CHAP. X.
Whether faln Angels be Corporeal or simply Incorporeal, and the absurdity of the assuming of Bodies, and the like consequents.
I am not insensible what great censure I may incurr for entring upon such a ticklish and nice point as the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels, seeing it hath exercised and crucified the wits of the most learned in all ages, especially being but an obscure person, and not heightned with those lofty titles that usually elevate Mens fames, more by those attributes than by the weight and strength of their arguments. Yet it being no necessary Article of the Christian Faith, but that a Man may lawfully defend either, it cannot rationally be judged by understanding Readers either to be pride or just offence for me to handle this subject. For seeing that most of the Christian and Learned Fathers for the space of four hundred years after Christ, were of the opinion that they were corporeal,it can be no novelty in me to revive or assert that opinion, and therefore I shall labour to make it manifest in this ensuing order.
The immort. of the Soul, p. 7, 8.
Nov. Organ.lib.1.p.49.
Ibid.p.21.
1. There is a late way of arguing taken up by Dr.Mooreand others, that they will undertake to prove a thing to be so or so, or else to make Man to deny his own faculties. And so the said Doctor doth undertake to prove the existence of immaterial and incorporeal beings, or else he thinketh he bringeth Men to deny their own faculties: And these faculties he maketh to be, common notions, external sense, and evident and undeniable deductions of reason. And concludeth that, what is not consonant to all or some of these is meer fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of truth or falshood, by either its vigour or perplexiveness. But this will not accomplish the business he intends, for these reasons. 1. Because there is not the common notion of a spiritual and immaterial being in all or any Man, neither is it (to use his own words) true at first sight to all men in their wits upon a clear perception of the terms, without any further discourse or reasoning, but is only a bare supposition without any proof or evidence at all. 2. The being of an immaterial and spiritual substance can no way incurr into the senses nor affect them, because it is manifest (asDes Carteshath sufficiently proved) that all sensation is procured by corporeal contact, and not otherwise. And though we deny not that there have been, are and may be apparitions, that cannot be rationally supposed to be the ordinaryPhænomenaof corporeal matter, yet affecting the senses, there must be something in them that performeth that effect, that is corporeal, or else the senses could not be wrought upon, forimmateriale non agit in materiale, nisi eminenter ut Deus. 3. No right deductions can possibly be drawn from the highest power of ratiocination, where the understanding hath no cognoscibility of the things that reason would draw its conclusions from, for as the same Doctor frameth his Axiome which is this: Whatsoever things are in themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become known to our faculties or cognitive powers. But we assert (which we shall make good anon) that our faculties or cognitive powers (how far soever some would vainly magnifie and extol them) have not the power of understanding beings that are simply and absolutely immaterial and incorporeal. 4. There is nothing that is more undoubtedly true than what the LordVerulamhath told us in these words:Causa vero & radix ferè omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est: quod dum mentis humanæ vires falso miramur & extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quæramus. And again:Subtilitas naturæ subtilitatem sensûs & intellectûs multis partibus superat, the which may be proved from many undeniable instances, which need not here be mentioned, only we shall add what the aforesaid learned Lord speaks to the same purpose which is this: “The fault of sense is twofold: For it either forsaketh or deceiveth us. For first there are many things that escape the sense, though rightly disposed, and no way impeded either by the subtilty of the whole body or by the minuteness of theparts, or by the distance of place, or tardity and velocity of motion, or by the familiarity of the object, or by reason of other causes. Neither again, where the sense doth apprehend the thing, are those apprehensions sufficiently firm. For the testimony and information of sense is always from the Analogie of Man, not from the Analogie of the Universe.” And it is altogether asserted with great error, that sense is the measure of things. Neither can these notions the Doctor would make so clear, be had or gathered, without some intimation from some of the senses.
An Antidot. &c.p.12.
Immortal.p.21.
2. Further the Doctor tells us that the Idea of a Spirit is as easie a notion, as of any other substance whatsoever. And he also saith: “Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that his Idea or notion (speaking of God) is as easy as any notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the World.” This later he speaketh concerning God. But that these assertions are unsound, these following reasons will sufficiently evince.
Reas. 1.
1. He doth define a Spirit thus: A Spirit is a substance penetrable and indiscerpible. Now if it be true that he affirms before, that, “the subject, or naked essence, or substance of a thing is utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties, and that if we take away aptitudes, operations, properties and modifications from a subject, that then the conception vanisheth into nothing, but into the Idea of a meer undiversificated substance, so that one substance is not then distinguishable from another, but only from accidents or modes, to which properly belongs no subsistence.” So then if we take away penetrability and indiscerpibility, which are but the modes and properties of a Spirit, whose genus he maketh substance to be, then it vanisheth into an indistinguishable notion, and so his definition comes to nothing.
Reas. 2.
2. For if substances be known by their properties and modifications, as we grant they are, the modifications and properties must of necessity be some ways known unto us: but there are no ways either by common notions, evidence of the senses, or sound deductions of reason that can certainly inform us of these properties or modifications of penetrability and indiscerpibility, and the Doctor yet never proved either; but is only a bare supposition, and a melancholy figment.
Reas. 3.
The Immort. p. 68.
De Inject.p.598.
De Natur. Subst. Energ.p.406.
3. He tells us that all substance has dimensions, that is, length, breadth and depth, but all has not impenetrability, and boldly saith: It is not the Characteristical of a body to have dimensions, but to be impenetrable; to which we answer. It is strongly asserted by learnedHelmont, that by the ultimate strength of nature, bodies do sometimes penetrate themselves and one another, and to that purpose he giveth convincing examples, and concludeth thus from them.Invenio equidem, naturæ contiguam dimensionum penetrationem, licet non ordinariam. And after saith thus: Quibus constat corpora solida, satis magna, penetrasse stomachum, intestina, uterum,omentum, abdomen, pleuram, vesicam, membranas inquam, tanti vulneris impatientes. Id est, absq; vulnere cultros per istas membranas transmissos. Quod æquivalet penetrationi dimensionum, factæ in natura, absq; ope Diaboli.And to the same purpose that most acute person, Dr.Glisson, handling this very point saith:Verum enimverò, si sola quantitas actualis sit causa impenetrabilitatis corporum (ut ex supra dictis liquet,) eaq; sit naturaliter mutabilis; quid impedit ne substantia materialis aliam substantiam, mutatâ quantitate, novâq; simul assumptâ utrisq; communi, penetret?And therefore we may as confidently deny his assumption, that Impenetrability is the Characteristical of body, as he affirm it without proof, and must with all the whole company of the learned, assign Extension to be the true and Genuine Character of Body. And further he granting that substance hath length, breadth, and depth, we must of necessity conclude, that whatsoever hath those properties must needs be material and corporeal, and so that which he would make to be Spirit is meerly Body.
Reas. 4.
Nov. organ.p.18.
4. Whereas he saith that the notion of Spirit is as easy a notion, as any other whatsoever, it is granted, but is not at all to the purpose: for our inquiry need not be of the facility of a notion, but of the verity of it, that is, of the congruity and adequation of the notion and the thing from whence it is taken; otherwise though the notion be easy, yet without an adequate congruity to the thing it is meerly false. As for instance, when a melancholy person doth verily imagine himself to be changed into a Wolf or Dog, it is not only an easy notion, but also it is truly a notion, and yet a false notion, because there is no true congruity betwixt it and the thing from whence it is taken, the Body of the person so conceiving, being not at all changed into Wolf or Dog, but still retaining its humane shape and figure. And therefore the LordVerulamdoth to this point speak truly and clearly in these words:Itaq; si notiones ipsæ mentis (quæ verborum quasi anima sunt, & totius hujusmodi structuræ ac fabricæ basis) malè ac temere à rebus abstractæ, & vagæ, nec satis definitæ & circumscriptæ, deniq; multis modis vitiosæ fuerint, omnia ruunt.And therefore the Doctor might very well have considered, whether these his new notions had been fitly and rightly drawn from the things, to which he doth so confidently affix them, before he had so boldly asserted them, which though they be truly his notions, that is, that he did think, conceive, and frame them, yet they are not truly abstracted from the things: And so he may be rather judged to be led by speculative and Philosophick Enthusiasm, than by the clear light of a sound understanding.
Reas. 5.
Job 11. 12.
1 Kings 8. 27.
5. And concerning his Tenent that the Idea or Notion of God is as easy as the notion of any thing else whatsoever, that the notion may be easy we grant; but whether it be true and adequate, there lies the question. For those old Hereticks that held that God had Eyes, Ears, Head, Hands and Feet and the like, had an easie notionof it, conceiving him to have humane members, but I hope the Doctor will not say that this notion of theirs was a notion truly drawn from the nature and being of God, because there is no corporeity in him at all. And it is and hath been the Tenent of all Orthodox Divines, Ancient, Middle and Modern, that God in his own nature and being is infinite and incomprehensible, and therefore there can no true and adequate notion of him, as being so, be duly and rightly gathered in the understanding of creatures; and so the Doctors position or notion must needs be Phantastry and imaginary Enthusiasm. For as there are many things in nature that in themselves are finite and comprehensible, that as he grants of naked essence or substance are utterly unconceivable to any of our faculties; much more must the being of God that is infinite and incomprehensible, which are attributes that are incommunicable, be utterly unconceivable to any of our faculties. And it is but the vain pride of Mans Head and Heart, thereby to magnifie his own abilities, whereas the Text doth pronounce this of him,For vain man would be wise; though he be born like a wild ass colt; that lifts him up to conceit that he can fathom and comprehend the Infinite and Almighty, whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain, and therefore cannot frame a true notion of him, whom perfectly he doth not understand nor comprehend, and the attributes of God are matters of Faith and not the weak deductions of humane reason.
Origin. sacr.l.2.c.8.p.233, 234.
3. Those that seem to idolize humane abilities and carnal reason, have not only applied those so much magnified Engines to the discovery of created things, wherein they have effected so little, that sufficiently proclaims the invalidity of the instruments or the inauspicious application of them, or both, all the several sorts of Natural Philosophy hitherto found out, or used, being examined, coming far short of solving thePhænomenaof nature, when even the least animal or vegetable affords matter enough to puzzle andnonplusthe greatest Philosopher, so that we may justly complain withSeneca, that the greatest part of those things we know are the least part of those things we know not; These engines (I say) though proving ineffectual to find out the true notions and knowledge of natural things, have also (like the fiction of the Gyants) notwithstanding invaded Heaven, and taken upon them to discover and determine of Celestials, wherein it is in a manner totally blind, or sees but with an Owl-like vision. For indeed the deciding of this point must be taken from the Divine authority of the Scriptures, and the clear deductions that may be drawn from thence; for this is that clear light, that we ought to follow, and not the Dark-lanthorn of Mans blind, frail and weak reason, for it isa sure word of Prophecie whereuntoit is goodto take heed, and not tovain Philosophy, old Wives Fables, or opposition of Sciences falsly so called. And therefore we shall conclude this point here concerning the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels with that Christian and learned position of Dr.Stillingfleetin these words: “But althoughChristianity be a Religion which comes in the highest way of credibility to the minds of Men, although we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have sufficient reason to make it appear that it is revealed by God, yet that any thing should be questioned whether it be of Divine revelation, meerly because our reason is to seek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a most absurd and unreasonable pretence.”
Gen. 2. 7.
Eccles. 3. 21.
4. In handling this point of the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels, we do here once for all exclude and except forth of our discourse and arguments the humane and rational Soul as not at all to be comprised in these limits, and that especially for these reasons. 1. Because the humane Soul had a peculiar kind of Creation differing from the Creation of other things, as appeareth in the words of the Text.And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.Upon which the note ofTremelliusandJuniusis,anima verò hominis spiritale quiddam est, & divinum. 2. Because I findSolomonthe wisest of Men making this question:who knoweth the spirit of man, that goeth upward: and the spirit of the beast, that goeth downward to the earth?3. Because it is safer to believe the nature of the Soul to be according to the Analogy of Faith, and the concurrent opinion of the learned, than to sift such a deep question by our weak understanding and reason. So having premised these things, and left this as a general exception and caution, we shall proceed to the matter intended in this order.
John 4. 24.
2 Cor. 3. 17.
1. We lay it down for a most certain and granted truth, that God simply and absolutely is only a most simple spirit, in whom there is no corporeity or composition at all, and what other things soever that are called or accounted spirits are but so in a relative and respective consideration, and not in a simple and absolute acceptation. And this is the unanimous Tenent of the Fathers, Schoolmen and all other Orthodox Divines, agreeing with the plain and clear words of the Scripture, as,God is a spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth. And again:Now the Lord is that spirit, and where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty. Therefore we shall lay down this following proposition.
2. That Angels being created substances, are not simply and absolutely incorporeal, but if they be by any called or accounted spirits, it can but be in a relative and respective sense, but that really and truly they are corporeal. And this we shall labour to make good not only by shewing the absurdities of that opinion of their being simply spiritual, but in laying open the unintelligibility of that opinion, and by answering the most material objections.
Argum. 1.
1. And first to begin at the lowest step, Body is a thing that affecteth the senses most plainly and feelingly; for though many bodies are so pure, as the air, æther, steams of the Loadstone, and many other steams of bodies, that they escape the sight of our eyes, yetare they either manifest to our feeling, or otherwise made manifest by some sensible effect, operation, or the like; yet for all this, the intrinsick nature of body as such is utterly unknown unto us, for when we speak of the extension of body, as its Characteristical property, we do but conceive of its superficial dimensions, its internal naturequatenus Corpus, being utterly unknown unto us; it being a certain truth, thatQuidditates rerum, non sunt cognoscibiles; and as DrMooregranteth, the naked essence or substance of a thing is utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties. From whence we argue,à minori ad majus, that if the substance of a body, whose affections and modifications do fully incur into, and work upon our senses, be utterly unconceiveable to any of our senses, much more of necessity must the substance of a Created spirit, conceived as immaterial and incorporeal, be utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties, because it hath no effects, operations, or modifications that can or do operate upon our senses.
Argum. 2.
2. And as we know not the intrinsick nature of body, so also we are ignorant of the highest degree of the purity and spiritualness of bodies, nor do we know where they end, and therefore cannot tell where to fix the beginning of a meer spiritual and immaterial being. For there are of Created bodies in the Universe, so great a diversity, and of so many sorts and degrees of purity and fineness, one exceeding another, that we cannot assign which of them cometh nearest to incorporeity, or the nature of spirit. And many of these being compared with other more gross and palpable bodies, may be and are called and accounted spirits, though notwithstanding they be all Corporeal, and but under a gradual difference. So the vital part in the bodies of men are by Physicians called Spirits in relation to the bones, ligaments, musculous flesh and the like; nay even in respect of the blood, lymphatick humor, lacteal juyce, or thesuccus nutritius nervosus, and yet still are contained within the limits of body, and are as really Corporeal as any of the rest, and so are the air and æther. And those visible species of other bodies that are carried in the air and represented unto our Eyes, by which we distinguish the shape, colour, site and similitude of one body from another, though by the Schools passed over with that sleight title of qualities, as though they were either simply nothing, or incorporeal things, are notwithstanding really Corporeal, else they could not incur into, nor affect the visive sensories: And these do in the air intersect and pass through one another (as may be optically demonstrated) without Confusion, Commixion, or discerpsion, and may comparatively be accounted spirital and incorporeal, though really they be not so. But what shall we say to that wonderful body, Image orIdolumof our selves, and other things that we behold in a mirrour or looking-glass? must this be a meer nothing, or an absolute incorporeal thing? surely not. For it is as really a body as any in the Universe, though of the greatest purity and fineness of any that we know; and how near itapproaches to the nature of spirit, is very difficult (if not impossible) to determine; for if it did exist when the body or subject from whence it floweth were removed, it might rationally be taken for a Spirit, and with far more probable ground than many things else that have been vainly supposed to be Spirits. And that these visible shapes of things, and this Image in the glass, are not meerly imaginary nothings, but Corporeal Figures and steams, is most manifest, because they vanish when the body or subject is removed, because thatnullius entis nulla est operatio, & Incorporeum non incurrit in sensus, and because they would pass through the glass, but only for the foil orBractealaid on the otherside, by which the Image is reflected. So that if we have bodies of so great purity, and near approach unto the nature of spirit, we cannot tell where spirit must begin, because we know not where the purest bodies end.
Argum. 3.
The Immortal. of the Soul.Axiom.2.p.6.
De natura substant. Energetic.c.27.p.379.
3. DrMooremaketh substance to be the genus, and spirit and body to be the two species, so that body and spirit are of one generical Identity, and so there must of necessity some certain specific difference betwixt them be assigned and proved, or else the division is vitious, and the property of spirit not proved, and so their opinion of spirit falls totally to the ground. For we affirm (and shall prove) that though a difference be imagined and supposed, yet it was never yet sufficiently proved, foromnia supposita, non sunt vera, otherwise all the impossible figments and vainChimærasof melancholy and doting persons might pass for true Oracles: but it is one thing truly to understand, and another thing to imagine and fancy what indeed is not, nor ever was. And though the supposition seem never so probable and like, yet it will but at the best infer the possibility of such an imagined difference, but not prove it really to be so, and therefore here we shall retort the Doctors Axiom against him, which is this: “Whatsoever is unknown to us, or is known but as meerly possible, is not to move us or determine us any way, or make us undetermined; but we are to rest in the present light and plain determination of our own faculties.” Now that a spirit is penetrable and indiscerpible, may be imagined as possible to the fancies of some, but cannot be clearly intelligible to any sober mind; for to imagine, and to understand, are faculties that are very different, and however if such a difference be conceived as possible (which cannot enter the narrow gate of my Intellect) yet the difference of being penetrable and indiscerpible, is not to move us to determine that a spirit hath those distinct properties from bodies, because they are but known to us as meerly possible. And therefore that these two differences of penetrability and indiscerpibility assigned by DrMoore, are not sufficiently proved to be so, we shall give these reasons. 1. If bodies in the ultimate act of nature can penetrate themselves and one another, as Helmont and DrGlissondo strongly labour to prove, then penetrability is not the proper difference of spirit from body, because then commonto them both. 2. But if it be taken for a truth (and the one of necessity must be true) that bodies do not, or can possibly penetrate themselves or one another, as the common tenent holdeth, and seemeth most agreeable to verity, for it is simply unintelligible and impossible to conceive, that two Cubes (suppose of Marble or Metal) should penetrate one another, and yet but to have the dimensions of one, and to possess no greater space than the one did formerly fill: And if this be impossible and unintelligible in respect of bodies, whose properties, aptitudes, affections and modifications are apparent to our senses, then must it be more impossible and unintelligible in substances supposed to be meerly incorporeal, because they must needs be more pure and perfect, and therefore less subject to such unconceiveable affections; and however, it can be no wayes known to our faculties or cognitive powers, that they have any such specifical property or affection. 3. As it is not any way manifest to any of our senses, nor can be proved by any sound deductions of reason, so it cannot be manifested to be any innate notion shining from the Intellect it self, and we ought not to take adventitious ones instead of those that are innate, nor fictitious ones for either, but to make a due distinction of each of them one from another. 4. Neither is indiscerpibility a proper difference of a spiritual substance from a corporeal one, because the visible species of things do in the air intersect one another, and suffer not discerpibility: and that these are bodies is manifest, because they affect the senses; and therefore that which is a property of some bodies cannot be the proper difference to distinguish a spirit from a body. 5. This is only an arbitrary and feigned supposition, and cannot be proved either by the testimony of any of the senses, by sound reason, or innate notions; and what is or cannot be proved by some of these (according to his own position) ought to be rejected. And therefore as indiscerpibility is no proper difference of a spirit from a body, no more is penetrability, which can no more be in a spiritual substance, than either in discreet quantity one can be two, or two one, or in continuate quantity one inch can be two, or two can become one. DrGlissonfrom his much admiredSuariusthe great Weaver of fruitless Cobwebs, hath devised another difference of spirit from body which he thus layeth down, as we give it in this English. “I assign (he saith) a twofold difference betwixt the substance of matter and that of spirits. The first is taken from the substantial (à substantiali materiæ mole) heap or weight of the matter. For I (he saith) besides the actual and accidental extension, do attribute to the matter this substantial heap or weight which is denied to spirits. But the sign of this heap or weight is, that if the matter in the same space be duplicated, triplicated, or centuplicated, that it will be made more dense twofold, threefold, or an hundred fold. And concludeth thus: I answer (he saith) that matter and spirit in this do agree betwixt themselves, that they both are finite, and from thence that they have this common,that neither of them can reduce themselves into a littleness that is infinite, or into an infinite magnitude. Therefore the difference betwixt them doth not consist in this; but in this, that a spirit whether it be contracted or dilated, is not made more dense or rare; but on the contrary, matter, whether it be contracted or expanded, is made more dense, or more rare.” To which we return this responsion. 1. It is usual with men, when by their wills and fancies they would maintain an opinion that is weak and groundless, finding they cannot clearly perform it, to bring in some strange, obscure or equivocal word, thereby to make a flourish, though they prove nothing: So here this learned person to make a shew to prove the difference of spirit doth assignmoles substantialisas peculiar to body, but not to spirit; but what is to be understood bymoles, he might know his own meaning, but I am sure there are few others that do or can understand it, and therefore is but a devised subterfuge to stumble and blind mens intellects, and not to prove the thing intended. 2. If by the wordmoleshe intend weight or gravity (and what else it can signifie is not intelligible) then it will not be a difference betwixt body and spirit, because gravity and levity are differences of bodies in respect of one another, and therefore can be none as he assignes it. 3. To assert that a spirit when contracted or dilated is not made more dense or more rare, but that matter whether it be contracted or expanded, is made more dense or more rare, is easily spoken, but not so easily proved: and rude assertions without sound proof, are of no validity, and may with as good reason be denied and rejected, as affirmed or received. 4. We have no density in bodies but in respect of the paucity and parvity of the pores, so that less of another body is contained in them, and that is accounted rare that hath many or greater, and so containeth more of another body in them, and are qualities or modifications that only belong unto bodies, and not at all unto spirits, and is but precariously taken up by the Doctor without any proof or demonstration at all. 5. If spirits cannot expand themselves into an infinite space, nor contract themselves into an infinite littleness, then where are bounds and limits of this contraction and expansion, or how is it proved that they can do either? seeing they are properties and affections of bodies and matter, and never were proved to be peculiar to spirits.
Argum. 4.
4. Those that are much affected to and zealous for experimental Philosophie, do often run into that extream, as utterly to condemn and throw away all the ancient Scholastick Learning, as though there were nothing in it of verity or worth: But this is too severe and dissonant from truth, as might be made manifest in many of their Maximes; but we shall only instance in one as pertinent to our present purpose, which is this:Imaginatio non transcendit Continuum. And this if we perpend it seriously, is a most certain and transcendant truth; for when we come to cogitate and conceive of a thing, we cannot apprehend it otherwise than as continuate and corporeal; for what other notions soever we make of things,they are but adventitious, arbitrary, and fictitious, for evennon entia ad modum entium concipiuntur. And therefore those that pretend that Angels are meerly incorporeal, must needs err, and put force upon their own faculties, which cannot conceive a thing that is not continuate and corporeal: But if they will trust their own Cogitations and faculties rightly disposed, and not vitiated, then they must believe that Angels are Corporeal, and not meerly and simply spirits, for absolutely nothing is so but God only.
Argum. 5.
Vid. Rob. Fludd. utri. Cosm. Hist.Tract.1.l.4.c.2.p.110.
5. If the Angelical nature were simply and absolutely spiritual and incorporeal, then they would be of the same essential Identity with God, which is simply impossible. For the Angels were not Created forth of any part of Gods Essence, for then he should be divisible, which he is not, nor can be, his Essence being simplicity, unity, and Identity it self, and therefore the Angels must of necessity be of an essence of Alterity, and different from the essence of God. Now God being a simple, pure, and absolute spirit in the Identity of his essence, if the Angels were simply and absolutely spiritual and incorporeal, then they must be of the same essence with him, which is absurd and impossible; and therefore they have Alterity in them, and so of necessity must be Corporeal, and not simply and meerly spiritual. And that as much as we contend for here is granted by DrMoorein these words: “For (he saith) I look upon Angels to be as truly a compound Being consisting of soul and body, as that of men and brutes.” Whereby he plainly asserteth their Composition, and so their Alterity, and therefore that they must needs have anInternumandexternum, as the learned and Christian Philosopher DrFludddoth affirm in these words:Certum est igitur inesse ipsis (scilicet Angelis) aliud, quod agit, aliud autem, quod patitur; nec verò illud secundùm quod agunt, aliud quam actus esse poterit, qui forma dicitur; neq; etiam illud secundum quod patiuntur, est quicquam præter potentiam, hæc autem materia appellatur.
Argum. 6.
Serm.6sup. Cantic.p.505.
Lib.5.
6. Therefore to conclude, these arguments do sufficiently and evidently prove that Angels are either Corporeal, or have bodies united unto them, which is all one to our purpose whether way soever it be taken. To which only we shall add these authorities; and first S.Bernardtells us thus much rendered into English. “Therefore (he saith) as we render unto God alone true immortality, so also incorporeity, because he alone doth so far transcend the universal Corporeal nature of spirits, that he doth not stand need of any body whatsoever, in any operation whatsoever, being content with only a spiritual nodd (or motion) when he will, to perform whatsoever he pleaseth. Therefore only that majesty of his, is that, which neither for himself, nor for another, hath need of the help of a Corporeal instrument, by which omnipotent will he is immediately present at every work.” And that ofDamascenis full to the purpose, which is this: “That Angelsquantum ad nos, are said to be incorporeal and immaterial: butcompared to God, are found to be Corporeal and material.” And of this opinion besides wereTertullian, S.Augustin,Nazianzen,Beda, and many others, as may be seen in the learned Writings ofZanchyupon this subject: with whose words we shall shut up this particular:Certum enim est, ex iis quæ scripturæ tradunt de Angelis, probabiliorem esse Patrum sententiam, quàm Scholasticorum: utram tamen sequaris, non multum peccaveris, nec proptereà inter Hæreticos haberi poteris.
And on the otherside, if they be holden to be simply and absolutely incorporeal, then these absurdities must of necessity follow.
1. If Angels be simply incorporeal, then they can cause no Physical or local motion at all, because nothing can be moved but by contact, and that must either be by immediate or virtual contact, for the Maxime is certain,Quicquid agit, agit vel mediatione suppositi, as when ones hand doth immediately touch a thing and so move it;vel mediatione virtutis, as when a man with a rod or a line, doth draw a thing forth of the water, both of these do require a Corporeal contact, that is, that the superficies of the body moving or drawing, must either mediately or immediately touch the superficies of the body to be moved or drawn. But that which is absolutely incorporeal hath no superficies at all, and therefore can make no contact either mediate or immediate; and therefore Angels if simply incorporeal, can cause no Physical or local motion at all.
The Immortal.l.1.c.10.p.72.
Princip. Phil.Part.2.p.40.
2. If Angels be absolutely incorporeal, then they cannot be contained or circumscribed in place, and consequently can perform no operation in Physical things. To which if they answer withThomas Aquinas:Quod circumscribi terminis localibus est proprium Corporum, sed circumscribi terminis essentialibus, est commune cuilibet Creaturæ, tam corporali, quam spirituali; This aiery distinction might have taken place, ifAquinashad shewed us what essential terms and limitations are, but of this we have no proof at all, and what was never proved may justly be denied. For what a definitive place is, was never yet defined, neither can we possibly conceive an Idea or notion of any such thing, but only as we may make aChimæraor figment of that which never was nor is. For though we may apprehend that they are not circumscribed in place, as gross bodies are, yet it is not to be doubted, but that they move from place to place, and do so consist in some place, that they occupy a certain space of place, and this is most certain, if we believe (as we ought) those things which the Scriptures do declare concerning the mission and motion of Angels. And therefore notwithstanding this frivolous and feigned distinction, we may conclude withTheodoret,Angelorum naturam esse finitam, & circumscriptam, eóq; opus habere loco. Neither doth that avail to solve the business, and make this a good distinction, which is brought by DrMoore, to wit, that there are two acceptions of place, the one being imaginary space,the other that place is the concave superficies of one body immediately environing another body, and that therefore there being these two acceptions of place (he concludeth) that the distinction of being thereCircumscriptive & definitive, is an allowable distinction. But by the Doctors leave we must affirm, that what he saith is not allowable, and that for these reasons. 1. Because imaginary space hath no existence in nature, but only in the fancy of the Imaginant,& entia rationalia, non sunt entia naturalia ex parte rerum existentia.2. Because it is a certain truth whichDes Carteshath taught us, to wit: That the names of place or space, do not signifie any thing different from a body that is said to be in a place, but only do design the magnitude, figure and site of it amongst other bodies. And that this site may be determined, we ought to have respect unto some other bodies, which we may consider as immoveable. And as we respect divers bodies, we may say that the same thing at the same time doth change place and not change place. As when a Ship is carried in the Sea, he who sitteth in the Ship doth alwayes remain in one place, if respect be had to the parts of the Ship, betwixt which parts he keepeth the same site: And the same person doth continually change place, if respect be had to the shores, because he continually receedeth from some shores, and cometh more near unto other. 3. Neither is this distinction good, because as the same Author tells us:Non etiam in re differunt spatium, sive locus internus, substantia corporea in eo contenta, sed tantum in modo, quo à nobis concipi soleat. 4. DrMooregranteth that spirits are substances and have extension, and we affirm that nothing can be so but what is Corporeal, and consequently must be in place circumscriptively, and therefore the fancy of a definitive place, is meerly a fictitious foppery, without ground or reason.
Object. 1.
1 Timoth. 6. 16.
Hebr. 1. 3.
1 Tim. 6. 13.
Job 34. 14, 15.
De Lithias.l.c.8.p.70.
And now let us examine the objections that are usually brought against this opinion, the strongest of which is to this purpose; that if Angels be Corporeal, then of necessity they must be mortal, alterable and destructible; to which I answer. 1. Because no Creaturely nature is or can be immortal,per se & ab intrinsecâ & propriâ naturâ, for God only is so as saith the Text,ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν,Who only hath immortality; Therefore the Angels whether corporeal or incorporeal, are not immortal, neither by themselves or their intrinsick nature, either (as the Schools speak)à parte ante, vel à parte post, because God only is so, exclusively considered in regard of any Creature, and so the objection is of no force. 2. The Corporeity of Angels doth not at all hinder their immortalityà parte post, for as God is only immortal in respect of Essence, Eternity, Infinity and Independency, so Angels nor any Creatures, are immortal in that point or respect, but only in regard of their dependency upon God, who by his conservative power doth keep them by Christ, that for the time or duration to come, they shall not die, perish, or be annihilated; and this he can and doth as well performif they be corporeal as spiritual, even as he doth preserve and conserve the bodies of the Saints in their Graves until the general Resurrection, and in the World to come doth keep them in immortality; though they be changed and made spiritual bodies, yet they remain bodies still. For it is hethat sustaineth all things by the power of his word; And it is hethat doth vivifie or quicken all things: and if he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust. So that the objection is of no validity, because no Creature is kept in perpetual duration,à parte post, ab intrinsecâ naturâ, sed ex causis conservantibus, which is the goodwill, benignity, and blessed influence ofJehovah, and not from any internal creaturely power. 3. Every spiritual and incorporeal substance that is created, is as annihilable by the prime power that created it, as is a Corporeal created substance. And on the contrary, a Corporeal or material substance is no more capable of annihilation by any power or efficiency of second Causes, than an incorporeal and spiritual substance is; and therefore whether Angels be simply incorporeal, or that they be Corporeal, it neither maketh for nor against their immortality, which consists only in the benign emanation of the Divine conservative power of the Almighty: And therefore doth profoundBradwardinedraw that invincible, and undeniable Corollary of verity,Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet Creaturam immediatiùs quacunq; causa creata. 4. Though the most of the bodies that are known unto us be divisible, alterable and discerpible, or dissipable in respect of our conceptions of them, yet actually we may find many bodies in nature that are not, nor ever were dissipated or disseveredsecundum totum, though there may be alteration in their superficial parts, as the Earth, the Sun, Moon, the rest of the Planets, and those great and glorious bodies that we call Stars; so that for the duration of bodiesà parte postwe can conclude little of certainty. And as there are bodies thatsecundum suum totum, are not severed or dissipated, so there are some bodies that though they may suffer division and dissipation into smaller parts, yet do those parts though most minute, suffer no real transmutation, but remain of the same Homogeneous nature they were before, as is most manifest in Silver dissolved inAqua fortis, wherein though it be so severed and dispersed, that it appear not at all unto the eye, yet may it be from thence recovered and redintegrated into its own nature as it was before. And also the Masters of the more abstruse Philosophy affirm to us upon their own certain experience, that though metallickMercurymay be divided into insensible and invisible Atomes, yet still it retains the nature of metallicMercury, and that thusHelmonttells us:Si non vidissem argentum vivum eludere quamcunq; artificum operam, adeò, quod aut totum avolet adhuc integrum, aut totum in igne permaneat, atq; utrolibet modo, servet impermutabilem sui ac primitivam identitatem, identitatisq; homogeneitatem anaticam: dicerem artem non esse veram, quæ vera est,sine mendacio, atq; longè verissima. So also there are bodies which although they suffer division and separation by some other bodies dissevering of them, yet by motion of coition they soon close and redintegrate themselves, having thereby suffered no detriment at all, as is most apparent in the pure body of the Æther, the visible species of things, the images in a Looking-glass and in shadows, which are all bodies. So that seeing bodies, no more than Spirits to be annihilable by second causes, and that there are some bodies that are not dissipatedsecundum totum, and that there are others that though they are separable into more minute particles, yet do they remain in Analytical and Homogeneous Identity, and that there are others that though they be actually for a small moment divided, yet they do instantaneously coalesce, and by coition unite themselves; yet we may therefore rationally conclude, that corporeity,quatenussuch, doth not at all take away immortalityà parte post, because bodies as well as spirits may be kept in immortality by the conservative concourse of Divine Power, and so the objection utterly falls to the ground.