Let me state, in proof of what I say as to the spirit which animates these Tripolitan Arabs, that I have ascertained during my trip down the coast that a subscription is actually being raised in Tripoli among the wealthier Moors for the equipment of a local militia, which may be ready to take its part in that war of race and religion for which every Tripolitan longs so earnestly. Italy must therefore give up the idea of Tripolias an utterly hopeless one. It is difficult to see in what other direction she can obtain the compensation she covets. Nothing, for example, can counterbalance the French occupation of Bizerta, that noble harbour which may justly be styled the pride of North Africa—a harbour which, if improved, at a comparatively small expenditure, may be made equal to the requirements of the greatest naval power in the world. It has been suggested that Italy, which now holds Pantellaria, might convert that island into a naval and military position of value. No doubt, looked at simply upon the map Pantellaria seems to be in an admirable strategical position. It appears to guard the Malta channel and to cover the Tunisian coast. But I have been to Pantellaria, and I find it destitute of anything in the shape of a harbour. It can never vie either with Goletta or Bizerta as a naval station; and to make it even a position of moderate strength would demand that which Italy cannot afford—the expenditure of an almost unlimited amount of money.
It does not seem, therefore, that the Italians can obtain any adequate compensation for the loss of influence they have sustainedthrough the action of the French. They must just submit, as other nations have had to do before them, to the aggressions of the strong. But the temper in which they have accepted that which they conceive to be the loss and humiliation to which they have been subjected does not bode well for the future peace of Europe.
I turn now to the position of England, and to the effects upon our own country of the French action in Tunis. In the first place, it cannot be doubted that down to the beginning of the present year the political position of England in Tunis was incomparably better than that of any other power. This was partly, it must be admitted, due to the exceptionally favourable way in which we were represented at the Court of the Bey. Mr. Reade has not only personal qualities and a vast experience which combine to make him a peculiarly able and powerful representative of his country in a State like Tunis, but he is the owner of that which in this part of the world may be called a really great name. His father, Sir Thomas Reade, who lies buried in the little English cemetery at Tunis, was for many years the most powerful andpopular personage in the country. He was known by all the Arabs not as “the English Consul,” but as “the Consul.” Mr. Reade himself was born in Tunis, and his return to it to fill the place once occupied by his father was hailed with universal delight by the Tunisians themselves.
But since the signature of the May treaty he has occupied an entirely different position. Up to that time he was regarded as the representative of the nation which was the disinterested friend of Tunis; and from the Bey downwards the people of the country consulted him and trusted him. Since then, however, it has been seen that England either will not or cannot interfere to save the Regency from the clutches of the French; and as a natural and inevitable consequence, Mr. Reade is no longer regarded as a powerful mediator on behalf of Tunis. In one word, our political influence in the country, once all-powerful, has now been completely destroyed, as the result of the French aggression. That our commercial influence will suffer can hardly be doubted. At present England supplies Tunis with the greater part of the European goods she consumes. Manchester,Birmingham, Sheffield, and London stock her bazaars, and everywhere in the shops familiar English names meet the eye. But this cannot last under the existing state of things. The French are pushing their way with the keenest anxiety to drive us out of the market, and they are not slow to turn political events to their own advantage and to our detriment. We must therefore lose considerably from what has taken place in Tunis; whilst the position of our Maltese fellow-subjects, who have hitherto led prosperous lives there, must necessarily be changed very much for the worse.
There is, however, one point on which England suffers no material injury from French aggression in Tunis. So long as she continues to hold Malta she can afford to leave France to do as she pleases at Bizerta and Goletta. Neither of those ports can ever really compare in military strength with our grand harbour of Valetta; while the position of Malta, in the very centre of the Mediterranean, gives it strategical advantages of which no North African port can boast. I say nothing of what has been done by the Englishmen of past generations to increasethe military and political value of Malta, though as one stands on the Barecca and surveys the splendid lines of fortification protecting the impregnable harbours in which our ironclads float in security, one cannot but feel grateful to the men who not only won this place for us, but who have guarded it since so well. Italy may feel that she has been outflanked by the seizure of Tunis; England, from the white heights of Malta, can watch the proceedings of the French with complete equanimity.
It remains for me to say a few words as to the effect of this Tunisian aggression upon France herself. Every man who is acquainted with the facts must feel that France will have to pay an enormous price for the “conquest” of M. Roustan—a price not to be measured in blood, money, or honour alone. She is already experiencing some of the results of the policy into which she has been lured. The exposure of military weakness and incompetence which has been made during the course of the campaign—a campaign which has been jealously watched on the spot by German observers—has done much to destroy theprestigeand influence she was rapidlyacquiring at Berlin. Prince Bismarck may now make his mind easy. The war of revenge is postponed indefinitely. But, on the other hand, Italy is not only estranged, but outraged. People in England have little idea how intense is the feeling of anger burning in the breasts of the Italians at this moment. You must go to Italy in order to learn the truth upon this point. The old sentiment of friendship which showed itself so strongly in 1870, no longer exists, and the Italians are longing for a chance of punishing France for what she has done in Tunis. The Arabs, again, are for ever estranged from their conquerors. They cannot hold their own against them. They have no arms capable of competing with those of France; nor have they military knowledge. But it is safe to predict that for years to come, under the new state of things, both in Algeria and Tunis there will be a constant waste of French life and money—a waste which might have been avoided but for the intrigues of M. Roustan. And at any moment France may find herself confronted by a deadly peril. She may have to choose between a dangerous rebuff in Tunis itself, and an attack upon Tripoli—an attackwhich would bring her into collision not only with Turkey, but with England, Italy, and Austria. Such are the Dead Sea apples borne by the tree she is now watering with her blood in Tunis.
THE END.
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Transcriber's note:pg114Changed: at any noment to: momentpg142Changed: to be forgotton to: forgottenpg260Changed: spendid interior to: splendidpg298Changed: the excitewent among to: excitementMinor changes in punctuation have been done silently.Other spelling inconsistencies have been left unchanged.