The battle of Mazra, one of the stiffest of the many battles between Britain and Afghanistan, was the deciding blow in a campaign with a curious history.
About 1878, hostilities were very pronounced in Afghanistan against Britain, and, as a result of these, the Ameer, who appeared unnerved at the troubles, abdicated the throne. This action after a time was consented to, General Roberts temporarily taking over the supreme control.
While Britain was casting about for someone qualified to fill the position of Ameer, Abdurrahman Khan appeared on the scene. Abdurrahman was the son of Afzool, and nephew of the Ameer, Sheer Ali. He had taken a prominent part in the rebellions formed by his father and uncle against the Ameer. This prince entered the country with a few followers, and in the belief that, from the capacity he had displayed during Sheer Ali’s time, he was likely to make a good ruler, negotiations were opened up with him on behalf of the British Government. Eventually he accepted the position of Ameer, and was installed at Cabul.
While these events had been taking place in and about Cabul, Ayoob Khan, the brother of Yakoob Khan, who had been deposed, was at Herat. During Sheer Ali’s rule, Yakoob Khan and Ayoob Khan had together governed Herat independently of their father, and as soon as it became known to Ayoob that the Indian Government had resolved not to place Yakoob Khan on the musnud of Cabul, he began making preparations to assert, by force of arms, his own claim to the Ameership.
The intention of the new claimant was to make an advance on Kandahar, the capital, and it was as a result of the success of this movement that the battle of Mazra had ultimately to be fought. During several months Ayoob, with fixed determination, occupied himself in making arrangements for the advance on Kandahar, and so satisfactorily had these been accomplished that by the 9th June, 1880, he was ready to form his camp outside the walls of Herat, preparatory to a march forward. The town of Herat is situated about 367 miles from Kandahar, and, as a matter of fact, the Indian Government was somewhat sceptical as to Ayoob’s capability of marching an army so far. Nevertheless he did it, with what results we shall see.
About the 12th June the claimant commenced his march. His army at starting consisted of 2500 cavalry, of whom only 900 were regulars, the rest being Khazadars, or mounted militia;ten regiments of infantry, varying in strength from 350 to 500 men; and 5 batteries, including one mule battery, with about 30 guns. Roughly, he had altogether between 7000 and 8000 men, and when it is remembered how hardy and resolute the average Afghan is, this in itself was a fairly formidable enemy that had set its mask towards the capital of Kandahar.
Hearing of the advance of Ayoob, British forces were at once posted to various parts of the country to obstruct the journey forward, but it was not to be; for, as was afterwards discovered, the unusual precedent was to present itself to Britain of her beginning a campaign in very bad fashion and finishing up brilliantly.
We have already referred to the strength of the forces which Ayoob Khan was to lead, and with these he made splendid progress on his journey to the capital. The obstructions which were put in his way were easily overcome, and the defeat of General Burrows was one of Ayoob’s greatest triumphs of the campaign.
By about 20th July Kandahar was occupied by about 4000 British troops, and on the 9th August General Roberts, according to orders, started his famous march from Cabul to relieve Kandahar.
About this time Ayoob Khan’s army was considerably strengthened by Ghilzais, having an army then under his control of nearly 20,000. But the real crisis was only brewing, and the splendid skill and resource of that ablest of British generals, Sir Frederick Roberts, was soon to be rewarded in the splendid triumph of Mazra.
The arrangements made by General Roberts prior to setting out on his famous mission to Kandahar, were of the most complete order, and he led in round numbers fully 10,000 troops to the scene of hostilities. Of these, close on 2000 were Europeans, and 8000 camp followers. General Roberts took with him a certain amount of European stores, such as rum, tea, and five days’ flour, but trusted largely for other supplies to the food and forage to be obtained on the line of march. But even this was not left to chance, and to facilitate the General’s obtaining such supplies, the Ameer sent with him several chiefs.
It was indeed a curious sight as the troops plodded onward, eager for the fray, for, in view of the difficulty of the road, the General took no wheeled vehicles with him, and even the guns were mounted on mules and elephants. But the commander’s foresight as to the difficulties he would have to encounter did not end here, and knowing that the ordinary road for supplies might be exhausted by the previous passage of troops and the presence of large bodies of insurgents, he changed from this route, and marched by the Logur Valley, which had been comparativelyuntouched. Although this road had the small disadvantage of hindering a couple of days longer the progress of the army by the ordinary route, it brought him into contact with the latter again a short distance before reaching Ghuzni. Here some opposition was anticipated, but, notwithstanding, none was experienced, and the army continued its march unmolested.
General Roberts accomplished this march, which must, reckoning his detour, have been little less than 370 miles, without any opposition, in 24 days, being an average of 14½ miles a day. Considering the difficulties that had to be encountered on the way, this was splendid progress. Picking up the garrison of 1100 men at Khelat-i-ghilzai, he arrived at Kandahar on August 31. Here was a feat almost unparalleled in history, and reflecting the highest credit on the troops, and their skilful, gallant and energetic commander.
The news of General Roberts’ approach soon spread, and Ayoob Khan, knowing well apparently what he had to face in furtherance of his desires before referred to, at once made an effort to open communications with him. General Roberts, however, having in view the whole situation and the nature of the negotiations, was entirely against this course, and would hear of nothing but unconditional surrender from the other side, and also the surrender of such prisoners as had been previously taken in the course of engagements.
The General then proceeded to encamp, and prepared for the coming battle. Passing round the northern wall of Kandahar, he encamped between the city and the enemy’s position. The British General was continually on the alert, and in the determination not to leave a stone unturned to accomplish his purpose, he immediately sent out his cavalry to reconnoitre. The main reason for this action was the fear that the Afghans, after hearing of the way their leader’s attempt at negotiations had been received, would retreat without fighting, and thus prolong the trouble, another prominent reason being General Roberts’ repeated experience of the moral effect of a prompt blow. In furtherance of his designs, Roberts determined to give battle the very next day.
During the first week in August, Ayoob, fresh from his victories elsewhere, directed his main body to appear in front of the city, his cavalry having invested it several days previously. Still watchful and on the alert, his method of going about matters was extremely guarded. He had erected batteries and occupied villages and posts on every side save the north. Up to the time of the approach of General Roberts, however, he did not venture on more than annoying the town with a distant and desultory cannonade, and the occupation,chiefly by the armed peasants and Ghazis, of a few posts near the walls.
On the other hand, the citadel was occupied in great force, and the garrison felt confident that they could defend their position against all Ayoob’s attacks. In an attempt, however, by one of the British Generals, General Primrose, to impede the progress of the besiegers, the British troops lost heavily. The garrison set about the work of repairing the fortifications and otherwise taking every opportunity to make their position as strong as possible.
Returning to General Roberts’ decision to strike a prompt blow, the result of the cavalry reconnaissance and the General’s own personal examination was the plan that we will mention after describing the position taken up by Ayoob Khan more minutely. About three miles from the north-west angle from the city of Kandahar is a range of heights running from south-west to north-east. Parallel to this range, and at a distance from its crest varying between one and three-quarters and two and three-quarters miles flows the Argaridub, which, by the way, is almost everywhere fordable at the end of August. In the intervening valley are many villages, enclosures, and gardens. Towards the south-west, or the enemy’s right, the range is terminated rather abruptly by a hill about 1000 feet above the level of Kandahar. This hill, called the Pir Paimal, is joined to the rest of the range by a col or neck, over which passes the road leading from the north-west angle of the city to the valley of the Helmund, in which is situated, at a distance of about four miles, the village of Mazra. Here, after a close scrutiny of his position, Ayoob had determined to establish his standing camp and headquarters.
The pass above mentioned is called Baba-wali Pass, and provided the advantage of leading directly to the centre of the enemy’s advanced position, which was on both sides of the road. The front of the Pass is screened from the city by an isolated hill, lower than the range in front. In front of Pir Paimal and to its right rear are situated several villages. In rear of the position again, and covering the village of Mazra from an enemy advancing up the river is a detached hill. It was on the crest of the main ridge of this that guns had been mounted, and, taking into consideration the arrangement of Ayoob’s camp, the leader of the Afghans was evidently expecting a front attack.
On the other hand, General Roberts’ plan of operations was entirely in contrast, and was yet simple, effective and safe. In the first place, the General resolved to amuse the enemy by demonstrations by General Primrose with a part of the Kandahar garrison against the Baba-wali Pass. Secondly, he sentGeneral Gough’s cavalry to the river at the entrance to the valley, to turn the enemy’s right with the three infantry brigades of the Cabul-Kandahar force. The whole scheme was worked out with admirable foresight, and thoughtful resource.
At nine o’clock in the morning of 1st September the battle began. According to instructions, General Primrose made demonstrations against the Baba-wali Pass, and fired with his heavy battery at the troops occupying it. The ruse succeeded well, and attention was fixed for the time on Primrose and his attempted attack.
It was recorded by one of the officers of Primrose’s forces that this trick on the part of General Roberts succeeded in a greater degree than was really expected, and, as the enemy appeared to be entirely deluded by it, the British forces were encouraged on seeing that the very initial part of the proceedings pointed to complete success. Primrose having thus attracted the enemy’s attention, General Roberts next despatched Gough’s cavalry brigade to the Argaridab, where it was favourably placed, either to cut off a retreat towards Girishk or to carry out a pursuit up the valley.
Simultaneous with this, he gave the order to the infantry, commanded by General Ross, to advance. All the forces were now in action, and the battle had commenced in real earnest. One eye-witness of the scene stated that the spectacle of the forces marching towards each other was one of the most impressive of many campaigns. The first of the brigades to come into collision with the Afghans was General Macpherson’s of the 1st Brigade. In front of Macpherson, and a little in advance of the right of Pir Paimal Hill, was an elevated and strongly-occupied village. This village was heavily shelled by the British artillery for a time with steady effect, and the enemy made an effectual reply. Gradually the opposing forces seemed to be wavering, and, observing this cringing, the 92nd Highlanders and the 2nd Goorkhas rushed on and stormed the village in most gallant fashion.
The bravery displayed by these regiments was splendid, and in determined fashion they forced the enemy out of their position. The 2nd, or Baker’s, Brigade then came into line with the 1st, the 3rd, or Macgregor’s, Brigade being in support. These two brigades were making for Pir Paimal, but they were to encounter stubborn resistance.
On the way, a number of orchards and enclosures had to be passed through, and here the enemy, showing in great numbers, fought desperately and well. Great forces of the Afghans came out of hiding, and, as the brigades appeared, rushed on them in overwhelming numbers, forming a formidable attack. As a great show of fight was anticipated, however, the brigades neverrallied a moment, and nothing could resist the heroic onslaught which they made to win the day. The Afghans, with admirable foresight, had prepared thoroughly for any attack that might be made upon them in turn, and, besides occupying every available covert, they also lined every wall.
The Afghans, as indeed most Orientals, are an exceedingly formidable foe when under cover, and at the outset they absolutely refused to give ground to the fire. It was only to the repeated rushes of the brigades that they yielded, and it was here that the British losses were greatest. But the British attempt was shortly to be successful. Natives and Europeans vied with each other in courage, and cut the enemy off at every corner. Forcing their way on, the brigades made great progress, and were ultimately successful in their desire to capture Pir Paimal.
The resistance still shown by the Afghans was characteristic of the race, and, although falling in large numbers, there was a determination goading them on almost equal to that prevailing on our side. From Pir Paimal the infantry continued to push on notwithstanding the desperate attempts of the enemy to hold their ground. Pressing the Afghans still further from their position, two of their camps and several pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the brigades, and here there was a perceptible slackening of the resistance on the part of Ayoob’s army.
It is one of the most wonderful things in war to note to what extent an apparently trifling occurrence will turn the scales of fortune.
Up to this time, although the British forces had certainly had the best of matters, in that they had made good progress, the Afghan army had never belied their reputation as a daring, if not foolhardy, race. But at this stage, when so little lay between the armies in regard to the main issue, the inevitable hitch was to occur and spoil the ultimate prospect of an Afghan victory. It was only a slight hitch, to be sure, but it was sufficient to create a much wider breach, and after the British brigades had been successful in making the small capture noted above, an extraordinary alarm began to spread along the enemy’s line, and soon the flight became general. The whole of the Afghan forces retreated before the British infantry in the utmost confusion, leaving behind all ammunition and so on in their flight. The infantry, much exhausted as a result of their heavy work, pursued the retreating forces, picking up guns at almost every step.
By noon, Ayoob’s standing camp at Mazra was in our hands, and the battle was over. The enemy was completely routed. But while the infantry were thoroughly exhausted with their morning’s work, the cavalry, which up till now had largelyparticipated only as spectators, at this juncture began to play a vital part in the issue. With his fine body of horsemen, Gough waited his opportunity, and, as soon as he saw the chance, dashed forward and crossed the river to where the fugitives were fleeing in retreat. The sight of the enemy with the cavalry in chase was in entire contrast with that which had been witnessed an hour before. The pursuit of the cavalry at the heels of the retreating Afghans was continued over a great distance at a terrific pace in the direction of the valley of Khakrey to the north, till the pursuing body, getting even with their quarry, succeeded in sabring between 200 and 300 of them. By this time the Afghans were utterly fatigued, but, scattering on all sides, many managed to get clear of their pursuers. The main object of Gough’s dash forward—that of dispersing the enemy on all sides—had been satisfactorily accomplished, and, making a complete circuit, he afterwards returned to camp.
On the way back Gough’s forces joined the 3rd Bombay cavalry and 3rd Scinde horse, under General Nuttal, so that had any mishap occurred in Gough’s pursuit of the enemy, these other forces would have yet saved disaster. General Nuttal, during the hottest part of the fighting, had been stationed with his brigade at Baba-wali Pass. When General Roberts saw the enemy was breaking, Nuttal and his forces were brought through the Pass, and ordered to carry on the pursuit for no less than fifteen miles up the river. In the course of his chase, Nuttal was successful in cutting up more than a hundred of the fugitives, and, like Gough, completely dispersed the enemy in flight.
The loss of the enemy in this battle, one of the stiffest in the history of Afghanistan, were severe. The killed alone would probably be upwards of 1200. A study of the figures as regards the work done, shows the havoc played by the respective British forces. Thus, on the direct line of the infantry advance no fewer than 650 dead bodies were found, while between 300 and 400 were slain by the cavalry in pursuit, many corpses never being recovered. This in itself shows that the attack on all hands by the British forces had been a deadly one, and was in most instances followed by disaster to Ayoob’s army.
In the action itself Ayoob lost some 32 guns, and six others, including two captured by General Burrows, were afterwards brought in, thus completing the total number of pieces possessed by the Afghan leader on the morning of 1st September, when the battle began. The general nature of the flight is here strongly evidenced. Not only was Ayoob’s army completely dispersed in every direction, but also completely cowed, while he himself, a discredited man without any political future, made the best of his way to Herat.
The only drawback, if such it can be called, to the entire success of this action, was that the Afghans got away too easily. For, in point of fact, the cavalry, from the difficulty of their positions, were unable to inflict the crushing blow upon the retreating forces that they might otherwise have done if better situated. Nevertheless, it has to be recognised that if the infantry had been so greatly fatigued there could have been no flight. For we have seen how desperate the Afghans were in their attempts to gain a victory, while the main object of the cavalry’s pursuit, that of dispersing the enemy, was yet successfully accomplished.
The total number of casualties in General Roberts’ force was only a little over 200—surely a small price to pay for so brilliant and decisive a victory.
The real cause of the enemy’s flight, the incident recorded about the taking of two of their camps, was greatly aided, it is supposed, by the spirit of dissension in the Afghan ranks. As to Ayoob himself, there was no want of skill on the part of his advisers, no matter what the ultimate result was. Ayoob himself was not a man of much ability or force of character, but it was evident all along that he had some excellent military counsellors with him.
In the papers relating to this campaign presented to the Houses of Parliament, the very important statement was made as a matter of fact that never had an army been handled with more skill than was Ayoob’s during its brief and ultimately disastrous campaign. Such a statement, coming from such a source, goes far to prove that the acumen shown in things military on the part of the Afghan leader was not a little remarkable. His advances to the scene of the final battle were conducted most methodically, and in accordance with all the rules of war. Indeed, the generalship of Ayoob, and the conduct of his troops were such that the conviction got abroad that the operations had been directed, and the guns worked, under the supervision of Europeans, although no proof of this could be obtained.
The battle of Tel-el-Kebir stands out pre-eminently as one of the most glorious achievements in the history of that gallant old regiment, the 79th Highlanders. The circumstances leading up to the battle were of a somewhat peculiar nature, and,briefly, are as follows. On the 26th June, 1879, the Khedive Ishmail, who had caused Britain much trouble, was ordered by the Sultan of Turkey to resign, and his son Tewfik was appointed as successor. A short period after this, Britain and France re-established dual control of Egypt, and this continued for two years.
About the end of that period a fellah officer, calling himself Ahmed Arabi, who had assisted Ishmail during his efforts to overthrow the constitutional ministry, headed a band of Arab officers, who complained of the preference shown to officers of Turkish origin. The dispute thereafter expanded into an attack on the privileged position of foreigners, and finally it was directed against all Christians, foreign and native.
The Government was then too weak to suppress the disorder, and for the time being certain concessions were made to Arabi. That individual, from being made Under Secretary for War, was afterwards appointed to the Cabinet. But the danger of a serious rising brought the British and French fleets, in May, 1882, to Alexandria, and after a massacre had been perpetrated by the Arab mob in that city on the 16th June, the British admiral bombarded the place.
The leaders of the national movement prepared to resist further British aggression by force. A conference of ambassadors was held at Constantinople. The Sultan, on being invited to quell the revolt, hesitated, and the British Government determined to commence the work. France, invited to take part, declined, and Italy took up a similar attitude. It was thus that the battle of Tel-el-Kebir came to be fought.
An expeditionary force, detailed from home stations and from Malta, was organised in two divisions, with a cavalry division, corps troops, and a siege train, numbering in all about 25,000 men. An Indian contingent, 7000 strong, complete in all arms, and with its own transport, was prepared for despatch to Suez. General Sir Garnet Wolseley was in command, with Lieutenant-General Sir John Adye as chief of staff.
The camp of the enemy was situated on the southern slope of a ridge at Tel-el-Kebir, and was hidden by the folds of a plateau which lay between this and the British camp. Their lines were drawn from a canal on the south to the northern slopes of the ridge, the highest part of which was occupied by three works for their heavier artillery. It was evident that they dreaded a turning movement on one or both flanks. A part of the lines had been executed nearly a year before the war broke out, for Tel-el-Kebir was held by Egyptian (or rather by American) strategists to be a position of the greatest importance. A single line of continuous trench, to which the Egyptians trusted, was prolonged northwards shortly before thebattle, and the work was here only partly complete. Continuous lines are condemned by European military writers as essentially weak, because once broken at any point they are probably lost to their entire extent. Tel-el-Kebir was to prove the truth of this tactical axiom.
One open work for guns was erected on the south slope of the desert ridge. The soil being light, cover was easily obtained. The trenches were about deep enough to allow of a man firing easily over the parapet, and an exterior ditch, some four feet deep, was dug at most parts of the line outside the mound. The gun positions, which were conspicuous above the surface, had embrasures very neatly riveted with maize-sticks and mud, but in so dry and sandy a country they would probably have been much damaged by any heavy practice from the guns which they contained. Arabi Pasha had paid special attention to his flanks, and on the north a line of parapet ran almost south-west at an acute angle to the front, along the crest of the ridge, to defend the position from the much-dreaded turning movement on his left flank. The southern flank was protected by the canal, and the Wady, a river which Arabi intended to flood. A battery of four Krupp guns was here placed outside the canal.
Such was the position on which the Egyptian War Minister staked the fate of his army for the Tel-el-Kebir fight, having with him there some 26,000 men of his entire available army. About half of these, including some 6000 negroes, the best troops to be found in Egypt, were trained soldiers, the rest being recruits of one or two months’ standing, sent down in trains from the depot near Cairo, and drilled at first with clubs, until they were able to handle a rifle. In addition to his regular troops and recruits; Arabi had enlisted the services of some 6000 Bedouin irregulars, both foot and mounted men. These were expected to make periodic raids on the British lines of communication. These raids, however, were not carried out, for though the Bedouin shiekhs would ride furiously up and down in front of our outposts, as if to show their valour, a single shot was found sufficient to disperse them, and they refused to come nearer. Moreover, when one of them was wounded, the whole tribe followed him home in disgust. Thus the Bedouin attacks were of little avail.
The British troops reached Kassassin, which is situated in the neighbourhood of Tel-el-Kebir, a few days before the battle was fought. The Bedouins, although they had not taken part in any fighting, hovered by night over the battlefield of Kassassin, where, a few days before, a vigorous attack by Arabi had failed. The Bedouins murdered or mutilated all the wounded who could not be shown to be Moslems.
While the Egyptian position covered the junction of the railways from Cairo and Belbeis, and was sufficiently strong, it had nevertheless its weak points, one of which was the intersected character of the country through which a retreat might have to be made. But the difficulty, which also of course affected the pursuit, would have arisen in almost any position taken up to oppose an advance from Ismaileh.
The line of operations chosen by the British General was incomparably the better of the two. The flat, open desert, without any natural features such as would interfere with evolutions on a large scale was far better suited for the advance than the narrow banks which lead from village to village at High Nile in the Delta itself. Thus the advantage of taking the strong works of Kefr-dowar in reverse, the shortening of the distance from Cairo, and the proximity of the important railway junction at Zaga-Zig were also considerations favouring the line adopted. The desert was generally hard enough for all arms, although some miles of drift sand had to be crossed.
To Arabi’s forces may be added about sixty guns.
Against the forces mentioned above, the British mustered only 11,000 infantry, with 2000 horse and 60 guns—a strength which, according to ordinary calculations, was quite unqualified for the task. The British army was extended into two lines, about a thousand yards apart, over a distance of three miles. The front line was composed of two brigades, whose duty it was to attack the highest part of the ridge—Graham’s Brigade on the right and Alison’s Highlanders on the left. Graham was supported by the guards, and between this and the supports of the Highland Brigade were 42 guns of the artillery division. A gap of more than 2000 yards was thus left between the Highlanders and the railway, along which the naval brigade and the iron-clad train advanced. The Indian troops, who supported the Seaforth Highlanders, south of the canal, formed the extreme left of the British line. The cavalry division, held in reserve for pursuit, was on the extreme right in the second line. The reserve ammunition train, with the telegraph and pontoons, bringing up the rear.
The enemy were to be taken entirely by surprise, for Arabi had not been expecting the attack for a day or two yet, or from such a position, the British troops being stationed at Ismaileh. Notwithstanding this, when the great camp was struck at Kassassin at sunset, the news soon reached the enemy’s ears, in spite of the secrecy maintained, and it is said that until midnight the Egyptians remained under arms, after which, in accordance with Oriental custom, they fell asleep, and, according to their own account, so remained until awakened by the shots of their outposts.
Sergeant Palmer, of the 79th Highlanders, in one of the most vivid published narratives of the battle, mentions that while the British army lay camped at Kassassin the brigade orders issued on the morning of the 10th September, fore-shadowed the night march on Tel-el-Kebir, which began the same evening. One of the instructions in those orders was that each man’s water-bottle should be filled with cold tea—for the purpose, it is supposed, of keeping the soldiers awake. The regimental orders issued in the afternoon confirmed the brigade orders, and announced that the position of Tel-el-Kebir was to be attacked with the bayonet; no one was to load; and not a shot to be fired until the men were over the enemy’s entrenchments. The 79th, upon whom the bulk of the fighting fell, cheered vigorously when the orders were read to them. They had the fullest confidence in their leader, Sir Archibald Alison, who, although severe, is described as a just and reasonable man, well versed in war. There were thirteen victories inscribed upon the Highlanders’ colours, but scarce a man in the rank and file had seen a battle, for it had been last in action during the Indian Mutiny.
The regiment paraded at 5.45 p.m. When the words “Stand at ease!” had been given, the captains of the respective companies explained to their men what they were to do to ensure victory at Tel-el-Kebir.
The remarks of Sergeant Palmer at this juncture are particularly impressive:—
“Our captain,” he explains, “was no great orator, but he had a straightforward, manly manner of speech, which somehow stirred the blood. As far as I can remember, this was what was said:—‘Men, you are marching to-night to attack a strongly-entrenched position called Tel-el-Kebir, mounting some 60 guns, and sweeping our line of approach. On the march from Nine Gun Hill there must be no smoking. The strictest silence must be kept, and, unless ordered to the contrary, you are to continue the march steadily, no matter if bullets and shells come hailstone-fashion into the ranks. No bayonets are to be fixed till the order is given, and no man is to charge until the last note of the bugle is finished. The bayonet alone is to do the work, and not a shot is to be fired until the trenches are carried. You are to fight on so long as a man stands up. Remember the country and regiment to which you belong, and fight now as fought the Highlanders of old!’”
It is further recorded that as the troops were marching to Nine Gun Hill chums were giving each other messages for home in case of being killed, for all knew there was hard fighting before them.
Reaching Nine Gun Hill, where lay their camp, the brigadein dense darkness deployed into line of half battalions of double companies at deploying intervals. During the halt at this hill, two lots of rum per man were served out—the first allowance of strong drink since quitting board ship. The regimental teetotaller called it “Dutch courage,” but nobody needed an incentive to fight. The rum proved very comforting to the men in the chill night air, and when they had bolted it—for it had to be swallowed on the spot—most of them went to sleep; this to many their last sleep prior to the final long sleep of all. About 1.30 a.m. the march was resumed, the 79th being appointed the directing regiment, while Lieutenant Rawson, R.N., had the duty of guiding it by the stars.
Occasionally clouds would obscure the sky as the men plodded on, but the North Star and part of the Little Bear remained visible. Sergeant Palmer and another non-commissioned officer were told off to march on the directing flank, close to Lieutenant Rawson. They were ordered to take off their helmets and keep their eyes fixed on a certain star, and if it should disappear they were instructed to inform Rawson in a whisper. Within the space of one hour several stars disappeared, and as they did so the Lieutenant indicated others for the men to watch. At this point the strictest discipline was maintained, and silence was vigorously enforced, save that occasionally a horse would neigh and another answer back in the cavalry ranks; not a sound was to be heard but the low trampling of many feet on the sand, described as resembling the fluttering of a flock of birds.
Once a man on whom either the rum had taken effect, or the weird silence had had an ungovernable influence, broke out into wild yells. Sir Garnet Wolseley immediately rode up, and ordered the offender to be bayoneted, but the regimental surgeon interposed, and begged leave to chloroform him instead. This was granted, and the man was drugged into insensibility and left lying on the sand.
After the troops had marched at a funeral pace for about two hours, a halt of twenty minutes was commanded. As the orders were slowly passed from company to company in a low tone of voice, they failed to reach the flanks of the brigade, which continued in motion, retaining the touch until the extremities all but met in front of the centre. Thus the brigade in effect formed a great hollow circle. The line had to be laboriously straightened out and re-formed in the inky darkness, and in all but silence. It was a fine proof of discipline that this was accomplished in the short space of twenty-five minutes, and about 4.30 a.m. the advance was resumed. Those present have described how the monotonous slow-step marching induced in them an almost overpowering sleepiness, somewhatincompatible, but not unusual, with a prospect of shortly facing the enemy.
The Colonel of the 79th, Sir Archibald Alison, at this period was becoming anxious, and was beginning to fear that something was wrong, as the minutes slipped by and nothing was discovered of the enemy’s position. Turning to Lieutenant Rawson, he exclaimed in a low tone, “Are we on the right track?”
“Yes, sir,” was the reply; “we have the north star on our right, and another in front, and soon we ought to be there.”
Suddenly out of the darkness ahead appeared shadowy forms, an appearance followed up instantly by the crack of a rifle and the roar of artillery. Never for a moment did the serried British ranks betray the confidence which had been placed in them, and though to spring forward was the impulse of every man, yet none stirred. Slowly and irresistibly the force moved forward. Here and there a man fell backward with a bullet through his head. The others made no sign.
All at once the order rang out sharp, “Fix bayonets!” and with alacrity the troops obeyed, the Highland regiments in the van. The order for the charge was now eagerly awaited, but the moment was not yet ripe.
For fully one hundred yards the silent force crept on, with arms at the slope, and the sound of the enemy’s bullets upon the British bayonets has been likened to the sound of hailstones on a tin roof. Suddenly the welcome command, “Prepare to charge!” rang out on the early morning air, for dawn was breaking, and a sigh of relief went up from the eager troops. An instant later and the “Charge!” was sounded. As the last note of the bugle died away, a mighty cheer went up, the pipes broke out into the slogan, and like a wave of the sea, with their gallant Colonel at the head, shouting, “Come on, the Camerons!” the devoted Highlanders swept forward over the enemy’s position.
A space of two hundred yards intervened before the first trench was reached, but at full speed, and shoulder to shoulder, not an instant was lost in traversing it. All the while the enemy fired vigorously, but fortunately aimed too high, and little damage was done. Now the charge was checked by the first trench, twelve feet in depth and twelve feet wide, which yawned in front of our men. Many fell headlong into it, but, scrambling and cheering, strenuously pushing, they gained the far side, and at length fell upon the enemy, steel to steel.
It is reported that the first man to gain the other side was a brave young soldier, Donald Cameron by name. He joined desperately hand to hand against a throng of Egyptians, till he received a bullet through the head and fell back bleeding intothe trench, never to stir again. Others were by this time pushing forward, though the steepness of the trench proved an almost insurmountable obstacle. In spite, however, of constant slipping back, and the difficulty of obtaining foothold, soon large numbers of the Highlanders gained the summit of the trench, and, cleaving their way with the bayonet, they swept headlong on towards the second trench, with stentorian cheers. Here similar scenes were enacted, and many hand-to-hand conflicts took place ere the force halted for a moment and then resumed the victorious onslaught.
It is reported that between two trenches an extraordinary incident, and one which for a moment threatened to bring ruin to the British arms, occurred. Even as the Highlanders swept on towards the second trench there were loud shouts of “Retire! retire!” and for an instant the ranks wavered. But not for long. Fortunately a staff officer in the nick of time galloped forward, and shouting, “No retire, men! Come on! come on!” led the hesitating ranks once more against the enemy.
Sergeant Palmer, to whose narrative we have before referred, gives the explanation of this singular occurrence, though the story is questioned by other writers. It seems that the cries of “Retire!” had been treacherously raised by a couple of Glasgow Irishmen, who had somehow evaded the precautions that were in force since the days of Fenianism to prevent the enlistment of disloyal characters. On two occasions they had been proved cowards, or something worse, and non-commissioned officers had been told off to watch their conduct in the field, it being left to the discretion of these to inflict summary justice if necessary. When the traitors were seen and heard to raise their coward voices, short shrift awaited them, and the bayonets of their fellows inflicted a speedy retribution.
In the rapidly-growing daylight it was now perceived that a short halt would be necessary to reform the somewhat scattered ranks, and this hastily effected, the brigade swept down before Tel-el-Kebir Lock, driving all opposition before them. Over the crest of the hill lay the white tents of the Egyptian camp, on the far side of the canal, and as the Highland ranks rushed on, the fugitive Egyptians threw themselves into the water in hundreds, and as many as gained the opposite bank were seen running like deer across the desert.
By now the 2nd Brigade arrived upon the scene, together with the Scottish division of the Royal Artillery at a gallop, and these quickly unlimbered and opened fire upon the rapidly-dispersing forces of Arabi. Then again dashing on, they took up a nearer position, and continued their deadly work. As they had passed the Highland Brigade a tremendous cheer wentup from battery after battery, and loud shouts of “Scotland for Ever!” rent the startled desert air.
The battle of Tel-el-Kebir was won. All that now remained was to push the victory, and this Sir Garnet was not long in doing. The 42nd were sent forward to clear the village, while the cavalry poured down across the desert in their hundreds. As these latter arrived, bitter disappointment was visible upon their faces, and they exclaimed as they shot past the now halted Highlanders in a whirl of dust, “You —— Jocks haven’t left us the chance of a fight!” Such has ever been the spirit of the British soldier, and a brave show the cavalry made, as, with “flashing lances and waving swords,” they swept on upon their work of annihilation.
The battle was won, but the casualty list was a heavy one, numbering 339 of all ranks. Of these no fewer than 243 occurred in the Highland Brigade, showing the lion’s share which that brigade had taken in the conflict.
Among the wounded lay the intrepid Lieutenant Rawson, through whose skilful leading the British plan of attack had met with so great success.
Says Sergeant Palmer:—“The sights of the battlefield were gruesome, now one looked at them in cold blood. The artillery had wrought fearful havoc. I remember one heap of twenty-four corpses, some blown absolutely into fragments, others headless and without limbs. In the outer trench our dead and wounded lay more thickly than those of the enemy, but in the inner trenches and in the spaces between, for one man of ours there were ten Egyptians.”
Meanwhile, the British commander had prepared, with admirable foresight and patience, for the pushing home of his victory. The rapidity of the subsequent pursuit was even greater indication of sound military insight than the admirably-planned attack of the early morning. Cavalry and artillery vied with each other in cutting up and harassing the hard-pressed foe, now in full retreat at all points. For everywhere our arms had been successful.
The Indian contingent, moving out of camp at 2.30 a.m., having a shorter distance to cover than the main brigades, stormed the battery which defended the canal by attacking the gap which lay south of the Highlanders, and plied the defenders with canister at a range of 30 yards. There are few recorded instances in military history in which artillery have been so handled, fighting alone against infantry in an entrenchment, but the departure would appear to have been fully justified by events.
For already so shaken by the northern attack were the entrenched Egyptians, that they were quickly dispersed by thebold tactics of Colonel Schreiber’s batteries, and a general rout ensued. By 4 p.m. on the same day, General Macpherson, with two squadrons of Indian horse, had reached Zag-a-zig, 26 miles distant, had captured the station, with five trains, and was in telegraphic communication with Cairo. Fortunately the orders issued by Arabi for the flooding of the district had not been carried out, or the position at Zag-a-zig would have been untenable.
The whole position was now in the hands of the British, and at length Arabi confessed himself beaten, surrendering “to that great nation, in whose clemency he placed his trust.” Hereafter his army was entirely broken up, straggling along the canal to Zag-a-zig, where its disarmament took place. The enemy’s rifles were either broken or thrown into the water.
The Egyptian dead numbered two thousand.
Not content, however, with the signal victory at Tel-el-Kebir, Sir Garnet Wolseley had more work to do, and a prompt dash on Cairo was no sooner conceived than carried into effect. Though it was well known that the city of Cairo was garrisoned by some 10,000 fresh troops and though the strength of its defences was admittedly formidable, Sir Garnet never hesitated for an instant.
By four o’clock in the afternoon of the 14th September, the day after the battle, the Indian cavalry brigade, with the 4th Dragoons and Mounted Infantry rode into the outskirts of Cairo, where the barracks were at once surrendered to them, some 50 troopers, a mere handful, accepting the submission of the garrison. Later the same evening another small detachment of 150 men demanded the submission of the citadel. So great was the prestige of our troops, that the 5000 armed soldiers who formed the garrison marched out submissively, and our Indian cavalry at once took possession, “riding like black demons into the formidable fortress.”
On the 15th, Sir Garnet Wolseley, attended by the Foot Guards, and fresh from his victory at Tel-el-Kebir, arrived in Cairo by train, and the campaign was brought to a glorious and successful termination, barely three weeks from the time of landing the expeditionary force. Arabi himself was banished to Ceylon.
No praise can be too high for the secrecy and energy with which the enterprise was carried out, and all ranks came in for the hearty congratulations of the commander-in-chief. The Highland Brigade, upon whom fell the brunt of the work, justly recall Tel-el-Kebir as one of the most glorious of their many glorious victories.
A period of comparative quiet prevailed in Burmah for some years following the conclusion of the war of ’52. Gradually, however, this was broken, and on the accession of King Theebaw to the Burmese throne, in ’78, relations between the Burmese and the Government of India became seriously strained. On his accession King Theebaw in the most cold-blooded manner massacred most of his nearest male relatives, and with these and other outrages it soon became undesirable to maintain a British convoy at the Court of Ava.
In 1879 this official was withdrawn from Mandalay, and on his retirement matters went from bad to worse. Ever intriguing, with first this Power and then that, it was felt that British prestige in Burmah was at a low ebb. Moreover, dacoities and persistent raiding by the hill-tribes served still further to unsettle the country, and so poor was the authority of the king that these lawless acts and expeditions threatened to overflow into British territory.
In the autumn of 1883 a particularly brutal and appalling massacre of 200 unarmed and defenceless prisoners in the Mandalay prison, by the orders of the king, still further augmented the trouble, and a considerable number of the subjects of the Burmese king crossed with their families into British territory, attracting the special attention of the Government of India to the prevailing state of affairs. Moreover, Bhamo, the second city of the kingdom of Burmah, had been captured by the Kachyin tribes, and these were expelled by the king only with the greatest difficulty—another evidence of Theebaw’s incompetent ruling.
Two causes combined at this juncture to bring matters to a head. With a treasury impoverished by his expedition against the Kachyin’s, Theebaw cast about him for a means of replenishing it, and his efforts to obtain a large loan from French sources was very closely watched by the Government of India, who naturally viewed the introduction of French capital with no very favourable eye. Unfortunately for Theebaw, his efforts to negotiate the French loan proved unavailing, and a convenient opportunity for repairing the deficiency presented itself in the alleged breach of contract on the part of the Bombay and Burmah Trading Company, which had worked the timber monopoly of the forests of Upper Burmah for the last few years. It was stated by the Mandalay authorities that the company’s agents had been exporting, as subject to a low rate of duty,quantities of logs which were really of a description liable to pay a higher rate.
The first demand for back payments on this account was estimated at £100,000, which was £30,000 more than the company were owed by the king on account of previous advances made to him. The agents, however, declined to recognise the claim when it was first mooted in August, and the dispute was carried on till two months later, when a royal decree from King Theebaw put an end to the protests by awarding a fine of £230,000 against the company. This preposterous fine met with a remonstrance through the medium of the Chief Commissioner for British Burmah, and not only was this remonstrance unheeded, but in October the king’s troops fired upon some of the Company’s draughtsmen, bringing matters to a crisis.
Drastic action was the outcome of this unfortunate business—the immediate cause of the third Burmese war. The Viceroy of India issued an ultimatum to King Theebaw, “requesting the latter to receive a British Resident at Mandalay, to settle the dispute in concert with the Burman Ministers, and asking for an explanation of the hostile conduct of the Burmese troops with regard to the company’s servants.” The 10th November was fixed as a limit for the king’s reply, and meantime a force was got together in preparation for eventualities, and the Burmese themselves prepared for the worst by massing their forces at Minhla on the Irrawaddy.
The time for parleying soon passed by without a satisfactory answer from King Theebaw, and on the 14th November the British expedition crossed the frontier.
Major-General, afterwards Sir, H. N. D. Prendergast, V.C., was placed in command, while Colonel Sladen accompanied the troops as chief political officer. A naval brigade, a field battery, two garrison batteries, one British, and two native mountain batteries, three European and seven native regiments of infantry, and six companies of sappers and miners made up the force. Brigadier-Generals Foord, White, V.C., and Norman commanded the first, second, and third brigades respectively, while Captain Woodward, R.N., was in charge of the naval detachment. The native troops hailed from Madras, Bengal, and Bombay, while the British regiments were composed of the Liverpool and Hampshire regiments of the 1st Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers. There were 10,000 men in all.
The part played by the naval brigade was of the utmost importance. The quickest and most satisfactory method of carrying out the campaign was at once seen to be an advance by water direct on the capital. At Rangoon were then lying a number of light-draught steamers belonging to the IrrawaddyFlotilla Company, and those with H.M.S. Irrawaddy, the armed launch Kathleen and other vessels made up the river transport and defence. No fewer than 55 steamers, barges, launches, etc., were employed in the advance. This began on the 14th November. “There is not the slightest doubt,” says one account, “that the Burmese king and his country were taken completely by surprise by the unexampled rapidity of the advance.”
A minor naval engagement was the opening one of the campaign. Moving out of Thayetmyo, the British post on the river nearest the frontier, the Irrawaddy, on the 14th, the first day of the advance, engaged the first Burmese batteries she came across, some 28 miles up stream, and was successful in cutting out the king’s steamer and some barges, which she brought back in triumph and without a casualty to our arms. Two days later the batteries themselves were captured by a land force, after a very feeble show of resistance.
On the 17th, however, at Minhla, where indeed most resistance had been anticipated, the Burmese made a determined stand. Successively they held a barricade, a pagoda, and the palace and redoubt of Minhla. A somewhat simple plan of attack was decided upon, which proved highly successful. The forts were to be attacked from the land face by troops landed higher up the river, and marched down through the dense undergrowth, while the naval brigade was to feint a determined onslaught from the river or front of the position.
Seven miles below Minhla, on the morning of the 17th, the land forces were disembarked, the first and second brigades on the left bank, the third on the right, for the forts were on both sides of the river. Immediately after the landing, the Irrawaddy and Kathleen made all speed up stream to Minhla, and soon the terrific noise of their great guns told of the commencement of the feint attack. Slowly and stealthily the troops crept forward in the dense underbush. Presently Kolegone on the left bank, the strongest of the Minhla forts, was reached, and, to the surprise of all, it was found to be empty. Shaken by the gunboats, and learning at length of the advance of a great land force, the Burmese, leaving only a few wounded, had evacuated the fort.
But the fighting was to come. On the right bank the enemy held a strong barricade in front of Minhla, and an obstinate resistance had to be overcome with cold steel ere the foe was driven out. Lieutenant Drury was killed here, and other officers wounded, but the fighting was not for long. Driven out of their barricade into a pagoda, and from there again into Minhla itself, the harassed Burmese eventually became victims to a panic. Throwing down their arms, others jumpingin the river, many fleeing over land, the soldiers of King Theebaw fled in all directions, leaving 170 killed and nearly 300 prisoners in our hands. The British casualties totalled 36, of whom only five were killed, one being an officer. This, the most important engagement of the campaign, thus proved itself to be a victory cheaply bought, and in confidence and high spirits the troops moved out of Minhla on the 19th, leaving only a small garrison to hold the place against a possible recapture.
No further resistance, with the exception of a little desultory firing on the far side of Pagau, the ancient city of temples, was now met with for nearly a hundred miles up the river, but on the 24th of the month the fleet came in sight of Mingyan, where the whole Burmese army was reported to be assembled. Here, as before, resistance was slight, the task of turning the enemy out of their position being entrusted to the naval guns. Though Mingyan was not reached until the evening, Captain Woodward at once opened a terrific fusilade, and soon silenced the enemy’s batteries and musket fire, driving all before him. Darkness now put a stop to the operations, but on resuming firing in the morning it was found that the Burmese had cleared out with heavy loss. British casualties were virtually nil, two or three men only being slightly wounded.
The route to Mandalay now lay open, and news was apparently carried to King Theebaw of the irresistible British advance, for on the afternoon of the 26th, as the flotilla was approaching Ava, envoys from the king approached General Prendergast with offers of surrender. The General’s reply was brief and to the point—only in the capital could details of surrender be arranged. The steady forward movement was recommenced.
On the 28th of the month Mandalay was occupied without resistance, the city’s defences being at once occupied by our soldiery.
Says a published record:—“The people seemed everywhere of a friendly disposition, and the soldiery gave up their arms and were allowed to disperse, a measure which afterwards proved highly disquieting, though the consequences of it could not at the time have been foreseen. There was doubtless a considerable party in the capital favourable to the palace and its inmates, as could only be expected; so, after an interview with the king, and a slight survey of the state of affairs in Mandalay. Colonel Sladen advised General Prendergast to let Theebaw and his family be sent out of the city without delay, for fear of an outbreak of the plundering hangers-on of the late favourites.
Accordingly, on the 29th November, the obstinate Theebaw and his wives were despatched by river to Rangoon, an exit which marked the termination of the royal reigning dynasty inBurmah, for on January 1st, 1886, rather more than a month from the occupation of Mandalay, a Viceregal proclamation was promulgated through the late Burmese Empire. “One of the shortest documents of its kind,” it ran as follows:—
“By command of the Queen-Empress, it is hereby notified that the territories formerly governed by King Theebaw will no longer be under his rule, but have become part of Her Majesty’s dominions, and will, during Her Majesty’s pleasure, be administered by such officers as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India may from time to time appoint.”
In such unmistakable and uncompromising terms was the annexation of Burmah accomplished.
Meanwhile, intriguers were found to be at work, and it was decided that the continued presence of King Theebaw, though a prisoner, was undesirable in Burmah. The king, quite a young man, was accordingly despatched to Madras, with a chosen band of attendants, where he was lodged, pending orders.
Fighting, however, was not yet entirely over, for almost immediately after the occupation of Mandalay and the disbandment of Theebaw’s army, dacoities began to take place all over the country, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, from which it is surmised these attacks were organised and probably executed by gangs of the late soldiery. The Tinedah-Woon indeed, said to have been one of the chief instigators of the late king’s warlike enterprises, was captured on the night of the 28th whilst attempting to leave the city disguised as a coolie or common labourer.
But, however instigated, these dacoities proved a serious trouble and menace to British authority, and some stiff fighting, attended however with little loss of life, had to be gone through before the country was finally pacified.
An unfortunate incident which occurred is worthy of record, as it concerned the company so intimately connected with the above events. Seven European employes of the Bombay and Burmah Company were engaged in timber operations up the Chindwyin river, at Keedat, at the time the ultimatum was despatched to Mandalay, and three of them were killed during their attempt to obey the order to return, and the rest imprisoned for a time. They were only released by a timely and rapid march from the Manipuri State, headed by Colonel Johnstone, the political agent there, aided by Manipuri troops.
During the month of February, 1886, Upper and Lower Burmah were, under Mr. C. Bernard, as Chief Commissioner, united into one province. On the 31st March, General Prendergast left Mandalay on the successful termination of his mission.
The struggle for supremacy in Egypt was far from being finally settled at Tel-el-Kebir. With the voice of discontent, bursting now and again into open revolt, with that potent influence, fanaticism, always at work, small wonder that the Soudan was the scene of perpetual conflict, and at length matters reached a crisis at the end of 1897.
The voice of rumour, growing louder and ever nearer, at length brought warning to Sir Herbert Kitchener, the Sirdar of the Anglo-Egyptian army, of threatening movements of a dervish force near Berber, and Anglo-Egyptian reinforcements were promptly hurried to the front to stem the tide of what promised to be a formidable revolt. The Egyptian army was at this time in a very complete state of organisation, thanks to the great brain which day and night watched ever its growth and prepared it against all eventualities, and now the time had come for action the ultimate issue of events was confidently awaited in Britain. General Sir Herbert Kitchener had had fifteen years’ experience of Egypt. He had been Intelligence Officer in Sir Garnet Wolseley’s campaign, commander at Suakim, fought with success again and again against Osman Digna, and finally succeeded Sir Francis Grenfell as commander-in-chief in Egypt. No man was better acquainted with the Egyptian question, and none knew better how to meet the coming difficulty.
The dervish forces were under the leadership of Mahmud and Osman Digna, and were reported to be marching steadily northward, with an ever-growing army, to attack the British force.
That force was now rapidly set in motion. With such men as Kitchener, Hunter, Macdonald, and Gatacre, to name but a few, no loss of time or energy took place, and in a few short weeks a formidable British force, admirably equipped in all arms and perfectly organised, was marching southward.
By March 1, the reinforcements were at Berber, some 25 miles from the junction of the Nile and the Atbara rivers, near which place it was rumoured that the dervish army, instead of advancing to the attack, were strongly entrenching themselves against our force. By this time the British army in the field numbered some 12,000 to 13,000 men. They were divided into four brigades. Three of these were Egyptian, under the chief command of General Hunter. The fourth was British. The first brigade, under General Macdonald, comprised the 9th, 10th and 11th Soudanese, and the 2nd Egyptian, and it is not too much to say that never had any troops, British or native,more confidence in their sturdy leader. General Macdonald had risen from the ranks, after conspicuous and repeated gallantry in Afghanistan. He had been taken prisoner in the Boer war at Majuba, and fought gallantly with his Soudanese at Gemaizeh, Tooki, and Afafit, and it is safe to say his devoted troops would have followed him wherever he might be pleased to lead them. These troops were at Berber. The second brigade, of similar constitution, three Soudanese regiments, the 12th, 13th, and 14th, together with the 8th Egyptian, was under the command of Colonel Maxwell, and quartered half way between Berber and Atbara, while at the latter place, and not far removed from the enemy’s outposts, was the third, or Egyptian, brigade, under Colonel Lewis.
The total strength of the Egyptian army was thus brought up to some 10,000 men, with 46 guns, while three gunboats operated on the Nile from Atbara. The fourth, or British, brigade, was under the charge of General Gatacre, and, after a forced and memorable march to Berber, in the first part of which the admirably constructed Egyptian railway played a valuable part, had encamped in the neighbourhood of the second brigade at Debeika. The Lincolnshire (10th), the Cameron Highlanders (79th), and the Warwickshire made up the force, while the 1st Seaforth Highlanders, under Colonel Murray, were daily expected. A maxim battery completed their equipment. Thus the total force under the Sirdar’s supreme command may be estimated at 14,000 men, with 52 guns in all.
The precise strength of the enemy was unknown, but it has been variously estimated at 15,000 to 20,000. The Arab spy is notoriously indifferent to accuracy, and thus precise particulars were almost unobtainable, in spite of the most strenuous efforts of Colonel Wingate, the chief of our Intelligence Department.
By the 16th March the whole Anglo-Egyptian force was concentrated at Kemir, some seven miles from Fort Atbara, and the men of all ranks and regiments, in the pink of condition, were keen and eager for the fight. Some days, however, were now spent in reconnoitring the enemy’s position, and in this connection invaluable services were rendered by the gunboats which patrolled the river. Almost daily did these seek a brush with the enemy’s outposts, and both loot and invaluable information were brought back to camp by the enterprising naval commanders.
Says the late G. W. Steevens, in his famous work on the campaign:—
“You may imagine that the officers of Her Majesty’s navy did not confine their work to looking on. A day or two ago, Mahmud had been transferring his war material in barges fromMetemmeh to Shendi (a point some hundred miles up the Nile). Knowing the ways of ‘the devils,’ as they amiably call the gunboats, he had entrenched a couple of hundred riflemen to cover the crossing. But one gunboat steamed cheerfully up to the bank and turned on the maxims, while the other sunk one ‘nuggar’ and captured two.”
With minor engagements of this nature, and in the camp hard drill and busy preparation, the days passed by, till at length, on the morning of Sunday, March 20th, the force moved out of Kemir, southwards, in the direction from which the enemy were known to be advancing. Two days previously the long-expected Seaforths had arrived in camp, and met with a warm reception from their British and Egyptian comrades. They arrived “smiling all over, from colonel to private, to find they were in time.”
Great was the joy of all ranks when it was at length announced that Mahmud’s force was on the Atbara river, and almost certain to give battle. Rumours were rife at this time, the most credible being that Mahmud had seized the Hudi ford, a few miles south of Fort Atbara, but on reaching here on March 20th and 21st, not a dervish was to be seen. The same day, however, as Hudi was reached, the cavalry had a brush with a party of advanced dervish horse, and succeeded in chasing them off into the bush. Our men, however, lost seven troopers killed, the first casualties of the campaign.
By this time the sand and dust of the desert had been exchanged for the thickly-grown, low-lying land of the Atbara, and the change was a welcome one in many ways, though indeed the scrub afforded ample cover for the enemy. The day following this a stronger reconnoitring force encountered some more dervish cavalry, and shots were exchanged, which brought the whole army to the front hot foot, but with the emptying of a few Dervish saddles the incident terminated. Everything, however, tended to show that a general engagement could not be long delayed. And for our officers and men, the sooner it came the better, for though food was plentiful, the camp equipments were scanty, and comfort almost unknown.
Says Mr. Steevens at this stage:—“Though the Soudan can be live coals by day, it can be aching ice by night. Officers and men came alike with one blanket and no overcoat, for you must remember that we left Kemir with the intention of fighting the next day or the next.”
The Egyptian army were better off than their British comrades. Knowing the Soudan, an Egyptian officer summed up the difference of the equipments of the two armies in a single sentence:—“I’ve been in this country five years, so when I was told to bring two days’ kit, I brought a fortnight’s.”
The British, however, unprepared for the long delay, had to make the best of things, and these discomforts, added to the eagerness of the men, made a general engagement the one prayer of all. On the 27th March, Haig’s reconnaissance of the Atbara river took place, but for a distance of 18 miles not a sign of Mahmud was to be seen, only “the impenetrable, flesh-tearing jungle of mimosa spears and halfa grass, through which no army in the world could possibly attack.”
On the morning of the 27th, the 15th Egyptian, with some friendly Yadin, who had many old scores to settle with Mahmud, arrived at Shendi in three gunboats, and, surprising a large party of the enemy, captured nearly 700 prisoners, mostly women, and killed 160 of the Baggara warriors. The captives were brought down to Fort Atbara, where they “are now probably the wives of such black soldiers as are allowed to marry.”
This important encounter, the result of the Sirdar’s carefully laid plans, almost certainly forced the engagement. For, distressed at the loss of their women, and now unable to retreat to Shendi, the fighting men of Mahmud’s army must be distracted at all costs. A fight with the British must occur without delay if the Khalifa’s enterprise is to succeed. As yet the precise position of the enemy’s main force was unknown, but at last, on March 30th, General Hunter’s reconnaissance located them, and the joyful news went round the camp like wildfire.
Nakheila, 18 miles away, on the Atbara, formed the stronghold of Mahmud. The General “had gone on until he came to it,” says Steevens. “He had ridden up to within 300 yards of it and looked in. The position faced the open desert, and went right back through the scrub to the river. Round it ran a tremendous zareba.” For a few days speculation was rife in camp as to the next move. Here was the enemy at last, not attacking as expected, but waiting to be driven from his entrenched position either by bayonet or hunger. What means would be adopted to accomplish a successful issue?
The decision was not long in coming. By April 3rd, the camp was at Abadar, on the 5th at Umdabieh—nearer, ever nearer to the enemy. A brush here and there was of daily occurrence now, and raiding became part of the routine. The description by Mr. Steevens of the scene of one such raid gives a vivid picture of the state of affairs at this juncture.
He was returning with the camel corps convoy from Fort Atbara, whither during the days of waiting they had ridden for supplies, when “suddenly one of the men discerned cases lying opened on the sand about a hundred yards off the trampled road. Anything for an incident. We rode listlessly up and looked. A couple of broken packing-cases, two tins of sardines, a tin of biscuits half empty, a small case of empty soda bottleswith Sirdar stencilled on it, and a couple of empty bottles of whisky. Among them lay a cigarette box, a needle and reel of cotton, and a badge—A.S.C.—such as the Army Service Corps wear on their shoulder-straps. We were on the scene of last evening’s raid. Two camels, we remembered, had been cut off and their loads lost.” With such incidents as these, and another reconnaissance in force by Hunter, terminating in a miniature battle with seventeen casualties, the evening of the 7th April arrived. In the early morning of the 8th, Good Friday, the long-expected battle was to be fought.
Dawn was the hour fixed for the attack. Unlike the approach to Tel-el-Kebir, the night of the march immediately preceding the battle on the Atbara was conspicuous for its brilliant moonlight. At six the force moved out of Umdabieh. At seven a halt was called, and till nearly one o’clock the troops rested. Some ate, some slept, but all were at last assured of the certainty of the morrow’s action. At one o’clock the march was resumed, and, under the guidance of Bunbashi Fitton of the Egyptian army, the dervish zareba was cautiously, but surely, approached by the Anglo-Egyptian squares. Between four and five another halt took place, and the prospective battle was discussed in low tones in the prevailing cold. Some slept once more, others shivered, waiting for the dawn. At length the sun rose and disclosed the enemy’s position right in front and the serried ranks of Britain ready to give battle.
Says Mr. Steevens:—“The word came, and the men sprang up. The squares shifted into the fighting formations, and at one impulse, in one superb sweep, nearly 12,000 men moved forward towards the enemy.... The awful war machine went forward into action.”
Twenty-four guns, under Colonel Long, were on the right flank, and 12 maxims were divided among the right and left flanks and the centre. Crash! broke out the roar of artillery, and in an instant the front of Mahmud’s camp was raked from end to end. The puffs of smoke floated lazily across the foreground as the iron hail tore its way into the quick-set hedge of the zareba, and here and there flames sprang out where the rockets compassed their work of relentless destruction. Once during the awful cannonade the dervish cavalry formed up on the extreme left of the position, emerging from the bush in handfuls, but a heavy maxim fire soon drove them back. For fully half an hour the enemy made no reply, and then, after this interval, the bullets began to whistle over the heads of the Anglo-Egyptian force. As at Tel-el-Kebir, the fire of the dervishes was aimed too high, and little damage was done.
At 7.30 the “Cease Fire!” sounded, and the infantry moved forward to the attack. The commanding officers of the variousregiments made stirring speeches to their men. Colonel Murray, addressing the Seaforth Highlanders, said:—“The news of victory must be in London to-night.” General Gatacre’s words were to the point, “there was to be no question about this, they were to go right through the zareba and drive the dervishes into the river.” The moment had arrived. The bugles sounded the “Advance!” the pipes screamed out “The March of the Cameron Men” with that voice of glorious memories and lust for battle which the pipes convey when heard in war, and the force swept forward on the foe.
Upon the Camerons fell a prominent part. They were to clear the front with a hot rifle fire, and while some were doing this others were to tear opens in the zareba or surmount it by scaling ladders. Next behind them followed the Lincolns, the Seaforths, and the Warwickshires. For a few moments as the force rushed forward, the enemy made never a sound. Then suddenly, as the Camerons reached the crest of the ridge overlooking the zareba, the murderous fire broke out. Fortunately, as always in the Soudanese campaigns, the fire was for a great part too high, and the casualties, though heavy, were not so great as might have been expected. Meanwhile, General Macdonald’s brigade advanced, and only about a minute elapsed from the time the combined force crowned the rise of the hill till the Camerons and Soudanese had torn down the zareba and made way for the main body of the army.