CHAPTER SEVENTEENResults

Altogether there were 13 regular excursions and two special ones by the American squadron, and 11 by the British squadron. In all, 70,117 mines were planted, of which 56,571, or four-fifths, were American. In its 230 miles length, the barrage varied in width from 15 to 35 miles, so that a submarine could not attempt a crossing without being in danger for from one to three hours, or twice as long, if running submerged. The obstruction extended to a depth of 240 feet, except over the eastern section of 50 miles length, where the deepest mines were submerged 125 feet.

In small fields, of a few score or hundreds of mines, laid piecemeal by fixed marks, the mines in adjacent lines are usually “staggered,” so as to halve and block the opposite intervals, but in an open-sea minefield of immense area, far beyond sight of any marks and laid at 12 knots speed or faster, no such nicety is possible or necessary. The great Northern Barrage opposed from 6 to 10 lines of mines to a submarine on the surface and three to four lines more at whatever depth the submarine might think he could safely pass. Absolute impassability never was attained nor expected. At the thickest part a submarine had one chance in ten of getting through. The explosion of defective mines had left some thin spots—but who could tell where? Such a minefield is not so much like a Chinese wall as it is like a stretch of rough, treacherous country, whose crossing would always be a desperate venture.

Submarines are known to have crossed the barrier, but they all feared it, and as early as 8 July, 1918, some experienced its deadly effect. From the very circumstances of the barrier’s great extent and the absence of observers, the full toll, in damage as well as destruction, may never be known. The official statistics of lost German submarines, compiled March 1, 1919, credit the Northern Barrage with the destruction of four submarines certainly, two more probably, and possibly still two more. An equal number were severely damaged, though not destroyed, and it is considered probable by the British Admiralty that the loss of five other submarines,the cause of which cannot be definitely proven, is accounted for by the Northern Barrage. Thus by reliable records, the toll was 17. Indications during the sweeping up of the barrage tend to confirm this. Besides these, to the squadron’s credit, should be added the two submarines reported lost in the North Irish Channel, in the field which consisted of British mines laid by ourBaltimore.

The summary of Activities of U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters, issued by Admiral Sims, says further:

There is no doubt that this barrage had a considerable moral effect on the German naval crews, for it is known that several submarines hesitated some time before crossing. Also, reports from German sources are that the barrage caused no small amount of panic in some of the submarine flotillas.It is also probable that the barrage played a part in preventing raids on Allied commerce by fast enemy cruisers.

It is also probable that the barrage played a part in preventing raids on Allied commerce by fast enemy cruisers.

In thus deterring a sally by enemy cruisers, the barrage aided the mission of the American Battleship Division Six, under Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers, U.S.N., flagshipUtah, which was sent over to guard the convoys and was based on Berehaven, Ireland.

One officially reported statement of a German submarine captain said that three submarines, including his own, had been damaged by the barrage but all had reached port. The injury in his case prevented his diving. Other accounts, in the press and from individuals, give some indication of the moral effect produced by this great minefield, reaching to the German Army and also among civilians.

It would be interesting to know what proportion of the submarines that passed the line of the barrier were harmed by it, but the effect upon the enemy went far beyond such tangible injuries. Every successive case of being damaged yet escaping destruction would increase the moral effect, and magnify the number of losses that would be attributed to the barrage, as other submarines failed to return. Official summaries rate depth charges first, mines next, in importance among the five most effective measures against submarines.

A mark of royal approval was indirectly conferred upon the Mine Force undertaking after only one excursion, in the bestowal upon Rear Admiral Strauss of the honor Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George, and our operations received mention later by the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty in his replyto the congratulatory message of Admiral Sims upon the conclusion of the armistice:

We recognize with a feeling of gratitude the debt we owe to the United States Navy for its wholehearted support during the past 18 months, not only in the submarine campaign and extensive minelaying programme, but also in sending the Atlantic squadron to reinforce the Grand Fleet ...

During the four months intervening, the press made occasional brief reference to the effectiveness of the North Sea barrier but, compared to other operations, ours received scant mention. A veil of general silence was deemed necessary for our doings, and the policy of concealing the destruction of submarines stood in the way of even telling our men the few authentic reports we did receive of damage to the enemy from our own work.

One account, widely copied in the British and home press, described the barrier, which we had begun and were still at work upon, as already a fact and a British accomplishment! And when, in October, the story was released in America, the accounts which reached us dwelt mainly upon the parts of the work done on shore. As the Secretary of the Navy put it, the minelaying was done with “no glamour nor romance nor appreciation.”

It was not in the character of our officers and men, however, to feel discontent. Thoroughly interested in their work and convinced of its importance, they were satisfied to have it progressing well, and to wait for their part to receive its due.

Admiral Sims expressed his recognition shortly before we sailed from Portland, England, for home. All the commanding officers, many other officers, and 25 men from each minelayer were assembled on board theSan Francisco, and when the admiral came on board, his flag was broken at the main truck. After brief mention of the large numbers and the many activities of our naval forces in European waters, he said that the Mine Force—

had done a stunt the like of which had not been done in the world before. After we came into the war we designed a mine, built it, equipped the minelayers, sent them over to this side and planted more mines in less space of time than any nation in the world ever thought of doing before. As to the efficiency of the mine barrier, that is something that has not concerned you so particularly as those who designed it; but fitting out the vessels, learning to handle the mines, planting them, and going through the strenuous work has been really one of the finest accomplishments of the navy on this side.... as a nautical feat, a piece of seamanship, it has been perfectly successful.Another thing particularly gratifying is that the conduct of the men of the Mine Force at their bases and at sea has been exemplary. I think one thing that has impressed itself on this side more than any other is the conduct of our men. They were inclined to regard us, when we first came over here, as men out of the wilds of America. I think they rather wanted to strengthen their police force when we came around. They found out it was not necessary. Not only have you created a good impression by your conduct as far as seamanship is concerned, but you have created a splendid impression socially. We hear it on all sides....I wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year; and when you get back there you can tell them all about it. You need not feel that you have to tell them you did the whole thing. Just tell them a straight story and you may be more than satisfied with that....

Another thing particularly gratifying is that the conduct of the men of the Mine Force at their bases and at sea has been exemplary. I think one thing that has impressed itself on this side more than any other is the conduct of our men. They were inclined to regard us, when we first came over here, as men out of the wilds of America. I think they rather wanted to strengthen their police force when we came around. They found out it was not necessary. Not only have you created a good impression by your conduct as far as seamanship is concerned, but you have created a splendid impression socially. We hear it on all sides....

I wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year; and when you get back there you can tell them all about it. You need not feel that you have to tell them you did the whole thing. Just tell them a straight story and you may be more than satisfied with that....

The Secretary of the Navy’s annual report characterizes the Northern Barrage as “the outstanding anti-submarine offensive project of the year,” and elsewhere he wrote of it as “a truly wonderful work,” the story of it “one of the thrilling contributions of what the navy men did in the war.”

Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, our highest professional authority, considered the achievement of the Mine Force

one of the most successful efforts of the whole war by any of the forces engaged. Not only has the North Sea barrage had a deterring effect necessarily on the enemy, but it has convinced the European nations that there is no task which the United States once undertakes to perform that they cannot and will not successfully carry through. I believe that the moral effect alone of the North Sea barrage, not only on the enemy, but on our friends, to say nothing of the excellent training to our own personnel, will be worth more to the country than all the money and time spent upon it.

Actual serious damage to submarines, in amount comparing well with that done by patrol and escort vessels in thrice the period of time, panic among submarine flotillas, probable deterrence of cruiser raids, and considerable moral effect at home and abroad—these results were well worth while. And is it not more than probable that the barrage weighed heavily towards the German collapse? Imperfect though it was—expected to be so in its first consideration—still, there it stood, a deadly menace already, which could and would become more and more effective, the more the submarine campaign was persisted in. That campaign could not hope to survive it.

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