MAJOR ANDRÉ.
The depression of the Americans was deepened by the treachery of Arnold. Conspicuous among their generals for energy and dash, he was a vulgar-minded, irritable man, ruined in fortune by his own extravagance, and with many enemies. He had been treated badly by congress, and was finally maddened by receiving a public reprimand ordered by a court-martial which was held to examine charges affecting his probity. Washington felt kindly towards him, and gave him the command of West Point, a highland fortress which was the key of the line of the Hudson. He had for some time contemplated deserting to the British, and was in correspondence with Clinton, receiving replies through Major André, a gallant and popular young officer, Clinton's adjutant-general, who wrote under the name of John Anderson. Determined to avenge himself on congress, he offered to betray West Point to the British. An attack was to be made on September 25, and Arnold was to arrange the American troops in such a way as to ensure its success. Had the plot succeeded, the Americans would have lost communication between the northern and southern provinces, and would probably have been forced to give up the struggle. An interview was necessary, and André sailed up the river in theVulturesloop, and met Arnold secretly on the night of the 21st. After the interview Arnold persuaded him to take shelter in a house which, though he was not aware of it, stood within the American lines, and gave him papers containing arrangements for the attack. The next day André could not find a boatman to take him to theVulture, and was forced to set out for New York by land. He had a pass from Arnold made out for John Anderson, he changed his uniform for a civilian dress, and passedthe American lines in safety. On the 23rd he fell into the hands of some American cattle-stealers; Arnold's papers were found in his boots, and his captors handed him over to a militia officer. Arnold received tidings of his capture and made his escape on board theVulture.
André was tried by a court-martial consisting of fourteen general officers, and was sentenced to death as a spy. Clinton made every effort to obtain his pardon; Washington was inexorable, and would not even grant André's request that he might die a soldier's death. He was hanged on October 2, and met his fate with dignity and courage. Inexpressibly sad as his end was, he was not treated unjustly; he entered the enemy's lines while attempting to assist their commander to betray his post, he was within their lines in disguise, and he was taken with papers upon him arranging the details of the betrayal. Washington would have been held to have acted with generosity if he had treated him as a prisoner of war, or even if he had granted his pathetic request that he might be spared the ignominy of the gallows. But an officer in command should not allow any consideration to hinder him from doing what he believes to be best for his army, provided it is not contrary to the usages of civilised warfare. That Washington was guided by this principle in sending André to the gallows may fairly be inferred from all we know of his character, and of the condition of the American army at the time. His conduct needs no other defence.[150]The traitor Arnold received £6,300 from the British government, and, it is painful to remember, a commission in the army, which he entered with a brevet of brigadier-general.
RODNEY AT ST. EUSTATIUS.
As soon as war was declared with the Dutch, orders were sent to Rodney, who returned from America to the Antilles at the end of 1780, to capture St. Eustatius. From a mass of barren rock this Dutch island had suddenly become a place of first-rate commercial importance. In order to supply our West India planters with food for their slaves, parliament allowed trade to be carried on there with the Americans. In St. Eustatius the goods of all nations were bought and sold; and British and French planters, American dealers and Dutch merchants traded with one another as in a time of peace. English plantersand merchants also used it as a place of deposit, believing that their goods would be safer there than in their own islands, which were open to attacks from the French. The wealth of the island was prodigious; the rents of the dwellings and warehouses hastily constructed on it amounted to a million a year; it had, as Burke said, risen from the waters like another Tyre to become the mart of the world. Like the British island of Nassau during the American civil war, it carried on along with legitimate commerce a brisk contraband trade, and its merchants supplied the Americans and French, their principal and most favoured customers, with vast quantities of naval stores and ammunition. It was practically undefended, and, together with its dependencies, St. Martin and Saba, was surrendered to Rodney without resistance on February 3, 1781. Over 150 vessels were taken in the bay, besides a richly laden convoy of Dutch ships which had lately put to sea. Rodney held that the island was a "nest of villains," and that its "infamous and deceitful inhabitants" owed their wealth to their support of the king's enemies by contraband trading; they "deserved scourging," and he vowed that they should get it. He confiscated all the property on the island, private as well as public, save what belonged to the French, who were open enemies. There was much truth in his indictment, but his indiscriminate confiscation was monstrously unjust.
The spoil of the island was estimated at £4,000,000. The king granted his rights over the booty to the captors. Rodney was a poor man, and was greedy for wealth; he seized more than the king could grant, or he could lawfully hold, for part of the booty belonged to English merchants. His conduct was severely and, though with some exaggeration, justly attacked by Burke in parliament, and in after years he was harassed by suits brought against him for unlawful spoliation. The booty sold on the spot fetched far less than its value, and much that was sent home fell into the hands of the French; for while Darby was engaged in the relief of Gibraltar, a French squadron intercepted the convoy which was bringing it to England, and carried off several ships laden with spoil. The capture of the island proved disastrous to England. A French fleet under Count de Grasse was unfortunately allowed to leave Brest in March, for England was embarrassed by naval conflicts all over the world.Rodney expected its coming, and sent Sir Samuel Hood, as fine a seaman as himself, and with a more single eye to the king's service, to blockade Fort Royal, in Martinique, in order to prevent four French ships which lay there from joining Grasse. Hood wished to cruise to windward of the island, which would have enabled him to force Grasse either to fight or to give up his junction with the four ships. Rodney, who remained at St. Eustatius looking after the loot, would not consent to this, because, so Hood asserts, he was afraid that the ships would slip out and attack the island.[151]Hood was forced to keep to leeward; Grasse got between him and the island, was joined by the ships, and so gained the superiority in force. Some distant and indecisive fighting took place on April 29 and 30, and finally Hood, being the inferior in force, and no longer having any reason to risk his ships, sailed away from the enemy. The French, though failing in an attack on St. Lucia, took Tobago, and, what was of graver consequence, Grasse was enabled, apparently through Rodney's anxiety concerning his booty, to maintain a strong fleet in the West Indies, which before long helped to bring victory within reach of the Americans. Grasse sailed for the American coast in August. Rodney was obliged by ill-health to return to England, and left Hood with only fourteen ships to follow the French fleet, directing him to join Admiral Graves, then in command in the American waters, in the neighbourhood of the Chesapeake.
CORNWALLIS IN SOUTH CAROLINA.
As the British forces were divided between New York and the southern provinces, it is obvious that the issue of the struggle depended on the command of the sea. So long as the British held the ocean way, the southern army would be able to receive reinforcements and supplies, and could be aided by diversions, the French alliance would be of little profit to the Americans, and the long land journey, expensive and open to attacks, would cut off the southern provinces from succours from the north. The navy, as both Clinton and Washington saw, "had the casting vote in the contest".[152]In July, 1780, soon after Clinton returned to New York from South Carolina, a French squadron brought nearly 6,000 men, commanded by Count de Rochambeau, to Rhode Island. A few days after the arrival of Rochambeau, the British fleet under Arbuthnot received reinforcements which made it stronger than the French. Clinton took measures for attacking the French by land and sea, but was called back to New York by a movement on the part of Washington, and a renewal of the plan was defeated by a quarrel between him and Arbuthnot. The seven French ships remained at Newport, blocked up by the British fleet, and though Washington obtained some help from the land force, the greater part stayed to guard the ships. Rodney should have attacked these ships as soon as he arrived at New York in September. He probably thought them of little importance, as they were thoroughly blockaded, and did not care to risk his ships within reach of the French batteries on the shore. The destruction of the squadron was within his power and was well worth some risk. Great as he was on sea, he did not understand the wide aspects of operations of war. The presence of the French compelled the British to keep a large force in New York and so hindered their operations in the south.
Before Clinton left South Carolina, he issued a proclamation which put an end to all hopes of neutrality; those who would not fulfil the duties of loyal subjects would be held to be rebels. This step caused many who would willingly have remained neutral to join the revolutionists rather than fight against them. The country soon became disturbed; the British were forced to act with severity, and the Americans, both revolutionists and loyalists, behaved with great cruelty towards their fellow-countrymen of the opposite party.[153]Partisan leaders, among whom Sumter and Marion were conspicuous, raised bands on their own responsibility, and fought against the British, acting sometimes independently and sometimes in conjunction with the forces of congress. Cornwallis worked energetically at Charleston, enrolling militia and providing for the administration, while Lord Rawdon with the main body of the army kept the border at Camden. Anxious to press on, Cornwallis desired Clinton to send a force to Chesapeake bay, to divert the enemy while he invaded North Carolina; but before he could advance further he had to fight for the southern province. Gates was appointed tothe supreme command in the south and was threatening Camden. Cornwallis hastened thither with his staff and found Rawdon with 700 sick and less than 2,000 fit for duty. The enemy was greatly superior in number, without reckoning 1,000 men under Sumter, who was cutting the British off from their supplies on the west side of the Wateree river. Cornwallis met them on August 16, and began the engagement with a vigorous attack on the American left, formed by the Virginia and North Carolina militia who, as the British advanced, firing and cheering, threw down their arms and fled. The British victory was complete; the Americans lost about 1,000 killed and wounded, over 1,000 prisoners, and their artillery and stores; the British casualties were 324. Two days later Colonel Tarleton smartly surprised Sumter, and dispersed his band, retaking a convoy which had fallen into his hands shortly before the battle of Camden. The defeat of Gates's army drove the Americans almost to despair.
Cornwallis was encouraged to pursue his grand plan of "conquest from south to north". Clinton, though he did not approve of his forward policy,[154]sent General Leslie with 3,200 men to Chesapeake bay to co-operate with him, and Cornwallis entered North Carolina and advanced as far as Charlotte. In spite of his brilliant victory he was beset by difficulties. The loyalists did not give him the help which he expected; as soon as he left South Carolina it broke into a ferment of disaffection, and his troops were not suited for the guerilla warfare largely adopted by the enemy, who were, Rawdon wrote, "mostly mounted militia not to be overtaken by our infantry, nor to be safely pursued in this strong country by our cavalry".[155]In this as in many other respects, the experiences of the war were repeated in South Africa in our own day. Before Cornwallis left South Carolina he detached a force of 800 militia and 100 regulars under Major Ferguson to scour the border and keep the country quiet in the rear of the army. They were met by a partisan army of 3,000 men under different leaders at King's Mountain on October 7; Ferguson was killed and all his men were either slain or captured. So severe a loss, combined with the anxiety of Cornwallis lest the important post called Ninety-six should be taken,put a stop to any further advance. Cornwallis fell back on Winnsborough, and bade Leslie convey his force to Charleston, which he was able to do as England had command of the sea, and reinforce him. The safety of the border was his first care. No sooner had Tarleton checked the inroads of Marion in the east than he was summoned westwards to protect Ninety-six from Sumter. He engaged Sumter's force at Blackstock on November 20, and claimed to have defeated him. Tarleton was a dashing cavalry officer, given to overrating his own achievements. His troops were few and weary, and at best he escaped defeat; but Sumter's band dispersed, for its leader was wounded and disabled for a while from further action.[156]
BATTLE OF THE COWPENS.
In December Greene, a general of far greater ability than Gates, took the chief command in the south. Cornwallis found the enemy on both his flanks. On the east Marion, then in common with Sumter holding a commission from congress, Henry Lee, and Greene himself endangered his communications with the coast, and penetrated as far as Georgetown, and on the west another division under Morgan threatened Ninety-six. Disaffection was spreading rapidly through the province. Believing that his one chance of conquering from south to north lay in pushing forward, he determined to march into North Carolina. Leslie joined him in January, 1781, and Clinton sent Arnold and Phillips with a large force to take Leslie's place in Virginia. On setting out for North Carolina, Cornwallis detached Tarleton to deal with Morgan. He brought him to bay at the Cowpens, near King's Mountain, on the 17th. Tarleton's force, numbering about 1,100, was slightly superior to that of the enemy, but he engaged while his men were weary after a hard night-march. Some of his troops behaved badly; he was utterly defeated, and lost nearly 800 men. This defeat was a severe blow to Cornwallis, for it deprived him of the best part of his light troops, which were specially necessary for his march through a wooded and thinly populated country where much foraging had to be done. He determined to advance, hoping to get between Greene and Virginia, and force him to fight before he received reinforcements. He burnt his superfluous baggage and crossed the Catawba river. The two divisions of theAmerican army retreated hastily through North Carolina, succeeded in forming a junction, and crossed the Dan into Virginia before the British could come up with them. Having thus cleared the province of the revolutionary troops, Cornwallis encamped at Hillsborough, and on February 20 summoned the loyalists to join him. Some were coming in when, on the 23rd, Greene, who had received reinforcements, recrossed the Dan. Any further loyalist movement was stopped by an act of revolting barbarity; 200 loyalists were caught by Lee's horse on their way to the British quarters; they made no resistance and asked for quarter, but were butchered by their fellow-countrymen.
Cornwallis, finding it difficult to support his troops and being anxious to encourage the loyalists by showing his superiority in the field, accepted Greene's offer of battle at Guilford courthouse on March 15. His force scarcely numbered 2,000, while the enemy, regulars and militia, were 4,300 strong. The battle was begun by the British left, consisting of the 22nd and 23rd regiments, supported by grenadiers and guards, which charged and routed the first line of the enemy with the bayonet. The second line, formed by Virginians, stood steady and was not driven back without a severe struggle; so too the First Maryland regiment, in the third line, repulsed the first attack upon it with heavy loss. The Second Marylanders fell back before a battalion of guards, who pressed heedlessly after them and were suddenly engaged by the American dragoons. The guards fought fiercely, but were broken. For a moment things looked awkward. Then the enemy was checked by the British artillery and the guards were rallied by their brigadier O'Hara, who, though severely wounded, was still able to do good service. The British fought magnificently and won a brilliant victory. Yet it was dearly bought, for the loss of over 500 rank and file, a full third of his infantry, left Cornwallis powerless. His little army was in need of supplies and he marched to Wilmington, where stores brought by sea were laid up for him.
CORNWALLIS ADVANCES INTO VIRGINIA.
Being too weak to do anything further without reinforcements, he decided to leave the Carolinas, effect a junction with Arnold in Virginia, and attempt the conquest of that province, reckoning that success there would check disaffection in South Carolina and ultimately tend to the conquest of NorthCarolina.[157]He wished Clinton to prosecute the war in Virginia with all the strength at his command, even at the expense of giving up New York. Clinton, however, was throughout opposed to his forward policy; he would have had him attempt nothing beyond the power of the force which he left with him, "the defence of South, and most probably the reduction of North, Carolina," and he did not intend the troops sent to Virginia to engage in "solid" operations, which he judged to be inadvisable until he should himself take the field. The king and the cabinet approved Cornwallis's line of action.[158]He advanced into Virginia on his own responsibility. This step led to unfriendly relations between the two commanders, and after the war was the subject of a bitter controversy between them. Cornwallis effected a junction with Arnold's army on May 20, and in command of over 5,000 troops overran the province, Lafayette, with a far inferior force, retreating before him. Meantime Rawdon struggled gallantly, though unsuccessfully, against Greene in South Carolina. He defeated Greene at Hobskirk hill on April 25, but was forced to retire from Camden. The loyalists saw that the British could not protect them; the whole province was disaffected, and post after post was taken by Greene, Lee, Sumter, Marion, and other generals. At last, after Rawdon's return to England on account of ill-health, a hard-fought battle at Eutaw springs on September 8, which both sides claimed as a victory, so weakened the British force that it remained in and about Charleston until it was withdrawn at the end of the war.
To return to the spring of the year, Cornwallis's invasion of Virginia and the destruction of property there seemed likely to bring the war to a successful issue. Washington's army was in grievous want of supplies, the American marine was annihilated, their finances were in a ruinous state, and their resources generally almost exhausted. Powerful co-operation with Cornwallis on the part of Clinton was urgently needed. The issue of the struggle depended on the power of Great Britain to prevent a French fleet and army from undertaking a joint enterprise with the Americans. At this critical juncture England lost the superiority at sea. In May, Washington andRochambeau agreed that, as soon as Grasse brought his fleet over, they would join forces, and either attack New York or, perhaps, march into Virginia, as circumstances might direct. Clinton discovered their design, would not spare any troops from New York, and in June called on Cornwallis to send him part of the force under his command, and ordered him to take up a defensive position. Cornwallis retired down the James river to Portsmouth. Clinton withdrew his demand for troops and directed him to fortify a station on the Yorktown peninsula as a port for ships. He would there be able to take up a defensive position secured by access to the sea. Cornwallis concentrated all his forces, about 7,000 men, and fortified Yorktown and Gloucester. On July 6 Rochambeau, in expectation of the arrival of Grasse's fleet, brought his troops from Rhode Island (p. 219) and joined Washington at White Plains. It was agreed between Grasse and Washington that the united army, 4,000 French and 2,000 Americans, should march into Virginia and act in co-operation with the French fleet. Clinton, however, deceived by fictitious letters, written by Washington and designed to be intercepted, believed that it would attack New York, and remained quietly there while it marched half through New Jersey. Not until September 2 did he discover that it was on its way to join in a combined attack on Cornwallis. On the 5th it reached the head of Chesapeake bay.
CAPITULATION OF CORNWALLIS.
By that time the inferiority of the British fleet rendered Cornwallis's situation extremely perilous. When Hood with the fourteen ships of the line left by Rodney (p. 218) arrived off Cape Henry on August 25, Graves was not there to meet him; he sailed to Sandy Hook and joined him. The fleet, nineteen ships of the line, sailed under Graves to Chesapeake bay, and found that during Hood's absence Grasse had entered the bay with twenty-eight ships of the line. Grasse at once stood out to sea, for he was anxious to secure a junction with the squadron from Newport, under Count de Barras, which Rodney had failed to attack in the previous September. Graves, who should have caught these ships instead of aiming at the main fleet, engaged him on September 5, handled his fleet badly, and got his ships knocked about. While he remained uselessly at sea the squadron of Barras slipped into the bay. On the 14th the British fleet returned to New York to refit, and Cornwallis was leftwithout succour. Lafayette with a large army of French and Americans was already blocking the neck of the peninsula. Clinton attempted a perfectly useless diversion in Connecticut under Arnold. Washington's army joined Lafayette on the 18th, and Cornwallis was soon besieged by a force of over 16,000 men. On October 19 he was forced to capitulate. Of the garrison which surrendered at Yorktown and Gloucester, 6,950 men, only 4,017 remained fit for duty. On the day of the surrender, naval reinforcements having arrived at New York and the fleet at last being refitted, Clinton sailed with 7,000 troops to the relief of Cornwallis. They found that they were too late and returned to New York.
With this disaster the war in America virtually ended. Cornwallis in his attempt to recover the southern provinces showed a vigour and capacity which might, perhaps, have brought matters to a different issue if he had held the chief command. But his means were inadequate to meet the wastage caused by battle and sickness; he found the loyalists a broken reed, and his troops not well suited to the kind of warfare in which they were engaged. "Had Lord Cornwallis staid in Carolina, as I had ordered him," wrote Clinton, "and I had even assembled my forces at New York, and remained there with my arms across without affront, negative victory would have insured American Dependence."[159]"Arms across" seems indeed to have been Clinton's favourite attitude.[160]Cornwallis's advance into Virginia was certainly a risky movement, but it was a choice of evils and did not in itself entail disaster. Clinton reckoned, not without reason, that the Americans were too exhausted to prolong the struggle; he was in favour of desultory operations on the Chesapeake, against Baltimore and Philadelphia, with the view of gaining loyalist support, and of waiting until he had received reinforcements large enough to enable him to undertake a "solid" campaign in Virginia, without leaving New York insufficiently defended. Cornwallis believed that the best chance of success lay in securing a firm hold on Virginia. Germain, who still persisted in directing operations in America from London, considered Cornwallis's plan more promising than that of Clinton.He treated Cornwallis as though he had an entirely independent command, with the result that serious misunderstandings arose between Cornwallis and Clinton, the commander-in-chief, which hindered their co-operation; and while he approved of the plan adopted by Cornwallis he did not discountenance Clinton's proposals, with the result that neither course of action was vigorously pursued. It was by Clinton's order that Cornwallis retired to the York peninsula, where his safety depended on the continued command of the sea; the choice of Yorktown as his post was his own. It was not a good choice; but he had little reason to expect that he would have to hold it against an overwhelming force of French and Americans, with a French fleet in command of the sea. Clinton should not have been misled by Washington's simple trick into allowing the combined force to advance beyond his reach on its way to crush Cornwallis's army.
The true cause of the catastrophe, however, lay in naval mismanagement. The mistaken policy of employing the British fleet in various and distant enterprises instead of off the ports of the enemy enabled Grasse to sail from Brest unopposed. Rodney let slip a grand opportunity of baulking his plans off Fort Royal, and sent, perhaps was forced to send, Hood after him to America with an insufficient fleet. Partly through accident and partly through an error of judgment, Graves missed his junction with Hood. Grasse was consequently allowed quietly to enter Chesapeake bay, and Graves afterwards failed to use his ships to the best advantage. The loss of the command at sea was fatal to Cornwallis.
THE MINISTRY LOSES GROUND.
Tidings of the disaster reached London on November 25, two days before the meeting of parliament. On receiving them North's habitual calmness broke down; he threw up his arms as though he were shot, and repeatedly exclaimed, "O God! it is all over!" The king's fortitude was unshaken, and he showed no sign of agitation, save that, in acknowledging Germain's letter informing him of the surrender, he omitted to note the exact moment of his writing, as his custom was. The speech from the throne at the opening of parliament, while acknowledging disaster, contained no hint of giving way. Parliament for a while upheld the ministers, and the address was carried in the lords by 75 to 31, and in the commons by 218 to 129. Fox and Burke threatened the ministers with impeachment and thescaffold; and Pitt condemned their policy in speeches not less effective for being more moderate in tone. North announced that the war would no longer be carried on with a design of conquest, but only for the possession of posts on the coast which would be useful in the war with France and Spain. Crowded meetings in London and Westminster condemned the government. It was evident that there was dissension in the cabinet; North was anxious for an acknowledgment of American independence, Germain declared that he would never agree to it. By Christmas the government lost many supporters in parliament.
Its position was further weakened by continued ill-success in war. The Marquis de Bouillé retook St. Eustatius on October 25. Grasse returned to Martinique, and in January, 1782, the two commanders landed a force on St. Kitts and besieged the garrison. Hood followed Grasse with twenty-two ships, out-manœuvred him brilliantly, beat him off on the 26th, and held his station against a fleet of thirty-three ships of the line until February 14, when, as he was unable to prevent the fall of the island, he sailed away. The capture of St. Kitts and Nevis reduced the British possessions in the West Indies to Jamaica, Antigua, and Barbadoes. A joint attack on Jamaica was planned by France and Spain. Rodney, however, again arrived at the Antilles with twelve ships, was joined by Hood, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, restored the British flag to its proper place at sea. Nearer home, Kempenfeldt, the admiral whose tragic end is famous in Cowper's verse, dealt the enemy a severe blow. He was sent, in December, 1781, with only twelve ships to intercept a French fleet consisting, as the admiralty knew, or ought to have known, of seventeen ships with a convoy bound for the West Indies. Kempenfeldt took at least twenty of the convoy with troops and stores, but, overmatched as he was, he was forced to let the fleet sail on. It was dispersed by a storm shortly afterwards, and many of the ships returned home. The loss of this convoy seriously crippled the French in the West Indies.[161]In the Mediterranean, the garrison of St. Philips, in Minorca, which had been besieged since August by a French and Spanish army, was forced to surrender on February 5, after being reduced by sickness and war from 2,692to 600 men fit for duty, and eighty years after its conquest the island was lost to England.
During the recess the ministers, convinced of the folly of prolonging the war, arranged to go on without Germain. Carleton succeeded Clinton at New York, and Germain was succeeded as third secretary of state by the insignificant Welbore Ellis, and was created Viscount Sackville, much to the wrath of the whig peers, who tried in vain to obtain a vote that the presence of a cashiered officer was derogatory to the dignity of their house. The opposition gathered strength. A powerful attack by Fox on the administration of the navy failed by twenty-two votes, a motion by Conway for putting an end to the American war only by one, and a like motion was carried a few days later by a majority of nineteen. The government then introduced a bill to enable the king to make peace, and North sent envoys to Paris to sound Franklin as to terms. It was evident that the end was near, and the new government was eagerly discussed. Pitt, though acting with the opposition, took a somewhat independent line, and announced in the house that he would not accept a subordinate office. This from a young member not then twenty-three excited some amazement, but his assumption soon proved to be well founded. On March 11 George sent the chancellor, Thurlow, to negotiate with Rockingham, but would not accept his terms. Three days later the government escaped a vote of want of confidence only by nine votes, and on the 20th North announced the resignation of the ministry. George was in great distress, and talked of retiring to Hanover, for life would be unendurable to him if he fell into the hands of the Rockingham party.
THE SECOND ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY.
The two parties in the opposition, though acting together against the government, held widely different views. The Rockinghams aimed at a homogeneous ministry; they represented the aristocratic whig faction, were the enemies of prerogative, and were strong advocates of American independence. Shelburne, like his old chief, Chatham, was opposed to government by party, held that the king should have an interest in the government, and so far "be his own minister," and like Chatham had been hostile to American independence.[162]For politicalreasons, then, George was drawn to Shelburne, while personally he despised Rockingham and hated Fox. He invited Shelburne first, and then Gower, to form a ministry. Both declined. Shelburne could not afford to split with the Rockinghams; he knew that they could not stand without him, and he advised the king to send for Rockingham. George would not see Rockingham himself, and negotiated with him through Shelburne on the basis of freedom as regards men and measures, and as to the acknowledgment of American independence.[163]Rockingham formed his cabinet on the 24th. He took the treasury. Shelburne was secretary for home, Irish, and colonial affairs; Fox for foreign affairs, the third secretaryship being abolished; Keppel, who was created a viscount, first lord of the admiralty; Richmond, master-general of the ordnance; Lord John Cavendish, chancellor of the exchequer; Camden, president of the council; Grafton, privy seal; Conway, commander-in-chief; Dunning, who was created Baron Ashburton, chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster. To please the king Thurlow was retained as chancellor. Pitt was offered, and declined, a subordinate office. Burke was treated by his aristocratic friends as unworthy of cabinet office, and was made paymaster of the forces.
The king was defeated. His system of personal government through ministers supported by his influence in parliament received its death-blow from the ill-success of the American war. Before long he adopted a better system; he found a prime minister who could command the confidence of the nation, and he yielded himself, not always willingly, to his guidance. Meanwhile the whigs were victorious. How long they were to remain victors is yet to be seen. George was resolute, skilful in intrigue, and by that time well versed in politics. He was aided by the jealousies and mistakes of his opponents. Even in their hour of triumph they found that he gained an advantage over them. The cabinet was divided; its new members belonged half to the Rockingham and half to the Shelburne party, while Thurlow was the king's trusted friend. Rockingham acted unwisely in accepting office offered to him in a way which showed that he was not to have the king'sconfidence. Though he was prime minister, George gave his apparent confidence to another member of the cabinet. Shelburne was not unreasonably believed to be ready to make himself useful to the king with an eye to his own advancement. The seeds of discord and distrust were at once sown among the new ministers. Even while the ministry was in process of formation Fox sharply remarked to Shelburne that he perceived that it "was to consist of two parts—one belonging to the king, the other to the public".[164]
FOOTNOTES:[145]Coxe,Bourbon Kings of Spain, iii., 424-37.[146]George III. to North, April 18, 1782,Corresp., ii., 423.[147]Rockingham Memoirs, ii., 425.[148]Parl. Hist., xxii., 488.[149]George to North, Sept. 26, 1780,Corresp., ii., 336.[150]For the contrary view seeEngl. Hist. Rev., v. (1890), 31sq.[151]Letters of Sir S. Hood, Introd., xxxi.-xxxii., pp. 15-16, ed. Hannay.[152]Washington to Jefferson, June 8, 1780,Works, viii., 71; Clinton to Germain, Oct. 29, 1780,Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 283.[153]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 238, 246, 261, 267.[154]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 104 n. 3a.[155]Rawdon to Leslie, Oct. 24, 1780,ibid., p. 274; see also pp. 272, 278.[156]Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 3, 1780,op. cit., pp. 304-7; Tarleton,Campaigns of 1780, 1781, pp. 179-80; Stedman, ii., 229-31.[157]Cornwallis to Germain, April 18, 1781,Clinton-Cornwallis Controv., i., 417-18.[158]Germain to Cornwallis, March 7, 1781,ibid., p. 338; see also ii., 10.[159]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 43, n. 1b.[160]Rodney to Germain, Dec. 22, 1780,Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., ix., App., pp. 108-9.[161]Chevalier,Histoire de la Marine Française(l'Indép. Amer.), pp. 278, 280.[162]Parl. Hist., xxii., 987, 1003.[163]Life of Shelburne, iii., 125-32.[164]Memorials of C. J. Fox, i., 292; see also p. 316.
[145]Coxe,Bourbon Kings of Spain, iii., 424-37.
[145]Coxe,Bourbon Kings of Spain, iii., 424-37.
[146]George III. to North, April 18, 1782,Corresp., ii., 423.
[146]George III. to North, April 18, 1782,Corresp., ii., 423.
[147]Rockingham Memoirs, ii., 425.
[147]Rockingham Memoirs, ii., 425.
[148]Parl. Hist., xxii., 488.
[148]Parl. Hist., xxii., 488.
[149]George to North, Sept. 26, 1780,Corresp., ii., 336.
[149]George to North, Sept. 26, 1780,Corresp., ii., 336.
[150]For the contrary view seeEngl. Hist. Rev., v. (1890), 31sq.
[150]For the contrary view seeEngl. Hist. Rev., v. (1890), 31sq.
[151]Letters of Sir S. Hood, Introd., xxxi.-xxxii., pp. 15-16, ed. Hannay.
[151]Letters of Sir S. Hood, Introd., xxxi.-xxxii., pp. 15-16, ed. Hannay.
[152]Washington to Jefferson, June 8, 1780,Works, viii., 71; Clinton to Germain, Oct. 29, 1780,Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 283.
[152]Washington to Jefferson, June 8, 1780,Works, viii., 71; Clinton to Germain, Oct. 29, 1780,Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 283.
[153]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 238, 246, 261, 267.
[153]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 238, 246, 261, 267.
[154]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 104 n. 3a.
[154]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 104 n. 3a.
[155]Rawdon to Leslie, Oct. 24, 1780,ibid., p. 274; see also pp. 272, 278.
[155]Rawdon to Leslie, Oct. 24, 1780,ibid., p. 274; see also pp. 272, 278.
[156]Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 3, 1780,op. cit., pp. 304-7; Tarleton,Campaigns of 1780, 1781, pp. 179-80; Stedman, ii., 229-31.
[156]Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 3, 1780,op. cit., pp. 304-7; Tarleton,Campaigns of 1780, 1781, pp. 179-80; Stedman, ii., 229-31.
[157]Cornwallis to Germain, April 18, 1781,Clinton-Cornwallis Controv., i., 417-18.
[157]Cornwallis to Germain, April 18, 1781,Clinton-Cornwallis Controv., i., 417-18.
[158]Germain to Cornwallis, March 7, 1781,ibid., p. 338; see also ii., 10.
[158]Germain to Cornwallis, March 7, 1781,ibid., p. 338; see also ii., 10.
[159]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 43, n. 1b.
[159]Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, i., 43, n. 1b.
[160]Rodney to Germain, Dec. 22, 1780,Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., ix., App., pp. 108-9.
[160]Rodney to Germain, Dec. 22, 1780,Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., ix., App., pp. 108-9.
[161]Chevalier,Histoire de la Marine Française(l'Indép. Amer.), pp. 278, 280.
[161]Chevalier,Histoire de la Marine Française(l'Indép. Amer.), pp. 278, 280.
[162]Parl. Hist., xxii., 987, 1003.
[162]Parl. Hist., xxii., 987, 1003.
[163]Life of Shelburne, iii., 125-32.
[163]Life of Shelburne, iii., 125-32.
[164]Memorials of C. J. Fox, i., 292; see also p. 316.
[164]Memorials of C. J. Fox, i., 292; see also p. 316.
THE ROUT OF THE WHIGS.
The new ministers at once attacked the sources from which the crown derived its corrupt influence over parliament. They carried bills preventing contractors from sitting in parliament and depriving revenue officers of the franchise. As these officers, who were dependent on the ministers of the crown, numbered according to one computation nearly 40,000, and to another 60,000, out of an electorate of about 300,000, their disfranchisement was an important step towards freedom of election. A message to parliament recommending economy was extorted from the king as an introduction to a plan of economical reform which was brought forward by Burke. It was not so drastic as his earlier plan, for the king acting in the cabinet through Shelburne and Thurlow objected to many of the proposed retrenchments. Nevertheless, in spite of mutilations, the bill, which became law, effected a saving of £72,000 a year, chiefly by abolishing useless offices. The act also again provided for the payment of arrears of the civil list, amounting this time to £296,000. Burke nobly continued his work by a bill for the reform of his own office, preventing the paymaster from gaining the enormous profits appropriated by nearly all his predecessors. Another declaration in favour of freedom of election was made by the commons, for they at last accepted Wilkes's annual motion for expunging from their journals the resolution of February, 1769, declaring him incapable of re-election. The corrupt influence of the crown would, Pitt declared, be checked most effectually by a reform of parliament. Acting on his own account, he proposed an inquiry into the state of the representation, without bringing forward any scheme of reform. He pointed out that some boroughs were in the handsof the treasury, that others had no actual existence, and that many were merely the property of purchasers, the nawáb of Arcot, for example, returning seven or eight members. His motion, though supported by Fox, was rejected by 161 to 141.
IRISH INDEPENDENCE.
Most memorable of the changes effected during the Rockingham administration is the establishment of the legislative independence of Ireland. When Carlisle went over as viceroy in December, 1780, he was instructed that the government would not oppose the demand for ahabeas corpusact, but that he was to prevent parliament from declaring for legislative independence, or for a limitation of the perpetual mutiny act which kept the army beyond its control. The Irish parliament for a while steadily supported the government. The small party in opposition included Flood, who, after holding a lucrative office for six years, found himself unable to influence the government, adopted a hostile line, and was dismissed, and, above all, Grattan who had become leader of the party after Flood took office. But the force which was to enlist parliament on the national side was outside its walls. The volunteers grew in strength, and reviews of large bodies of them were held during the summer of 1781. They remained loyal, and when in September the fleets of France and Spain threatened the coast of Munster, they eagerly prepared to meet the enemy. At the same time the impending success of the American revolution encouraged them to demand independence for their own country, and as they were nearly 100,000 armed and disciplined men, while less than 5,000 regular troops were left in Ireland, their voice could not be disregarded. It soon made itself heard. On the invitation of Charlemont's regiment a meeting of delegates from the Ulster volunteers assembled in the church of Dungannon on February 15, 1782. They passed resolutions condemning the claim of the British parliament to legislate for Ireland, and the control which, in accordance with Poyning's act, the privy councils of England and Ireland exercised over Irish legislation, and they demanded the limitation of the mutiny act, and the independence of the judges.
Before the Irish parliament met after the Easter recess the Rockingham ministry came into office; Carlisle was abruptly removed, and the Duke of Portland was appointed to succeed him. Rockingham, Fox, and Burke were anxious to satisfyIreland, but the ministry seems not to have determined its exact line of policy. An attempt was made to embarrass the ministers by Eden, Carlisle's chief secretary, apparently in revenge for their discourteous treatment of Carlisle. Without consultation with them, he proposed the repeal of the act of 9 George I. which asserted the right of the king and parliament of Great Britain to legislate for Ireland. Fox opposed the motion and it was withdrawn. The next day, April 9, the ministers brought a royal message to parliament recommending to its consideration means of satisfying Irish discontent. The spirit manifested in the Dungannon meeting overcame the resistance of the Irish parliament, and the nation was united in its demands. Rockingham and Fox tried in vain to persuade Grattan to give them time for consideration.[165]On the 16th he moved an address to the king in the Irish parliament asserting independence, and it was carried unanimously. The ministers, misled by Portland, believed that the Irish demands might be modified, and proposed negotiation. Grattan refused, and they yielded everything. On May 17 resolutions, afterwards followed by statutes, were carried without division in both houses, conceding legislative independence to Ireland, restoring the appellate jurisdiction of the Irish house of lords, and limiting the mutiny act. Ireland thus became almost an independent state. It remained connected with Great Britain by the tie of the crown, it had no executive dependent on its parliament, and its legislation was subject to a ministerial veto. The revolution of 1782, pressed on by Grattan, set up relations between the two kingdoms which were anomalous and fraught with danger.