FOOTNOTES:[116]Writing under date of January, 1782, Mr. Hildreth says: "The surrender of Cornwallis was soon felt in the Southern department. Wilmington was evacuated, thus dashing all the hopes of the North Carolina Tories. Greene approached Charleston, and distributed his troops so as to confine the enemy to the neck and adjacent islands."In re-establishing the State Government ofSouth Carolina, none were allowed to vote who had taken British protection. John Matthews was elected Governor. Among the earliest proceedings of the Assembly was the passage of a lawbanishing the most active British partisans and confiscating their property. The services of Greene were also gratefully remembered in a vote of 10,000 guineas, or $50,000, to purchase him an estate."The Georgia Assembly, in meeting at Augusta, chose John Martin as Governor,and passed a law of confiscation and banishment very similar to that of South Carolina. Greene presently received from this Province, also, the present of a confiscated plantation.North Carolinaacknowledged his services by a grant of wild lands." (History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xliii., p. 373.)[117]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap, xxv., p. 456."Under the immediate eye of Cornwallis," says Mr. Bancroft, "the prisoners who had capitulated in Charleston were the subjects of perpetual persecution, unless they would exchange their paroles for oaths of allegiance. Mechanics and shopkeepers could not collect their dues except after promises of loyalty."Lord Rawdon, who had the very important command on the Santee, raged equally against deserters from his Irish regiment and against the inhabitants. The chain of forts for holding South Carolina consisted of Georgetown, Charleston, Beaufort, and Savannah on the sea; Augusta, Ninety-Six, and Camden in the interior. Of these, Camden was the most important, for it was the key between the north and south. On the rumour of an advancing American army, Rawdon called on all the inhabitants round Camden to join in arms. One hundred and sixty who refused he shut up during the heat of midsummer in one prison, and loaded more than twenty of them with chains, some of whom were protected by the capitulation of Charleston." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xv., pp. 311, 312, 313.)"Peace was restored to Georgia (July, 1782), after having been four years in possession of the British. That State is supposed to have lost 1,000 of its citizens and 4,000 slaves." (Moultrie's Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 340; quoted in Holmes' American Annals, Vol. II., p. 340.)[118]Quoted in Holmes' Annals, Vol. II., p. 351.[119]"I saymajorities, because I am satisfied that in almost every State there were minorities, more or less numerous, who desired the adoption of a more moderate course. In New York it is certain that the first political parties, after the peace, were formed in consequence of divisions which existed among the Whigs as to the lenity or severity which should be extended to their vanquished opponents."[120]Historical Essay, introductory to Colonel Sabine's Sketches of the American Loyalists, pp. 86-90.
[116]Writing under date of January, 1782, Mr. Hildreth says: "The surrender of Cornwallis was soon felt in the Southern department. Wilmington was evacuated, thus dashing all the hopes of the North Carolina Tories. Greene approached Charleston, and distributed his troops so as to confine the enemy to the neck and adjacent islands."In re-establishing the State Government ofSouth Carolina, none were allowed to vote who had taken British protection. John Matthews was elected Governor. Among the earliest proceedings of the Assembly was the passage of a lawbanishing the most active British partisans and confiscating their property. The services of Greene were also gratefully remembered in a vote of 10,000 guineas, or $50,000, to purchase him an estate."The Georgia Assembly, in meeting at Augusta, chose John Martin as Governor,and passed a law of confiscation and banishment very similar to that of South Carolina. Greene presently received from this Province, also, the present of a confiscated plantation.North Carolinaacknowledged his services by a grant of wild lands." (History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xliii., p. 373.)
[116]Writing under date of January, 1782, Mr. Hildreth says: "The surrender of Cornwallis was soon felt in the Southern department. Wilmington was evacuated, thus dashing all the hopes of the North Carolina Tories. Greene approached Charleston, and distributed his troops so as to confine the enemy to the neck and adjacent islands.
"In re-establishing the State Government ofSouth Carolina, none were allowed to vote who had taken British protection. John Matthews was elected Governor. Among the earliest proceedings of the Assembly was the passage of a lawbanishing the most active British partisans and confiscating their property. The services of Greene were also gratefully remembered in a vote of 10,000 guineas, or $50,000, to purchase him an estate.
"The Georgia Assembly, in meeting at Augusta, chose John Martin as Governor,and passed a law of confiscation and banishment very similar to that of South Carolina. Greene presently received from this Province, also, the present of a confiscated plantation.North Carolinaacknowledged his services by a grant of wild lands." (History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xliii., p. 373.)
[117]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap, xxv., p. 456."Under the immediate eye of Cornwallis," says Mr. Bancroft, "the prisoners who had capitulated in Charleston were the subjects of perpetual persecution, unless they would exchange their paroles for oaths of allegiance. Mechanics and shopkeepers could not collect their dues except after promises of loyalty."Lord Rawdon, who had the very important command on the Santee, raged equally against deserters from his Irish regiment and against the inhabitants. The chain of forts for holding South Carolina consisted of Georgetown, Charleston, Beaufort, and Savannah on the sea; Augusta, Ninety-Six, and Camden in the interior. Of these, Camden was the most important, for it was the key between the north and south. On the rumour of an advancing American army, Rawdon called on all the inhabitants round Camden to join in arms. One hundred and sixty who refused he shut up during the heat of midsummer in one prison, and loaded more than twenty of them with chains, some of whom were protected by the capitulation of Charleston." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xv., pp. 311, 312, 313.)"Peace was restored to Georgia (July, 1782), after having been four years in possession of the British. That State is supposed to have lost 1,000 of its citizens and 4,000 slaves." (Moultrie's Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 340; quoted in Holmes' American Annals, Vol. II., p. 340.)
[117]Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap, xxv., p. 456.
"Under the immediate eye of Cornwallis," says Mr. Bancroft, "the prisoners who had capitulated in Charleston were the subjects of perpetual persecution, unless they would exchange their paroles for oaths of allegiance. Mechanics and shopkeepers could not collect their dues except after promises of loyalty.
"Lord Rawdon, who had the very important command on the Santee, raged equally against deserters from his Irish regiment and against the inhabitants. The chain of forts for holding South Carolina consisted of Georgetown, Charleston, Beaufort, and Savannah on the sea; Augusta, Ninety-Six, and Camden in the interior. Of these, Camden was the most important, for it was the key between the north and south. On the rumour of an advancing American army, Rawdon called on all the inhabitants round Camden to join in arms. One hundred and sixty who refused he shut up during the heat of midsummer in one prison, and loaded more than twenty of them with chains, some of whom were protected by the capitulation of Charleston." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xv., pp. 311, 312, 313.)
"Peace was restored to Georgia (July, 1782), after having been four years in possession of the British. That State is supposed to have lost 1,000 of its citizens and 4,000 slaves." (Moultrie's Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 340; quoted in Holmes' American Annals, Vol. II., p. 340.)
[118]Quoted in Holmes' Annals, Vol. II., p. 351.
[118]Quoted in Holmes' Annals, Vol. II., p. 351.
[119]"I saymajorities, because I am satisfied that in almost every State there were minorities, more or less numerous, who desired the adoption of a more moderate course. In New York it is certain that the first political parties, after the peace, were formed in consequence of divisions which existed among the Whigs as to the lenity or severity which should be extended to their vanquished opponents."
[119]"I saymajorities, because I am satisfied that in almost every State there were minorities, more or less numerous, who desired the adoption of a more moderate course. In New York it is certain that the first political parties, after the peace, were formed in consequence of divisions which existed among the Whigs as to the lenity or severity which should be extended to their vanquished opponents."
[120]Historical Essay, introductory to Colonel Sabine's Sketches of the American Loyalists, pp. 86-90.
[120]Historical Essay, introductory to Colonel Sabine's Sketches of the American Loyalists, pp. 86-90.
Review of the Principal Characteristics of the American Revolution, and Remarks on the Feelings which should now be Cultivated by both of the Former Contending Parties.
The entire failure of the Americans to conquer Canada in the war of 1812-1815 is an illustration of the folly of coercing the allegiance of a people against their will. Upper Canada at that time consisted of less than 100,000 inhabitants; yet, with the extra aid of only a few hundred English soldiers,she repelled for three years the forces of the United States—more than ten times their number, and separated only by a river.
Mr. J.M. Ludlow, in his brief but comprehensive "History of the War of American Independence, 1775-1783," Chapter vii., well statesthe folly of England in endeavouring to conquer by arms the opinionsof three millions of people, and the impossibility of the American colonists achieving their independence without the aid of men and money, and ships from France, to which, in connection with Spain and Holland, the Americans are actually indebted for their independence, and not merely to their own sole strength and prowess, as American writers so universally boast. Mr. Ludlow observes:
"At a time when steam had not yet baffled the winds, to dream of conquering by force of arms, on the other side of the Atlantic, a people of the English race, numbering between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000, with something like 1,200 miles of seaboard, was surely an act of enormous folly. We have seen in our own days the difficulties experienced by the far more powerful and populous Northern States in quelling the secession of the Southern, when between the two there was no other frontier than at most a river, very often a mere ideal line, and when armies could be raised by 100,000 men at a time. England attempted a far more difficult task, with forces which, till 1781, never exceeded 35,000 men, and never afterwards exceeded 42,075, including 'Provincials,'i.e., American Loyalists." (But England, repeatedly on the verge of success, failed from the incapacity and inactivity of the English generals.)
"Yet it is impossible to doubt that not once only, but repeatedly during the course of the struggle, England was on the verge of triumph. The American armies were perpetually melting away before the enemy—directly, through the practice of short enlistments; indirectly, through desertions. These desertions, if they might be often palliated by the straits to which the men were reduced through arrears of pay and want of supplies, arose in other cases, as after the retreat from New York, from sheer loss of heart in the cause. The main army, under Washington, was seldom even equal in numbers to that opposed to him. In the winter of 1776-77, when his troops were only 4,000 strong, it is difficult to understand how it wasthat Sir William Howe, with more than double the number, should have failed to annihilate the American army."
"WEAKNESS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY.
"In the winter of 1777-78 the 'dreadful situation of the army for want of provisions,' made Washington 'advise' that they should not have been excited to a general mutiny and desertion. In May, 1779, he hardly knew any resource for the American causeexcept in reinforcements from France, and did not know what might be the consequence if the enemy had it in their power to press the troops hard in the ensuing campaign. In December of that year his forces were 'mouldering away daily,' and he considered that Sir Henry Clinton, with more than twice his numbers, could 'not justify remaining inactive with a force so superior.' A year later he was compelled, for want of clothing, to discharge the levies which he had always so much trouble in obtaining; and 'want of flour would have disbanded the whole army' if he had not adopted this expedient.
"In March, 1781, again the crisis was 'perilous,' and though he did not doubt the happy issue of the contest, he considered that the period for accomplishment might be too far distant for a person of his years. In April he wrote: 'We cannot transport provisions from the States in which they are assessed to the army, because we cannot pay the teamsters, who will no longer work for certificates. It is equally certain that our troops are approaching fast to nakedness, and that we have nothing to clothe them with; that our hospitals are without medicines, and our sick without nutriment, except such as well men eat; and that all our public works are at a stand, and the artificers disbanding. * * It may be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never our deliverance must come.' Six months later, when Yorktown capitulated, the British forces remaining in North America, after the surrender of that garrison by Cornwallis, were more considerable than they had been as late as February, 1779, and Sir Henry Clinton even then declared that with a reinforcement of 10,000 he would be responsible for the conquest of America.
"The main hope of success on the Englishside lay in the idea that the spirit and acts of resistance to the authority ofthe mother country were in reality only on the part of a turbulent minority—that the bulk of the people desired to be loyal. It is certain indeed that the struggle was, in America itself, much more of a civil war than the Americans are now generally disposed to admit. In December, 1780, there were 8,954 'Provincials' among the British forces in America, and on March 7th, 1781, a letter from Lord George Germaine to Sir H. Clinton, intercepted by the Americans, says: 'The American levies in the King's service are more in number than the whole of the enlisted troops in the service of the Congress.' As late as September 1st, 1781, there were 7,241. We hear of loyal 'associations' in Massachusetts, Maryland, and Pennsylvania; of 'associated Loyalists' in New York; and everywhere of 'Tories,' whose arrest Washington is found suggesting to Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, as early as November 12th, 1775. But New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania remained long full of Tories. By June 28th, 1776, the disaffected on Long Island had taken up arms, and after the evacuation of New York by Washington a brigade of Loyalists was raised on the island, and companies were formed in two neighbouring counties to join the King's troops. During Washington's retreat through New Jersey, 'the inhabitants, either from fear or disaffection, almost to a man refused to turn out.' In Pennsylvania, the militia, instead of giving any assistance in repelling the British, exulted at their approach and over the misfortunes of their countrymen. On the 20th of that month the British were 'daily gathering strength from the disaffected.' In 1777, the Tories who joined Burgoyne in his expedition from the North are said to have doubled his force. In 1778, Tories joined the Indians in the devastation of Wyoming and Cherry Valley; and although the indiscriminate ravages of the British, or of the Germans in their pay, seem to have aroused the three States above mentioned to self-defence, yet, as late as May, 1780, Washington still speaks of sending a small party of cavalry to escort La Fayette safely through the 'Tory settlements' of New York. Virginia, as late as the spring of 1776, was 'alarmed at the idea of independence.' Washington admitted that his countrymen (of that State), 'from their form of government, and steady attachment heretofore to royalty,' would 'come reluctantly' to that idea, but trusted to 'time andpersecution.' In 1781, the ground for transferring the seat of war to the Chesapeake was the number of Loyalists in that quarter. In the Southern States the division of feeling was still greater. In the Carolinas, a royalist regiment was raised in a few days in 1776, and again in 1779. In Georgia and in South Carolina the bitterest partisan warfare was carried on between Whig and Tory bands; and a body of New York Tories contributed powerfully to the fall of Savannah in 1778, by taking the American forces in the rear.
"On the other hand, the British generals did not receive that support from the Loyalists which they had expected. They seem to have looked upon the Loyalists as an inferior class of aids to the regular soldiery; their advice seems to have been unsought, and the mode of war pursued was European, and not adapted to the peculiar circumstances of America. The Loyalist volunteers were looked upon as the rivals to rather than fellow-soldiers of the regular army; and no provincial Loyalist was promoted to lead any expedition or command any position of importance. This depreciation of the Loyalists by the English (utterly incompetent) generals exactly answered the purposes of American writers.But the real cause of its protraction, though it may be hard to an American to admit the fact, lay in the incapacity of the American politicians, and, it must be added, in the supineness and want of patriotism of the American people. If indeed importing into the views of later date, we look upon it as one between two nations, the mismanagement of the war by the Americans on all points save one—the retention of Washington in the chief command—is seen to have been so pitiable, from first to last, as to be in fact almost unintelligible."
"DESCRIPTION OF THE AMERICAN ARMY, AND THE MANNER OF RAISING IT.
"We can only understand the case when we see there was no such thing as an American nation in existence, but only a number of revolted colonies, jealous of one another, and with no tie but that of common danger. Even in the army divisions broke out. Washington, in a General Order of August, 1776, says: 'It is with great concern that the general understands that jealousies have arisen among the troops from the different provinces, and reflections are frequently thrown out which canonly tend to irritate each other and injure the noble cause in which we are engaged.'"
"WANT OF PUBLIC SPIRIT AND PATRIOTISM IN THE STATES.
"It was seldom that much help could be obtained in troops from any State, unless the State were immediately threatened by the enemy; and even then these troops would be raised by that State for its own defence, irrespectively of the general or 'continental army.' 'Those at a distance from the seat of war,' wrote Washington, in April, 1778, 'live in such perfect tranquillity, that they conceive the dispute to be in a manner at an end, and those near it are so disaffected that they serve only as embarrassments.' In January, 1779, we find him remonstrating with the Governor of Rhode Island, because that State had 'ordered several battalions to be raised for the State only; and this before the proper measures are taken to fill the continental regiments.' The different bounties and rates of pay allowed by the various States were a constant source of annoyance to him."
"DECLINE OF CONGRESS.
"After the first year, the best men were not returned to Congress, and did not return to it. Whole States remained frequently unrepresented. In the winter of 1777-78, Congress was reduced to twenty-one members. But even with a full representation it could do little. 'One State will comply with a requisition,' writes Washington in 1780, 'another neglects to do it, a third executes by halves, and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up-hill.'
"At first, Congress was really nothing more than a voluntary Committee. When the Confederation was completed, which was only, be it remembered, on March 1, 1781, it was still, as Washington wrote in 1785, 'little more than a shadow without a substance, and the Congress a nugatory body;' or, as it was described by a late writer, 'powerless for government, and a rope of sand for union.'"
"DECLINE OF ENERGY AND SPIRIT AMONG THE COLONISTS AND ARMY.
"Like politicians, like people. There was, no doubt, a brilliant display of patriotic ardour at the first flying to armsof the colonists. Lexington and Bunker's Hill were actions decidedly creditable to their raw troops. The expedition to Canada, foolhardy though it proved, was pursued up to a certain point with real heroism. But with it the heroic period of the war (individual instances excepted) may be said to have closed. There seems little reason to doubt that the revolution would never have been commenced if it had been expected to cost so tough a struggle. 'A false estimate of the power and perseverance of our enemies,' wrote James Duane to Washington, 'was friendly to the present revolution, and inspired that confidence of success in all ranks of the people which was necessary to unite them in so arduous a cause.' As early as November, 1775, Washington wrote, speaking of military arrangements: 'Such a dearth of public spirit, and such want of virtue—such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantage of one kind or another, I never saw before, and pray God's mercy that I may never be witness to it again.' Such a 'mercenary spirit' pervaded the whole of the troops that he should not have been 'at all surprised at any disaster.' At the same date, besides desertion of thirty or forty soldiers at a time, he speaks of the practice of plundering as so rife that 'no man is secure in his effects, and scarcely in his person.' People were 'frightened out of their houses under pretence of those houses being ordered to be burnt, with a view of seizing the goods;' and to conceal the villainy more effectually, some houses were actually burned down. On February 28th, 1777, 'the scandalous loss, waste, and private appropriation of public arms during the last campaign' had been 'beyond all conception.' Officers drew 'large sums under pretence of paying their men, and appropriated them.'
"'Can we carry on the war much longer?' Washington asks in 1778, after the treaty with France and the appearance of the French fleet off the coast. 'Certainly not, unless some measures can be devised and speedily executed to restore the credit of our currency and restrain extortion and punish forestallers.' A few days later: 'To make and extort money in every shape that can be devised, and at the same time to decry its value, seems to have become a mere business and an epidemical disease.' On December 30th, 1778, 'speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seems to have got the better of everyconsideration, and almost of every order of men; * * party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day (in Congress), whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit, which in its consequences is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations."
"DECLINE OF PATRIOTIC FEELING ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS.
"After the first loan had been obtained from France and spent, and a further one was granted in 1782, so utterly unpatriotic and selfish was known to be the temper of the people that the loan had to be kept secret, in order not to diminish such efforts as might be made by the Americans themselves. On July 10th of that year, with New York and Charleston still in British hands, Washington writes: 'That spirit of freedom which at the commencement of the contest would have gladly sacrificed everything to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place.' But, indeed, the mere fact that from the date of the battle of Monmouth (July 28th, 1778), Washington was never supplied with sufficient means, even with the assistance of the French fleets and troops, to strike one blow at the English in New York—though these were but very sparingly reinforced during the period—shows an absence of public spirit, one might almost say of national shame, scarcely conceivable, and in singular contrast with the terrible earnestness exhibited on both sides, some eighty years later, in the Secession War."
"INCAPACITY OF ENGLISH GENERALS IN AMERICA.
"Why, then, must we ask on the other side, did the English fail at last?
"The English were prone to attribute their ill success to the incompetency of their generals. Lord North, with his quaint humour, would say, 'I do not know whether our generals will frighten the enemy, but I know they frighten me whenever I think of them.' When, in 1778, Lord Carlisle came out as Commissioner, in a letter speaking of the great scale of all things in America, he says, 'We have nothing on a great scale with us but our blunders, our losses, our disgraces and misfortunes.' No doubt, it is difficult to account for Gage's early blunders; for Howe's repeated failure to follow up his own success, or profit by his enemy's weakness; and Cornwallis's movement, justly censured by Sir Henry Clinton, in transferring the bulk of his army from the far south to Virginia, within marching distance of Washington, opened the way to that crowning disaster at Yorktown, without which it is by no means impossible that Georgia and the Carolinas might have remained British."
"INEFFECTIVE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS IN AMERICA.
"Political incapacity was, of course, charged upon Ministers as another cause of disaster; and no doubt their miscalculation of the severity of the struggle was almost childish. But no mistakes in the management of the war by British statesmen can account for their ultimate failure. However great British mismanagement may have been, it was far surpassed by the Americans. There was nothing on the British side equal to that caricature of a recruiting system in which different bounties were offered by Congress, by the States, by the separate towns, so as to make it the interest of the intended soldier to delay enlistment as long as possible, in order to sell himself to the highest bidder; to that caricature of a war establishment, the main bulk of which broke up every twelvemonth in front of the enemy, which was only paid, if at all, in worthless paper, and left continually without supplies. On the whole, no better idea can be had of the nature of the struggle on the American side, after the first heat of it had cooled down, than from the words of Count de Rochambeau, writing to Count de Vergennes, July 10th, 1780: 'They have neither money nor credit; their means of resistance are only momentary, and called forth when they are attacked in their own homes. They then assemble for the moment of immediate danger and defend themselves.'"
"FRENCH MONEY, TROOPS, AND SHIPS TURN THE SCALE IN FAVOUR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.
"A far more important cause in determining the ultimate failure of the British was the aid afforded by France to America, followed by that of Spain and Holland. It was impossible for England to re-conquer a continent and carry on a war at thesame time with the three most powerful naval States of Europe. The instincts of race have tended on both the English and American side to depreciate the value of the aid given by France to the colonists. It may be true that Rochambeau's troops, which disembarked on Rhode Island in July, 1780, did not march till July, 1781; that they were blockaded soon after their arrival, threatened with attack from New York, and only disengaged by a feint of Washington's on that city. But more than two years before their arrival, Washington wrote to a member of Congress: 'France, by her supplies, has saved us from the yoke thus far.' The treaty with France alone was considered to afford a 'certain prospect of success' to 'secure' American independence. The arrival of D'Estaing's fleet, although no troops joined the American army, and nothing eventually was done, determined the evacuation of Philadelphia. The discipline of the French troops, when they landed in 1780, set an example to the Americans; chickens and pigs walked between the lines without being disturbed. The recruits of 1780 could not have been armed without fifty tons of ammunition supplied by the French. In September of that year, Washington, writing to the French envoy, speaks of the 'inability' of the Americans to expel the British from the South unassisted, or perhaps even to stop their career; and he writes in similar terms to Congress a few days later. To depend 'upon the resources of the country, unassisted by foreign loans,' he writes to a member of Congress two months later, 'will, I am confident, be to lean upon a broken reed.' In January, 1781, writing to Colonel Laurens,[121]the American envoy in Paris, he presses for 'an immediate, ample, efficacious succour in money from France,' also for the maintenance on the American coasts of 'a constant naval superiority,' and likewise for 'an additional succour in troops.' And since the assistance so requested was in fact granted in every shape, and the surrender of Yorktown was obtained by the co-operation both of the French army and fleet, we must hold that Washington's words were justified by the event."[122]
FOOTNOTES:[121]War of American Independence, 1777-1783, by John Malcolm Ludlow, Chap, vii., pp. 215-227.[122]Dr. Ramsay says: "Pathetic representations were made to the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty by Washington, Dr. Franklin, and particularly by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, who was sent to the Court of Versailles as a special Minister on this occasion. The King of Francegavethe United States a subsidy [as a present] of six millions of livres, and became their security for ten millions more, borrowed for their use in the United Netherlands." (History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiii., p. 407.)
[121]War of American Independence, 1777-1783, by John Malcolm Ludlow, Chap, vii., pp. 215-227.
[121]War of American Independence, 1777-1783, by John Malcolm Ludlow, Chap, vii., pp. 215-227.
[122]Dr. Ramsay says: "Pathetic representations were made to the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty by Washington, Dr. Franklin, and particularly by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, who was sent to the Court of Versailles as a special Minister on this occasion. The King of Francegavethe United States a subsidy [as a present] of six millions of livres, and became their security for ten millions more, borrowed for their use in the United Netherlands." (History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiii., p. 407.)
[122]Dr. Ramsay says: "Pathetic representations were made to the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty by Washington, Dr. Franklin, and particularly by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, who was sent to the Court of Versailles as a special Minister on this occasion. The King of Francegavethe United States a subsidy [as a present] of six millions of livres, and became their security for ten millions more, borrowed for their use in the United Netherlands." (History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiii., p. 407.)
Reflections of Lord Mahon on the American Contest and its Results—Apology for George the Third—Unhappiness of Americans since the Revolution—Unity of the Anglo-Saxon Race.
At this period(Declaration of Independence), the culminating point in the whole American war, I may be forgiven for desiring to interrupt its narrative in order to review its course and its results. That injurious and oppressive acts of power had been inflicted by England upon America, I have in many places shown, and do most fully acknowledge. That from the other side, and above all from Massachusetts, there had been strong provocation, I must continue to maintain. I should not deem it consistent with candour to deny that the Americans had sufficient ground for resisting, as they did resist, the Ministerial and Parliamentary measures. But whether these had yet attained a pitch to justify them in discarding and renouncing their allegiance to the Throne is a far more doubtful question—a question on which perhaps neither an Englishman nor yet an American could quite impartially decide.
"The time has come, however, as I believe and trust, when it is possible to do equal justice to the many good and upright men who in this great struggle embraced the opposite sides. The great mass of the people meant honestly on both shores of the Atlantic. The two chief men in both countries were alike pure-minded. On the one side there were deeds that savoured of tyranny; on the other side there were deeds that savoured of rebellion; yet at heart George the Third was never a tyrant, nor Washington ever a rebel. Of Washington I most firmly believe, that no single act appears in his whole public life proceeding from any other than public, and those the highestmotives. But my persuasion is no less firm that there would be little flattery in applying the same terms of respect and commendation to the 'good old king.' I do not deny, indeed, that some degree of prejudice and pride may, though unconsciously, have mingled with his motives. I do not deny that at the outset of these troubles he lent too ready an ear to the glozing reports of his governors and deputies, the Hutchinsons or Olivers, Gateses, Dunmores, etc., assuring him that the discontents were confined to a factious few, and that measures of rigour and repression alone were needed. For such measures of rigour he may deserve, and has incurred, his share of censure. But after the insurgent colonies had proclaimed their independence, is it just to blame King George, as he often has been blamed, for his steadfast and resolute resistance to that claim? Was it for him, unless after straining every nerve against it, to forfeit a portion of his birthright and a jewel of his crown? Was it for him, though the clearest case of necessity, to allow the rending asunder his empire—to array for all time to come of several millions of his people against the rest? After calling on his loyal subjects in the colonies to rise, after requiring and employing their aid, was it for him, on any light grounds, to relinquish his cause and theirs, and yield them over, unforgiven, to the vengeance of their countrymen? Was it for him to overlook the consequences, not even yet, perhaps in their full extent unfolded, of such a precedent of victory to popular and colonial insurrection? May not the King, on the contrary, have deemed that on such a question, touching as it did both his honour and his rights, he was bound to be firm—firmer than even the firmest of his Ministers? Not, of course, that he could be justified for persevering; but in truth, he did not so persevere after every reasonable hope had failed. Not, of course, that he could be excused from continuing to demand, or to expect, unconditional submission; but, as his own letters to Lord North assure us, such an idea was never harboured in his mind. To do his duty conscientiously, as he should answer it to God hereafter, and according to the lights he had received, such was his unceasing aim and endeavour from the day when, young but superior to the frailties of youth, he first assumed the reins of government, until that dismal period, half a century later, when, bowed down by yearsand sorrows, and blind, doubly blind, he concluded his reign, though not, as yet, his life.
"Before the American war had commenced, and during its first period, nearly all the statesmen and writers of England argued, or rather took for granted as too plain to stand in need of argument, that separation from our colonies would most grievously impair, if not wholly ruin, the parent State. * * It is worthy of note how much our experience has run counter to the general prognostication—how little the loss was felt, or how quickly the void was supplied. An historian of high and just authority—Mr. Macaulay—has observed that England was never so rich, so great, so formidable to foreign princes, so absolutely mistress of the sea, as since the alienation of the American colonies. (Essays, Vol. II.) The true effect of that alienation upon ourselves, as time has shown, has been not positive, but by comparison it has lain not in the withdrawal of wealth and population and resources, but in raising up a rival State from the same race, and with powers and energies not inferior to our own.
"But how far, and in what degree, has the new form of government promoted the happiness of the United States themselves? * * It would be folly, or worse than folly, to deny that since their independence the prosperity of the United States has advanced with gigantic strides; that they have grown to be a first-rate power; that immense works of public utility have been achieved with marvellous speed; that the clearing of new lands and the building of new cities have been such as to outstrip the most sanguine calculations; that among them the working classes have been, in no common degree, well paid and prosperous; that a feeling for the national honour is in no country stronger; that the first elements of education have been most widely diffused; that many good and brave men have been trained and are training to the service of the Commonwealth. But have their independent institutions made them, on the whole, a happy and contented people? That, among themselves, is often proclaimed as undeniable; and certainly among themselves it may not always be safely denied. That, however, is not always the impression conveyed to him who only sojourns in their land, by the careworn faces, by the hurried steps, by the unsocial meals which he sees, or by the incessant party crieswhich he hears around him; by the fretful aspirations and the feverish hopes resulting from the unbounded space of competition open to them without check or barrier; and by the innumerable disappointments and heartburnings which in consequence arise. On the true condition of North America, let us mark the correspondence between two of the greatest and most highly gifted of her sons. There is now open before me a letter which, in August, 1837, and on the annexation of Texas, Dr. Channing wrote to Mr. Clay. In that letter, as published in Boston, I find the following words (and what Dr Channing said in 1837 has been illustrated in scores of instances since that time, and greatly enhanced by the events of the civil war):
"'I cannot do justice to this topic without speaking freely of our country, as freely as I should of any other; and unhappily we are so accustomed, as a people, to receive incense, to be soothed by flattery, and to account reputation a more important interest than morality, that my freedom may be construed into a kind of disloyalty. But it would be wrong to make concessions to this dangerous weakness. * * Among us a spirit of lawlessness pervades the community which, if not repressed, threatens the dissolution of our present forms of society. Even in the old States, mobs are taking the government into their hands, and a profligate newspaper finds little difficulty in stirring up multitudes to violence. * * Add to all this the invasions of the rights of speech and of the press by lawless force, the extent and toleration of which oblige us to believe that a considerable portion of our citizens have no comprehension of the first principles of liberty. It is an undeniable fact that, in consequence of these and other symptoms, the confidence of many reflecting men in our free institutions is very much impaired. Some despair. That main pillar of public liberty—mutual trust among citizens—is shaken. That we must seek security for property and life in a stronger government is a spreading conviction. Men who in public talk of the ability of our institutions, whisper their doubts, perhaps their scorn, in private.
"'Whether the people of the United States might have been as thriving and more happy had they remained British subjects, I will not presume to say. Certainly not if violent men like Lord Hillsborough, or corrupt men like Mr. Rigby, had continued to take part in the administration. With other hands at the helm the case might have been otherwise. Jefferson, at least, in his first draft of the Declaration of Independence, said of his countrymen and of the English: "We might have been a free and great people together." One thing, at all events, is plain, that had these colonies shared the fate of the other dominions of the British Crown, the main curse and shame—the plague spot of the system of slavery—would have been long since removed from them (before it was); but, as in the case of Jamaica, not without a large compensation in money to the slave owners. It is also plain that in the case supposed they would have equally shared in our pride and glory at the wondrous growth of the Anglo-Saxon race—that race undivided and entire, extending its branches as now to the furthest regions of the earth, yet all retaining their connection with the parent stem—all its members bound by the same laws, all animated by the same loyalty, and all tending to the same public-spirited aim. How great a nation should we and they be together!—how great in the arts both of peace and war! scarcely unequal now to all other nations of the world combined!" * *
"Since 1782 at the latest, views like these are merely day-dreams of the past. In place of them, let us now indulge the hope and expectation that the American people may concur with ours in desiring that no further resentment may be nourished, no further strife be stirred, between the kindred nations; so that both, mindful of their common origin, and conscious of their growing greatness, may both alike discard, as unworthy of them, all mean and petty jealousies, and be ever henceforth what nature has designed them—friends."[123]
FOOTNOTES:[123]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. liii., pp. 150-160.
[123]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. liii., pp. 150-160.
[123]Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. liii., pp. 150-160.
Treatment of the Loyalists by the British Government and Parliament after the Revolution.
PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT—REFUSAL OF THE STATES TO COMPENSATE THE LOYALISTS.
It has beenseen, by the fact stated in the last preceding chapter, that the promised recommendations of Congress to the several States, as agreed upon by the English and American Commissioners of the peace negotiations at Paris, were, as had been expected and predicted by Dr. Franklin at the time, without any result, the State Legislatures passing Acts to proscribe rather than compensate the Loyalists. In justification of these Acts, the American writers of that period, and largely down to the present time, assailed the character of the Loyalists in the grossest language of calumny and abuse; but the most respectable American writers of the present age bear testimony to the intelligence, wealth, and respectability of the Loyalists; and the fact, no longer questionable, that they sacrificed wealth, liberty, country, and chose poverty and exile, in support of their principles, has fully vindicated their character and presented their conduct in advantageous contrast with that of those who deprived them of their liberty, and largely profited by the confiscation of their immense property, while they and their families were pining in exile and want.
The only resource of the exiled and impoverished Loyalists, under such circumstances, was the Government and Parliament of the mother country to which they had so faithfully adhered,and nothing could be more honourable than the testimony borne in the British Parliament to their character and merits, and the consideration given to their wants and claims. The fifth Article of the Treaty of Paris, leaving the Loyalists to the recommendation of the Congress to the Legislatures of the several States, was severely reprobated in both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Commons, Mr. Wilberforce said that "when he considered the case of the Loyalists, he confessed he felt himself conquered; there he saw his country humiliated; he saw her at the feet of America; still he was induced to believe that Congress would religiously comply with the Article, and that the Loyalists would obtain redress from America. Should they not, this country was bound to afford it them. Theymust be compensated; Ministers, he was persuaded, meant to keepthe faith of the nation with them."
Lord North(who had been Prime Minister during twelve years, including the war) said:
"And now let me, Sir, pause on a part of the treaty which awakens human sensibility in a very irresistible and lamentable degree. I cannot but lament the fate of those unhappy men, who, I conceive, were in general objects of ourgratitudeandprotection. The Loyalists, from their attachments, surely had some claim to our affection. But what were not the claims of those who, in conformity to theirallegiance, theircheerful obedienceto thevoice of Parliament, their confidence in the proclamation of our generals, invited under every assurance ofmilitary, parliamentary, political, and affectionate protection,espoused with the hazard of their lives, and the forfeiture of their properties, the cause of Great Britain?I cannot but feel for men thus sacrificed for their bravery and principles—men who have sacrificed all the dearest possessions of the human heart. They have exposed their lives, endured an age of hardships, deserted their interests, forfeited their possessions, lost their connections, and ruined their familiesin our cause. Could not all this waste of human enjoyment excite one desire of protecting them from a state of misery, with which the implacable resentment of the States has desired to punish their loyalty to their Sovereign and their attachment to their mother country? Had we not espoused their cause from aprinciple of affection and gratitude, we should, at least, haveprotectedthemto have preserved our own honour. If not tender oftheir feelings, we should have been tenderof our own character. Never was thehonour, theprinciples, the policy of a nation so grossly abused as in the desertion of those men, who are now exposed toevery punishmentthatdesertionandpovertycan inflict,because they were not rebels."
Lord Mulgravesaid: "The Article respecting the Loyalists he never could regard but as a lasting monument ofnational disgrace. Nor was this Article, in his opinion, more reproachful and derogatory to thehonour and gratitudeof Great Britain than it appeared to be wanton and unnecessary. The honourable gentleman who had made the motion had asked if those gentlemen who thought the present peace not sufficiently advantageous to Great Britain, considering her circumstances, could consent to pay the amount which another campaign (twenty millions) would have put us to, for the degree of advantage they might think we had a right to expect? In answer to this, he declared, for one, he had rather, large as the estimated sum in question was, have had it stipulated in the treaty,that Great Britain should apply it to making good the losses of the Loyalists, than that they should have been soshamefully deserted and the national honour so pointedly disgracedas it was by the fifth Article of the treaty with the United States."
Mr. Secretary Townsend(afterwards Lord Sydney) said "he was ready to admit that many of the Loyalists had the strongest claims upon the country; and he trusted, should the recommendation of Congress to the American States prove unsuccessful, which he flattered himself would not be the case,this countrywould feel itself boundin honour to make them full compensation for their losses."
Mr. Burkesaid: "At any rate, it must be agreed on all hands that a vast number of Loyalists had been deluded by this country, and had risked everything in our cause; to such men thenation owed protection, and its honour was pledged for their security at all hazards."
The Lord Advocatesaid: "With regard to the Loyalists, they meritedevery possible effort on the part of this country."
Mr. Sheridan"execrated the treatment of those unfortunate men, who, without the least notice taken of their civil and religious rights, were handed over as subjects to a power thatwould not fail to take vengeance on them for their zeal and attachment to the religion and government of this country. This was an instance ofBritish degradation not inferiorto the unmanly petitions to Congress for the wretched Loyalists. Great Britain at the feet of Congress, suing in vain, was not a humiliation or a stigma greater than the infamy of consigning over the loyal inhabitants of Florida, as we had done, without any conditions whatsoever."
"The Honourable Mr. Nortonsaid that 'Under the circumstances, he was willing to approve of the two former (European treaties with France and Spain); but on account of the Article relating to the Loyalists, he felt it impossible to give his assent to the latter."
Sir Peter Burrellsaid: "The fate of the Loyalists claimed the compassion of every human breast. These helpless, forlorn men, abandoned by the Ministers of a people on whosejustice, gratitude, andhumanitythey had the best-founded claims, were left at the mercy of a Congress highly irritated against them. He spoke not from party zeal, but as an independent country gentleman, who, unconnected with party, expressed the emotions of his heart and gave vent to his honest indignation."
Sir William Bootlesaid: "There was one part of the treaty at which his heart bled—the Article relative to the Loyalists. Being a man himself, he could not but feel for men so cruelly abandoned to the malice of their enemies. It was scandalous; it was disgraceful. Such an Article as that ought scarcely on any condition to have been admitted on our part. They had fought for us and run every hazard to assist our cause; and when it most behoved us to afford them protection, we deserted them."
Several other members spoke to the same effect. The treaty recognizing the Independence of America could not be reversed, as an Act passed the previous session had expressly authorized the King and his Cabinet to make it; but it was denied that a treaty sacrificing the Loyalists and making the concessions involved had been authorized; in consequence of which an express vote of censure was passed by the Commons by a majority of seventeen. The Earl of Shelburne, the Prime Minister, forthwith resigned in consequence of this vote of censure, and it was nearly three months before a new Administration could be formed; and during this administrative interregnum affairs were in great confusion.
In theHouse of Lords, Lord Walsinghamsaid that "he could neither think nor speak of the dishonour of leaving these deserving people to their fate with patience."Lord Viscount Townsendconsidered that "to desert men who had constantly adhered to loyalty and attachment, was a circumstance of such cruelty as had never before been heard of."Lord Stormontsaid that "Britain was bound in justice and honour, gratitude and affection, and by every tie, to provide for and protect them."Lord Sackvilleregarded "the abandonment of the Loyalists as a thing of so atrocious a kind, that if it had not been painted in all its horrid colours he should have attempted the ungracious task but never should have been able to describe the cruelty in language as strong and expressive as were his feelings;" and again, that "peace on the sacrifice of these unhappy subjects must be answered in the sight of God and man."Lord Loughboroughsaid that "the fifth Article of the treaty had excited a general and just indignation, and that neither in ancient nor modern history had there been so shameful a desertion of men who had sacrificed all to their duty and to their reliance on British faith."
In reply,Lord Shelburne, the Prime Minister, frankly admitted that the Loyalists were left without better provision being made for them "from the unhappynecessityof public affairs, which induced the extremity of submitting the fate of their property to the discretion of their enemies;" and he continued: "I have but one answer to give the House—it is the answer I gave my own bleeding heart—apartmust be wounded, that the whole of the empire may not perish. If better terms could be had, think you, my lords, that I would not have embraced them?I had but the alternative either to accept the terms proposed or continue the war." TheLord Chancellorheld that the stipulations of the treaty were "specific," and said: "My own conscious honour will not allow me to doubt the good faith of others, and my good wishes to the Loyalists will not let me indiscreetly doubt the disposition of Congress, since the understanding is that all these unhappy men shall be provided for; yet, if it were not so, Parliament could take cognizance of their case, and impart to each sufferingindividual that relief which reason, perhaps policy, certainly virtue and religion, required."
Such were the sentiments of members in both Houses of Parliament, and of both parties, as to the character and merits of the Loyalists. But there were no prospects of the States compensating them for their losses. Indeed, this idea was entertained by Lord Shelburne himself, and that compensation would have to be made to the Loyalists by Parliament when, in the speech above quoted, he said that "without one drop of blood spilt, and without one-fifth of the expense of one year's campaign, happiness and ease can be given to them in as ample a manner as these blessings were ever in their enjoyment." This was certainly a very low and mercenary view of the subject. It was one thing for the Loyalists to have their rights as British subjects maintained while they were obeying the commands of the King and maintaining their allegiance to the empire, and another thing for them to become pensioners upon the bounty of the British Parliament, to be paid in pounds, shillings, and pence for the rights and privileges which should have been secured to them by national treaty as British subjects. The House of Commons had adopted a resolution against continuing the American war for thepurpose of enforcing the submission of the colonies; but it had not resolved against continuing the war to protect the rights and property of British subjects in the colonies. A campaign for this purpose, on the refusal of the American Commissioners to recognize what was sanctioned by the laws and usages of nations, would have been honourable to the British Government, would have been popular in England, and would have divided America; for there were many thousand "Whigs" in America, who believed in the equity of treating the Loyalists after the war as all others were treated who conformed to the laws, as has been the case in Holland, Ireland, and Spain. England was then mistress of the seas, held New York, Charleston, Rhode Island, Penobscot, and other military posts, and could soon have induced the Americans to do what their Peace Commissioners at Paris had refused to do—place British subjects in America upon the same footing as to property that they possessed before the war, and that they possess in the United States at this day. England could have easily and successfully refused granting to the United Statesa foot of land beyond the limits of the thirteen colonies, and thus have secured those vast western territories now constituting the larger part of the United States, and retained the garrisons of New York, Rhode Island, and Charleston as guarantees until the stipulated conditions in regard to the Loyalists should be fulfilled. A joint Commission in America could have settled upon equitable grounds all disputed claims in much less time than the six years occupied by a Parliamentary Commission in examining into and deciding upon the individual claims of Loyalist claimants. If the war to reduce the colonies to absolute submission had been unpopular in England, the peace upon the terms submitted to by the English Commissioners and the Ministry was equally unpopular. If England had been wrong in its war of coercion against the revolting colonists, was she not equally wrong, and more than wrong, in abandoning to their enemies those who had abided faithful to her laws and commands? The language of the speeches of members of both Houses of Parliament, above quoted, is as just as it is severe; although much could be and was said in justification of the policy of the Government in promoting peace upon almost any terms, seeing that England was at war with the three most powerful naval nations of Europe, besides that in America.
The fallacy of the argument employed by the advocates of the treaty, that the Americans would honourably fulfil the recommendations of Congress, was illustrated by the following facts:
"The province of Virginia, a short time before the peace, had come to an unanimous conclusion 'that all demands or requests of the British Court for the restoration of property confiscated by the State were wholly impossible; and that their delegates should be instructed to move Congress that they should direct the deputies for adjusting peace not to agree to any such restitution.'"
The State of New Yorkresolved, "That it appears to this Legislature that divers of the inhabitants of this State have continued to adhere to the King of Great Britain, after these States were declared free and independent, and persevered in aiding the said king, his fleets and armies, to subjugate the United States to bondage: Resolved, That as on the one hand the scales of justice do not require, so on the other the publictranquillity will not permit, that such adherents who have been attainted should be restored to the rights of citizens, and that there can be no reason for restoring property which has been confiscated or forfeited."
AGENTS OF LOYALISTS—PROCEEDINGS OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION—RESULTS.
Of course all hope of obtaining relief under the stipulations of the treaty was abandoned by the Loyalists, who "now applied to the Government which they had ruined themselves to serve, and many of them, who had hitherto been 'refugees' in different parts of America, went to England to state and recover payment for their losses. They organized an agency, and appointed a Committee composed of one delegate or agent from each of the thirteen States,[124]to enlighten the British public, and adopt measures of proceeding in securing the attention and action of the British Ministry in their behalf. In a tract printed by order of these agents (which now lies before us, entitledThe Case and Claim of American Loyalists impartially Stated and Considered, published in 1783), it is maintained that 'it is an established rule, that all sacrifices made by individuals for the benefit and accommodation of others shall be equally sustained by all those who partake of it,' and numerous cases are cited from Puffendorf, Burlamaqui and Vattel, to show that the 'sacrifices' of the Loyalists were embraced in this principle. As a further ground of claim, it is stated that in case of territory alienated or ceded away by one sovereign power to another, the rule is still applicable; for that in the treaties of international law it is held, 'The State ought toindemnify the subject for the loss he has sustained beyond his proportion.' And in the course pursued at the close of the civil war in Spain, when the States of Holland obtained their independence, under the Treaty of Utrecht, and at various other periods, proved that therightsof persons similarly situated had been respected and held inviolate. The conclusion arrived at from the precedents in history, and diplomacy, and in the statute-books of the realm, is, that as the Loyalists were as 'perfectly subjects of the British State as any man in London or Middlesex, they were entitled to the same protection and relief.' The claimants had been 'called by their sovereign, when surrounded by tumult and rebellion, to defend the supreme rights of the nation, and to assist in suppressing a rebellion which aimed at their destruction. They have received from the highest authority the most solemn assurances of protection, and even reward, for their meritorious services;' and that 'His Majesty and the two Houses of Parliament having thought it necessary, as theprice of peace, or to the interest and safety of the empire, or from some other motive of public convenience, to ratify the Independence of America,without securing any restitution whatever to the Loyalists, they conceive that the nation is bound, as well by the fundamental laws of society as by the invariable and external principles of natural justice, to make them compensation.'"[125]
Though the treaty of peace left the Loyalists to the mercy—rather to the resentment (as the result proved)—of the American States, and as such received the censure of the House of Commons, British justice and honour recognized the claims of the Loyalists to compensation for their losses, as well as to gratitude for their fidelity to the unity of the empire. The King, at the opening of the session of Parliament, said: "I have ordered inquiry to be made into the application of the sum to be voted in support of the American sufferers; and I trust you will agree with me, that a due and generous attention ought to be shown to those who have relinquished their properties or professions from motives of loyalty to me, or attachment to themother country." Accordingly, a Bill was introduced and passed without opposition in June, 1783, entitled "An Act Appointing Commissioners to Inquire into the Losses and Services of all such Persons who have Suffered in their Rights, Properties, and Professions, during the late Unhappy Dissensions in America, in consequence of their Loyalty to his Majesty and Attachment to the British Government."
The Commissioners named were John Wilmot, M.P., Daniel Parker Coke, M.P., Esquires, Col. Robert Kingston, Col. Thomas Dundas, and John Marsh, Esquire, who, after preliminary preparations, began their inquiry in the first week of October, and proceeded, with short intermissions, through the following winter and spring. The time for presenting claims was first limited by the Act to the 20th of March, 1784; but the time was extended by the renewal of the Act, from time to time, until 1789, when the Commissioners presented theirtwelfthand last report, and Parliament finally disposed of the whole matter in 1790, seven years after its commencement.
The Commissioners, according to their first report, divided the Loyalists intosixclasses, as follows: 1. Those who had rendered service to Great Britain. 2. Those who had borne arms for Great Britain. 3. Uniform Loyalists. 4. Loyal English subjects resident in Great Britain. 5. Loyalists who had taken oaths to the American States, but afterwards joined the British. 6. Loyalists who had borne arms for the American States, but afterwards joined the British navy or army. The reason for this classification is not very apparent; for all showed alike who were able to establish their losses, without reference to differences of merit, or the time or circumstances of their adhering to the Crown.
Every applicant was required to furnish proof of his loyalty, and of every species of loss for which he claimed compensation; in addition to which each claimant was put upon his oath as to his alleged losses; and if in any caseperjuryorfraudwere believed to have been practised, the claimant was at once cut off from his whole claim. The rigid rules which the Commissioners laid down and enforced in regard to claimants, examining each claimant and the witnesses in his behalf separately and apart, caused much dissatisfaction, and gave the proceeding more the character of an Inquisition than of Inquiry.It seemed to place the claimants almost in the position of criminals on whom rested the burden of proof to establish their own innocence and character, rather than in that of Loyalists who had faithfully served their King and country, and lost their homes and possessions in doing so. Very many, probably the large majority of claimants, could not possibly prove the exact value of each species of loss which they had sustained years before, in houses, goods, stocks of cattle, fields with their crops and produce, woods with their timber, etc., etc. In such a proceeding the most unscrupulous would be likely to fare the best, and the most scrupulous and conscientious the worst; and it is alleged that many false losses were allowed to persons who had suffered no loss, while many other sufferers received no compensation, because they had not the means of bringing witnesses from America toprovetheir losses, in addition to their own testimony.
The chairman of the Commission admits the delay and difficulty caused by the mode of proceeding adopted by the Commissioners. He says: "The investigation of the property of each claimant, and of the value of each article of that property, real and personal, could not but be attended with a good deal of time as well as much caution and difficulty, each claim in fact branching out into so many articles, or rather distinct causes, in which the Commissioners were obliged to execute the office of both judge and jury, or rather of arbitrators between the nation on one side, and the individual on the other, whose whole patrimony as well as character depended on their verdict."[126]
The Act passed in 1783, authorizing the inquiry, being limited to two years, expired in July, 1785, but was renewed with some additions, one of which was a clause to empower the Commissioners to appoint proper persons to repair to America "to inquire into such circumstances as they might thinkmaterial for better ascertaining the several claims which had been or should be presented to them under this or the former Act of Parliament." The Commissioners appointed John Anstey, Esq., a barrister-at-law, as agent to the United States, "to obtain information as to the confiscation, sale, and value of landed estates, and the total loss of the property of the claimants," respecting which he procured much valuable and authentic information and testimony. They sent Colonel Thomas Dundas and Mr. Jeremy Pemberton, two members of the Board, to visit Nova Scotia and Canada, "to inquire into the claims of such persons as could not without great inconvenience go over to Great Britain."
Before the 25th of March, 1784, the latest period allowed by the first Act for presenting claims, the number of claimants was 2,063, and the property alleged by them to have been lost, according to their schedules, amounted to £7,046,278, besides debts to the amount of £2,354,135. The sum was very large, but the losses were undoubtedly very great. The Commissioners made their first report in July, 1784; and after having detailed their assiduous proceeding in the fulfilment of their trust, and care in examining and deciding on individual cases, reported on the part of the cases submitted, and awarded £201,750 for £534,705 claimed, reducing the amount by more than half the amount claimed.
Thesecondreport of the Commissioners was made in December of the same year, and states that 128 additional cases had been examined and disposed of, the amount claimed being £693, 257, and the amount allowed was £150,935—less than one-fourth the amount claimed.
One hundred and twenty-two (122) cases were examined into and disposed of in May and July, 1785, according to the third and fourth reports—the amount claimed being £898,196, and the amount allowed being £253,613—less than one-third of the amount claimed.
In April, 1786, the fifth report of the Commissioners was presented, announcing that 142 other claims had been considered and decided, the claims amounting to £733,311, on which the Commissioners allowed £250,506—a little more than one-third of the amount claimed.
The Commissioners proceeded in the same manner with theirinvestigations, and with about the same results, in 1786 and 1787.[127]
On the 5th of April, 1788, the Commissioners reported that they had examined into and declared upon 1,680 claims, and had allowed the sum of £1,887,548 for their payment.
Under all the circumstances, it appears scarcely possible that the Commissioners could have proceeded with more despatch than they did. But the delay caused much dissatisfaction among the Loyalists, whose agents petitioned both King and Parliament on the delay, or on the course pursued by the Commissioners, or on some subject connected with the claims of the Loyalists. Essays and tracts were published; letters and communications appeared in the newspapers on the subject; in 1786, the agents of the Loyalists presented a petition to Parliament, which contained among other things the following touching words: "It is impossible to describe the poignant distress under which many of these persons now labour, and which must daily increase should the justice of Parliament be delayed until all the claims are liquidated and reported; * * ten years have elapsed since many of them have been deprived of their fortunes, and with their helpless families reduced from independent affluence to poverty and want; some of them now languishing in British jails; others indebted to their creditors, who have lent them money barely to support their existence, and who, unless speedily relieved, must sink more than the value of their claims when received, and be in a worse condition than if they had never made them; others have already sunk under the pressure and severity of their misfortunes; and others must, in all probability, soon meet the same melancholy fate, should the justice due them be longer postponed. But, on the contrary, should provision be now made for payment of those whose claims have been settled and reported, it will not only relieve them from their distress, but give credit to others whose claims remain to be considered, and enable all of them to provide for their wretched families, and become again useful members of society."
Two years later, in 1788, a tract was published by a Loyalist, entitled "The Claim of the American Loyalists Reviewed and Maintained upon Incontrovertible Principles of Law and Justice." The writer of that tract thus forcibly states the situation of the Loyalists: "It is well known that this delay of justice has produced the most melancholy and shocking events. A number of sufferers have been driven into insanity and become their own destroyers, leaving behind them their helpless widows and orphans to subsist upon the cold charity of strangers. Others have been sent to cultivate the wilderness for their subsistence, without having the means, and compelled through want to throw themselves on the mercy of the American States, and the charity of former friends, to support the life which might have been made comfortable by the money long since due by the British Government; and many others with their families are barely subsisting upon a temporary allowance from Government, a mere pittance when compared with the sum due them."
Shortly after the publication of the pamphlet containing thesestatements, the Commissioners submitted their eleventh report, April, 1788, and Mr. Pitt, Chancellor of the Exchequer, yielded the following month to the pressing entreaties of the claimants to allow their grievances to be discussed in Parliament. "Twelve years had elapsed since the property of most of them had been alienated under the Confiscation Acts, and five since their title to recompense had been recognized by the law under which their claims had been presented and disposed of."
We will give an abridged account of the proceedings in Parliament and by the Commissioners in their own words:
"The business came on in the House of Commons on the 6th of June, 1788, which Mr. Pitt opened in a very handsome and eloquent speech respecting the merits of the American Loyalists, and which, he did not doubt, would meet with the unanimous acknowledgment of the House; and he trusted, therefore, there would be no difference of opinion as to the principle, though there might be as to the mode of compensation and the distribution which he thought it his duty to propose.
"The first principle he laid down was, that however strong their claims might be on the generosity of the nation, the compensation could not be considered asa matter of right and strict justice;[129]in the mode, therefore, he had pursued, he had markedthe principle in the various quotas of compensation he should propose to be made to the various classes of the American Loyalists.
"He considered the three first classes of them, stated by the Commissioners in their reports as the most meritorious, and who were likewise the most numerous, viz.:
"1st. Loyalists who had rendered services to Great Britain. Number, 204.
"2nd. Loyalists who had borne arms in the service of Great Britain—481.
"3rd. Zealous and uniform Loyalists—626.
"Total number of these three classes—1,311.
"The number of the remaining classes were much fewer, viz.:
"4th. Loyal British subjects resident in Great Britain—20.
"5th. Who took the oath to the Americans, but afterwards joined the British—27.
"6th. Who bore arms for the Americans, but afterwards joined the British—23.
"7th. Ditto, losses under the Prohibitory Act—3.
"8th. Loyal British proprietors—2.
"9th. Subject or settled inhabitants of the United States—25.
"10th. Claims disallowed and withdrawn—313.
"11th. Loyal British subjects who appear to have relief by the Treaty of Peace, but state the impossibility of procuring it—4.
"Mr. Pitt proposed to pay classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, whose liquidated losses did not amount to more than £10,000 each, the full amount of their losses; and if they should exceed thesum of £10,000, to deduct the sum of ten per cent. from excess only of £10,000, provided such losses did not exceed £35,000; and if they exceeded £35,000, then fifteen per cent. from the excess of £10,000, and not above £50,000; and if they exceeded £50,000, then to deduct twenty per cent. from the excess of £10,000; and which principle, he informed the Committee, he meant to follow in every other class.
"With regard to the 4th and 8th classes, viz., of loyal British subjects and loyal British proprietors resident in Great Britain during the war, he did not mean to propose any deduction from the losses under £10,000; but from the losses which amounted from £10,000 to £50,000 he proposed a deduction of twenty per cent. should be made; and a further deduction from those losses amounting to above £50,000, and a still further deduction of seventy per cent. from those from £50,000 to £200,000; and so on in proportion.
"He next considered the case of those Loyalists whose losses principally, if not solely, arose from their loss of office or profession, by which they had been deprived of their livelihood, or means of support, both for themselves or families. These persons were distinct from those who had been in trade or other branches of business, or gained their livelihood by their manual labour. Though these losses were not of so substantial a nature as those who lost property real or personal, yet they could not be easily reinstated in the same lucrative professions which they had enjoyed—civil employment, in the law, in the Church, or in physic—and therefore he thought them entitled to a liberal compensation. But as they were not precluded from exercising their industry and talents in this country, he proposed that all those persons who were reported by Commissioners to have lost incomes not exceeding £400per annum, should receive pensions at the rate of £50per cent.of such income, and £40per cent.for every £100 above £400 per annum; where the value did not exceed £1,500per annum, £30per cent.for every £100 per annum exceeding £400; thus thepercentagewould be governed by and diminish in proportion to the increase of the income lost.