5.Must H-bomb controls relate to deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material? If they must, can the present UN plan fully provide for these controls or does it require revision or changes in emphasis?
Should control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium call for the same emphasis and consideration which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has already given to control of U-235 and plutonium? Would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture furnish better insurance against illicit H-bomb construction than surveillance of U-235 and plutonium, or is the reverse more apt to be true? Are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium? Or is the UN plan, as now constituted, sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to take care of light-element control?
Since H-bombs require either U-235 or plutonium, as well as deuterium and tritium, and since absolute or near-absolute control of U-235 or plutonium is not possible, it becomes obvious that H-bomb controls must relate to both deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material. Since the UN plan does not mention them by name, added safeguards are necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium. No safeguards, however, could be devised even in this respect to provide absolute or near-absolute protection.
6.Is it technically possible to detect the manufacture of heavy water and deuterium through international inspection? Would an international agreement flatly prohibiting production in quantity be desirable?
The manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes. They may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales.
TheSecond Reportof the UN Commission comments as follows:
The international agency shall have the authority to require periodic reports from nations regarding the production, shipment, location, and use of specialized equipment and supplies directly related to the production and use of atomic energy, such as mass spectrometers, diffusion barriers, gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope separation units, very pure graphite in large amounts, heavy water, and beryllium or beryllium compounds in large amounts. In addition, the agency shall have authority to require reports as specified of certain distinctive facilities and construction projects having features of size and design, or construction or operation, which, in combination with their location and/or production or consumption of heat or electricity, are peculiarly comparable to those of known atomic facilities of dangerous character (p. 54).
Would inspectors possessing freedom of movement be able to locate deuterium and heavy water plants? Would aerial surveys and aerial photographs of industrial areas help detect processes which produce hydrogen as a byproduct and which might thereforebe concerned with the manufacture of heavy water or deuterium? Should quantity production of deuterium be prohibited even though it is used in certain types of peacetime reactors such as the Canadian reactor at Chalk River, the French reactor at Chatillon, Swedish reactors under construction, and a research reactor at the Argonne National Laboratory? Is it possible on technical grounds to enforce such a prohibition?
It would not be desirable to prohibit production of heavy water and deuterium in quantity since heavy water is the best moderator of neutrons in the large-scale production of atomic power for industrial uses. Furthermore, such a prohibition could never be enforced, since, as stated, the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes that “may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales.” What makes it even more difficult, if not impossible, to detect any violation of such a prohibition is the fact that the raw material for heavy water or deuterium is just plain water.
The United Nations plan assumes that the production of fissionable material cannot be regulated withoutstrict supervision over the mining of source materials such as uranium and thorium:
Without the control of raw materials, any other controls that might be applied in the various processes of atomic energy production would be inadequate because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the international agency has knowledge of the disposition ofallraw material. (Second Report, p. 30.)
Whereas uranium and thorium are needed to produce U-235, [U-233] and plutonium, the production of deuterium is not subject to such limitation of source materials. Only water, the existence of power, and comparatively simple plants are needed for the manufacture of heavy water and deuterium. In view of these facts, can the existing United Nations plan cope with the problem of regulating deuterium production?
In commenting upon spot aerial surveys, for example, theSecond Reportrecommends that “the [international] agency shall conduct spot aerial surveys in each period of 2 years over areas not exceeding 5 percent of the territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed 2,000 square miles, whichever is the larger. (These area limitations apply to spot aerial surveys only)” (p. 68). If aerial surveys were to be used not only in controlling raw materials but also to help in spotting deuterium and heavy water plants, must they be carried out more frequently than is provided in the existing plan?
TheSecond Reportalso indicates that a UN inspectorate should be compelled to secure permission, through a warrant procedure, before inspecting “privateand restricted property not open to visitation by the population in the locality, and in the case of certain ground surveys and aerial surveys which are additional to others which the agency may conduct without warrant or other special authorization” (p. 60). Do the technical facts surrounding heavy water and deuterium production suggest that such a restriction on an international agency’s authority would have to be modified?
See comment on question 6.
U-235 and plutonium may be used either in weapons or as fuels for peacetime reactors. Here is the reason most frequently cited for requiring that international control include not only inspection but also such further guaranties as United Nations ownership, operation, and management of “dangerous” plants. The potentiality, both for good and evil, that characterizes fissionables does not appear to characterize tritium, which has no known peacetime uses except as a laboratory research tool. Is it therefore possible that the reason for requiring inspection plus other guaranties as regards U-235 and plutonium does not apply to tritium and that inspection alone would answer?
If quantity production of tritium were altogetherforbidden—as having no peacetime purpose—the mere act of preparing lithium (the tritium raw material) for irradiation and the mere act of inserting it in a nuclear reactor might be considered a violation. Would such action be impossible to conceal from managers and inspectors stationed at each reactor permitted under the control agreement? Would an illegal reactor itself be impossible to conceal from inspectors enjoying freedom of movement?
A few private commentators have argued that the UN plan fundamentally errs in assuming industrial power to be around the corner. They estimate that this goal is actually a decade or two away and that meanwhile the control problem would be simplified if all high-powered reactors were dismantled. Does the role of reactor-produced tritium in H-bomb production strengthen such an argument?
The UN plan distinguishes between atomic facilities which are sufficiently “dangerous” to require UN management and facilities which may be operated by national governments and merely require international inspection. Since all reactors produce neutrons and hence might be useful in some degree—however small—in manufacturing tritium, is it now necessary to regard certain reactors formerly considered to be “non-dangerous” as now being in the “dangerous” category?
Are there other methods, apart from reactors, for producing tritium? If so, how can they be controlled? Would the right of the international control agency to own, operate, and manage “dangerous” plants and to own and regulate both fissionable materials and “fusionable materials” meet such a situation?
AUTHOR’S COMMENT
The most efficient and rapid method for producing tritium is by inserting lithium metal into a large nuclear reactor, thus exposing it to irradiation by neutrons, which transmute the lithium into tritium and helium. Tritium could also be produced in a similar manner in the smaller nuclear reactors used for research purposes, and though these smaller reactors would produce it at a considerably slower rate, the fact that the amounts of tritium required may be rather small would inevitably shift these reactors from the “non-dangerous” to the “dangerous” category. Such small reactors are essential for research, and their prohibition would strike a vital blow at the progress of science. Furthermore, they could be much more easily hidden than large reactors. This fact, therefore, weakens, rather than strengthens the argument for the dismantling of all high-powered reactors, as such dismantling would not prevent the production of tritium.
There are other, though less efficient, methods for producing tritium, however, that do not require any reactors at all. A good neutron source can be provided by exposing beryllium to radium, radon, or polonium. These neutrons could then be used to bombard lithium and convert it into tritium. Nor is lithium necessary, for at least four other elements, including deuterium, helium 3, boron, and nitrogen, can be transmuted by neutrons from the beryllium into tritium. What is more, even neutrons are not absolutely essential, since deuterons (nuclei of deuterium)and beryllium could be made to yield tritium by bombarding them with other deuterons. The latter method, however, would require the use of giant cyclotrons and would be very slow.
All this would indicate that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide safeguards against the clandestine production of tritium.
A key feature of the United Nations plan is the provision for a world-wide geological survey of uranium and thorium—the raw materials potentially usable in A-bombs. This survey is considered necessary in order to permit tracing of materials as they progress from the mines through various processing phases and finally enter a nuclear reactor. Does the same kind of logic apply to lithium—raw material for tritium? How formidable is the technical problem of locating and controlling deposits of lithium?
Pegmatite minerals constitute a principal source of lithium ores, which are currently produced as a byproduct of the nonmetallic mineral industry. Commercial deposits of lithium are known to exist in the Black Hills of North Dakota; northern New Mexico; Saskatchewan, Canada; and southwest Africa. Production of ores rose to about 900 tons of lithium oxide in 1944 and is now about 200 tons. So long as requirements do not exceed byproduct production, supply does not appear to present a problem. If requirements exceedbyproduct supply, the cost of the excess might be high. Lithium is now used commercially in glass, as a compound in welding fluxes, in storage batteries, in fluorescent light tubes, and as an alloying element.
Are the quantities of lithium ore required on an order of magnitude that makes control feasible?
Such a world-wide geological survey would be futile, as only a few hundred pounds of lithium would be necessary to produce enough tritium for a relatively large H-bomb stockpile, and such amounts could be hidden right now from available stocks.
Various critics of the UN plan have denied that management control over “dangerous” plants is essential to protect against violations. High-power reactors are among the plants to be classified as “dangerous” under the UN plan, and these same reactors are the ones which might produce not merely plutonium but tritium in quantity. Likewise, an international agency would possess authority to check the design of any isotope separation unit and to assume the right of construction and operation if these fall into the “dangerous” category. Deuterium may be obtained through isotopic separation. Do such facts as these refute thecritics and demonstrate that managerial and material control by the United Nations, over and above inspection, is more than ever necessary in order to prevent diversion of nuclear fuel or illegal irradiation of lithium?
In the light of the technical facts about the H-bomb, the argument as to whether managerial control over “dangerous” plants is essential to protect against violations becomes wholly academic. We have seen that even managerial control would not offer either absolute or near-absolute protection. No plan that does not offer at least near-absolute protection against the clandestine production of even one H-bomb per year could be trusted when a nation’s very existence may be at stake.
The United Nations plan would take effect by “stages”—one stage to include, among other projects, a world-wide geological survey, another stage, to involve, among other projects, the taking over of atomic installations, and still another to bring about the disposition of fissionable materials.
At what point in some such progression would national stockpiles of deuterium and tritium be placed under control? When this point was reached, would they be destroyed or be held in storage under United Nations auspices? If a nation pretended to makeknown its entire stockpile of tritium and deuterium while actually it kept hidden a substantial portion, how would the international agency discover such a violation?
See comment on questions 12 and 13.
When a control plan takes effect, what should be done with supplies of U-235 and plutonium in excess of a quantity immediately usable for peacetime purposes? This problem has received relatively little consideration in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. If excess stocks were destroyed, a valuable future source of energy and storehouse of neutrons would be lost. On the other hand, if the stocks were kept in existence under UN guard, seizure by an aggressor state might rapidly permit it to attack with atomic bombs—and innocent countries might have relatively little warning.
Such seizures might quickly lead, under certain circumstances, to the construction of “triggers” for H-bombs. Does this fact tip the balance in favor of destroying excess U-235 and plutonium? Or are these substances still too valuable and too difficult to replace to justify destruction? Is there a third alternative—possibly involving partial destruction or the use of “denaturants” or the construction of many power reactors,regardless of cost factors—to keep excess stocks of fissionables contaminated with fission products?
The problem of the disposition of existing stocks of fissionable materials was given little consideration because it was too hot to handle. From the very beginning Russia insisted that all atomic bombs be destroyed, and she left no doubt that she meant the destruction of the fissionable materials with which bombs could be quickly assembled. Even before the H-bomb, such destruction might have meant suicide to nations that complied, since they would have been at the complete mercy of noncomplying nations. The advent of the H-bomb makes all talk of such destruction, wholly apart from the waste of a priceless, irreplaceable natural resource, completely unrealistic, as any such act would be tantamount to abdication, a prelude to a super-Munich by the free nations. Denaturing, which makes fissionable materials temporarily useless for bombs, is also out of the question, since it would take a long time to reconcentrate them, giving nations with a hidden stock of nondenatured material a tremendous advantage that might well mean the difference between survival and annihilation for a nation that acted in good faith. All this also applies to the destruction of stocks of deuterium and tritium.
The United Nations plan envisages that reactors and other atomic facilities will be distributed amongthe nations according to “quotas” and a “strategic balance”—whereby no one nation, by seizing the plants within or near its borders, could gain an undue military advantage over innocent nations. This “quota” feature has been criticized as unnecessary and as likely to hinder individual countries in developing the peacetime uses of atomic energy to the maximum extent.
Does the fact that reactor fuels, if seized by an aggressor, might make available H-bomb “triggers” tend to render all the more desirable the “quota” idea? How long a time would an aggressor require to make enough deuterium and tritium for H-bombs in seized plants? Could a world control authority, by requiring that certain design features be incorporated in the plants under its control, extend this time period? What should be done with plants in existence at the time a control agreement takes effect and well suited to H-bomb production but poorly suited to peacetime uses? How should such plants, if they were not dismantled, figure in “quota” allotments?
From its very inception the quota system was totally impossible of realization. Today it is likely to prove a snare and a delusion, giving a false sense of security, since it could not guarantee against the clandestine production of at least one H-bomb a year. The plutonium for the trigger could be produced in hidden small reactors, while the deuterium and tritium could be produced in other small plants that could be equally hidden. As we have seen, tritium production does not even require a nuclear reactor.
Like the “quota system,” the system of “stages” has also become completely out of date, since it was predicated on the control system taking effect before Russia developed her own atomic bombs or had built her own nuclear reactors. Today there is no longer any logical reason for any stages, since any delay would make effective control more difficult. Even today, if an international agency were to take over stockpiles, it could never be certain that considerable amounts had not been hidden away. In other words, even if the UN plan were to be adopted today, it would not give security against a surprise atomic attack, which is the very purpose of the plan.
Under the United Nations plan, individual nations would be forbidden to engage in atomic weapons research, but such research would be performed by the world control agency itself, as a means of keeping it at the forefront of knowledge in this field and thereby enabling it to detect violations which might otherwise pass unnoticed through ignorance. Is research upon H-bombs so dangerous that not even the world control agency should be allowed to undertake it?
If an international agency is ever established, it is obvious that it would have to carry on research onH-bombs for the same reason that would make it vital for it to carry on research on A-bombs—“to keep at the forefront of knowledge” so that it would be in a position to “detect violations.” This would become all the more imperative just because the H-bomb is so much more dangerous.
In 1946 the United States transmitted six volumes of technical information on atomic energy to the United Nations. This was one important means of providing members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with sufficient basic data to discuss international control.
No similar body of material on hydrogen bombs has been transmitted to the United Nations. Can the Commission now discuss the control of hydrogen warfare without further official information on its technical aspects? If such information is to be provided, who should be the provider, the United States or the Soviet Union, or both?
All the information so far has come from the United States. In fact, the Smyth Report, the six volumes of technical information submitted to the UN, the testimony by scientists at the Congressional hearingson the McMahon Act, and much declassified information have been of invaluable aid to Russia in developing her own atomic bomb. It is about time that this one-way flow of information came to a stop. Not a trickle has so far come out of Russia—not even an official acknowledgment that she has exploded her first A-bomb—and until she shows her willingness to co-operate fully, we must stop playing Santa Claus.
It is now more than 4 years since the Acheson-Lilienthal Board made its recommendations on international control. Their findings have since been largely incorporated into the UN plan.
Do the events of the last 4 years make it desirable, for technical reasons, to rethink the control problem? Are the technical data of hydrogen bombs such, as to demand a recasting and change of emphasis in the existing UN plan? Have the prospects of large-scale peacetime applications of atomic energy sufficiently changed that a different orientation in control measures is desirable?
If re-examination of the control question is indicated, should this inquiry be undertaken in the first instance by a group of qualified Americans? Or should the United States suggest that an internationally constituted board initially take on this assignment?
Considering the strong Soviet opposition to the UN plan, is it useful to consider the problem of control? Is the Soviet attitude at all likely to change in the foreseeable future? Would a rethinking of the control problem contribute to a solution unless Soviet representatives participated? Would the appointment of a new “Acheson-Lilienthal Board” raise false hopes?
As indicated in Chapter IV and in the preceding comments, the UN plan for the international control of atomic energy is wholly out of date, and the sooner we realize it, the better for us and for the world. It was at best a noble ideal, which did not have the slightest chance of realization from the very start. A re-examination of the entire problem, even before the advent of the H-bomb, had been long overdue. Today it is all the more imperative. Since such a re-examination requires, or at least implies, the withdrawal of the plan, originally sponsored by this country, it should be done by an international board, preferably at the suggestion of some nation other than the United States.
The new board, in considering the whole problem anew, should avoid our original error of regarding control of atomic weapons as a problem wholly separate from that of other weapons of mass destruction. It should recognize the facts of life and not aim at bringing the millennium overnight. It should not seek absolute security, since the facts show it to be unattainable. Rather should it accept as a wise maxim that even partial security is better than none.
If the board set for itself certain limited objectives,they would have a much better chance of universal acceptance than if its aims were too high, as they were in the original United States plan, now the plan of the majority of United Nations. Its first limited objective should be a general agreement to outlaw the use of all weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations. This would mean outlawing the use not only of A- and H-bombs against large urban centers of population, but also of all other conventional weapons for the mass killing of noncombatants.
A second limited objective should be the outlawing of radiological warfare in all forms, which should include the use of the rigged H-bomb as well as the use of A-bombs in a manner that takes advantage of their radioactive effects. This would mean the prohibition of the explosion of A- or H-bombs from a low altitude, or their explosion underwater in a harbor.
These limited objectives would still permit nations to manufacture atomic weapons and to use them as tactical weapons against military personnel, while they would eliminate their use as strategic weapons against large urban centers. The very possession of atomic weapons by both sides, however, may in itself prevent their use even tactically. In fact, there would still be the hope that they would serve as effective deterrents against war itself.
The advantage of such a plan of limited objectives is the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that even Russia would not dare to turn it down and thus stand before the world as preventing the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons against civilian populations. And once we reached agreement with Russia on oneset of limited objectives, the door may possibly have been opened for further agreement on other limited objectives.
Peace, step by step, appears to be the only alternative to possible catastrophe. One limited objective after another must become our major policy.
A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET
A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET
A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET
The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins. This type belongs to the family of printing types called “modern face” by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders on the general design of Scotch Modern, but is more freely drawn than that letter.
The book was composed, printed, and bound by Kingsport Press, Inc., Kingsport, Tennessee.
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Also byWilliam L. LaurenceDAWN OVER ZERO[1946,1947]This is a Borzoi Book, published in New York by Alfred A. Knopf
Also byWilliam L. LaurenceDAWN OVER ZERO[1946,1947]This is a Borzoi Book, published in New York by Alfred A. Knopf
Also byWilliam L. Laurence
DAWN OVER ZERO
[1946,1947]
This is a Borzoi Book, published in New York by Alfred A. Knopf
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTESPageChanged fromChanged to56Valuing their liberty more their lives, the AmericanValuing their liberty more than their lives, the American122Einstein’s formula, E = mc₂, revealed that matterEinstein’s formula, E = mc², revealed that matterTypos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
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