CHAP. IX.
Of Divine permission, providence and prescience.
There is no one thing that hath more promoted this false and wicked Tenent of a kind of omnipotency in Devils, and the exorbitant power ascribed to Witches, than the misunderstanding of the true and right Doctrine of Divine Providence, and the admitting of a bare permission in God as different and distinct from his providence. From whence it cometh to pass that not only the vulgar, but such as tread in the steps ofArminius, do hold a meer bare permission, and that God sits as a quiet beholder by his Prescience from the event of things to see what will be effected by Devils and wicked Men, who in the mean time run and rove about, acting what, when and how they please, and that God hath neither hook in their nostrils, nor bridle in their mouths, neither keeps them in any restraint, order or government, and so we must needs have a mad rule in this World, during this permission and naked inspection.
But that we may proceed in such order, as may be clear and intelligible to the Readers, we shall here propose the state of the matter that we undertake to confute, which is this: That there is not in God a nude, passive permission, separate from the positive and active decree, order and will of his Divine Providence and Government, but that he doth rule all things according to the power and determination of his own positive and actual will. And this we shall prosecute in this following order and particulars.
Those that deny that there is in God a passive permission separate from his decretive and actual will in his providence are accused by others, thereby to infer the absurdity, that God is the author or efficient cause of sin; which pretended absurdity, in truth and reason cannot be any, because it is a simple and absolute impossibility, thatGod should be the author of sin as these arguments do sufficiently testifie.
Argum. 1.
James 1. 13.
Psal. 5. 4.
Deut. 32. 3.
1. That of necessity must be false, which the Scriptures do declare to be so, in open and plain terms. But that God should be the author of sin or evil, the Scriptures do deny in open and plain terms, as where the Text saith:God cannot be tempted with evil: where both the act, and the possibility of it is absolutely denied. Again:For thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee. Therefore it is false that God is, or can be the author of sin; and so by consequence the supposed absurdity is a meer impossibility; and an absurdity urged that is impossible, is most of all absurd.
Argum. 2.
2. He isens summè perfectum, & quicquid est in Deo, est Deus; but sin howsoever understood, or accepted, is an imperfection, defect and an aberration from a just and perfect rule, and therefore it is simply impossible that God can be the cause of any thing that is imperfect, sinful or evil, if sin be considered asmalum culpæ.
Argum. 3.
Rom. 4. 15.
3. God is not under any binding law given to him by some other, for then he should cease to be supream, independent and omnipotent: Now to whom there is no law given to observe, there can be no transgression, for the Apostle saith,where there is no law, there is no transgression; and therefore it is simply impossible that God should be the author, or causer of sin, or evil, because there is no law that he can transgress against.
Argum. 4.
De Civitat. Dei,l.2.c.7.
4. God prohibiteth and hateth sin, as the Scriptures do every where testifie, but God is the cause of nothing but that which he loveth, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil of sin. And to speak properly sin hath no efficient cause, but a deficient, such as is the will of faln Angels, and wicked Men, whose irregularity of will, from the command of God, is all the cause that sin and evil hath or can have. An efficient cause is only of those things that are good, because every efficient cause doth by working put something in being: But privations (of which sort are sins) do put nothing in being, but do truly note the absence of beings. Therefore did S.Augustinesay well:Mali causa efficiens nulla est, sed tantùm deficiens.
Argum. 5.
Gen. 1. 3.
John 8. 44.
1 John 3. 8.
5. That which properly hath an efficient cause, hath also an end properly so called: But sin hath not an end properly so called, because the end is being, and therefore good, and the perfection of the thing. But the Scripture doth declare thatall things that God created were exceeding good; and that the cause of sin was Man, and the Devil; for the text saith, thatthe Devil was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth: And again,He that committeth sin, is of the Devil, for the Devil sinneth from the beginning. Therefore from hence it is clear, that God neither is nor can be the author or causer of sin.
Argum. 6.
Vid. Schar. de miser. hom. stat. sub peccato,c.3.
Fulgent.lib.1.ad Monim
6. That which God is the author of, doth not make Man worse.but sin doth make Man worse, therefore God is not the author of it. And all sin is perpetrated, because thereby it receeded from the order that respecteth God, as the ultimate end of all things; but God doth incline all things unto himself, as to the ultimate end, neither doth he turn them from himself, because he issummum bonum. And further asFulgentiussaith:Deus non est ejus rei autor, cujus est ultor. At Deus est peccati ultor, ergo non autor.And therefore we conclude, that this is a vain pretence of an absurdity, because it is impossible that God should be the author or causer of sin.
Job 13. 7.
This plausible pretence to seem to be zealous, not to make God the author of sin, we commend as allowable; but it is but like the zeal of the Scribes and Pharisees, which was without knowledge, because they pretend that for an absurdity, that is a simple impossibility. And they ought to remember the argument ofJob, which is this:will ye speak wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him?For as we ought not to suppose, or imply him to be the author of sin; so we ought not to rob him of his Glory, by detracting from his power and providence, nor in ascribing that unto Creatures, that is only due unto the Creator; as those do that hold a nude passive permission in him separate from his will and decree in his providence. Neither doth the denying of this any way imply that he is the author of sin, for a providential permission we allow as the act of his will and decree, as we shall shew hereafter.
Now concerning permission in God, being a suspension of his efficiency in regard of some acts permitted to the creatures, and that for just and good ends, the definition of it and its affections or properties are so darkly handled even by those that make most ado about it, that it would serve rather to divert Men from the right way than to guide them in it, or unto it. Therefore here we shall only note these three things, and pursue it more fully hereafter. 1. There must be the person or power permitting that hath ability, right and authority so to do. 2. There must be the person or power permitted that hath ability to perform the thing permitted, otherwise it would be in vain, and to no purpose. 3. There must be the thing or action that is permitted to be done, or brought to pass, by the person permitted to act, and that must not be impossible.
1. Before the Creation it is meerly improper to attribute permission unto God, because there was no person, nor power besides himself that could act any thing, and therefore could not be permitted, and so the correlative being awanting, both the relative and the relation betwixt them must necessarily fall to the ground, as having no existence; and so it is impossible that permission should be in God when there was no Creature to be permitted, and so could not be attributed unto him before the Creation.
Heb. 1. 3.
Job 34. 14, 15.
Vid. Chrysost. in Loc.
Psal. 104. 19.
Verse 9.
Psal. 107. 25.
Job 38. 11.
Jerem. 5. 22.
De Caus. Dei,l.1.c.2.p.165.
Isai. 38. 8.
Exod. 14. 21, 22, 23.
Id.v.17.
Jonah 1. 4.
Id.2. 10.
Psal. 119. 91.
Greg.16.mor.4.
Thom. de Christ. Religion.133.
De Caus. Dei,p.171.
2. It is as improper to attribute permission unto God in respect of the Physical agency of second causes, because he not only worketh all in all, and by his Divine concourse and conservative powersustaineth all things by the word of his power, andJobtells us:If he gather unto himself his spirit and breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again into dust. Upon which place of theHebrewsS.Chrysostomesaith thus:Feratq; inquit omnia, hoc est, gubernet omnia. Siquidem cadentia, & ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim minus est continere mundum quàm fecisse: Sed si oportet aliquid quod admireris dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem, ex nullis extantibus rerum essentiæ productæ sunt: in continendo verò, ea quæ facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant continentur. Hæc ergo dum reguntur, & ad invicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum & valdè mirabile, plurimæq; virtutis judicium declaratur: But also because he hath set all natural things their bounds, and ordered, decreed and determined their ends in acting. Now what he hath appointed, ordered and decreed to be the agency of every creature, and determinated its end in acting, cannot properly be called permission, but his will, ordination and providence. As if one should say he suffereth and permitteth the Sun and Moon to run their course, it is an improper expression and injurious to his wisdom and power in his providential government of the creatures, seeing that it is a certain truth,Deus operatur in omni operante: Andhe hath appointed the Moon for seasons, and the sun knoweth his going down. And it is absurd to say he suffereth the Sea to Ebb and Flow, when he hathset it a bound that it cannot pass over. For he commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves thereof. And said, hitherto shalt thou come and no further: And here shall thy proud waves be staid.And again,Will ye not tremble at my presence saith the Lord, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea, by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof toss themselves, yet can they not prevail; though they roar, yet can they not pass over it. And therefore we may conclude that the whole Creation in respect of Physical agency is ruled according to those orders, and not by a fortuitous chance, or a bare passive permission. 1. For first all creatures have their Physical agency, and the affections and properties thereof ordained by God in the Creation, and according to this they constantly act, except they be turned, altered, or suspended by the Creator himself, and he doth immediately act in them all, and they cannot properly be said to be permitted. 2. They are upholden, sustained and conserved in their several conditions, by the word of his mighty power, his continual concourse and divine emanation, which if it should but cease one minute, the whole Creation would fall into that nothing, from whence his Eternal and OmnipotentFiatdid raise and call them forth, so that we dare affirm with profoundBradwardine,Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet Creaturam immediatiùs quacunq; causa creata. 3. When he pleaseth he doth suspend the effects and agency of natural causes, as in making the Sun stand still in the victory ofJoshua, and of the three Children in the fiery Furnace. Sometimes he causeth them to act contrary totheir innate powers and qualities, as inmaking the shaddow go ten degrees back in Ahaz sun-dial: and in causingthe waters of the red sea, contrary to their natures, which are to tend downwards,to be divided, and to go backward, and to be as a wall on the right hand, and on the left, until Moses, and the children of Israel were passed through.And by many other wayes and means doth he alter and change the course of natural agents, to serve his will and good pleasure in his mercy, or in his justice, and yet here is no bare or passive permission. 4. Besides these he ordereth all the particular acts of natural agents, to be subservient unto his will: So whenJonahfled toTarshish,the Lord sent forth a great wind into the sea, and raised a mighty tempest to overtake Jonah; and when he was cast into the Sea,the Lord prepared a great fish to swallow him up, and also the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited up Jonah upon the dry land. Now the wind was not carried nor the storm raised, by a permissive power, but by the will and order of the Lord Jehovah, who sent them, and directed them either by his immediate power, or by the ministry of his Angels; and though they wrought according to their natural agency, yet the special ordering as to the particular act was not by permission, but by the will and appointment of his providence. Neither did the great fish come by chance or permission, but God in his merciful providence had prepared him for the preservation ofJonah, and caused him to be vomited on the dry land; so that all creatures do not only continue according to his ordinances, but also all elementary, and irrational creatures do praise the Lord by fulfilling his word, will and providence. And lest we be either censured to wrest the Scriptures, or to be single in this opinion, take the judgment of some few others. S.Gregory(as he is quoted by learnedBradwardine) tells us thus much:Quis de Deo ista vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirùm dum sit semper omnipotens, sic intendit omnibus, ut assit singulis; sic adest singulis, ut simul omnibus nunquam desit; sic itaq; exteriora circundat, ut interiora impleat; sic interiora implet, ut exteriora circundet; sic summa regit, ut ima non deserat; sic imis præsens est, ut à superioribus non recedat. AndThomas Aquinastheir great Schoolman (as the same author cites him) saith:Quòd Deus immediatè ordinat omnes effectus per seipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur, sed in ipsâ executione quodammodò immediatè se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causæ mediæ agunt in virtute causæ primæ, ut quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere videatur, & omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti. Therefore we will conclude this with that of S.Augustine:Proculdubio nullus est locùs ab ejus præsentia absens; super omnem creaturam quippè præsidet regendo, subtus est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute, quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab illo sustentetur, qui eam creavit. Extra omnia est, sed non exclusus, intra omnia, sed non conclusus.And these places need nofiction of an Hebraism to expound them, nor no device of a verb of an active termination, and a permissive signification to evade the pressure of this truth. And therefore in respect of Physical agency we are bold withBradwardineto assert these three Corollaries.
Amos 3. 6.
4. So that however permission may be understood, it must properly relate to intellectual and rational creatures, and that only and especially in respect of those actions which we call moral, that is, in regard of sin, evil ormalum culpæ; for whatsoever ismalum pœnæ, God is the author, causer and inflicter of, according to the Text:Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?To understand aright the nature of permission, we are to consider the affections, properties and adjuncts of it, both in regard of the person permitting, the creature permitted to act, and the thing permitted to be done, with all the circumstances about them, and these we shall take from their Ring-leader and great ChampionArminiushimself in these points.
Vid. Twisse Vindic. grat. de permiss.p.341.
5. And first in respect of the person permitting (he saith) it is necessary that he know, what, to whom, and the ability of performance, that is to be granted, or used, by the person permitted, and that the person permitting have power to permit and to impede, and also that he have the right and authority of permitting. 2. In the person permitted, it is necessarily requisite, that he have sufficient power to effect and perform the thing permitted, if not hindered; for otherwise it would be nonsense to say, that a person is permitted to do an act that he hath no power to perform. 3. If the person permitted have sufficiency of power to perform the act permitted, yet there is also required a propension and disposition in the person permitted, to perform the thing permitted, otherwise the permission as to that act would be without a certain end, and so would bein vagum, inconstant and not to be performed, and therefore he concludeth thus:Imò nec rectè dici potest quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illos præstandi affectu nullo tenetur.
De permiss.p.342.
Eccles. 7. 29.
6. We shall omit the exceptions that the learned and subtile Dr.Twissehath made against diverse particulars in these passages, and shall only fix upon one that is manifestly false (if he mean of permission in general which he confesseth.) For in the Angels andAdambefore their falling and committing of sin, there was not any propension or disposition to sin, and therefore to this we shall give the most acute answer of Dr.Twissein these words:Nam licèt insit homini propensio ad peccandum (scilicet post lapsum) per modum dispositionis, quæ præcedanea sit permissioni actus peccaminosi; At in Adamo (ante lapsum) nulla inerat hujusmodi dispositio, aut adpeccandum propensio, ante peccatum ejus primum. Sed neq; in Angelis, qui à statu suo ceciderunt. Secundo, ut ut dispositio, sive habitus insit qui inclinet ad agendum, non est ex natura dispositionis sive habitus cujuscunq; ut faciat hominem propendere ad actum aliquem particularem, cujus vel solius ratione dicitur permissio.And though it be granted that God did create the Angels, andAdam in statu labili, wherein they had a sufficiency of power or grace not to have sinned, or faln, and though that power or grace was not withdrawn from them, and that there was no coaction upon their wills to inforce them to sin; for if it had been so, their falls would have been no sin: so neither did God supply them with more assisting grace to have upholden them, for then their estate had not been labile, nor they in a possibility to sin. But it is manifest that they in their Creation were set inæquilibrio, and had equal power of freedom of will either to sin or not to sin, and so had no propension or disposition at all to commit that sin, to which they were left by a free permission: and so propension and disposition to the act permitted (if permission be understood generally) had no place in the Angels norAdambefore their first sinning, according to the Text,God made man upright, that is like a straight or right line that falling perpendicularly upon another right line, doth incline to neither end of the line upon which it falls, soAdamwas made upright without any propension or inclination to sin at all. And if this propension and disposition be understood, and applied to Angels in their condition after their fall, then it is true they have not only an inclination but a most strong will and desire to commit more evil and mischief than God in his goodness permits them to perform, forthe Devil goeth about like a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour, and it was Satan that not only had a disposition, butdesired to sift Peter as wheat. And it is manifest that wicked Men have a strong will and desire to commit mischief; but that God hath an hook in their Nostrils, and a Bridle in their Jawes wherewith he curbs and restrains them, that they cannot act out all the mischief that they intend, as is manifest in the example ofSennacheriband many others.
Twissede Permiss. ut supra.
Fran. Jun. de peccat. prim. Adam.p.111, 114.
August. Enchir.75, 76.
7. Permission must be referred and reduced to the will of God, for nolition is an act of his will as well as volition: and to speak properly and truly, permission is but an act of the Divine Will not to impede such or such particular actions of the creatures; and therefore the same things will follow from his volition or his willnon impediendi, as from his volition to the acts of a free agent, seeing neither do put coaction upon the will of the Creature that is to act. And that permission is an act of the Divine will, and to be reduced unto itArminiusconfesseth in these words:Permissionem ad genus actionis pertinere ex ipsa vocis flexione est notum, sive per se sive reductive, ut in Scholis loquuntur. Cessatio enim ab actu, ad actum quoq; est reducenda: causam autem proximam & immediatam habet voluntatem, non scientiam, non potentiam, non potestatem, licet& ista in permittente requirantur.And when he defineth permission, he saith:Permissio Dei, est actus voluntatis Divinæ; than which nothing can be more clear. And not much different from this is the definition of permission, that is given by learnedJuniusthus:Est autem permissio actus voluntatis, quo is penes quem est alienas actiones inhibere, eas non inhibet, sed agentis voluntati permittit earum modum. And again he saith:Apud Deum verò Opt. Max. nulla est omnino permissio, nisi voluntaria: quandoquidem omnis divina permissio à principio interno est, id est, à voluntate ipsius, & movetur ad finem quem voluntas præfinivit ejus. But we will conclude this with that of S.Augustinthus Englished: “Not any thing cometh to pass, unless the Omnipotent will have it to be done, either that it may be done by his suffering, or by his Volition. Neither is it to be doubted that God doth well, even by suffering those things to be done, that are done evilly; For he doth not permit but by a just judgment, and verily every thing is good that is just. Although therefore those things that are evil, in as much as they are evil, they are not good; notwithstanding, as they are not only good, but also as they are evil, it is good. For unless this were good that there should be evils, they would by no means be permitted of the omnipotent good, to whom without all doubt it is always as easy to do that which he would, as it is easy not to suffer that which he would not have to be.” By all which it is plain that his permission is the act of his Divine Will, and if he would not have it done he would not permit it, and so the same consequences will follow from Nolition, that follow from Volition, in respect as they are both acts of the Divine Will.
Twisse ut supra.346.
Prov. 16. 4.
8. It is a certain truth that all moral actions are performed by a physical power in respect of the sustentation of the will in its natural being while it acteth, and that the creature is conserved even in the act as it is natural, though there be obliquity in the will of the creature acting in reference to the law given, or made known unto it. And thisArminiusacknowledgeth in these words:Necesse itaq; est, ut cum Deus potentiæ creaturæ actum aliquem permittit, creatura illa conservetur, ut sit, & vivat, potentia ejusdem permaneat, idonea ad actum producendum, nulla major vel æqualis potentia opponatur, objectum deniq; offeratur, & potentia permittatur. From whence therefore to instance in the first sin of the Angels andAdam, besides the equal power and liberty of will that they had to sin or not to sin, it is manifest that God willed and determined not to withdraw his conservative power from them, but that they might be and live in the very act of their sinning. Neither did he withdraw that power they had, nor opposed a greater, or equal power to impede them, much less did he create or infuse any evil into their natures, nor put upon them any coaction of will, to inforce them to sin, but solely left them to the power and liberty of their own free wills. And though by his prescience he certainly knew that they would sin and fall, yet he determined in his purpose not to hinder them, but by his providential decree did setdown how to guide and order that fall and defection the most advantagiously for his glory both in his Mercy and Justice. So that even in this there was no bare passive permission, separate and distinct from his will and decree in his providence, but only permission to the moral act of their wills, which by his wisdom, decree and providence, he ordered for his own glory, according to the Text:The Lord hath made(or wrought)all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil. The Hebrew wordhath wrought, doth properly signifie, to work by polishing, trimming, or framing and fitting, so that the wicked (who have made themselves so by the acts of their own wills) God by his decree and providence doth polish, fit and order for the setting forth of his own glory in framing the wicked for the day of evil, the evil of punishment and judgment.
9. Further it is necessary that the creature acting a moral act (especially in this case of the Angels andAdambefore their fall) have the liberty and freedom of will, and that the will at the instant of the act, be not restrained nor under a coactive power, for otherwisemalum culpæor sin would cease to be evil, and so there could be no sin at all. And thus far, and in this peculiar respect only, the Angels andAdambefore their acting of sin, and in the very instant of the act it self, were permitted, that is, God willed and determined not to impede them, but for the ordering of that sin and fall, the permission was conjoined with his will and providence, and not separate from it, or a nude permission.
Rom. 7. 8, 11.
10. Thatmalum culpæ, or sin doth arise by the occasion of a law; for where no law is, there can be no sin, and therefore the Apostle saith:But sin taking occasion by the Commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. So that sin considered as it is sin, is an Aberration or Deviation of the Will of the creature from the revealed law of the Creator, and hath simply and absolutely no other causality, but only the deficiency andἀταξίαof the Creature to produce it, especially in these cases of the Angels andAdamin their first acts of sin.
Psal. 73. 18.
Psal. 37. 10.
Psal. 75. 6, 7.
11. Now we will come to the application of this unto wicked Men as they are under original and actual sins, and that in these few examples. 1. It is not by a bare permissive power, but by his will and order in his providence, for hesetteth up the wicked in slippery places, andyet a little while and the wicked shall not be: yea, thou shalt diligently consider his place, and it shall not be. SoCainwas suffered to slay his BrotherAbel, but by and by he was sent from the presence of the Lord into the land ofNod: So he set upSaulto beKingoverIsrael, and soon after rejected him, and also destroyed him: these were by providence, not only bare permission. 2.For promotion cometh neither from the East nor the West, nor from the South: But God is the judge, he pulleth down one, and setteth up another.So wickedHamanwas set up to be the highest in the Kingdom nextAhasuerus, and got a decree to have all the Jewes putto death, and had set up a pair of Gallows to hangMordecaiupon, and yet see the providence of God, who quickly brought him to be hanged upon them himself: and this will be further made out where we speak of providence.
Resp. Fludan. ad Lanov.p.18.
12. Though those that ascribe so large a power unto Devils and Witches, do take it for granted that they are only under a bare passive permission, and that the faln Angels do act, what, when, where and how they list, yet is it a meer falsity, for they are under the rule of Gods Divine Will, decree and providence, and do act nothing, but as and so far as they are licensed, ordered and limited by his will and providence, and are under a punctual restraint, nay kept in the chains of everlasting darkness unto the judgment of the great day, as we shall prove at full in that Chapter where we handle the knowledge and power of faln Angels. And therefore here we shall only say this, that if Devils could do as much mischief as they would, and were under no restraint or chains, then none of the godly would be left alive. But it is manifest that Devils do act nothing (excepting the obliquity and evil of their own wills) but meerly as instruments of the Divine Will and Providence, for as the Christian Philosopher saith:Illa est impietas; nimirum ea falso attribuere creaturis, quæ radicaliter Deo soli sunt propria, & inter cætera, actum aliquem peculiarem in diabolo esse existimare, qui non est originaliter à Deo, & consequenter immediatè, cum essentialis Dei actus sit per se sine divisione in omni re.
Greg. in Dialog.
Isai. 42. 9.
Acts 15. 18.
August. de. Trinit.l.15.c.7.
Ephes. 1. 11.
Psal. 115. 3.
Psal. 33. 13, 14, 15.
Vid. Rivet. de Provid. Disput.1.
August. de lib. arbitr.l.3.
Concerning Divine prescience, which is as S.Gregorysaith,Præscientia est unamquamq; rem antequam veniat, videre, & id quod futurum est priusquam præsens sit prævidere, we may only note this, That it is certain and infallible, as saith the Lord by the Prophet:Behold the former things are come to paß, and new things do I declare, before they spring forth I tell you of them: Also,known unto God are all his works from the foundation of the World. “So that his prescience is that infallible vision, by which he comprehendeth all what he knows by one eternal, immutable and ineffable vision.” But this prescience in God doth not flow from the things that are to come to pass, but from his decree, by which all future things are determined, who dothall things according to the counsel of his own will, forGod is in heaven, he hath done whatsoever he pleased. But this prescience is not to be considered only by it self, as a bare vision, or inspection, but as it is coupled and joined with his providence,For the Lord looketh from heaven, he beholdeth all the sons of men. From the place of his habitation he looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth. Forming(or framing) likewisetheir hearts, and considering all their works. And this prescience considered solely by it self, is not the cause of the things that come to pass, for as the Father saith well:Sicut tu memoria tuâ non cogis facta esse quæ præterierunt, sic Deus præscientia suâ non cogit facienda quæ sunt futura. So that we conclude that God by a naked prescience doth not only behold infallibly the things that are to come, and sois only a spectator of what Devils and wicked Men will do, but also that he doth order, rule and predesign all their works and actions.
Andr. Rivet. disputat. Thes.1.p.4.
De provid. Trac.p.9.
Isagog. Christ.c.32.p.52.
1. As touching Gods Government and Administration of the World by his Divine providence, we shall in the first place lay down some of the definitions of it from the most sound and learned Divines of the Reformed Churches, and that in English, after this order. The acute and learnedRivetdescribes it thus: “Providence is an ineffable force and virtue of the Divine Sapience and Potency, by which God doth conserve and govern to his own Glory all his Works according to his eternal, most wise, and most free decree, and directing every thing in time unto its end.”Johannes de Spinadefines it thus: “Providence is the prescience and counsel of God eternal, most free, immutable, most just, most wise; most good, whereby God worketh and determineth all good things in all, but doth only permit evil things, and doth dispose and direct all things to his own Glory and the Salvation of his elect.” And much to the same purpose dothLambertus Danæusspeak in these words: “Providence is a most free and most powerful action of God, by which he not only stirreth up and governeth universals, but also singulars, in every one of their single actions. And (he saith) it is called a most free and most powerful act, because it can neither be hindered nor overcome by any law.” And to these for substance do agreeCalvin,Musculus,Beza,Zanchius, and the rest of all Orthodox Divines.
Exeges. Loc.6.p.143, 144.&c.
2. But we shall chiefly insist on that definition that is given by learnedPiscatorin these words: “The providence of God is his eternal, most wise, most just and immutable counsel or decree, whereby he doth most freely govern all things by him created to the glory of himself, and the Salvation of his elect.” To which he giveth this explication: “That it doth consist of a Genus and three differences. The Genus is the wordDecretumwhich is illustrated by four adjuncts; Eternity, Sapience, Justice and Immutability. The first difference is taken from the objects; which are all created things. The second from the ends, which are two, the Glory of God, and the Salvation of the elect. The third from the effect, which is the government of things created, which Gubernation is illustrated by the adjunct which is liberty.”
Acts 2. 23.
Acts 4. 27, 28.
Heb. 1. 3.
Matth. 10. 29, 30, 31.
Deut. 19. 4, 5.
Gen. 45. 5.
Prov. 16. 33.
Prov. 16. 4.
Rom. 9. 22, 23.
Rom. 8. 28, 30.
Psal. 115. 3.
Rom. 9. 15, 18.
Job 34. 13.
3. The parts of this definition are thus proved. 1. That the providence of God is his counsel and decree, appeareth most plainly from these Scriptures:Peterin his Sermon to the Jews upon the day of Pentecost saith:Him(that was Jesus)being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God(τῇ ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει Θεοῦ)ye have taken, and by wicked hand have crucified and slain. And again the Church atJerusalemin their prayers say thus:Of a truth against thy holy Child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together, For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counseldetermined(ἡ χείρ σου καὶ ἡ βουλή σου προώρισε γενέσθα)before to be done. 2. That all things created (nay also those things which do seem to happen fortuitously, or to be by permission, as sinful actions) are governed and ordered by the providence of God, as these Scriptures will sufficiently demonstrate.Christ Jesus the son of God, doth uphold(or sustain)all things by the word of his power. And doth not our Saviour tell us:Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your father? But the very hairs of your heads are all numbred. Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows.That place concerning the Cities of refuge, and the fleeing of the ignorant man-slayer thither is most remarkable, and is this.And this is the case of the slayer, which shall flee thither, that he may live: whoso killeth his neighbour ignorantly, whom he hated not in times past, as when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroak with the ax to cut down the tree, and the head slipeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour that he die, he shall flee unto one of those Cities, and live.And was not the action ofJosephsbrethren, sin and sinful in selling of him to the Ismaelites, and yet he acknowledgeth,that God sent him before them to preserve life. So that God brought good forth of evil, and doth order even the sins of the wicked to just and good ends by his Divine Providence. Again:The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. So when the Men in the Ship withJonahdid cast lots, by the Lords disposingthe lot fell upon Jonahwho was justly guilty, and so by providence pointed out. 3. That God doth govern all things to his own glory is manifest by these Texts:The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea even the wicked for the day of evil. And,what if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory?And that he governeth all things for the Salvation of his elect, is plain:And we know that all things work together for good, to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. So that if God be for the Elect, who can be against them? 4. That God doth govern all things most freely is clear, because he is omnipotent and supream, and there is no power that can either impede, or constrain him,For he hath done whatsoever he would, both in Heaven and Earth. And the Apostle saith;I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.Forwho hath given him a charge over the earth? or who hath disposed the whole world?
Gen. 37. 18, 19, 20, 26, 27.
Id.45. 5. & 50. 20.
Prov. 21. 1.
Exod. 7. 3.
Id.9. 16, 17.
Rom. 9. 17.
Psal. 105. 25.
Rom. 8. 14.
Matth. 4. 1.
Mark 1. 12.
Luke 4. 1.
Gen. 9. 27.
2 Sam. 24. 1.
1 Chron. 21. 1.
1 Kings 22. 22.
Judges 9. 23, 56, 57.
Psal. 81. 11, 12.
Acts 14. 16.
Rom. 1. 24.
Gen. 20. 6.
4. The several ways that God useth in governing the creatures in the world whether good or bad, may be comprised in these four ways. 1. He ruleth and ordereth them, by bending, inclining and turning of their wills and intentions, to serve and fullfil his decreeand pleasure. So when the Brethren ofJosephwere fully resolved to murther him, God by the means ofReubenandJudah, so wrought upon their minds and wills, that they were contented to sell him to the Ismaelites, that so the determinate counsel of God might be fulfilled; for though they intended it for evil, that he might never return to his Father, nor to have his dream fulfilled that they might bow down before him, yet God intended it for good, and so brought it to pass. And this he did not by changing or taking away their natures, nor by putting a coactive power upon their wills; but by inclining and bending them to his own purpose, so that the act was the act of their own wills, but the moving of their wills to spare his life was from the Lord: for as he that made the eye must needs see, so he that made the will must needs have a power to move, incline and turn it. And therefore the Father said well,Certum est, nos velle cum velimus, sed Deus facit, ut velimus bonum. And it is apparent that the hearts of all men are in the hands of the Lord, and he turneth and inclineth them according to his will and purpose, as saithSolomon,The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will. Upon which the note ofTremelliusandJuniusis this:Est quidem animus omnium hominum gubernaculum, quo velut naves in mediis aquis reguntur corpora & actiones nostræ: tamen ne ipsorum quidem regum animus ex seipso permovetur, impellitur, inhibeturque, sed Deus in singulorum animis, veluti clavum tenet. And concerning the wicked God saith:I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and multiply my signes and wonders in the land of Ægypt. And again: Andindeed for this cause, have I raised(made thee stand,feci ut existeres, asBezanotes)thee up, for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth. And as yet exaltest thou thy self against my people, that thou wilt not let them go?And further the Text saith:He turned their hearts, to hate his people, to deal subtilly with his servants. 2. God also ruleth and ordereth his creatures by leading, drawing, inciting and moving their wills to his own ends and purposes, as sometimes to good, as in his own people:For as many as are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God. And so was our Saviourled, or driven (ἐκβάλλει, ἤγετο, ἀνήχθη)into the wilderness, to be tempted of the devil. To this agreeth the blessing and prophecie ofNoah:God shall perswade, or allureJaphet,to dwell in the tents of Shem. Sometimes God inciteth the creatures to evil by the ministery of Satan, as is manifest in these examples. For the Text saith,And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, to say, Go number Israel and Judah. And another place saith:And Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number the people. Whereby it is plain that Satan was the instrument, as sent and ordered of God to moveDavidto number the people, that thereby the King and people might be punished, and the King thereby brought to a deeper sight of his sins, repentance, and a closertrusting and adhering to his God. So when the Lord intended to haveAhabto go up toRamoth Gileadthat he might be slain, he sent forth an evil Angel, to be a lying spirit in allAhabsProphets, and said unto him,Thou shalt perswade him, and prevail also: Go forth and do so. So that what God orders, Satan doth but execute. So when God intended to punish and destroyAbimelech, and the Men ofShechem, he sent an evil spirit between them to divide them, and so accomplisht his will upon both parties, as saith the Text:Thus God rendred the wickedness of Abimelech which he did unto his father, in slaying his seventy brethren. And all the evil of the men of Shechem, did God render upon their heads: and upon them came the curse of Jotham the son of Jerubbaal.3. God ruleth his creatures by permission, or his will of not impeding them to act according to their wills and power, as in these cases. For God speaking of his people ofIsraelsaith:But my people would not hearken unto my voice; and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up unto their own hearts lusts, and they walked in their own counsels.Agreeable to which is that in theActs:Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways: which is asBezanotes:Ex arbitrio suo vivere, nulla ipsis præscripta ratione religionis. And in this sense, and to this purpose it is thatGod gave(παρέδωκεν)them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts; because of that horrible Idolatry that formerly they were guilty of. 4. God ruleth his creatures by his providence, sometimes by repressing, prohibiting and impeding the execution of their wicked wills, as is clear in the case ofAbimelechKing ofGerar, who tookSarahAbrahamsWife intending to have had carnal knowledge of her, but God plagued him and his Family, and said;For I also withheld thee from sinning against me; therefore I suffered thee not to touch her.
Now we shall come to consider how the faln Angels are under the rule and restraint of this Divine and all-governing providence, wherein we shall make it appear, that they act nothing in this elementary and sublunary World, after any corporeal manner, but as they are ordered, licensed and limited by the will and decree of the Almighty, and so do not wander and rove at their own pleasures to act in corporeal things, what, when and how they list, as the Witchmongers vainly suppose, and this we shall clear in these particulars.
1. It cannot rationally be supposed that God is less wise, in ruling and ordering the Prince of darkness, the Prince of Devils, and the head of all Rebellion and Rebels, than he is in ruling his Subjects and Servants, which are all wicked men; but all these he ruleth with a rod of Iron, and breaketh them in sunder like a Potters vessel: And therefore much more hath he a restraint upon, and a rule over the faln Angels who kept not their first estates, and therefore are reserved in chains in darkness until the judgment of the great day.