I. As soon as we have determined the place which should be assigned to man in the great order of the universe, the first question which rises is, whether there is one human species, or several.
It is well known that this question has caused a division amongst anthropologists. ThePolygenistsregard the differences of height, features, and colour, which distinguish the inhabitants of different countries of the globe, as fundamental; theMonogenistsconsider these differences merely as the result of accidental conditions, which have modified, in various degrees, a primitive type. The former hold that there areseveralhumanspeciesperfectly independent of each other; the latter that there isbut one speciesof man which is divided into several races, all of which are derived from a common stock.
However slight may be our familiarity with the language of zoology and botany or their applications, it is evident that the question before us is a purely scientific one, and entirely within the province of the natural sciences. Unfortunately the discussion has by no means been confined to this ground.
A dogma supported by the authority of the Book which is held in almost equal respect by Christians, Jews and Mussulmans, has long referred the origin of all men without opposition to a single father and mother. Nevertheless, the first blow aimed at this ancient belief was founded upon the same book. In 1655 La Peyrère, a Protestant gentlemanin Condé’s army, interpreting to the letter the two narratives of the creation contained in the Bible as well as various particulars in the history of Adam and of the Jewish nation, attempted to prove that the latter alone were descended from Adam and Eve; that they had been preceded by other men who had been created at the same time as the animals in all parts of the habitable globe; that the descendants of thesePreadamiteswere identical with theGentiles, who were always so carefully distinguished from the Jews. Thus we see that polygenism generally regarded as the result ofFree Thoughtwas biblical and dogmatic in origin.
La Peyrère attacked the Adamic dogma in the name of the respect due to the text of a sacred Book. The philosophers of the eighteenth century spoke in the name of Science and Reason. It is to them that the school of Polygenists in reality owe their origin. But it is easy to see that the greater number of them were only guided in their writings by a controversial spirit, their chief aim was the destruction of a dogma. Unfortunately, the same prepossession appears in too many works published in our own day. On the other hand certain monogenists are guilty of seeking in religious doctrines arguments in favour of their theory, and anathematising their adversaries in the name of dogma.
Social and political prejudices in addition to dogmatic and anti-dogmatic prejudices have helped to make still more obscure a question already very difficult in itself. In the United States in particular the advocates of slavery and its opponents have often fought upon this ground. Further still in 1844 Mr. Calhoun, Minister of Foreign Affairs, when replying to the representations made to him by France and England on the subject of slavery, did not hesitate to defend the institutions of his country by urging the radical differences, which, according to him, separated the Negro from the White man.
Besides those polygenists who are influenced by prejudicesalmost or entirely unscientific, there are sincere and disinterested men of science who believe in the multiplicity of human origins. Foremost among the latter aremedicalmen, who are accustomed to the study of theindividualand who only possess a slight familiarity with the study of thespecies. Then again there are palæontologists, who from the nature of their work are compelled only to take into account morphological resemblances and differences, without even turning their attention to facts of reproduction or offiliation. Finally, there are entomologists, conchologists, etc., who, exclusively interested in the distinction of innumerable species by purely external characters, are entirely ignorant of physiological phenomena, and judge living beings as they would fossils.
On the other hand, monogenism reckons among its partisans nearly all those naturalists who have turned their attention to the phenomena of life, and among them some of the most illustrious. In spite of the difference of their doctrines, Buffon and Linnæus, Cuvier and Lamarck, Blainville and the two Geoffroys, Müller the physiologist and Humboldt agree upon this point. Apart from any influence which the name of these great men might exercise, it is clear that I share their opinion. I have on different occasions explained the purely scientific reasons for my convictions. I shall now endeavour to sum them up in as few words as possible.
II. Let us first establish the importance of the question. It escapes many minds and I have heard a doubt expressed upon it by men who have enthusiastically followed anthropological studies. It is, however, easily proved.
If the human groups have appeared with all their distinctive characters in the isolated condition, and in the various localities where geography teaches us to seek them; if we can trace them up to stocks originally distinct, thus constituting so manyspecial species, then the study of them is one of the most simple, presenting no more difficulty than that of animal or vegetable species. Therewould be nothing singular in the diversity of the groups. It would be sufficient to examine and describe them one after the other, merely determining the degree ofaffinitybetween them. At most we should have to fix their limits and to discover the influence which groups geographically brought in contact had been able to exercise upon each other.
If, on the contrary, these groups can be traced to one common primitive stock, if there isbut one single speciesof man, the differences, sometimes so striking, which separate the groups, constitute a problem similar to that of our animal and vegetable races. Further, man is found in all parts of the globe, and we must account for this dispersion; we must explain how the same species has been able to accommodate itself to such opposite conditions of existence as those to which the inhabitants of the pole and the equator are subject. And lastly, thesimple affinityof naturalists is changed intoconsanguinity; and the problems offiliationare added to those ofvariation,migration, andacclimatisation.
It is clear that, independently of every religious, philosophical, or social consideration, this science will differ entirely in character as we consider it from a polygenistic point of view, or according to theories of monogenism.
III. If the former of these doctrines claims such a large number of adherents, the reason may for the most part be found in the causes mentioned above. But its seductive simplicity and the facility which it seems to lend to the interpretation of facts also stand for a great deal. Unfortunately these advantages are only apparent. Polygenism conceals or denies difficulties; it does not suppress them. They are suddenly revealed, like submarine rocks, to anyone who tries, however little, to go to the root of the matter.
The case is the same with this doctrine as with theSystemsof classification formerly employed in botany and zoology which rested upon a small number of arbitrary data. They were undoubtedly very convenient, but possessed the seriousfault of being conducive to most erroneous opinions from a destruction of true relations and an imposition of false connections.
Monogenism acts in the same manner as theNatural Method. The zoologist and the botanist are by this method brought face to face with each problem which is put before them under every aspect. It often displays the insufficiency of actual knowledge, but it is the only means of destroying illusions, and of preventing a belief in false explanations.
It is the same with Monogenism. It also brings the anthropologist face to face with reality, forces him to investigate every question, shows him the whole extent of each, and often compels him to confess his inability to solve them. But by this very means it protects him against error, provoking him to fresh investigation, and from time to time rewards him with some great progress which remains an acquisition for ever.
I shall return to these considerations, the truth of which will be better understood when the principal general questions of anthropology have been reviewed. Henceforward I shall attempt to justify as briefly as possible the preceding criticisms and eulogies.