268Book of the Ordre of Chyualry, foll. 18 b, 31 b, 34 b. Robertson,History of the Reign of Charles V.i. 84. Sainte-Palaye,Mémoires sur l’ancienne chevalerie, i. 76sq.
268Book of the Ordre of Chyualry, foll. 18 b, 31 b, 34 b. Robertson,History of the Reign of Charles V.i. 84. Sainte-Palaye,Mémoires sur l’ancienne chevalerie, i. 76sq.
269Mills,History of Chivalry, p. 152.
269Mills,History of Chivalry, p. 152.
270Lancelot du Lac, vol. ii. fol. 2 a.
270Lancelot du Lac, vol. ii. fol. 2 a.
271Sainte-Palaye,op. cit.i. 135.
271Sainte-Palaye,op. cit.i. 135.
272Ibid.i. 236sq.
272Ibid.i. 236sq.
273Ibid.ii. 47.Cf.Kames,op. cit.iv. 157.
273Ibid.ii. 47.Cf.Kames,op. cit.iv. 157.
274Pike,History of Crime in England, i. 283.
274Pike,History of Crime in England, i. 283.
275Pollock and Maitland,History of English Law before the Time of Edward I.ii. 535sq.
275Pollock and Maitland,History of English Law before the Time of Edward I.ii. 535sq.
276Pike,op. cit.i. 265, 269; ii. 392.
276Pike,op. cit.i. 265, 269; ii. 392.
277Ibid.i. 142; ii. 238.
277Ibid.i. 142; ii. 238.
In modern times, according to Mr. Pike, the Public Records testify a decrease of deception in England.278Commercial honesty has improved, and those mean arts to which, during the reigns of the Tudors, even men in the highest positions frequently had recourse, have now, at any rate, descended to a lower grade of society.279At present, in the civilised countries of the West, opinion as to what the duty of sincerity implies varies not only in different individuals, but among different classes or groups of people, as also among different nations. Duplicity is held more reprehensible in a gentleman than in a shopkeeper or a peasant. The notion which seems to be common in England, that an advocate is over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he knows to be false if he is instructed to say it,280appears strange at least to some foreigners;281and in certain countries it is commonly regarded as blamable if a person ostensibly professes a religion in which he does not believe, say, by going to church. The Quakers deem all complimentary modes of speech, for instance in addressing people, to be objectionable as being inconsistent with truth.282Certain philosophers have expressed the opinion that veracity is an unconditional duty, which is not to be limited by any expediency, but must be respected in all circumstances. According to Kant, it would be a crime to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whetherour friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had taken refuge in our house.283Fichte maintains that the defence of so-called necessary lies is “the most wicked argument possible amongst men.”284Dymond says, “If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same purpose.”285But this rigorous view is not shared by common sense, nor by orthodox Protestant theology.286Jeremy Taylor asks, “Who will not tell a harmless lie to save the life of his friend, of his child, of himself, of a good and brave man?”287Where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, says Professor Sidgwick, “common sense seems to concede that it may sometimes be right: for example, most persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid, if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock: nor do I perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not know the truth.”288In the case of grown-up people, however, this principle seems to require the modification made by Hutcheson, that there is no wrong in false speech when the party deceived himself does not consider it an injury to be deceived.289Otherwise it might easily be supposed to give support to “pious fraud,” which in its crudest form is nowadays generally disapproved of, but which in subtle disguise still has many advocates among religious partisans. It is argued that the most important truths of religion cannot be conveyed into the minds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed, as it were, in a shell of fiction, and that by relating such fictions as if they were facts we are really performing an act of substantial veracity.290But this argument seems chiefly to have been invented for thepurpose of supporting a dilapidated structure of theological teaching, and can hardly be accepted by any person unprejudiced by religious bias. As a means of self-defence deviation from truth has been justified not only in the case of grosser injuries, but in the case of illegitimate curiosity, as it seems unreasonable that a person should be obliged to supply another with information which he has no right to exact.291The obligation of keeping a promise, again, is qualified in various ways. Thoughtful persons would commonly admit that such an obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him.292A promise to do an immoral act is held not to be binding, because the prior obligation not to do the act is paramount.293If, before the time comes to fulfil a promise, circumstances have altered so much that the effects of keeping it are quite different from those which were foreseen when it was made, all would agree that the promisee ought to release the promiser; but if he declines to do so, some would say that the latter is in every case bound by his promise, whilst others would maintain that a considerable alteration of circumstances has removed the obligation.294How far promises obtained by force or fraud are binding is a much disputed question.295According to Hutcheson, for instance, no regard is due to a promise which has been extorted by unjust violence.296Adam Smith, on the other hand, considers that whenever such a promise is violated, though for the most necessary reason, it is always with some degree of dishonour to the person who made it, and that “a brave man ought to die rather than make a promisewhich he can neither keep without folly nor violate without ignominy.”297
278Ibid.i. 264.Cf.ibid.ii. 474.
278Ibid.i. 264.Cf.ibid.ii. 474.
279Ibid.ii. 14sq.
279Ibid.ii. 14sq.
280Sidgwick,Methods of Ethics, p. 316. Paley,Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, iii. 15 (Complete Works, ii. 117). The same view was expressed by Cicero (De officiis, ii. 14).
280Sidgwick,Methods of Ethics, p. 316. Paley,Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, iii. 15 (Complete Works, ii. 117). The same view was expressed by Cicero (De officiis, ii. 14).
281See also Dymond,Essays on the Principles of Morals, ii. 5, p. 50sqq.
281See also Dymond,Essays on the Principles of Morals, ii. 5, p. 50sqq.
282Gurney,Views and Practices of the Society of Friends, p. 401.
282Gurney,Views and Practices of the Society of Friends, p. 401.
283Kant, ‘Ueber ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu Lügen,’ inSämmtliche Werke, vii. 309.
283Kant, ‘Ueber ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu Lügen,’ inSämmtliche Werke, vii. 309.
284Fichte,Das System der Sittenlehre, p. 371; English translation, p. 303sq.
284Fichte,Das System der Sittenlehre, p. 371; English translation, p. 303sq.
285Dymond,op. cit.ii. 6, p. 57.
285Dymond,op. cit.ii. 6, p. 57.
286Reinhard,System der Christlichen Moral, iii. 193sqq.Martensen,Christian Ethics, ‘Individual Ethics,’ p. 216sqq.Newman,Apologia pro vita sua, p. 274.
286Reinhard,System der Christlichen Moral, iii. 193sqq.Martensen,Christian Ethics, ‘Individual Ethics,’ p. 216sqq.Newman,Apologia pro vita sua, p. 274.
287Taylor,Whole Works, xii. 162.
287Taylor,Whole Works, xii. 162.
288Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 316.
288Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 316.
289Hutcheson,System of Moral Philosophy, ii. 32.
289Hutcheson,System of Moral Philosophy, ii. 32.
290Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 316.
290Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 316.
291Schopenhauer,Die Grundlage der Moral, § 17 (Sämmtliche Werke, vi. 247sqq.).
291Schopenhauer,Die Grundlage der Moral, § 17 (Sämmtliche Werke, vi. 247sqq.).
292Whewell,Elements of Morality, p. 156. Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 305.
292Whewell,Elements of Morality, p. 156. Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 305.
293Dymond,op. cit.ii. 6, p. 55. Whewell,op. cit.p. 156sq.Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 305. This is also the opinion of Thomas Aquinas (op. cit.ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5).
293Dymond,op. cit.ii. 6, p. 55. Whewell,op. cit.p. 156sq.Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 305. This is also the opinion of Thomas Aquinas (op. cit.ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5).
294Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 306sq.Thomas Aquinas says (op. cit.ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5) that a person who does not do what he has promised is excused “if the conditions of persons and things are changed.”
294Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 306sq.Thomas Aquinas says (op. cit.ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5) that a person who does not do what he has promised is excused “if the conditions of persons and things are changed.”
295Dymond,op. cit.ii. 6, p. 55sq.Whewell,op. cit.pp. 155, 159sqq.Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 305sq.Adam Smith,Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 486sqq.
295Dymond,op. cit.ii. 6, p. 55sq.Whewell,op. cit.pp. 155, 159sqq.Sidgwick,op. cit.p. 305sq.Adam Smith,Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 486sqq.
296Hutcheson,System of Moral Philosophy, ii. 34.
296Hutcheson,System of Moral Philosophy, ii. 34.
297Adam Smith,op. cit.p. 489.
297Adam Smith,op. cit.p. 489.
In point of veracity and good faith the old distinction between duties which we owe to our fellow-countrymen and such as we owe to foreigners is still preserved in various cases. It is particularly conspicuous in the relations between different states, in peace or war. Stratagems and the employment of deceptive means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the enemy or the country are held allowable in warfare, independently of the question whether the war is defensive or aggressive.298Deceit has, in fact, often constituted a great share of the glory of the most celebrated commanders; and particularly in the eighteenth century it was a common opinion that successes gained through a spy are more creditable to the skill of a general than successes in regular battles.299Lord Wolseley writes:—“As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child’s copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever.”300At the same time, there are some exceptions to the general rule that deceit is permitted against an enemy. Under the customs of war it has been agreed that particular acts and signs shall have a specific meaning in order that belligerentsmay carry on certain necessary intercourse, and it is forbidden to employ such acts or signs in deceiving an enemy. Thus information must not be surreptitiously obtained under the shelter of a flag of truce; buildings not used as hospitals must not be marked with an hospital flag; and persons not covered by the provisions of the Geneva Convention must not be protected by its cross.301A curious arbitrary rule affects one class of stratagems by forbidding certain permitted means of deception from the moment at which they cease to deceive. It is perfectly legitimate to use the distinctive emblems of an enemy in order to escape from him or to draw his forces into action; but it is held that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of their enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which they can be recognised before attacking, and that a vessel using the enemy’s flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or shell.302Disobedience to this rule is considered to entail grave dishonour; for “in actual battle enemies are bound to combat loyally, and are not free to ensure victory by putting on a mask of friendship.”303But, as Mr. Hall observes, it is not easy to see why it is more disloyal to wear a disguise when it is obviously useless, than when it serves its purpose.304Finally, it is universally agreed that promises given to the enemy ought to be kept;305this was admitted even by Machiavelli306and Bynkershoek,307who did not in general burden belligerents with particularly heavy duties. But the restrictions which “international law”lays on deceit against enemies do not seem to be taken very seriously. Treaties between nations and promises given by one state to another, either in war or peace, are hardly meant to be kept longer than it is convenient to keep them. And when an excuse for the breach of faith is felt necessary, that excuse itself is generally a lie.
298Conférence de Bruxelles, art. 14.Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 16, 101.Conférence internationale de la paix, La Haye, 1899, ‘Règlement concernant les lois de la guerre sur terre,’ art. 24, pt. i. p. 245. Roman Catholicism admits the employment of stratagems in wars which are just (Gratian,op. cit.ii. 23. 2. 2; Ayala,De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari, i. 8. 1sq.; Ferraris, quoted by Adds,Catholic Dictionary, p. 945; Nys,Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, p. 128sq.), on the authority of St. Augustine, the great advocate of general truthfulness (Quæstiones in Jesum Nave, 10,ad Jos.viii. 2 [Migne,op. cit.xxxiv. 781]:—“Cum autem justum bellum susceperit, utrum aperta pugna utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest”).
298Conférence de Bruxelles, art. 14.Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 16, 101.Conférence internationale de la paix, La Haye, 1899, ‘Règlement concernant les lois de la guerre sur terre,’ art. 24, pt. i. p. 245. Roman Catholicism admits the employment of stratagems in wars which are just (Gratian,op. cit.ii. 23. 2. 2; Ayala,De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari, i. 8. 1sq.; Ferraris, quoted by Adds,Catholic Dictionary, p. 945; Nys,Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, p. 128sq.), on the authority of St. Augustine, the great advocate of general truthfulness (Quæstiones in Jesum Nave, 10,ad Jos.viii. 2 [Migne,op. cit.xxxiv. 781]:—“Cum autem justum bellum susceperit, utrum aperta pugna utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest”).
299Halleck,International Law, i. 567. Maine,International Law, p. 149sqq.
299Halleck,International Law, i. 567. Maine,International Law, p. 149sqq.
300Wolseley,Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field Service, p. 169.
300Wolseley,Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field Service, p. 169.
301Conférence de Bruxelles, art. 13sq.Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 101, 114, 117.Manual of the Laws of War on Land, prepared by the Institute of International Law, (art. 8 (d). Hall,Treatise on International Law, p. 537sq.
301Conférence de Bruxelles, art. 13sq.Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, art. 101, 114, 117.Manual of the Laws of War on Land, prepared by the Institute of International Law, (art. 8 (d). Hall,Treatise on International Law, p. 537sq.
302Hall,op. cit.p. 538sq.Bluntschli,Droit international, § 565, p. 328sq.
302Hall,op. cit.p. 538sq.Bluntschli,Droit international, § 565, p. 328sq.
303Bluntschli,op. cit.§ 565, p. 329.
303Bluntschli,op. cit.§ 565, p. 329.
304Hall,op. cit.p. 539.
304Hall,op. cit.p. 539.
305Heffter,Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, § 125, p. 262.
305Heffter,Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, § 125, p. 262.
306Machiavelli,Discorsi, iii. 40 (Opere, iii. 164).
306Machiavelli,Discorsi, iii. 40 (Opere, iii. 164).
307Bynkershoek,Quæstiones juris publici, i. 1, p. 4. The maxim of Canon Law, “Fides servanda hosti” (Gratian,Decretum, ii. 23. i. 3), however, was greatly impaired by the principle, “Juramentum contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam praestitum non tenet” (Gregory IX.Decretales, ii. 24, 27. See Nys,Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, p. 126sq.).
307Bynkershoek,Quæstiones juris publici, i. 1, p. 4. The maxim of Canon Law, “Fides servanda hosti” (Gratian,Decretum, ii. 23. i. 3), however, was greatly impaired by the principle, “Juramentum contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam praestitum non tenet” (Gregory IX.Decretales, ii. 24, 27. See Nys,Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, p. 126sq.).
THEcondemnation of untruthfulness and bad faith springs from a variety of sources. In the first place, he who tells a lie, or who breaks a promise, generally commits an injury against another person. His act consequently calls forth sympathetic resentment, and becomes an object of moral censure.
Men have a natural disposition to believe what they are told. This disposition is particularly obvious in young children; it is acquired wisdom and experience only that teach incredulity, and, as Adam Smith observes, they very seldom teach it enough.1Even people who are themselves pre-eminent liars are often deceived by the falsehoods of others.2When detected a deception always implies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas; and such a conflict gives rise to a feeling of pain,3which may call forth resentment against its volitional cause, the deceiver.
1Reid,Inquiry into the Human Mind, vi. 24, p. 430sqq.Adam Smith,Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 494sq.Dugald Stewart,Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, ii. 340sq.
1Reid,Inquiry into the Human Mind, vi. 24, p. 430sqq.Adam Smith,Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 494sq.Dugald Stewart,Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, ii. 340sq.
2Burton,Two Trips to Gorilla Land, i. 106 (Mpongwe).
2Burton,Two Trips to Gorilla Land, i. 106 (Mpongwe).
3Lehmann,Hovedlovene for det menneskelige Følelseliv, p. 181.Cf.Bain,Emotions and the Will, p. 218.
3Lehmann,Hovedlovene for det menneskelige Følelseliv, p. 181.Cf.Bain,Emotions and the Will, p. 218.
But men are not only ready to believe what they are told, they also like to know the truth. Curiosity, or the love of truth, is coeval with the first operations of the intellect; it seems to be an ultimate fact in the humanframe.4In our endeavour to learn the truth we are frustrated by him who deceives us, and he becomes an object of our resentment.
4Dugald Stewart,op. cit.ii. 334, 340.
4Dugald Stewart,op. cit.ii. 334, 340.
Nor are we injured by a deception merely because we like to know the truth, but, chiefly, because it is of much importance for us that we should know it. Our conduct is based upon our ideas; hence the erroneous notion as regards some fact in the past, present, or future, which is produced by a lie or false promise, may lead to unforeseen events detrimental to our interests. Moreover, on discovering that we have been deceived, we have the humiliating feeling that another person has impertinently made our conduct subject to his will. This is a wound on our pride, a blot on our honour. Francis I. of France laid down as a principle, “that the lie was never to be put up with without satisfaction, but by a base-born fellow.”5“The lie,” says Sainte-Palaye, “has always been considered the most fatal and irreparable affront that a man of honour could receive.”6
5Millingen,History of Duelling, i. 71.
5Millingen,History of Duelling, i. 71.
6Sainte-Palaye,Mémoires sur l’ancienne chevalerie, i. 78.
6Sainte-Palaye,Mémoires sur l’ancienne chevalerie, i. 78.
How largely the condemnation of falsehood and bad faith is due to the harm suffered by the victim appears from the fact that a lie or breach of faith is held more condemnable in proportion to the magnitude of the harm caused by it. But even in apparently trifling cases the reflective mind strongly insists upon the necessity of truthfulness and fidelity to a given word. Every lie and every unfulfilled promise has a tendency to lessen mutual confidence, to predispose the perpetrator to commit a similar offence in the future, and to serve as a bad example for others. “The importance of truth,” says Bentham, “is so great, that the least violation of its laws, even in frivolous matters, is always attended with a certain degree of danger. The slightest deviation from it is an attack upon the respect we owe to it. It is a first transgression which facilitates a second, and familiarises the odious idealof falsehood.”7Contrariwise, as Aristotle observes, he who is truthful in unimportant matters will be all the more so in important ones.8Similar considerations, however, require a certain amount of reflection and farsightedness; hence intellectual development tends to increase the emphasis laid on the duties of sincerity and good faith. At the earlier stages of civilisation it is frequently considered good form to tell an untruth to a person in order to please him, and ill-mannered to contradict him, however much he be mistaken,9for the reason that farther consequences are left out of account. The utilitarian basis of the duty of truthfulness also accounts for those extreme cases in which a deception is held permissible or even a duty, when promoting the true interests of the person subject to it.
7Bentham,Theory of Legislation, p. 260.
7Bentham,Theory of Legislation, p. 260.
8Aristotle,Ethica Nicomachea, iv. 7. 8.
8Aristotle,Ethica Nicomachea, iv. 7. 8.
9Besides statements referred to above, see Dobrizhoffer,Account of the Abipones, ii. 137; Hennepin,New Discovery of a Vast Country in America between New France and New Mexico, ii. 70; Dall,Alaska, p. 398 (Aleuts); Oldfield, inTrans. Ethn. Soc.N.S. iii. 255 (West Australian natives). “The natives of Africa,” says Livingstone (Expedition to the Zambesi, p. 309), “have an amiable of desire to please, and often tell what they imagine will be gratifying, rather than the uninteresting naked truth.” An English sportsman, after firing at an antelope, inquired of his dark attendant, “Is it wounded?” The answer was, “Yes! the ball went right into his heart.” These mortal wounds never proving fatal, he asked a friend, who understood the language, to explain to the man that he preferred the truth in every case. “He is my father,” replied the native, “and I thought he would be displeased if I told him that he never hits at all.” The wish to please is likewise a fertile source of untruth in children, especially girls (Sully,Studies of Childhood, p. 256).
9Besides statements referred to above, see Dobrizhoffer,Account of the Abipones, ii. 137; Hennepin,New Discovery of a Vast Country in America between New France and New Mexico, ii. 70; Dall,Alaska, p. 398 (Aleuts); Oldfield, inTrans. Ethn. Soc.N.S. iii. 255 (West Australian natives). “The natives of Africa,” says Livingstone (Expedition to the Zambesi, p. 309), “have an amiable of desire to please, and often tell what they imagine will be gratifying, rather than the uninteresting naked truth.” An English sportsman, after firing at an antelope, inquired of his dark attendant, “Is it wounded?” The answer was, “Yes! the ball went right into his heart.” These mortal wounds never proving fatal, he asked a friend, who understood the language, to explain to the man that he preferred the truth in every case. “He is my father,” replied the native, “and I thought he would be displeased if I told him that he never hits at all.” The wish to please is likewise a fertile source of untruth in children, especially girls (Sully,Studies of Childhood, p. 256).
The detestation of falsehood is in a very large measure due to the motive which commonly is at the bottom of a lie. It is doubtful whether a lie ever is told simply from love of falsehood.10The intention to produce a wrong belief has a deeper motive than the mere desire to produce such a belief; and in most cases this motive is the deceiver’s hope of benefiting himself at the expense of the person deceived. A better motive makes the act less detestable, or may even serve as a justification. But the broad doctrine that the end sanctifies the means is generally rejected; and the principle which sometimes allowsdeceit from a benevolent motive has been restricted within very narrow limits by a higher conception of individual freedom and individual rights. Thus the emancipation of morality from theology has brought discredit on the old theory that religious deception is permissible when it serves the object of saving human souls from eternal perdition. The opinion that no motive whatsoever can justify an act of falsehood has been advocated not only by intuitional moralists, but on utilitarian grounds.11But it certainly seems absurd to the common sense of mankind that we should be allowed to save our own life or the life of a fellow-man by killing the person who wants to take it, but not by deceiving him.
10Dugald Stewart,op. cit.ii. 342.
10Dugald Stewart,op. cit.ii. 342.
11Macmillan,Promotion of General Happiness, p. 166sq.
11Macmillan,Promotion of General Happiness, p. 166sq.
It is easy to see why falsehood is so frequently held permissible, praiseworthy, or even obligatory, when directed against a stranger. In early society an injury inflicted on a stranger calls forth no sympathetic resentment. On the contrary, being looked upon with suspicion or hated as an enemy, he is considered a proper object of deception. Among the Bushmans “no one dare give any information in the absence of the chief or father of the clan.”12“A Bedouin,” says Burckhardt, “who does not know the person interrogating him, will seldom answer with truth to questions concerning his family or tribe. The children are taught never to answer similar questions, lest the interrogator may be a secret enemy and come for purposes of revenge.”13Among the Beni Amer a stranger can never trust a man’s word on account of “their contempt for everything foreign.”14That even civilised nations allow stratagem in warfare is the natural consequence of war itself being allowed; and if good faith is to be preserved between enemies, that is because only thereby useless cruelty can be avoided and an end be put to hostilities.
12Chapman,Travels in the Interior of South Africa, i. 76.
12Chapman,Travels in the Interior of South Africa, i. 76.
13Burckhardt,Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys, p. 210.
13Burckhardt,Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys, p. 210.
14Munzinger,Ostafrikanische Studien, p. 337.
14Munzinger,Ostafrikanische Studien, p. 337.
However, deceit is not condemned merely because it isan injury to the party deceived and as such apt to arouse sympathetic resentment, but it is an object of disinterested, moral resentment also because it is intrinsically antipathetic. Lying is a cheap and cowardly method of gaining an undue advantage, and is consequently despised where courage is respected.15It is the weapon of the weak, the woman,16and the slave.17Fraud, says Cicero, is the property of a fox, force that of a lion; “both are utterly repugnant to society, but fraud is the more detestable.”18“To lie is servile,” says Plutarch, “and most hateful in all men, hardly to be pardoned even in poor slaves.”19On account of its cowardliness, lying was incompatible with Teutonic and knightly notions of manly honour; and among ourselves the epithets “liar” and “coward” are equally disgraceful to a man. “All … in the rank and station of gentlemen,” Sir Walter Scott observes, “are forcibly called upon to remember that they must resent the imputation of a voluntary falsehood as the most gross injury.”20Fichte asks, “Whence comes that internal shame for one’s self which manifests itself even stronger in the case of a lie than in the case of any other violation of conscience?” And his answer is, that the lie is accompanied by cowardice, and that nothing so much dishonours us in our own eyes as want of courage.21According to Kant, “a lie is the abandonment, and, as it were, the annihilation, of the dignity of a man.”22
15Cf.Schopenhauer,Die Grundlage der Moral, § 17 (Sämmtliche Werke, vi. 250); Grote,Treatise on the Moral Ideals, p. 254.
15Cf.Schopenhauer,Die Grundlage der Moral, § 17 (Sämmtliche Werke, vi. 250); Grote,Treatise on the Moral Ideals, p. 254.
16Women are commonly said to be particularly addicted to falsehood (Schopenhauer,Parerga und Paralipomena, ii. 497sq.Galton,Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 56sq.Krauss,Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven, pp. 508, 514. Maurer,Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammmes, ii. 159 [ancient Scandinavians]. Döllinger,The Gentile and the Jew, ii. 234 [ancient Greeks]. Lane,Arabian Society in the Middle Ages, p. 219. Le Bon,La civilisation des Arabes, p. 433. Loskiel,History of the Mission of the United Brethren, i. 16 [Iroquois]. Hearne,Journey to the Northern Ocean, p. 307sq.[Northern Indians]. Lyon,Private Journal, p. 349 [Eskimo of Igloolik]. Dalager,Grønlandske Relationer, p. 69; Cranz,History of Greenland, i. 175).
16Women are commonly said to be particularly addicted to falsehood (Schopenhauer,Parerga und Paralipomena, ii. 497sq.Galton,Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 56sq.Krauss,Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven, pp. 508, 514. Maurer,Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammmes, ii. 159 [ancient Scandinavians]. Döllinger,The Gentile and the Jew, ii. 234 [ancient Greeks]. Lane,Arabian Society in the Middle Ages, p. 219. Le Bon,La civilisation des Arabes, p. 433. Loskiel,History of the Mission of the United Brethren, i. 16 [Iroquois]. Hearne,Journey to the Northern Ocean, p. 307sq.[Northern Indians]. Lyon,Private Journal, p. 349 [Eskimo of Igloolik]. Dalager,Grønlandske Relationer, p. 69; Cranz,History of Greenland, i. 175).
17Seeinfra,p. 129sq.
17Seeinfra,p. 129sq.
18Cicero,De officiis, i. 13.
18Cicero,De officiis, i. 13.
19Plutarch,De educatione puerorum, 14.
19Plutarch,De educatione puerorum, 14.
20Scott, ‘Essay on Chivalry,’ inMiscellaneous Prose Works, vi. 58.
20Scott, ‘Essay on Chivalry,’ inMiscellaneous Prose Works, vi. 58.
21Fichte,Das System der Sittenlehre, p. 370; English translation, p. 302sq.
21Fichte,Das System der Sittenlehre, p. 370; English translation, p. 302sq.
22Kant,Metaphysische Anfangungsgründe der Tugendlehre, p. 84.
22Kant,Metaphysische Anfangungsgründe der Tugendlehre, p. 84.
But a lie may also be judged of from a very different point of view. It may be not only a sign of cowardice, but a sign of cleverness. Hence a successful lie may excite admiration, a disinterested kindly feeling towards the liar, genuine moral approval; whereas to be detected in a lie is considered shameful. And not only is the clever liar an object of admiration, but the person whom he deceives is an object of ridicule. To the mind of a West African native, Miss Kingsley observes, there is no intrinsic harm in lying, “because a man is a fool who believes another man on an important matter unless he puts on the oath.”23A Syrian proverb says, “Lying is the salt (goodness) of men, and shameful only to one who believes.”24