[284]399.[285]Cf.Herodotus: ii. 135.[286]401 E.[287]“Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat.”—Cicero:De Div., ii. 56. Plutarch, however, is able to say, “Even nowadays some oracles are published in verse,” and to cite a very interesting instance (De Pyth. Orac., 404 A).[288]408 C, D.[289]409 D.[290]404 C.[291]Lamprias.The writer of this letter to “Terentius Priscus” is addressed by the name of “Lamprias” in the course of the dialogue (413 E). This Terentius is not mentioned elsewhere by Plutarch, but one may venture the guess that he was one of the friends whom, as in the case of Lucius the Etrurian, and Sylla the Carthaginian, Plutarch had met at Rome (Symposiacs, 727 B). Sylla and Lucius, whom we know to have been on intimate terms with Plutarch, are interlocutors in the dialogueDe Facie in Orbe Lunæ, and one of them uses the same form of address to the writer of that dialogue as is employed by Ammonius in this passage (940 F). There is not the faintest doubt as to the genuineness of either of these two dialogues, and it is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that Plutarch, desiring perhaps to pay a compliment to a relative, veils his own personality in this way: “Omnium familiarium et propinquorum ante ceteros omnes Lampriam fratrem, et ejusdem nominis avum Lampriam, eos imprimis fuisse qui Plutarchi amicitiam memoriamque obtinuerint, nobis apparet” (De Plutarchi Familiaribus—Chenevière). He pays a similar compliment to his friend Theon, who sums up and concludes the argument of theDe Pythiæ Oraculis. (For the closeness of Theon’s intimacy with Plutarch, see especiallyConsolatio ad Uxorem, 610 B, andSymposiacs, 725 F.) Cf.Gréard’sLa Morale de Plutarque, p. 303: “Plutarque a ses procédés, qu’on arrive à connaître. D’ordinaire ils consistent à accorder successivement la parole aux défenseurs des systèmes extrèmes et à réserver la conclusion au principal personnage du dialogue. Or ce personnage est presque toujours celui qui a posé la thèse; et le plus souvent il se trouve avoir avec Plutarque lui-même un lien de parenté.”—Plutarch delights to such an extent to bring his friends into his works, that it has even been suggested that no work is authentic without this distinguishing mark. Readers of Plutarch know that one characteristic of his style is the avoidance of hiatus, and that he puts himself to all kinds of trouble to secure this object. In this connexion, Chenevière remarks: “Mirum nobis visum est quod, ne in uno quidem librorum quos hiatus causa G. Benseler Plutarcho abjudicavit, nullius amici nomen offenditur. Scripta autem quæ nullo hiatu fœdata demonstrat, vel amico cuidam dicata, vel nominibus amicorum sunt distincta.” (The work by Benseler referred to is, of course, hisDe Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis et Historicis Græcis.)[292]Plutarch does not, of course, wish to convey the suggestion that Apollo’s shrine is still the centre of the earth, and that Britain is as far away in one direction as the Red Sea is in another. The oracle’s repulse of Epimenides, who wished to be certain on the point, indicates that the question is one surrounded with difficulty, and that the wise man will do best to leave it alone. Bouché-Leclerq has a startling comment: “Plutarque ajoute que, de son temps, la mesure avait été verifiée par deux voyageurs partis l’un de la Grande Bretagne et l’autre du fond de la mer Rouge” (La Divination, iii. p. 80).[293]410 A, B. Cf. note, p. 90.[294]411 E.[295]The cessation of the oracles was only comparative.Wolff, in hisDe Novissima Oraculorum Ætate, examines the history of each oracle separately, and comes to a conclusion that the oracles were not silent even in the age of Porphyry (bornA.D.232): “Nondum obmutuisse numina fatidica Porphyrii tempore. Vera enim ille deorum responsa censuit; quæ Christianis opposuit, ne soli doctrinam divinitus accepisse viderentur.” Strabo alludes to the failure of the oracle at Dodona, and adds that the rest were silent too (Strabo: vii. 6, 9). Cicero alludes with great contempt to the silence of the Delphic oracles in his own times: “Sed, quod caput est, cur isto modo jam oracula Delphis non eduntur, non modo nostrâ ætate, sed jamdiu; ut modo nihil possit esse contemtius? Hoc loco quum urgentur evanuisse aiunt vetustate vim loci ejus, unde anhelitus ille terræ fieret, quo Pythia, mente incitata, oracula ederet.... Quando autem ista vis evanuit? An postquam homines minus creduli esse cœperunt” (De Div., ii. 57). When Cicero wrote this passage he had probably forgotten the excellent advice which the oracle had once given him when he went to Delphi to consult it (Plut.:Cicero, cap. 5).[296]412 D.[297]Some of these points of grammar which attracted the scorn of Heracleon were whether βάλλω loses a λ in the future; and what were the positives from which the comparatives χεῖρον and βέλτιον, and the superlatives χεῖριστον and βέλτιστον were formed (412 E).—“Quelques années après les guerres médiques, le pinceau de Polygnote couvrit la Lesché des Cnidiens à Delphes de scènes empruntées au monde infernal.” (Bouché-Leclerq: iii. 153.)—It would have been more interesting to a modern student if Heracleon had replied that the pictures of Polygnotus were quite sufficient to keep one mentally alert, and had seized the opportunity to give us an exact description of the scenes depicted and the meaning they conveyed to the men of his time. “‘Not all the treasures,’ as Homer has it, ‘which the stone threshold of the Far-darter holds safe within, would now,’ as Mr. Myers says, ‘be so precious to us as the power of looking for one hour on the greatest work by the greatest painter of antiquity, the picture by Polygnotus in the Hall of the Cnidians at Delphi, of the descent of Odysseus among the dead.’”[298]Didymus, “surnamed Planetiades,” is a picturesque figure, evidently drawn from life. It is interesting to compare his attitude with that imposed upon the ideal cynic of Epictetus: “It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say, like Socrates, ‘Men, whither are you hurrying? what are you doing, wretches? Like blind people you are wandering up and down: you are going by another road, and have left the true road: you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another shows you where they are you do not believe him’” (Long’sEpictetus, p. 251). Planetiades certainly endeavours to play thisrôleon the occasion in question, though he is doubtless as far below the stoic ideal as he is above thesoi-disantcynics whom Dion met atAlexandria.[299]Cf.Blount:Apollonius of Tyana, p. 37. Blount collects a number of ancient and modern parallels to the thought of Plutarch here.Horace,Epist.i. 16. 59, readily occurs to the memory. (For the Pindaric fragment, see W. Christ, p. 225.)[300]413 D.[301]“Plutarch does not mean to say that Greece was not able at all to furnish 3000 men capable of arms, but that if burgess armies of the old sort were to be formed they would not be in a position to set on foot 3000 ‘hoplites.’”—Mommsen.[302]414 C.[303]417 A, B. Cf.De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, 944 C, D.[304]431 B.[305]436 F.[306]437 F.[307]De Pythiæ Orac., 398 B.[308]De Defectu Orac., 418 E.[309]De Defectu Orac., 438 D.[310]Plutarch, in reply to Boethus the Epicurean, uses an interesting example to illustrate the two opposite views maintained on this point. “Even you yourself here are beneficially influenced, it would seem, by what Epicurus wrote and spoke three centuries ago; and yet you are of opinion that God could not supply a Principle of Motion or a Cause of Feeling, unless He took and shut Himself up in each individual thing and became an intermingled portion of its essence” (398 B, C).[311]“As to Plutarch’s theology, he was certainly a monotheist. He probably had some vague belief in inferior deities (demons he would have called them) as holding a place like that filled by angels and evil spirits in the creed of most Christians;yet it is entirely conceivable that his occasional references to these deities are due merely to the conventional rhetoric of his age” (Andrew P. Peabody: Introduction to a translation—already referred to—of theDe Sera Numinis Vindicta). It is a little difficult to be patient with the ignorance displayed in the italicized part of this citation. That Plutarch’s “references to these deities” are not “occasional” is a matter of fact; that they are not “due merely to conventional rhetoric” it is hoped that the analysis in the text—incomplete as it may be in other respects—has at least made sufficiently clear. It is, however, gratifying to find that this American translator, unlike Dr. Super, of Chicago, recognizes that Plutarch “was certainly a monotheist.”[312]Plutarch found the existence of the Dæmons recognized in each of the three spheres which contributed to the formation of religious beliefs—in philosophy, in popular tradition, and in law.Stobæus:Tit.44, 20 (“On Laws and Customs”—Tauchnitzedition of 1838, vol. ii. p. 164) has an interesting quotation, headed “Preamble of the Laws of Zaleucus,” in which the following passage occurs:—“If an Evil Dæmon come to any man, tempting him to Vice, let him spend his time near temples, and altars, and sacred shrines, fleeing from Vice as from an impious and cruel mistress, and let him pray the gods to deliver him from her power.” Zaleucus may, of course, have been embodying the teaching of his Pythagorean colleagues, but the fact remains that the belief in the influence of Dæmons on human life received the authority of a celebrated system of law, unless we are to be more incredulous than Cicero himself—Quis Zaleucum leges scripsisse non dixit?(Ad Atticum, vi. 1).—(“His code is stated to have been the first collection of written laws that the Greeks possessed.”—Smaller Classical Dictionary, Smith and Marindin, 1898.)[313]Adversus Coloten, 1124 D. The religious value of the belief in Dæmonology is indicated in an interesting passage in the “De Iside et Osiride” in which Isis, by her sufferings, is described as “having given a sacred lesson of consolation to men and women involved in similar sorrows.” 361 E. (In the next sentence she and Osiris are raised from the dæmonic rank to the divine.)[314]Accepting Bernardakis’ first emendation—εἰς θεοὺς ἐπαναφέρει τὰς τῶν πράξεων ἀρχὰς. 580 A.[315]581 F.—Phidolaus would not have been at home among Xenophon’s troops (Anabasis, iii. 2, 9).[316]588 C, D.[317]588 E.[318]589 D.[319]586 A.[320]589 F.[321]591 A.[322]594.[323]De Defectu, 415 B, C. In theDe Facie quæ apparetthe connexion between mankind and the dæmons in described in similar terms to those employed in theDe Dæmonio Socratis. The Dæmons do not spend all their time on the moon; they take charge of oracles, assist at initiatory rites, punish evildoers, help men in battle and at sea, and for any want of fairness or competence in the discharge of these duties they are punished by being driven again to earth to enter human bodies once more (944 D; cf. 944 C).[324]That this truth is one which appeals to the Imagination more cogently than to the Reason, resembling in that respect the belief in the soul’s immortality, is evident to Plutarch. It is on this account that he illustrates it by Myth instead of arguing it by Reason, and takes every precaution to prevent his readers from regarding it as a complete and final presentation of a logically irrefutable belief.[325]Non posse suaviter, &c., 1101 B, C.[326]1101 D.[327]1102 B.[328]De Audiendis Poetis34 B.[329]Conjugalia Præcepta, 140 D. Champagny sees a reference here to Christianity. But why not also inPlato’sLaws, 674 F, and 661 C?—It is quite in harmony with Plutarch’s love of openness in Religion that to the general reticence displayed by the Greeks on the subject of their religious Mysteries, he seems to add a personal reticence peculiarly his own. Considering how anxiously he hovers about the question of the soul’s immortality (see above, p. 118, and cf.Consolatio ad Apollonium, 120 B, C: “If, as is probable, there is any truth in the sayings of ancient poets and philosophers ... then must you cherish fair hopes of your dear departed son”—a passage curiously similar in form and thought toTacitus,Agric.46: “Si quis piorum manibus locus, si, ut sapientibus placet,”&c.), it is remarkable that only once—and then under the stress of a bitter domestic bereavement—does he specifically quote the Mysteries (those of Dionysus) as inculcating that doctrine (Ad Uxorem, 611 D). His adoption of an unknown writer’s beautiful comparison of Sleep to the Lesser Mysteries of Death (Consol. ad Apoll., 107 E), and his repetition of the same idea elsewhere (see above, p. 118), may also be indications how naturally the teaching of the Mysteries suggested the idea of immortality. But he most frequently alludes to the Mysteries as secret sources of information for the identification of nominally different deities (De Iside et Osiride, 364 E), or for the assignation of their proper functions to the Dæmons (De Defectu, 417 C), who are regarded as responsible for what Mr. Andrew Lang (“Myth, Ritual, and Religion,”passim) calls “the barbaric and licentious part of the performances” (De Iside et Osiride, 360 E, F). We should perhaps conclude, from the few indications which Plutarch gives of his views on this subject, that he regarded the Mysteries in a twofold light; they were a source of religious instruction, or consolation, respecting the future state of the soul, and they were also a means of explaining and justifying the crude legends which so largely intermingled with the purer elements of Greek religion. Though, as Plutarch hints, many of these barbaric legends were not suited to discussion by the profane, yet the mind, when purified by sacred rites, and educated to the apprehension of sacred meanings, could grasp the high and pure significance of things which were a stumbling-block to the uninitiated, and could make them an aid to a loftier moral life.[330]“Das eigentlich einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt- und Menschengeschichte, dem alle übrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der Conflict des Unglaubens und des Aberglaubens.”—Goethe,Westöstlicher Divan(quoted byTholuck).[331]165 C.[332]165 D.[333]Bernardakisadopts Bentley’s emendation βαπτισμούς, whichmightbe an allusion to Christianity, but would more probably refer to such a process as that already described in the words βάπτισον σεαυτὸν εἰς θάλασσαν. We have previously discussed the general question involved (see p. 45), but may here add the opinion of so unprejudiced a Christian writer as Archbishop Trench, “strange to say. Christianity is to him (Plutarch) utterly unknown.”—(See also note, p. 202).[334]166 B.[335]166 B.[336]168 F.[337]Bello primo, Aristodemum Messeniorum regem per superstitionem animum ac spes omnes despondisse, seque ipsum interfecisse, narrat etiam Pausanias, iv. 3.—Wyttenbach.[338]169 C.Iliad, vii. 193, 194.[339]170 A. Trench quotes SenecaEpist., 123—“Quid enim interest utrum deos neges, an infames?”[340]170 F.[341]To the numerous citations made by Gréard (p. 209), we may add an expression of opinion by Dr. Tholuck, given with special reference to Plutarch’s views on Superstition:—“Wir haben in Alterthum einen hohen Geist, Plutarch, welcher dem, was das Alterthum Aberglaube nannte, viele Betrachtungen gewidmet hat, dem Gegenstande zwar nicht auf den Grund gekommen,aber in der Betrachtuug desselben doch so tiefe religiöse Wahrheiten ausgesprochen, dass wir nicht umhin können, ihn hier ausführlicher dem Leser vorzuführen” (Ueber Aberglauben und Unglauben).[342]Wyttenbachbases this possibility on the 150th entry in the Lamprian catalogue, “On Superstition, against Epicurus.” (Entry No. 155 in the catalogue as given inBernardakis, vol. vii. pp. 473-7.) But the discussion on this point in theNon posse suaviterforms so important a part of that tract that the title “On Superstition, against Epicurus” would be no inapt title for the whole treatise.[343]The view taken in the text as to the character of this strenuous and noble sermon onSuperstitionis, of course, quite at variance with the opinion of Prof. Mahaffy, who regards it as “one of those sophistical exercises practised by every one in that age—I mean, the defence of a paradox with subtlety and ingenuity,taking little account of sober truth in comparison with dialectical plausibility.”—Greeks under Roman Sway, p. 318.[344]Pharsalia, viii. 831.[345]Apuleius,Meta: Lib. xi. Lucius (a descendant of Plutarch, by the way), in his pious gratitude, enters the service of the goddess who haduncharmedhim.—Rursus donique, quam raso capillo,collegi vetustissimi et sub illis Sullæ temporibus conditimunia, non obumbrato vel obtecto calvitio, sed quoquoversus obvio, gaudens obibam.[346]364 E.[347]354 C.[348]355 B.[349]Cf.De Pyth. Orac., 400 A.[350]355 D.[351]358 E. Mr. Andrew Lang justly remarks, “Why these myths should be considered ‘more blasphemous’ than the rest does not appear” (Myth, Ritual, and Religion, vol. ii. pp. 116, 117).[352]358 F. This is a difficult passage. It seems necessary to read ἀνακλάσει for ἀναχωρήσει (cf. ἀνάκλασις δή που περὶ τὴν ἶριν,Amatorius, 765 E), but even then the meaning is difficult to elicit, and it is not confidently claimed that the rendering in the text has elicited it. Three translations are appended: “For as mathematicians assure us that the rainbow is nothing else but a variegated image of the sun, thrown upon the sight by the reflexion of his beams from the clouds, so ought we to look upon the present story as the representation, or reflexion rather, of something real as its true cause” (PlutarchiDe Iside et OsirideLiber: Græce et Anglice, bySamuel Squire, A.M., Cambridge, 1744).—“Und so wie die Naturforscher den Regenbogen für ein Gegenbild der Sonne erklären, das durch das Zurücktreten der Erscheinung an die Wolke bunt wird, so ist hier die Sage das Gegenbild einer Wahrheit, welche ihre Bedeutung auf etwas anderes hin abspiegelt” (Plutarchüber Isis und Osirisherausgegeben vonG. Parthey, Berlin, 1850).—Legendum ἀναχρώσει vel ἀνακλάσει, ut Reisk.“Et quemadmodum mathematici arcum cælestem Solis tradunt esse imaginem variatam visus ad nubem reflexu: Sic fabula hoc loco indicium est orationis alio reflectentis intellectum.”—Wyttenbach.[353]Myth, Ritual, and Religion, vol. ii. p. 120.[354]In our spelling of this name we use the freedom of choice so graciously accorded by Xylander—Si Euhemerus mavis, non repugno.[355]De Placitis Philosophorum, 880 D. Cf.Cicero,De Natura Deorum. i. 42. “Ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturæ demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem, an penitus totam sustulisse?” SeeMayor’s note on this passage. The references to Lactantius and Eusebius and many others bearing on the question are collected by Corsini in his first dissertation on theDe Placitis. Zimmerman is very indignant with Plutarch on account of the charge here brought against Euhemerus and Diagoras, and has defended them against our author with great energy and spirit. (Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen qua Euemerus Messenius et Diagoras Melius ab Atheismo contra Plutarchum aliosque defenduntur.)[356]360 A.[357]The language here seems curiously outspoken in view of the now established apotheosis of the Emperors.[358]360 D.[359]356, 357. Cf.De Dædalis Platæensibus.[360]364 A.[361]366 C.[362]364 D.[363]367 D.[364]368 D.[365]369 C. It is clear from a careful examination of the text that Plutarch gives only a critical examination of this theory: he does not adopt it as his own, as has frequently been asserted.[366]369 D. “It is impossible,” argued these ancient thinkers, “that moral life and death, that good and evil, can flow from a single source. It is impossible that a Holy God can have been the author of evil. Evil, then, must be referred to some other origin: it must have had an author of its own.”—“Some Elements of Religion,” by CanonLiddon(Lecture iv. sect. i.).[367]370 E.[368]371 A.[369]See especially the quotations from Plato in 370 F, and the application of Platonic terms in the interpretation of the Isiac and Osirian myth in 372 E, F, 373 and 374. Hesiod, too, is made to agree with this Platonic explanation of the Egyptian legend (374 C), and the Platonic notion of matter is strained to allow of its being identified with Isis (372 E, 374 F). In 367 C, a parallelism is pointed out between Stoic theology and an interpretation of the myth; and in 367 E the death of Osiris on the 17th of the month is used to illustrate, if not to explain, the Pythagorean ἀφοσίωσις of that number.As regards the identification of particular deities in this tract, reference may be made to 364 E, F and 365 A, B, where Dionysus is identified with Osiris; and to 365 F, where Mnaseas of Patara is mentioned with approval as associating with Epaphus, not only Dionysus, but Serapis and Osiris also. Anticleides is also referred to as asserting that Isis was the daughter of Prometheus and the wife of Dionysus. In 372 D, Osiris is identified with the Sun under the name of Sirius, and Isis with the Moon, in 375, a fanciful philology is called in to aid a further identification of Greek and Egyptian deities; but not much importance is attached to similarities derived in this way. In the next sentence Isis is stated to have been identified with Athene by the Egyptians; and the general principle of identity is boldly stated in 377 C:—“It is quite legitimate to regard these gods as common possessions and not the exclusive property of the Egyptians—Isis and the deities that go in her train are universally known and worshipped. The names, indeed, of certain of them have been borrowed from the Egyptians, not so long ago; but their divinity has been known and recognized for ages.”[370]378 A.[371]There is a strain of mysticism in theDe Osiridewhich is alien from the cheerful common sense which usually marks Plutarch; a remark which also applies to theDe Facie quæ apparet in Orbe Lunæ. But the same strain appears in others of his authentic tracts, though mostly operating through the medium of Platonic dreams and myths,e.g.the story of Thespesius in theSera Num. Vindic., and that of Timarchus in theDe Dæmonio Socratis. Besides, one would not ceteris paribus deny the authenticity of Browning’s “Childe Roland” because he had written “The Guardian Angel,” or that of “The Antiquary” because Scott was also the author of “The Monastery.” The tract was probably composed after that return from Alexandria to which Plutarch so charmingly alludes inSympos., 678 C. Moreover, the very nature of the subject, and the priestly character of the lady to whom it was addressed, as well as the mysterious nature of the goddess whose ministrant she was, are all parts of a natural inducement to mysticism. We must admit that Plutarch here participates in that spirit of mysticism which, always inherent in Platonism, was kept in check by his acutely practical bent, to be revived and exaggerated to the destruction of practical ethics in the dreams and abstractions of the Neo-Platonists.[372]A very slight acquaintance with Plutarch’s writings will serve to dispose of the charge of Atheism brought against him by Zimmerman, the professor of Theology in the Gymnasium of Zurich:—Credo equidem Plutarchum inter eos fuisse qui cum Cicerone crediderint eos qui dant philosophiæ operam non arbitrari Deos esse.—It is true that Zimmerman supports his case by quoting the pseudo-PlutarcheanDe Placitis(Idem de providentia non minus male loquitur quam ipsi Epicurei), and seems himself afraid to accept the conclusion of his own demonstrations:—Atheum eum fuisse non credo, sed quomodo asserere potuerit Superstitione Atheismum tolerabiliorem esse, simul tamen eos, quos atheos fuisse minime probare potuit, Superstitioni autem inimicissimos, omnem malorum mundum intulisse, consociare nequeo.—But the learned author is too intent on exculpatingNoster Euhemerusfrom Plutarch’s “injustice” to have justice to spare for Plutarch himself.—(J. J.Zimmerman,Epistola ad Nonnen). Gréard quotes other authors of this charge against Plutarch (p. 269).—We cannot allow this opportunity to pass of protesting against the attitude of those who assumed, even in the Nineteenth Century, that it was a sign either of moral depravity, or mental incapacity, in Plutarch not to have been a believer in the Christian faith. Even Archbishop Trench, who admits, concerning such writers as our author, that “many were by them enabled to live their lives after a far higher and nobler fashion than else they would have attained” cannot rid himself of the notion that had Plutarch actively opposed Christianity he would have committed an offence which our generosity might have pardoned, though our justice must recognize that itneededpardon. “Plutarch himself may be entirely acquitted of anyconsciousattempt to fight against that truth which was higher than any which he had” (p. 13).—“I have already mentioned that,through no fault of his own, he stood removed from all the immediate influences of the Christian Church” (p. 89). But suppose the facts to have been just the opposite of those indicated in the words we have italicized, it would involve the loss of all sense of historical perspective to draw the conclusion which would clearly have been drawn by Trench himself. The use of similar language by Prof. Mahaffy has already been noted. (Pref. p. xii.) The position assumed by writers who maintain this view, is one quite inappropriate for historical discussion, and its natural expression, if it must be expressed at all, is through the medium of such poetical aspirations as that breathed in the epigram of John, the Metropolitan of Euchaita:—“If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall saveFrom wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the causeTheir speech supported: Thine, too, were the lawsTheir hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blindTo recognize Thee Lord of human kind,Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shownTo bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.”[373]Dr. Martineau (Types of Ethical Theory, vol. i. p. 91) thinks that “we must go a little further than Zeller, who decides that Plato usually conceived of God as if personal, yet was restrained by a doctrine inconsistent with such conception from approaching it closely or setting it deliberately on any scientific ground,” and devotes several closely-reasoned pages to show that, although there was no room for a personal god in Plato’s philosophy, Plato himself was in distinct opposition to his own views as systematically expounded in his writings. “We may regard him as fully aware of the conditions of the problem, and, though unable to solve it without lesion of his dialectic, yet deliberately pronouncing judgment on the side of his religious feeling.” Butpace tantorum virorumit will be admitted that the personality of God is not very evident in Plato when those who understand him best can only maintain that it is not essentially interwoven with his philosophy, having only an indirect and accidental existence which is not possible “without lesion of his dialectic.”[374]“Abstractedly, the theology of the Stoics appears as a materialistic pantheism; God is represented as a fire, and the world as a mode of God.” (Grant,The Ethics of Aristotle, vol. i. p. 265.) In the famous “hymn of Cleanthes,” preserved, like so many other of the great wonders of classical literature, by Stobæus, Grant sees an emphatic recognition of the personality of God, but it is equally natural to regard the hymn as a more detailed expression of that necessity of submitting to Destiny—of living in accordance with nature—which Cleanthes enounces in that other famous fragment which Epictetus would have us hold ready to hand in all the circumstances of life:—“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,The way that I am bid by you to go:To follow I am ready. If I choose not,I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.”—Epictetus,Encheir.lii. (Long’s translation.) Epictetus, indeed, and Seneca, late comers in the history of Stoicism, have undoubtedly attained to a clear recognition of the personality of God.
[284]399.
[284]399.
[285]Cf.Herodotus: ii. 135.
[285]Cf.Herodotus: ii. 135.
[286]401 E.
[286]401 E.
[287]“Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat.”—Cicero:De Div., ii. 56. Plutarch, however, is able to say, “Even nowadays some oracles are published in verse,” and to cite a very interesting instance (De Pyth. Orac., 404 A).
[287]“Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat.”—Cicero:De Div., ii. 56. Plutarch, however, is able to say, “Even nowadays some oracles are published in verse,” and to cite a very interesting instance (De Pyth. Orac., 404 A).
[288]408 C, D.
[288]408 C, D.
[289]409 D.
[289]409 D.
[290]404 C.
[290]404 C.
[291]Lamprias.The writer of this letter to “Terentius Priscus” is addressed by the name of “Lamprias” in the course of the dialogue (413 E). This Terentius is not mentioned elsewhere by Plutarch, but one may venture the guess that he was one of the friends whom, as in the case of Lucius the Etrurian, and Sylla the Carthaginian, Plutarch had met at Rome (Symposiacs, 727 B). Sylla and Lucius, whom we know to have been on intimate terms with Plutarch, are interlocutors in the dialogueDe Facie in Orbe Lunæ, and one of them uses the same form of address to the writer of that dialogue as is employed by Ammonius in this passage (940 F). There is not the faintest doubt as to the genuineness of either of these two dialogues, and it is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that Plutarch, desiring perhaps to pay a compliment to a relative, veils his own personality in this way: “Omnium familiarium et propinquorum ante ceteros omnes Lampriam fratrem, et ejusdem nominis avum Lampriam, eos imprimis fuisse qui Plutarchi amicitiam memoriamque obtinuerint, nobis apparet” (De Plutarchi Familiaribus—Chenevière). He pays a similar compliment to his friend Theon, who sums up and concludes the argument of theDe Pythiæ Oraculis. (For the closeness of Theon’s intimacy with Plutarch, see especiallyConsolatio ad Uxorem, 610 B, andSymposiacs, 725 F.) Cf.Gréard’sLa Morale de Plutarque, p. 303: “Plutarque a ses procédés, qu’on arrive à connaître. D’ordinaire ils consistent à accorder successivement la parole aux défenseurs des systèmes extrèmes et à réserver la conclusion au principal personnage du dialogue. Or ce personnage est presque toujours celui qui a posé la thèse; et le plus souvent il se trouve avoir avec Plutarque lui-même un lien de parenté.”—Plutarch delights to such an extent to bring his friends into his works, that it has even been suggested that no work is authentic without this distinguishing mark. Readers of Plutarch know that one characteristic of his style is the avoidance of hiatus, and that he puts himself to all kinds of trouble to secure this object. In this connexion, Chenevière remarks: “Mirum nobis visum est quod, ne in uno quidem librorum quos hiatus causa G. Benseler Plutarcho abjudicavit, nullius amici nomen offenditur. Scripta autem quæ nullo hiatu fœdata demonstrat, vel amico cuidam dicata, vel nominibus amicorum sunt distincta.” (The work by Benseler referred to is, of course, hisDe Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis et Historicis Græcis.)
[291]Lamprias.The writer of this letter to “Terentius Priscus” is addressed by the name of “Lamprias” in the course of the dialogue (413 E). This Terentius is not mentioned elsewhere by Plutarch, but one may venture the guess that he was one of the friends whom, as in the case of Lucius the Etrurian, and Sylla the Carthaginian, Plutarch had met at Rome (Symposiacs, 727 B). Sylla and Lucius, whom we know to have been on intimate terms with Plutarch, are interlocutors in the dialogueDe Facie in Orbe Lunæ, and one of them uses the same form of address to the writer of that dialogue as is employed by Ammonius in this passage (940 F). There is not the faintest doubt as to the genuineness of either of these two dialogues, and it is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that Plutarch, desiring perhaps to pay a compliment to a relative, veils his own personality in this way: “Omnium familiarium et propinquorum ante ceteros omnes Lampriam fratrem, et ejusdem nominis avum Lampriam, eos imprimis fuisse qui Plutarchi amicitiam memoriamque obtinuerint, nobis apparet” (De Plutarchi Familiaribus—Chenevière). He pays a similar compliment to his friend Theon, who sums up and concludes the argument of theDe Pythiæ Oraculis. (For the closeness of Theon’s intimacy with Plutarch, see especiallyConsolatio ad Uxorem, 610 B, andSymposiacs, 725 F.) Cf.Gréard’sLa Morale de Plutarque, p. 303: “Plutarque a ses procédés, qu’on arrive à connaître. D’ordinaire ils consistent à accorder successivement la parole aux défenseurs des systèmes extrèmes et à réserver la conclusion au principal personnage du dialogue. Or ce personnage est presque toujours celui qui a posé la thèse; et le plus souvent il se trouve avoir avec Plutarque lui-même un lien de parenté.”—Plutarch delights to such an extent to bring his friends into his works, that it has even been suggested that no work is authentic without this distinguishing mark. Readers of Plutarch know that one characteristic of his style is the avoidance of hiatus, and that he puts himself to all kinds of trouble to secure this object. In this connexion, Chenevière remarks: “Mirum nobis visum est quod, ne in uno quidem librorum quos hiatus causa G. Benseler Plutarcho abjudicavit, nullius amici nomen offenditur. Scripta autem quæ nullo hiatu fœdata demonstrat, vel amico cuidam dicata, vel nominibus amicorum sunt distincta.” (The work by Benseler referred to is, of course, hisDe Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis et Historicis Græcis.)
[292]Plutarch does not, of course, wish to convey the suggestion that Apollo’s shrine is still the centre of the earth, and that Britain is as far away in one direction as the Red Sea is in another. The oracle’s repulse of Epimenides, who wished to be certain on the point, indicates that the question is one surrounded with difficulty, and that the wise man will do best to leave it alone. Bouché-Leclerq has a startling comment: “Plutarque ajoute que, de son temps, la mesure avait été verifiée par deux voyageurs partis l’un de la Grande Bretagne et l’autre du fond de la mer Rouge” (La Divination, iii. p. 80).
[292]Plutarch does not, of course, wish to convey the suggestion that Apollo’s shrine is still the centre of the earth, and that Britain is as far away in one direction as the Red Sea is in another. The oracle’s repulse of Epimenides, who wished to be certain on the point, indicates that the question is one surrounded with difficulty, and that the wise man will do best to leave it alone. Bouché-Leclerq has a startling comment: “Plutarque ajoute que, de son temps, la mesure avait été verifiée par deux voyageurs partis l’un de la Grande Bretagne et l’autre du fond de la mer Rouge” (La Divination, iii. p. 80).
[293]410 A, B. Cf. note, p. 90.
[293]410 A, B. Cf. note, p. 90.
[294]411 E.
[294]411 E.
[295]The cessation of the oracles was only comparative.Wolff, in hisDe Novissima Oraculorum Ætate, examines the history of each oracle separately, and comes to a conclusion that the oracles were not silent even in the age of Porphyry (bornA.D.232): “Nondum obmutuisse numina fatidica Porphyrii tempore. Vera enim ille deorum responsa censuit; quæ Christianis opposuit, ne soli doctrinam divinitus accepisse viderentur.” Strabo alludes to the failure of the oracle at Dodona, and adds that the rest were silent too (Strabo: vii. 6, 9). Cicero alludes with great contempt to the silence of the Delphic oracles in his own times: “Sed, quod caput est, cur isto modo jam oracula Delphis non eduntur, non modo nostrâ ætate, sed jamdiu; ut modo nihil possit esse contemtius? Hoc loco quum urgentur evanuisse aiunt vetustate vim loci ejus, unde anhelitus ille terræ fieret, quo Pythia, mente incitata, oracula ederet.... Quando autem ista vis evanuit? An postquam homines minus creduli esse cœperunt” (De Div., ii. 57). When Cicero wrote this passage he had probably forgotten the excellent advice which the oracle had once given him when he went to Delphi to consult it (Plut.:Cicero, cap. 5).
[295]The cessation of the oracles was only comparative.Wolff, in hisDe Novissima Oraculorum Ætate, examines the history of each oracle separately, and comes to a conclusion that the oracles were not silent even in the age of Porphyry (bornA.D.232): “Nondum obmutuisse numina fatidica Porphyrii tempore. Vera enim ille deorum responsa censuit; quæ Christianis opposuit, ne soli doctrinam divinitus accepisse viderentur.” Strabo alludes to the failure of the oracle at Dodona, and adds that the rest were silent too (Strabo: vii. 6, 9). Cicero alludes with great contempt to the silence of the Delphic oracles in his own times: “Sed, quod caput est, cur isto modo jam oracula Delphis non eduntur, non modo nostrâ ætate, sed jamdiu; ut modo nihil possit esse contemtius? Hoc loco quum urgentur evanuisse aiunt vetustate vim loci ejus, unde anhelitus ille terræ fieret, quo Pythia, mente incitata, oracula ederet.... Quando autem ista vis evanuit? An postquam homines minus creduli esse cœperunt” (De Div., ii. 57). When Cicero wrote this passage he had probably forgotten the excellent advice which the oracle had once given him when he went to Delphi to consult it (Plut.:Cicero, cap. 5).
[296]412 D.
[296]412 D.
[297]Some of these points of grammar which attracted the scorn of Heracleon were whether βάλλω loses a λ in the future; and what were the positives from which the comparatives χεῖρον and βέλτιον, and the superlatives χεῖριστον and βέλτιστον were formed (412 E).—“Quelques années après les guerres médiques, le pinceau de Polygnote couvrit la Lesché des Cnidiens à Delphes de scènes empruntées au monde infernal.” (Bouché-Leclerq: iii. 153.)—It would have been more interesting to a modern student if Heracleon had replied that the pictures of Polygnotus were quite sufficient to keep one mentally alert, and had seized the opportunity to give us an exact description of the scenes depicted and the meaning they conveyed to the men of his time. “‘Not all the treasures,’ as Homer has it, ‘which the stone threshold of the Far-darter holds safe within, would now,’ as Mr. Myers says, ‘be so precious to us as the power of looking for one hour on the greatest work by the greatest painter of antiquity, the picture by Polygnotus in the Hall of the Cnidians at Delphi, of the descent of Odysseus among the dead.’”
[297]Some of these points of grammar which attracted the scorn of Heracleon were whether βάλλω loses a λ in the future; and what were the positives from which the comparatives χεῖρον and βέλτιον, and the superlatives χεῖριστον and βέλτιστον were formed (412 E).—“Quelques années après les guerres médiques, le pinceau de Polygnote couvrit la Lesché des Cnidiens à Delphes de scènes empruntées au monde infernal.” (Bouché-Leclerq: iii. 153.)—It would have been more interesting to a modern student if Heracleon had replied that the pictures of Polygnotus were quite sufficient to keep one mentally alert, and had seized the opportunity to give us an exact description of the scenes depicted and the meaning they conveyed to the men of his time. “‘Not all the treasures,’ as Homer has it, ‘which the stone threshold of the Far-darter holds safe within, would now,’ as Mr. Myers says, ‘be so precious to us as the power of looking for one hour on the greatest work by the greatest painter of antiquity, the picture by Polygnotus in the Hall of the Cnidians at Delphi, of the descent of Odysseus among the dead.’”
[298]Didymus, “surnamed Planetiades,” is a picturesque figure, evidently drawn from life. It is interesting to compare his attitude with that imposed upon the ideal cynic of Epictetus: “It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say, like Socrates, ‘Men, whither are you hurrying? what are you doing, wretches? Like blind people you are wandering up and down: you are going by another road, and have left the true road: you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another shows you where they are you do not believe him’” (Long’sEpictetus, p. 251). Planetiades certainly endeavours to play thisrôleon the occasion in question, though he is doubtless as far below the stoic ideal as he is above thesoi-disantcynics whom Dion met atAlexandria.
[298]Didymus, “surnamed Planetiades,” is a picturesque figure, evidently drawn from life. It is interesting to compare his attitude with that imposed upon the ideal cynic of Epictetus: “It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say, like Socrates, ‘Men, whither are you hurrying? what are you doing, wretches? Like blind people you are wandering up and down: you are going by another road, and have left the true road: you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another shows you where they are you do not believe him’” (Long’sEpictetus, p. 251). Planetiades certainly endeavours to play thisrôleon the occasion in question, though he is doubtless as far below the stoic ideal as he is above thesoi-disantcynics whom Dion met atAlexandria.
[299]Cf.Blount:Apollonius of Tyana, p. 37. Blount collects a number of ancient and modern parallels to the thought of Plutarch here.Horace,Epist.i. 16. 59, readily occurs to the memory. (For the Pindaric fragment, see W. Christ, p. 225.)
[299]Cf.Blount:Apollonius of Tyana, p. 37. Blount collects a number of ancient and modern parallels to the thought of Plutarch here.Horace,Epist.i. 16. 59, readily occurs to the memory. (For the Pindaric fragment, see W. Christ, p. 225.)
[300]413 D.
[300]413 D.
[301]“Plutarch does not mean to say that Greece was not able at all to furnish 3000 men capable of arms, but that if burgess armies of the old sort were to be formed they would not be in a position to set on foot 3000 ‘hoplites.’”—Mommsen.
[301]“Plutarch does not mean to say that Greece was not able at all to furnish 3000 men capable of arms, but that if burgess armies of the old sort were to be formed they would not be in a position to set on foot 3000 ‘hoplites.’”—Mommsen.
[302]414 C.
[302]414 C.
[303]417 A, B. Cf.De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, 944 C, D.
[303]417 A, B. Cf.De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, 944 C, D.
[304]431 B.
[304]431 B.
[305]436 F.
[305]436 F.
[306]437 F.
[306]437 F.
[307]De Pythiæ Orac., 398 B.
[307]De Pythiæ Orac., 398 B.
[308]De Defectu Orac., 418 E.
[308]De Defectu Orac., 418 E.
[309]De Defectu Orac., 438 D.
[309]De Defectu Orac., 438 D.
[310]Plutarch, in reply to Boethus the Epicurean, uses an interesting example to illustrate the two opposite views maintained on this point. “Even you yourself here are beneficially influenced, it would seem, by what Epicurus wrote and spoke three centuries ago; and yet you are of opinion that God could not supply a Principle of Motion or a Cause of Feeling, unless He took and shut Himself up in each individual thing and became an intermingled portion of its essence” (398 B, C).
[310]Plutarch, in reply to Boethus the Epicurean, uses an interesting example to illustrate the two opposite views maintained on this point. “Even you yourself here are beneficially influenced, it would seem, by what Epicurus wrote and spoke three centuries ago; and yet you are of opinion that God could not supply a Principle of Motion or a Cause of Feeling, unless He took and shut Himself up in each individual thing and became an intermingled portion of its essence” (398 B, C).
[311]“As to Plutarch’s theology, he was certainly a monotheist. He probably had some vague belief in inferior deities (demons he would have called them) as holding a place like that filled by angels and evil spirits in the creed of most Christians;yet it is entirely conceivable that his occasional references to these deities are due merely to the conventional rhetoric of his age” (Andrew P. Peabody: Introduction to a translation—already referred to—of theDe Sera Numinis Vindicta). It is a little difficult to be patient with the ignorance displayed in the italicized part of this citation. That Plutarch’s “references to these deities” are not “occasional” is a matter of fact; that they are not “due merely to conventional rhetoric” it is hoped that the analysis in the text—incomplete as it may be in other respects—has at least made sufficiently clear. It is, however, gratifying to find that this American translator, unlike Dr. Super, of Chicago, recognizes that Plutarch “was certainly a monotheist.”
[311]“As to Plutarch’s theology, he was certainly a monotheist. He probably had some vague belief in inferior deities (demons he would have called them) as holding a place like that filled by angels and evil spirits in the creed of most Christians;yet it is entirely conceivable that his occasional references to these deities are due merely to the conventional rhetoric of his age” (Andrew P. Peabody: Introduction to a translation—already referred to—of theDe Sera Numinis Vindicta). It is a little difficult to be patient with the ignorance displayed in the italicized part of this citation. That Plutarch’s “references to these deities” are not “occasional” is a matter of fact; that they are not “due merely to conventional rhetoric” it is hoped that the analysis in the text—incomplete as it may be in other respects—has at least made sufficiently clear. It is, however, gratifying to find that this American translator, unlike Dr. Super, of Chicago, recognizes that Plutarch “was certainly a monotheist.”
[312]Plutarch found the existence of the Dæmons recognized in each of the three spheres which contributed to the formation of religious beliefs—in philosophy, in popular tradition, and in law.Stobæus:Tit.44, 20 (“On Laws and Customs”—Tauchnitzedition of 1838, vol. ii. p. 164) has an interesting quotation, headed “Preamble of the Laws of Zaleucus,” in which the following passage occurs:—“If an Evil Dæmon come to any man, tempting him to Vice, let him spend his time near temples, and altars, and sacred shrines, fleeing from Vice as from an impious and cruel mistress, and let him pray the gods to deliver him from her power.” Zaleucus may, of course, have been embodying the teaching of his Pythagorean colleagues, but the fact remains that the belief in the influence of Dæmons on human life received the authority of a celebrated system of law, unless we are to be more incredulous than Cicero himself—Quis Zaleucum leges scripsisse non dixit?(Ad Atticum, vi. 1).—(“His code is stated to have been the first collection of written laws that the Greeks possessed.”—Smaller Classical Dictionary, Smith and Marindin, 1898.)
[312]Plutarch found the existence of the Dæmons recognized in each of the three spheres which contributed to the formation of religious beliefs—in philosophy, in popular tradition, and in law.Stobæus:Tit.44, 20 (“On Laws and Customs”—Tauchnitzedition of 1838, vol. ii. p. 164) has an interesting quotation, headed “Preamble of the Laws of Zaleucus,” in which the following passage occurs:—“If an Evil Dæmon come to any man, tempting him to Vice, let him spend his time near temples, and altars, and sacred shrines, fleeing from Vice as from an impious and cruel mistress, and let him pray the gods to deliver him from her power.” Zaleucus may, of course, have been embodying the teaching of his Pythagorean colleagues, but the fact remains that the belief in the influence of Dæmons on human life received the authority of a celebrated system of law, unless we are to be more incredulous than Cicero himself—Quis Zaleucum leges scripsisse non dixit?(Ad Atticum, vi. 1).—(“His code is stated to have been the first collection of written laws that the Greeks possessed.”—Smaller Classical Dictionary, Smith and Marindin, 1898.)
[313]Adversus Coloten, 1124 D. The religious value of the belief in Dæmonology is indicated in an interesting passage in the “De Iside et Osiride” in which Isis, by her sufferings, is described as “having given a sacred lesson of consolation to men and women involved in similar sorrows.” 361 E. (In the next sentence she and Osiris are raised from the dæmonic rank to the divine.)
[313]Adversus Coloten, 1124 D. The religious value of the belief in Dæmonology is indicated in an interesting passage in the “De Iside et Osiride” in which Isis, by her sufferings, is described as “having given a sacred lesson of consolation to men and women involved in similar sorrows.” 361 E. (In the next sentence she and Osiris are raised from the dæmonic rank to the divine.)
[314]Accepting Bernardakis’ first emendation—εἰς θεοὺς ἐπαναφέρει τὰς τῶν πράξεων ἀρχὰς. 580 A.
[314]Accepting Bernardakis’ first emendation—εἰς θεοὺς ἐπαναφέρει τὰς τῶν πράξεων ἀρχὰς. 580 A.
[315]581 F.—Phidolaus would not have been at home among Xenophon’s troops (Anabasis, iii. 2, 9).
[315]581 F.—Phidolaus would not have been at home among Xenophon’s troops (Anabasis, iii. 2, 9).
[316]588 C, D.
[316]588 C, D.
[317]588 E.
[317]588 E.
[318]589 D.
[318]589 D.
[319]586 A.
[319]586 A.
[320]589 F.
[320]589 F.
[321]591 A.
[321]591 A.
[322]594.
[322]594.
[323]De Defectu, 415 B, C. In theDe Facie quæ apparetthe connexion between mankind and the dæmons in described in similar terms to those employed in theDe Dæmonio Socratis. The Dæmons do not spend all their time on the moon; they take charge of oracles, assist at initiatory rites, punish evildoers, help men in battle and at sea, and for any want of fairness or competence in the discharge of these duties they are punished by being driven again to earth to enter human bodies once more (944 D; cf. 944 C).
[323]De Defectu, 415 B, C. In theDe Facie quæ apparetthe connexion between mankind and the dæmons in described in similar terms to those employed in theDe Dæmonio Socratis. The Dæmons do not spend all their time on the moon; they take charge of oracles, assist at initiatory rites, punish evildoers, help men in battle and at sea, and for any want of fairness or competence in the discharge of these duties they are punished by being driven again to earth to enter human bodies once more (944 D; cf. 944 C).
[324]That this truth is one which appeals to the Imagination more cogently than to the Reason, resembling in that respect the belief in the soul’s immortality, is evident to Plutarch. It is on this account that he illustrates it by Myth instead of arguing it by Reason, and takes every precaution to prevent his readers from regarding it as a complete and final presentation of a logically irrefutable belief.
[324]That this truth is one which appeals to the Imagination more cogently than to the Reason, resembling in that respect the belief in the soul’s immortality, is evident to Plutarch. It is on this account that he illustrates it by Myth instead of arguing it by Reason, and takes every precaution to prevent his readers from regarding it as a complete and final presentation of a logically irrefutable belief.
[325]Non posse suaviter, &c., 1101 B, C.
[325]Non posse suaviter, &c., 1101 B, C.
[326]1101 D.
[326]1101 D.
[327]1102 B.
[327]1102 B.
[328]De Audiendis Poetis34 B.
[328]De Audiendis Poetis34 B.
[329]Conjugalia Præcepta, 140 D. Champagny sees a reference here to Christianity. But why not also inPlato’sLaws, 674 F, and 661 C?—It is quite in harmony with Plutarch’s love of openness in Religion that to the general reticence displayed by the Greeks on the subject of their religious Mysteries, he seems to add a personal reticence peculiarly his own. Considering how anxiously he hovers about the question of the soul’s immortality (see above, p. 118, and cf.Consolatio ad Apollonium, 120 B, C: “If, as is probable, there is any truth in the sayings of ancient poets and philosophers ... then must you cherish fair hopes of your dear departed son”—a passage curiously similar in form and thought toTacitus,Agric.46: “Si quis piorum manibus locus, si, ut sapientibus placet,”&c.), it is remarkable that only once—and then under the stress of a bitter domestic bereavement—does he specifically quote the Mysteries (those of Dionysus) as inculcating that doctrine (Ad Uxorem, 611 D). His adoption of an unknown writer’s beautiful comparison of Sleep to the Lesser Mysteries of Death (Consol. ad Apoll., 107 E), and his repetition of the same idea elsewhere (see above, p. 118), may also be indications how naturally the teaching of the Mysteries suggested the idea of immortality. But he most frequently alludes to the Mysteries as secret sources of information for the identification of nominally different deities (De Iside et Osiride, 364 E), or for the assignation of their proper functions to the Dæmons (De Defectu, 417 C), who are regarded as responsible for what Mr. Andrew Lang (“Myth, Ritual, and Religion,”passim) calls “the barbaric and licentious part of the performances” (De Iside et Osiride, 360 E, F). We should perhaps conclude, from the few indications which Plutarch gives of his views on this subject, that he regarded the Mysteries in a twofold light; they were a source of religious instruction, or consolation, respecting the future state of the soul, and they were also a means of explaining and justifying the crude legends which so largely intermingled with the purer elements of Greek religion. Though, as Plutarch hints, many of these barbaric legends were not suited to discussion by the profane, yet the mind, when purified by sacred rites, and educated to the apprehension of sacred meanings, could grasp the high and pure significance of things which were a stumbling-block to the uninitiated, and could make them an aid to a loftier moral life.
[329]Conjugalia Præcepta, 140 D. Champagny sees a reference here to Christianity. But why not also inPlato’sLaws, 674 F, and 661 C?—It is quite in harmony with Plutarch’s love of openness in Religion that to the general reticence displayed by the Greeks on the subject of their religious Mysteries, he seems to add a personal reticence peculiarly his own. Considering how anxiously he hovers about the question of the soul’s immortality (see above, p. 118, and cf.Consolatio ad Apollonium, 120 B, C: “If, as is probable, there is any truth in the sayings of ancient poets and philosophers ... then must you cherish fair hopes of your dear departed son”—a passage curiously similar in form and thought toTacitus,Agric.46: “Si quis piorum manibus locus, si, ut sapientibus placet,”&c.), it is remarkable that only once—and then under the stress of a bitter domestic bereavement—does he specifically quote the Mysteries (those of Dionysus) as inculcating that doctrine (Ad Uxorem, 611 D). His adoption of an unknown writer’s beautiful comparison of Sleep to the Lesser Mysteries of Death (Consol. ad Apoll., 107 E), and his repetition of the same idea elsewhere (see above, p. 118), may also be indications how naturally the teaching of the Mysteries suggested the idea of immortality. But he most frequently alludes to the Mysteries as secret sources of information for the identification of nominally different deities (De Iside et Osiride, 364 E), or for the assignation of their proper functions to the Dæmons (De Defectu, 417 C), who are regarded as responsible for what Mr. Andrew Lang (“Myth, Ritual, and Religion,”passim) calls “the barbaric and licentious part of the performances” (De Iside et Osiride, 360 E, F). We should perhaps conclude, from the few indications which Plutarch gives of his views on this subject, that he regarded the Mysteries in a twofold light; they were a source of religious instruction, or consolation, respecting the future state of the soul, and they were also a means of explaining and justifying the crude legends which so largely intermingled with the purer elements of Greek religion. Though, as Plutarch hints, many of these barbaric legends were not suited to discussion by the profane, yet the mind, when purified by sacred rites, and educated to the apprehension of sacred meanings, could grasp the high and pure significance of things which were a stumbling-block to the uninitiated, and could make them an aid to a loftier moral life.
[330]“Das eigentlich einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt- und Menschengeschichte, dem alle übrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der Conflict des Unglaubens und des Aberglaubens.”—Goethe,Westöstlicher Divan(quoted byTholuck).
[330]“Das eigentlich einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt- und Menschengeschichte, dem alle übrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der Conflict des Unglaubens und des Aberglaubens.”—Goethe,Westöstlicher Divan(quoted byTholuck).
[331]165 C.
[331]165 C.
[332]165 D.
[332]165 D.
[333]Bernardakisadopts Bentley’s emendation βαπτισμούς, whichmightbe an allusion to Christianity, but would more probably refer to such a process as that already described in the words βάπτισον σεαυτὸν εἰς θάλασσαν. We have previously discussed the general question involved (see p. 45), but may here add the opinion of so unprejudiced a Christian writer as Archbishop Trench, “strange to say. Christianity is to him (Plutarch) utterly unknown.”—(See also note, p. 202).
[333]Bernardakisadopts Bentley’s emendation βαπτισμούς, whichmightbe an allusion to Christianity, but would more probably refer to such a process as that already described in the words βάπτισον σεαυτὸν εἰς θάλασσαν. We have previously discussed the general question involved (see p. 45), but may here add the opinion of so unprejudiced a Christian writer as Archbishop Trench, “strange to say. Christianity is to him (Plutarch) utterly unknown.”—(See also note, p. 202).
[334]166 B.
[334]166 B.
[335]166 B.
[335]166 B.
[336]168 F.
[336]168 F.
[337]Bello primo, Aristodemum Messeniorum regem per superstitionem animum ac spes omnes despondisse, seque ipsum interfecisse, narrat etiam Pausanias, iv. 3.—Wyttenbach.
[337]Bello primo, Aristodemum Messeniorum regem per superstitionem animum ac spes omnes despondisse, seque ipsum interfecisse, narrat etiam Pausanias, iv. 3.—Wyttenbach.
[338]169 C.Iliad, vii. 193, 194.
[338]169 C.Iliad, vii. 193, 194.
[339]170 A. Trench quotes SenecaEpist., 123—“Quid enim interest utrum deos neges, an infames?”
[339]170 A. Trench quotes SenecaEpist., 123—“Quid enim interest utrum deos neges, an infames?”
[340]170 F.
[340]170 F.
[341]To the numerous citations made by Gréard (p. 209), we may add an expression of opinion by Dr. Tholuck, given with special reference to Plutarch’s views on Superstition:—“Wir haben in Alterthum einen hohen Geist, Plutarch, welcher dem, was das Alterthum Aberglaube nannte, viele Betrachtungen gewidmet hat, dem Gegenstande zwar nicht auf den Grund gekommen,aber in der Betrachtuug desselben doch so tiefe religiöse Wahrheiten ausgesprochen, dass wir nicht umhin können, ihn hier ausführlicher dem Leser vorzuführen” (Ueber Aberglauben und Unglauben).
[341]To the numerous citations made by Gréard (p. 209), we may add an expression of opinion by Dr. Tholuck, given with special reference to Plutarch’s views on Superstition:—“Wir haben in Alterthum einen hohen Geist, Plutarch, welcher dem, was das Alterthum Aberglaube nannte, viele Betrachtungen gewidmet hat, dem Gegenstande zwar nicht auf den Grund gekommen,aber in der Betrachtuug desselben doch so tiefe religiöse Wahrheiten ausgesprochen, dass wir nicht umhin können, ihn hier ausführlicher dem Leser vorzuführen” (Ueber Aberglauben und Unglauben).
[342]Wyttenbachbases this possibility on the 150th entry in the Lamprian catalogue, “On Superstition, against Epicurus.” (Entry No. 155 in the catalogue as given inBernardakis, vol. vii. pp. 473-7.) But the discussion on this point in theNon posse suaviterforms so important a part of that tract that the title “On Superstition, against Epicurus” would be no inapt title for the whole treatise.
[342]Wyttenbachbases this possibility on the 150th entry in the Lamprian catalogue, “On Superstition, against Epicurus.” (Entry No. 155 in the catalogue as given inBernardakis, vol. vii. pp. 473-7.) But the discussion on this point in theNon posse suaviterforms so important a part of that tract that the title “On Superstition, against Epicurus” would be no inapt title for the whole treatise.
[343]The view taken in the text as to the character of this strenuous and noble sermon onSuperstitionis, of course, quite at variance with the opinion of Prof. Mahaffy, who regards it as “one of those sophistical exercises practised by every one in that age—I mean, the defence of a paradox with subtlety and ingenuity,taking little account of sober truth in comparison with dialectical plausibility.”—Greeks under Roman Sway, p. 318.
[343]The view taken in the text as to the character of this strenuous and noble sermon onSuperstitionis, of course, quite at variance with the opinion of Prof. Mahaffy, who regards it as “one of those sophistical exercises practised by every one in that age—I mean, the defence of a paradox with subtlety and ingenuity,taking little account of sober truth in comparison with dialectical plausibility.”—Greeks under Roman Sway, p. 318.
[344]Pharsalia, viii. 831.
[344]Pharsalia, viii. 831.
[345]Apuleius,Meta: Lib. xi. Lucius (a descendant of Plutarch, by the way), in his pious gratitude, enters the service of the goddess who haduncharmedhim.—Rursus donique, quam raso capillo,collegi vetustissimi et sub illis Sullæ temporibus conditimunia, non obumbrato vel obtecto calvitio, sed quoquoversus obvio, gaudens obibam.
[345]Apuleius,Meta: Lib. xi. Lucius (a descendant of Plutarch, by the way), in his pious gratitude, enters the service of the goddess who haduncharmedhim.—Rursus donique, quam raso capillo,collegi vetustissimi et sub illis Sullæ temporibus conditimunia, non obumbrato vel obtecto calvitio, sed quoquoversus obvio, gaudens obibam.
[346]364 E.
[346]364 E.
[347]354 C.
[347]354 C.
[348]355 B.
[348]355 B.
[349]Cf.De Pyth. Orac., 400 A.
[349]Cf.De Pyth. Orac., 400 A.
[350]355 D.
[350]355 D.
[351]358 E. Mr. Andrew Lang justly remarks, “Why these myths should be considered ‘more blasphemous’ than the rest does not appear” (Myth, Ritual, and Religion, vol. ii. pp. 116, 117).
[351]358 E. Mr. Andrew Lang justly remarks, “Why these myths should be considered ‘more blasphemous’ than the rest does not appear” (Myth, Ritual, and Religion, vol. ii. pp. 116, 117).
[352]358 F. This is a difficult passage. It seems necessary to read ἀνακλάσει for ἀναχωρήσει (cf. ἀνάκλασις δή που περὶ τὴν ἶριν,Amatorius, 765 E), but even then the meaning is difficult to elicit, and it is not confidently claimed that the rendering in the text has elicited it. Three translations are appended: “For as mathematicians assure us that the rainbow is nothing else but a variegated image of the sun, thrown upon the sight by the reflexion of his beams from the clouds, so ought we to look upon the present story as the representation, or reflexion rather, of something real as its true cause” (PlutarchiDe Iside et OsirideLiber: Græce et Anglice, bySamuel Squire, A.M., Cambridge, 1744).—“Und so wie die Naturforscher den Regenbogen für ein Gegenbild der Sonne erklären, das durch das Zurücktreten der Erscheinung an die Wolke bunt wird, so ist hier die Sage das Gegenbild einer Wahrheit, welche ihre Bedeutung auf etwas anderes hin abspiegelt” (Plutarchüber Isis und Osirisherausgegeben vonG. Parthey, Berlin, 1850).—Legendum ἀναχρώσει vel ἀνακλάσει, ut Reisk.“Et quemadmodum mathematici arcum cælestem Solis tradunt esse imaginem variatam visus ad nubem reflexu: Sic fabula hoc loco indicium est orationis alio reflectentis intellectum.”—Wyttenbach.
[352]358 F. This is a difficult passage. It seems necessary to read ἀνακλάσει for ἀναχωρήσει (cf. ἀνάκλασις δή που περὶ τὴν ἶριν,Amatorius, 765 E), but even then the meaning is difficult to elicit, and it is not confidently claimed that the rendering in the text has elicited it. Three translations are appended: “For as mathematicians assure us that the rainbow is nothing else but a variegated image of the sun, thrown upon the sight by the reflexion of his beams from the clouds, so ought we to look upon the present story as the representation, or reflexion rather, of something real as its true cause” (PlutarchiDe Iside et OsirideLiber: Græce et Anglice, bySamuel Squire, A.M., Cambridge, 1744).—“Und so wie die Naturforscher den Regenbogen für ein Gegenbild der Sonne erklären, das durch das Zurücktreten der Erscheinung an die Wolke bunt wird, so ist hier die Sage das Gegenbild einer Wahrheit, welche ihre Bedeutung auf etwas anderes hin abspiegelt” (Plutarchüber Isis und Osirisherausgegeben vonG. Parthey, Berlin, 1850).—Legendum ἀναχρώσει vel ἀνακλάσει, ut Reisk.“Et quemadmodum mathematici arcum cælestem Solis tradunt esse imaginem variatam visus ad nubem reflexu: Sic fabula hoc loco indicium est orationis alio reflectentis intellectum.”—Wyttenbach.
[353]Myth, Ritual, and Religion, vol. ii. p. 120.
[353]Myth, Ritual, and Religion, vol. ii. p. 120.
[354]In our spelling of this name we use the freedom of choice so graciously accorded by Xylander—Si Euhemerus mavis, non repugno.
[354]In our spelling of this name we use the freedom of choice so graciously accorded by Xylander—Si Euhemerus mavis, non repugno.
[355]De Placitis Philosophorum, 880 D. Cf.Cicero,De Natura Deorum. i. 42. “Ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturæ demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem, an penitus totam sustulisse?” SeeMayor’s note on this passage. The references to Lactantius and Eusebius and many others bearing on the question are collected by Corsini in his first dissertation on theDe Placitis. Zimmerman is very indignant with Plutarch on account of the charge here brought against Euhemerus and Diagoras, and has defended them against our author with great energy and spirit. (Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen qua Euemerus Messenius et Diagoras Melius ab Atheismo contra Plutarchum aliosque defenduntur.)
[355]De Placitis Philosophorum, 880 D. Cf.Cicero,De Natura Deorum. i. 42. “Ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturæ demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem, an penitus totam sustulisse?” SeeMayor’s note on this passage. The references to Lactantius and Eusebius and many others bearing on the question are collected by Corsini in his first dissertation on theDe Placitis. Zimmerman is very indignant with Plutarch on account of the charge here brought against Euhemerus and Diagoras, and has defended them against our author with great energy and spirit. (Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen qua Euemerus Messenius et Diagoras Melius ab Atheismo contra Plutarchum aliosque defenduntur.)
[356]360 A.
[356]360 A.
[357]The language here seems curiously outspoken in view of the now established apotheosis of the Emperors.
[357]The language here seems curiously outspoken in view of the now established apotheosis of the Emperors.
[358]360 D.
[358]360 D.
[359]356, 357. Cf.De Dædalis Platæensibus.
[359]356, 357. Cf.De Dædalis Platæensibus.
[360]364 A.
[360]364 A.
[361]366 C.
[361]366 C.
[362]364 D.
[362]364 D.
[363]367 D.
[363]367 D.
[364]368 D.
[364]368 D.
[365]369 C. It is clear from a careful examination of the text that Plutarch gives only a critical examination of this theory: he does not adopt it as his own, as has frequently been asserted.
[365]369 C. It is clear from a careful examination of the text that Plutarch gives only a critical examination of this theory: he does not adopt it as his own, as has frequently been asserted.
[366]369 D. “It is impossible,” argued these ancient thinkers, “that moral life and death, that good and evil, can flow from a single source. It is impossible that a Holy God can have been the author of evil. Evil, then, must be referred to some other origin: it must have had an author of its own.”—“Some Elements of Religion,” by CanonLiddon(Lecture iv. sect. i.).
[366]369 D. “It is impossible,” argued these ancient thinkers, “that moral life and death, that good and evil, can flow from a single source. It is impossible that a Holy God can have been the author of evil. Evil, then, must be referred to some other origin: it must have had an author of its own.”—“Some Elements of Religion,” by CanonLiddon(Lecture iv. sect. i.).
[367]370 E.
[367]370 E.
[368]371 A.
[368]371 A.
[369]See especially the quotations from Plato in 370 F, and the application of Platonic terms in the interpretation of the Isiac and Osirian myth in 372 E, F, 373 and 374. Hesiod, too, is made to agree with this Platonic explanation of the Egyptian legend (374 C), and the Platonic notion of matter is strained to allow of its being identified with Isis (372 E, 374 F). In 367 C, a parallelism is pointed out between Stoic theology and an interpretation of the myth; and in 367 E the death of Osiris on the 17th of the month is used to illustrate, if not to explain, the Pythagorean ἀφοσίωσις of that number.As regards the identification of particular deities in this tract, reference may be made to 364 E, F and 365 A, B, where Dionysus is identified with Osiris; and to 365 F, where Mnaseas of Patara is mentioned with approval as associating with Epaphus, not only Dionysus, but Serapis and Osiris also. Anticleides is also referred to as asserting that Isis was the daughter of Prometheus and the wife of Dionysus. In 372 D, Osiris is identified with the Sun under the name of Sirius, and Isis with the Moon, in 375, a fanciful philology is called in to aid a further identification of Greek and Egyptian deities; but not much importance is attached to similarities derived in this way. In the next sentence Isis is stated to have been identified with Athene by the Egyptians; and the general principle of identity is boldly stated in 377 C:—“It is quite legitimate to regard these gods as common possessions and not the exclusive property of the Egyptians—Isis and the deities that go in her train are universally known and worshipped. The names, indeed, of certain of them have been borrowed from the Egyptians, not so long ago; but their divinity has been known and recognized for ages.”
[369]See especially the quotations from Plato in 370 F, and the application of Platonic terms in the interpretation of the Isiac and Osirian myth in 372 E, F, 373 and 374. Hesiod, too, is made to agree with this Platonic explanation of the Egyptian legend (374 C), and the Platonic notion of matter is strained to allow of its being identified with Isis (372 E, 374 F). In 367 C, a parallelism is pointed out between Stoic theology and an interpretation of the myth; and in 367 E the death of Osiris on the 17th of the month is used to illustrate, if not to explain, the Pythagorean ἀφοσίωσις of that number.
As regards the identification of particular deities in this tract, reference may be made to 364 E, F and 365 A, B, where Dionysus is identified with Osiris; and to 365 F, where Mnaseas of Patara is mentioned with approval as associating with Epaphus, not only Dionysus, but Serapis and Osiris also. Anticleides is also referred to as asserting that Isis was the daughter of Prometheus and the wife of Dionysus. In 372 D, Osiris is identified with the Sun under the name of Sirius, and Isis with the Moon, in 375, a fanciful philology is called in to aid a further identification of Greek and Egyptian deities; but not much importance is attached to similarities derived in this way. In the next sentence Isis is stated to have been identified with Athene by the Egyptians; and the general principle of identity is boldly stated in 377 C:—“It is quite legitimate to regard these gods as common possessions and not the exclusive property of the Egyptians—Isis and the deities that go in her train are universally known and worshipped. The names, indeed, of certain of them have been borrowed from the Egyptians, not so long ago; but their divinity has been known and recognized for ages.”
[370]378 A.
[370]378 A.
[371]There is a strain of mysticism in theDe Osiridewhich is alien from the cheerful common sense which usually marks Plutarch; a remark which also applies to theDe Facie quæ apparet in Orbe Lunæ. But the same strain appears in others of his authentic tracts, though mostly operating through the medium of Platonic dreams and myths,e.g.the story of Thespesius in theSera Num. Vindic., and that of Timarchus in theDe Dæmonio Socratis. Besides, one would not ceteris paribus deny the authenticity of Browning’s “Childe Roland” because he had written “The Guardian Angel,” or that of “The Antiquary” because Scott was also the author of “The Monastery.” The tract was probably composed after that return from Alexandria to which Plutarch so charmingly alludes inSympos., 678 C. Moreover, the very nature of the subject, and the priestly character of the lady to whom it was addressed, as well as the mysterious nature of the goddess whose ministrant she was, are all parts of a natural inducement to mysticism. We must admit that Plutarch here participates in that spirit of mysticism which, always inherent in Platonism, was kept in check by his acutely practical bent, to be revived and exaggerated to the destruction of practical ethics in the dreams and abstractions of the Neo-Platonists.
[371]There is a strain of mysticism in theDe Osiridewhich is alien from the cheerful common sense which usually marks Plutarch; a remark which also applies to theDe Facie quæ apparet in Orbe Lunæ. But the same strain appears in others of his authentic tracts, though mostly operating through the medium of Platonic dreams and myths,e.g.the story of Thespesius in theSera Num. Vindic., and that of Timarchus in theDe Dæmonio Socratis. Besides, one would not ceteris paribus deny the authenticity of Browning’s “Childe Roland” because he had written “The Guardian Angel,” or that of “The Antiquary” because Scott was also the author of “The Monastery.” The tract was probably composed after that return from Alexandria to which Plutarch so charmingly alludes inSympos., 678 C. Moreover, the very nature of the subject, and the priestly character of the lady to whom it was addressed, as well as the mysterious nature of the goddess whose ministrant she was, are all parts of a natural inducement to mysticism. We must admit that Plutarch here participates in that spirit of mysticism which, always inherent in Platonism, was kept in check by his acutely practical bent, to be revived and exaggerated to the destruction of practical ethics in the dreams and abstractions of the Neo-Platonists.
[372]A very slight acquaintance with Plutarch’s writings will serve to dispose of the charge of Atheism brought against him by Zimmerman, the professor of Theology in the Gymnasium of Zurich:—Credo equidem Plutarchum inter eos fuisse qui cum Cicerone crediderint eos qui dant philosophiæ operam non arbitrari Deos esse.—It is true that Zimmerman supports his case by quoting the pseudo-PlutarcheanDe Placitis(Idem de providentia non minus male loquitur quam ipsi Epicurei), and seems himself afraid to accept the conclusion of his own demonstrations:—Atheum eum fuisse non credo, sed quomodo asserere potuerit Superstitione Atheismum tolerabiliorem esse, simul tamen eos, quos atheos fuisse minime probare potuit, Superstitioni autem inimicissimos, omnem malorum mundum intulisse, consociare nequeo.—But the learned author is too intent on exculpatingNoster Euhemerusfrom Plutarch’s “injustice” to have justice to spare for Plutarch himself.—(J. J.Zimmerman,Epistola ad Nonnen). Gréard quotes other authors of this charge against Plutarch (p. 269).—We cannot allow this opportunity to pass of protesting against the attitude of those who assumed, even in the Nineteenth Century, that it was a sign either of moral depravity, or mental incapacity, in Plutarch not to have been a believer in the Christian faith. Even Archbishop Trench, who admits, concerning such writers as our author, that “many were by them enabled to live their lives after a far higher and nobler fashion than else they would have attained” cannot rid himself of the notion that had Plutarch actively opposed Christianity he would have committed an offence which our generosity might have pardoned, though our justice must recognize that itneededpardon. “Plutarch himself may be entirely acquitted of anyconsciousattempt to fight against that truth which was higher than any which he had” (p. 13).—“I have already mentioned that,through no fault of his own, he stood removed from all the immediate influences of the Christian Church” (p. 89). But suppose the facts to have been just the opposite of those indicated in the words we have italicized, it would involve the loss of all sense of historical perspective to draw the conclusion which would clearly have been drawn by Trench himself. The use of similar language by Prof. Mahaffy has already been noted. (Pref. p. xii.) The position assumed by writers who maintain this view, is one quite inappropriate for historical discussion, and its natural expression, if it must be expressed at all, is through the medium of such poetical aspirations as that breathed in the epigram of John, the Metropolitan of Euchaita:—“If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall saveFrom wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the causeTheir speech supported: Thine, too, were the lawsTheir hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blindTo recognize Thee Lord of human kind,Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shownTo bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.”
[372]A very slight acquaintance with Plutarch’s writings will serve to dispose of the charge of Atheism brought against him by Zimmerman, the professor of Theology in the Gymnasium of Zurich:—Credo equidem Plutarchum inter eos fuisse qui cum Cicerone crediderint eos qui dant philosophiæ operam non arbitrari Deos esse.—It is true that Zimmerman supports his case by quoting the pseudo-PlutarcheanDe Placitis(Idem de providentia non minus male loquitur quam ipsi Epicurei), and seems himself afraid to accept the conclusion of his own demonstrations:—Atheum eum fuisse non credo, sed quomodo asserere potuerit Superstitione Atheismum tolerabiliorem esse, simul tamen eos, quos atheos fuisse minime probare potuit, Superstitioni autem inimicissimos, omnem malorum mundum intulisse, consociare nequeo.—But the learned author is too intent on exculpatingNoster Euhemerusfrom Plutarch’s “injustice” to have justice to spare for Plutarch himself.—(J. J.Zimmerman,Epistola ad Nonnen). Gréard quotes other authors of this charge against Plutarch (p. 269).—We cannot allow this opportunity to pass of protesting against the attitude of those who assumed, even in the Nineteenth Century, that it was a sign either of moral depravity, or mental incapacity, in Plutarch not to have been a believer in the Christian faith. Even Archbishop Trench, who admits, concerning such writers as our author, that “many were by them enabled to live their lives after a far higher and nobler fashion than else they would have attained” cannot rid himself of the notion that had Plutarch actively opposed Christianity he would have committed an offence which our generosity might have pardoned, though our justice must recognize that itneededpardon. “Plutarch himself may be entirely acquitted of anyconsciousattempt to fight against that truth which was higher than any which he had” (p. 13).—“I have already mentioned that,through no fault of his own, he stood removed from all the immediate influences of the Christian Church” (p. 89). But suppose the facts to have been just the opposite of those indicated in the words we have italicized, it would involve the loss of all sense of historical perspective to draw the conclusion which would clearly have been drawn by Trench himself. The use of similar language by Prof. Mahaffy has already been noted. (Pref. p. xii.) The position assumed by writers who maintain this view, is one quite inappropriate for historical discussion, and its natural expression, if it must be expressed at all, is through the medium of such poetical aspirations as that breathed in the epigram of John, the Metropolitan of Euchaita:—
“If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall saveFrom wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the causeTheir speech supported: Thine, too, were the lawsTheir hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blindTo recognize Thee Lord of human kind,Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shownTo bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.”
“If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall saveFrom wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the causeTheir speech supported: Thine, too, were the lawsTheir hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blindTo recognize Thee Lord of human kind,Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shownTo bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.”
“If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall saveFrom wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the causeTheir speech supported: Thine, too, were the lawsTheir hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blindTo recognize Thee Lord of human kind,Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shownTo bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.”
“If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall save
From wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,
Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the cause
Their speech supported: Thine, too, were the laws
Their hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blind
To recognize Thee Lord of human kind,
Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shown
To bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.”
[373]Dr. Martineau (Types of Ethical Theory, vol. i. p. 91) thinks that “we must go a little further than Zeller, who decides that Plato usually conceived of God as if personal, yet was restrained by a doctrine inconsistent with such conception from approaching it closely or setting it deliberately on any scientific ground,” and devotes several closely-reasoned pages to show that, although there was no room for a personal god in Plato’s philosophy, Plato himself was in distinct opposition to his own views as systematically expounded in his writings. “We may regard him as fully aware of the conditions of the problem, and, though unable to solve it without lesion of his dialectic, yet deliberately pronouncing judgment on the side of his religious feeling.” Butpace tantorum virorumit will be admitted that the personality of God is not very evident in Plato when those who understand him best can only maintain that it is not essentially interwoven with his philosophy, having only an indirect and accidental existence which is not possible “without lesion of his dialectic.”
[373]Dr. Martineau (Types of Ethical Theory, vol. i. p. 91) thinks that “we must go a little further than Zeller, who decides that Plato usually conceived of God as if personal, yet was restrained by a doctrine inconsistent with such conception from approaching it closely or setting it deliberately on any scientific ground,” and devotes several closely-reasoned pages to show that, although there was no room for a personal god in Plato’s philosophy, Plato himself was in distinct opposition to his own views as systematically expounded in his writings. “We may regard him as fully aware of the conditions of the problem, and, though unable to solve it without lesion of his dialectic, yet deliberately pronouncing judgment on the side of his religious feeling.” Butpace tantorum virorumit will be admitted that the personality of God is not very evident in Plato when those who understand him best can only maintain that it is not essentially interwoven with his philosophy, having only an indirect and accidental existence which is not possible “without lesion of his dialectic.”
[374]“Abstractedly, the theology of the Stoics appears as a materialistic pantheism; God is represented as a fire, and the world as a mode of God.” (Grant,The Ethics of Aristotle, vol. i. p. 265.) In the famous “hymn of Cleanthes,” preserved, like so many other of the great wonders of classical literature, by Stobæus, Grant sees an emphatic recognition of the personality of God, but it is equally natural to regard the hymn as a more detailed expression of that necessity of submitting to Destiny—of living in accordance with nature—which Cleanthes enounces in that other famous fragment which Epictetus would have us hold ready to hand in all the circumstances of life:—“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,The way that I am bid by you to go:To follow I am ready. If I choose not,I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.”—Epictetus,Encheir.lii. (Long’s translation.) Epictetus, indeed, and Seneca, late comers in the history of Stoicism, have undoubtedly attained to a clear recognition of the personality of God.
[374]“Abstractedly, the theology of the Stoics appears as a materialistic pantheism; God is represented as a fire, and the world as a mode of God.” (Grant,The Ethics of Aristotle, vol. i. p. 265.) In the famous “hymn of Cleanthes,” preserved, like so many other of the great wonders of classical literature, by Stobæus, Grant sees an emphatic recognition of the personality of God, but it is equally natural to regard the hymn as a more detailed expression of that necessity of submitting to Destiny—of living in accordance with nature—which Cleanthes enounces in that other famous fragment which Epictetus would have us hold ready to hand in all the circumstances of life:—
“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,The way that I am bid by you to go:To follow I am ready. If I choose not,I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.”
“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,The way that I am bid by you to go:To follow I am ready. If I choose not,I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.”
“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,The way that I am bid by you to go:To follow I am ready. If I choose not,I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.”
“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,
The way that I am bid by you to go:
To follow I am ready. If I choose not,
I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.”
—Epictetus,Encheir.lii. (Long’s translation.) Epictetus, indeed, and Seneca, late comers in the history of Stoicism, have undoubtedly attained to a clear recognition of the personality of God.