Footnotes

Footnotes1.F. H. Jacobi.2.The Hegelian Philosophy.3.Fichte and Schelling.4.Hegel.5.Kant is the only writer who has confused this idea of reason, and in this connection I refer the reader to the Appendix, and also to my“Grundprobleme der Ethik”: Grundl. dd. Moral. § 6, pp. 148-154, first and second editions.6.Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat.Seneca, epist. 81.7.It is shown in the Appendix that matter and substance are one.8.This shows the ground of the Kantian explanation of matter, that it is“that which is movable in space,”for motion consists simply in the union of space and time.9.Not, as Kant holds, from the knowledge of time, as will be explained in the Appendix.10.On this see“The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,”§ 49.11.The first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books belong to these seven paragraphs.12.Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and 27 of the third edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason.13.Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the Supplement.14.Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the Supplement.15.Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.16.I am therefore of opinion that a science of physiognomy cannot, with certainty, go further than to lay down a few quite general rules. For example, the intellectual qualities are to be read in the forehead and the eyes; the moral qualities, the expression of will, in the mouth and lower part of the face. The forehead and the eyes interpret each other; either of them seen alone can only be half understood. Genius is never without a high, broad, finely-arched brow; but such a brow often occurs where there is no genius. A clever-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be so the uglier the face is; and a stupid-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be stupid the more beautiful the face is; for beauty, as the approximation to the type of humanity, carries in and for itself the expression of mental clearness; the opposite is the case with ugliness, and so forth.17.Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.18.Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.19.Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.20.Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.21.The reader must not think here of Kant's misuse of these Greek terms, which is condemned in the Appendix.22.Spinoza, who always boasts that he proceedsmore geometrico, has actually done so more than he himself was aware. For what he knew with certainty and decision from the immediate, perceptive apprehension of the nature of the world, he seeks to demonstrate logically without reference to this knowledge. He only arrives at the intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary concepts framed by himself (substantia causa sui, &c.), and in the demonstrations he allows himself all the freedom of choice for which the nature of the wide concept-spheres afford such convenient opportunity. That his doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in his case, as in that of geometry, quite independent of the demonstrations of it. Cf. ch. 13 of supplementary volume.23.Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.24.Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus opiniones). Epictet., c. v.25.Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι εφαρμοξειν ταις επι μερους (Hæc est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus). Epict. dissert., ii., 26.26.Cf. Ch. 16 of Supplement.27.Cf. Ch. xviii. of the Supplement.28.We can thus by no means agree with Bacon if he (De Augm. Scient., L. iv. in fine.) thinks that all mechanical and physical movement of bodies has always been preceded by perception in these bodies; though a glimmering of truth lies at the bottom of this false proposition. This is also the case with Kepler's opinion, expressed in his essayDe Planeta Martis, that the planets must have knowledge in order to keep their elliptical courses so correctly, and to regulate the velocity of their motion so that the triangle of the plane of their course always remains proportional to the time in which they pass through its base.29.Cf. Ch. xix. of the Supplement.30.Cf. Ch. xx. of the Supplement, and also in my work,“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”the chapters on Physiology and Comparative Anatomy, where the subject I have only touched upon here is fully discussed.31.This is specially treated in the 27th Ch. of the Supplement.32.This subject is fully worked out in my prize essay on the freedom of the will, in which therefore (pp. 29-44 of the“Grundprobleme der Ethik”) the relation ofcause,stimulus, andmotivehas also been fully explained.33.Cf. Ch. xxiii. of the Supplement, and also the Ch. on the physiology of plants in my work“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”and the Ch. on physical astronomy, which is of great importance with regard to the kernel of my metaphysic.34.Wenzel, De Structura Cerebri Hominis et Brutorum, 1812, ch. iii.; Cuvier, Leçons d'Anat., comp. leçon 9, arts. 4 and 5; Vic. d'Azyr, Hist. de l'Acad. de Sc. de Paris, 1783, pp. 470 and 483.35.On the 16th of September 1840, at a lecture upon Egyptian Archæology delivered by Mr. Pettigrew at the Literary and Scientific Institute of London, he showed some corns of wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a grave at Thebes, in which they must have lain for three thousand years. They were found in an hermetically sealed vase. Mr. Pettigrew had sowed twelve grains, and obtained a plant which grew five feet high, and the seeds of which were now quite ripe.—Times, 21st September 1840. In the same way in 1830 Mr. Haulton produced in the Medical Botanical Society of London a bulbous root which was found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy, in which it was probably put in observance of some religious rite, and which must have been at least two thousand years old. He had planted it in a flower-pot, in which it grew up and flourished. This is quoted from the Medical Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institute of Great Britain, October 1830, p. 196.—“In the garden of Mr. Grimstone of the Herbarium, Highgate, London, is a pea in full fruit, which has sprung from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officials of the British Museum took out of a vase which had been found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain 2844 years.”—Times, 16th August 1844. Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead to the conclusion that even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of years, if this is begun in the dormant period and maintained by special circumstances.36.Cf. Chap. xxii. of the Supplement, and also my work“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”p. 54et seq., and pp. 70-79 of the first edition, or p. 46et seq., and pp. 63-72 of the second, or p. 48et seq., and pp. 69-77 of the third edition.37.The Scholastics therefore said very truly:Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum.Cf. Suarez, Disp. Metaph. disp. xxiii., sec. 7 and 8.38.Cf.“Critique of Pure Reason. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Deduction of the Events in the Universe,”pp. 560-586 of the fifth, and p. 532 and following of first edition; and“Critique of Practical Reason,”fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz' edition, p. 224 and following. Cf. my Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 43.39.Cf.“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”at the end of the section on Comparative Anatomy.40.Cf.“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”the section on Comparative Anatomy.41.Chatin, Sur la Valisneria Spiralis, in the Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. de Sc., No. 13, 1855.42.Cf. Chaps. xxvi. and xxvii. of the Supplement.43.Cf. Chap. xxviii. of the Supplement.44.F. H. Jacobi.45.See for example,“Immanuel Kant, a Reminiscence, by Fr. Bouterweck,”pg. 49, and Buhle's“History of Philosophy,”vol. vi. pp. 802-815 and 823.46.Cf. Chap. xxix. of Supplement.47.I also recommend the perusal of what Spinoza says in his Ethics (Book II., Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and Book V., Props. 25-38), concerning thecognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva, in illustration of the kind of knowledge we are considering, and very specially Prop. 29, Schol.; prop. 36, Schol., and Prop. 38, Demonst. et Schol.48.Cf. Chap. xxx. of the Supplement.49.This last sentence cannot be understood without some acquaintance with the next book.50.Cf. Chap. xxxi. of the Supplement.51.I am all the more delighted and astonished, forty years after I so timidly and hesitatingly advanced this thought, to discover that it has already been expressed by St. Augustine:Arbusta formas suas varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quodnossenon possunt, quasiinnotescerevelle videantur.—De civ. Dei, xi.27.52.Cf. Chap. 35 of Supplement.53.Jakob Böhm in his book,“de Signatura Rerum,”ch. i., § 13-15, says,“There is nothing in nature that does not manifest its internal form externally; for the internal continually labours to manifest itself.... Everything has its language by which to reveal itself.... And this is the language of nature when everything speaks out of its own property, and continually manifests and declares itself, ... for each thing reveals its mother, which thus givesthe essence and the willto the form.”54.The last sentence is the German of theil n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit, of Helvetius. In the first edition there was no occasion to point this out, but since then the age has become so degraded and ignorant through the stupefying influence of the Hegelian sophistry, that some might quite likely say that an antithesis was intended here between“spirit and nature.”I am therefore obliged to guard myself in express terms against the suspicion of such vulgar sophisms.55.This digression is worked out more fully in the 36th Chapter of the Supplement.56.In order to understand this passage it is necessary to have read the whole of the next book.57.Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto.58.Cf. Ch. xxxiv. of Supplement.59.It is scarcely necessary to say that wherever I speak of poets I refer exclusively to that rare phenomenon the great true poet. I mean no one else; least of all that dull insipid tribe, the mediocre poets, rhymsters, and inventors of fables, that flourishes so luxuriantly at the present day in Germany. They ought rather to have the words shouted in their ears unceasingly from all sides—Mediocribus esse poëtisNon homines, non Dî, non concessere columnæ.It is worthy of serious consideration what an amount of time—both their own and other people's—and paper is lost by this swarm of mediocre poets, and how injurious is their influence. For the public always seizes on what is new, and has naturally a greater proneness to what is perverse and dull as akin to itself. Therefore these works of the mediocre poets draw it away and hold it back from the true masterpieces and the education they afford, and thus working in direct antagonism to the benign influence of genius, they ruin taste more and more, and retard the progress of the age. Such poets should therefore be scourged with criticism and satire without indulgence or sympathy till they are induced, for their own good, to apply their muse rather to reading what is good than to writing what is bad. For if the bungling of the incompetent so raised the wrath of the gentle Apollo that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what the mediocre poets will base their claim to tolerance.60.Cf. Ch. xxxviii. of Supplement.61.Cf. Ch. xxxvii. of the Supplement.62.Leibnitii epistolæ, collectio Kortholti, ep. 154.63.Cf. Ch. xxxix. of Supplement.64.The following remark may assist those for whom it is not too subtle to understand clearly that the individual is only the phenomenon, not the thing in itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing,i.e., the complemental condition of the possibility of the whole objective world, and, on the other hand, a particular phenomenon of will, the same will which objectifies itself in everything. But this double nature of our being does not rest upon a self-existing unity, otherwise it would be possible for us to be conscious of ourselvesin ourselves, and independent of the objects of knowledge and will. Now this is by no means possible, for as soon as we turn into ourselves to make the attempt, and seek for once to know ourselves fully by means of introspective reflection, we are lost in a bottomless void; we find ourselves like the hollow glass globe, from out of which a voice speaks whose cause is not to be found in it, and whereas we desired to comprehend ourselves, we find, with a shudder, nothing but a vanishing spectre.65.“Scholastici docuerunt, quod æternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio successio; sedNunc stans,i.e., idem nobisNunc esse, quod eratNunc Adamo,i.e., internuncettuncnullam esse differentiam.”—Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 46.66.In Eckermann's“Conversations of Goethe”(vol. i. p. 161), Goethe says:“Our spirit is a being of a nature quite indestructible, and its activity continues from eternity to eternity. It is like the sun, which seems to set only to our earthly eyes, but which, in reality, never sets, but shines on unceasingly.”Goethe has taken the simile from me; not I from him. Without doubt he used it in this conversation, which was held in 1824, in consequence of a (possibly unconscious) reminiscence of the above passage, for it occurs in the first edition, p. 401, in exactly the same words, and it is also repeated at p. 528 of that edition, as at the close of § 65 of the present work. The first edition was sent to him in December 1818, and in March 1819, when I was at Naples, he sent me his congratulations by letter, through my sister, and enclosed a piece of paper upon which he had noted the places of certain passages which had specially pleased him. Thus he had read my book.67.This is expressed in the Veda by saying, that when a man dies his sight becomes one with the sun, his smell with the earth, his taste with water, his hearing with the air, his speech with fire, &c., &c. (Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 249et seq.) And also by the fact that, in a special ceremony, the dying man gives over his senses and all his faculties singly to his son, in whom they are now supposed to live on (Oupnek'hat, vol. ii. p. 82et seq.)68.Cf. Chap. xli.-xliv. of Supplement.69.“Critique of Pure Reason,”first edition, pp. 532-558; fifth edition, pp. 560-586; and“Critique of Practical Reason,”fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz's edition, pp. 224-231.70.Cart. Medit. 4.—Spin. Eth., pt. ii. prop. 48 et 49, cæt.71.Herodot. vii. 46.72.Cf. Ch. xlvi. of Supplement.73.Cf. Ch. xlv. of the Supplement.74.Thus the basis of natural right of property does not require the assumption of two grounds of right beside each other, that based ondetentionand that based onformation; but the latter is itself sufficient. Only the nameformationis not very suitable, for the spending of any labour upon a thing does not need to be a forming or fashioning of it.75.The further exposition of the philosophy of law here laid down will be found in my prize-essay,“Ueber das Fundament der Moral,”§ 17, pp. 221-230 of 1st ed., pp. 216-226 of 2d ed.76.Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement.77.Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 60 et seq.78.That Spanish bishop who, in the last war, poisoned both himself and the French generals at his own table, is an instance of this; and also various incidents in that war. Examples are also to be found in Montaigne, Bk. ii. ch. 12.79.Observe, in passing, that what gives every positive system of religion its great strength, the point of contact through which it takes possession of the soul, is entirely its ethical side. Not, however, the ethical side directly as such, but as it appears firmly united and interwoven with the element of mythical dogma which is present in every system of religion, and as intelligible only by means of this. So much is this the case, that although the ethical significance of action cannot be explained in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, yet since every mythus follows this principle, believers regard the ethical significance of action as quite inseparable, and indeed as absolutely identical, and regard every attack upon the mythus as an attack upon right and virtue. This goes so far that among monotheistic nations atheism or godlessness has become synonymous with the absence of all morality. To the priests such confusions of conceptions are welcome, and only in consequence of them could that horrible monstrosity fanaticism arise and govern, not merely single individuals who happen to be specially perverse and bad, but whole nations, and finally embody itself in the Western world as the Inquisition (to the honour of mankind be it said that this only happened once in their history), which, according to the latest and most authentic accounts, in Madrid alone (in the rest of Spain there were many more such ecclesiastical dens of murderers) in 300 years put 300,000 human beings to a painful death at the stake on theological grounds—a fact of which every zealot ought to be reminded whenever he begins to make himself heard.80.The Church would say that these are merelyopera operata, which do not avail unless grace gives the faith which leads to the new birth. But of this farther on.81.The right of man over the life and powers of the brutes rests on the fact that, because with the growing clearness of consciousness suffering increases in like measure; the pain which the brute suffers through death or work is not so great as man would suffer by merely denying himself the flesh, or the powers of the brutes. Therefore man may carry the assertion of his existence to the extent of denying the existence of the brute, and the will to live as a whole endures less suffering in this way than if the opposite course were adopted. This at once determines the extent of the use man may make of the powers of the brutes without wrong; a limit, however, which is often transgressed, especially in the case of beasts of burden and dogs used in the chase; to which the activity of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals is principally devoted. In my opinion, that right does not extend to vivisection, particularly of the higher animals. On the other hand, the insect does not suffer so much through its death as a man suffers from its sting. The Hindus do not understand this.82.As I wander sunk in thought, so strong a sympathy with myself comes over me that I must often weep aloud, which otherwise I am not wont to do.83.Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement. It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that the whole ethical doctrine given in outline in §§61-67has been explained fully and in detail in my prize-essay on the foundation of morals.84.This thought is expressed by a beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical Sanscrit writing,“Sankhya Karica:”“Yet the soul remains a while invested with body; as the potter's wheel continues whirling after the pot has been fashioned, by force of the impulse previously given to it. When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.”Colebrooke,“On the Philosophy of the Hindus: Miscellaneous Essays,”vol i. p. 271. Also in the“Sankhya Karica by Horace Wilson,”§ 67, p. 184.85.See, for example,“Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron,”vol. ii., Nos. 138, 144, 145, 146.“Mythologie des Indous,”par Mad. de Polier, vol. ii., ch. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.“Asiatisches Magazin,”by Klaproth: in the first volume,“Ueber die Fo-Religion,”also“Baghnat Geeta”or“Gespräche zwischen Krishna und Arjoon;”in the second volume,“Moha-Mudgava.”Also,“Institutes of Hindu Law, or the Ordinances of Manu,”from the Sanscrit, by Sir William Jones (German by Hüttner, 1797), especially the sixth and twelfth chapters. Finally, many passages in the“Asiatic Researches.”(In the last forty years Indian literature has grown so much in Europe, that if I were now to complete this note to the first edition, it would occupy several pages.)86.At the procession of Jagganath in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw themselves under the wheels, and were instantly killed. (Letter of an East Indian proprietor in theTimesof 30th December 1840.)87.On δευτερος πλους cf. Stob. Floril., vol. ii. p. 374.88.Bruckeri Hist. Philos., tomi iv. pars. i. p. 10.89.Henry VI., Part ii. act 3, sc. 3.90.Cf. Ch. xlviii. of the Supplement.91.How truly this is the case may be seen from the fact that all the contradictions and inconceivabilities contained in the Christian dogmatics, consistently systematised by Augustine, which have led to the Pelagian insipidity which is opposed to them, vanish as soon as we abstract from the fundamental Jewish dogma, and recognize that man is not the work of another, but of his own will. Then all is at once clear and correct: then there is no need of freedom in theoperari, for it lies in theesse; and there also lies the sin as original sin. The work of grace is, however, our own. To the rationalistic point of view of the day, on the contrary, many doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics, founded on the New Testament, appear quite untenable, and indeed revolting; for example, predestination. Accordingly Christianity proper is rejected, and a return is made to crude Judaism. But the miscalculation or the original weakness of Christian dogmatics lies—where it is never sought—precisely in that which is withdrawn from all investigation as established and certain. Take this away and the whole of dogmatics is rational; for this dogma destroys theology as it does all other sciences. If any one studies the Augustinian theology in the books“De Civitate Dei”(especially in the Fourteenth Book), he experiences something analogous to the feeling of one who tries to make a body stand whose centre of gravity falls outside it; however he may turn it and place it, it always tumbles over again. So here, in spite of all the efforts and sophisms of Augustine, the guilt and misery of the world always falls back on God, who made everything and everything that is in everything, and also knew how all things would go. That Augustine himself was conscious of the difficulty, and puzzled by it, I have already shown in my prize-essay on the Freedom of the Will (ch. iv. pp. 66-68 of the first and second editions). In the same way, the contradiction between the goodness of God and the misery of the world, and also between the freedom of the will and the foreknowledge of God, is the inexhaustible theme of a controversy which lasted nearly a hundred years between the Cartesians, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld, and many others. The only dogma which was regarded as fixed by all parties was the existence and attributes of God, and they all unceasingly move in a circle, because they seek to bring these things into harmony,i.e., to solve a sum that will not come right, but always shows a remainder at some new place whenever we have concealed it elsewhere. But it does not occur to any one to seek for the source of the difficulty in the fundamental assumption, although it palpably obtrudes itself. Bayle alone shows that he saw this.92.This is also just the Prajna—Paramita of the Buddhists, the“beyond all knowledge,”i.e., the point at which subject and object are no more. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt,“Ueber das Mahajana und Pratschna-Paramita.”)

Footnotes1.F. H. Jacobi.2.The Hegelian Philosophy.3.Fichte and Schelling.4.Hegel.5.Kant is the only writer who has confused this idea of reason, and in this connection I refer the reader to the Appendix, and also to my“Grundprobleme der Ethik”: Grundl. dd. Moral. § 6, pp. 148-154, first and second editions.6.Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat.Seneca, epist. 81.7.It is shown in the Appendix that matter and substance are one.8.This shows the ground of the Kantian explanation of matter, that it is“that which is movable in space,”for motion consists simply in the union of space and time.9.Not, as Kant holds, from the knowledge of time, as will be explained in the Appendix.10.On this see“The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,”§ 49.11.The first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books belong to these seven paragraphs.12.Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and 27 of the third edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason.13.Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the Supplement.14.Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the Supplement.15.Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.16.I am therefore of opinion that a science of physiognomy cannot, with certainty, go further than to lay down a few quite general rules. For example, the intellectual qualities are to be read in the forehead and the eyes; the moral qualities, the expression of will, in the mouth and lower part of the face. The forehead and the eyes interpret each other; either of them seen alone can only be half understood. Genius is never without a high, broad, finely-arched brow; but such a brow often occurs where there is no genius. A clever-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be so the uglier the face is; and a stupid-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be stupid the more beautiful the face is; for beauty, as the approximation to the type of humanity, carries in and for itself the expression of mental clearness; the opposite is the case with ugliness, and so forth.17.Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.18.Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.19.Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.20.Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.21.The reader must not think here of Kant's misuse of these Greek terms, which is condemned in the Appendix.22.Spinoza, who always boasts that he proceedsmore geometrico, has actually done so more than he himself was aware. For what he knew with certainty and decision from the immediate, perceptive apprehension of the nature of the world, he seeks to demonstrate logically without reference to this knowledge. He only arrives at the intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary concepts framed by himself (substantia causa sui, &c.), and in the demonstrations he allows himself all the freedom of choice for which the nature of the wide concept-spheres afford such convenient opportunity. That his doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in his case, as in that of geometry, quite independent of the demonstrations of it. Cf. ch. 13 of supplementary volume.23.Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.24.Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus opiniones). Epictet., c. v.25.Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι εφαρμοξειν ταις επι μερους (Hæc est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus). Epict. dissert., ii., 26.26.Cf. Ch. 16 of Supplement.27.Cf. Ch. xviii. of the Supplement.28.We can thus by no means agree with Bacon if he (De Augm. Scient., L. iv. in fine.) thinks that all mechanical and physical movement of bodies has always been preceded by perception in these bodies; though a glimmering of truth lies at the bottom of this false proposition. This is also the case with Kepler's opinion, expressed in his essayDe Planeta Martis, that the planets must have knowledge in order to keep their elliptical courses so correctly, and to regulate the velocity of their motion so that the triangle of the plane of their course always remains proportional to the time in which they pass through its base.29.Cf. Ch. xix. of the Supplement.30.Cf. Ch. xx. of the Supplement, and also in my work,“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”the chapters on Physiology and Comparative Anatomy, where the subject I have only touched upon here is fully discussed.31.This is specially treated in the 27th Ch. of the Supplement.32.This subject is fully worked out in my prize essay on the freedom of the will, in which therefore (pp. 29-44 of the“Grundprobleme der Ethik”) the relation ofcause,stimulus, andmotivehas also been fully explained.33.Cf. Ch. xxiii. of the Supplement, and also the Ch. on the physiology of plants in my work“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”and the Ch. on physical astronomy, which is of great importance with regard to the kernel of my metaphysic.34.Wenzel, De Structura Cerebri Hominis et Brutorum, 1812, ch. iii.; Cuvier, Leçons d'Anat., comp. leçon 9, arts. 4 and 5; Vic. d'Azyr, Hist. de l'Acad. de Sc. de Paris, 1783, pp. 470 and 483.35.On the 16th of September 1840, at a lecture upon Egyptian Archæology delivered by Mr. Pettigrew at the Literary and Scientific Institute of London, he showed some corns of wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a grave at Thebes, in which they must have lain for three thousand years. They were found in an hermetically sealed vase. Mr. Pettigrew had sowed twelve grains, and obtained a plant which grew five feet high, and the seeds of which were now quite ripe.—Times, 21st September 1840. In the same way in 1830 Mr. Haulton produced in the Medical Botanical Society of London a bulbous root which was found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy, in which it was probably put in observance of some religious rite, and which must have been at least two thousand years old. He had planted it in a flower-pot, in which it grew up and flourished. This is quoted from the Medical Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institute of Great Britain, October 1830, p. 196.—“In the garden of Mr. Grimstone of the Herbarium, Highgate, London, is a pea in full fruit, which has sprung from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officials of the British Museum took out of a vase which had been found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain 2844 years.”—Times, 16th August 1844. Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead to the conclusion that even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of years, if this is begun in the dormant period and maintained by special circumstances.36.Cf. Chap. xxii. of the Supplement, and also my work“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”p. 54et seq., and pp. 70-79 of the first edition, or p. 46et seq., and pp. 63-72 of the second, or p. 48et seq., and pp. 69-77 of the third edition.37.The Scholastics therefore said very truly:Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum.Cf. Suarez, Disp. Metaph. disp. xxiii., sec. 7 and 8.38.Cf.“Critique of Pure Reason. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Deduction of the Events in the Universe,”pp. 560-586 of the fifth, and p. 532 and following of first edition; and“Critique of Practical Reason,”fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz' edition, p. 224 and following. Cf. my Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 43.39.Cf.“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”at the end of the section on Comparative Anatomy.40.Cf.“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”the section on Comparative Anatomy.41.Chatin, Sur la Valisneria Spiralis, in the Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. de Sc., No. 13, 1855.42.Cf. Chaps. xxvi. and xxvii. of the Supplement.43.Cf. Chap. xxviii. of the Supplement.44.F. H. Jacobi.45.See for example,“Immanuel Kant, a Reminiscence, by Fr. Bouterweck,”pg. 49, and Buhle's“History of Philosophy,”vol. vi. pp. 802-815 and 823.46.Cf. Chap. xxix. of Supplement.47.I also recommend the perusal of what Spinoza says in his Ethics (Book II., Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and Book V., Props. 25-38), concerning thecognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva, in illustration of the kind of knowledge we are considering, and very specially Prop. 29, Schol.; prop. 36, Schol., and Prop. 38, Demonst. et Schol.48.Cf. Chap. xxx. of the Supplement.49.This last sentence cannot be understood without some acquaintance with the next book.50.Cf. Chap. xxxi. of the Supplement.51.I am all the more delighted and astonished, forty years after I so timidly and hesitatingly advanced this thought, to discover that it has already been expressed by St. Augustine:Arbusta formas suas varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quodnossenon possunt, quasiinnotescerevelle videantur.—De civ. Dei, xi.27.52.Cf. Chap. 35 of Supplement.53.Jakob Böhm in his book,“de Signatura Rerum,”ch. i., § 13-15, says,“There is nothing in nature that does not manifest its internal form externally; for the internal continually labours to manifest itself.... Everything has its language by which to reveal itself.... And this is the language of nature when everything speaks out of its own property, and continually manifests and declares itself, ... for each thing reveals its mother, which thus givesthe essence and the willto the form.”54.The last sentence is the German of theil n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit, of Helvetius. In the first edition there was no occasion to point this out, but since then the age has become so degraded and ignorant through the stupefying influence of the Hegelian sophistry, that some might quite likely say that an antithesis was intended here between“spirit and nature.”I am therefore obliged to guard myself in express terms against the suspicion of such vulgar sophisms.55.This digression is worked out more fully in the 36th Chapter of the Supplement.56.In order to understand this passage it is necessary to have read the whole of the next book.57.Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto.58.Cf. Ch. xxxiv. of Supplement.59.It is scarcely necessary to say that wherever I speak of poets I refer exclusively to that rare phenomenon the great true poet. I mean no one else; least of all that dull insipid tribe, the mediocre poets, rhymsters, and inventors of fables, that flourishes so luxuriantly at the present day in Germany. They ought rather to have the words shouted in their ears unceasingly from all sides—Mediocribus esse poëtisNon homines, non Dî, non concessere columnæ.It is worthy of serious consideration what an amount of time—both their own and other people's—and paper is lost by this swarm of mediocre poets, and how injurious is their influence. For the public always seizes on what is new, and has naturally a greater proneness to what is perverse and dull as akin to itself. Therefore these works of the mediocre poets draw it away and hold it back from the true masterpieces and the education they afford, and thus working in direct antagonism to the benign influence of genius, they ruin taste more and more, and retard the progress of the age. Such poets should therefore be scourged with criticism and satire without indulgence or sympathy till they are induced, for their own good, to apply their muse rather to reading what is good than to writing what is bad. For if the bungling of the incompetent so raised the wrath of the gentle Apollo that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what the mediocre poets will base their claim to tolerance.60.Cf. Ch. xxxviii. of Supplement.61.Cf. Ch. xxxvii. of the Supplement.62.Leibnitii epistolæ, collectio Kortholti, ep. 154.63.Cf. Ch. xxxix. of Supplement.64.The following remark may assist those for whom it is not too subtle to understand clearly that the individual is only the phenomenon, not the thing in itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing,i.e., the complemental condition of the possibility of the whole objective world, and, on the other hand, a particular phenomenon of will, the same will which objectifies itself in everything. But this double nature of our being does not rest upon a self-existing unity, otherwise it would be possible for us to be conscious of ourselvesin ourselves, and independent of the objects of knowledge and will. Now this is by no means possible, for as soon as we turn into ourselves to make the attempt, and seek for once to know ourselves fully by means of introspective reflection, we are lost in a bottomless void; we find ourselves like the hollow glass globe, from out of which a voice speaks whose cause is not to be found in it, and whereas we desired to comprehend ourselves, we find, with a shudder, nothing but a vanishing spectre.65.“Scholastici docuerunt, quod æternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio successio; sedNunc stans,i.e., idem nobisNunc esse, quod eratNunc Adamo,i.e., internuncettuncnullam esse differentiam.”—Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 46.66.In Eckermann's“Conversations of Goethe”(vol. i. p. 161), Goethe says:“Our spirit is a being of a nature quite indestructible, and its activity continues from eternity to eternity. It is like the sun, which seems to set only to our earthly eyes, but which, in reality, never sets, but shines on unceasingly.”Goethe has taken the simile from me; not I from him. Without doubt he used it in this conversation, which was held in 1824, in consequence of a (possibly unconscious) reminiscence of the above passage, for it occurs in the first edition, p. 401, in exactly the same words, and it is also repeated at p. 528 of that edition, as at the close of § 65 of the present work. The first edition was sent to him in December 1818, and in March 1819, when I was at Naples, he sent me his congratulations by letter, through my sister, and enclosed a piece of paper upon which he had noted the places of certain passages which had specially pleased him. Thus he had read my book.67.This is expressed in the Veda by saying, that when a man dies his sight becomes one with the sun, his smell with the earth, his taste with water, his hearing with the air, his speech with fire, &c., &c. (Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 249et seq.) And also by the fact that, in a special ceremony, the dying man gives over his senses and all his faculties singly to his son, in whom they are now supposed to live on (Oupnek'hat, vol. ii. p. 82et seq.)68.Cf. Chap. xli.-xliv. of Supplement.69.“Critique of Pure Reason,”first edition, pp. 532-558; fifth edition, pp. 560-586; and“Critique of Practical Reason,”fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz's edition, pp. 224-231.70.Cart. Medit. 4.—Spin. Eth., pt. ii. prop. 48 et 49, cæt.71.Herodot. vii. 46.72.Cf. Ch. xlvi. of Supplement.73.Cf. Ch. xlv. of the Supplement.74.Thus the basis of natural right of property does not require the assumption of two grounds of right beside each other, that based ondetentionand that based onformation; but the latter is itself sufficient. Only the nameformationis not very suitable, for the spending of any labour upon a thing does not need to be a forming or fashioning of it.75.The further exposition of the philosophy of law here laid down will be found in my prize-essay,“Ueber das Fundament der Moral,”§ 17, pp. 221-230 of 1st ed., pp. 216-226 of 2d ed.76.Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement.77.Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 60 et seq.78.That Spanish bishop who, in the last war, poisoned both himself and the French generals at his own table, is an instance of this; and also various incidents in that war. Examples are also to be found in Montaigne, Bk. ii. ch. 12.79.Observe, in passing, that what gives every positive system of religion its great strength, the point of contact through which it takes possession of the soul, is entirely its ethical side. Not, however, the ethical side directly as such, but as it appears firmly united and interwoven with the element of mythical dogma which is present in every system of religion, and as intelligible only by means of this. So much is this the case, that although the ethical significance of action cannot be explained in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, yet since every mythus follows this principle, believers regard the ethical significance of action as quite inseparable, and indeed as absolutely identical, and regard every attack upon the mythus as an attack upon right and virtue. This goes so far that among monotheistic nations atheism or godlessness has become synonymous with the absence of all morality. To the priests such confusions of conceptions are welcome, and only in consequence of them could that horrible monstrosity fanaticism arise and govern, not merely single individuals who happen to be specially perverse and bad, but whole nations, and finally embody itself in the Western world as the Inquisition (to the honour of mankind be it said that this only happened once in their history), which, according to the latest and most authentic accounts, in Madrid alone (in the rest of Spain there were many more such ecclesiastical dens of murderers) in 300 years put 300,000 human beings to a painful death at the stake on theological grounds—a fact of which every zealot ought to be reminded whenever he begins to make himself heard.80.The Church would say that these are merelyopera operata, which do not avail unless grace gives the faith which leads to the new birth. But of this farther on.81.The right of man over the life and powers of the brutes rests on the fact that, because with the growing clearness of consciousness suffering increases in like measure; the pain which the brute suffers through death or work is not so great as man would suffer by merely denying himself the flesh, or the powers of the brutes. Therefore man may carry the assertion of his existence to the extent of denying the existence of the brute, and the will to live as a whole endures less suffering in this way than if the opposite course were adopted. This at once determines the extent of the use man may make of the powers of the brutes without wrong; a limit, however, which is often transgressed, especially in the case of beasts of burden and dogs used in the chase; to which the activity of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals is principally devoted. In my opinion, that right does not extend to vivisection, particularly of the higher animals. On the other hand, the insect does not suffer so much through its death as a man suffers from its sting. The Hindus do not understand this.82.As I wander sunk in thought, so strong a sympathy with myself comes over me that I must often weep aloud, which otherwise I am not wont to do.83.Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement. It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that the whole ethical doctrine given in outline in §§61-67has been explained fully and in detail in my prize-essay on the foundation of morals.84.This thought is expressed by a beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical Sanscrit writing,“Sankhya Karica:”“Yet the soul remains a while invested with body; as the potter's wheel continues whirling after the pot has been fashioned, by force of the impulse previously given to it. When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.”Colebrooke,“On the Philosophy of the Hindus: Miscellaneous Essays,”vol i. p. 271. Also in the“Sankhya Karica by Horace Wilson,”§ 67, p. 184.85.See, for example,“Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron,”vol. ii., Nos. 138, 144, 145, 146.“Mythologie des Indous,”par Mad. de Polier, vol. ii., ch. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.“Asiatisches Magazin,”by Klaproth: in the first volume,“Ueber die Fo-Religion,”also“Baghnat Geeta”or“Gespräche zwischen Krishna und Arjoon;”in the second volume,“Moha-Mudgava.”Also,“Institutes of Hindu Law, or the Ordinances of Manu,”from the Sanscrit, by Sir William Jones (German by Hüttner, 1797), especially the sixth and twelfth chapters. Finally, many passages in the“Asiatic Researches.”(In the last forty years Indian literature has grown so much in Europe, that if I were now to complete this note to the first edition, it would occupy several pages.)86.At the procession of Jagganath in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw themselves under the wheels, and were instantly killed. (Letter of an East Indian proprietor in theTimesof 30th December 1840.)87.On δευτερος πλους cf. Stob. Floril., vol. ii. p. 374.88.Bruckeri Hist. Philos., tomi iv. pars. i. p. 10.89.Henry VI., Part ii. act 3, sc. 3.90.Cf. Ch. xlviii. of the Supplement.91.How truly this is the case may be seen from the fact that all the contradictions and inconceivabilities contained in the Christian dogmatics, consistently systematised by Augustine, which have led to the Pelagian insipidity which is opposed to them, vanish as soon as we abstract from the fundamental Jewish dogma, and recognize that man is not the work of another, but of his own will. Then all is at once clear and correct: then there is no need of freedom in theoperari, for it lies in theesse; and there also lies the sin as original sin. The work of grace is, however, our own. To the rationalistic point of view of the day, on the contrary, many doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics, founded on the New Testament, appear quite untenable, and indeed revolting; for example, predestination. Accordingly Christianity proper is rejected, and a return is made to crude Judaism. But the miscalculation or the original weakness of Christian dogmatics lies—where it is never sought—precisely in that which is withdrawn from all investigation as established and certain. Take this away and the whole of dogmatics is rational; for this dogma destroys theology as it does all other sciences. If any one studies the Augustinian theology in the books“De Civitate Dei”(especially in the Fourteenth Book), he experiences something analogous to the feeling of one who tries to make a body stand whose centre of gravity falls outside it; however he may turn it and place it, it always tumbles over again. So here, in spite of all the efforts and sophisms of Augustine, the guilt and misery of the world always falls back on God, who made everything and everything that is in everything, and also knew how all things would go. That Augustine himself was conscious of the difficulty, and puzzled by it, I have already shown in my prize-essay on the Freedom of the Will (ch. iv. pp. 66-68 of the first and second editions). In the same way, the contradiction between the goodness of God and the misery of the world, and also between the freedom of the will and the foreknowledge of God, is the inexhaustible theme of a controversy which lasted nearly a hundred years between the Cartesians, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld, and many others. The only dogma which was regarded as fixed by all parties was the existence and attributes of God, and they all unceasingly move in a circle, because they seek to bring these things into harmony,i.e., to solve a sum that will not come right, but always shows a remainder at some new place whenever we have concealed it elsewhere. But it does not occur to any one to seek for the source of the difficulty in the fundamental assumption, although it palpably obtrudes itself. Bayle alone shows that he saw this.92.This is also just the Prajna—Paramita of the Buddhists, the“beyond all knowledge,”i.e., the point at which subject and object are no more. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt,“Ueber das Mahajana und Pratschna-Paramita.”)

Footnotes1.F. H. Jacobi.2.The Hegelian Philosophy.3.Fichte and Schelling.4.Hegel.5.Kant is the only writer who has confused this idea of reason, and in this connection I refer the reader to the Appendix, and also to my“Grundprobleme der Ethik”: Grundl. dd. Moral. § 6, pp. 148-154, first and second editions.6.Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat.Seneca, epist. 81.7.It is shown in the Appendix that matter and substance are one.8.This shows the ground of the Kantian explanation of matter, that it is“that which is movable in space,”for motion consists simply in the union of space and time.9.Not, as Kant holds, from the knowledge of time, as will be explained in the Appendix.10.On this see“The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,”§ 49.11.The first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books belong to these seven paragraphs.12.Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and 27 of the third edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason.13.Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the Supplement.14.Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the Supplement.15.Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.16.I am therefore of opinion that a science of physiognomy cannot, with certainty, go further than to lay down a few quite general rules. For example, the intellectual qualities are to be read in the forehead and the eyes; the moral qualities, the expression of will, in the mouth and lower part of the face. The forehead and the eyes interpret each other; either of them seen alone can only be half understood. Genius is never without a high, broad, finely-arched brow; but such a brow often occurs where there is no genius. A clever-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be so the uglier the face is; and a stupid-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be stupid the more beautiful the face is; for beauty, as the approximation to the type of humanity, carries in and for itself the expression of mental clearness; the opposite is the case with ugliness, and so forth.17.Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.18.Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.19.Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.20.Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.21.The reader must not think here of Kant's misuse of these Greek terms, which is condemned in the Appendix.22.Spinoza, who always boasts that he proceedsmore geometrico, has actually done so more than he himself was aware. For what he knew with certainty and decision from the immediate, perceptive apprehension of the nature of the world, he seeks to demonstrate logically without reference to this knowledge. He only arrives at the intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary concepts framed by himself (substantia causa sui, &c.), and in the demonstrations he allows himself all the freedom of choice for which the nature of the wide concept-spheres afford such convenient opportunity. That his doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in his case, as in that of geometry, quite independent of the demonstrations of it. Cf. ch. 13 of supplementary volume.23.Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.24.Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus opiniones). Epictet., c. v.25.Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι εφαρμοξειν ταις επι μερους (Hæc est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus). Epict. dissert., ii., 26.26.Cf. Ch. 16 of Supplement.27.Cf. Ch. xviii. of the Supplement.28.We can thus by no means agree with Bacon if he (De Augm. Scient., L. iv. in fine.) thinks that all mechanical and physical movement of bodies has always been preceded by perception in these bodies; though a glimmering of truth lies at the bottom of this false proposition. This is also the case with Kepler's opinion, expressed in his essayDe Planeta Martis, that the planets must have knowledge in order to keep their elliptical courses so correctly, and to regulate the velocity of their motion so that the triangle of the plane of their course always remains proportional to the time in which they pass through its base.29.Cf. Ch. xix. of the Supplement.30.Cf. Ch. xx. of the Supplement, and also in my work,“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”the chapters on Physiology and Comparative Anatomy, where the subject I have only touched upon here is fully discussed.31.This is specially treated in the 27th Ch. of the Supplement.32.This subject is fully worked out in my prize essay on the freedom of the will, in which therefore (pp. 29-44 of the“Grundprobleme der Ethik”) the relation ofcause,stimulus, andmotivehas also been fully explained.33.Cf. Ch. xxiii. of the Supplement, and also the Ch. on the physiology of plants in my work“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”and the Ch. on physical astronomy, which is of great importance with regard to the kernel of my metaphysic.34.Wenzel, De Structura Cerebri Hominis et Brutorum, 1812, ch. iii.; Cuvier, Leçons d'Anat., comp. leçon 9, arts. 4 and 5; Vic. d'Azyr, Hist. de l'Acad. de Sc. de Paris, 1783, pp. 470 and 483.35.On the 16th of September 1840, at a lecture upon Egyptian Archæology delivered by Mr. Pettigrew at the Literary and Scientific Institute of London, he showed some corns of wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a grave at Thebes, in which they must have lain for three thousand years. They were found in an hermetically sealed vase. Mr. Pettigrew had sowed twelve grains, and obtained a plant which grew five feet high, and the seeds of which were now quite ripe.—Times, 21st September 1840. In the same way in 1830 Mr. Haulton produced in the Medical Botanical Society of London a bulbous root which was found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy, in which it was probably put in observance of some religious rite, and which must have been at least two thousand years old. He had planted it in a flower-pot, in which it grew up and flourished. This is quoted from the Medical Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institute of Great Britain, October 1830, p. 196.—“In the garden of Mr. Grimstone of the Herbarium, Highgate, London, is a pea in full fruit, which has sprung from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officials of the British Museum took out of a vase which had been found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain 2844 years.”—Times, 16th August 1844. Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead to the conclusion that even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of years, if this is begun in the dormant period and maintained by special circumstances.36.Cf. Chap. xxii. of the Supplement, and also my work“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”p. 54et seq., and pp. 70-79 of the first edition, or p. 46et seq., and pp. 63-72 of the second, or p. 48et seq., and pp. 69-77 of the third edition.37.The Scholastics therefore said very truly:Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum.Cf. Suarez, Disp. Metaph. disp. xxiii., sec. 7 and 8.38.Cf.“Critique of Pure Reason. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Deduction of the Events in the Universe,”pp. 560-586 of the fifth, and p. 532 and following of first edition; and“Critique of Practical Reason,”fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz' edition, p. 224 and following. Cf. my Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 43.39.Cf.“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”at the end of the section on Comparative Anatomy.40.Cf.“Ueber den Willen in der Natur,”the section on Comparative Anatomy.41.Chatin, Sur la Valisneria Spiralis, in the Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. de Sc., No. 13, 1855.42.Cf. Chaps. xxvi. and xxvii. of the Supplement.43.Cf. Chap. xxviii. of the Supplement.44.F. H. Jacobi.45.See for example,“Immanuel Kant, a Reminiscence, by Fr. Bouterweck,”pg. 49, and Buhle's“History of Philosophy,”vol. vi. pp. 802-815 and 823.46.Cf. Chap. xxix. of Supplement.47.I also recommend the perusal of what Spinoza says in his Ethics (Book II., Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and Book V., Props. 25-38), concerning thecognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva, in illustration of the kind of knowledge we are considering, and very specially Prop. 29, Schol.; prop. 36, Schol., and Prop. 38, Demonst. et Schol.48.Cf. Chap. xxx. of the Supplement.49.This last sentence cannot be understood without some acquaintance with the next book.50.Cf. Chap. xxxi. of the Supplement.51.I am all the more delighted and astonished, forty years after I so timidly and hesitatingly advanced this thought, to discover that it has already been expressed by St. Augustine:Arbusta formas suas varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quodnossenon possunt, quasiinnotescerevelle videantur.—De civ. Dei, xi.27.52.Cf. Chap. 35 of Supplement.53.Jakob Böhm in his book,“de Signatura Rerum,”ch. i., § 13-15, says,“There is nothing in nature that does not manifest its internal form externally; for the internal continually labours to manifest itself.... Everything has its language by which to reveal itself.... And this is the language of nature when everything speaks out of its own property, and continually manifests and declares itself, ... for each thing reveals its mother, which thus givesthe essence and the willto the form.”54.The last sentence is the German of theil n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit, of Helvetius. In the first edition there was no occasion to point this out, but since then the age has become so degraded and ignorant through the stupefying influence of the Hegelian sophistry, that some might quite likely say that an antithesis was intended here between“spirit and nature.”I am therefore obliged to guard myself in express terms against the suspicion of such vulgar sophisms.55.This digression is worked out more fully in the 36th Chapter of the Supplement.56.In order to understand this passage it is necessary to have read the whole of the next book.57.Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto.58.Cf. Ch. xxxiv. of Supplement.59.It is scarcely necessary to say that wherever I speak of poets I refer exclusively to that rare phenomenon the great true poet. I mean no one else; least of all that dull insipid tribe, the mediocre poets, rhymsters, and inventors of fables, that flourishes so luxuriantly at the present day in Germany. They ought rather to have the words shouted in their ears unceasingly from all sides—Mediocribus esse poëtisNon homines, non Dî, non concessere columnæ.It is worthy of serious consideration what an amount of time—both their own and other people's—and paper is lost by this swarm of mediocre poets, and how injurious is their influence. For the public always seizes on what is new, and has naturally a greater proneness to what is perverse and dull as akin to itself. Therefore these works of the mediocre poets draw it away and hold it back from the true masterpieces and the education they afford, and thus working in direct antagonism to the benign influence of genius, they ruin taste more and more, and retard the progress of the age. Such poets should therefore be scourged with criticism and satire without indulgence or sympathy till they are induced, for their own good, to apply their muse rather to reading what is good than to writing what is bad. For if the bungling of the incompetent so raised the wrath of the gentle Apollo that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what the mediocre poets will base their claim to tolerance.60.Cf. Ch. xxxviii. of Supplement.61.Cf. Ch. xxxvii. of the Supplement.62.Leibnitii epistolæ, collectio Kortholti, ep. 154.63.Cf. Ch. xxxix. of Supplement.64.The following remark may assist those for whom it is not too subtle to understand clearly that the individual is only the phenomenon, not the thing in itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing,i.e., the complemental condition of the possibility of the whole objective world, and, on the other hand, a particular phenomenon of will, the same will which objectifies itself in everything. But this double nature of our being does not rest upon a self-existing unity, otherwise it would be possible for us to be conscious of ourselvesin ourselves, and independent of the objects of knowledge and will. Now this is by no means possible, for as soon as we turn into ourselves to make the attempt, and seek for once to know ourselves fully by means of introspective reflection, we are lost in a bottomless void; we find ourselves like the hollow glass globe, from out of which a voice speaks whose cause is not to be found in it, and whereas we desired to comprehend ourselves, we find, with a shudder, nothing but a vanishing spectre.65.“Scholastici docuerunt, quod æternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio successio; sedNunc stans,i.e., idem nobisNunc esse, quod eratNunc Adamo,i.e., internuncettuncnullam esse differentiam.”—Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 46.66.In Eckermann's“Conversations of Goethe”(vol. i. p. 161), Goethe says:“Our spirit is a being of a nature quite indestructible, and its activity continues from eternity to eternity. It is like the sun, which seems to set only to our earthly eyes, but which, in reality, never sets, but shines on unceasingly.”Goethe has taken the simile from me; not I from him. Without doubt he used it in this conversation, which was held in 1824, in consequence of a (possibly unconscious) reminiscence of the above passage, for it occurs in the first edition, p. 401, in exactly the same words, and it is also repeated at p. 528 of that edition, as at the close of § 65 of the present work. The first edition was sent to him in December 1818, and in March 1819, when I was at Naples, he sent me his congratulations by letter, through my sister, and enclosed a piece of paper upon which he had noted the places of certain passages which had specially pleased him. Thus he had read my book.67.This is expressed in the Veda by saying, that when a man dies his sight becomes one with the sun, his smell with the earth, his taste with water, his hearing with the air, his speech with fire, &c., &c. (Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 249et seq.) And also by the fact that, in a special ceremony, the dying man gives over his senses and all his faculties singly to his son, in whom they are now supposed to live on (Oupnek'hat, vol. ii. p. 82et seq.)68.Cf. Chap. xli.-xliv. of Supplement.69.“Critique of Pure Reason,”first edition, pp. 532-558; fifth edition, pp. 560-586; and“Critique of Practical Reason,”fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz's edition, pp. 224-231.70.Cart. Medit. 4.—Spin. Eth., pt. ii. prop. 48 et 49, cæt.71.Herodot. vii. 46.72.Cf. Ch. xlvi. of Supplement.73.Cf. Ch. xlv. of the Supplement.74.Thus the basis of natural right of property does not require the assumption of two grounds of right beside each other, that based ondetentionand that based onformation; but the latter is itself sufficient. Only the nameformationis not very suitable, for the spending of any labour upon a thing does not need to be a forming or fashioning of it.75.The further exposition of the philosophy of law here laid down will be found in my prize-essay,“Ueber das Fundament der Moral,”§ 17, pp. 221-230 of 1st ed., pp. 216-226 of 2d ed.76.Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement.77.Oupnek'hat, vol. i. p. 60 et seq.78.That Spanish bishop who, in the last war, poisoned both himself and the French generals at his own table, is an instance of this; and also various incidents in that war. Examples are also to be found in Montaigne, Bk. ii. ch. 12.79.Observe, in passing, that what gives every positive system of religion its great strength, the point of contact through which it takes possession of the soul, is entirely its ethical side. Not, however, the ethical side directly as such, but as it appears firmly united and interwoven with the element of mythical dogma which is present in every system of religion, and as intelligible only by means of this. So much is this the case, that although the ethical significance of action cannot be explained in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, yet since every mythus follows this principle, believers regard the ethical significance of action as quite inseparable, and indeed as absolutely identical, and regard every attack upon the mythus as an attack upon right and virtue. This goes so far that among monotheistic nations atheism or godlessness has become synonymous with the absence of all morality. To the priests such confusions of conceptions are welcome, and only in consequence of them could that horrible monstrosity fanaticism arise and govern, not merely single individuals who happen to be specially perverse and bad, but whole nations, and finally embody itself in the Western world as the Inquisition (to the honour of mankind be it said that this only happened once in their history), which, according to the latest and most authentic accounts, in Madrid alone (in the rest of Spain there were many more such ecclesiastical dens of murderers) in 300 years put 300,000 human beings to a painful death at the stake on theological grounds—a fact of which every zealot ought to be reminded whenever he begins to make himself heard.80.The Church would say that these are merelyopera operata, which do not avail unless grace gives the faith which leads to the new birth. But of this farther on.81.The right of man over the life and powers of the brutes rests on the fact that, because with the growing clearness of consciousness suffering increases in like measure; the pain which the brute suffers through death or work is not so great as man would suffer by merely denying himself the flesh, or the powers of the brutes. Therefore man may carry the assertion of his existence to the extent of denying the existence of the brute, and the will to live as a whole endures less suffering in this way than if the opposite course were adopted. This at once determines the extent of the use man may make of the powers of the brutes without wrong; a limit, however, which is often transgressed, especially in the case of beasts of burden and dogs used in the chase; to which the activity of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals is principally devoted. In my opinion, that right does not extend to vivisection, particularly of the higher animals. On the other hand, the insect does not suffer so much through its death as a man suffers from its sting. The Hindus do not understand this.82.As I wander sunk in thought, so strong a sympathy with myself comes over me that I must often weep aloud, which otherwise I am not wont to do.83.Cf. Ch. xlvii. of Supplement. It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that the whole ethical doctrine given in outline in §§61-67has been explained fully and in detail in my prize-essay on the foundation of morals.84.This thought is expressed by a beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical Sanscrit writing,“Sankhya Karica:”“Yet the soul remains a while invested with body; as the potter's wheel continues whirling after the pot has been fashioned, by force of the impulse previously given to it. When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.”Colebrooke,“On the Philosophy of the Hindus: Miscellaneous Essays,”vol i. p. 271. Also in the“Sankhya Karica by Horace Wilson,”§ 67, p. 184.85.See, for example,“Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron,”vol. ii., Nos. 138, 144, 145, 146.“Mythologie des Indous,”par Mad. de Polier, vol. ii., ch. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.“Asiatisches Magazin,”by Klaproth: in the first volume,“Ueber die Fo-Religion,”also“Baghnat Geeta”or“Gespräche zwischen Krishna und Arjoon;”in the second volume,“Moha-Mudgava.”Also,“Institutes of Hindu Law, or the Ordinances of Manu,”from the Sanscrit, by Sir William Jones (German by Hüttner, 1797), especially the sixth and twelfth chapters. Finally, many passages in the“Asiatic Researches.”(In the last forty years Indian literature has grown so much in Europe, that if I were now to complete this note to the first edition, it would occupy several pages.)86.At the procession of Jagganath in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw themselves under the wheels, and were instantly killed. (Letter of an East Indian proprietor in theTimesof 30th December 1840.)87.On δευτερος πλους cf. Stob. Floril., vol. ii. p. 374.88.Bruckeri Hist. Philos., tomi iv. pars. i. p. 10.89.Henry VI., Part ii. act 3, sc. 3.90.Cf. Ch. xlviii. of the Supplement.91.How truly this is the case may be seen from the fact that all the contradictions and inconceivabilities contained in the Christian dogmatics, consistently systematised by Augustine, which have led to the Pelagian insipidity which is opposed to them, vanish as soon as we abstract from the fundamental Jewish dogma, and recognize that man is not the work of another, but of his own will. Then all is at once clear and correct: then there is no need of freedom in theoperari, for it lies in theesse; and there also lies the sin as original sin. The work of grace is, however, our own. To the rationalistic point of view of the day, on the contrary, many doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics, founded on the New Testament, appear quite untenable, and indeed revolting; for example, predestination. Accordingly Christianity proper is rejected, and a return is made to crude Judaism. But the miscalculation or the original weakness of Christian dogmatics lies—where it is never sought—precisely in that which is withdrawn from all investigation as established and certain. Take this away and the whole of dogmatics is rational; for this dogma destroys theology as it does all other sciences. If any one studies the Augustinian theology in the books“De Civitate Dei”(especially in the Fourteenth Book), he experiences something analogous to the feeling of one who tries to make a body stand whose centre of gravity falls outside it; however he may turn it and place it, it always tumbles over again. So here, in spite of all the efforts and sophisms of Augustine, the guilt and misery of the world always falls back on God, who made everything and everything that is in everything, and also knew how all things would go. That Augustine himself was conscious of the difficulty, and puzzled by it, I have already shown in my prize-essay on the Freedom of the Will (ch. iv. pp. 66-68 of the first and second editions). In the same way, the contradiction between the goodness of God and the misery of the world, and also between the freedom of the will and the foreknowledge of God, is the inexhaustible theme of a controversy which lasted nearly a hundred years between the Cartesians, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld, and many others. The only dogma which was regarded as fixed by all parties was the existence and attributes of God, and they all unceasingly move in a circle, because they seek to bring these things into harmony,i.e., to solve a sum that will not come right, but always shows a remainder at some new place whenever we have concealed it elsewhere. But it does not occur to any one to seek for the source of the difficulty in the fundamental assumption, although it palpably obtrudes itself. Bayle alone shows that he saw this.92.This is also just the Prajna—Paramita of the Buddhists, the“beyond all knowledge,”i.e., the point at which subject and object are no more. (Cf. J. J. Schmidt,“Ueber das Mahajana und Pratschna-Paramita.”)

It is scarcely necessary to say that wherever I speak of poets I refer exclusively to that rare phenomenon the great true poet. I mean no one else; least of all that dull insipid tribe, the mediocre poets, rhymsters, and inventors of fables, that flourishes so luxuriantly at the present day in Germany. They ought rather to have the words shouted in their ears unceasingly from all sides—

Mediocribus esse poëtisNon homines, non Dî, non concessere columnæ.

It is worthy of serious consideration what an amount of time—both their own and other people's—and paper is lost by this swarm of mediocre poets, and how injurious is their influence. For the public always seizes on what is new, and has naturally a greater proneness to what is perverse and dull as akin to itself. Therefore these works of the mediocre poets draw it away and hold it back from the true masterpieces and the education they afford, and thus working in direct antagonism to the benign influence of genius, they ruin taste more and more, and retard the progress of the age. Such poets should therefore be scourged with criticism and satire without indulgence or sympathy till they are induced, for their own good, to apply their muse rather to reading what is good than to writing what is bad. For if the bungling of the incompetent so raised the wrath of the gentle Apollo that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see on what the mediocre poets will base their claim to tolerance.

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