and that disgrace, which they have hitherto brought upon the publick, shall fall for the future only upon the authors of them.
Of giving this assurance, and of quieting by it the clamours of the people; clamours which, whether just or not, are too formidable to be slighted, and too loud not to be heard, we have now the most proper opportunity before us. The address which the practice of our ancestors requires us to make to his majesty, may give us occasion of expressing at once our loyalty to the crown, and our fidelity to our country; our zeal for the honour of our sovereign, and our regard for the happiness of the people.
For this purpose it is necessary that, as we preserve the practice of our ancestors in one respect, we revive it in another; that we imitate those in just freedom of language whom we follow in the decent forms of ceremony; and show that as we preserve, like them, a due sense of the regal dignity, so, like them, we know likewise how to preserve our own, and despise flattery on one side, as we decline rudeness on the other.
A practice, my lords, has prevailed of late, which cannot but be allowed pernicious to the publick, and derogatory from the honour of this assembly; a practice of retaining in our address the words of the speech, and of following it servilely from period to period, as if it were expected that we should always adopt the sentiments of the court; as if we were not summoned to advise, but to approve, and approve without examination.
By such addresses, my lords, all inquiries may be easily precluded; for the minister by whom the speech is compiled, may easily introduce the most criminal transactions in such a manner, as that they may obtain the approbation of this house; which he may plead afterwards at our bar, when he shall be called before it, and either involve us in the disgrace of inconsistency, and expose us to general contempt, or be acquitted by our former suffrages, which it would be reproachful to retract, and yet criminal to confirm.
It is not necessary, my lords, on this occasion to observe, what all parties have long since acknowledged, when it did not promote their interest to deny it, that every speech from the throne is to be considered as the work of the minister, because it is generally written by him; or if composed by the king himself, must be drawn up in pursuance of the information and counsel of the ministry, to whom it is, therefore, ultimately to be referred, and may consequently be examined without any failure of respect to the person of the prince.
This ought, however, to be observed, my lords, that it may appear more plainly how certainly this practice may be imputed to the artifices of ministers, since it does not promote the honour of the prince, and manifestly obstructs the interest of the people; since it is a practice irrational in itself, because it is inconsistent with the great purpose of this assembly, and can, therefore, serve no other purpose than that of procuring indemnity to the ministers, by placing them out of the reach of future animadversion.
Let not, my lords, the uninterrupted continuance of this practice for some reigns be pleaded in its defence; for nothing is more worthy of the dignity of this house, than to prevent the multiplication of dangerous precedents. That a custom manifestly injurious to the publick has continued long, is the strongest reason for breaking it, because it acquires every year new authority and greater veneration: if when a nation is alarmed and distracted, a custom of twenty years is not to be infringed, it may in twenty years more be so firmly established, that many may think it necessary to be supported, even when those calamities are incontestably felt, which, perhaps, now are only feared.
I shall, therefore, my lords, propose, that of the address moved for, all be left out but the first paragraph; it will then be more consistent with the honour of your lordships, with our regard for the people, and with our duty to the crown, and hope no lord will refuse his concurrence.
Lord HARDWICKE rose next, and spoke to the following effect:—My lords, upon an attentive consideration of the address now proposed, I am not able to discover any objections which can justly hinder the unanimous concurrence of this assembly, since there is not any proposition contained in it either dangerous or uncertain.
The noble lords who have opposed this motion with the most ardent vehemence, are very far from denying what is asserted in it; they readily grant that designs are concerted by many formidable powers against the house of Austria, and that the consequences of the ruin of that family must extend to the utmost parts of Europe, and endanger the liberties of Britain itself; that the power of France will then be without a rival, and that she may afterwards gratify her ambition without fear and without danger.
Nor is it, my lords, less obvious in itself, or less generally allowed, that this is a time which demands the most active vigour, the most invariable unanimity, and the most diligent despatch; that nothing can interrupt the course of our common enemies but the wisest counsels, and the most resolute opposition; and that upon our conduct at this great conjuncture may probably depend the happiness and liberty of ourselves, our allies, and our posterity.
All this, my lords, is allowed to be apparently and indisputably true; I am, therefore, at a loss to conceive what can be the occasion of the debate in which some of your lordships have engaged. As the causes of the calamities which are said to threaten us are not assigned in the address, we shall leave ourselves at full liberty to charge them upon those who shall appear from future inquiries to deserve so heavy an accusation.
If the ministers of the court have, by any inconstancy in their measures, or folly in their negotiations, given an opportunity to the enemies of Europe to extend their influence, or endangered either our own interest, or that of our allies; if they have by oppression or negligence alienated from his majesty the affections of his people, or the confidence of his confederates, nothing that is contained in the address now before us can be produced by them in justification of their conduct, or secure them from accusation, censure, and punishment.
If the war, my lords, has been hitherto carried on with clandestine stipulations, or treacherous compacts; if our admirals have received orders to retire from the coast of Spain, only to give our enemies an opportunity of invading the dominions of the queen of Hungary, or have, without directions, deserted their stations, and abandoned the protection of our commerce and our colonies; we shall, notwithstanding this address, retain in our hands the privilege of inquiring into their conduct, and the power, if it be found criminal, of inflicting such penalties as justice shall require.
I know not, therefore, my lords, upon what motives the debate is continued, nor what objections they are which hinder our unanimity, at a time when all petty controversies ought to be forgot, and all nominal distinctions laid aside; at a time when general danger may justly claim general attention, and we ought to suspend the assertion of our particular opinions, and the prosecution of our separate interests, and regard only the opposition of France, the support of our allies, and the preservation of our country.
The noble lords who have offered their sentiments on this occasion, have very diffusely expatiated on the miseries that impend over us, and have shown uncommon dexterity and acuteness in tracing them all to one source, the weakness or dishonesty of the British ministry.
For my part, my lords, though, perhaps, I believe that many circumstances of the present distress are to be imputed to accidents which could not be foreseen, and that the conduct of the ministry, however sometimes disappointed of the effects intended by it, was yet prudent and sincere, I shall at present forbear to engage in their defence, because the discussion of a question so complicated must necessarily require much time, and because I think it not so useful to inquire how we were involved in our present difficulties, as by what means we may be extricated from them.
The method by which weak states are made strong, and by which those that are already powerful, are enabled to exert their strength with efficacy, is the promotion of union, and the abolition of all suspicions by which the people may be incited to a distrust of their sovereign, or the sovereign provoked to a disregard of his people. With this view, my lords, all addresses ought to be drawn up, and this consideration will be sufficient to restrain us from any innovations at a time like this.
If it should be granted, my lords, that the ancient method were better adapted to the general intention of addresses, more correspondent to the dignity of this house, and liable to fewer inconveniencies than that which later times have introduced, yet it will not follow that we can now safely change it.
Nothing in the whole doctrine of politicks is better known, than that there are times when the redress of grievances, inveterate and customary, is not to be attempted; times when the utmost care is barely sufficient to avert extreme calamities, and prevent a total dissolution; and in which the consideration of lighter evils must not be suffered to interrupt more important counsels, or divert that attention which the preservation of the state necessarily demands.
Such, my lords, is the present time, even by the confession of those who have opposed the motion, and of whom, therefore, it may be reasonably demanded, why they waste these important hours in debates upon forms and words?
For that only forms and words have produced the debate, must be apparent, even to themselves, when the fervour of controversy shall have slackened; when that vehemence, with which the most moderate are sometimes transported, and that acrimony, which candour itself cannot always forbear, shall give way to reflection and to reason. That the danger is pressing, and that pressing dangers require expedition and unanimity, they willingly grant; and what more is asserted in the address?
That any lord should be unwilling to concur in the customary expressions of thankfulness and duty to his majesty, or in acknowledgments of that regard for this assembly with which he asks our assistance and advice, I am unwilling to suspect; nor can I imagine that any part of the opposition to this proposal can be produced by unwillingness to comply with his majesty's demands, and to promise that advice and assistance, which it is our duty, both to our sovereign, our country, and ourselves, to offer.
That those, my lords, who have expressed in terms so full of indignation their resentment of the imaginary neglect of the queen of Hungary's interest, have declared the house of Austria the only bulwark of Europe, and expressed their dread of the encroachments of France with emotions which nothing but real passion can produce, should be unwilling to assert their resolution of adhering to the Pragmatick sanction, and of defending the liberties of the empire, cannot be supposed.
And yet, my lords, what other reasons of their conduct can be assigned either by the emperour, or the people, or the allies of Britain; those allies whose claim they so warmly assert, and whose merits they so loudly extol? Will it not be imagined in foreign courts, that the measures now recommended by the emperour, are thought not consistent with the interest of the nation? Will it not be readily believed, that we propose to abandon those designs of which we cannot be persuaded to declare our approbation?