To say that the story of Somaliland lies before it, is, at first sight, to make a self-evident and apparently obvious assertion. But undoubtedly the future of the country will constitute by far the most important part of its history. The “Unknown Horn of Africa” was but recently, and is indeed still, a barbarous land whose tale is yet to be told. Day by day, however, the story is being added to, and this out-of-the-way district of Africa is at the present receiving an amount of attention from European Powers which will ensure it, ere long, an important and prosperous development.
As early as 1840 treaties with the native chiefs of this tract of land opposite Aden had been concluded by the British. Between 1873-77 the country was practically annexed by Egypt, but was given up and eventually occupied by the British in 1885, who declared a Protectorate over it, to the great satisfaction of its inhabitants. The reasons for such occupation were obvious—partly to save the country from relapsing into barbarism, and partly to prevent its occupation by other Powers, by which the overland route to the east might be menaced. Such Powers were France, Italy, and Abyssinia. The outcome of conferences between these Powers—with France in 1888, Italy in ’91 and ’94, and Abyssinia in ’97—fixed the boundaries of the Somali Coast Protectorate. So far the story of Somaliland development was a peaceful one, and the commerce of the country in skins and hides, ostrich feathers, gums, cattle and sheep bade fair to grow and flourish to the profit of all concerned.
In 1899, however, the name of the Mullah began to be first heard. In that year Haji Mohammed Abdullah, a strict Moslem and Somali patriot, started a fanatical movement in the Dolbahanta country against both British and Abyssinian rule.
For several months, however, apathy marked the attitude of the British Government towards the Mullah and his following. It was thought that the rebellion would in all probability come to nothing, and nothing was accordingly done to check it. The issue proved the contrary, and as the Mullah’s following increased and he now and again moved within a threatening distance of Berbera, the principal port, it was felt that something must be done. The Abyssinians were the first to make a move, and, massing a large army, they fought a sanguinary battle in the Ogaden country against the forces of the Mullah at Jig-gigga. The immediate outcome of this engagement was to drive theMullah towards Berbera, and once more his presence in the vicinity, and his frequent daring raids, had the affect of unsettling the countryside.
Accordingly, in 1901, Colonel Swayne, the Consul General of the Protectorate, took the field with a small force, but with most unfortunate results. It has been suggested that not only was the force at Colonel Swayne’s disposal totally inadequate, but that his appeals to the Foreign Office did not receive the backing they merited; in any event, disaster overtook the small expeditionary force. Not at first, however. On June 1st the column reached Sanala, and captured much of the enemy’s live stock. Leaving a Zareba under Captain Macneil with 300 men, Colonel Swayne moved against the Mullah’s camp at Yahel. The Zareba meantime was fiercely attacked, but gallantly defended, and the enemy driven off. Further operations resulted in the break up of the Mullah’s force, but the Mullah himself escaped across the Haud desert, where pursuit was, under the circumstances, impossible.
A period of comparative quiet followed, extending to nearly six months, but at length, in December, 1901, the Mullah once more resumed his operations against the friendly tribes. Colonel Swayne again got together a force, but while operating between Bohotte and Mudug sustained a severe reverse at Erego. Two officers, Colonel Phillips and Captain Angus, with 50 men, were killed, and the British wounded numbered over 100. The force was attacked in the thick bush, and the Somali levies were severely shaken by the savage onslaught of the Mullah’s men. Under the circumstances Colonels Swayne and Cobbe, the latter wounded in the engagement, decided to retreat to Bohotte.
Not a little anxiety was occasioned at home over this setback, and the immediate outcome of Colonel Swayne’s urgent entreaty for more men was the despatch of large reinforcements under General Manning. Such measures were felt to be especially necessary, as a Hungarian adventurer (“of the worst type,” says one account) was reported to be directing the Mullah’s forces, and would assuredly make the most of the British reverse. This report was, however, discredited. In any event, large reinforcements were now despatched to Berbera; Bombay Grenadiers from Aden, and Bombay Infantry from Simla, Soudanese and Sikhs, with maxims and many extra officers—all were hastened to the scene of war.
General Manning himself set foot in Berbera on the morning of the 22nd October, and at once all was renewed activity. The campaign, however, was destined to be a failure, owing to inefficient transport, the service of which utterly broke down, and also to the great daring and activity of the opposing force, whose fighting qualities had been seriously underestimated.
As far on as April 15th, 1903, advices reached this country from Somaliland, telling of successful reconnaissances and bright prospects of success, but two days later, on the 17th, and again on the 23rd of the month, two such severe blows were inflicted on the large British force now in the field as to render a second withdrawal from the country necessary. Colonel Plunkett, in charge of a strong party of the King’s African Rifles with maxims, set out from Galadi in the direction of Walwal, on the 15th of the month for the purpose of rounding-up stock in the bush. After marching 40 miles, the force left its spare kit and maxims, and pushed on after the carriers, who, with the cattle, were following the Mullah’s rear. On the 17th the force was surrounded by the enemy and cut to pieces. No fewer than 10 officers and 174 men were killed, among them Colonel Plunkett himself. The enemy’s force was estimated at 80,000, of whom they left 2000 dead on the field. Only 41 of the little British force managed to reach camp, six alone being unwounded. Both maxims fell into the Mullah’s hands. A force under Colonel Cobbe in the vicinity was, with the greatest difficulty, extricated by General Manning, who left Bohotte at midnight on hearing of the disaster.
But alas! this was not all. A week later, on the 23rd, the flying column under Major Gough, operating to the north, was attacked with a loss of two officers, Captains Godfrey and Bruce, and 13 men. With the greatest difficulty it reached Bohotte, and here the 1902 campaign came to a disastrous termination.
Small wonder that considerable dissatisfaction should by this time have arisen at home over the conduct of the Somaliland campaign. The question of withdrawal from the country was even mooted, but fortunately overruled, and a still stronger force was once more got together to initiate the campaign which is at the present time (1904) in progress.
Meanwhile the Mullah sustained a trifling defeat at the hands of an Abyssinian force on the 31st May, the remains of the British expedition being still at Bohotte, where they were detained until plans of reinforcement and advance had been duly organised.
On the 21st June Major-General Sir C. Egerton was appointed to command the Somaliland expeditionary force.
Shortly after the General’s arrival at Berbera, active and most strenuous preparations were made for an expedition which should at last succeed in overthrowing the Mullah’s power. Several months were spent in these preparations. Reinforcements began to arrive in large quantities at Berbera; from Simla came mounted infantry and Punjaubees, companies of the Norfolk and Yorkshire regiments, mounted infantry from Bombay, 300 of the Hampshire regiment from Aden, a telegraphbattalion of the Royal Engineers from Lorne, two companies of the Army Service Corps from Durban, Natal, and even a strong contingent from the newly-formed Boer colony in South Africa, with camels and transport materials, and all the munitions of war poured into Somaliland in a steady stream.
Sheikh was chosen as a first base of concentration, and later this was advanced to Kurit, where there is a capital and abundant water supply. Lack of water indeed has constituted one of the chief difficulties attending operations in Somaliland—the possessor of the somewhat infrequent wells being master of the situation. Transport, too, is of even greater importance than ever in such a country, Somali camels alone being found thoroughly suitable for the purpose. Many thousands of other camels were imported into the country, but it was found that they stood the climate ill, and in many instances were totally useless. Under the circumstances, the local supply had to be mainly depended upon, and as this proved to be wholly inadequate, the best had to be done under adverse circumstances. In due course, however, garrisons were established at Bohotte, Ganero, and Burao, and early in December the General issued a proclamation to the tribes that operations were about to commence, and abjured them to preserve a loyal and helpful attitude to the British arms.
On the 19th December occurred the first fight of any importance. On that date Colonel Kenna, moving out of Eil Dab, on a reconnaissance, came on 2000 of the enemy at Jidballi at the head of the Nogal Valley. Fierce fighting ensued, the enemy losing 80 killed and nearly 100 wounded. The British loss was two of the Tribal horse killed. These troops fought with conspicuous gallantry, and earned the special commendation of their British leaders. After the engagement, Colonel Kenna fell back upon the main body as the Mullah was reported to be in force in the Nogal Valley.
Such indeed proved to be the case. On January 11th was fought what may be described as an important battle at Jidballi, the enemy losing over 1000 killed, and retreating considerably shaken. At nine o’clock on the morning of the 11th, General Egerton advanced upon the enemy’s position. Leaving the heavy transport in a zareba, 12 miles in the rear, the force advanced in the following order.
The 1st and 2nd Brigades, commanded respectively by Generals Manning and Fasken, marched in one large square, covered by a screen of Illaloe natives on the front. The advance guard was composed of the Gadabursi horse, with the Somali mounted infantry. On the south flank was Major Kenna with two companies of British and three companies of Indian mounted infantry. The Tribal horse, supported by the Bikauirs, hadbeen sent from the north flank to work round the enemy’s rear to prevent them making a way to the east or north.
Slowly the British force worked up towards the enemy’s position—a deep nullah directly in front of the line of march. Nearer and nearer came the attacking party, until within 700 yards of the position. Suddenly the Mullah’s dervishes swept down with wild cries, and hurled themselves towards the square. They never reached it. From rifle and maxim swept forth such a fire as must have astounded those who lived to recall it. For ten minutes an awful hurricane of bullets hurled back the Mullah’s soldiers, and then, doubly bewildered by the flank attack of the mounted troops, they turned and fled. The attempt to rush the square had failed. It was the only one they made. Losing heart under the terrific storm of lead, they scattered, helpless and disordered, in all directions. Three hundred lay dead upon the field.
Major Kenna’s mounted infantry now took a hand in the engagement, and for two hours inflicted severe punishment on the fugitives at short range, killing over 500, as they fled hither and thither, and only pausing when his horses were worn out for lack of water, and ammunition began to run short.
The Mullah’s army at Jidballi was estimated at 5000 men, of whom they left, as stated, 1000 dead behind their line of flight. The Mullah himself, who was a few miles distant, escaped. But the victory had cost us dear. Three officers, including Lieutenants C. H. Bowden-Smith and V. R. Welland, were killed, together with nine of the native troops, whilst the wounded officers numbered nine, and other wounded 22. The total British force numbered 3200 of all ranks.
Captain the Hon. T. Lister, of the 10th Hussars, who was at first reported missing, was found also to have been killed. He was the eldest son of Lord Ribbledale—a young man of five and twenty.
Thus ended the fight at Jidballi, a position which the Mullah had ordered his forces to hold to the last, and there can be no doubt that the effect of the victory was far-reaching, if indeed it did not succeed in shattering the morale of his troops. Meanwhile, the pursuit of the fugitive was actively proceeded with.
For a series of years matters had been in an unsatisfactory state between Thibet and the Indian Government. This wascaused by the non-fulfilment of treaty obligations on the part of the former. The Indian Government made long-continued efforts to bring matters to a proper understanding, but all without result. These efforts were frustrated by combined duplicity on the part of the Llamas of Thibet and of the Chinese authorities. The Thibet and Chinese authorities having repeatedly failed to fulfil their promise of sending properly-authorised deputies to settle matters of dispute and disagreement, the Indian Government at last felt compelled to send a political agent to the seat of Thibetan authority in order to have proper parties to deal with. Accordingly, Colonel Younghusband was despatched for that purpose, but for his protection he required a military escort. The progress of the party was reported from time to time, everything going on peacefully, when the country was startled by the account of the following engagement, the British forces, under General Macdonald, comprising 1000 men, also four guns and two maxims.
The whole history of war shows no parallel to the extraordinary action fought at Hot Springs, the tragical romance of it being heightened by the fact that it took place in the throne of the winds of the world, in a secret place of the earth under the shadow of the mighty snow-capped mountains. The Thibetan position extended for about a mile from the road under which the springs issue. Up the steep ridge the road was barred by a wall ending in a blockhouse. Walls were built on every fairly level spot on the ridge. When Colonel Younghusband asked Brigadier-General Macdonald to get the Thibetans out of their position, if possible without firing, our force was deployed and moved slowly up the ridge. The Thibetans manning the topmost wall, numbering about 200, surrendered without resistance, and allowed themselves to be disarmed. The remainder, however, obstinately held their places till our troops were within a few feet. They then sullenly retired towards the blockhouse, where the Lhassa General and other Thibetan officials were collected. Within a short time there was gathered between the blockhouse and the ridge a great mob of Thibetan soldiery. Estimates as to their number differ, but the place they occupied would have held a battalion in quarter column, and the Thibetans were shoulder to shoulder. The driving operation was carried out with the most admirable exactitude, the troops showing great self-restraint in not firing, although not knowing when the Thibetans might attack them.
When the Thibetans were all gathered together, Brigadier-General Macdonald, Colonel Younghusband, their staffs, the press correspondents, and others rode up to look at them. At this time the Thibetan rear was perfectly open, and they could have marched away if they had wished. The mob, nevertheless, stoodtogether round the Lhassa General in a discontented frame of mind and muttering angry threats. Their attitude was sufficiently hostile to induce Brigadier-General Macdonald to order up two more companies of Pioneers with fixed bayonets. Presently there was a thin ring of Sikhs round the Thibetans, but no one dreamt of the terrible event which was impending. The officers got off their horses; some sat down to eat sandwiches, and others brought out cameras. Suddenly a scuffle began in the north-eastern corner of the ring. The Thibetans shook their fists in the faces of the Sikhs and commenced throwing stones. The Lhassa General himself fired the first shot, blowing away a Sikh’s jaw. A great tumult instantly arose. The Thibetans uttered a wild shout, drew their swords, and surged forward in all directions, firing their matchlocks. About a dozen swordsmen made a desperate rush in the direction of Brigadier-General Macdonald and the small knot of officers surrounding him.
Major Dunlop had two of his fingers slashed off. This assailant was shot down by Lieutenant Bignell. Four Thibetans made for Mr. Edmund Candler, “Daily Mail” correspondent, who was unarmed. He received no fewer than 12 wounds. Brigadier-General Macdonald himself shot down one of Mr. Candler’s assailants at a few yards distance, and Lieutenant Davys, I.M.S., promptly killed two others, thus saving Mr. Candler from death. The other Thibetans, rushing forward, were met by revolver fire. Meanwhile, the Sikhs in front had drawn back a few yards, and met the Thibetans who were trying to climb over the wall with a terrible magazine fire. Four or five of the enemy actually climbed over the wall, and died like heroes. One old man, armed with only a matchlock, sprang over the heaps of dead and deliberately kneeling down, well in advance of the others fired into the Sikhs. He was riddled with bullets. The Thibetans were so huddled together that they were unable either to use their swords or to fire. Many of them probably killed each other in their mad excitement. Finally the mob surged to the rear, breaking through the ring of Sikhs.
The scenes that then followed were impressive and more awful than a fight in the cockpit. The Thibetans, though their retreat was still open, disdained to scatter and run. They tramped away slowly and steadily, sullen and solemn, followed by a perfect hail of bullets. The mountain battery came into action and tore their line with shrapnel. A terrible trail of dead and dying marked their line of march. Finally the last wounded Thibetan limped round the corner about 400 yards away. The grim tragedy was over. The whole affair did not last ten minutes, but in that short space of time the flower of the Thibetan army perished. The Thibetan General and the wholeof his personal escort, as well as five high Lhassa officials were killed. Our own small losses are accounted for by the fact that the Thibetan swordsmen in the front rank could not reach the Sikhs, who had fixed bayonets, while the men in the middle of the mob were unable to use any weapon, but they all died game.
All those who witnessed the scene will carry for ever the memory of the grim, determined faces lighted with devildom and savagery. The Lhassa General himself undoubtedly provoked the fight, for in his interview with Colonel Younghusband his attitude was that of a man determined to either die or turn the Mission back. Part of the fearlessness shown by the Thibetans was undoubtedly due to want of knowledge of the effect of modern firearms, as well as contempt for the smallness of our forces. The Thibetan soldiers outnumbered the wing of the Sikhs by six or seven to one. The impassive stolidity of the Sikhs of the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers deserves a word of admiration. Had they given way before the rush of the swordsmen, or had Brigadier-General Macdonald and the small knot of officers shown less personal courage, a disaster one does not care to dwell upon might have taken place. Colonel Younghusband and his staff were amongst the onlookers near the Thibetan soldiers, and were wholly unarmed.
The total British casualties were 12, but, besides these, two or three officers and a number of men received bruises from the flat edge of the Thibetan swords. Immediately after our wounded had been attended to, several officers with attendants went out among the wounded Thibetans scattered over the battlefield, binding up injured limbs, administering water, and applying field dressings to the wounded. Our troops provided dressing splints, hastily improvised from the muskets and scabbards abandoned by the enemy. The Thibetan prisoners were employed in placing the wounded under shelter. The next day men were sent out from Turin, and a large number of wounded were brought into a house in the village, where Captain Baird and Lieutenant Day attended to them. They were evidently most grateful for these attentions. Some of them were to be seen cheerfully smoking cigarettes, and there were no signs of cringing in their manner, which rather suggested a proud and independent spirit.
Transcriber’s Note:Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation are as in the original.
Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation are as in the original.