“No holy confidence or fellowship reigns there.”
“No holy confidence or fellowship reigns there.”
“No holy confidence or fellowship reigns there.”
“No holy confidence or fellowship reigns there.”
Wherefore as the law is the bond of civil society, and equal rights form that of the law, by what power can acommunity of citizens be maintained, where their condition is not an equal one? If therefore it is not expedient to equalize fortunes; if the powers of mind cannot be equalized in all, certainly then an equality of rights ought to exist, among those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a state but a community of rights? * * * * *
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XXXIII. * * other governments however are deemed by them not to deserve those names, which they have chosen to arrogate to themselves. For why should I call a man who is greedy of rule, or of the sole command, and who is trampling upon an oppressed people, king, which is the title of the good Jupiter, rather than tyrant? A tyrant may be clement as well as a king may be oppressive; the matter really interesting to the people is, whether they are to serve under a gentle or a severe master: for as to being any thing but servants, that is not to be avoided. How could Lacedemon, when she was thought to excel in the science of government, possess only good and just kings, when she was obliged to take any king who was sprung from the royal blood? And the better class, who can endure them, who have arrogated to themselves in their own assemblies, a name not conceded to them by the people? For who is the man to be pronounced best, in learning, in the arts, in studies? * * * * *
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XXXIV. * * * * If it was done by lot, the government would be overthrown; like a ship, at whose helm, some passenger taken at hazard was placed. A nation can entrust its affairs to whom it may choose; and if it wishes to remain free, it will choose from among the best. For certainly the security of states is found in the counsels of the best citizens; especially as nature has not only ordained that they should preserve an influence over the weak by their conspicuous virtue and courage, but also that the weak should resign themselves to the government of great minds. This most desirable state of things, they say, is prevented by the erroneous opinions of men who, through ignorance of that virtue, which belongs to but few, and is seen and appreciated only by few, deem those who are sprung from a noble race, or who are opulent and wealthy, to be the best men. Under this vulgar error, when the power, not the virtues of a few, have got possession of the government; those chiefs tenaciously preserve the title of better class; a name however to which the substance is wanting. For riches, titles, and power, devoid of wisdom, of the knowledge of self-government, and that of the government of others, exhibit nothing but insolent and disgraceful pride. Nor can the condition of any city be more deplorable, than where the richest men pass for the best. But what can be more delightful than a state virtuously governed? What more illustrious than the man, who while he governs others, is himself the slave of no bad passions? Who, while he calls upon the citizens to observe the regulations he has formed, lives up to them all himself? Nor imposes any lawsupon the people, which he himself obeys not, but who presents his whole life to his fellow citizens as one unbroken law. If one man could suffice to all things, there would be no need of many; and if all men could perceive what is best, and consent to it, no one would require any chiefs to be elected. The difficulty of coming to wise determinations, has transferred the rule from one king to many persons; and the error and rashness of the people, from the multitude to a few. Thus between the obstinacy of one, and the temerity of many, the better class have possessed themselves of the middle and least turbulent of all the situations: by whom if the commonwealth is well administered, the people relieved from all care and thought, must necessarily be happy: enjoying their independence through the labours of those, whose duty it is to preserve it to them; and who ought never to permit the people to think that their interests are neglected by their rulers. As to that exact equality of rights, which is held so dear by a free people; it cannot be preserved: for the people themselves, however free and unrestrained they may be, are remarkable for their deference to many persons; and exercise a great preference as it respects men and dignities. That which is called equality also, is a most unjust thing in itself: for when the same honour is enjoyed by the high and by the low, through a whole people, that very equality must be unjust; and in those states which are governed by the better class, it can never happen. These, Lælius, and some other reasons resembling them, are wont to be urged by those who chiefly praise that form of government.
XXXV. “But which, Scipio, among those three, do you chiefly approve of?” said Lælius.
Scipio. “You do well to ask, which chiefly of the three, since separately I do not approve of any of them; but should prefer to every one of them, a government constituted out of all three. But if one of them for its simplicity may be admired, I should approve of the kingly form, and give it the highest praise. For the name of king calls up at once the idea of a father, consulting with his citizens as if they were his own children; and more anxious to preserve them, than to reduce them to slavery: it being a great advantage to the weak to be sustained by the exertions and by the foresight of one pre-eminent and good man. Here however the better class profess to do the same thing to more advantage, and say there is more wisdom with numbers than with one, and at the same time equal justice and faith. But the people call out with a loud voice, that they choose neither to obey one nor many; that nothing is sweeter to the beasts of the field than liberty, which is wanting to all who serve either under the better class or under a king. Thus on the score of personal attachment, kings attract us. The better class by their wisdom; and liberty on the side of the people. So that in making the comparison, it is difficult to say which is preferable.”
L. “I believe it,” said he, “but if you leave this point unfinished, the other parts of the subject can scarcely be cleared up.”
XXXVI. S. “Let us imitate therefore Aratus, who in his introduction to a discourse upon high matters, thought it best to begin with Jupiter.”
L. “Why with Jupiter? and what has this discussion to do with the verses of Aratus?”
S. “Insomuch, that the opening of our debate may be honoured with the name of him, whom all, learned and unlearned, consent with one voice, to be the one king of all the gods and men.” “What then!” said Lælius. “What do you believe in but the things which are before your eyes?” replied he. “This opinion has been established for the conduct of life, by those who have had the direction of public affairs; that the belief might prevail, that one king ruled in heaven, who with his nod, as Homer says, could tumble down Olympus; and that he should be considered as the King and Father of all. Great is the authority for it, and many the witnesses, inasmuch as all have concurred in it. Nations too have agreed, as we find in the decrees of princes, that the regal form of government was most excellent, since they imagine the gods themselves to be under the government of one king. And if we have been told that this and similar opinions have sprung from fables and the errors of the ignorant, let us listen to those who may be considered almost the common teachers of erudite men; who as it were, saw these very things with their eyes, which we scarcely are acquainted with, when we hear of them.” “And who are they?” said Lælius. “They,” replied he, who in their investigations of the nature of all things, have perceived a design in the universal structure of this world * * * * * *
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XXXVII. * * * * * * “But if you desire it Lælius, I can give you authorities in no wise barbarous, nor of too remote an antiquity.”
L. I should be glad to have them.
S. You are aware that it is now somewhat less than four hundred years since this city has been governed without kings.
L. That is true; rather less.
S. What then are four hundred years, for the age of a city or state; is it such a long period?
L. It can hardly be called an adult age.
S. Then there was a king in Rome four hundred years ago?
L. And a very superb one.
S. Who before him?
L. A most just one; and from that period up to Romulus, who reigned six hundred years from the present time.
S. Then he is not so very remote.
L. Not at all. The institutions of Greece were already on the wane.
S. I submit to you now, whether Romulus was the king of a barbarous people?
L. If as the Greeks say, all men were either Greeks or Barbarians; then I am afraid he must be esteemed a king of a barbarous people. But if that epithet is appropriate to a difference of manners, rather than to languages, I think the Greeks not less barbarians than the Romans.” “In relation to the matter of which we speak,” said Scipio, “it is intelligence we are looking for, rather than men. If a discreet people therefore, not ofa very ancient period, have preferred the government of kings, I am availing myself of testimony which cannot be deemed savage, uncivilized, or of a barbarous antiquity.”
XXXVIII. “I perceive Scipio,” said Lælius, “that you are sufficiently provided with testimony. But with me, as with good judges, sound argument prevails more than witnesses.” “Make use of an argument then,” replied Scipio, “which your knowledge of yourself can suggest to you.” “What knowledge,” said he.
S. Why as when by chance it happens to you to be angry with some one.
L. That occurs oftener than I could wish.
S. What! when you are in anger, do you suffer your mind to fall under the domination of that passion?
L. No, so help me Hercules. I rather imitate Archytas, the Tarentine; who on arriving at his country house, and being greatly offended at perceiving his orders had been disobeyed, “You are a miserable wretch,” said he to his farmer, “and I would have you flogged to death if I were not angry.” “Excellent,” said Scipio. “Archytas wished to calm his anger by reflection, considering that degree of it which was not under the control of reason, to be leading on to a sort of sedition of the mind. To it add avarice, ambition, the passion for glory, and for sensual pleasures; and it will appear that there exists in the minds of men, a sort of regal controlling power, to wit, reflection. For that is the best part of the mind, and where its authorityprevails, there is no room for sensuality, for anger, or for rashness.
L. So it is.
S. Do you approve therefore of a mind so disposed?
L. There is nothing I admire more.
S. Then you really do not think, reflection being driven away; that voluptuousness or the angry passions, which are without end, should have the mastery in all things.
L. Indeed I can conceive of nothing more wretched, than such a state of mind; nor of a man more debased than when under such government.
S. You prefer then all parts of the mind, to be under some government, the government of reflection?
L. I certainly prefer it.
S. Why therefore do you hesitate in your opinion about public affairs; where if the administration is transferred to many, there will be no one, as I now understand it, to take the command. And it seems that if authority is not one thing, it is nothing at all.
XXXIX. “I would ask,” said Lælius, “of what consequence it is to us, whether one or many, if justice is dispensed by the latter.” “Since I find Lælius,” said Scipio, “that my witnesses have made no great impression on you, I shall not desist from making use of yourself as a witness to prove what I say.” “Me,” said he, “in what way?”
S. Why adverting to the directions you so earnestly gave to your family, when we were lately at Formianum; to obey only the orders of one person.
L. Oh! my farmer!
S. Well, at home, I suppose, several are entrusted with the management of your affairs?
L. No, only one.
S. What, your whole establishment! does no one but yourself manage it?
L. Just so.
S. Do not you therefore accede to the same conclusion in public affairs: that the government of a single person, if it is a just one, is the best?
L. I am brought to the conclusion, and must almost assent to it.
XL. You will be more inclined to that opinion, said Scipio, when omitting the analogies of one pilot, one physician, who if they are any way skilled in their arts, ought one to have the control of the ship; the other of the patient, in preference to many; I come to the consideration of greater matters.
L. What are they?
S. Are you not aware that the name of king became odious to this people, on account of the oppression and pride of one man, Tarquin?
L. Yes, I am aware.
S. Then you are aware of what haply in the course of this discussion, I may find occasion to speak. Tarquin being driven out, the people exulted with a marvellous sort of insolence of freedom. At one time driving innocent people into exile; at another, confiscating the property of many. Next came annual consuls. Then the fasces prostrated before the people—appeals in all cases. Then the mutiny of the plebeians—thena complete revolution in every thing, placing all things in the power of the people.
L. It is as you say. “It is true,” said Scipio—“in peace and tranquillity, some license may be permitted when there is nothing to fear, as at sea sometimes, or in a slight fever: but like him who is at sea, when suddenly the ocean puts on its terrors, or the sick man, when his complaint oppresses him, and the assistance of one is implored: so our people in time of peace, interfere in internal affairs, threaten the magistrates, refuse submission to them, denounce them and provoke them; yet in war obey them as they would a king, preferring their safety to the indulgence of their passions. Also in our more important wars, our countrymen have constantly preferred the command to be in the hands of one, without any colleague; the extent of whose power is indicated by his name. For a dictator is so called on account of every thing being dictated by him. But in our books, Lælius, you see also that he is called master of the people.”
L. It is so. “Wisely therefore did those ancients,” said Scipio * * * *
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XLI. * * * When a people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after the death of one of the best of kings,
“Long were their bosoms moved with deep regret;Oft they together call upon his manes.Oh, godlike Romulus! the bounteous godsWhat a protector did they give in thee?Oh father, parent, blood derived from heaven!”
“Long were their bosoms moved with deep regret;Oft they together call upon his manes.Oh, godlike Romulus! the bounteous godsWhat a protector did they give in thee?Oh father, parent, blood derived from heaven!”
“Long were their bosoms moved with deep regret;Oft they together call upon his manes.Oh, godlike Romulus! the bounteous godsWhat a protector did they give in thee?Oh father, parent, blood derived from heaven!”
“Long were their bosoms moved with deep regret;
Oft they together call upon his manes.
Oh, godlike Romulus! the bounteous gods
What a protector did they give in thee?
Oh father, parent, blood derived from heaven!”
Those whom the laws enjoined them to obey, they did not call lords or masters; finally, not even kings, but guardians of the country, fathers and gods. Nor without cause, for what is added,
“Thou broughtest us into the realms of light!”
“Thou broughtest us into the realms of light!”
“Thou broughtest us into the realms of light!”
“Thou broughtest us into the realms of light!”
They thought that life, honour, and every comfort was given to them by the justice of a king. And the same inclinations would have remained with their posterity, if the character of their kings had not changed. But you perceive that kind of government was ruined by the injustice of one man.
L. I do perceive it, and I am desirous of knowing the course of these changes, not only in our own country, but in all governments.
XLII. “It will be for you,” said Scipio, “when I shall have given my opinion of that kind of government which I prefer, to give a more accurate account of the mutations in governments; although I do not think them much to be apprehended in the form I am inclined to. But a regal form of government is particularly and most certainly exposed to change. When a king begins to be unjust, that form of government perishes at once. The tyrant is, at the same time, the worst of all conditions of government, and the nearest to the best. Whom, if the better class have overturned, which for the most part happens, the commonwealth possessesthat second class of the three. And this is a sort of royalty; a paternal government of the principal people, for the benefit of the rest. But if the people cast out or slay the tyrant; rejoicing in their own deed, they are more moderate, as long as they know and feel the value of being so, in their endeavour to protect the commonwealth constituted by themselves. But when the populace have bent their force against a just king, and have stripped him of his kingdom; or even, as it happens very often, have tasted the blood of the better class, and have prostrated the whole republic in their madness; think not that the vexed ocean or the wildest conflagration, can be more easily kept down, than the unbridled insolence of the multitude.
XLIII. Then is produced what in Plato is so clearly described, if I can in any manner express it in Latin, a thing difficult to be done, but I will endeavour. “It is then,” he says, “when the insatiable throats of the people, parched with the thirst of liberty, and led on by rash demagogues, have greedily drank, not temperate but too unalloyed draughts of freedom. Then the magistrates and chiefs, unless they are too lenient and indulgent, permitting them every excess of liberty; are pursued, impeached, insulted, and called oppressors, kings, and tyrants.” I think this part of his works is known to you.
L. I am well acquainted with it.
S. Then follows, “Those who pay obedience to the magistrates, are tormented by the people, are called voluntary slaves. But those magistrates who affect to be on an equality with the lowest; and other individualswho strive to abolish all distinction between citizens and magistrates, are exalted with praises, and overwhelmed with honours. And in this condition of things, it follows, of course, that there is an unrestrained license in a government of this kind; so that every private family is without any government: and this evil extends even to the beasts. At length the father fears the son—the son disregards the father: every sort of decency is extinguished, that an open license may prevail. Nothing distinguishes the citizen from the stranger. The master pays court to his scholars, that he may be flattered by them. Teachers are despised by their disciples. Young persons take upon themselves the authority of aged ones, who abase themselves to mingle in their games, lest they become odious and burdensome to them. At last slaves give themselves all sorts of liberties. Wives assume the privileges of their husbands. Nay the dogs, the horses, the asses at length are so infected with liberty, and run kicking about so, that it is absolutely necessary to get out of their way. Wherefore from this infinite license these things result, that the minds of the citizens become so scornful and impatient, that if the least power of government is exercised, they become exasperated and will not endure it; whence they come to despise every kind of law, that they may be without the least restraint whatever.”
XLIV. “You have,” said Lælius, “precisely expressed Plato’s sentiments.”
S. Returning therefore to the subject of my discourse. “It is from this very license,” he says, “which they deem to be liberty itself, that a tyrantsprings up as a sapling from a root. For as the destruction of the better class arises from their overweening power, so this excess of liberty, effects the slavery of this free people. Thus all extremes of an agreeable nature, whether in the seasons, or in the fertility of the fields, or in our natural feelings, are often converted into their opposites. Especially it occurs in public affairs, where excess of liberty degenerates into public and individual slavery. Out of such licentious freedom a tyrant arises, and the most unjust and severe bondage. For by a people so untameable, or rather so outrageous, some leader is chosen out of the multitude, in opposition to the better class, now persecuted and driven from their offices: bold and dishonest, perversely persecuting those who have frequently deserved well of their country, and gratifying the people from his own means and from those of others. To whom, that he may be freed from all apprehensions on account of his private condition, authority is given and continued to him. Surrounded too by guards, as was the case with Pisistratus at Athens, at length he becomes the tyrant of the very citizens who brought him forward. Who, if he is subdued by the good, as often happens, the state is regenerated. If by the bad, then a faction is established, another kind of tyranny. The same state of things too frequently occurs in that goodly form of government of the better class, when the vices of the chiefs have caused them to deviate from their integrity. Thus do they snatch the government of the commonwealth from each other like a ball—tyrants from kings—chiefs or the people fromtyrants; and factions or tyrants from them, nor does the same mode of government ever last a long time.
XLV. These things being so, the regal form of government is in my opinion much to be preferred of those three kinds. Nevertheless one which shall be well tempered and balanced out of all those three kinds of government, is better than that; yet there should be always something royal and pre-eminent in a government, at the same time that some power should be placed in the hands of the better class, and other things reserved for the judgment and will of the multitude. Now we are struck first with the great equability of such a constitution, without which a people cannot be free long; next with its stability. The three other kinds of government easily fall into the contrary extremes: as a master grows out of a king; factions from the better class; and mobs and confusion from the people. The changes too are perpetual which are taking place. This cannot well happen in such a combined and moderately balanced government, unless by the great vices of the chief persons. For there is no cause for change, where every one is firmly placed in his proper station, and never gives way, whatever may fall down or be displaced.
XLVI. But I am afraid, Lælius, and you too my very discreet and respected friends, if I continue long in this strain, my discourse will appear more like that of a master or teacher to you, than as a conversation with you. Wherefore I will speak of matters known to us all, and which we have all inquired into long ago. For I am convinced, and believe, and declare, that no kindof government, either in the constitution, the planning, or the practice, is to be compared with that which our fathers have left to us, and which was adopted by our ancestors. Which if you please, since you have been desirous that I should repeat things known to yourselves, I will shew not only what it is, but that it is the best. And with our own government in view, I will if I can, have a reference to it, in whatever I may say respecting the best form of government. The which if I can follow up and effect, I shall, as I think, amply fulfil the task which Lælius has imposed on me.
XLVII. “It is your task indeed, Scipio,” said Lælius, “most truly yours. For who in preference to yourself may speak of the institutions of our forefathers; you being sprung from such illustrious ancestors; or of the best form of government. The which if we now possess it, would hardly be so, if any one stood in a more conspicuous situation than yourself. Or who may venture to advise measures for posterity, when thou, having delivered the city from its greatest terrors, hast foreseen for the latest times?”
CICERO’S REPUBLIC.
CICERO’S REPUBLIC.
CICERO’S REPUBLIC.
CICERO’S REPUBLIC.