CHAPTER VIII.
Sir Rowland Hillhaving received an order early in the morning of the 12th of January, to retrace his steps to Portalegre, we marched from Merida at nine o'clock,A.M.and in the afternoon bivouacked behind La-Nava. Next evening we reposed on the bank of a little river, under the castle of Zagala, and on the 14th returned to Albuquerque. We retired to Alegreta on the 16th, and to Portalegre on the 17th. On the succeeding day, the men were busily employed in renewing their stock of clean linen; and on the 19th, we moved to Alpalhao, on our way to the North, to tender Lord Wellington our assistance, should his lordship require it. We reached Niza on the 20th, where, on the following morning, we received the glad tidings of the fall of Ciudad-Rodrigo. As Marmont, however, still shewed a disposition to give battle, we advanced from Niza to the Tagus on the 25th, crossed that river by a bridge of boats at Villa-Velha, and then moved two leagues farther, andoccupied a few miserable villages. Next day we entered Castello-Branco, where we had the pleasure of meeting with the French garrison of Ciudad-Rodrigo, on their way to British transports.
Marmont having withdrawn his army to Salamanca, to wait an opportunity of resuming the offensive, when his chances of success should appear more inviting, we bade adieu to Castello-Branco on the 1st of February, and retraced our steps as far as Villa-Velha, where we bivouacked. On the 2nd, we occupied Niza, the 3rd Alpalhao, and re-entered Portalegre the following morning.
The siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo, forms one of the most glorious achievements of the late Peninsular war, and marks in an eminent degree the consummate military talent of the General who brought it to a successful conclusion.
The Marshals Marmont, Soult, and Suchet, viewing the inactivity of the allied army in the latter months of 1811, as something tantamount to an acknowledgment on the part of the British chief, that he was not in a condition to undertake any offensive movement of importance, formed a triple league, by which Marmont appears to have agreed to favour his brother Marshals with a few of his brigades during the winter months, on condition of receiving asimilarfavour from them in the following summer. Marmont's reinforcements quitted the banks of the Tormes and Tagus in the end of November and beginning of December 1811,and moved towards the seat of war in the east and south of Spain. On the approach of their friends, Soult laid siege to Tariffa, and Suchet to Valencia.
Having instantly discovered the deep game which his powerful opponents were playing, Lord Wellington took measures to render it a losing one. With the eye of the eagle, he watched their every movement, but never attempted to derange their plans, or arrest the progress of the brigades, till the latter had arrived at a point so distant, that they could not return to the banks of the Agweda in time to prevent his Lordship carrying into execution his designs upon Ciudad-Rodrigo. But on Marmont's troops arriving at that point, instructions were immediately transmitted to Sir Rowland Hill, to carry into execution the first part of those admirably planned operations, which terminated in the capture of that important military post.
No better proof can be adduced of the ability with which the whole of these operations were planned and executed, than the signal advantages which resulted from them to the common cause. Sir Rowland Hill's grand object in marching upon Merida, being to draw the attention of the enemy to a point far distant from that to be assailed, his movement was attended with all the success which could have been anticipated, The Count D'Erlon no sooner heard of our arrival on the banks of the Guadiana, than he withdrew precipitately from Almendralejo,and for a day or two after, dispatched a courier to Soult every two hours, soliciting immediate assistance, otherwise he would be inevitably devoured by the "Arroyo-del-Molinos devils," who were in close pursuit of him. Being totally ignorant as to the number of "devils" that were following his friend D'Erlon, Soult, on receiving a few of these applications for succour, transmitted instructions to General Laval, commanding before Tariffa, to raise the siege of that place, and at the expence of all his battering-train, &c. fly with all possible celerity to the Count's relief, which instructions were implicitly obeyed. From these proceedings of the enemy in Andalusia, and the subsequent tardy movements of Marmont on the side of Ciudad-Rodrigo, it appears quite evident that the eyes of the two were rivetted too long upon our movements, for before they recovered from the panic which our march created amongst them, they thus allowed the British flag proudly to wave over the turrets of Ciudad-Rodrigo.
With all deference to the experience and high military characters of the three Marshals, it seems evident that their plan of operations was based on a capital military error,—that of under-rating the strength of their opponent. By adopting this view of Lord Wellington's forces, Marmont denuded himself of the means of affording the necessary protection to that portion of the Spanish territory which his Imperial Master had placedunder his charge, and as a natural consequence of such conduct, lost possession of Ciudad-Rodrigo. Soult, on the other hand, committed another error, little inferior in magnitude to the one just mentioned, that of over-rating the force under General Hill. By doing so, Soult not only raised the siege of Tariffa in a disgraceful manner, but allowed his attention to be completely abstracted from that point towards which the eyes of every Frenchman in the Peninsula should have been directed. These facts, I conceive, shew us the folly of any general either under-rating or over-rating the numbers, courage, or discipline of an opponent's forces. For although I most readily admit that it may be a little difficult at times for a general to banish from his breast the timidity of a Druet, who exaggerated the danger that threatened him, or the temerity of a Marmont, who as much underrated them; yet I am quite satisfied, that unless a general's experience and knowledge of his duties are such as will enable him to steer clear of timidity on the one hand, and temerity on the other, he should be held incapable of conducting any field operation, if the result is expected to have any influence on the issue of the campaign.
On passing a church one morning during our residence in Portalegre, a melancholy sound struck my ear,—it was a funeral dirge. In a few minutes the mournful procession entered the portal of the church, and being anxious to observe theceremony, I followed. Around the bier stood an assemblage of priests and friars, who for a considerable time chaunted hymns for the soul of the deceased. At the conclusion of the service I stepped forward to view the coffin, and the piece of inanimate clay it contained. The coffin being open, I beheld a female figure laid out in the usual manner, with her face uncovered, and decorated in a rich muslin dress. The countenance, though then in ruins, exhibited marks of beauty. The junior priests having removed the corpse to a grave dug for its reception in the body of the church, the bottom of the coffin was withdrawn, when the body descended into its place of repose, in a manner the most revolting I ever witnessed. But distressing to the feelings as was this disgusting mode of depositing the body of a fellow-creature in the silent tomb, the subsequent operations of the sexton was ten times more so. The latter, after sprinkling a little mould over the body, instantly began to pound it with a log of wood, resembling a paviour's mallet, and continued to do so, after every additional layer of earth, till the whole of the latter had been so far replaced in its original position, as to permit the flag which surmounted the grave to be laid on a level with those around it. During the latter part of the ceremony I remained close to the grave, gazing in silent astonishment at the scene before me. At length, however, I was roused from my reverie, by a most offensiveeffluvia proceeding from the depository of the deceased. I did not, however, for some time, desert the post which I had assigned to myself; but being at length completely overcome, I made the best of my way towards the door, lest the exertions of the grave-digger might impose on his superiors the disagreeable duty of bearing me to my lodgings.
There being no places of public amusement in Portalegre, time, long before the end of February, had become such a drug on our hands, that the collective wisdom of the garrison was frequently reduced to its last shift to devise a rational mode of employing it. Our walks being few, and miserably bad, and having no books "save the devil's," by scanning the pages of which we could hope to spend a few hours each day with pleasure and advantage, not a few of the idlers paid more visits to a place denominatedhell, than were at all profitable either for their purses or their morals. When officers are once induced to give up their time to play, and employ all the powers of their mind to gratify the low, grovelling ambition of acquiring wealth at the expense of those whom they consider their friends and brothers;—when the love of play leads officers to prefer the amusements of the card and billiard-tables, and the rattling of dice, to the faithful discharge of their public and private duties; when they become so wedded to their favourite pursuits, as to consider it a punishment to eat,drink, and sleep, they must be held as totally useless to the service,—to be worthless members of society,—the slaves of vice,—and of that low cunning and chicanery which borders upon villany.
Accursed game! thy blight is every-where,Thy lawless fingers pilfer every purse;The smart mechanic, and the pamper'd peer,Endure alike the pressure of thy curse.When hopeless ruin hath dissolv'd thy snare,Thepistolor thebowlare things of course;And few can from thy gripping fangs departWithout ablighted nameorbroken heart.