CHAPTERIV.Of the state and nature of reason, as it is in man; and how its perfection in matters of religion is to be known.THIS writer and others, who take to themselves the names offree-thinkers, make their court to the world, by pretending to vindicate the right that all men have, to judge and act accordingto their own reason. Though, I think, the world has no more to thank them for on this account, than if they had pretended to assert the right that every man has, to seeonlywith hisown eyes, or to hearonlywith hisown ears.For their own reason always did, does, and ever will, govern rational creatures, in every thing they determine, either in speculation or practice. It is not a matter ofdutyfor men to use their own reason, but ofnecessity: and it is as impossible to do otherwise, as for a being that cannot act but from choice, to act without choice.Man is under the same necessity of acting from his own choice, thatmatteris of not acting at all; and a being, whose principle of action is reason and choice, can no more act without it, or contrary to it, than an extended being can be without extension.All men therefore are equally reasonable in this respect, that they are, and must be, by anecessityof nature, equally directed and governed by their own reason and choice.* The dispute therefore betwixt Christians andunbelievers, concerning reason, is not, whether men are to use theirown reason, any more than whether they are to see with theirown eyes; but whether every man’s reason must needs guide him, by itsown light, or must cease to guide him, as soon as it guides him by a light borrowed from revelation? This is the true state of the question, not whether reason is to be followed, but when itisbestfollowed? Not whether it is to be our guide, but how it may be made oursafest guide?* Thefree-thinkers, therefore, rather appeal to the passions, than reason of the people, when they represent the clergy and Christianity as enemies to reason, and themselves as friends and advocates for the use of reason.* For Christians oppose unbelievers, not because theyreason, but because they reasonill. They receive revelation, not to suppress the natural power, but to give new and heavenly light to their reason; not to take away their right of judging for themselves, but to secure them from false judgments.Christians therefore do not differ from unbelievers in theconstant useof their reason, but in themannerof using it: asvirtuousmen differ fromrakes, not in their desire of happiness, but in their manner of seeking it.It appears from what has been said, that every man’s own reason is his only principle of action, and that he must judge according to it, whether he receives, or rejects revelation.Now although every man is to judge according to the light of his own reason, yet his reason has very little light that can be called its own. For, as we derive our nature from our parents, so that which we generally callnatural knowledge, or the light of nature, is a knowledge and light that is made natural to us, by the same authority,which makes a certain language, certain customs, and modes of behaviour, natural to us.Nothing seems to be our own, but a bare capacity to be instructed, a nature fitted for any impressions; as liable to be made aHottentot, by being born among Hottentots, as to be aChristian, by being born among Christians.It is not my intention by this to signify, that there is not a good and evil, right and wrong founded in the nature of things: but only to shew, that we find out this right and wrong, not by any inward strength, that our natural reason of itself affords, but by such external means, as people are taught articulate language, or the rules of civil life.Men do not prefer virtue to vice, from a philosophical contemplation of the fitness of the one, and the unfitness of the other; but because it is a judgment as early in their minds, as their knowledge of the words, virtue and vice.And it can no more be reasonably affirmed, that our knowledge of God and divine things, our opinions of the excellency of this, or that virtue, and of the immortality of our souls, are the effects of our natural light; than it can be reasonably affirmed, that our living in society, and our articulate language are owing to the light of nature.For, as all mankind find themselves in this state before any reasoning about it; as education, and human authority have taught us language,and accustomed us to the rules and manners of a social life: so education, and the same authority, have planted in our minds, certain notions of God and divine things, and formed us to a belief of our soul’s immortality, and the expectation of another life.And mankind are no more left to find out a God, or the fitness of virtue, by their own reason, than they are left by their own reason, to find out who are their parents, to find out the fitness of speaking an articulate language.Now if this is the state of reason, as it is in man; if this is all the light that we have from our own nature, a bare capacity of receiving good or bad impressions, right or wrong opinions and sentiments, according to the state of the world we fall into; then we are but poorly furnished, to assert theabsolute perfectionof our own reason.If our light is little more than the opinions and customs of those amongst whom we live, and it be so hard for a man to arrive at a greater wisdom, than the common wisdom of thecountrywhich gave him birth and education; how unreasonably do we appeal to the perfection of our reason, against thenecessityandadvantageof divine revelation?* If we are nothing without the assistance of men; if we are a kind of foolish, helpless animals, ’till education and experience have revealed to us the wisdom and knowledge of our fellow-creatures; shall we think ourselves too wise and fullof our own light, to be farther enlightened with a wisdom revealed to us by God himself?This gentleman, speaking of education, saith, “Education is justly esteemed a second nature; and its force is so strong, that few can wholly shake off its prejudices, even in things unreasonable and unnatural.”All that I shall add to this account, is, that we are by the condition of human life, necessarily subjected to thissecond nature, and cannot avoid coming under its power.And here let me ask this pleader for the sufficiency of the light of nature, how those that resign themselves up to the light of theirown nature, shall know, whether it is theirfirst, or theirsecondnature that directs them?Here are, it seems,two natures; they may be as different as good and evil; yet as they are bothnatures, bothinternal light, how shall a man know which he follows? He does not know which was first, or why he should call one first, and the other second; they are both internal, and without any thing to distinguish them. And as he is not to resist the motions of nature, or stifle its directions; so he must be as obedient to the directions of the second, as of the first nature, because he does not perceive their difference, nor has any means to distinguish their operations.He therefore that asserts the light of nature to be a sufficient unerring guide in divine matters,ought either to shew, that oursecondnature is assafea guide as the first; or that though it is nature, yet it has nonatural powersover us.For since every man isnecessitatedto take upon him a second nature, which he does notknowto be a second, orwhenit began, orhow farit has proceeded, or howcontraryit is to his first nature; he that would prove the light of nature to be so perfect, that nothing can be added to it, is obliged to prove, that our second nature, which we receive by education, has the same degree of perfection. For so far as our second nature is different from the first, so far it has changed the first; and if we are to follow nature exclusive of revelation, we may takerevenge,self-murder,incontinence,sensuality,pride,self-conceit, and acontemptof all things sacred, to be the true dictates of nature.For it often happens to people, to be thus educated; so if education is a second nature, and nature is to be esteemed atrueandperfectguide; a man thus educated, has all his vices made so many glorious laws of nature; and thro’ the strength of his natural light, he condemns humility, self-denial, and devotion, as foolish bigotry.This writer says, “Natural religion,that is, the religion of nature, is a perpetual standing rule for men of the meanest, as well as the highestcapacities, and carries its own evidence with it, those internal, inseparable marks of truth.¹But if education is asecond nature, and, as this writer affirms,has the force of a second nature even in things unreasonable and unnatural; then this second nature has not only its natural religion, which is alsoa perpetual standing rule for men of the meanest, as well as the highest capacities; which carries its own evidence with it, those internal, inseparable marks of truth; but it may also have a natural religion, bothunreasonable and unnatural; since education has the force of nature even in things of this kind.”¹Page 243.Again: If education has this force of nature even in things unreasonable and unnatural; if it is also absolutely necessary for all men to come under the power of some second nature; what can be more vain, than to pretend to state the light, or rectitude of human nature, since it must be for the most part in every man, as the uncertainty, variety, happiness or unhappiness of education has rendered it?And our author can no more tell, what man would be without education, or what nature would do for those who had no foreign instruction, than he can tell what sort of beings dwell in the moon. And yet he that does not know this, how can he know what the light of nature is in itself?* Again to declare the light of nature so perfect, as to be incapable of all improvement even by divine revelation, is no less an extravagance, than to declare the education of mankind to be perfect in the same degree.* For if nature not only wants, but cannot possibly avoid education; if this necessary unavoidable education becomes another nature, undiscernible from the first; then nothing can possibly be affirmed of the perfection of the light of nature, but what must be affirmed in the same degree of the perfection of education. And he that affirms that mankind have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the same sufficient, perfect light of nature, must affirm, that mankind have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the same perfect, unerring education.* When therefore it is just, for all people to abide by the absolute perfection of their education, the infallible light of their second nature, as the unerring standard, of all that is moral, religious, and divine; then it may be just to appeal to the natural light of all men, of all ages, and all places, as a sufficient teacher of all that ought, or ought not to be a matter of religion.* For till it can be shewn, that men are not liable to a second nature from education; the state of nature must differ all over the world, and in every age of the world, just as the light,and advantages of education, have differed in the several parts, and ages of the world.* In a word, the religious and moral light of our first nature, is just as great as the first strength of infants; and the religious and moral light of our second nature, is just as perfect as our education, and as much of our own growth, as the first language that we are taught to speak.May not therefore one justly wonder, what it is that could lead any people into an imagination of the absolute perfection of human reason? There seems no more in the state of mankind, to betray a man into this fancy, than to persuade him, that the reason of infants is absolutely perfect. For sense and experience, are as full and strong a proof against one, as against the other.But it must be said for these writers, that they decline all arguments from facts and experience, to give a better account of human nature; but with the same justice, as if a man was to lay aside the authority of history, to give you a truer account of the life ofAlexander.Their objection against revelation is founded upon the pretended sufficiency and perfection of human reason, to teach all men all that is wise, and holy, and divine, in religion. But how do they prove this perfection of human reason? Do they appeal to mankind as proofs of it? Do they produce any body of men in this or any other age, that without any assistance from revelation, haveattained to this perfection of religious knowledge? This is not so much as pretended to; the history of such men is entirely wanting. And yet the want of such a fact as this, has even the force of demonstration against this pretended sufficiency of natural reason.Because it is a matter not capable of any other kind of proof, but must be admitted as certainly true, or rejected as certainly false, according as fact and experience bear witness for or against it.* For an enquiry about the light, and strength, and sufficiency of reason, to guide and preserve men in the knowledge and practice of true religion, is a question, assolelyto be resolved byfact and experience, as if the enquiry was about theshapeof man’s body, or thenumberof his senses. And to talk of a light and strength of reason, natural to man, which fact and experience have never yet proved, is as egregious nonsense, as to talk of natural senses, or faculties of his body, which fact and experience have never yet discovered.From the bare consideration of a rational soul in union with a body, and bodily passions, we can neither prove man to bestrongnorweak,goodnorbad,sicklynorsound,mortalnorimmortal: all these qualities must discover themselves, as theeyediscovers its degree ofsight, thehandits degree ofstrength.To enquire therefore, whether men have bynature light sufficient to guide, and keep them in the true religion; is the same appeal to fact and experience, as to enquire, whether men aremortal,sickly, orsound: or how far they canseeandhear.* As therefore these gentlemen are, in this debate, without any proof, or even pretence of proof, from experience, so their cause ought to be looked upon to be as vain and romantic, as if they had asserted, that men have senses naturally fitted to hear sounds, and see objects at all distances, tho’ experience has, from the creation to this time, proved the quite contrary.For he that asserts the sufficiency of reason, to guide men in matters of religion, is not only without any positive proof from experience on his side, but has the history of all ages, for near six thousand years, fully demonstrating the quite contrary.If some other enquirers into human nature, should affirm, that there is in mankind anatural instinct, sufficient to make every man, at all times, love every other man, with thesame degreeof affection, as he loves himself; I suppose such an opinion would be thought too absurd to need any confutation. And yet all the absurdity of it would lie in this, that it affirmed something of thesufficiencyof a natural quality in man, which could not be supported by a single instance of any one man, and was contraryto the experience and history of every age of the world.Now this is exactly the case of these gentlemen: their opinion has neither more or less absurdity in it: they only affirm such a sufficiency of reason to be natural to all men, as cannot be supported by a single instance of any one man, that ever lived, and is fully contradicted by the experience and history of every age since the creation of the world.By what has been said, I hope the reader will observe, that this enquiry about the perfection or imperfection, the strength or weakness, of reason in man, as to matters of religion, restswhollyupon fact and experience; and that therefore all speculative reasonings upon it, are as idle and visionary, as a sick man’s dreams about health; and are as wholly to be rejected, as any speculative arguments that should pretend to prove, in spite of all facts and experience, theimmortality, andunalterablestate of human bodies.Our author himself seems sensible, that the argument drawn from facts and experience, pressed hard upon his cause; and therefore has given the best answer to it, he can yet think of.“It cannot,says he, be imputed to any defect in the light of nature, that thePaganworld ran into idolatry; but to their being entirely governed by priests, who pretended communication with their gods, and to have thence their revelations,which they imposed upon the credulous, as divine oracles.”The justness of this assertion will fully appear by the following illustration.“It cannot be imputed to any defect in the health and soundness of man’s natural constitution, that the world has, in all ages, been over-run with distempers; but to their being entirely governed by physicians, who pretended to I know not what secret knowledge of medicines, which they imposed upon the sickly, as infallible remedies.”For, as a perfect state of health, conscious to itself of a sufficiency of natural strength to keep clear of all diseases, seems to be out of all danger from physicians; so had mankind been ever conscious to themselves, of a sufficient natural knowledge of what is true or false in religion; suchas enabled men of the meanest capacity to distinguish between religion and superstition,¹whatroomhad there been for frauds and impostures herein?¹Page 3.“Can the superstition of thePagansbe imputed to any defect or insufficiency in the light of reason, when it was wholly owing to their abandoning that divine light; and in defiance of it, running into senseless traditions?”¹¹Page 37.But how came it, that they ran into senseless traditions? What was it that admitted these traditions as just and good? Why, it was that facultywhich judges of every thing, and which this writer recommends as an unerring guide. And to say, a man’s superstition is not owing to any defect or weakness of his reason, but to his admitting senseless traditions, is as vain, as to say, a man’s false reasoning is not owing to any weakness of his reason, but to his proceeding upon foolish and absurd arguments.He proceeds thus: “It is certainly no good argument against the sufficiency of the divine light of nature, that men could not err, except they left it, and followed vain traditions.”¹¹Second Address, page 39.This observation has just the same sense and acuteness in it, as if it had been said,It is certainly no good argument againstthe sufficiency of the divine healthfulnessof human nature, that men could not be sickly, except they left it, andfell into various distempers: or, against thesufficiency of the divine strength of natural courage, that men could not be timorous, till they left it, and followed vain fears. For, to prove that reason is sufficient, because every thing that is absurd, is contrary to reason, is like proving our healthfulness to be sufficient, because all distempers are contrary to it: or our courage to be sufficient, because fears and cowardice are contrary to it.Besides, how is it that men leave their reason? Why, just as ignorant men leave their knowledge; as dull people leave their wit, or cowards leave their courage. The first part of this paragraph tells you of a sufficiency of the divine light of nature: well; What has this divine light of nature done? What sufficient effects has it had? Why, it has covered all the world with darkness.Again: Supposing that all mankind, even the wisest nations, have for this six thousand years been thus imposed upon, not knowing how to distinguish idle tales and senseless traditions from true religion; is not this a noble foundation for this writer to build thesufficiency of the divine light of nature upon? For supposing it had been in the greatest degree insufficient, what other effect could have followed from it, but only this, thatall mankind, even thewisest nations, should have been over-run with error? And is it not strange, that effects should bear no proportion to their causes; that the same things should follow from thesufficiencyof the divine light of nature, which must have followed from itsgreatest insufficiency?* And must not the enemies ofreasonandfree-thinkingbe forced to confess, that this writer hath chosen an excellent guide for himself; since he so fully acknowledges, that no one yet has been rightly guided by it? Must not his present undertaking be granted to bethe effect of cool and sober deliberation, since it only calls people ofall, even themeanest capacities, to such an use of their reason, as the wisest of men and nations have always been strangers to?
Of the state and nature of reason, as it is in man; and how its perfection in matters of religion is to be known.
THIS writer and others, who take to themselves the names offree-thinkers, make their court to the world, by pretending to vindicate the right that all men have, to judge and act accordingto their own reason. Though, I think, the world has no more to thank them for on this account, than if they had pretended to assert the right that every man has, to seeonlywith hisown eyes, or to hearonlywith hisown ears.
For their own reason always did, does, and ever will, govern rational creatures, in every thing they determine, either in speculation or practice. It is not a matter ofdutyfor men to use their own reason, but ofnecessity: and it is as impossible to do otherwise, as for a being that cannot act but from choice, to act without choice.
Man is under the same necessity of acting from his own choice, thatmatteris of not acting at all; and a being, whose principle of action is reason and choice, can no more act without it, or contrary to it, than an extended being can be without extension.
All men therefore are equally reasonable in this respect, that they are, and must be, by anecessityof nature, equally directed and governed by their own reason and choice.
* The dispute therefore betwixt Christians andunbelievers, concerning reason, is not, whether men are to use theirown reason, any more than whether they are to see with theirown eyes; but whether every man’s reason must needs guide him, by itsown light, or must cease to guide him, as soon as it guides him by a light borrowed from revelation? This is the true state of the question, not whether reason is to be followed, but when itisbestfollowed? Not whether it is to be our guide, but how it may be made oursafest guide?
* Thefree-thinkers, therefore, rather appeal to the passions, than reason of the people, when they represent the clergy and Christianity as enemies to reason, and themselves as friends and advocates for the use of reason.
* For Christians oppose unbelievers, not because theyreason, but because they reasonill. They receive revelation, not to suppress the natural power, but to give new and heavenly light to their reason; not to take away their right of judging for themselves, but to secure them from false judgments.
Christians therefore do not differ from unbelievers in theconstant useof their reason, but in themannerof using it: asvirtuousmen differ fromrakes, not in their desire of happiness, but in their manner of seeking it.
It appears from what has been said, that every man’s own reason is his only principle of action, and that he must judge according to it, whether he receives, or rejects revelation.
Now although every man is to judge according to the light of his own reason, yet his reason has very little light that can be called its own. For, as we derive our nature from our parents, so that which we generally callnatural knowledge, or the light of nature, is a knowledge and light that is made natural to us, by the same authority,which makes a certain language, certain customs, and modes of behaviour, natural to us.
Nothing seems to be our own, but a bare capacity to be instructed, a nature fitted for any impressions; as liable to be made aHottentot, by being born among Hottentots, as to be aChristian, by being born among Christians.
It is not my intention by this to signify, that there is not a good and evil, right and wrong founded in the nature of things: but only to shew, that we find out this right and wrong, not by any inward strength, that our natural reason of itself affords, but by such external means, as people are taught articulate language, or the rules of civil life.
Men do not prefer virtue to vice, from a philosophical contemplation of the fitness of the one, and the unfitness of the other; but because it is a judgment as early in their minds, as their knowledge of the words, virtue and vice.
And it can no more be reasonably affirmed, that our knowledge of God and divine things, our opinions of the excellency of this, or that virtue, and of the immortality of our souls, are the effects of our natural light; than it can be reasonably affirmed, that our living in society, and our articulate language are owing to the light of nature.
For, as all mankind find themselves in this state before any reasoning about it; as education, and human authority have taught us language,and accustomed us to the rules and manners of a social life: so education, and the same authority, have planted in our minds, certain notions of God and divine things, and formed us to a belief of our soul’s immortality, and the expectation of another life.
And mankind are no more left to find out a God, or the fitness of virtue, by their own reason, than they are left by their own reason, to find out who are their parents, to find out the fitness of speaking an articulate language.
Now if this is the state of reason, as it is in man; if this is all the light that we have from our own nature, a bare capacity of receiving good or bad impressions, right or wrong opinions and sentiments, according to the state of the world we fall into; then we are but poorly furnished, to assert theabsolute perfectionof our own reason.
If our light is little more than the opinions and customs of those amongst whom we live, and it be so hard for a man to arrive at a greater wisdom, than the common wisdom of thecountrywhich gave him birth and education; how unreasonably do we appeal to the perfection of our reason, against thenecessityandadvantageof divine revelation?
* If we are nothing without the assistance of men; if we are a kind of foolish, helpless animals, ’till education and experience have revealed to us the wisdom and knowledge of our fellow-creatures; shall we think ourselves too wise and fullof our own light, to be farther enlightened with a wisdom revealed to us by God himself?
This gentleman, speaking of education, saith, “Education is justly esteemed a second nature; and its force is so strong, that few can wholly shake off its prejudices, even in things unreasonable and unnatural.”
All that I shall add to this account, is, that we are by the condition of human life, necessarily subjected to thissecond nature, and cannot avoid coming under its power.
And here let me ask this pleader for the sufficiency of the light of nature, how those that resign themselves up to the light of theirown nature, shall know, whether it is theirfirst, or theirsecondnature that directs them?
Here are, it seems,two natures; they may be as different as good and evil; yet as they are bothnatures, bothinternal light, how shall a man know which he follows? He does not know which was first, or why he should call one first, and the other second; they are both internal, and without any thing to distinguish them. And as he is not to resist the motions of nature, or stifle its directions; so he must be as obedient to the directions of the second, as of the first nature, because he does not perceive their difference, nor has any means to distinguish their operations.
He therefore that asserts the light of nature to be a sufficient unerring guide in divine matters,ought either to shew, that oursecondnature is assafea guide as the first; or that though it is nature, yet it has nonatural powersover us.
For since every man isnecessitatedto take upon him a second nature, which he does notknowto be a second, orwhenit began, orhow farit has proceeded, or howcontraryit is to his first nature; he that would prove the light of nature to be so perfect, that nothing can be added to it, is obliged to prove, that our second nature, which we receive by education, has the same degree of perfection. For so far as our second nature is different from the first, so far it has changed the first; and if we are to follow nature exclusive of revelation, we may takerevenge,self-murder,incontinence,sensuality,pride,self-conceit, and acontemptof all things sacred, to be the true dictates of nature.
For it often happens to people, to be thus educated; so if education is a second nature, and nature is to be esteemed atrueandperfectguide; a man thus educated, has all his vices made so many glorious laws of nature; and thro’ the strength of his natural light, he condemns humility, self-denial, and devotion, as foolish bigotry.
This writer says, “Natural religion,that is, the religion of nature, is a perpetual standing rule for men of the meanest, as well as the highestcapacities, and carries its own evidence with it, those internal, inseparable marks of truth.¹But if education is asecond nature, and, as this writer affirms,has the force of a second nature even in things unreasonable and unnatural; then this second nature has not only its natural religion, which is alsoa perpetual standing rule for men of the meanest, as well as the highest capacities; which carries its own evidence with it, those internal, inseparable marks of truth; but it may also have a natural religion, bothunreasonable and unnatural; since education has the force of nature even in things of this kind.”
¹Page 243.
¹Page 243.
¹Page 243.
Again: If education has this force of nature even in things unreasonable and unnatural; if it is also absolutely necessary for all men to come under the power of some second nature; what can be more vain, than to pretend to state the light, or rectitude of human nature, since it must be for the most part in every man, as the uncertainty, variety, happiness or unhappiness of education has rendered it?
And our author can no more tell, what man would be without education, or what nature would do for those who had no foreign instruction, than he can tell what sort of beings dwell in the moon. And yet he that does not know this, how can he know what the light of nature is in itself?
* Again to declare the light of nature so perfect, as to be incapable of all improvement even by divine revelation, is no less an extravagance, than to declare the education of mankind to be perfect in the same degree.
* For if nature not only wants, but cannot possibly avoid education; if this necessary unavoidable education becomes another nature, undiscernible from the first; then nothing can possibly be affirmed of the perfection of the light of nature, but what must be affirmed in the same degree of the perfection of education. And he that affirms that mankind have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the same sufficient, perfect light of nature, must affirm, that mankind have had, at all times, and in all places of the world, the same perfect, unerring education.
* When therefore it is just, for all people to abide by the absolute perfection of their education, the infallible light of their second nature, as the unerring standard, of all that is moral, religious, and divine; then it may be just to appeal to the natural light of all men, of all ages, and all places, as a sufficient teacher of all that ought, or ought not to be a matter of religion.
* For till it can be shewn, that men are not liable to a second nature from education; the state of nature must differ all over the world, and in every age of the world, just as the light,and advantages of education, have differed in the several parts, and ages of the world.
* In a word, the religious and moral light of our first nature, is just as great as the first strength of infants; and the religious and moral light of our second nature, is just as perfect as our education, and as much of our own growth, as the first language that we are taught to speak.
May not therefore one justly wonder, what it is that could lead any people into an imagination of the absolute perfection of human reason? There seems no more in the state of mankind, to betray a man into this fancy, than to persuade him, that the reason of infants is absolutely perfect. For sense and experience, are as full and strong a proof against one, as against the other.
But it must be said for these writers, that they decline all arguments from facts and experience, to give a better account of human nature; but with the same justice, as if a man was to lay aside the authority of history, to give you a truer account of the life ofAlexander.
Their objection against revelation is founded upon the pretended sufficiency and perfection of human reason, to teach all men all that is wise, and holy, and divine, in religion. But how do they prove this perfection of human reason? Do they appeal to mankind as proofs of it? Do they produce any body of men in this or any other age, that without any assistance from revelation, haveattained to this perfection of religious knowledge? This is not so much as pretended to; the history of such men is entirely wanting. And yet the want of such a fact as this, has even the force of demonstration against this pretended sufficiency of natural reason.
Because it is a matter not capable of any other kind of proof, but must be admitted as certainly true, or rejected as certainly false, according as fact and experience bear witness for or against it.
* For an enquiry about the light, and strength, and sufficiency of reason, to guide and preserve men in the knowledge and practice of true religion, is a question, assolelyto be resolved byfact and experience, as if the enquiry was about theshapeof man’s body, or thenumberof his senses. And to talk of a light and strength of reason, natural to man, which fact and experience have never yet proved, is as egregious nonsense, as to talk of natural senses, or faculties of his body, which fact and experience have never yet discovered.
From the bare consideration of a rational soul in union with a body, and bodily passions, we can neither prove man to bestrongnorweak,goodnorbad,sicklynorsound,mortalnorimmortal: all these qualities must discover themselves, as theeyediscovers its degree ofsight, thehandits degree ofstrength.
To enquire therefore, whether men have bynature light sufficient to guide, and keep them in the true religion; is the same appeal to fact and experience, as to enquire, whether men aremortal,sickly, orsound: or how far they canseeandhear.
* As therefore these gentlemen are, in this debate, without any proof, or even pretence of proof, from experience, so their cause ought to be looked upon to be as vain and romantic, as if they had asserted, that men have senses naturally fitted to hear sounds, and see objects at all distances, tho’ experience has, from the creation to this time, proved the quite contrary.
For he that asserts the sufficiency of reason, to guide men in matters of religion, is not only without any positive proof from experience on his side, but has the history of all ages, for near six thousand years, fully demonstrating the quite contrary.
If some other enquirers into human nature, should affirm, that there is in mankind anatural instinct, sufficient to make every man, at all times, love every other man, with thesame degreeof affection, as he loves himself; I suppose such an opinion would be thought too absurd to need any confutation. And yet all the absurdity of it would lie in this, that it affirmed something of thesufficiencyof a natural quality in man, which could not be supported by a single instance of any one man, and was contraryto the experience and history of every age of the world.
Now this is exactly the case of these gentlemen: their opinion has neither more or less absurdity in it: they only affirm such a sufficiency of reason to be natural to all men, as cannot be supported by a single instance of any one man, that ever lived, and is fully contradicted by the experience and history of every age since the creation of the world.
By what has been said, I hope the reader will observe, that this enquiry about the perfection or imperfection, the strength or weakness, of reason in man, as to matters of religion, restswhollyupon fact and experience; and that therefore all speculative reasonings upon it, are as idle and visionary, as a sick man’s dreams about health; and are as wholly to be rejected, as any speculative arguments that should pretend to prove, in spite of all facts and experience, theimmortality, andunalterablestate of human bodies.
Our author himself seems sensible, that the argument drawn from facts and experience, pressed hard upon his cause; and therefore has given the best answer to it, he can yet think of.
“It cannot,says he, be imputed to any defect in the light of nature, that thePaganworld ran into idolatry; but to their being entirely governed by priests, who pretended communication with their gods, and to have thence their revelations,which they imposed upon the credulous, as divine oracles.”
The justness of this assertion will fully appear by the following illustration.
“It cannot be imputed to any defect in the health and soundness of man’s natural constitution, that the world has, in all ages, been over-run with distempers; but to their being entirely governed by physicians, who pretended to I know not what secret knowledge of medicines, which they imposed upon the sickly, as infallible remedies.”
For, as a perfect state of health, conscious to itself of a sufficiency of natural strength to keep clear of all diseases, seems to be out of all danger from physicians; so had mankind been ever conscious to themselves, of a sufficient natural knowledge of what is true or false in religion; suchas enabled men of the meanest capacity to distinguish between religion and superstition,¹whatroomhad there been for frauds and impostures herein?
¹Page 3.
¹Page 3.
¹Page 3.
“Can the superstition of thePagansbe imputed to any defect or insufficiency in the light of reason, when it was wholly owing to their abandoning that divine light; and in defiance of it, running into senseless traditions?”¹
¹Page 37.
¹Page 37.
¹Page 37.
But how came it, that they ran into senseless traditions? What was it that admitted these traditions as just and good? Why, it was that facultywhich judges of every thing, and which this writer recommends as an unerring guide. And to say, a man’s superstition is not owing to any defect or weakness of his reason, but to his admitting senseless traditions, is as vain, as to say, a man’s false reasoning is not owing to any weakness of his reason, but to his proceeding upon foolish and absurd arguments.
He proceeds thus: “It is certainly no good argument against the sufficiency of the divine light of nature, that men could not err, except they left it, and followed vain traditions.”¹
¹Second Address, page 39.
¹Second Address, page 39.
¹Second Address, page 39.
This observation has just the same sense and acuteness in it, as if it had been said,It is certainly no good argument againstthe sufficiency of the divine healthfulnessof human nature, that men could not be sickly, except they left it, andfell into various distempers: or, against thesufficiency of the divine strength of natural courage, that men could not be timorous, till they left it, and followed vain fears. For, to prove that reason is sufficient, because every thing that is absurd, is contrary to reason, is like proving our healthfulness to be sufficient, because all distempers are contrary to it: or our courage to be sufficient, because fears and cowardice are contrary to it.
Besides, how is it that men leave their reason? Why, just as ignorant men leave their knowledge; as dull people leave their wit, or cowards leave their courage. The first part of this paragraph tells you of a sufficiency of the divine light of nature: well; What has this divine light of nature done? What sufficient effects has it had? Why, it has covered all the world with darkness.
Again: Supposing that all mankind, even the wisest nations, have for this six thousand years been thus imposed upon, not knowing how to distinguish idle tales and senseless traditions from true religion; is not this a noble foundation for this writer to build thesufficiency of the divine light of nature upon? For supposing it had been in the greatest degree insufficient, what other effect could have followed from it, but only this, thatall mankind, even thewisest nations, should have been over-run with error? And is it not strange, that effects should bear no proportion to their causes; that the same things should follow from thesufficiencyof the divine light of nature, which must have followed from itsgreatest insufficiency?
* And must not the enemies ofreasonandfree-thinkingbe forced to confess, that this writer hath chosen an excellent guide for himself; since he so fully acknowledges, that no one yet has been rightly guided by it? Must not his present undertaking be granted to bethe effect of cool and sober deliberation, since it only calls people ofall, even themeanest capacities, to such an use of their reason, as the wisest of men and nations have always been strangers to?
CHAPTERV.Shewing that all themutabilityof our tempers, thedisordersof our passions, thecorruptionof our hearts, all thereveriesof the imagination, all thecontradictionsandabsurditiesthat are to be found in human life, and human opinions, are in effect the mutability, disorders, corruption, and absurdities ofhuman reason.IT is the intent of this chapter to shew, that altho’ common language ascribes a variety of faculties and principles to the soul, imputing this action to the blindness of ourpassions, that to the inconstancy of ourtempers; one thing to the heat of ourimagination, another to the coolness of ourreason; yet, in strictness of truth, every thing that is done by us, is the action and operation of our reason, and is to be ascribed to it, as the sole principle from whence it proceeded, and by which it is governed and effected.And the different degrees of reason are in men, as the different degrees of love and aversion;as the different degrees of wit, parts, good nature, or ill nature, are in man.And as all men have naturally more or less of these qualities, so all men have naturally more or less reason: and the bulk of mankind are as different in reason, as they are in these qualities.As love is the same passion in all men, yet is infinitely different; as hatred is the same passion in all men, yet with infinite differences; so reason is the same faculty in all men, yet with infinite differences.And as our passions not only make us different from other men, but frequently and almost daily different from ourselves, loving and hating under great inconstancy; so our reason is not only different from the reason of other men, but is often different from itself; by a strange inconstancy, setting up first one opinion, and then another.So that when we talk ofhuman reason, or a reasoncommonto mankind, we talk of asvarious,uncertain, andunmeasurablea thing, as when we talk of alove, anaversion, agood nature, orill nature, common to mankind; for these qualities admit of no variation, uncertainty, or mutability, but such as they directly receive from thereasonof mankind.For it is as much the reason of man that acts in all these tempers, and makes them to be justwhat they are, as it is the reason of man that demonstrates a mathematical proposition.Was our reason steady, there would be just the same steadiness and regularity in our tempers; did not reason fall into follies and absurdities, we should have nothing foolish or absurd in our love or aversion. For every humour, every kind of love or aversion, is as strictly theactionoroperationof our reason, as judgment is the act of our reason.And the tempers and passions of a child, differ only from the tempers and passions of a man, as the reason of a child differs from the reason of man.So that our passions and tempers, are the natural real effects of our reason, and have no qualities, either good or bad, but such as are to be imputed to it.A laudable good nature, or a laudable aversion, is only reason acting in acertain manner: a criminal good nature, or a criminal aversion, is nothing else but reason acting in another certain manner.But still it is reason, or our understanding that is theonly agentin our bad passions, as well as good passions; and as much thesole agentin all our passions and tempers, as in things of mere speculation.So that the state of reason in human life, is nothing else but the state of human tempers andpassions; and right reason in morality, is nothing else but right love, and right aversion.Allthattherefore which we commonly call the weakness, blindness, and disorder of ourpassions, is in reality the weakness, blindness, and disorder of ourreason. For a right love, or wrong love, denotes only reason acting in acertain, particularmanner.So that if any thing can be said of love, aversion, good nature, or ill nature, as common to mankind; the same may be said of reason, as common to mankind.For the distinction of our reason from our passions, is only a distinction in language, made at pleasure; and is no more real than thedesireandinclinationare really different from thewill. All therefore that is weak and foolish in our passions, is the weakness and folly of our reason; all the inconstancy and caprice of our humours and tempers, is the caprice and inconstancy of our reason.It is not properlyavaricethat makes men sordid; it is notambitionthat makes them restless; it is notbriberythat makes men sell their consciences; it is notinterestthat makes them lye, and cheat, and perjure themselves. What is it therefore? Why it is thatabsolutely perfectfaculty, which our author sets up as theunerringstandard of all that iswise,holy, andgood; it isreason, theuse of reason, human reason, that does all this.For whether any thing be fit to be done, it is as he says, “reason alone which must judge; as the eye is the sole judge of what is visible, the ear of what is audible, so reason of what is reasonable.”Every thing therefore that is done, every thing that is chosen in human life before any thing else, is as strictly chosen by reason, as every thing that is seen, is seen by the eye; and every thing that is heard, is heard by the ear.To suppose that reason permits itself to be governed by passions or tempers, but is not theimmediate agentof all that is done by them, is as absurd, as to suppose that reason permits itself to be governed by thehandwhen it is writing falsly, or thetongue, when it is talking profanely, but it is not the immediate, direct agent of all that is written and spoken by them.*Brutesare incapable of immorality, because none of their actions are the actions ofreason: every thing therefore that is immorality, baseness, or villainy in us, must be the act of our reason, otherwise it could no more be immoral, than the actions of brutes.* If therefore, as this author often saith, reason be the only faculty that distinguisheth us from brutes; it necessarily follows, that those irregularities, whether of humour, passions, or tempers, which cannot be imputed to brutes, must be solely attributed to that faculty by which we are distinguished from brutes; and consequently, everything that is foolish, vain, shameful, false, treacherous, and base, must be the acts of our reason; since if they were the acts of any thing else, they could have no more vanity, falseness, or baseness, than hunger and thirst.It is not my intent to condemn our common language, which talks of reason and the passions, as if they were as different as agovernorand hissubjects.These forms of speech are very intelligible and useful, and give great life and ornament to all discourses upon morality.But when persons ascribe to reason, as adistinct facultyof human nature, I know not whatabsolute perfection, making it as immutable, and incapable of any addition or improvement, as God himself: it is necessary to consider reason, not as it is represented in common language, but as it is in reality in itself.Notwithstanding therefore in common language, our passions, and the effects of them, are usefully distinguished from our reason, I have here ventured to shew, that all the disorders of human nature, are in effect the disorders of human reason, and that all the perfection or imperfection of our passions is the perfection or imperfection of our reason.Our follies and absurdities of every kind are as necessarily to be ascribed to our reason, as thefirst immediatecause of them, as our wisdom and discretion are to be ascribed to it in that degree.The difference between reason assenting to the properties of asquare, and reason acting in motions of desire or aversion, is only this, that in the latter case, it is reason acting under a sense of its own good or evil, in the former case, it is reason acting under a sense ofmagnitude.And as the relations of magnitude, as they are the objects of our reason, are only the objects of its assent or dissent; so good and evil, as they are objects of our reason, are only the objects of itsdesireoraversion: and as the assent or dissent, in matters of speculation, whether right or wrong, is solely the act of our reason; so desire or aversion, in human life, whether right or wrong, is equally the act of our reason.We often say, that our passions deceive us, or persuade us; but this is no more strictly so, than when we say, ourinterestdeceived, or a bribe blinded us. For bribes and interest are not active principles, nor have any power of deception; it is only our reason that gives them a false value, and prefers them to a greater good.It is just so in what we call the deceit of our passions: they meddle with us no more than bribes meddle with us; but that pleasurable perception, which is to be found in certain enjoyments, is by our reason preferred to that better good, which we might expect from self-denial.We say again, that our passions paint things in false colours, and present to our minds vain appearances of happiness.But this is no more strictly true, than when we say,♦ourimaginationforms castles in the air. For the imagination signifies no distinct faculty from our reason, but only reason acting upon ourown ideas.♦“out” replaced with “our”So when our passions are said to give false colours to things, or present vain appearances of happiness, it is only our reason acting upon its own ideas ofgoodandevil, just as it acts upon its own ideas ofarchitecture, in forming castles in the air.So that allthatwhich we call different faculties, tempers, and passions, strictly speaking, means nothing else, but the various acts of one and the same rational principle, which has different names, according to the objects that it acts upon, and the manner of its acting.In some things it is called speculative, in others it is called practical reason. And we may as justly think our speculative reason is a different faculty from our practical reason, as that our aversions, or likings, are not as fully to be ascribed to our reason, as syllogisms and demonstrations.* It was truly reason that madeMedeakill her children, that madeCatokill himself, that made Pagans offer human sacrifices to idols; that madeEpicurusdeny a providence,Mahometpretend a revelation; that made some men sceptics, others bigots; some enthusiasts, others profane; that madeHobbesassert all religion to be human invention, andSpinosato declare trees, and stones,and animals to be parts of God; that makes free-thinkers deny freedom of will, and fatalists exhort to a reformation of manners; that madeVauxa conspirator, andLudlowa regicide; that madeMuggletona fanatic; andRochestera libertine. It was as truly reason that did all these things, as it is reason that demonstrates mathematical propositions.MedeaandCatoacted as truly according to the judgment of their reason at that time, as the confessor that chuses rather to suffer, than deny his faith.Had notMedeaandCatothought it best to do what they did, at the time they did it, they would no more have done it than theconfessorwould chuse to suffer rather than deny his faith, unless he had judged best so to do.And when we say reason governs the passions, it means no more, than that reason governs itself; that it acts with deliberation and attention, does not yield to its first judgments, but uses second, and third thoughts.So that guarding against the passions, is only guarding against its own first judgments and opinions; that is guarding against itself.To all this may, perhaps, be objected, that our passions arise from bodily motions, and depend upon the state of our blood and animal spirits, and therefore what we do under their commotions, cannot be attributed to our reason.It is readily granted, that the body has this share in our passions and tempers: but then the same thing must be granted of the body, in all the acts and operations of the mind. So that if our desires and aversions cannot be imputed to our reason, because of the joint operation of the animal spirits in them; no more can syllogisms and demonstrations be attributed to our reason, because the operation of bodily spirits concurreth in the forming of them.For the most abstract thought, and speculation of the mind, has as truly theconjunctoperation of bodily spirits, as our strongest desires or aversions. And it is as much owing to the state of the body, that such speculations are what they are, as it is owing to the state of the body, that such passions are what they are.For the motions of the bodily spirits are inseparable from, and according to, the state and action of the mind: when reason is in speculation of a trifle, they concur but weakly; when reason speculates intensely, their operation is increased. And sometimes the attention of the mind is so great, and has so engaged and called in all the animal spirits to its assistance, that the operations of our senses are suspended, and we neither see, nor feel, till the attention of the mind has let the spirits return to all the parts of the body.Now will any one say, that these intense thoughts are less the acts of the mind, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits,than when it is acting with indifference, and so has a lesser quantity of bodily spirits?Yet this might as well be said, as to say, that the assent or dissent, in speculation, is the act of our reason; but liking or disliking, loving or hating, are not the acts of our reason, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits.For, as the mind is in a different state when it desires good, or fears evil, from what it is when it only compares two triangles; so the motions of the bodily spirits, have onlysucha difference, as iscorrespondentto these two states of the mind. They act and join as much in comparing the triangles, as in the desire of good, or fear of evil. And the mind is just as much governed by the body, in its passions, as in its calmest contemplations.For as the gentle operation of the animal spirits is then correspondent to the state and action of the mind; so in all our passions, the strong and increased motion of the animal spirits, is equally correspondent thereto.So that reason is no more the agent, in our tempers and passions, than in our dry and sedate speculations.It may happen, that a man may have as great an eagerness in solving a mathematical problem, as another hath to obtain any great good, or avoid any great evil.But may it therefore be said, that it is not reason that solves the problem, because the bodily spirits are so active in it?To draw now some plain consequences from the foregoing account.First, If reason be theuniversal agentin the natural man; if all the difference amongsuchmen, is only such a difference as reason makes, then nothing can be more extravagant, than to affirm any thing concerning the degree of perfection, or imperfection of reason, ascommonto man. It is as wild and romantic, as to pretend to state the measure of folly and wisdom, of fear and courage, of pride and humility, of good humour and ill-humour,commonto mankind: for as these states of the mind, are only so many different states of reason; so no uncertainty belongs to them, but what, in thesame degree, belongs toreason.Secondly, Granting that all matters of religion must be agreeable toright, unprejudicedreason; yet this could be no ground for receiving nothing in religion, but whathumanreason could prove to be necessary; forhumanreason is no moreright, unprejudicedreason, than a sinner issinless, or a man anangel.Granting again, that a man may go a great way towards rectifying his reason, and laying aside its prejudices; yet no particular man can be abetter judgeof the rectitude of hisown reason, than he is of the rectitude of his ownself-love,the brightness of his ownparts, and the depth of his ownjudgment.For there is nothing to deceive him inself-love, in the opinion of hisown merit,wit, andjudgment, but what has the same power to deceive him, in the opinion of his own reason. And if, as our author says, “It be the fate of most sects to be the fondest of their ugliest brats.”¹None seem so inevitably exposed to this fatality, as those whose religion is to have no form, but such as it receives from their own hearts.¹Page 184.Thirdly, A man that has his religion to chuse, and with this precious privilege, that he need not allow any thing to be matter of religion, but what his own reason can prove to be so, is in as fair a way to be governed by hispassions, as he that has hisconditionof life to chuse, with the liberty of taking that which his own reason directs him to.Does any one suppose, that nothing butreasonwould direct him in the choice of his condition? Or that he would make the better choice, because he proceeded upon this maxim, that nothing could be right, but that which was agreeable to hisown reason? Or that his tempers, his prejudices, his self-love, his passions, his partiality, would have no influence upon his choice, becausehe had resigned himself up to hisown reason?Now it is just the same in the choice of a religion, as in the choice of a condition of life: as it is not a matter of speculation, but ofgoodandevil; so if it is left to be determined by ourown reason, it rather appeals to ourtempers, than employs our reason; and to resign ourselves up to our own reason, to tell us what ought, or ought not to be a matter of religion, is only resigning ourselves up to our tempers,♦to take what welike, and refuse what wedislikein religion.♦removed duplicate “to”* In a word; whenself-loveis a proper arbitrator betwixt a man and his adversary; whenrevengeis a just judge of meekness; whenprideis a true lover of humility; whenfalshoodis a teacher of truth; when lust is a fast friend of chastity; when thefleshleads to the spirit; whensensualitydelights in self-denial; whenpartialityis a promoter of equity; when thepalatecan taste the difference between sin and holiness; when thehandcan feel the truth of a proposition; then mayhuman reasonbe a proper arbitrator between God and man, the sole, final, just judge of all that ought, or ought not to be a matter of aholy,divine, andheavenlyreligion.Lastly, If this be the state of reason, then to pretend, that our reason, is too perfect to be governed by any thing but its own light, is the sameextravagance, as to pretend, that our love is too pure to be governed by any thing but its own inclinations, our hatred too just to be governed by any thing but its own motions. For if all that is base and criminal in love, all that is unjust and wicked in hatred, is to be imputed to our reason; then no perfection can be ascribed to our reason, but such as is to be ascribed to our love and hatred.
Shewing that all themutabilityof our tempers, thedisordersof our passions, thecorruptionof our hearts, all thereveriesof the imagination, all thecontradictionsandabsurditiesthat are to be found in human life, and human opinions, are in effect the mutability, disorders, corruption, and absurdities ofhuman reason.
IT is the intent of this chapter to shew, that altho’ common language ascribes a variety of faculties and principles to the soul, imputing this action to the blindness of ourpassions, that to the inconstancy of ourtempers; one thing to the heat of ourimagination, another to the coolness of ourreason; yet, in strictness of truth, every thing that is done by us, is the action and operation of our reason, and is to be ascribed to it, as the sole principle from whence it proceeded, and by which it is governed and effected.
And the different degrees of reason are in men, as the different degrees of love and aversion;as the different degrees of wit, parts, good nature, or ill nature, are in man.
And as all men have naturally more or less of these qualities, so all men have naturally more or less reason: and the bulk of mankind are as different in reason, as they are in these qualities.
As love is the same passion in all men, yet is infinitely different; as hatred is the same passion in all men, yet with infinite differences; so reason is the same faculty in all men, yet with infinite differences.
And as our passions not only make us different from other men, but frequently and almost daily different from ourselves, loving and hating under great inconstancy; so our reason is not only different from the reason of other men, but is often different from itself; by a strange inconstancy, setting up first one opinion, and then another.
So that when we talk ofhuman reason, or a reasoncommonto mankind, we talk of asvarious,uncertain, andunmeasurablea thing, as when we talk of alove, anaversion, agood nature, orill nature, common to mankind; for these qualities admit of no variation, uncertainty, or mutability, but such as they directly receive from thereasonof mankind.
For it is as much the reason of man that acts in all these tempers, and makes them to be justwhat they are, as it is the reason of man that demonstrates a mathematical proposition.
Was our reason steady, there would be just the same steadiness and regularity in our tempers; did not reason fall into follies and absurdities, we should have nothing foolish or absurd in our love or aversion. For every humour, every kind of love or aversion, is as strictly theactionoroperationof our reason, as judgment is the act of our reason.
And the tempers and passions of a child, differ only from the tempers and passions of a man, as the reason of a child differs from the reason of man.
So that our passions and tempers, are the natural real effects of our reason, and have no qualities, either good or bad, but such as are to be imputed to it.
A laudable good nature, or a laudable aversion, is only reason acting in acertain manner: a criminal good nature, or a criminal aversion, is nothing else but reason acting in another certain manner.
But still it is reason, or our understanding that is theonly agentin our bad passions, as well as good passions; and as much thesole agentin all our passions and tempers, as in things of mere speculation.
So that the state of reason in human life, is nothing else but the state of human tempers andpassions; and right reason in morality, is nothing else but right love, and right aversion.
Allthattherefore which we commonly call the weakness, blindness, and disorder of ourpassions, is in reality the weakness, blindness, and disorder of ourreason. For a right love, or wrong love, denotes only reason acting in acertain, particularmanner.
So that if any thing can be said of love, aversion, good nature, or ill nature, as common to mankind; the same may be said of reason, as common to mankind.
For the distinction of our reason from our passions, is only a distinction in language, made at pleasure; and is no more real than thedesireandinclinationare really different from thewill. All therefore that is weak and foolish in our passions, is the weakness and folly of our reason; all the inconstancy and caprice of our humours and tempers, is the caprice and inconstancy of our reason.
It is not properlyavaricethat makes men sordid; it is notambitionthat makes them restless; it is notbriberythat makes men sell their consciences; it is notinterestthat makes them lye, and cheat, and perjure themselves. What is it therefore? Why it is thatabsolutely perfectfaculty, which our author sets up as theunerringstandard of all that iswise,holy, andgood; it isreason, theuse of reason, human reason, that does all this.
For whether any thing be fit to be done, it is as he says, “reason alone which must judge; as the eye is the sole judge of what is visible, the ear of what is audible, so reason of what is reasonable.”
Every thing therefore that is done, every thing that is chosen in human life before any thing else, is as strictly chosen by reason, as every thing that is seen, is seen by the eye; and every thing that is heard, is heard by the ear.
To suppose that reason permits itself to be governed by passions or tempers, but is not theimmediate agentof all that is done by them, is as absurd, as to suppose that reason permits itself to be governed by thehandwhen it is writing falsly, or thetongue, when it is talking profanely, but it is not the immediate, direct agent of all that is written and spoken by them.
*Brutesare incapable of immorality, because none of their actions are the actions ofreason: every thing therefore that is immorality, baseness, or villainy in us, must be the act of our reason, otherwise it could no more be immoral, than the actions of brutes.
* If therefore, as this author often saith, reason be the only faculty that distinguisheth us from brutes; it necessarily follows, that those irregularities, whether of humour, passions, or tempers, which cannot be imputed to brutes, must be solely attributed to that faculty by which we are distinguished from brutes; and consequently, everything that is foolish, vain, shameful, false, treacherous, and base, must be the acts of our reason; since if they were the acts of any thing else, they could have no more vanity, falseness, or baseness, than hunger and thirst.
It is not my intent to condemn our common language, which talks of reason and the passions, as if they were as different as agovernorand hissubjects.
These forms of speech are very intelligible and useful, and give great life and ornament to all discourses upon morality.
But when persons ascribe to reason, as adistinct facultyof human nature, I know not whatabsolute perfection, making it as immutable, and incapable of any addition or improvement, as God himself: it is necessary to consider reason, not as it is represented in common language, but as it is in reality in itself.
Notwithstanding therefore in common language, our passions, and the effects of them, are usefully distinguished from our reason, I have here ventured to shew, that all the disorders of human nature, are in effect the disorders of human reason, and that all the perfection or imperfection of our passions is the perfection or imperfection of our reason.
Our follies and absurdities of every kind are as necessarily to be ascribed to our reason, as thefirst immediatecause of them, as our wisdom and discretion are to be ascribed to it in that degree.
The difference between reason assenting to the properties of asquare, and reason acting in motions of desire or aversion, is only this, that in the latter case, it is reason acting under a sense of its own good or evil, in the former case, it is reason acting under a sense ofmagnitude.
And as the relations of magnitude, as they are the objects of our reason, are only the objects of its assent or dissent; so good and evil, as they are objects of our reason, are only the objects of itsdesireoraversion: and as the assent or dissent, in matters of speculation, whether right or wrong, is solely the act of our reason; so desire or aversion, in human life, whether right or wrong, is equally the act of our reason.
We often say, that our passions deceive us, or persuade us; but this is no more strictly so, than when we say, ourinterestdeceived, or a bribe blinded us. For bribes and interest are not active principles, nor have any power of deception; it is only our reason that gives them a false value, and prefers them to a greater good.
It is just so in what we call the deceit of our passions: they meddle with us no more than bribes meddle with us; but that pleasurable perception, which is to be found in certain enjoyments, is by our reason preferred to that better good, which we might expect from self-denial.
We say again, that our passions paint things in false colours, and present to our minds vain appearances of happiness.
But this is no more strictly true, than when we say,♦ourimaginationforms castles in the air. For the imagination signifies no distinct faculty from our reason, but only reason acting upon ourown ideas.
♦“out” replaced with “our”
♦“out” replaced with “our”
♦“out” replaced with “our”
So when our passions are said to give false colours to things, or present vain appearances of happiness, it is only our reason acting upon its own ideas ofgoodandevil, just as it acts upon its own ideas ofarchitecture, in forming castles in the air.
So that allthatwhich we call different faculties, tempers, and passions, strictly speaking, means nothing else, but the various acts of one and the same rational principle, which has different names, according to the objects that it acts upon, and the manner of its acting.
In some things it is called speculative, in others it is called practical reason. And we may as justly think our speculative reason is a different faculty from our practical reason, as that our aversions, or likings, are not as fully to be ascribed to our reason, as syllogisms and demonstrations.
* It was truly reason that madeMedeakill her children, that madeCatokill himself, that made Pagans offer human sacrifices to idols; that madeEpicurusdeny a providence,Mahometpretend a revelation; that made some men sceptics, others bigots; some enthusiasts, others profane; that madeHobbesassert all religion to be human invention, andSpinosato declare trees, and stones,and animals to be parts of God; that makes free-thinkers deny freedom of will, and fatalists exhort to a reformation of manners; that madeVauxa conspirator, andLudlowa regicide; that madeMuggletona fanatic; andRochestera libertine. It was as truly reason that did all these things, as it is reason that demonstrates mathematical propositions.
MedeaandCatoacted as truly according to the judgment of their reason at that time, as the confessor that chuses rather to suffer, than deny his faith.
Had notMedeaandCatothought it best to do what they did, at the time they did it, they would no more have done it than theconfessorwould chuse to suffer rather than deny his faith, unless he had judged best so to do.
And when we say reason governs the passions, it means no more, than that reason governs itself; that it acts with deliberation and attention, does not yield to its first judgments, but uses second, and third thoughts.
So that guarding against the passions, is only guarding against its own first judgments and opinions; that is guarding against itself.
To all this may, perhaps, be objected, that our passions arise from bodily motions, and depend upon the state of our blood and animal spirits, and therefore what we do under their commotions, cannot be attributed to our reason.
It is readily granted, that the body has this share in our passions and tempers: but then the same thing must be granted of the body, in all the acts and operations of the mind. So that if our desires and aversions cannot be imputed to our reason, because of the joint operation of the animal spirits in them; no more can syllogisms and demonstrations be attributed to our reason, because the operation of bodily spirits concurreth in the forming of them.
For the most abstract thought, and speculation of the mind, has as truly theconjunctoperation of bodily spirits, as our strongest desires or aversions. And it is as much owing to the state of the body, that such speculations are what they are, as it is owing to the state of the body, that such passions are what they are.
For the motions of the bodily spirits are inseparable from, and according to, the state and action of the mind: when reason is in speculation of a trifle, they concur but weakly; when reason speculates intensely, their operation is increased. And sometimes the attention of the mind is so great, and has so engaged and called in all the animal spirits to its assistance, that the operations of our senses are suspended, and we neither see, nor feel, till the attention of the mind has let the spirits return to all the parts of the body.
Now will any one say, that these intense thoughts are less the acts of the mind, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits,than when it is acting with indifference, and so has a lesser quantity of bodily spirits?
Yet this might as well be said, as to say, that the assent or dissent, in speculation, is the act of our reason; but liking or disliking, loving or hating, are not the acts of our reason, because they have a greater concurrence of bodily spirits.
For, as the mind is in a different state when it desires good, or fears evil, from what it is when it only compares two triangles; so the motions of the bodily spirits, have onlysucha difference, as iscorrespondentto these two states of the mind. They act and join as much in comparing the triangles, as in the desire of good, or fear of evil. And the mind is just as much governed by the body, in its passions, as in its calmest contemplations.
For as the gentle operation of the animal spirits is then correspondent to the state and action of the mind; so in all our passions, the strong and increased motion of the animal spirits, is equally correspondent thereto.
So that reason is no more the agent, in our tempers and passions, than in our dry and sedate speculations.
It may happen, that a man may have as great an eagerness in solving a mathematical problem, as another hath to obtain any great good, or avoid any great evil.
But may it therefore be said, that it is not reason that solves the problem, because the bodily spirits are so active in it?
To draw now some plain consequences from the foregoing account.
First, If reason be theuniversal agentin the natural man; if all the difference amongsuchmen, is only such a difference as reason makes, then nothing can be more extravagant, than to affirm any thing concerning the degree of perfection, or imperfection of reason, ascommonto man. It is as wild and romantic, as to pretend to state the measure of folly and wisdom, of fear and courage, of pride and humility, of good humour and ill-humour,commonto mankind: for as these states of the mind, are only so many different states of reason; so no uncertainty belongs to them, but what, in thesame degree, belongs toreason.
Secondly, Granting that all matters of religion must be agreeable toright, unprejudicedreason; yet this could be no ground for receiving nothing in religion, but whathumanreason could prove to be necessary; forhumanreason is no moreright, unprejudicedreason, than a sinner issinless, or a man anangel.
Granting again, that a man may go a great way towards rectifying his reason, and laying aside its prejudices; yet no particular man can be abetter judgeof the rectitude of hisown reason, than he is of the rectitude of his ownself-love,the brightness of his ownparts, and the depth of his ownjudgment.
For there is nothing to deceive him inself-love, in the opinion of hisown merit,wit, andjudgment, but what has the same power to deceive him, in the opinion of his own reason. And if, as our author says, “It be the fate of most sects to be the fondest of their ugliest brats.”¹None seem so inevitably exposed to this fatality, as those whose religion is to have no form, but such as it receives from their own hearts.
¹Page 184.
¹Page 184.
¹Page 184.
Thirdly, A man that has his religion to chuse, and with this precious privilege, that he need not allow any thing to be matter of religion, but what his own reason can prove to be so, is in as fair a way to be governed by hispassions, as he that has hisconditionof life to chuse, with the liberty of taking that which his own reason directs him to.
Does any one suppose, that nothing butreasonwould direct him in the choice of his condition? Or that he would make the better choice, because he proceeded upon this maxim, that nothing could be right, but that which was agreeable to hisown reason? Or that his tempers, his prejudices, his self-love, his passions, his partiality, would have no influence upon his choice, becausehe had resigned himself up to hisown reason?
Now it is just the same in the choice of a religion, as in the choice of a condition of life: as it is not a matter of speculation, but ofgoodandevil; so if it is left to be determined by ourown reason, it rather appeals to ourtempers, than employs our reason; and to resign ourselves up to our own reason, to tell us what ought, or ought not to be a matter of religion, is only resigning ourselves up to our tempers,♦to take what welike, and refuse what wedislikein religion.
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* In a word; whenself-loveis a proper arbitrator betwixt a man and his adversary; whenrevengeis a just judge of meekness; whenprideis a true lover of humility; whenfalshoodis a teacher of truth; when lust is a fast friend of chastity; when thefleshleads to the spirit; whensensualitydelights in self-denial; whenpartialityis a promoter of equity; when thepalatecan taste the difference between sin and holiness; when thehandcan feel the truth of a proposition; then mayhuman reasonbe a proper arbitrator between God and man, the sole, final, just judge of all that ought, or ought not to be a matter of aholy,divine, andheavenlyreligion.
Lastly, If this be the state of reason, then to pretend, that our reason, is too perfect to be governed by any thing but its own light, is the sameextravagance, as to pretend, that our love is too pure to be governed by any thing but its own inclinations, our hatred too just to be governed by any thing but its own motions. For if all that is base and criminal in love, all that is unjust and wicked in hatred, is to be imputed to our reason; then no perfection can be ascribed to our reason, but such as is to be ascribed to our love and hatred.