FOOTNOTES:

BURGOYNE IN DIFFICULTIES.

On July 10 Burgoyne set out to march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward, sending his artillery and stores by water to Fort George. His route, though not more than twenty miles, was extremely difficult; it was obstructed by trees felled by the enemy and lay through swamps and forests, and at least forty bridges had to be constructed in its course. He might have avoided these difficulties by returning to Ticonderoga and conveying his army by water up Lake George; but he rejected that route because he thought that a retrograde movement would discourage his troops and abate the panic of the enemy. His army did not reach the Hudson until the 30th. At Fort Edward his supplies ran short and he had to wait there, for his means of transport were not sufficient to bring his stores from Fort George. Garrisons had to be found for Ticonderoga and for posts of communication, and this diminished his army. Meanwhile the enemy was increasing in force. While at Ticonderoga he published a foolish proclamation reminding those who persisted in rebellion that he had it in his power to let loose the Indians upon them. Nothing would have induced him to commit so hideous a crime, and his proclamation only served to enrage the Americans and swell the number of their troops. The Indians were offended by his efforts to restrain them, and deserted him; they were no loss, for they caused more trouble than they were worth, and some excesses which they committed, and specially the murder of a Miss McCrae by an Indian who, it is said, was sent by her betrothed to bring her into the British lines, excited widespread indignation. Burgoyne was in sore need of supplies and made an attempt to seize the insurgents' stores and horses collected at Bennington. He sent only some 500 men on this service, for he was assured that the district was friendly. It was far otherwise. The party was surrounded on August 16, and another detachment formed of German troops which was despatched to help them marched so slowly that it did not come up in time. Both bodies were defeated with a loss, perhaps, of about 500 men.

News came of the failure of St. Leger's expedition. Onhis arrival at Oswego he was joined by Sir John Johnson and Butler with their loyalist regiments, and by a force of Indians whom Johnson, one of their superintendents, and the Mohawk leader, Brant, persuaded to march with them. He besieged Fort Stanwix, and, on August 6, defeated a force sent to relieve it. But his guns were too light for siege operations; the garrison held out, and his Indians forced him to raise the siege. During his retreat they mutinied; he was barely able to bring off his regular troops, and lost his guns and stores. Burgoyne was in a dangerous position; the country swarmed with enemies; "wherever the king's troops point," he wrote, "militia to the number of three or four thousand assemble in a few hours". He might have retreated to Fort Edward, where he would have had communication with Lake George; but he held that he was bound by his orders to advance, and on September 15, after collecting provisions for about a month, he conveyed his force to the western bank of the Hudson and cut himself off from communication with the lakes. Besides artillery, he had then with him only 5,000 men under arms.[126]On the 19th his force was partially engaged by Arnold at Freeman's Farm. The British held their ground but lost over 500 men, and Gates, the American commander, with 11,000 men, who did not take part in the fight, occupied a strong position in front of them. A message came from Clinton that he was about to attack the forts on the Hudson below Albany, and Burgoyne sent answer that he hoped to be able to hold his ground until October 20. He fortified his position and waited for further news. None came to him. The insurgent forces grew to at least 16,000 men; Burgoyne's provisions were becoming exhausted and on October 3 he put his little army on half rations. Despite the overwhelming number of the enemy, he moved forward on the 7th to ascertain whether he could force a passage through their lines. He was defeated with heavy loss and fell back on Saratoga.

SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE'S ARMY.

A council of war held on the 12th decided on a retreat to Fort Edward. It was too late; the Americans held the fords and had a strong force encamped between Fort George and Fort Edward. Only 3,500 fighting men were left with Burgoyne; he was completely surrounded, and on the 14th he openednegotiations with Gates. Even then he refused to surrender unconditionally, and the convention of Saratoga was concluded on the 17th. His troops marched out with the honours of war, and were to be allowed to return to England on condition of not serving again in the war. The whole number which surrendered, including camp-followers, labourers, and detachments, was 5,762. Gates's behaviour at the surrender was such as became an officer and a gentleman. Congress shamefully broke the engagement. The captive troops were marched to Boston, but when the transports called for them, they were not allowed to embark. The paltry subterfuges by which congress defended its conduct only throw a specially odious light on its sacrifice of honour to policy. From the beginning of the war both sides made frequent complaints as to the treatment of prisoners, and both apparently with justice. Burgoyne's men were shamefully treated. He and his staff were allowed to return home in the spring of 1778; others were exchanged from time to time, but the mass of the army never came back. Clinton, who was then unaware of Burgoyne's distress, did what he could to render his position secure in case he arrived at Albany. As soon as he received reinforcements from England, he pushed up the Hudson and on October 6 destroyed the forts which barred the passage of our ships. He could do no more, for he was forced to send 4,000 men to Howe and could not leave New York without a sufficient garrison. A messenger from Burgoyne at last reached him. The way being cleared, the ships ascended the river and burnt the batteries and town at Esopus creek. The news of Clinton's activity doubtless secured Burgoyne more favourable terms than Gates was at first inclined to grant.

The chief blame for this disaster must rest on Howe. His assertion that Philadelphia was the prime object of his campaign made Germain uneasy, and he wrote to him on May 18 that whatever he might meditate, he was not to neglect to co-operate with the northern army.[127]This despatch did not reach Howe until August 16, when he had made co-operation with Burgoyne impossible. A few days later Germain wrote again; the despatch was not ready for his signature at the time at which hewished to go into the country, and when he came back it was forgotten. It was a piece of gross carelessness, but an undue importance has been attached to it.[128]Howe was well aware of Burgoyne's expedition. On June 5 he had received a copy of a despatch from Germain which told him that Burgoyne was ordered to "force his way to Albany" and join him with the utmost speed.[129]Nevertheless, he persisted in pursuing his own plan. He must have hesitated whether to reach Philadelphia by land or water. When in June he at last made up his mind to move, he evidently tried to reach Philadelphia by land. If he had succeeded and had swept Washington before him, he might have kept in communication with Burgoyne and have co-operated with him. Failing in this, he decided to go by sea, and when he was told that he could not safely land in the Delaware, went on to Chesapeake bay. When he gained his object by taking Philadelphia he did so by a course which made it impossible for him to co-operate with Burgoyne, and put Washington's army between them.

According to the government plan the chief object of his campaign should have been his junction with Burgoyne. The government, that is Germain, certainly erred in not giving him precise orders, while Burgoyne had virtually no discretionary power. Yet it was for Howe, as commander-in-chief on the spot, to judge of the situation without explicit instructions. According to his own statements, his view of the situation was that Burgoyne would march through a friendly country and encounter no enemy except the army of 4,000 men under Schuyler, that Clinton would be able to give him any assistance which he might require, that his own expedition to Philadelphia would divert the enemy from Burgoyne, that he would be able to "account for" Washington, and that if Washington gave him the slip, he would be able to follow him up and prevent him from annoying Burgoyne.[130]These considerations may be supposed to have satisfied him that no direct co-operation withBurgoyne was required of him. Burgoyne had to encounter foes whom neither he nor Howe reckoned upon, and it was Howe's duty to be at hand to prevent their crushing him. Burgoyne made some mistakes in preparing for and prosecuting his campaign, but he and his men exhibited splendid courage, and he is not to be blamed for trying his fortune to the utmost. In view of his orders, and of the risk of leaving a co-operating force unsupported, he was bound to ascertain whether he could force his way through the enemy. The irregular character of the American force rendered success possible, and justified his gallant attempt of October 7. He was a fine soldier, and was regarded with confidence and affection by his subordinates. Clinton seems to have done all that was in his power considering the small force left with him in New York.[131]

EFFECT OF THE SURRENDER.

The surrender of Burgoyne's army could not in itself affect the issue of the war. Its importance lies in its effect on the policy of foreign nations and specially of France. So far as the Americans alone were concerned, England had good reason to expect ultimate success. They would neither enlist in sufficient numbers to keep up a regular army nor provide for such troops as they had. The meddlesomeness and incapacity of congress were destroying its army; generals were intriguing against one another, soldiers were perishing for lack of necessaries, stores were wasted. Money was scarce and public credit bad. Early in 1778 congress had 5,500,000 paper dollars in circulation, and the value of its paper dollar was from half to a quarter of the silver dollar. Above all, the Americans had no fleet, and were consequently unable to protect their sea-board. Their alliance with France and subsequently with Spain brought them, along with other help, the sea-power without which the issue of the struggle might well have been adverse to them. France and Spain hoped to recoup themselves for former losses, France by conquests in the West Indies, Spain by regaining Gibraltar, Minorca, and Jamaica. In 1775 an agent of the French court went over to America with offers of help, and early in 1776 the Count de Vergennes, foreign minister of Louis XVI., proposed as a system of policy that the Bourbon kings should give secret aid to the Americans and strengthen their own forces, takingcare, however, to persuade England that their intentions were pacific. About the same time congress sent Deane to France as a secret agent.

In accordance with the proposal of Vergennes the French and Spanish courts provided money for the Americans; and Beaumarchais, the dramatist, who masqueraded as a firm of merchants in order to conceal the participation of his government, spent it in purchasing military stores for them. The young Marquis de Lafayette and other Frenchmen entered their army. So too did the Poles, Kosciusko and Pulaski, and the Germans, Kalb and Steuben. In December Franklin went over to Paris. The philosophic movement was then at its height in France. Thephilosophesdesired freedom of thought in religion, constitutional liberty, and the abolition of privilege of all kinds. They speculated as to the origins of political and social institutions and the laws of human progress. The works of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were eagerly studied by the nobles and fine ladies of the court with whomphilosophismewas fashionable. America they regarded as a land of freedom and primitive simplicity; and they hailed the crude assertions of the Declaration of Independence, issued by a body largely composed of slave-owners, that all men are created equal and with an inalienable right to liberty, as bringing their theories within the range of practical politics. Franklin was received with ludicrous adulation as an embodiment of republican virtue and philosophic thought. He busied himself in stirring up hostility to England. Another American envoy sought help from Prussia. Frederick showed his hatred of England by forbidding some German troops which George had hired to pass through his dominions; but his quarrel with Austria with reference to the Bavarian succession rendered him unwilling to provoke Great Britain: he had no sympathy with the Americans and would not receive their envoy.

THE INTERVENTION OF FRANCE.

Besides the stores sent by Beaumarchais and 1,000 livres in cash, France helped the Americans by neglecting to prevent the violation of her neutrality by their ships. Although the Americans could not dispute with Great Britain on the sea, they had a few ships built by congress, more belonging to the maritime provinces, and a vast number of privateers. These ships did much damage to British trade. Already they hoveredabout the coasts of England and Ireland, and were so dangerous to our merchant vessels that merchants embarked their goods on foreign ships to avoid the risk of capture. By the end of 1778 nearly 1,000 merchant ships were taken by American privateers. Some of these privateers were fitted out in French ports, brought their prizes into them, and sailed from them again on fresh expeditions. Our ambassador, Lord Stormont, complained vigorously of these open breaches of neutrality, and at last the French government took some measures to stop them. The opposition in parliament constantly insisted that, if the war went on, France and Spain would certainly take part with the Americans. The government could no longer ignore, though it still strove to discredit, the danger of foreign intervention. The king's speech at the opening of parliament on October 20, 1777, took note of the naval preparations of the two powers and recommended an augmentation of the navy. Tidings of Burgoyne's disaster reached Europe on December 2. Vergennes at once informed the American agents that his master would make a treaty with them. The alliance was concluded on February 6, 1778; it was agreed that, in the event of war between France and England, neither of the contracting parties should make peace without the consent of the other or until the independence of the United States should be assured by treaty. France renounced all claim to Canada. If taken from England, it was to belong to the United States, while all conquests in the West Indies were to belong to France. Spain at this time declined to join in the alliance. That a treaty was signed was soon generally believed in England; it was officially declared by France on March 13. War between Great Britain and France began in the summer.

With the intervention of France the war enters on a new phase. Thenceforward England had to deal with more powerful enemies than the Americans. The war had lasted for three years and the rebellion was not crushed. Was it too much for England to expect that she would subdue a people of her own stock, as the Americans were then, separated from her by 3,000 miles of sea, and spread over a vast and difficult country? Had she trusted to her navy, as Barrington and others desired, shut the American ports, and held the towns on the coast and the navigable rivers, the insurgents might possibly have been drivento submission without any severe struggle. Conquest by land was decided on. Was Chatham right in declaring in May, 1777, that England could not conquer the Americans? Six months later a capable French officer serving in their army wrote to the French minister of war that, unless his country declared war against England, the Americans would fail to obtain independence; so little enthusiasm for the cause was there among them, so keenly did they feel the privations of the war.[132]In our war in South Africa of 1899-1902 the Boers showed themselves better soldiers than the Americans, and were not less brave; they were akin to us in race, and their country was at least as difficult as America. In both wars our well-drilled troops constantly found their previous training useless or worse; in both we received loyal support from numerous colonials on the spot. While improved means of transport brought South Africa far nearer to us than America was in the eighteenth century, the Boers were better prepared for war than the Americans, and were a more martial people. Yet England conquered them. So far, then, as the Americans alone were concerned, Chatham's assertion must be denied.

ENGLAND'S CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

Why then had England done so little in those three years? There was much active loyalty on our side: thousands of colonials fought for the crown during the course of the war; in the central provinces at least half the population was for us. Everything depended on the vigour and judgment with which force was applied. In these respects there was failure both at home and on the spot. In the first place the effort required was underestimated. In February, 1774, Gage thought four regiments would keep things quiet; in 1775 it was believed that 10,000 men would be enough; in January, 1776, Howe asked for 20,000, in November his estimate for the next year was 35,000. Germain promised to raise his army to that number, yet instead of 10,000 men he offered him only 7,800 rank and file. On March 26 he confessed that he could only send 2,900, and on April 19 that he had to subtract 400 of these for Canada.[133]The country was strong for coercion, but recruits were hard to raise; it willed the end but not the means. The king andGermain interfered too much with the plans of operations. To direct a war from the other side of the Atlantic in days when letters between the secretary at war and the commander-in-chief seem often to have been nearly two months on their way, was to court failure.

At the outset of the war the enemy was unduly despised both by ministers at home and soldiers in the field. As the British general in command at Belmont is said to have rejected a proposal for turning the Boers' position, declaring that he would "put the fear of God into them," so Howe at Bunker hill delivered a frontal attack on the enemy's entrenchments which cost him over 1,000 men. Then he went to the opposite extreme of over-caution. It is needless to recapitulate the occasions on which either from over-caution or supineness he allowed great opportunities to slip, as notably on Long Island. He, indeed, in a greater degree than any one else is responsible for the British failure to bring the war to an end. Every month improved the fighting qualities of the Americans, under the judicious handling of Washington, and at last France and the other enemies of England saw that they might take them seriously and might turn the war to their own profit.[134]

FOOTNOTES:[112]Johnston,Campaign of 1776, p. 125.[113]Mr. Johnston contends that the American casualties were about 1,000 (op. cit., pp. 202-6); they were probably about double that number (Fortescue,History of the British Army, iii., 185).[114]Howe,Narrative of Conduct, pp. 4-5.[115]Johnston,Campaign of 1776, Documents, p. 117.[116]Carleton to Douglas, Oct. 14, 1776, Add. MS. 21,699 (Haldimand Papers), ff. 52-53.[117]Examination of Joseph Galloway, p. 14.[118]Washington,Works, iv., 203, 223, 231.[119]State Trials, xx., 1365.[120]Parl. Hist., xix., 103-86.[121]Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, Add. MS. 21,697, f. 158; for Carleton's reply (May 20) and Germain's rejoinder (July 25) seeReport on Canadian Archivesfor 1885, pp. 132-37.[122]Hist. MSS. Comm.,App. to Report, vi. (Strachey Papers), p. 402.[123]Jones,History of New York, i., 193, 219.[124]Washington,Works, v., 193sqq., 239;Galloway's Evidence, pp. 21, 29.[125]Stedman, i., 309-11, 317.[126]Lieut. Hadden,Journal and Orderly Books, p. 153.[127]Howe to Germain, Jan. 20; Germain to Howe, May 18, 1777;Howe's Narrative, pp. 12-24.[128]Life of Shelburne, i., 358-59.[129]Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, Add. MS. 21,697, f. 161;Howe's Narrative, p. 15.[130]Howe to Carlton, April 2 and June 16, 1777, printed inFugitive Pieces, p. 126; Howe to Burgoyne, July 17, inEvidence Concerning the War(1779), pp. 77-78;Howe's Narrative, pp. 21-23; Howe'sObservations on Letters, etc., p. 61; Fonblanque'sBurgoyne, pp. 280-81.[131]Clinton to Burgoyne, Dec. 16, 1777, Fonblanque'sBurgoyne, pp. 324-25;Parl. Hist., xix., 611.[132]Du Portail to the Comte de St. Germain, Nov. 12, 1777, Stedman, i., 386.[133]Correspondence between Germain and Howe,Hist. MSS. Comm. Report, vi., App., p. 402.[134]Here, and in other passages treating of the American revolutionary war, much valuable help has been given me by Colonel E. M. Lloyd, late R.E.

[112]Johnston,Campaign of 1776, p. 125.

[113]Mr. Johnston contends that the American casualties were about 1,000 (op. cit., pp. 202-6); they were probably about double that number (Fortescue,History of the British Army, iii., 185).

[114]Howe,Narrative of Conduct, pp. 4-5.

[115]Johnston,Campaign of 1776, Documents, p. 117.

[116]Carleton to Douglas, Oct. 14, 1776, Add. MS. 21,699 (Haldimand Papers), ff. 52-53.

[117]Examination of Joseph Galloway, p. 14.

[118]Washington,Works, iv., 203, 223, 231.

[119]State Trials, xx., 1365.

[120]Parl. Hist., xix., 103-86.

[121]Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, Add. MS. 21,697, f. 158; for Carleton's reply (May 20) and Germain's rejoinder (July 25) seeReport on Canadian Archivesfor 1885, pp. 132-37.

[122]Hist. MSS. Comm.,App. to Report, vi. (Strachey Papers), p. 402.

[123]Jones,History of New York, i., 193, 219.

[124]Washington,Works, v., 193sqq., 239;Galloway's Evidence, pp. 21, 29.

[125]Stedman, i., 309-11, 317.

[126]Lieut. Hadden,Journal and Orderly Books, p. 153.

[127]Howe to Germain, Jan. 20; Germain to Howe, May 18, 1777;Howe's Narrative, pp. 12-24.

[128]Life of Shelburne, i., 358-59.

[129]Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, Add. MS. 21,697, f. 161;Howe's Narrative, p. 15.

[130]Howe to Carlton, April 2 and June 16, 1777, printed inFugitive Pieces, p. 126; Howe to Burgoyne, July 17, inEvidence Concerning the War(1779), pp. 77-78;Howe's Narrative, pp. 21-23; Howe'sObservations on Letters, etc., p. 61; Fonblanque'sBurgoyne, pp. 280-81.

[131]Clinton to Burgoyne, Dec. 16, 1777, Fonblanque'sBurgoyne, pp. 324-25;Parl. Hist., xix., 611.

[132]Du Portail to the Comte de St. Germain, Nov. 12, 1777, Stedman, i., 386.

[133]Correspondence between Germain and Howe,Hist. MSS. Comm. Report, vi., App., p. 402.

[134]Here, and in other passages treating of the American revolutionary war, much valuable help has been given me by Colonel E. M. Lloyd, late R.E.

WAR WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN.

The surrender of Burgoyne's army was eagerly used by the opposition as an opportunity for harassing the government. The nation at large showed a worthier spirit by seeking to repair its loss. Manchester, Liverpool, Edinburgh, and Glasgow each raised a regiment; and other regiments and companies were raised in the Highlands and in Wales. In London and Bristol the corporations refused to join the movement, but large sums were subscribed by private persons for raising troops. The opposition absurdly maintained that these levies were unconstitutional, and Fox accounted for the zeal displayed by Manchester and Scotland by observing that they were "accustomed to disgrace". The ministers were bitterly reproached for employing Germans and Indians. "If," said Chatham, "I were an American, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I would never lay down my arms—never—never—never." He condemned the employment of Indians in the war in words of fiery eloquence. It was certainly deplorable that they should have been employed. In that matter, however, England had no choice. They would have taken part in the war on one side or the other. They had fought in every war between the English and French in America, and while Pitt himself was conducting the war in 1760 Amherst used them with the authority of government.[135]In the present war the Americans were the first to employ them, and in 1776 congress resolved that it was expedient to do so and authorised Washington to enlist 2,000 of them. They were more ready to fight for the king than for the Americans, who had treated them badly; and as they caused the insurgents trouble and committed many shocking acts of barbarity, theAmericans inveighed against us for employing them. If we had not done so they would have fought for the Americans, as some of them did. Otherwise we should have been better without them, for no dependence could be placed upon them.

THE OPPOSITION DISUNITED.

Energetic as the opposition was in attack, it was not united in policy. Chatham, zealous for England's imperial position, declared that he would never consent to American independence. There was yet time to make peace with the people of our own blood and so be ready to meet our foreign foes. He proposed a cessation of hostilities and an immediate offer of terms. All that the Americans could demand as subjects should be granted, and overtures made to them on the basis of political dependence and the navigation act; that is, their trade should still be regulated by duties. They would, he was sure, accept these terms. If not, they must be compelled to obedience. The Americans would certainly not have treated on his basis. Chatham had repeatedly declared that it was impossible for us to conquer them; yet he proposed that if his basis were rejected we should use coercion after putting ourselves at a disadvantage by withdrawing our army. Still, as there were many Americans besides the loyalists who would have welcomed conciliation, and as the proposed French alliance was unpopular, it is just possible that had Chatham himself been prime minister some way might have been found which, while securing to America virtual independence such as England's self-governing colonies now enjoy, might have prevented the severance of the bond. On the other hand, the Rockingham party held that we should prevent the alliance between France and America by acknowledging American independence. This division between the two sections of the opposition set them in hostile camps.

When people were convinced that the alliance was certain the nation became uneasy, and a strong feeling prevailed, which was shared by some of Chatham's opponents, that at such a crisis England needed him at the head of affairs. In February, 1778, it was believed that he and Bute were engaged on some scheme of coalition which might again put him in power. The report was merely the outcome of the officious meddling of his physician, Addington, and one of Bute's friends.[136]No onewas more anxious than North for a change of ministry. He begged the king in vain to accept his resignation. On the 17th he brought in two bills for a scheme of conciliation to which George had at last given his sanction. He proposed an express repeal of the tea duty, the surrender of all taxation except for the regulation of trade, and the appointment of commissioners to be sent to America with full powers to put an end to hostilities, grant pardons, and treat with congress on any terms short of independence. His proposals did not materially differ from those made by Burke three years before. He declared that he was not responsible for American taxation, that it was the work of his predecessors, and that he had always desired conciliation. He was heard with general consternation: his own party felt that he was turning his back on the policy which they had supported under his leadership; the opposition, that he was, as it were, stealing their thunder. The bills were carried and the king appointed the commissioners. They arrived in America in June. Congress refused to listen to any offers short of independence; the commissioners appealed to the American people, and their manifesto was treated with contempt.

THE KING'S CONDUCT EXAMINED.

When the Franco-American alliance was announced, North was urging the king to invite Chatham to take office and to allow him to retire, and Shelburne was sounded as to the terms on which Chatham would come in. He replied that he would insist on "an entire new cabinet". George, who had unwillingly agreed to this negotiation, was prepared to accept any men of talent with a view of strengthening the existing ministry, but not of forming another in its place, or of changing its measures. He would not commission Chatham or any opposition leader to form a new ministry: "no advantage to this country nor personal danger to himself" would, he wrote to North, induce him to do so; he would rather "lose his crown". "No consideration in life," he wrote again, "shall make me stoop to the opposition;" he would not give himself up "to bondage". His determination has been pronounced equally criminal with the acts which brought Charles I. to the scaffold.[137]According to our present ideas he should certainly have been guided by the assurance of his first minister that the government was unequalto the situation, have accepted his resignation, and allowed his new ministers to act as they thought best. These duties, however, were not, as we have seen, so clearly settled in those days. The prime minister of our time was not then fully invented, and George's plan of personal government through ministers was not yet rejected by the country. He could still rely on the support of parliament. A proposal to request the king to dismiss his ministers was defeated at that very time by 263 to 113 in the commons and by 100 to 36 in the lords. Chatham's return to office would doubtless have been hailed with satisfaction by the nation. Yet, though a change in public sentiment with regard to the American war was beginning, and was soon to spread rapidly, the king's policy was still popular with the larger part of his subjects.[138]When therefore his conduct in March, 1778, is compared with that of Charles I. it should be remembered that George had parliament and the mass of the nation at his back.

The personal light in which he regarded the question is inexcusable. He had been disappointed and deeply offended by Chatham's political conduct, and he had cause to fear that a whig government would rob him of the power which he loved. As a king he had no right to allow his private feelings to affect his public action. That he did so was the result partly of his system of personal rule, partly of serious defects in his character, his implacability of temper, and his habit of regarding all things as they affected himself. North struggled in vain against his determination, and gave way before it. It is a mistake, however, to regard the king as solely responsible for the continuance of the war. If he is to be blamed because, rather than submit to the loss of the colonies, which nearly all men believed would be the end of England's greatness and prosperity, he determined to carry on the struggle, the blame must be shared by others. Had North been true to his convictions George could not have formed another administration willing to act on the same system. Had the majority of the commons refused to support the king, the constitution afforded the means of over-ruling his will.[139]

Questions as to Chatham's return to power were soon to be brought to an end. On April 7 he appeared in the lords after a severe attack of illness, and, in faltering sentences, though with some remains of his peculiar fire, protested against the surrender of the sovereignty of America, "the dismemberment of this ancient and most glorious monarchy". He urged that England should refuse to bow before the house of Bourbon; "if we fall let us fall like men". Richmond answered him by dwelling on the expediency of acknowledging American independence; otherwise, said he, "instead of Great Britain and America against France and Spain, as in the last war, it will now be France, Spain, and America against Great Britain". Chatham rose to reply and fell back in a fit. He died on May 11. Parliament voted him a public funeral, the stately statue which stands in Westminster Abbey, £20,000 for the payment of his debts, and a perpetual pension of £4,000 a year annexed to the earldom of Chatham. Throughout his long career he was invariably courageous and self-reliant; his genius was bold, his conceptions magnificent, his political purity unsullied. His rhetoric was sublime. He did not excel in debate or in prepared speeches. His spirit burned like fire, and his speeches were the outpourings of his heart in words which, while they owed something to art, came spontaneously to his lips, and were not less lofty than his thoughts. As a statesman he had serious defects; he was haughty, vain, and overbearing, his opinions were unsettled, his far-reaching views often nebulous; his passion was stronger than his judgment, and he was immoderately given to bombast. In spite of his true greatness he lacked simplicity, and he imported the arts of a charlatan into political life. Yet Englishmen must ever reverence his memory, for he loved England with all the ardour of his soul, and, as Richmond said as he praised him to his face on the day that he was stricken for death, "he raised the glory of the nation to a higher pitch than had been known at any former period".

In 1778 the losses and expenses of the war and disappointment at its results began to work a change in the feeling of the country. In parliament tories sometimes voted with the opposition. North continued to strive in vain to be released from office. He made some overtures to the opposition. Fox, in spite of the violence of his attacks, was anxious for a coalition, whichwould have given him office, though he held first that Germain only, and in 1779 that North himself and Sandwich, must be excluded.[140]He was restrained by Rockingham, and North's efforts failed. The death of Chatham, though it united the opposition, on the whole strengthened the ministry, and in June, 1778, it gained in ability by the appointment of Thurlow as chancellor and Wedderburn as attorney-general. Burgoyne, who was unfairly treated by Germain, was defended by Fox, and on his return joined the opposition. The struggle in parliament had a constitutional importance not overlooked by either party. On the issue of the American war, "the king's war" as it was called, depended the question whether George would be able to establish his system of government by influence. The opposition reckoned on failure in America, and hoped that, by exposing the errors and corrupt practices of the government, they would so rouse public feeling that, when the war ended in national humiliation, the king would be forced to accept a minister imposed on him by his people. No party can reckon on national humiliation as a means of attaining its ends, however praiseworthy they may be, without serious consequences to its own character. When England was in extreme peril, the opposition, and Fox above all, magnified her losses, encouraged her enemies by exposing her weakness, and, not content with insisting on the maladministration of the government, cavilled at every measure proposed for the defence of her empire. Their conduct irritated their fellow-countrymen, for the spirit of the nation was roused by the intervention of France in the war with the colonies.

ADMIRALTY ABUSES.

Ample grounds existed for dissatisfaction with the government. Unfortunately, this was specially the case with respect to the navy. Its expenses had greatly increased. During the eight years of the late war, 1755 to 1762, the money spent upon it, exclusive of ordnance and votes for men, amounted to no more than £3,390,000; during eight years of Sandwich's administration, 1771 to 1778, it was stated in parliament to have been £6,472,000.[141]During the latter period there had been voted for repairing and building ships £2,900,000, and for extra storesfor them £600,000, in all £3,500,000, enough, it was said, to build 100 men-of-war and as many frigates. Nothing is so destructive to efficiency as corruption. Under Sandwich abuses of all kinds flourished. Many existed before his time, and things grew worse under him. When in 1778 the naval estimates for the year were laid before the commons, it was stated that though £27,000 had been voted between 1771 and 1775 for the repair of theDragon(74), and £10,273 for her stores, the ship was lying untouched and rotting at Portsmouth, and so in various degrees with other ships. In reply, Welbore Ellis, the treasurer of the navy, said that though estimates were the usual way of raising money, the money once raised was spent at the discretion of the admiralty. Indignant at this amazing statement, Burke flung the smart book of estimates at the treasury bench. Ships were built of foreign oak of an inferior kind and needed constant repair; contracts were jobbed; stores were wasted, stolen, and sold. The country paid for many more seamen than it got; for example, in September, 1777, the number returned as victualled was 51,715, though the seamen actually serving were only 47,407. Greenwich hospital, with a revenue of £70,000, was a hot-bed of abuses.

What was the result of this corrupt system? How did our navy stand in 1778 in comparison with the navies of France, then at war with us, and Spain, which was on the eve of joining against us? Choiseul's policy of naval reform was steadily pursued, and in 1778 France had eighty ships of the line in good order and 67,000 seamen. Spain followed the lead of France and, when she entered the war in 1779, had about sixty ships of the line. In 1778 we had 119 first, second, and third rates; of this number there were, on Sandwich's showing, in November, 1777, excluding ships on foreign service, only thirty-five manned and ready for sea, and seven which he said were nearly ready, but some of the thirty-five were short of their full complement of men, and there was a great scarcity of frigates. By July, 1778, the number ready was stated as forty-five. But when Keppel put to sea in June, it was with difficulty that twenty-one could be got ready to sail with him.[142]

BATTLE OFF USHANT.

Keppel, though an opponent of the government, was appointed to command the "grand," or, as it was called later, the channel fleet, apparently at the king's wish. On July 27 he engaged the French fleet from Brest under Count d'Orvilliers, westward of Ushant, both having thirty ships of the line. An indecisive action took place, the two fleets passing each other on opposite tacks and exchanging broadsides. Sir Hugh Palliser, the third in command and one of the lords of the admiralty, was blamed for the resultless issue of the engagement. A quarrel ensued between him and Keppel, which was made a matter of party politics; the government upheld Palliser, the opposition Keppel, and violent speeches were made in parliament. A court-martial in 1779 honourably acquitted Keppel of the charges which Palliser brought against him, and he received the thanks of parliament. London was on his side; the mob gutted Palliser's house and broke the windows of the admiralty and of some official residences. Another court-martial acquitted Palliser though with a slight censure. Keppel was annoyed by the position taken up by the admiralty, notified his wish not to serve again under the present ministry, and struck his flag. The rot of faction, which was infecting political life, laid some hold on the navy. Other naval officers declared that they would not serve under Sandwich; the spirit of insubordination affected the seamen and symptoms of mutiny appeared in the channel fleet.

The intervention of France forced England to contract her operations in America. The project of isolating the northern provinces was dropped, and thenceforward her efforts were mainly directed towards the recovery of the southern colonies, in order to secure their trade, and the suppression of privateering expeditions from the New England coast. Howe was recalled at his own request, and the chief command was given to Clinton, who was ordered to withdraw from Philadelphia and concentrate upon New York, where a French attack was expected. Philadelphia was evacuated on June 18, 1778. Of its loyalist citizens 3,000 embarked for New York; those who remained behind were harshly treated and two quaker gentlemen were hanged for adhering to the enemy. As Clinton's army was marching through New Jersey, the Americans tried to cut off his rear-guard near Monmouth, but after an indecisive engagement failed in their attempt. Clinton reached New York without furthermolestation, and soon afterwards Washington encamped at White Plains. The Toulon fleet under Count d'Estaing arrived off Sandy Hook on July 11, and Lord Howe with a far inferior force prepared to defend the entrance to the port. While D'Estaing lay outside, the wind rose; he was afraid to risk his ships by an attempt to cross the bar, and sailed away southwards, for Washington persuaded him to attack Newport in conjunction with an army under Sullivan. Lord Howe followed him, and arrived at Point Judith on August 9, the day after the French ships passed the batteries. D'Estaing stood out to sea to meet him. Howe's fleet, though reinforced, was still much the weaker, but "Black Dick," as the sailors called him, was master of his profession and out-manœuvred D'Estaing who was a cavalry officer turned admiral. A storm dispersed both fleets and D'Estaing, after collecting his ships, sailed off to Boston to refit. Sullivan retreated and got away from Rhode Island a day before Clinton arrived with 4,000 men. Lord Howe soon afterwards resigned his command, declaring that he would not serve again under the present ministers. D'Estaing sailed from Boston to the West Indies, leaving the American populace furious at his departure from Rhode Island.

Clinton was called upon to send 5,000 men to the West Indies, Washington was badly supported by congress, and neither was in a position to act against the other. Successful expeditions were made in the autumn against the privateering haunts of the insurgents, Buzzard's bay, Martha's Vineyard, and on the New Jersey coast; many ships were taken and much damage was done. The western frontiers were raided by the tory troops of Johnson and Butler and by our Indian allies. Shocking barbarities were committed, specially in the Wyoming valley, where the prisoners were massacred by the Indians, though there the women and children were spared, and at Cherry Valley, where there was a general massacre during the attack. In 1779 the Americans retaliated on the Indians with fearful severity, and cruelly wasted the lands of the Senecas and Cayugas and the settlements in the Alleghany.

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