It was desired, my lords, by the queen of Hungary, that a British army might appear on the continent in her favour, for she knew the reputation and terrour of our arms; and as her demand was equitable in itself, and honourable to the nation, it was complied with; and as many of our native troops were sent, as it was thought convenient to spare, the rest were necessarily to be hired; and it is the business of those lords who defend the motion, to show from whence they could be called more properly than from Hanover.
It has been urged with great warmth, that the contract made for these troops has not been laid before the senate, a charge which the noble lord who spoke last but one, has shown to be ill grounded; because the former determinations of the senate enabled the crown to garrison the frontier towns without any new deliberations, but which may be, perhaps, more satisfactorily confuted by showing, that it is an accusation of neglecting that which was in reality not possible to be performed, or which at least could not be performed without subjecting the government to imputations yet more dangerous than those which it now suffers.
The accounts, my lords, by which the ministry were determined to send the army into Flanders, arrived only fifteen days before the recess of the senate; nor was the resolution formed, as it may easily be imagined, till several days after; so that there was very little time for senatorial deliberations, nor was it, perhaps, convenient to publish at that time the whole scheme of our designs.
But let us suppose, my lords, that the senate had, a few days before they rose, been consulted, and that a vote of credit had been required to enable the crown to hire forces during the interval of the sessions, what would those by whom this motion is supported have urged against it? Would they not with great appearance of reason have alleged the impropriety of such an application to the thin remains of a senate, from which almost all those had retired, whom their employments did not retain in the neighbourhood of the court? Would it not have been echoed from one corner of these kingdoms to another, that the ministry had betrayed their country by a contract which they durst not lay before a full senate, and of which they would trust the examination only to those whom they had hired to approve it. Would not this have been generally asserted, and generally believed? Would not those who distinguished themselves as the opponents of the court, have urged, that the king ought to exert his prerogative, and trust the equity of the senate for the approbation of his measures, and the payment of the troops which he had retained for the support of the common cause, the cause for which so much zeal had been expressed, and for which it could not with justice be suspected, that any reasonable demands would be denied? Would not the solicitation of a grant of power without limits, to be exerted wholly at the discretion of the ministry, be censured as a precedent of the utmost danger, which it was the business of every man to oppose, who had not lost all regard to the constitution of his country?
These insinuations, my lords, were foreseen and allowed by the ministry to be specious, and, therefore, they determined to avoid them by pursuing their schemes at their own hazard, without any other security than the consciousness of the rectitude of their own designs; and to trust to the equity of the senate when they should be laid before them, at a time when part of their effects might be discovered, and when, therefore, no false representations could be used to mislead their judgment. They knew the zeal of the commons for the great cause of universal liberty; they knew that their measures had no other tendency than the promotion of that cause, and, therefore, they confidently formed those expectations which have not deceived them, that the pay of the troops would be readily granted, and ordered them, therefore, to march; though if the commons had disapproved their plan, they must have returned into their own country, or have been supported at the expense of the electorate.
The objections raised against these troops, have apparently had no influence in the other house, because supplies have been granted for their pay; and I believe they will, upon examination, be found by your lordships not to deserve much regard.
It is asserted, that they cannot act against the emperour, established and acknowledged by the diet, without subjecting their country to an interdict; and it was, therefore, suspected, that they would in reality be of no use. This suspicion, my lords, I suppose, it is now not necessary to censure, since you have heard from his majesty, that they are preparing to march; and as the consequences of their conduct can only affect the electorate, its propriety or legality with regard to the constitution of the empire, falls not properly under our consideration.
How his majesty's measures may be defended, even in this view, I suppose I need not inform any of this assembly. It is well known, that the emperour was chosen not by the free consent of the diet, in which every elector voted according to his own sense, but by a diet in which one vote of the empire was suspended without any regard to law or justice, and in which the rest were extorted by a French army, which threatened immediate ruin to him who should refuse his consent. The emperour thus chosen, was likewise afterwards recognised by the same powers, upon the same motives, and the aid was granted as the votes were given by the influence of the armies of France.
For this reason, my lords, the queen of Hungary still refuses to give the elector of Bavaria the style and honours which belong to the imperial dignity; she considers the throne as still vacant, and requires that it should be filled by an uninfluenced election.
It has been observed, my lords, that his majesty gave his vote to the elector of Bavaria; and it has been, therefore, represented as an inconsistency in his conduct, that he should make war against him. But, my lords, it will by no means follow, that because he voted for him he thinks him lawfully elected, nor that it is unjust to dispossess him; though it is to be observed, that we are not making war to dethrone the emperour, however elected, but to support the Pragmatick sanction.
This observation, though somewhat foreign from the present debate, I have thought it not improper to lay before your lordships, that no scruples might remain in the most delicate and scrupulous, and to show that the measures of his majesty cannot be justly charged with inconsistency.
But this, my lords, is not the only, nor the greatest benefit which the queen of Hungary has received from these troops; for it is highly probable, that the states will be induced to concur in the common cause, when they find that they are not incited to a mock confederacy, when they perceive that we really intend to act vigorously, that we decline neither expense nor danger, and that a compliance with our demands will not expose them to stand alone and unassisted against the power of France, elated by success, and exasperated by opposition.
If this, my lords, should be the consequence of our measures, and this consequence is, perhaps, not far distant, it will no longer be, I hope, asserted, that these mercenaries are an useless burden to the nation, that they are of no advantage to the common cause, or that the people have been betrayed by the ministry into expenses, merely that Hanover might be enriched. When the grandconfederacyis once revived, and revived by any universal conviction of the destructive measures, the insatiable ambition, and the outrageous cruelty of the French, what may not the friends of liberty presume to expect? May they not hope, my lords, that those haughty troops which have been so long employed in conquests and invasions, that have laid waste the neighbouring countries with slaughters and devastations, will be soon compelled to retire to their own frontiers, and be content to guard the verge of their native provinces? May we not hope, that they will soon be driven from their posts; that they will be forced to retreat to a more defensible station, and admit the armies of their enemies into their dominions; and that they will be pursued from fortress to fortress, and from one intrenchment to another, till they shall be reduced to petition for peace, and purchase it by the alienation of part of their territories.
I hope, my lords, it may be yet safely asserted that the French, however powerful, are not invincible; that their armies may be destroyed, and their treasures exhausted; that they may, therefore, be reduced to narrow limits, and disabled from being any longer the disturbers of the peace of the universe.
It is well known, my lords, that their wealth is not the product of their own country; that gold is not dug out of their mountains, or rolled down their rivers; but that it is gained by an extensive and successful commerce, carried on in many parts of the world, to the diminution of our own. It is known, likewise, that trade cannot be continued in war, without the protection of naval armaments; and that our fleet is at present superiour in strength to those of the greatest part of the universe united. It is, therefore, reasonably to be hoped, that though by assisting the house of Austria we should provoke the French to declare war against us, their hostilities would produce none of those calamities which seem to be dreaded by part of this assembly; and that such a confederacy might be formed as would be able to retort all the machinations of France upon herself, as would tear her provinces from her, and annex them to other sovereignties.
It has been urged, that no such success can be expected from the conduct which we have lately pursued; that we, who are thus daring the resentment of the most formidable power in the universe, have long suffered ourselves to be insulted by an enemy of far inferiour force; that we have been defeated in all our enterprises, and have at present appeared to desist from any design of hostilities; that the Spaniards scarcely perceive that they have an enemy, or feel, any of the calamities or inconveniencies of war; and that they are every day enriched with the plunder of Britain, without danger, and without labour.
That the war against Spain has not hitherto been remarkably successful, must be confessed; and though the Spaniards cannot boast of any other advantages than the defence of their own dominions, yet they may, perhaps, be somewhat elated, as they have been able to hold out against an enemy superiour to themselves. But, my lords, I am far from believing, that they consider the war against us as an advantage, or that they do not lament it as one of the heaviest calamities that could fall upon them. If it be asked, in what part of their dominions they feel any effects of our hostility, I shall answer with great confidence, that they feel them in every part which is exposed to the evils of a naval war; that they are in pain wherever they are sensible; that they are wounded wherever they are not sheltered from our blows, by the interposition of the nations of the continent.
If we examine, my lords, the influence of our European armaments, we shall find that their ships of war are shut up in the harbour of France, and that the fleets of both nations are happily blocked up together, so that they can neither extricate each other by concerted motions, in which our attention might be distracted, and our force divided, nor by their united force break through the bars by which they are shut up from the use of the ocean.
But this, my lords, however important with respect to us, is perhaps the smallest inconvenience which the Spaniards feel from our naval superiority. They have an army, my lords, in Italy, exposed to all the miseries of famine, while our fleet prohibits the transportation of those provisions which have been stored in vessels for their supply, and which must be probably soon made defenceless by the want of ammunition, and fall into the hands of their enemies without the honour of a battle.
But what to the pride of a Spaniard must be yet a more severe affliction, they have on the same continent a natural confederate, who is yet so intimidated by the British fleets, that he dares neither afford them refuge in his dominions, nor send his troops to their assistance. The queen, amidst all the schemes which her unbounded ambition forms for the exaltation of her family, finds her own son, after having received a kingdom from her kindness, restrained from supporting her, and reduced to preserve those territories which she has bestowed upon him, by abandoning her from whom he received them.
These, my lords, are the inconveniencies which the Spaniards feel from our fleets in the Mediterranean; and even these, however embarrassing, however depressing, are lighter than those which our American navy produces. It is apparent, that money is equivalent to strength, a proposition of which, if it could be doubted, the Spanish monarchy would afford sufficient proof, as it has been for a long time supported only by the power of riches. It is, therefore, impossible to weaken Spain more speedily or more certainly, than by intercepting or obstructing the annual supplies of gold and silver which she receives from her American provinces, by which she was once enabled to threaten slavery to all the neighbouring nations, and incited to begin, with the subjection of this island, her mighty scheme of universal monarchy, and by which she has still continued to exalt herself to an equality with the most powerful nations, to erect new kingdoms, and set at defiance the Austrian power.
These supplies, my lords, are now, if not wholly, yet in a great measure, withheld; and by all the efforts which the Spaniards now make, they are exhausting their vitals, and wasting the natural strength of their native country. While they made war with adventitious treasures, and only squandered one year what another would repay them, it was not easy to foresee how long their pride would incline them to hold out against superiour strength. While they were only engaged in a naval war, they might have persisted for a long time in a kind of passive obstinacy; and while they were engaged in no foreign enterprises, might have supported that trade with each other which is necessary for the support of life, upon the credit of those treasures which are annually heaped up in their storehouses, though they are not received; and by which, upon the termination of the war, all their debts might at once be paid, and all their funds be reestablished.
But at present, my lords, their condition is far different; they have been tempted by the prospect of enlarging their dominions to raise armies for distant expeditions, which must be supported in a foreign country, and can be supported only by regular remittances of treasure, and have formed these projects at a time when the means of pursuing them are cut off. They have by one war increased their expenses, when their receipts are obstructed by another.
In this state, my lords, I am certain the Spaniards are very far from thinking the hostility of Britain merely nominal, and from inquiring in what part of the world their enemies are to be found. The troops in Italy see them sailing in triumph over the Mediterranean, intercepting their provisions, and prohibiting those succours which they expected from their confederate of Sicily. In Spain their taxes and their poverty, poverty which every day increases, inform them that the seas of America are possessed by the fleets of Britain, by whom their mines are made useless, and their wealthy dominions reduced to an empty sound. They may, indeed, comfort themselves in their distresses with the advantages which their troops have gained over the king of Sardinia, and with the entrance which they have forced into his dominions; but this can afford them no long satisfaction, since they will, probably, never be able to break through the passes at which they have arrived, or to force their way into Italy; and must perish at the feet of inaccessible rocks, where they are now supported at such an expense that they are more burdensome to their own master than to the king of Sardinia.
Of this prince, I know not why, it has been asserted that he will probably violate his engagements to Britain and Austria; that he will purchase peace by perfidy, and grant a passage to the army of Spain. His conduct has certainly given, hitherto, no reason for such an imputation; he has opposed them with fortitude, and vigour, and address; nor has he failed in any of the duties required of a general or an ally; he has exposed his person to the most urgent dangers, and his dominions to the ravages of war; he has rejected all the solicitations of France, and set her menaces at defiance; and surely, my lords, if no private man ought to be censured without just reason, even in familiar discourse, we ought still to be more cautious of injuring the reputation of princes by publick reproaches in the solemn debates of national assemblies.
The same licentiousness of speech has not, indeed, been extended to all the princes mentioned in this debate. The emperour has been treated with remarkable decency as the lawful sovereign of Germany, as one who cannot be opposed without rebellion, and against whom we, therefore, cannot expect that the troops of Hanover should presume to act, since they must expose their country to the severities of the imperial interdict.
The noble lords who have thus ardently asserted the rights of the emperour, who have represented in such strong language the crime of violating the German constitutions, and have commended the neutrality of the king of Prussia, as proper to be imitated by all the rest of the princes 'of the empire, have forgotten, or hoped that others Would forget, the injustice and violence by which he exalted himself to the throne, from which they appear to think it a sacrilegious attempt to endeavour to thrust him down. They forget that one of the votes was illegally suspended, and that the rest were extorted by the terrour of an army. They forget that he invited the French into the empire, and that he is guilty of all the ravages which have been committed and all the blood that has been shed, since the death of the emperour, in the defence of the Pragmatick sanction which he invaded, though ratified by the solemn consent of the imperial diet.
In defence of the Pragmatick sanction, my lords, which all the princes of the empire, except his majesty, saw violated without concern, are we now required to exert our force; we are required only to perform what we promised by the most solemn treaties, which, though they have been broken by the cowardice or ambition of other powers, it will be our greatest honour to observe with exemplary fidelity.
With this view, as your lordships have already been informed, the Hanoverian troops will march into the empire; nor has their march been hitherto delayed, either because there was yet no regular scheme projected, or because they were obliged to wait for the permission of the king of Prussia, or because they intended only to amuse Europe with an empty show: they were detained, my lords, in Flanders, because it was believed that they were more useful there than they would be in any other place, because they at once encouraged the states, alarmed the French, defended the Low Countries, and kept the communication open between the queen's dominions and those of her allies. Nor were these advantages, my lords, chimerical, and such as are only suggested by a warm imagination; for it is evident that by keeping their station in those countries they have changed the state of the war, that they have protected the queen of Hungary from being oppressed by a new army of French, and given her an opportunity of establishing herself in the possession of Bavaria; that the French forces, instead of being sent either to the assistance of the king of Spain against the king of Sardinia, or of the emperour, for the recovery of those dominions which he has lost by an implicit confidence in their alliance, have been necessarily drawn down to the opposite extremity of their dominions, where they are of no use either to their own country, or to their confederates. The united troops of Britain and Hanover, therefore, carried on the war, by living at ease in their quarters in Flanders, more efficaciously than if they had marched immediately into Bavaria or Bohemia.
Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show the justice of our designs, and the usefulness of the measures by which we have endeavoured to execute them; and doubt not but your lordships will, upon considering the arguments which have been urged on either side, and those which your own reflections will suggest, allow that it was not only just but necessary to take into our pay the troops of Hanover, for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, and the preservation of the house of Austria; and that since the same reasons which induced the government to hire them, still make it necessary to retain them, you will prefer the general happiness of Europe, the observation of publick faith, and the security of our own liberties and those of our posterity, to a small alleviation of our present expenses, and unanimously reject a motion, which has no other tendency than to resign the world into the hands of the French, and purchase a short and dependant tranquillity by the loss of all those blessings which make life desirable.
Lord LONSDALE spoke next to the following effect:—My lords, notwithstanding the confidence with which the late measures of the government have been defended by their authors, I am not yet set free from the scruples which my own observations had raised, and which have been strengthened by the assertions of those noble lords, who have spoken in vindication of the motion.
Many of the objections which have been raised and enforced with all the power of argument, have yet remained unanswered, or those answers which have been offered are such as leave the argument in its full strength. Many of the assertions which have been produced seem the effects of hope rather than conviction, and we are rather told what we are to hope from future measures, than what advantages we have received from the past.
I am, indeed, one of those whom it will be difficult to convince of the propriety of engaging in a new war, when we are unsuccessful in that which we have already undertaken, and of provoking a more powerful enemy, when all our attempts are baffled by a weaker; and cannot yet set myself free from the apprehension of new defeats and new disgraces from the arms of France, after having long seen how little we are able to punish the insolence of Spain. I cannot but fear that by an ill-timed and useless opposition to schemes which, however destructive or unjust, we cannot obviate, we shall subject ourselves to numberless calamities, that the ocean will be covered with new fleets of privateers, that our commerce will be interrupted in every part of the world, and that we shall only provoke France to seize what she would at least have spared some time longer.
But, my lords, if it be granted, that the Pragmatick sanction is obligatory to us, though it is violated by every other power; that we should labour to reduce the powers of Europe to an equipoise, whenever accident or folly produces any alteration of the balance; and that we are now not to preserve the house of Austria from falling, but raise it from the dust, and restore it to its ancient splendour, even at the hazard of a war with that power which now gives laws to all the western nations; yet it will not surely be asserted, that we ought to be without limits, that we ought to preserve the house of Austria, not only by the danger of our own country, but by its certain ruin, and endeavour to avert the possibility of slavery, by subjecting ourselves to miseries more severe than the utmost arrogance of conquest, or the most cruel wantonness of tyranny, would inflict upon us.
I have observed, that many lords have expressed in this debate an uncommon ardour for the support of the queen of Hungary; nor is it without pleasure, that I see the most laudable of all motives, justice and compassion, operate in this great assembly with so much force. May your lordships always continue to stand the great advocates for publick faith, and the patrons of true greatness in distress; may magnanimity always gain your regard, and calamity find shelter under your protection.
I, likewise, my lords, desire to be remembered among those who reverence the virtues and pity the miseries of this illustrious princess, who look with detestation on those who have invaded the dominions which they had obliged themselves by solemn treaties to defend, and who have taken advantage of the general confederacy against her, to enrich themselves with her spoils, who have insulted her distress and aggravated her misfortunes.
But, my lords, while I feel all these sentiments of compassion for the queen of Hungary, I have not yet been able to forget, that my own country claims a nearer regard; that I am obliged both by interest and duty to preserve myself and my posterity, and my fellow-subjects, from those miseries which I lament; when they happen to others, however distant, I cannot but remember, that I am not to save another from destruction by destroying myself, nor to rescue Austria by the ruin of Britain.
Though I am, therefore, my lords, not unwilling to assist the queen of Hungary, I think it necessary to fix the limits of our regard, to inquire how far we may proceed with safety, and what expenses the nation can bear, and how those expenses may be best employed. The danger of the queen of Hungary ought not to have an effect which would be reproachful, even if the danger was our own. It ought not so far to engross our faculties as to hinder us from attending to every other object. The man who runs into a greater evil to avoid a less, evidently shows that he is defective either in prudence or in courage; that either he wants the natural power of distinguishing, or that his dread of an approaching, or his impatience of a present evil, has taken it away.
Let us, therefore, examine, my lords, the measures with which those who are intrusted with the administration of publick affairs, would persuade us to concur, and inquire whether they are such as can be approved by us without danger to our country. Let us consider, my lords, yet more nearly, whether they are not such as we ourselves could not be prevailed upon even to regard as the object of deliberation, were we not dazzled on one part by glaring prospects of triumphs and honours, of the reduction of France, and the rescue of the world; of the propagation of liberty, and the defence of religion; and intimidated on the other by the view of approaching calamities, the cruelties of persecution, and the hardships of slavery.
All the arts of exaggeration, my lords, have been practised to reconcile us to the measures which are now proposed, and, indeed, all are necessary; for the expenses to which we are about to condemn this nation, are such as it is not able to bear, and to which no lord in this house would consent, were he calm enough to number the sums.
To prove the truth of this assertion, one question is necessary. Is any lord in this assembly willing to assist the queen of Hungary at the expense of sixteen hundred thousand a year? I think the universal silence of this assembly is a sufficient proof, that no one is willing; I will, however, repeat my question. Is any lord in this assembly willing that this nation should assist the queen of Hungary at the annual expense of sixteen hundred thousand pounds? The house is, as I expected, still silent, and, therefore, I may now safely proceed upon the supposition of an unanimous negative. Nor does any thing remain in order to evince the impropriety of the measures which we are about to pursue, but that every lord may reckon up the sum required for the support of those troops. Let him take a view of our military estimates, and he will quickly be convinced, how much we are condemned to suffer in this cause. He will find, that we are about not only to remit yearly into a foreign country more than a million and a half of money, but to hazard the lives of multitudes of our fellow-subjects, in a quarrel which at most affects us but remotely; that we are about to incur as auxiliaries an expense greater than that which the principals sustain.
The sum which I have mentioned, my lords, enormous as it may appear, is by no means exaggerated beyond the truth. Whoever shall examine the common military estimates, will easily be convinced, that the forces which we now maintain upon the continent cannot be supported at less expense; and that we are, therefore, about to exhaust our country in a distant quarrel, and to lavish our blood and treasure with useless profusion.
This profusion, my lords, is useless, at least useless to any other end, than an ostentatious display of our forces, and our riches; not because the balance of power is irrecoverably destroyed, not because it is contrary to the natural interest of an island to engage in wars on the continent, nor because we shall lose more by the diminution of our commerce, than we shall gain by an annual victory. It is useless, not because the power of France has by long negligence been suffered to swell beyond all opposition, nor because the queen of Hungary ought not to be assisted at the hazard of this kingdom, though all these reasons are of importance enough to claim our consideration. It is useless, my lords, because the queen of Hungary may be assisted more powerfully, at less charge; because a third part of this sum will enable her to raise, and to maintain, a greater body of men than have now been sent her.
Nor will the troops which she may be thus enabled to raise, my lords, be only more numerous, but more likely to prosecute the war with ardour; and to conclude it, therefore, with success. They will fight for the preservation of their own country, they will draw their swords to defend their houses and their estates, their wives and their children from the rage of tyrants and invaders; they will enter the field as men who cannot leave it to their enemies, without resigning all that makes life valuable; and who will, therefore, more willingly die than turn their backs.
It may reasonably be imagined, my lords, that the queen will place more confidence in such forces, than in troops which are to fight only for honour or for pay; and that she will expect from the affection of her own subjects, a degree of zeal and constancy which she cannot hope to excite in foreigners; and that she will think herself more secure in the protection of those whose fidelity she may secure by the solemnity of an oath, than those who have no particular regard for her person, nor any obligations to support her government.
It is no inconsiderable motive to this method of assisting our ally, that we shall entirely take away from France all pretences of hostilities or resentment, since we shall not attack her troops or invade her frontiers, but only furnish the queen of Hungary with money, without directing her how to apply it. I am far, my lords, from being so much intimidated by the late increase of the French greatness, as to imagine, that no limits can be set to their ambition. I am far from despairing, that the queen of Hungary alone, supported by us with pecuniary assistance, may be able to reduce them to solicitations for peace by driving them out of her dominions, and pursuing them into their own. But as the chance of war is always uncertain, it is surely most prudent to choose such a conduct as may exempt us from danger in all events; and since we are not certain of conquering the French, it is, in my opinion, most eligible not to provoke them, because we cannot be conquered without ruin.
This method is yet eligible on another account; by proceeding with frugality, we shall gain time to observe the progress of the war, and watch the appearance of any favourable opportunity, without exhausting ourselves so far as to be made unable to improve them.
The time, my lords, at which we shall be thus exhausted, at which we shall be reduced to an absolute inability to raise an army or equip a fleet, is not at a great distance. If our late profusion be for a short time continued, we shall quickly have drained the last remains of the wealth of our country. We have long gone on from year to year, raising taxes and contracting debts; and unless the riches of Britain are absolutely unlimited, must in a short time reduce them to nothing. Our expenses are not all, indeed, equally destructive; some, though the method of raising them be vexatious and oppressive, do not much impoverish the nation, because they are refunded by the extravagance and luxury of those who are retained in the pay of the court; but foreign wars threaten immediate destruction, since the money that is spent in distant countries can never fall back into its former channels, but is dissipated on the continent, and irrecoverably lost.
When this consideration is present to my mind, and, on this occasion, no man who has any regard for himself or his posterity can omit it, I cannot but think with horrour on a vote by which such prodigious sums are wafted into another region: I cannot but tremble at the sound of a tax for the support of a foreign war, and think a French army landed on our coasts not much more to be dreaded than the annual payment to which we appear now to be condemned, and from which nothing can preserve us but the address which is now proposed.
By what arguments the commons were persuaded, or by what motives incited to vote a supply for the support of this mercenary force, I have not yet heard; nor, as a member of this house, my lords, was it necessary for me to inquire. Their authority, though mentioned with so much solemnity on this occasion, is to have no influence on our determinations. If they are mistaken, it is more necessary for us to inquire with uncommon caution. If they are corrupt, it is more necessary for us to preserve our integrity. If we are to comply blindly with their decisions, our knowledge and experience are of no benefit to our country, we only waste time in useless solemnities, and may be once more declared useless to the publick.
The commons, my lords, do not imagine themselves, nor are imagined by the nation, to constitute the legislature. The people, when any uncommon heat prevails in the other house, disturbs their debates, and overrules their determinations, have been long accustomed to expect redress and security from our calmer counsels; and have considered this house as the place where reason and justice may be heard, when, by clamour and uproar, they are driven from the other. On this occasion, my lords, every Briton fixes his eye upon us, and every man who has sagacity enough to discover the dismal approach of publick poverty, now supplicates your lordships, by agreeing to this address, to preserve him from it.
Then the SPEAKER spoke to the following purport:—My lords, having very attentively observed the whole progress of this important debate, and considered with the utmost impartiality the arguments which have been made use of on each side, I cannot think the question before us doubtful or difficult; and hope that I may promote a speedy decision of it by recapitulating what has been already urged, that the debate may be considered at one view, and by adding some observations which have arisen to my own thoughts on this occasion.
At the first view of the question before us, in its present state, no man can find any reasons for prejudice in favour of the address proposed. This house is, indeed, yet divided, and many lords have spoken on each side with great force and with great address; but the authority of the other house, added to the numbers which have already declared in this for the support of the foreign troops, is sufficient to turn the balance, in the opinion of any man who contents himself to judge by the first appearance of things; and must incline him to imagine that position at least more probable, which is ratified by the determination of one house, and yet undecided by the other.
I know, my lords, what may be objected to these observations on the other house, and readily agree with the noble lord, that our determinations ought not to be influenced by theirs. But on this occasion, I introduce their decision not as the decrees of legislators, but as the result of the consideration of wise men; and in this sense it may be no less reasonable to quote the determination of the commons, than to introduce the opinion of any private man whose knowledge or experience give his opinion a claim to our regard.
Nor do I mention the weight of authority on one side as sufficient to influence the private determination of any in this great assembly. It is the privilege and the duty of every man, who possesses a seat in the highest council of his country, to make use of his own eyes and his own understanding, to reject those arguments of which he cannot find the force, whatever effect they may have upon others, and to discharge the great trust conferred upon him by consulting no conscience but his own.
Yet, though we are by no means to suffer the determinations of other men to repress our inquiries, we may certainly make use of them to assist them; we may very properly, therefore, inquire the reasons that induced the other house to approve those bills which are brought before them, since it is not likely that their consent was obtained without arguments, at least probable, though they are not to be by us considered as conclusive upon their authority. The chief advantage which the publick receives from a legislature formed of several distinct powers, is, that all laws must pass through many deliberations of assemblies independent on each other, of which, if the one be agitated by faction or distracted by divisions, it may be hoped that the other will be calm and united, and of which it can hardly be feared that they can at any time concur in measures apparently destructive to the commonwealth.
But these inquiries, my lords, however proper or necessary, are to be made by us not in solemn assemblies but in our private characters; and therefore I shall not now lay before your lordships what I have heard from those whom I have consulted for the sake of obtaining information on this important question, or shall at least not offer it as the opinion of the commons, or pretend to add to it any influence different from that of reason and truth.
The arguments which have been offered in this debate for the motion, are, indeed, such as do not make any uncommon expedients necessary; they will not drive the advocates for the late measures to seek a refuge in authority instead of reason. They require, in my opinion, only to be considered with a calm attention, and their force will immediately be at an end.
The most plausible objection, my lords, is, that the measures to which your approbation is now desired, were concerted and executed without the concurrence of the senate; and it is, therefore, urged, that they cannot now deserve our approbation, because it was not asked at the proper time.
In order to answer this objection, my lords, it is necessary to consider it more distinctly than those who made it appear to have done, that we may not suffer ourselves to confound questions real and personal, to mistake one object for another, or to be confounded by different views.
That the consent of the senate was not asked, my lords, supposing it a neglect, and a neglect of a criminal kind, of a tendency to weaken our authority, and shake the foundations of our constitution, which is the utmost that the most ardent imagination, or the most hyperbolical rhetorick can utter or suggest, may be, indeed, a just reason for invective against the ministers, but is of no force if urged against the measures. To take auxiliaries into our pay may be right, though it might be wrong to hire them without applying to the senate; as it is proper to throw water upon a fire, though it was conveyed to the place without the leave of those from whose well it was drawn, or over whose ground it was carried.
If the liberties of Europe be really in danger, if our treaties oblige us to assist the queen of Hungary against the invaders of her dominions, if the ambition of France requires to be repressed, and the powers of Germany to be animated against her by the certain prospect of a vigorous support, I cannot discover the propriety of this motion, even supposing that we have not found from the ministers all the respect that we have a right to demand. As a lawful authority may do wrong, so right may be sometimes done by an unlawful power; and surely, though usurpation ought to be punished, the benefits which have been procured by it, are not to be thrown away. We may retain the troops that have been hired, if they are useful, though we should censure the ministry for taking them into pay.
But the motion to which our concurrence is now required, is a motion by which we are to punish ourselves for the crime of the ministers, by which we are about to leave ourselves defenceless, because we have been armed without our consent, and to resign up all our rights and privileges to France, because we suspect that they have not been sufficiently regarded on this occasion by our ministers.
Those noble lords who have dwelt with the greatest ardour on this omission, have made no proposition for censuring those whom they condemn as the authors of it, though this objection must terminate in an inquiry into their conduct, and has no real relation to the true question now before us, which is, whether the auxiliaries be of any use? If they are useless, they ought to be discharged without any other reason; if they are necessary, they ought to be retained, whatever censure may fall upon the ministry.
I am, indeed, far from thinking, that when your lordships have sufficiently examined the affair, you will think your privileges invaded, or the publick trepanned by artifice into expensive measures; since it will appear that the ministry in reality preferred the most honest to the safest methods of proceeding, and chose rather to hazard themselves, than to practice or appear to practice any fraud upon their country.
When it was resolved in council to take the troops of Hanover into the pay of Britain, a resolution which, as your lordships have already been informed, was made only a few days before the senate rose, it was natural to consider, whether the consent of the senate should not be demanded; but when it appeared upon reflection, that to bring an affair of so great importance before the last remnant of a house of commons, after far the greater part had retired to the care of their own affairs, would be suspected as fraudulent, and might give the nation reason to fear, that such measures were intended as the ministers were afraid of laying before a full senate. It was thought more proper to defer the application to the next session, and to venture upon the measures that were formed, upon a full conviction of their necessity.
This conduct, my lords, was exactly conformable to the demands of those by whom the court has hitherto been opposed, and who have signalized themselves as the most watchful guardians of liberty. Among these men, votes of credit have never been mentioned but with detestation, as acts of implicit confidence, by which the riches of the nation are thrown down at the feet of the ministry to be squandered at pleasure. When it has been urged, that emergencies may arise, during the recess of the senate, which may produce a necessity of expenses, and that, therefore, some credit ought to be given which may enable the crown to provide against accidents, it has been answered, that the expenses which are incurred during the recess of the senate, will be either necessary or not; that if they are necessary, the ministry have no reason to distrust the approbation of the senate, but if they are useless, they ought not to expect it. And that, instead of desiring to be exempted from any subsequent censures, and to be secured in exactions or prodigality by a previous vote, they ought willingly to administer the publick affairs at their own hazard, and await the judgment of the senate, when the time shall come, in which their proceedings are laid before it.
Such have hitherto been the sentiments of the most zealous advocates for the rights of the people; nor did I expect from any man who desired to appear under that character, that he would censure the ministry for having thrown themselves upon the judgment of the senate, and neglected to secure themselves by any previous applications, for having trusted in their own integrity, and exposed their conduct to an open examination without subterfuges and without precautions. I did not imagine, my lords, that a senate, upon whose decision all the measures which have been taken, so apparently depend, would have been styled a senate convened only to register the determinations of the ministry; or that any of your lordships would think his privileges diminished, because money was not demanded before the use of it was fully known. If we lay aside, my lords, all inquiries into precedents, and, without regard to any political considerations, examine this affair only by the light of reason, it will surely appear that the ministry could not, by any other method of proceeding, have shown equal regard to the senate, or equal confidence in their justice and their wisdom. Had they desired a vote of credit, it might have been justly objected that they required to be trusted with the publick money, without declaring, or being able to declare, how it was to be employed; that either they questioned the wisdom or honesty of the senate; and, therefore, durst undertake nothing till they were secure of the supplies necessary for the execution of it. Had they informed both houses of their whole scheme, they might have been still charged, and charged with great appearance of justice, with having preferred their own safety to that of the publick, and having rather discovered their designs to the enemy, than trusted to the judgment of the senate; nor could any excuse have been made for a conduct so contrary to all the rules of war, but such as must have dis-honoured either the ministers or the senate, such as must have implied either that the measures intended were unworthy of approbation, or that they were by no means certain, that even the best conduct would not be censured.
These objections they foresaw, and allowed to be valid; and, therefore, generously determined to pursue the end which every man was supposed to approve, by the best means which they could discover, and to refer their conduct to a full senate, in which they did not doubt but their integrity, and, perhaps, their success, would find them vindicators. Instead of applying, therefore, to the remains of the commons, a few days before the general recess; instead of assembling their friends by private intimations, at a time when most of those from whom they might have dreaded opposition, had retired, they determined to attempt, at their own hazard, whatever they judged necessary for the promotion of the common cause, and to refer their measures to the senate, when it should be again assembled.
The manner in which one of the noble lords, who have spoken in support of the address, has thought it necessary that they should have applied to us, is, indeed, somewhat extraordinary, such as is certainly without precedent, and such as is not very consistent with the constituent rights of the different powers of the legislature. His lordship has been pleased to remark, that the crown has entered into a treaty, and to ask why that treaty was not previously laid before the senate for its approbation.
I know not, my lords, with what propriety this contract for the troops of Hanover can be termed a treaty. It is well known that no power in this kingdom can enter into a treaty with a foreign state, except the king; and it is equally certain, that, with regard to Hanover, the same right is limited to the elector. This treaty, therefore, my lords, is a treaty of the same person with himself, a treaty of which the two counterparts are to receive their ratification from being signed with the same hand. This, surely, is a treaty of a new kind, such as no national assembly has yet considered. Had any other power of Britain than its king, or in Hanover any other than the elector, the right of entering into publick engagements, a treaty might have been made; but as the constitution of both nations is formed, the treaty is merely chimerical and absolutely impossible.
Had such a treaty, as is thus vainly imagined, been really made, it would yet be as inconsistent with the fundamental establishment of the empire, to require that before it was ratified it should have been laid before the senate. To make treaties, as to make war, is the acknowledged and established prerogative of the crown. When war is declared, the senate is, indeed, to consider whether it ought to be carried on at the expense of the nation; and if treaties require any supplies to put them in execution, they likewise fall properly, at that time, under senatorial cognizance: but to require that treaties shall not be transacted without our previous concurrence, is almost to annihilate the power of the crown, and to expose all our designs to the opposition of our enemies, before they can be completed.
If, therefore, the troops of Hanover can be of use for the performance of our stipulations, if they can contribute to the support of the house of Austria, the ministry cannot, in my opinion, be censured for having taken them into British pay; nor can we refuse our concurrence with the commons in providing for their support, unless it shall appear that the design for which all our preparations have been made is such as cannot be executed, or such as ought not to be pursued.
Several arguments have been offered to prove both these positions; one noble lord has asserted, that it is by no means for the advantage either of ourselves or any other nation, to restore the house of Austria to its ancient elevation; another, that it is, by the imperial constitutions, unlawful for any of the princes of Germany to make war upon the emperour solemnly acknowledged by the diet. They have endeavoured to intimidate us, by turning our view to the difficulties by which our attempts are obstructed; difficulties which they affect to represent as insuperable, at least to this nation in its present state. With this design, my lords, has the greatness of the French power been exaggerated, the faith of the king of Sardinia questioned, and the king of Prussia represented as determined to support the pretensions of the emperour; with this view has our natural strength been depreciated, and all our measures and hopes have been ridiculed, with wantonness, not very consistent with the character of a British patriot.
Most of these arguments, my lords, have been already answered, and answered in such a manner as has, I believe, not failed of convincing every lord of their insufficiency, unless, perhaps, those are to be excepted ty whom they were offered. It has with great propriety been observed, that the inconsistency imputed to his majesty in opposing the emperour for whom he voted, is merely imaginary; since it is not a necessary consequence, that he for whom he voted is, therefore, lawfully elected; and because his majesty does not engage in this war for the sake of dethroning the emperour, but of supporting the Pragmatick sanction; nor does he oppose him as the head of the German body, but as the invader of the dominions of Austria.
With regard to the propriety of maintaining the Austrian family in its present possessions, and of raising it, if our arms should be prosperous, to its ancient greatness, it has been shown, that no other power is able to defend Europe either against the Turks on one part, or the French on the other; two powers equally professing the destructive intention of extending their dominions without limits, and of trampling upon the privileges and liberties of all the rest of mankind.
It has been shown, that the general scheme of policy uniformly pursued by our ancestors in every period of time, since the increase of the French greatness, has been to preserve an equipoise of power, by which all the smaller states are preserved in security. It is apparent, that by this scheme alone can the happiness of mankind be preserved, and that no other family but that of Austria is able to balance the house of Bourbon.
This equipoise of power has by some lords been imagined an airy scheme, a pleasing speculation which, however it may amuse the imagination, can never be reduced to practice. It has been asserted, that the state of nations is always variable, that dominion is every day transferred by ambition or by casualties, that inheritances fall by want of heirs into other hands, and that kingdoms are by one accident divided at one time, and at other times consolidated by a different event; that to be the guardians of all those whose credulity or folly may betray them to concur with the ambition of an artful neighbour, and to promote the oppression of themselves, is an endless task; and that to obviate all the accidents by which provinces may change their masters, is an undertaking to which no human foresight is equal; that we have not a right to hinder the course of succession for our own interest, nor to obstruct those contracts which independent princes are persuaded to make, however contrary to their own interest, or to the general advantage of mankind. And it has been concluded by those reasoners, that we should show the highest degree of wisdom, and the truest, though not the most refined policy, by attending steadily to our own interest, by improving the dissensions of our neighbours to our own advantage, by extending our commerce, and increasing our riches, without any regard to the happiness or misery, freedom or slavery of the rest of mankind.
I believe I need not very laboriously collect arguments to prove to your lordships that this scheme of selfish negligence, of supine tranquillity, is equally imprudent and ungenerous; since, if we examine the history of the last century, we shall easily discover, that if this nation had not interposed, the French had now been masters of more than half Europe; and it cannot be imagined that they would have suffered us to set them at defiance in the midst of their greatness, that they would have spared us out of tenderness, or forborne to attack us out of fear. What the Spaniards attempted, though unsuccessfully, from a more distant part of the world, in the pride of their American affluence, would certainly have been once more endeavoured by France, with far greater advantages, and as it may be imagined, with a different event.
That it would have been endeavoured, cannot be doubted, because the endeavour would not have been hazardous; by once defeating our fleet, they might land their forces, which might be wafted over in a very short time, and by a single victory they might conquer all the island, or that part of it, at least, which is most worth the labour of conquest; and though they should be unsuccessful, they could suffer nothing but the mortification of their pride, and would be in a short time enabled to make a new attempt.
Thus, my lords, if we could preserve our liberty in the general subjection of the western part of the world, we should do it only by turning our island into a garrison, by laying aside all other employment than the study of war, and by making it our only care to watch our coasts: a state which surely ought to be avoided at almost any expense and at any hazard.
To think that we could extend our trade or increase our riches in this state of the continent, is to forget the effects of universal empire. The French, my lords, would then be in possession of all the trade of those provinces which they had conquered, they would be masters of all their ports and of all their shipping; and your lordships may easily conceive with what security we should venture upon the ocean, in a state of war, when all the harbours of the continent afforded shelter to our enemies. If the French privateers from a few obscure creeks, unsupported by a fleet of war, or at least not supported by a navy equal to our own, could make such devastations in our trade as enabled their country to hold out against the confederacy of almost all the neighbouring powers; what, my lords, might not be dreaded by us, when every ship upon the ocean should be an enemy; when we should be at once overborne by the wealth and the numbers of our adversaries; when the trade of the world should be in their hands, and their navies no less numerous than their troops.
I have made this digression, my lords, I hope not wholly without necessity, to show that the advantages of preserving the equipoise of Europe are not, as they have been sometimes conceived, empty sounds, or idle notions; but that by the balance of one nation against another, both the safety of other countries and of our own is preserved; and that, therefore, it requires all our vigilance and all our resolution to establish and maintain it.
That there may come a time in which this scheme will be no longer practicable, when a coalition of dominions may be inevitable, and when one power will be necessarily exalted above the rest, is, indeed, not absolutely impossible, and, therefore, not to be peremptorily denied. But it is not to be inferred, that our care is vain at present, because, perhaps, it may some time be vain hereafter; or that we ought now to sink into slavery without a struggle, because the time may come, when our strongest efforts will be ineffectual.
It has, indeed, been almost asserted, that the fatal hour is now arrived, and that it is to no purpose that we endeavour to raise any farther opposition to the universal monarchy projected by France. We are told, that the nation is exhausted and dispirited; that we have neither influence, nor riches, nor courage remaining; that we shall be left to stand alone against the united house of Bourbon; that the Austrians cannot, and that the Dutch will not, assist us; that the king of Sardinia will desert his alliance; that the king of Prussia has declared against us; and, therefore, that by engaging in the support of the Pragmatick sanction, we are about to draw upon ourselves that ruin which every other power has foreseen and shunned.
I am far from denying, my lords, that the power of France is great and dangerous; but can draw no consequence from that position, but that this force is to be opposed before it is still greater, and this danger to be obviated while it is yet surmountable, and surmountable I still believe it by unanimity and courage.
If our wealth, my lords, is diminished, it is time to confine the commerce of that nation by which we have been driven out of the markets of the continent, by destroying their shipping, and intercepting their merchants. If our courage is depressed, it is depressed not by any change in the nature of the inhabitants of this island, but by a long course of inglorious compliance with the demands, and of mean submission to the insults, of other nations, to which it is necessary to put an end by vigorous resolutions.
If our allies are timorous and wavering, it is necessary to encourage them by vigorous measures; for as fear, so courage, is produced by example: the bravery of a single man may withhold an army from flight, and other nations will be ashamed to discover any dread of that power which France along sets at defiance. They will be less afraid to declare their intentions, when they are convinced that we intend to support them; and if there be, in reality, any prince who does not favour our design, he will be at least less inclined to obstruct it, as he finds the opposition, which he must encounter, more formidable.
For this reason, my lords, I am far from discovering the justness of the opinion which has prevailed very much in the nation, on this occasion, that we are not to act without allies, because allies are most easily to be procured by acting, and because it is reasonable and necessary for us to perform our part, however other powers may neglect theirs.
The advice which the senate has often repeated to his majesty, has been to oppose the progress of France; and though it should be allowed, that he has been advised to proceed in concertwith his allies, yet it must be understood to suppose such allies as may be found to have courage and honesty enough to concur with him. It cannot be intended, that he should delay his assistance till corruption is reclaimed, or till cowardice is animated; for to promise the queen of Hungary assistance on such terms, would be to insult her calamities, and to withhold our succours till she was irrecoverably ruined. The senate could not insist that we should stand neuter, till all those, who were engaged by treaty to support the Pragmatick sanction, should appear willing to fulfil their stipulations; for even France is to be numbered among those who have promised to support the house of Austria in its possessions, however she may now endeavour to take them away.
Even with regard to that power from which most assistance may be reasonably expected, nothing would be more imprudent than to declare that we determine not to act without them; for what then would be necessary, but that the French influence one town in their provinces, or one deputy in their assemblies, and ruin the house of Austria in security and at leisure, without any other expense than that of a bribe.
It was, therefore, necessary to transport our troops into Flanders, to show the world that we were no longer inclined to stand idle spectators of the troubles of Europe; that we no longer intended to amuse ourselves, or our confederates, with negotiations which might produce no treaties, or with treaties which might be broken whenever the violation of them afforded any prospect of that advantage; we were now resolved to sacrifice the pleasures of neutrality, and the profits of peaceful traffick, to the security of the liberties of Europe, and the observation of publick faith.
This necessity was so generally allowed, that when the first body of troops was sent over, no objection was made by those who found themselves inclined to censure the conduct of our affairs, but that they were not sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and would be taken prisoners by a French detachment; the ministry were therefore asked, why they did not send a larger force, why they engaged in hostilities, which could only raise the laughter of our enemies, and why, if they intended war, they did not raise an army sufficient to prosecute it?
An army, my lords, an army truly formidable, is now raised, and assembled on the frontiers of France, ready to assist our ally, and to put a stop to the violence of invasions. We now see ourselves once again united with the house of Austria, and may hope once more to drive the oppressors of mankind before us. But now, my lords, a clamour is propagated through the nation, that these measures, which have been so long desired, are pernicious and treacherous; that we are armed, not against France, but against ourselves; that our armies are sent over either not to fight, or to fight in a quarrel in which we have no concern; to gain victories from which this nation will receive no advantage, or to bring new dishonour upon their country by a shameful inactivity.
This clamour, which if it had been confined to the vulgar, had been, perhaps, of no great importance, nor could have promoted any of the designs of those by whom it was raised, has been mentioned in this house as an argument in favour of the motion which is now under the consideration of your lordships; and it has been urged that these measures cannot be proper, because all measures, by which his majesty's government is made unpopular, must in the end be destructive to the nation.
On this occasion, my lords, it is necessary to consider the nature of popularity, and to inquire how far it is to be considered in the administration of publick affairs. If by popularity is meant only a sudden shout of applause, obtained by a compliance with the present inclination of the people, however excited, or of whatsoever tendency, I shall without scruple declare, that popularity is to be despised; it is to be despised, my lords, because it cannot be preserved without abandoning much more valuable considerations. The inclinations of the people have, in all ages, been too variable for regard. But if by popularity be meant that settled confidence and lasting esteem, which a good government may justly claim from the subject, I am far from denying that it is truly desirable; and that no wise man ever disregarded it. But this popularity, my lords, is very consistent with contempt of riotous clamours, and of mistaken complaints; and is often only to be obtained by an opposition, to the reigning opinions, and a neglect of temporary discontents; opinions which may be inculcated without difficulty by favourite orators, and discontents which the eloquence of seditious writers may easily produce on ignorance and inconstancy.
How easily the opinions of the vulgar may be regulated by those who have obtained, by whatever methods, their esteem, the debate of this day, my lords, may inform us; since, if the measures against which this motion is intended, be really unpopular, as they have been represented, it is evident that there has been lately a very remarkable change in the sentiments of the nation; for it is yet a very little time since the repression of the insolence of France, and the relief of the queen of Hungary was so generally wished, and so importunately demanded, that had measures like these been then formed, it is not improbable that they might have reconciled the publick to that man whom the united voice of the nation has long laboured to overbear.
It is, indeed, urged with a degree of confidence, which ought, in my opinion, to proceed from stronger proof than has yet been produced, that no hostilities are intended; that our armaments on the continent are an idle show, an inoffensive ostentation, and that the troops of Hanover have been hired only to enrich the electorate, under the appearance of assisting the queen of Hungary, whom in reality they cannot succour without drawing upon their country the imperial interdict.
It has been alleged, my lords,-that these measures have been concerted wholly/or the advantage of Hanover; that this kingdom is to be sacrificed to the electorate, and that we are in reality intended to be made tributaries to a petty power.
In confirmation of these suggestions, advantage has been taken from every circumstance that could admit of misrepresentation. The constitution of the empire has been falsely quoted, to prove that they cannot act against the emperour, and their inactivity in Flanders has been produced as a proof, that they do not intend to enter Germany.
Whoever shall consult the constituent and fundamental pact by which the German form of government is established, will find, my lords, that it is not in the power of the emperour alone to lay any of the states of Germany under the ban; and that the electors are independent in their own dominions, so far as that they may enter into alliances with foreign powers, and make war upon each other.
It appears, therefore, my lords, that no law prohibits the elector of Hanover to send his troops to the assistance of the queen of Hungary; he may, in consequence of treaties, march into Germany, and attack the confederates of the emperour, or what is not now intended, even the emperour himself, without any dread of the severities of the ban.
Nor does the continuance of the forces in Flanders show any unwillingness to begin hostilities, or any dread of the power of either Prussia, whose prohibition is merely imaginary, or of France, who is not less perplexed by the neighbourhood of our army than by any other method that could have been taken of attacking her; for being obliged to have an equal force always in readiness to observe their motions, she has not been able to send a new army against the Austrians, but has been obliged to leave the emperour at their mercy, and suffer them to recover Bohemia without bloodshed, and establish themselves at leisure in Bavaria.
Nor is this, my lords, the only advantage which has been gained by their residence in Flanders; for the United Provinces have been animated to a concurrence in the common cause, and have consented so far to depart from their darling neutrality, as to send twenty thousand of their forces to garrison the barrier. Of which no man, I suppose, will say that it is not of great importance to the queen of Hungary, since it sets her free from the necessity of distracting her views, and dividing her forces for the defence of the most distant parts of her dominions at once; nor will it be affirmed, that this advantage could have probably been gained, without convincing our allies of our sincerity, by sending an army into the continent.
If it be asked, what is farther to be expected from these troops? it ought to be remembered, my lords, with how little propriety our ministers can be required to make publick a scheme of hostile operations, and how much we should expose ourselves to our enemies, should a precedent be established by which our generals would be incapacitated to form any private designs, and an end would be for ever put to military secrecy.
What necessity there can be for proposing arguments like these, I am not, indeed, able to discover, since the objections which have been made seem to proceed rather from obstinacy than conviction; and the reflections that have been vented seem rather the product of wit irritated by malevolence, than of reason enlightened by calm consideration. The ministers have been reproached with Hanoverian measures, without any proof that Hanover is to receive the least advantage; and have been charged with betraying their country by those who cannot show how their country is injured, nor can prove either that interest or faith would allow us to sit inactive in the present disturbance of Europe, or that we could have acted in any other manner with equal efficacy.
It is so far from being either evident or true, my lords, that Britain is sacrificed to Hanover, that Hanover is evidently hazarded by her union with Britain. Had this electorate now any other sovereign than the king of Great Britain, it might have been secure by a neutrality, and have looked upon the miseries of the neighbouring provinces without any diminution of its people, or disturbance of its tranquillity; nor could any danger be dreaded, or any inconvenience be felt, but from an open declaration in favour of the Pragmatick sanction.
Why the hire of the troops of any particular country should be considered as an act of submission to it, or of dependency upon it, I cannot discover; nor can I conceive for what reason the troops of Hanover should be more dangerous, or less popular, at this than at any former time, or why the employment of them should be considered as any particular regard. If any addition of dominion had been to be purchased for the electorate by the united arms of the confederate army, I should, perhaps, be inclined to censure the scheme, as contrary to the interest of my native country; nor shall any lord more warmly oppose designs that may tend to aggrandize another nation at the expense of this. But to hire foreigners, of whatever country, only to save the blood of Britons, is, in my opinion, an instance of preference which ought to produce rather acknowledgments of gratitude than sallies of indignation.