that the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be their destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation.... This right is so clear in principle that no man can deny it who admits the legality of maritime capture, because if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is property that can be captured, it is impossible to capture.
that the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be their destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation.... This right is so clear in principle that no man can deny it who admits the legality of maritime capture, because if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is property that can be captured, it is impossible to capture.
On this another rule has been grafted which is suggested by the enunciation of the law as to the right of search. That rightmustbe exercised for the very same reason that the right has been allowed, for otherwise you do not know whether you have the right to seize. From theright of searchhas therefore developed theduty to search; and it is the omission to recognise this duty that has plunged the German Admiralty into its piratical career.
But the heart of the neutral merchant is desperately ingenious, especially when his country is contiguous to the theatre of war, and no sooner had he obtained the inch to which practical considerations made him appear to be entitled than he developed it into an ell of his own imagining. He argued thus: A neutral vessel bound to an enemy port is liable to detention, because the presumption is that she has cargo for the enemy, and that her cargo is probably contraband; the presumption also is that cargoes on board a vessel bound for a neutral port are not destined for the enemy, even though they may be contraband; nothing easier than to bring them across the sea in a neutral vessel with a neutral destination; all that remains to be done is to pass them on to the belligerent, either transhipping them into another vessel and sending it down the coast, out of the way of the attentions of the enemy’s cruisers, or better still, if the neutral and belligerent countries are contiguous, by rail across the border. And the best of the plan is that the shipper on the other side of the water, say some innocent merchant in copper in the United States, need know nothing about it, so that if by chance the cargo does get seized he will do all the shouting.
With this problem, devised in some such human fashion, the United States was faced during the Civil War, and the Judges settled it in characteristic and logical manner. They discovered the doctrine of ‘continuous voyages.’ It is nothingmore than the simple application of elementary principles, and is arrived at by the elimination of the presumption of innocence which the voyage to the neutral port raised. All presumptions may be rebutted, and this one manifestly. ‘Be the destination what it may,’ the right of search existed; the presumption had only been allowed to grow because it was convenient. If goods destined for the enemy reached him by way of a neutral port, that port was only an intermediate destination; the ultimate consignee was the enemy, and there was a continuous voyage to him from the port of shipment. Therefore the seizure, and therefore the search, were justified, and could not be denied merely because ‘the final destination of the cargo was left so skilfully open.’
But the neutral merchant’s wits are sharpened by much profit in prospect; he is no simpleton, and a consignment of, let us say, copper from the United States is not likely to be addressed ‘Herr Krupp von Bohlen, Essen,viâRotterdam, by kind favour of Messrs. Petersen & Co.’ Hence a most ingenious argument conducted on the principle ‘You shut your eyes, I’ll keep mine open.’ A consignment ‘to order’ (as ‘to the order of Messrs. Petersen & Co.’) may perhaps be legitimately seized, because the words do not clearly indicate the Dutch firm to be the real purchasers; but certainly not a consignment to a specific person (as to Messrs. Petersen & Co., Rotterdam). The sophistry is obvious; it does not negative the possibility that Messrs.Petersen & Co. are either acting as buyers for, or have imported the goods with the intention of passing them on to, Herr Krupp of Essen. And with the help of trade statistics the possibility may be discovered to be a probability.
And now the pendulum swings back, and in the doctrine of embargo the really neutral merchant comes into his own. ‘Embargo’ is the action taken by a neutral Government in regard to goods which have been declared to be contraband by one or other of the belligerents; and the point to be emphasised is that it springs directly out of the doctrine of ‘continuous voyages.’ In order to prevent neutral ships destined to its ports with goods which one of the belligerents treats as contraband being detained and searched at sea, it prohibits the export of those goods from its own ports. The embargo satisfies the belligerent that these goods will not go out of the neutral country, and therefore will not get directly or indirectly into the hands of the enemy; he therefore feels justified in letting those ships go free, for the doctrine of ‘continuous voyages’ cannot apply. Now the reason for the embargo is that the merchants of the neutral country require the commodity for themselves. Suppose, for example, that Spanish merchants require copper for their own use; then in order to ensure cargoes of copper coming direct to Spanish ports without being interfered with at sea by the search of belligerent cruisers,the Spanish Government might put an embargo on copper: that is to say, might prohibit its export. There could be no better evidence that the Spanish merchants were importing the copper for their own trade, and that none of it would get through to the enemy. I can therefore best describe an embargo thus: It is action taken by a neutral Government to protect those of its merchants who do not desire to engage in trade in contraband from the consequences which would result from the action of those who do.
There is only one point in connexion with this doctrine which requires attention. Is the action thus taken by the neutral Government a breach of its neutrality to the other belligerent? For, undoubtedly, it does act favourably to the belligerent who has declared the goods to be contraband. The answer is simple. Once admit the strict logic of the doctrine of ‘continuous voyages,’ it follows that an embargo is a measure neither directed against one belligerent nor imposed to favour the other. It is simply a measure of self-defence, taken in order to prevent the national industries from suffering from the undoubted belligerent right of detention at sea and possible seizure.
There are other occasions in which an embargo may be resorted to, as in the case of the embargo on rubber imported by Great Britain to which reference has been made above.[20]That is purely a municipal question with which international law can have no concern.
And now I come to the last point of all, blockade, which is the supreme manifestation of force at sea for the purpose of crushing the enemy. Here all minor considerations vanish. The artificial distinction between absolute and conditional contraband disappears; there is no longer any free list; neutral as well as enemy cargoes are subject to seizure, whether going to or coming from the blockaded port. The humanitarian concession that war is not made on the civil population finds no place; indeed, blockade derives much of its efficacy from the pressure which the strangling process brings to bear on that population. It has been described as a siege carried on at sea, but under somewhat more elastic conditions than a land siege. It is a convenient comparison, because all the outcry against its inhumanity is silenced by the recollection of Paris in 1870, and the vision of what Paris would have been in 1914 if the German plan had succeeded. It is rigorous, almost brutal, but it is war, and war admits of no half-measures which come within the code of civilisation; and this measure, extreme though it be, has long been recognised as legitimate warfare. Nor is there any conventional limitation as to the time when it may be resorted to. Coming as it naturally does at the end of the discussion to which other principles have led up, it might appear as if custom had decreed that it should only be resorted to after all other measures had failed. But there is nothing to prevent a war starting with a blockade; nothing,that is to say, in the theory of the subject, though there are any number of practical reasons which make it improbable. I presume, however, that if a great maritime Power were at war with a State which had only a miniature fleet, a blockade of its coasts would be the speediest and, therefore, the most humane way of bringing it to a conclusion. Certainly there is no rule or custom which prevents a Power at war from putting forth its full strength at once.
The ascending scale is easier for purposes of study; the mind grasps smaller things more easily, and they prepare the way for the appreciation of the greater things. But it is not by a process of logical development that we reach blockade after a study of contraband. Blockade is treated last more conveniently because it involves the greatest development of force against the enemy; but it would have been more logical to have begun at the other end of the scale, starting with the greatest exhibition of force, and letting the series of rules emerge in diminishing strength. In view of what remains to be said, it is of great importance to appreciate that the incarnation of sea-power, blockade, which cuts the enemy off absolutely from the outer world, lies at one end of the scale of what one belligerent may do to the other, and the seizure of contraband on a neutral ship going to an enemy port, which cuts the enemy off but partially, lies at the other end. There can then be no difficulty in justifying what comes in between.
But the most curious point is that it is onlywhen we come to the recognition of this extreme manifestation of force that we meet with artificial rules. A blockade must be ‘effective.’ Yet this word, as to the meaning of which in its ordinary use there can be no doubt, is given in treaties and by the authorities a wholly artificial meaning. Sometimes it includes the exact contrary to effectiveness, as that ‘A blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather’[21]: during which the adventurous skipper may run in. It is not necessary to labour the point; but it is necessary, when measures short of ‘blockade’ have been taken by England, that the full extent of what blockade pressure upon neutral trade means should be understood.
In order to determine what characterises a blockaded port, that denomination is given only where there is, by the disposition of the Power which attacks it with ships, stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering.[22]A blockade [by cruising squadrons allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution] is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port or arsenal to which it is applied, and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given to neutral Powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade.[23]
In order to determine what characterises a blockaded port, that denomination is given only where there is, by the disposition of the Power which attacks it with ships, stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering.[22]
A blockade [by cruising squadrons allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution] is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port or arsenal to which it is applied, and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given to neutral Powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade.[23]
These two quotations embody the principles of the English prize law. Article 17 of the Declaration of London contains a modification of them, and provides that ‘neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the war-ships detailed to render the blockade effective.’
I have come to the threshold of a subject of gravest importance, the new policy of the British Government adopted in answer to the ‘war-zone’ declaration of Germany, and I stop. To devote to it merely the end of an already long article would not be treating it with the consideration which it deserves, and which the question demands. Moreover, it would not be expedient for an ex-official Englishman to discuss the subject controversially at present. It is sufficient that the measure has been adopted after full and mature consideration by the Government, that the question is political as well as legal, and for us it must be taken to be within the legitimate powers of a belligerent. Presently, to judge from what has already happened, there certainly will be any amount of nonsense talked and written about it; already the term ‘paper-blockade’ has come in handily for the making of a paragraph, and some bold spirit has hit upon a brand-new term, ‘long-distance blockade.’ Also there has been some not very wise talk about ‘Two wrongs not making a right.’ I would suggest to those who feel irresistibly impelled to discuss the question that they should omit the word ‘blockade,’ for, as we have seen, itis a pernicketty term, and all sorts of legal niceties spring up in its train. I have endeavoured to show that ‘blockade’ is the extreme manifestation of the force known as sea-power against the enemy, that sea-power lies at the root of the authority which has been given to the series of principles governing belligerent interference with neutral trade, and that these principles are not a mere adventitious set of rules drawn up at odd times as wars at sea occasioned them. The principles and the rules have resulted from the play of natural forces, exerted by the belligerents on the one side, by the neutral merchant on the other. The rules are not even a compromise. The clash of forces has thrown off alternating sparks, rules recognising now the right of the one, now the right of the other. But in the supreme display of sea-power known as ‘blockade’ we find that the right of the belligerent does, as is inevitable, take the upper hand, and the right of the neutral disappears. And there are two French maxims worthy of note just now: ‘Qui veut les fins veut les moyens,’ and ‘Qui peut plus peut moins.’
P.S.—I must briefly refer to two questions which appear at first sight to conflict with the principles advanced in this article—Foreign Enlistment, and the King’s Proclamations of Neutrality.
Before agreeing with the United States as to the ‘Three Rules’ which, as I have pointed out,[24]deal solely with ‘foreign enlistment,’ the British Government declared that they could not assent to the contention that those rules were a statement of principles of international law in force at the time when theAlabamaclaims arose. This is expressly stated in Article 6 of the Treaty of Washington. ‘Historicus,’ in one of his Letters,[25]cites some American authorities which bear out this view. Further, he explains the true inwardness of the Foreign Enlistment Act:—
The Enlistment Act is directed, not against theanimus vendendi, but against theanimus belligerendi.It prohibits warlike enterprise, but it does not interfere with commercial adventure. A subject of the Crown may sell a ship of war, as he may sell a musket, to either belligerent with impunity; nay, he may even despatch it for sale to the belligerent port. But he may not take part in the overt act of making war upon a people with whom his Sovereign is at peace. The purview of the Foreign Enlistment Act is to prohibit a breach of allegiance on the part of the subject against his own Sovereign, not to prevent transactions in contraband with the belligerent. Its object is to prohibit private war, and not to restrain private commerce.
The Enlistment Act is directed, not against theanimus vendendi, but against theanimus belligerendi.
It prohibits warlike enterprise, but it does not interfere with commercial adventure. A subject of the Crown may sell a ship of war, as he may sell a musket, to either belligerent with impunity; nay, he may even despatch it for sale to the belligerent port. But he may not take part in the overt act of making war upon a people with whom his Sovereign is at peace. The purview of the Foreign Enlistment Act is to prohibit a breach of allegiance on the part of the subject against his own Sovereign, not to prevent transactions in contraband with the belligerent. Its object is to prohibit private war, and not to restrain private commerce.
It is only when it has become the subject of agreement between two or more States that ‘foreign enlistment’ assumes an international as well as a municipal character. I presume that this municipal character has not been lost by the inclusion of the duty to prevent the fitting out or arming of vessels in Article 8 of the Hague Convention, No. 13, of 1907, relating to the duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War.
As to the Proclamations of Neutrality, so much as recites and reinforces the Foreign Enlistment Act need not trouble us; the King’s loving subjects are exhorted to comply therewith. The rest of the Proclamations amounts to no more than a warning to subjects not to do ‘any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral Power in a war between other Powers, or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that behalf’; but, as ‘Historicus’ says,[26]‘The nature of the penalty is pointed out with equal clearness and correctness—viz.the withdrawal of the King’s protection from the contraband on its road to the enemy, and an abandonment of the subject to the operation of belligerent rights.’ What those belligerent rights are I have endeavoured to explain.