EXERCISE XVI.Hasty Expedients.
I.T., 93 (iii.), directs the training of the section to include rough and ready expedients so as to form a fighting front in any direction. This training is of great value, both from a disciplinary point of view, as it makes men quick to move on an order, and also from the point of view ofmoral, as men accustomed to get sudden and unexpected orders given under imaginary circumstances will be more likely to keep cool, when such orders are necessitated by the stress of actual battle, than men who have always been trained in a deliberate fashion.
Such sudden orders must in general mean one of two things, either that the enemy has got you, or you have got him, “on the hop,” if I may introduce an expression from the cricket field, and that there is every chance of the bowler, whoever he is, being badly scored off, unless he treats the batsman to something more difficult than the expensive half-volley. If you are fortunately able to find the enemy at a disadvantage, you will actagainst him by rifle fire alone; but, on the other hand, you may find yourself caught in a bad situation, by either artillery or rifle fire, or possibly by cavalry, who mean to use the steel. It follows then, in practising expedients, based, as they should be, on some possible situation, that you should make the central idea either offensive, as if attempting to bring your men into a position to get the best results from their fire, or defensive, as if to escape, or mitigate shell fire or rifle fire, to which you are subjected under adverse conditions.
Against artillery fire from ranges or in positions at which you cannot reply effectively with rifle fire, your action at first, at all events, must be purely defensive, i.e., all you can do, will be to escape being overwhelmed by the shell fire, and even at effective rifle range, the shields of modern field guns, enable them to engage infantry on very equal terms, so long as the infantry is in front, or not far on a flank, of the line of guns.
In the days of muzzle-loaders, it was the cavalry who possessed the power of suddenly annihilating infantry, when caught unprepared to withstand their charge. The magazine rifle has reduced this danger, but the quick-firing cannon has now equal, if not greater, powers ofdealing out swift destruction to any infantry that it finds exposed in close formation, if only the range be known. At least once in the Russo-Japanese War, and again in the Turko-Bulgarian war, if we may believe the somewhat ill-authenticated reports yet to hand, have artillery wiped out of existence in a few moments several hundred unfortunate infantrymen, who were caught in therafâlefired at a range either ascertained previously, or got at the moment by good luck or good judgment. The contingency of being thus caught by artillery is evidently one that should be prepared for by infantry, as was the forming of squares in the old days, when a cavalry charge was an ever present peril. In this case of artillery fire, the conditions and the object desired are practically always the same—the infantry is in close order of some sort, and wishes to break up into a congeries of small groups, so as to isolate the effect of the burst of each shrapnel. The matter of rifle fire is different, as there are any number of ways in which you may seek either to escape the results of the enemy’s fire or attempt to use your own, and this is the proper field in which to practise expedients.
Whenever you intend to carry out some such movement to meet a supposed situation, you must let the men know exactlywhat you are picturing, so that they also may understand what is needed. The essence of these practices is that they should be performed without time for deliberate thought—the men must learn to think and act quickly. The most satisfactory way is to be yourself mounted, as you can then get the whole company to hear you at once, whereas, if on foot, the men who are farthest from you often lose the first part of what you say; you then have to repeat it, and the thing loses its character of surprise for the rest, who have already heard it once. Give out the situation in a loud voice, and in as few words as possible, then try and give the very order you think you would give, if the situation was a real one on service; use your own imagination, in figuring what you would say, and how you would say it. To call attention, it seems legitimate to use your whistle, as on service the men would have some warning that things were about to happen, either by the arrival of shell or bullets, the sight of the enemy, or by the signal of their own scouts. In giving the situation, if you are receiving fire, give out what kind of fire it is, the enemy’s position, if it is allowable to suppose it known, or if you are going to be on the offensive, give out where the enemy is, and what he is doing, and how you learn this, i.e., by yourscouts, or by first-hand observation. For example, while the company is marching in fours along a road, you see, in imagination, two shells burst simultaneously near by, and about two hundred yards from each other, and you wisely deduce that the enemy is ranging on your company. Blow your whistle and give out “Artillery fire is opening on the company, from such and such a direction—open out to columns of sections.” If you have taught your men what to do to escape artillery fire, they will open out at the double into columns of platoons, at not less than fifty yards interval, measuring roughly at right angles to the direction of the supposed fire (I.T., 118 (3)).
In practising this opening out under artillery fire, which, as I have said, is the one specific hasty manœuvre performed under conditions nearly always similar, it is inexpedient to lay down any fixed rules for the positions to be taken up by the platoons. It sounds simple to say that the platoons of the leading half-company go to the right, and those of the rear half to the left, but when men are marching at ease, and shells begin bursting round them unexpectedly, I do not think there will be time for anyone to see which half-company is leading. The main thing is to get the platoons instantly awayfrom the road on which the enemy has laid his guns, and from each other. Direct platoon commanders to lead their men at the double in any direction away from the platoon in front, except, of course, towards the rear. In theory, of course, this might result in all four making out towards one flank, but, even so, this is better than having any deliberative halts on the road, and in practice the platoons in rear can see which way those in front are heading, and wheel to go to the other flank. There is no advantage to be had from getting the men in the ranks into extended order, as the shrapnel scatter the whole width of their bursting zone in an impartial manner, nor is it any use to seek such slight cover as gives only a screen from view, unless with a view to getting away from the shell-swept locality without attracting notice. Platoon commanders should, of course, make for any cover that is sufficiently steep on the rear side to shelter them from the downward dropping shrapnel bullets. If there is no cover, the best thing after getting out into the line of platoons separated by fully fifty yards intervals, is to move rapidly forward. If cover exists with open ground round it, the men may be got away by “dribbling” man by man, in the hope that the enemy may not spot the movement, and continue or resume his shell practice, to defeat it.
As regards expedients against rifle fire, I will only suggest a few, and leave you to invent others suited to the nature of the ground you have got to exercise on.
1. The company in close order is surprised by a heavy rifle fire; there is cover near by sufficient to hold the whole company crowded together. Order the men to get into the cover helter skelter, and then advance or retire, by the successive movement of platoons or sections, who take extended order at their best speed as they emerge from shelter. If facilities exist, tell one or two platoons to reply to the fire, from the cover, till their own turn comes to move, by which time the first lots that went out should have got into position to open fire.2. The company in close order is again surprised by rifle fire, but there is no cover near to act as a base. Get the company quickly into extended order, and let men reply to the fire as soon as they have extended, using studiously slow fire.3. The company or platoons in extended order have to change front to meet an attack from a flank. As in the book, call on them toline a hedge or ditch, facing so as to fire in the new direction.4. Coming through a gap in a hedge or wall, either in advance or retreat, scattering off right and left, so as to get out of the way of fire concentrated on the gap.5. The scouts from a position some distance from the company report a body of the enemy unaware of their presence and exposed to fire. Bring the company quickly up to the scouts’ position, halt, load, and adjust sights under cover and just short of the firing position, and on your whistle the men advance at once to the edge of the fire position and surprise the enemy by a simultaneous fire from all the rifles.6. Taking up quickly an all-round defensive position; the platoons or sections go off and find the best positions in different directions which you merely indicate roughly.7. Hastily organised attacks, to dislodge an enemy unexpectedly found in occupation of a position, also taking up action as flank and rearguards under fire.
1. The company in close order is surprised by a heavy rifle fire; there is cover near by sufficient to hold the whole company crowded together. Order the men to get into the cover helter skelter, and then advance or retire, by the successive movement of platoons or sections, who take extended order at their best speed as they emerge from shelter. If facilities exist, tell one or two platoons to reply to the fire, from the cover, till their own turn comes to move, by which time the first lots that went out should have got into position to open fire.
2. The company in close order is again surprised by rifle fire, but there is no cover near to act as a base. Get the company quickly into extended order, and let men reply to the fire as soon as they have extended, using studiously slow fire.
3. The company or platoons in extended order have to change front to meet an attack from a flank. As in the book, call on them toline a hedge or ditch, facing so as to fire in the new direction.
4. Coming through a gap in a hedge or wall, either in advance or retreat, scattering off right and left, so as to get out of the way of fire concentrated on the gap.
5. The scouts from a position some distance from the company report a body of the enemy unaware of their presence and exposed to fire. Bring the company quickly up to the scouts’ position, halt, load, and adjust sights under cover and just short of the firing position, and on your whistle the men advance at once to the edge of the fire position and surprise the enemy by a simultaneous fire from all the rifles.
6. Taking up quickly an all-round defensive position; the platoons or sections go off and find the best positions in different directions which you merely indicate roughly.
7. Hastily organised attacks, to dislodge an enemy unexpectedly found in occupation of a position, also taking up action as flank and rearguards under fire.