Chapter 11

"Nature never did betrayThe heart that loved her; 'tis her privilege,Through all the years of this our life, to leadFrom joy to joy; for she can so informThe mind that is within us, so impressWith quietness and beauty, and so feedWith lofty thoughts, that neither evil tongues,Rash judgments, nor the sneers of selfish men,Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor allThe dreary intercourse of daily life,Shall e'er prevail against us, or disturbOur cheerful faith, that all which we beholdIs full of blessings. Therefore, let the moonShine on thee in thy solitary walk;And let the misty mountain winds be freeTo blow against thee: and, in after years,When these wild ecstasies shall be maturedInto a sober pleasure, when thy mindShall be a mansion for all lovely forms,Thy memory be as a dwelling-placeFor all sweet sounds and harmonies; oh then,If solitude, or fear, or pain, or grief,Should be thy portion, with what healing thoughtsOf tender joy wilt thou remember meAnd these my exhortations!"

Note XXXII., page241.

No best possible Created System.

Dante has given magnificent expression to the truth that no created system can be absolutely perfect:—

"Colui che volse il sestoAllo stremo del mondo, e dentro ad essoDistinse tanto occulto e manifesto,Non poteo suo valor si fare impressoIn tutto l'universo, che il suo verboNon rimanesse in infinito eccesso.E ciò fa certo, che il primo Superbo,Che fu la somma d'ogni creatura,Per non aspettar lume, cadde acerbo:E quinci appar ch' ogni minor naturaÈ corto recettacolo a quel beneChe non ha fine, e se in se misura.Dunque nostra veduta, che convieneEssere alcun de' raggi della menteDi che tutte le cose son ripiene,Non può di sua natura esser possenteTanto, che suo principio non discernaMolto di là, da quel ch' egli è, parvente.Però nella giustizia sempiternaLa vista che riceve il vostro mondo,Com' occhio per lo mare, entro s' interna;Che, benchè dalla proda veggia il fondo,In pelago nol vede; e nondimenoEgli è; ma cela lui l'esser profondo."—Del Paradiso, cant. xix. 40-63.

"He his compasses who placedAt the world's limit, and within the lineDrew beauties, dimly or distinctly traced—Could not upon the universe so writeThe impress of his power, but that His WordMust still be left in distance infinite:And hence 'tis evident that he in heavenCreated loftiest his fate incurredBecause he would not wait till light was given.And hence are all inferior creatures shownScant vessels of that Goodness unconfinedWhich nought can measure save Itself alone.Therefore our intellect—a feeble beam,Struck from the light of the Eternal Mind,With which all things throughout creation teem,—Must by its nature be incapable,Save in a low and most remote degree,Of viewing its exalted principle.Wherefore the heavenly Justice can no moreBy mortal ken be fathomed than the sea:For though the eye of one upon the shoreMay pierce its shallows, waves unfathomed boundHis further sight, yet under them is laidA bottom, viewless through the deep profound."—Wright.

Note XXXIII., page245.

Defects in the Organic World.

The objections to final causes from alleged defects in the organic world have been answered with wisdom and success by M. Janet, in his 'Causes Finales,' pp. 313-348.

The views of Professor Helmholtz as to the defects of the eye will be found stated at length in his popular lectures on scientific subjects. The chief defects enumerated are: 1. Chromatic aberration, connected with 2.Spherical aberration and defective centring of the cornea and lens, together producing the imperfection known as astigmatism; 3. Irregular radiation round the images of illuminated points; 4. Defective transparency; 5. Floating corpuscles, and 6. The "blind spot" with other gaps in the field of vision. "The eye has every possible defect that can be found in an optical instrument, and even some which are peculiar to itself." "It is not too much to say that if an optician wanted to sell me an instrument which had all these defects, I should think myself quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the strongest terms, and giving him back his instrument. Of course I shall not do this with my eyes, and shall be only too glad to keep them as long as I can—defects and all. Still, the fact that, however bad they may be, I can get no others, does not at all diminish their defects, so long as I maintain the narrow but indisputable position of a critic on purely optical grounds."

Helmholtz himself, however, points out that the defects of the eye are "all so counteracted, that the inexactness of the image which results from their presence very little exceeds, under ordinary conditions of illumination, the limits which are set to the delicacy of sensation by the dimensions of the retinal cones;" that "the adaptation of the eye to its function is most complete, and is seen in the very limits which are set to its defects." In fact, were the eye more perfect as an instrument of optical precision, it would be less perfect as an eye. Its absolute defects are practical merits. To be a useful eye it must be neither a perfect telescope nor a perfect microscope, but a something which can readily serve many purposes, and which can be supplemented by many instruments. The delicate finish of a razor renders it unfit forcutting wood. All man's senses and organs are inferior to those possessed by some of the lower animals, but the inferiority is of a kind which is a real and vast advantage. It is of a kind which allows them to be put to a greater variety of uses than could more perfect senses and organs. It is the very condition of their capacity to be utilised in manifold directions by an inventive and progressive reason. Further, no man can see at all merely with a so-called perfect optical instrument. He must have in addition the imperfect instrument, composed of a soft, watery, animal substance, and designated the eye. There is that in the eye which immeasurably transcends all mere physics and chemistry, all human mechanism and contrivance; there is life; there is vision.

Note XXXIV., page252.

Epicurean Dilemma.

The Epicurean dilemma has been often dealt with. I shall content myself with quoting Mr Bowen's remarks on the subject: "Omnipotence and benevolenceare apparently very simple and very comprehensive terms, though few are more vaguely used. The former means a power to do everything; but this does not include the ability to do two contradictory things at the same moment, or to accomplish any metaphysical impossibility. Thus, the Deity cannot cause two and two to make five, nor place two hills near each other without leaving a valley between them. The impossibility in such cases does not argue a defect of power, but an absurdity in the statement of the case to which the power is to beapplied. A statement which involves a contradiction in terms does not express a limitation of ability, because in truth it expresses nothing at all; the affirmation and the denial, uttered in the same breath, cancel each other, and no meaning remains. All metaphysical impossibilities can be reduced to the formula, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same moment, as this would be an absurdity—that is, an absurd or meaningless statement. Thus, virtue cannot exist without free agency, because a free choice between good and evil is involved in the idea ofvirtue, so that the proposition means no more than this—that what contains freedom cannot be without freedom. We cannot choose between good and evil, unless good and evil are both placed before us—that is, unless we know what these words mean; and we cannot express our choice in action, unless we are able to act—that is, unless we have the power of doing either good or evil. In the dilemma quoted from Epicurus, a contradiction in terms is held to prove a defect of power, or to disprove omnipotence; the dilemma, therefore, is a mere logical puzzle, like the celebrated one of Achilles and the tortoise.

"The meaning ofbenevolenceappears simple enough; but it is often difficult to tell whether a certain act was or was not prompted by kind intentions. Strictly speaking, of course, benevolence is a quality of mind—that is, of will (benevolo) or intention, not of outward conduct. Anactionis said to be benevolent only by metaphor; it is so called, because we infer from it, with great positiveness, that the agent must have had benevolent intentions. We think that the motives are indicated by the act; but we may be mistaken. He who gives foodto the hungry poor would be esteemed benevolent; but he may do it with a view to poison them. To strike for the avowed purpose of causing pain usually argues ill-will or a malignant design; but the blow may come from the kindest heart in the world, for the express purpose of benefiting him who receives it. In the present argument, Epicurus assumes that the presence of evil—that is, the outward fact—is enough to prove a want of benevolence, or even a malignant design, on the part of him who might have prevented it. But if by evil is here meant mere pain or suffering, whether proceeding from bodily or mental causes, we may boldly deny the inference. If pleasure or mere enjoyment is not the greatest good, if sometimes it is even inconsistent with the possession of a higher blessing, then a denial of it may be a proof of goodness instead of malice."—Metaphysical and Ethical Science, pp. 362, 363.

Note XXXV., page263.

God and Duty.

"To such readers as have reflected on man's life; who understand that for man's wellbeing Faith is properly the one thing needful; how with it martyrs, otherwise weak, can cheerfully endure the shame and the cross—and without, worldlings puke up their sick existence by suicide in the midst of luxury: to such it will be clear that for a pure moral nature the loss of religious belief is the loss of everything.

"All wounds, the crush of long-continued destitution, the stab of false friendship and of false love, all woundsin thy so genial heart, would have healed again had not its life-warmth been withdrawn.

"Well mayest thou exclaim, 'Is there no God, then; but at best an absentee God, sitting idle, ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside of His universe andseeingit go?' 'Has the word Duty no meaning? is what we call Duty no Divine messenger and guide, but a false earthly phantasm made up of desire and fear?' 'Is the heroic inspiration we name Virtue but some passion; some bubble of the blood, bubbling in the direction others profit by?' I know not; only this I know, if what thou namest Happiness be our true aim, then are we all astray. 'Behold, thou art fatherless, outcast, and the universe is—the Devil's.'"—Carlyle.

Note XXXVI., page268.

Histories of the Theistic Proofs.

There are several histories of the proofs for the Divine existence. One of the earliest is Ziegler's 'Beiträge zur Geschichte des Glaubens an das Dasein Gottes' (1792). The best known, and perhaps the most interesting, is Bouchitté's 'Histoire des Preuves de l'Existence de Dieu' (Mémoires de l'Académie, Savants Étrangers, i.), written from the Krausean point of view. The 'Geschichte der Beweise für das Dasein Gottes bis zum 14 Jahrhundert' (1875), by Alfred Tyszka, and the 'Geschichte der Beweise für das Dasein Gottes von Cartesius bis Kant' (1876), by Albert Krebs, supplement each other. There are two very able articles—partly historical, but chiefly critical—on these proofs by ProfessorKöstlin in the 'Theol. Studien und Kritiken,' H. 4, 1875, and H. 1, 1876. The most conscientious, useful, and learned history of speculation regarding Deity is, so far as is known to me, the four-volumed work of Signor Bobba, 'Storia della Filosofia intorno all' Idea di Dio.'

On the history of thea prioriproofs there may be consulted the treatise of Fischer, 'Der ontologische Beweis f. d. Dasein Gottes u. s. Geschichte,' 1852, and an article of Seydel, "Der gesch. Eintritt ontologischer Beweisführing," &c. (Tr. f. Ph. H. i. 1858). In Hase's 'Life of Anselm' (of which there is an English translation) there is a good account of Anselm's argument. There is also a translation of the 'Proslogion,' with Gaunilo's objections and Anselm's reply, in the 'Bibliotheca Sacra,' 1851. On the Cartesian proofs there is a special work by Huber, 'Die cartes. Beweise v. Dasein Gottes' (1854).

Hegel's 'Vorlesungen über d. Beweise f. d. Dasein Gottes' are of great interest and value in various respects; but his view of the historical succession of the proofs does not appear to me to be tenable.

Note XXXVII., page269.

A prioriProof not Proof from a Cause.

The philosophers and theologians who have supposeda prioriproof to be proof from a cause or antecedent existence, have, of course, denied that there can be anya prioriproof of the Divine existence. Aristotle laid down as a rule that demonstration must proceed from things prior to and the causes of the things to bedemonstrated, and those who assented to this rule necessarily denied the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God. The assertion of Clemens of Alexandria that "God cannot be apprehended by any demonstrative science" is indubitable, if the view of demonstration on which he rests it be correct; "for such science is from things prior and more knowable, whereas nothing can precede that which is uncreated." It is a manifest contradiction to imagine that an eternal being is subsequent to any other being, or a perfect being dependent on any other being. Even mathematical demonstration, however, is not from causes; nor is there any reason for supposing that the order of knowledge is necessarily and universally the same as the order of existence.

It is by confounding demonstration erroneously understood in the manner indicated with proof in general that not a few persons have arrived at the conclusion that the existence of God cannot be proved at all, and have deemed preposterous assertions like that of Jacobi, "A God who can be proved is no God, for the ground of proof is necessarily above the thing proved by it," both profound and pious.

Note XXXVIII., page285.

Somea prioriArguments.

I have treated of Clarke's argument in the 'Encyc. Brit.' art. "Samuel Clarke."

The demonstration of Dr Fiddes is contained in his 'Theologia Speculativa, or a Body of Divinity,' 2 vols., 1718-20. It consists of six propositions: 1. Somethingdoes now exist; 2. Something has existed eternally; 3. Something has been eternally self-existent; 4. What is self-existent must have all the perfections that exist anywhere or in any subject; 5. What is self-existent must have all possible perfections, and every perfection, in an infinite measure; 6. What has all possible perfections in an infinite measure is God. He proves his fourth proposition thus: "Since nothing can arise out of nothing, and since there can be no perfection but what has some subject of inherence, every perfection must have been eternally somewhere or other, or in one subject or other, into which it must be ultimately resolved, or else it could never have been at all; without admitting, what of all things we are the best able to conceive, an infinite progression of efficient causes—that is, an infinite series of beings derived one from another, without a beginning or any original cause at the head of the series. So that whatever perfections we observe in any being must have been originally and eternally in the self-existent being." On behalf of his fifth proposition he advances two arguments: 1. "All properties essentially follow the nature and condition of the subject, and must be commensurate to it. For this reason we say that wisdom, power, and goodness being attributes of an infinite subject, or one which is the substratum of oneinfiniteattribute, these and all the other perfections belonging to it must be infinite also. Otherwise the same subject, considered as a subject, would be infinite in one respect, and yet finite in another; which, if it be not a contradiction, seems to border so near upon one that we cannot comprehend the possibility of it." 2. "A self-existent being as the subject of any perfection cannot limit itself; because it must necessarily have existedfrom all eternity what it is, and have been the same in all properties essentially inherent in it, antecedently to any act or volition of its own. Nor can such a being be limited by anything external to it; for, besides that self-existence necessarily implies independence, properties which are essential to any subject can admit of no increase or diminution or the least imaginable change, without destroying the essence itself of the subject. Nor yet can it be said that there is any impossibility in the nature of the thing that the perfections inhering in aninfinitesubject should be in the highest or even in an infinite degree. Indeed it is scarce possible for us (for the reasons already assigned) to conceive how they should be otherwise. Neither can any such impossibility arise from the nature of the perfections themselves. If, then, the perfections of a self-existent being cannot be limited by itself, nor by anything external to it, nor from any invincible repugnancy in the nature of the perfections themselves, I conclude that the self-existent being must not only have all possible perfections, but every perfection in aninfinitedegree."

The 'Demonstration of the Existence of God against Atheists,' by the Rev. Colin Campbell, Minister of the Parish of Ardchattan, 1667-1726, has been recently printed for private circulation from a MS. now deposited in the library of Edinburgh University. The editor has added to it a learned and admirable appendix. Mr Campbell's manner of proving that there is one, and but one, infinite Being, is as follows: "As everything which hath a beginning forces confession of one who hath none—because to produce is an action, and must presuppose an actor,—by the same force of reason, we must confess that whatever is limited, or made of such and such alimited nature, is limited by something which did limit it to be such a thing, and no other. For limit is an action, and confesseth an actor. So that there must be a being anterior to all limited beings, and, consequently, some being that is not at all limited, to evite the absurd progress of running infinitely upwards unlimited beings, without a single limiter. Now, an unlimited being is the same as to say an infinite being. And so, by the force of reason, we have a being which is eternal, which is infinite. There can be but one infinite, because, were there two or more, the one would limit the other; and so the infinite would be finite, the unlimited would be limited. Therefore, the unlimited, or infinite, must be one only; and that one purely single and uncompounded, else every part of the compound would limit the other parts, so that all the parts would be limited. And a whole whose parts are limited must be limited in the whole, it being impossible that a compound or conjunction of finites can, by addition, produce an infinite, unless you imagine this complex whole to consist partly of finites, and also of some infinite. But the one infinite part, if infinite, cannot leave place for any other finite to make it up, it being itself unlimited and infinite; and such an addition would speak it limited by the part which was added. And a thousand like absurdities would follow."

Wollaston's attempted demonstration is contained in the fifth section of his 'Religion of Nature Delineated' (1725). This is a common book, and the mere reference to it must suffice.

Moses Lowman's 'Argument to prove the Unity and Perfection of Goda priori' was published in 1735, and reprinted, with a preface by Dr Pye Smith, containingan account of the author and his works, in the Cabinet Library of Scarce and Celebrated Tracts (1836). I reproduce the abstract which Dr Smith gave of this ingenious argument in his 'First Lines of Christian Theology:' "1. Positive existence is possible, for it involves no contradiction. 2. All possible existence is eithernecessary, which must be, and in its own nature cannot but be; orcontingent, which may be or not be, for in neither case is a contradiction involved. 3.Someexistence isnecessary: for, if all existence were contingent, all existence might not be as well as might be; and that thing which might not be never could be without some other thing as the prior cause of its existence, since every effect must have a cause. If, therefore, all possible existence were contingent, all existence would be impossible; because the idea or conception of it would be that of an effect without a cause, which involves a contradiction. 4. Necessary existence must beactualexistence: for necessary existence is that which must be and cannot but be—that is, it is such existence as arises from the nature of the thing in itself; and it is an evident contradiction to affirm that necessary existence might not be. 5. Necessary existence being such as must be and cannot but be, it must bealwaysand cannot but be always; for to suppose that necessary existence could begin to be, or could cease to be—that is, that a time might be in which necessary existence would not be—involves a contradiction. Therefore, necessary existence is without beginning and without end—that is, it is eternal. 6. Necessary existence must bewhereverany existence is possible: for all existence is either contingent or necessary; all contingent existence is impossible without necessary existence being previously as itscause, and wherever existence is possible it must be either of a necessary or a contingent being. Therefore, necessary existence must be wherever existence is possible—that is, it must beinfinite. 7. There can be butonenecessarily existent being; for two necessarily existent beings could in no respect whatever differ from each other—that is, they would be one and the same being. 8. The one necessarily existent being must haveall possible perfections: for all possible perfections must be the perfections of some existence; all existence is either necessary or contingent; all contingent existence is dependent upon necessary existence; consequently, all possible perfections must belong either to necessary existence or to contingent existence—that is, to contingent beings, which are caused by and are dependent upon necessary being. Therefore, since there can be but one necessarily existent being, that being must have all possible perfections. 9. The one necessarily existent being must be afree agent; for contingent existence is possible, as the conception of it involves no contradiction; but necessary existence must be the cause or producing agent of contingent existence, otherwise contingent existence would be impossible, as an effect without a cause; and necessary existence as the cause of contingent existence does not act necessarily, for then contingent existence would itself be necessary, which is absurd as involving a contradiction. Therefore necessary existence, as the cause of contingent existence, actsnot necessarilybutfreely—that is, is a free agent, which is the same thing as being anintelligent agent. 10. Therefore, there is one necessarily existent being, the cause of all contingent existence—that is, of all other existences besides himself; and this being is eternal, infinite,possessed of all possible perfections, and is an intelligent free agent—that is,this Being is God."

The demonstration of the Divine existence given by the Chevalier Ramsay is contained in the First Book of his 'Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion' (1748). It is as elaborately mathematical in form as the reasoning in Spinoza's 'Ethics,' and has continuous reference to that reasoning. It is impossible to give any distinct conception of its nature by a brief description.

The argument of Dr Hamilton, Dean of Armagh, is fully set forth in his 'Attempt to prove the Existence and Absolute Perfection of the Supreme Unoriginated Being, in a Demonstrative Manner' (1785). It assumes the "axiom" that "whatever is contingent, or might possibly have been otherwise than it is, had some cause which determined it to be what it is. Or in other words: if two different or contrary things were each of them possible, whichever of them took place, or came to pass, it must have done so in consequence of some cause which determined thatit, and notthe other, should take the place." The propositions which he endeavours to demonstrate are these: I. There must be in the universe some one being, at least, whose non-existence is impossible—whose existence had no cause, no beginning, and can have no end. II. The whole nature of the unoriginated being, or the aggregate of his attribute, is uncaused, and must be necessarily and immutably what it is; so that he cannot have any attribute or modification of his attributes but such as were the eternal and necessary concomitants of his existence. III. Whatever are the attributes of the unoriginated being, he must possess each of them unlimitedly, or in its whole extent, such asit is when considered in the abstract. IV. In whatevermannerthe unoriginated being exists or is present anywhere, he must in thelike mannerexist or be present everywhere. V. The unoriginated being is one individual uncompounded substance identically the same everywhere, and to which our ideas ofwholeandparts,magnitudeorquantity, are not applicable. VI. The unoriginated being must necessarily possess intelligence and power unlimited, and all other natural attributes that are in themselves absolute perfections. VII. There is in the universe but one unoriginated being, who must therefore be the original fountain of all existence, and the first cause of all things. VIII. All things owe their existence ultimately to the power of the first cause operating according to his free will. IX. Almighty God, the first cause and author of all things, must be a Being of infinite goodness, wisdom, mercy, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the supreme author and governor of the universe.

THE END.

PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

[1]See AppendixI.[2]See AppendixII.[3]By J. S. Mill, in the very essay in which he assailed religion by trying to show that the world had outgrown the need of it.[4]See AppendixIII.[5]See AppendixIV.[6]See AppendixV.[7]See AppendixVI.[8]See AppendixVII.[9]E. Naville, 'The Heavenly Father,' pp. 283, 284.[10]See AppendixVIII.[11]Ulrici, Gott und die Natur, i.[12]See AppendixIX.[13]See AppendixX.[14]Barrett's Physical Ethics, p. 225.[15]Three Essays on Religion, pp. 142, 143.[16]President's Address in Transactions of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1870.[17]See W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, ii. 452, 453.[18]Jevons, Principles of Science, ii. 438.[19]See AppendixXI.[20]See AppendixXII.[21]See AppendixXIII.[22]See AppendixXIV.[23]See AppendixXV.[24]See AppendixXVI.[25]See AppendixXVII.[26]See AppendixXVIII.[27]See AppendixXIX.[28]See AppendixXX.[29]See AppendixXXI.[30]Three Essays on Religion, pp. 176, 177.[31]See AppendixXXII.[32]See AppendixXXIII.[33]Lay Sermons, pp. 330, 331.[34]See AppendixXXIV.[35]See AppendixXXV.[36]See AppendixXXVI.[37]See AppendixXXVII.[38]Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107.[39]See AppendixXXVIII.[40]See AppendixXXIX.[41]See AppendixXXX.[42]See AppendixXXXI.[43]See AppendixXXXII.[44]See AppendixXXXIII.[45]See AppendixXXXIV.[46]See AppendixXXXV.[47]See AppendixXXXVI.[48]See AppendixXXXVII.[49]See AppendixXXXVIII.[50]Canon Mosley, On Miracles, Lect. IV.

[1]See AppendixI.

[2]See AppendixII.

[3]By J. S. Mill, in the very essay in which he assailed religion by trying to show that the world had outgrown the need of it.

[4]See AppendixIII.

[5]See AppendixIV.

[6]See AppendixV.

[7]See AppendixVI.

[8]See AppendixVII.

[9]E. Naville, 'The Heavenly Father,' pp. 283, 284.

[10]See AppendixVIII.

[11]Ulrici, Gott und die Natur, i.

[12]See AppendixIX.

[13]See AppendixX.

[14]Barrett's Physical Ethics, p. 225.

[15]Three Essays on Religion, pp. 142, 143.

[16]President's Address in Transactions of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1870.

[17]See W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science, ii. 452, 453.

[18]Jevons, Principles of Science, ii. 438.

[19]See AppendixXI.

[20]See AppendixXII.

[21]See AppendixXIII.

[22]See AppendixXIV.

[23]See AppendixXV.

[24]See AppendixXVI.

[25]See AppendixXVII.

[26]See AppendixXVIII.

[27]See AppendixXIX.

[28]See AppendixXX.

[29]See AppendixXXI.

[30]Three Essays on Religion, pp. 176, 177.

[31]See AppendixXXII.

[32]See AppendixXXIII.

[33]Lay Sermons, pp. 330, 331.

[34]See AppendixXXIV.

[35]See AppendixXXV.

[36]See AppendixXXVI.

[37]See AppendixXXVII.

[38]Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107.

[39]See AppendixXXVIII.

[40]See AppendixXXIX.

[41]See AppendixXXX.

[42]See AppendixXXXI.

[43]See AppendixXXXII.

[44]See AppendixXXXIII.

[45]See AppendixXXXIV.

[46]See AppendixXXXV.

[47]See AppendixXXXVI.

[48]See AppendixXXXVII.

[49]See AppendixXXXVIII.

[50]Canon Mosley, On Miracles, Lect. IV.

Transcriber's NotesVariations in spelling, punctuation and hyphenation have been retained except in obvious cases of typographical errors.The repetition of the title on the first two pages has been removed.

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