THE TRIAL.

The first day’s proceedings began with the entrance of the presiding judge, M. Delegorgue, the other members of the court being Councillors Lault and Bousquet. Attorney-General Van Cassel appeared for the prosecution, M. Fernand Labori for M. Zola, and M. Albert Clemenceau, assisted by his brother, M. Georges Clemenceau, for M. Perrenx, thegérantof “L’Aurore.” The court-room of the assize court of the Seine was crowded to its utmost capacity; wherefore the judge, on taking his seat, addressed those present as follows:

“I notify the public that we shall not begin until all are seated. I likewise warn the public that every sort of manifestation, whether for or against the accused, is formally forbidden, and that at the first sign of disorder I shall order the court-room cleared. Please consider this said once for all, for I shall not repeat it.”

The usual dialogue then ensued between the judge and M. Zola.

“Your name?”

“Emile Zola.”

“Your profession?”

“Man of letters.”

“Your age?”

“Fifty-eight years.”

“Your residence?”

“21bis, Rue de Bruxelles.”

The drawing of the jury was then proceeded with. Three challenges were used by the prosecution, and seven by the defence, the jurors finally selected being as follows:

Foreman, Auguste Dutrieux, merchant; Auguste Leblond, roof-builder; Pierre Emery, merchant; Bernier, molder in copper; Edouard Gressin, clerk; Bouvier, proprietor; Albert Chevanier, wine merchant; Nigon, leather-dresser; Charles Fouquet, seedsman; Joseph Moureire, wire-drawer; Charles Huet, market-gardener; Brunot, linen-draper. Supplementary jurors: Antoine Jourde, tradesman; Alfred Boucreux, butcher.

Then began the reading of the documents in the case by the clerk, the only one of interest being the complaint of Gen. Billot. Referring to M. Zola’s letter, the complainant declared:

This article contains a series of insults and slanders directed against two ministers of war, general officers, and army officers of all grades under their orders. Chiefs and subordinates are above such outrages, and the opinion of parliament, of the country, and of the army has already placed them beyond reach of attack. Though the minister of war does not consider it his duty to lodge a complaint for the persons above referred to, any more than for the council of war which rendered the verdict of 1894, the authority of which must remain intact, we cannot admit any suspicion of the independence of military justice or any accusation that it rendered on January 11 in obedience to orders an iniquitous sentence and committed a judicial error in knowingly acquitting a guilty man. Consequently I have the honor to lodge a complaint against thegérantof “L’Aurore” and M. Emile Zola on account of the defamation directed against the first council of war of the military government of Paris, which at its sessions of January 10 and 11, 1898, declared the acquittal of Major Esterhazy.

After the reading of the documents, Attorney-General Van Cassel took the floor to make what he described as “a statement of the case,” speaking as follows:

“The minister of war has taken notice, in his complaint, of the imputation cast by M. Emile Zola upon the first council of war of having acquitted Major Esterhazy in obedience to orders. The summons could not go beyond the terms of the complaint. It is natural that every complainant should circumscribe the grievances for which hedemands reparation. Otherwise it would be too easy for the accused to turn the discussion from its proper course, and create a diversion for the audience, which is the great art in the assize court. A single question is submitted to you, gentlemen of the jury:Did the first council of war act in obedience to orders in acquitting Major Esterhazy?The other imputation contained in M. Zola’s article the minister of war holds in contempt. Nevertheless the accused assert the right to discuss all the allegations contained in the article. Their avowed plan is to make you judges of the legality of the sentence passed upon Dreyfus. We shall not permit it. I warn them that any attempt on their part to provoke a sort of indirect revision of the Dreyfus case would be illegal and futile. No one has a right to indirectly call in question the thing judged. Our legislation, in its desire to avoid judicial error, has laid down rules for revision. These rules were broadened by the law of 1895. This law was passed prior to the trial of Dreyfus. Why have the accused not availed themselves of it? Why have they not attempted revision by the legal methods? They have not done so. They have tried to secure the conviction of a second officer on account of the crime of which Dreyfus was convicted. They have failed in their undertaking. Since then no new fact has been produced; no unknown document of such a nature as to establish the innocence of the condemned has been revealed to justice. In the absence of material wherewith to secure a legal revision, they wish—I use the words of M. Emile Zola—to provoke a revolutionary revision. The court will not lend itself to this manœuvre. Respect for the thing judged requires that the discussion be circumscribed to the single matter of which the minister of war takes notice in his complaint. Therefore no evidence can be admitted here except such as tends to prove the charges relating to the pretended iniquity committed in obedience to orders in 1898 by the military judges of Major Esterhazy. Accusations foreign to this special matter must remain outside of the discussion. I ask, then, that the accused may not be authorized to attempt proof thereof, either by documents or by testimony. The charges preferred by them against the officers, the witnesses, the experts, the members of the council of war of 1894, which convicted Dreyfus, have no connection with the defamation of the council of war of 1898.”

To this contention M. Labori made the following reply:

“I am not much astonished, gentlemen, at the difficultieswhich M. Zola meets in this affair, and I expect that this incident, which is the first, will not be the last. We expected that they would offer to you and impose upon us a restricted discussion. Such was the desire of the minister of war, and it was his right. It will be ours, at a certain moment, to ask what could have been the underlying reasons for the exercise of this right under the circumstances in which the minister of war has made use of it. However that may be, it was his right, and I do not deny it. But, gentlemen, I do not believe that the form of the complaint within which he confines himself involves the consequences which he has hoped for.”

Reading then all the charges made at the end of M. Zola’s letter, M. Labori continued:

“You know, gentlemen, what was the reply. It began on the day when, after five days and five nights of deliberation and uncertainty, the minister of war preferred this complaint, the bearing of which you now know, and it continues today in the motions which the attorney-general now makes in the name of the complainant and in his own name. Do you think that that is going to strangle the discussion? Absurd! It is as if one should place himself in the middle of a torrent to prevent it from flowing. The discussion is open. If they wanted to stifle it, they need not have prosecuted either Perrenx or Zola. They had the right to refrain; and, in fact, public opinion, to which, gentlemen, I shall speak,—public opinion, which is not enlightened, and which, admirable in generosity and in faith, but blind, most faithfully supports the ruling powers,—public opinion perhaps would have given its sanction to such a course. But they have chosen to prosecute M. Zola. Being accused, he will defend himself. Are they, then, serious when they say to us today that the three paragraphs cited from this letter of two thousand lines have nothing to do with the intention of M. Zola on the one hand, or, on the other, with the article as a whole and the other charges contained in it? Can the court accept that? Between the three matters taken notice of by the minister of war and the sum total of the matters which I have read to the court there is a connection not only close, but indivisible. In the first place, gentlemen, Major Esterhazy was prosecuted for the same crime of treason for which Captain Dreyfus had been prosecuted. The document of the trial was thebordereau; thebordereauconcerning which the first experts testified; thebordereauconcerning which, at the second trial, experts testified again. And it isnot strange to read that the experts of both trials, not being the same, feel no desire to meet at this bar in contradiction of each other in a discussion where the light is to be complete. But it is certain that the document in question, and which was the object of discussion in the Esterhazy trial and in the Dreyfus trial, is thebordereau. The two crimes were the same. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had denounced Major Esterhazy. If Major Esterhazy had been condemned, the setting aside of the verdict against Captain Dreyfus would have followed as a matter of necessity. Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The question remains open, and we are to deal with it. The question takes the form of a dilemma. Either we are to be prevented from offering any proof, and in that case we shall see; or, on the contrary, we are to be permitted to examine the situation of Captain Dreyfus as well as that of Major Esterhazy, since both are closely connected, and it would not be possible for us to prove here the guilt of Major Esterhazy and his acquittal in obedience to orders, if we had not the right to prove at the same time the innocence of Captain Dreyfus. To say nothing of the fact, gentlemen, that the minister of war, in drawing up his complaint, perhaps not perceiving this dangerous detail, allowed a little paragraph to slip in, in which it was said that the second council of war covered the illegality to which the first had committed itself. Now, gentlemen, how are we to demonstrate that they have covered an illegality, unless we are allowed to demonstrate first that an illegality has been committed? Unless, indeed, they mean—and I confess that that would seem to me a really curious preliminary to this discussion—to acknowledge that the illegality has been committed, and that it is recognized in the face of France and the civilized world. If not, then on this point as on others we must be permitted the opportunity of proof. You know, gentlemen, what the authorities say. It is a matter of doctrine and of law that, outside of the matters set forth in the summons, it is permissible to prove matters connected with them by close and indivisible ties. I have shown you that the matters which it is our right to prove are closely bound up with the other matters of which we likewise offer proof. It remains only to say a single word in answer to a last objection of the attorney-general,—the thing judged. The thing judged! What will be left of it, gentlemen, if we succeed in showing that it has been irregularly and illegally judged, this thing, in which public opinion has such faith that it considers as public malefactors thosewho dream for a second of doubting it, even though they have declared that they are ready to furnish the proof? Citizens respect this thing judged. It is their right and their duty to respect it. But only, I repeat, because they believe it to have been regularly and legally judged. Where there is no right, there is no legality, no justice, no thing judged, Mr. Attorney-General, and let us say no more of exceptions.”

In reinforcement of the position of M. Labori, M. Albert Clemenceau then addressed the court:

“I wish to speak simply of two points made by the attorney-general. He has told us that his hands are tied by the minister of war, that he is unable to broaden the discussion, and that it must take the form that the minister of war desires. We suspected it, but I believe that it will be interesting to the jury to know that, if he had desired a general discussion, the minister of war perhaps would have done as all French citizens do when they believe themselves injured,—namely, would have lodged a complaint with the attorney-general. The attorney-general is supposed to know something about law. He would have read M. Zola’s article, and it is probable that he would have had us indicted on grounds much more numerous than those which this complaint specifically alleges. So much for the first point. The second is this. The attorney-general, who knows the meaning of words, began his observations by saying: ‘Gentlemen, I am going to make a statement of the case’; but he made an argument, and he finished in a way of which the jury had had no warning, asking the court to limit the discussion which we desire to carry on at this bar.”

M. Labori then submitted a formal motion that the court authorize the introduction of evidence on all the matters referred to in M. Zola’s letter.

Before the court had passed upon this motion, the three experts in handwriting, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard, intervened through their counsel, M. Cabanes, asking that, in view of the fact that they had prosecuted M. Zola and “L’Aurore” in the police courts, no introduction of their names into the case now on trial should be permitted.

The Judge.—“The purpose of this motion is to enable the experts, in case it is granted, to prosecute M. Zola in the assize court for outrages upon witnesses because of their testimony before the council of war.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We accept any discussion before the assize court.”

M. Labori.—“If that is the motive of the intervention of the experts, I ask the court to suspend judgment on the motion, until that point in the discussion is reached which concerns the experts and their testimony. And, if it is a matter of reserving to these gentlemen a special right, which will end, I imagine, in one facility more for the production of the explanations that we have to furnish, we can only congratulate ourselves in so far as we are concerned. I speak in the name of M. Zola and M. Perrenx.”

M. Zola.—“Complete light!”

M. Clemenceau.—“Whatever motions may be made in this court, and from whatsoever persons they may come, if their object is to bring about a public discussion in the assize court, we second them. In fact, I do not care even to know whether these motions are well founded in law; you warn us that their tendency would be to bring us here again on another charge; we accept every sort of discussion before the assize court.”

Without passing upon the motion of M. Cabanes, the court then rendered an adverse decision on M. Labori’s motion for the introduction of evidence concerning all the charges preferred by M. Zola, claiming that they were not indivisibly connected with the matter on trial.

The time having arrived for the calling of the witnesses, the court announced that it had received letters from several of them, in explanation of their absence.

The Judge.—“I have a letter from the keeper of the seals, saying that the minister of war, General Billot, has not been authorized to respond to the summons. M. Labori and M. Clemenceau, do you forego this witness’s evidence?”

M. Labori.—“In regard to him we make a reservation.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from General Gonse. He asks to be heard among the first, because of his service.”

M. Labori.—“We shall be able to hear General Gonse among the first. It was our intention to do so. But, in spite of our great desire to hear him, we cannot take his personal convenience into consideration.”

The Attorney-General.—“Nor his service?”

M. Labori.—“Nor his service.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Major d’Ormescheville, declaring that, having been the reporter for the council of war, he does not believe it his duty to respond to the summons.”

M. Labori.—“I make a reservation, as in the case of General Billot.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Gibert, cited as a witness by M. Zola. ‘I have left Havre, and have retired to.... In view of the gravity of my condition, it is impossible for me to come to testify in person, and I have just sent what I have to say to M. Labori.’”

M. Labori.—“I have not yet received it.”

The Judge.—“Then you make a reservation?”

M. Labori.—“Yes.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Casimir-Perier, in which he says: ‘I am unable to enlighten justice on any matter that has occurred since my resignation of the presidency of the republic. I add that, if I were questioned concerning matters which occurred when I held the presidency, personal responsibilities would impose silence upon me. Out of deference for the court, I am ready to appear before it, if it deems it necessary that I repeat this declaration verbally.’”

M. Labori.—“I make a reservation in regard to M. Casimir-Perier.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. He says: ‘In the Dreyfus case I performed the functions of an officer of judicial police. My only part in the Esterhazy trial was to testify behind closed doors, and in the matter of this testimony I am bound to professional secrecy. Under these circumstances I have the honor to pray you to excuse me from appearing in court, where I should be unable to furnish any information concerning the matters mentioned in the summons.’”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola and M. Perrenx deem Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam a witness of the highest importance, not only in matters relating to the Dreyfus trial, but in matters relating to the Esterhazy trial. Furthermore, the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is necessary, because it bears upon the good faith of the accused, for, if certain information that has come to M. Zola, and the production of which he will call for before this court, is to be believed, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam has been mixed up in matters which concerned Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, certain of which are very curious. Furthermore, a complaint has been lodged against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, the consideration of which has been entrusted to Examining Magistrate Bertulus. For all these reasons the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is indispensable. We cannot produce here certain evidence that concerns him, unless he is called to explain himself in person.And under these circumstances I believe it my duty to make formal motion that all legal means be employed to make Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam come here and testify concerning his relations with the de Comminges family, concerning the scene with the mysterious lady in 1892, and concerning the telegrams signed ‘Speranza’ and ‘Blanche,’ addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart at Tunis.”

The Attorney-General.—“M. du Paty de Clam declares in his letter, like all the members of the council of war, the hearing of whom has been abandoned because it was evident that it could not be exacted, that professional secrecy prevents him from giving any information whatever. Consequently there is no reason for rejecting his excuse. But M. Labori points out that Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam was interested as a witness in an examination not yet finished, but opened on the complaint of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The reply to this is manifest and direct. There can be no confusion here between M. Zola and thegérantof ‘L’Aurore’ on the one hand, and Colonel Picquart on the other. The latter has lodged a complaint which is being regularly examined, and it is for him alone to intervene if he sees fit. But his proceeding is the proceeding of a third party, so far as these defendants are concerned. From no point of view, then, do the arguments that have just been presented seem to me well founded.”

M. Labori.—“Will the court permit me to indicate the matters concerning which M. Zola desires to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, and the connection between them and the verdict of January 11? In 1892 Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, who had not then risen to his present office, was in very close relations with the de Comminges family, whose society Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart also frequented. Mlle. Blanche de Comminges and her brother, Captain de Comminges, have been summoned here as witnesses.”

The Judge.—“I regret to inform you that Mlle. de Comminges is sick, and that she has sent a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Labori.—“We hope that she will be well again within forty-eight hours. There are many sick people in this case. We shall have something to say concerning the things that are happening in this matter to prevent witnesses from coming, and we shall expose all intimidations and threats. Mlle. de Comminges knew Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart and Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. At the beginning ofthe campaign in relation to Major Esterhazy, Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart received at Tunis two singular dispatches. One of them read: ‘All is discovered. Speranza.’ The court will remember that this is a signature which has been met already in the Esterhazy trial. The other dispatch said in substance: ‘It is known that Georges (that is the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart) is the author of the telegram. All is discovered. Blanche.’ By Blanche was meant Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, and that this was understood by the military authorities is proved by the fact that they demanded of Mlle. Blanche de Comminges certain specimens of her handwriting. She protested, and lodged a complaint, as did Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. These dispatches, then, were forgeries. It would be interesting to find out who the forgers are. Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart attributes one of them to the police agent, Souffrain, and we have summoned him. We hope that he will come, and then we shall have an explanation. As for the other telegram, we are curious to know how there could have started from certain circles which must be in touch either with the minister of war or with Major Esterhazy a dispatch signed Blanche which Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart was expected to consider as coming from Mlle. Blanche de Comminges. We should like to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam concerning these matters, and others of an earlier date in which he has been mixed up, and which relate exclusively and very closely to Major Esterhazy. They happened in 1892, and we shall have need also of the testimony of Mlle. de Comminges on the same subject.”

The Judge.—“There is no question here of Mlle. de Comminges. The question is of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam.”

M. Labori.—“But it is Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam whom these matters concern. He was induced at a certain moment, on the intervention of one of his most eminent superiors, General Davout, to restore to the de Comminges family certain correspondence. I cannot be more precise on this point, and the court understands why; but the matter is in the hands of the prefect of police. One day Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam said that a certain letter belonging to this correspondence was not in his hands, and that he could not give it up directly, because it had fallen into the hands of a woman, but that it was not very difficult to see her, and that the only thing necessary was to hand her a 500-franc bill in exchange for the letter. Then,it seems, on the demand of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, a meeting was appointed at thecours la Reine, at the very spot to which came the singular veiled lady of Major Esterhazy. There, in the presence of witnesses, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam entered into conversation with the veiled lady, with whom he remained a long time, and to whom he pretended to have given a 500-franc bill, which, however, no one had sent to him. Then he brought back the letter to transmit it anew to the de Comminges family. These are facts concerning which I can say nothing more, in presence of the interested parties. I can furnish only indications.”

The Judge.—“But I do not see the relation between what you have just said and the matter for which your client is prosecuted.”

M. Labori.—“You shall see. M. Zola does not hesitate to think that the veiled lady, far from being in relations with Colonel Picquart, as they have not feared to state in official reports, and as Major Esterhazy loudly and audaciously charges, belongs to the circle of certain members of the staff, or to the circle of Major Esterhazy himself. Now, concerning this veiled lady we shall have to have explanations. For how can you expect us to prove that a guilty man has been acquitted in obedience to orders, if we do not begin by proving that he is guilty, and by establishing consequently the various circumstances which could culminate in his guilt? Under these circumstances it is for us to examine in detail, in order to get complete light, points that in no way concern the national defence, which has been abused. It is our indisputable right to seek light on Major Esterhazy’s means of defence, which have been welcomed in another place with a facility that they will not meet at the hands of this jury.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“At the trial of Major Esterhazy, and in the course of his examination, reference was made to the veiled lady, and this mysterious person was taken so seriously that the president of the council of war asked the accused if he could not give some indications concerning this lady, who had given him the mysterious rendezvous. I conclude therefrom that in the Esterhazy trial, with which we are necessarily concerned, the veiled lady was in question, and that therefore all that concerns her is well within our case. Again, Major du Paty de Clam, in his letter, says that he cannot come here to testify, because he was a judicial officer of police in the first examination. The court perhapsremembers that in this very place, in the case known as the Prado case, they heard Examining Magistrate Guillot, who came to testify concerning facts that took place in his private office. The presiding judge was a Paris magistrate. Now, what was done in the Prado case can be done in this case, and I do not see that the fact that Major du Paty de Clam played a part in another inquiry is a reason why we should not hear him here.”

M. Labori.—“Another thing. This is the first time that I have known witnesses to be judged according to the utility of their evidence. M. du Paty de Clam is not sick, nor is he detained, so far as I know, by the duties of his military office. He does not know upon what points he is to be examined, or what we shall ask him. It is his duty to appear in this case. We have to question him as well on matters of fact as on matters of morals pertaining exclusively to the Esterhazy case, and not at all to the Dreyfus case. Under these circumstances it is indispensable that M. du Paty de Clam should appear at this bar. If we question him upon points in regard to which he can take shelter behind professional secrecy, he will take such shelter, and will not answer. And even then it will be our right to make a motion before the court, asking whether, as a matter of law, M. du Paty de Clam can cut himself off behind professional secrecy. M. du Paty de Clam refers to closed doors. Well, if closed doors are necessary in this assize court, we will have them. With a jury, closed doors have no terrors for us. But we shall ask no questions concerning the national defence. None are involved in this affair.”

M. Zola.—“None.”

M. Labori.—“They have put forward the plea of the nation’s defence. But that is a jest.”

The Attorney-General.—“The defence of the nation a jest?”

M. Labori.—“Ah! really, that is not worthy of you, Mr. Attorney-General. I do not accept that. No, no! I will suffer no one, not even you, to suspect my patriotism. No! I repeat, gentlemen of the jury, if there is any question here that concerns the national defence, we shall not approach it. If closed doors are necessary, let the doors be closed; we are willing. But we will not permit them to say, in placing us at the mercy of all calumnies and all insults, that we are paid men, when, in fact, in a trial like this, we are fighting a battle in which we risk our life and honor. We will allow no one to say that we are triflers, and that contempt is themost that we deserve. It will be seen later whether we deserve it.”

The Judge.—“I have a letter from Mme. de Boulancy in which she says: ‘I am kept in bed by an affection of the heart, which gives me much pain just now. I enclose the certificate of my doctor, M. de Basse, 4, Rue de Berlin. I beg to refer you to my evidence before M. Bertulus.’”

M. Labori.—“We must hear Mme. de Boulancy. She cannot lapse into a state of perpetual silence simply because she testified before M. Bertulus. From the standpoint of authenticity Major Esterhazy’s letters belong to this discussion. Major Esterhazy, realizing how terrible a blow the letter in which he styled himself a Uhlan would be to him, in spite of his numerous protectors, has denied its genuineness; now, it is genuine, it is, I declare it! And, if Mme. de Boulancy were here, we would prove it. In the presence of all these obstacles, I have the right, in the name of my client, who, I am sure, will approve me” ...

M. Zola.—“Certainly.”

M. Labori.—“... and it is my duty, to tell the whole. Mme. de Boulancy has other letters” ...

M. Zola.—“That is absolutely true.”

M. Labori.—“... which are authentic and still more serious. For weeks she has been the object of all sorts of threats. Major Esterhazy visits her house daily, with the support and protection of the police, who do not prevent him. And Major Esterhazy threatens her with death, if she gives up the letters. Mme. de Boulancy has also in her hands telegrams from Major Esterhazy of a later date, in which he begs her to give him the letters, and this is a fact known to more than one witness. For instance, there is M. Tysse. We shall be told directly that he will not come because, it seems, the Crédit Lyonnais threatens him with discharge if he comes, and promises to pay his fine if he does not come. We submit these facts to the jurors, and we ask them whether it is M. Zola, or the minister of war by his complaint and his limitations, who is creating in France a situation which, whatever may be said, is really revolutionary.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“It was not until this morning that Mme. de Boulancy became afflicted with heart trouble, but for two days we have known that she would not come, and that, in the fear that the court will send an expert physician to examine her, she will remain in bed all day. I must add that Mme. de Boulancy has informed the courtthat she lives in the Rue de Berlin. I beg the court to send either a doctor or a sheriff’s officer to that address. He will not find Mme. de Boulancy there.”

The Judge.—“She lives in the Boulevard des Batignolles, No. 22.”

M. Zola.—“She is not there either.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“You will not find Mme. de Boulancy at 22, Boulevard des Batignolles. I have the honor to offer a motion drawn up forty-eight hours ago, in which we foresaw that Mme. de Boulancy would be afflicted with heart trouble, and here, according to the terms of her letter, she is suffering with an affection of the heart. We were not mistaken.”

M. Clemenceau then offered a formal motion that, whereas Mme. de Boulancy had declared on several occasions that she possessed letters from Major Esterhazy no less insulting to the French army than those already known, and that she would produce them in the assize court, and whereas it was known to the defence that Mme. de Boulancy had recently received three dispatches from Major Esterhazy demanding a return of these letters, and threatening her with death if she should produce them in court, and whereas, because of these threats, Mme. de Boulancy had moved, concealing her new address, a physician be sent to examine her physical condition, and that a police officer be sent to seize the letters and dispatches referred to, wherever he might find them.

The Judge.—“M. Lebrun-Renault writes: ‘I am summoned only because of the special service that I performed January 5, 1895, at the parade in which Captain Dreyfus was disgraced. I can report what took place in the course of this service only to my hierarchical chiefs, and that is what I did. It is for them to make such use of my report as may seem to them proper. As for me, outside of them, I am bound to silence by my professional duty. Wherefore it is impossible for me to testify before the jurors. Under these circumstances I shall not respond.’”

M. Labori then offered a motion that, whereas there had been for some weeks a question in the press and at the tribune of the chamber of deputies of pretended confessions made by ex-Captain Dreyfus to Captain Lebrun-Renault on the day of the former’s degradation, the court order the hearing, first, of M. Lebrun-Renault, who will be asked to state whether he received the confession from Dreyfus and under what conditions, whether he reported the confessionofficially and under what circumstances, and whether he has spoken to various persons concerning them, and especially to M. Forzinetti, the baron de Vaux, M. P..., M. Fontbrune, and M. Dumont, and, second, of any other witness who can be usefully questioned concerning these matters.

The judge then read the following letter from Major Ravary:

My presence at the trial would be absolutely useless. I abstain, then, from appearing.Ravary.

My presence at the trial would be absolutely useless. I abstain, then, from appearing.

Ravary.

M. Labori.—“Major Ravary was the first to establish officially, in a report that has been read publicly, the existence of what is known as the secret documents in the Dreyfus case. This is a point wholly pertinent to the discussion, since M. Zola and his fellow-defendant are authorized to prove that an illegality was committed in 1894 and covered in 1898. Therefore it is indispensable that M. Ravary be heard, and I shall have the honor to make a motion to that effect.”

The Judge.—“I have received a letter from General Mercier, in which he says that the prosecution of M. Zola deals only with the Esterhazy verdict, with which he had nothing do. He says that he has received from General Billot an authorization not to appear.”

M. Labori.—“I am greatly surprised that General Mercier, like so many others, should constitute himself judge of the question whether it is incumbent upon him to appear before the court. The minister of war may confine his complaint within limits, but he has no right as complainant to pursue the shocking and monstrous course of interposing an obstacle, not juridical, but material to the facts that we wish to establish. General Mercier is a witness of the first importance. Perhaps he will read tomorrow in the newspapers what has occurred at this first hearing, which is given in the presence, not of fifteen hundred persons simply, but of all France. M. Zola declares that in 1894 General Mercier, then minister of war, constituting himself judge in a council of war, did, after the hearing was over, outside of the discussion, without the knowledge of the accused, without examination of the accused upon the matter, and without even submitting it to his counsel, communicate to the council of war a secret document, and a document, for that matter, of no significance. If that is not true, let General Mercier come here tomorrow and say so. If it is true, I have no further use for him.”

The judge then announced that Major Rivals and the court clerk, Vallecalle, had notified him that they would not appear.

M. Labori.—“The complainant is represented here by the attorney-general. We should like him to inform us whether the minister of war has given to all these witnesses, as to General Mercier, an authorization which to them would have been more than an authorization,—that is, an order. If the attorney-general does not know, I would like him to put the question to the minister of war between now and tomorrow, in order to give us an answer.”

M. Zola.—“In short, we should like to know whether these persons have received orders from Billot, or are acting on their own initiative.”

M. Labori.—“Have they been ordered not to come? If so, let it be stated frankly, and the court tomorrow will pass upon our motion, which possibly will ask for a postponement of the case, in order that it may be judged when we are in full possession of the facts.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“The president of the republic refused to sign the decree of the minister of justice summoning M. Billot; then M. Billot authorized General Mercier not to appear in the assize court. Knowing the beginning of the story, we are interested in knowing the sequel, and I ask the attorney-general to inform us at the next hearing if the other officers, of a lower grade than that of General Mercier, have likewise been authorized by their superiors not to appear in court. If so, I may be permitted to express my astonishment that there has not been found a person in all this hierarchy to understand that there is one thing which is above the minister of war,—namely, justice. We thought so until today.”

The court then presented the refusals of Colonel Maurel, president of the council of war of 1894, M. Autant, architect, and M. Eichmann, who sat in the first council of war; and the defence, as in the previous cases, insisted upon their appearance.

The Judge.—“A letter from General de Boisdeffre reads as follows: ‘I do not need to tell you that, out of respect to the jury and deference to the court, I would willingly appear, but I have been in no way connected with the Esterhazy case, which was conducted entirely by the military government of Paris. Outside of professional secrecy, therefore, I could furnish no useful information.’”

M. Labori.—“All these witnesses seem to imagine thatthey constitute a caste apart and independent, and that it is permissible to them to rise above the law, above justice itself, and personally constitute themselves judges of the question whether they are useful or not as witnesses in a trial. Consequently in the case of General de Boisdeffre, as in the other cases, we insist and we protest.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We are a little at sea. In the letters read, some witnesses declare that they will not come because they know certain facts, while others, like M. de Boisdeffre, declare that they will not come because they do not know any facts in this case. We do not know which of these two observations is sound, but it is impossible for both of them to be. It is interesting also to the jurors to know that former cabinet ministers, who are by no means the first comers, MM. Guérin and Trarieux, former keepers of the seals, and M. Raymond Poincaré, former minister of finance, have responded to the summons. It is certain that they would have had nothing to fear, if they had written to the court that they could not come. These former cabinet ministers come; yet among the military officers we cannot get a single witness. I believe it is well for the jurors to remember that.”

The court announcing that ex-President Casimir-Perier would appear, the defence withdrew its motion for his further summons. But M. Labori then offered a formal motion that MM. d’Ormescheville, Ravary, General Mercier, Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Autant, Eichmann, de Boisdeffre, and Captain de Comminges be forcibly constrained to appear. And he submitted a further motion that Mlle. Blanche de Comminges be constrained to appear, unless it should be found that her illness was genuine, and that, in the latter case, a commission should be appointed to visit her and ask her the following questions:

(1) Is she aware that her name has been used in writing to Colonel Picquart?(2) How did she become aware of it?(3) Did she not give the nickname “demigod” to Captain Lallement?(4) Does she know whether this name was used in a telegram which is said to have been a forgery?(5) Had Colonel du Paty de Clam any reason for entertaining a revengeful feeling toward her and her family?(6) Is it not within her knowledge that he resorted in 1892 to very serious manœuvres, notably the employment of anonymous letters?(7) Was not this matter put in the hands of M. Lozé, prefect of police, and did not General D—— have to intervene?(8) Did not Colonel du Paty de Clam arrange, for the restitution of a letter, a scene that took place atcours la Reine, in which a veiled lady appeared?

(1) Is she aware that her name has been used in writing to Colonel Picquart?

(2) How did she become aware of it?

(3) Did she not give the nickname “demigod” to Captain Lallement?

(4) Does she know whether this name was used in a telegram which is said to have been a forgery?

(5) Had Colonel du Paty de Clam any reason for entertaining a revengeful feeling toward her and her family?

(6) Is it not within her knowledge that he resorted in 1892 to very serious manœuvres, notably the employment of anonymous letters?

(7) Was not this matter put in the hands of M. Lozé, prefect of police, and did not General D—— have to intervene?

(8) Did not Colonel du Paty de Clam arrange, for the restitution of a letter, a scene that took place atcours la Reine, in which a veiled lady appeared?

After hearing these motions, the court adjourned for the day.

The second day’s hearing began at half past twelve with the announcement of the court that, before proceeding to the hearing of the witnesses, there were new excuses to be read. The first was from Major Esterhazy, who wrote as follows:

I have been accused by M. Mathieu Dreyfus of the crime of high treason, and my judges have acquitted me by a unanimous decree of the council of war. Today I receive, at the instance of a simple individual, M. Emile Zola, a summons to appear as a witness in his trial in the assize court. It is plain, on the other hand, that in this trial the object of M. Zola is at the same time to revise by a revolutionary method the decree of acquittal rendered in my favor, and to sully, by representing them as criminals, the judges whom I respect. Such is the work in which M. Emile Zola invites me to participate. Under such circumstances I consider that I am not obliged to respond to M. Zola’s summons.

M. Labori.—“Major Esterhazy was present yesterday. It does not become me to inquire what suggestions he obeys today. I have not consulted M. Emile Zola, but I can say this for myself: it was a feeling of high discretion that led us to summon Major Esterhazy. He will not be here as an accused person, since he has been acquitted, and we consider his case a thing judged. But we have a right to the testimony of Major Esterhazy for the purpose of proving M. Zola’s good faith. Major Esterhazy refuses. So be it. I do not insist. We will discuss hisrôlewithout him.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Pardon me. For my part, I do not give up his testimony. I have some questions to put to Major Esterhazy in the name of thegérantof ‘L’Aurore.’ I demand that he be summoned again, and, if need be, forced to come.”

The next letter was from a widow Chapelon, who declared herself afflicted with influenza.

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Mme. Chapelon appeared at the office of ‘L’Aurore’ a week ago; it was after she had been notified. She asked that her name be struck from the list of witnesses. She was asked why. She replied that she was soliciting for her son a scholarship at Chaptal, and that, if she were to testify, they would not give it to her. M. Perrenx informed her that this was not a good reason, and that she was required to come to the assize court and tell the truth. She went away, slamming the doors, and saying: ‘If you force me to come, I will tell the opposite of the truth.’ I insist that this witness shall come, and I demandthat, as in the case of Major Esterhazy, she be brought to court after a second summons.”

The Judge.—“There is a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Clemenceau.—“I ask that an expert physician be sent to her. The one who is to see Mme. de Boulancy can see her too.”

The court then rendered its decision on the motions of the day before, ordering that Dr. Socquet be sent to examine Mme. de Boulancy, Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, M. Autant, and the widow Chapelon, and that a second summons be served upon Captain Lebrun-Renault, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, Major d’Ormescheville, Major Ravary, General Mercier, MM. Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Eichmann, General de Boisdeffre, and Major Esterhazy, directing them to appear on February 9.

The calling of the witnesses was then begun, the first to take the stand being Mme. Lucie Dreyfus, wife of ex-Captain Dreyfus.

M. Labori.—“I would like Mme. Dreyfus to have the goodness to tell us what she thinks of M. Zola’s good faith, and in this connection to make known to us under what circumstances in 1894 she learned of her husband’s arrest, and what was the attitude at that time of Colonel du Paty de Clam, who was then only a major.”

The Judge.—“What has that to do with the case?”

M. Labori.—“It concerns M. Zola’s good faith.”

M. Zola.—“I ask to be allowed here the liberty that is accorded thieves and murderers. They can defend themselves, summon witnesses, and ask them questions; but every day I am insulted in the street; they break my carriage windows, they roll me in the mud, and an unclean press treats me as a bandit. I have the right to prove my good faith, my probity, my honor.”

The Judge.—“Do you know Article 52, of the law of 1881?”

M. Zola.—“I do not know the law, and at the present moment I do not want to know it. I appeal to the probity of the jurors. I make them judges of the situation in which I am placed, and I entrust myself to them.”

The Judge.—“I remind you of the terms of the decree rendered yesterday by the court, the provisions of Article 52 of the law of 1881, and the terms of your summons. Let us not depart therefrom. Any question outside of these limitswill not be put by me. Let that be well understood. It is useless to recur to the matter.”

M. Zola.—“I ask to be treated here as well as thieves and murderers. All accused persons are entitled to prove their probity, their good faith, and their honor.”

M. Labori.—“Will you permit me to point out the bearing of my questions? M. Zola has made two assertions. He has asserted that the council of war of 1894 convicted, in the person of ex-Captain Dreyfus, an innocent man by illegal methods.”

The Judge.—“He is not prosecuted for that.”

M. Labori.—“Pardon me, he is prosecuted for having said that the second council of war knowingly acquitted a guilty man by covering, in obedience to orders, the illegality committed by the first.”

M. Zola.—“It is in the summons.”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola asks to prove this illegality, and the elements out of which it grew, from the standpoint of his good faith. This illegality is not confined to the moment of the verdict of the council of war, but extends over the very period of inquiry in which occurred facts of the highest gravity which M. Zola asks to produce. If the court considers that Mme. Dreyfus can not be heard on this point, I shall be obliged to offer a motion.”

The Judge.—“Offer your motion. The question will not be put by me.”

M. Clemenceau.—“I ask to make a simple observation, addressed especially to the jurors. I am of the opinion that the law must be complied with, whatever it may be. But I beg you to remember, gentlemen of the jury, that M. Zola has written an article which fills sixteen pages of the pamphlet in my hands. Out of these sixteen pages the public prosecutor, at the order of the minister of war, complains of only fifteen lines, and, when we come to court, it transpires that, in spite of a judicious selection of fifteen lines from sixteen pages, the prosecution is still embarrassed by one of these fifteen lines. They tell us in these fifteen lines there are still six which must be put aside, because, were we to leave them there, embarrassing evidence would be put in.”

The Judge.—“I repeat that no question will be put which would be a means of arriving at the revision of a case sovereignly judged.”

M. Clemenceau.—“Then the court will put no question concerning good faith?”

The Judge.—“Concerning anything that relates to theDreyfus case. No. Offer your motions. I repeat that I will not put the question.”

M. Labori.—“Will you permit me,Monsieur le Président, in our common interest, to ask you, then, what practical means you see by which we may ascertain the truth?”

The Judge.—“That does not concern me.”

M. Labori then made a formal motion that, whereas the matters upon which the testimony of Mme. Dreyfus was required bore directly upon the matters expressly set out in the complaint, and especially upon the illegality charged, and whereas the defendants maintained, in spite of the court’s decree, the right to prove their good faith, and whereas the refusal to hear the witnesses summoned would constitute the highest violation of the defendants’ rights, the court order the following questions to be put to Mme. Dreyfus:

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