The speech which had been delivered by Mr. Benton, was intended for effect upon the country—to influence the forthcoming elections—and not with any view to act upon the Senate, still consisting of the same members who had passed the condemnatory resolution, and not expected to condemn their own act. The expunging resolution was laid upon the table, without any intention to move it again during the present session; but, on the last day of the session, when the Senate was crowded with business, and when there was hardly time to finish up the indispensable legislation, the motion was called up, and by one of its opponents—Mr. Clayton, of Delaware—the author of the motion being under the necessity to vote for the taking up, though expecting no good from it. The moment it was taken up, Mr. White, of Tennessee, moved to strike out the word "expunge," and insert "rescind, reverse, and make null and void." This motion astonished Mr. Benton. Mr. White, besides opposing all the proceedings against President Jackson, had been his personal and political friend from early youth—for the more than forty years which each of them had resided in Tennessee. He expected his aid, and felt the danger of such a defection. Mr. Benton defended his word as being strictly parliamentary, and the only one which was proper to be used when an unauthorized act is to be condemned—all other phrases admitting the legality of the act which is to be invalidated. Mr. White justified his motion on the ground that an expurgation of the journal would be its obliteration, which he deemed inconsistent with the constitutional injunction to "keep" a journal—the word "keep" beingtaken in its primary sense of "holding," "preserving," instead of "writing," a journal: but the mover of the resolution soon saw that Mr. White was not the only one of his friends who had yielded at that point—that others had given way—and, came about him importuning him to give up the obnoxious word. Seeing himself almost deserted, he yielded a mortifying and reluctant assent; and voted with others of his friends to emasculate his own motion—to reduce it from its high tone of reprobation, to the legal formula which applied to the reversal of a mere error in a legal proceeding. The moment the vote was taken, Mr. Webster rose and exulted in the victory over the hated phrase. He proclaimed the accomplishment of every thing that he desired in relation to the expunging resolution: the word was itself expunged; and he went on to triumph in the victory which had been achieved, saying:
"That which made this resolution, which we have now amended, particularly offensive, was this: it proposed to expunge our journal. It called on us to violate, to obliterate, to erase, our own records. It was calculated to fix a particular stigma, a peculiar mark of reproach or disgrace, on the resolution of March last. It was designed to distinguish it, and reprobate it, in some especial manner. Now, sir, all this most happily, is completely defeated by the almost unanimous vote of the Senate which has just now been taken. The Senate has declared, in the most emphatic manner, that its journal shall not be tampered with. I rejoice most heartily, sir, in this decisive result. It is now settled, by authority not likely to be shaken, that our records are sacred. Men may change, opinions may change, power may change, but, thanks to the firmness of the Senate, the records of this body do not change. No instructions from without, no dictates from principalities or powers, nothing—nothing can be allowed to induce the Senate to falsify its own records, to disgrace its own proceedings, or violate the rights of its members. For one, sir, I feel that we have fully and completely accomplished all that could be desired in relation to this matter. The attempt to induce the Senate to expunge its journal has failed, signally and effectually failed. The record remains, neither blurred, blotted, nor disgraced."
"That which made this resolution, which we have now amended, particularly offensive, was this: it proposed to expunge our journal. It called on us to violate, to obliterate, to erase, our own records. It was calculated to fix a particular stigma, a peculiar mark of reproach or disgrace, on the resolution of March last. It was designed to distinguish it, and reprobate it, in some especial manner. Now, sir, all this most happily, is completely defeated by the almost unanimous vote of the Senate which has just now been taken. The Senate has declared, in the most emphatic manner, that its journal shall not be tampered with. I rejoice most heartily, sir, in this decisive result. It is now settled, by authority not likely to be shaken, that our records are sacred. Men may change, opinions may change, power may change, but, thanks to the firmness of the Senate, the records of this body do not change. No instructions from without, no dictates from principalities or powers, nothing—nothing can be allowed to induce the Senate to falsify its own records, to disgrace its own proceedings, or violate the rights of its members. For one, sir, I feel that we have fully and completely accomplished all that could be desired in relation to this matter. The attempt to induce the Senate to expunge its journal has failed, signally and effectually failed. The record remains, neither blurred, blotted, nor disgraced."
And then, to secure the victory which he had gained, Mr. Webster immediately moved to lay the amended resolution on the table, with the peremptory declaration that he would not withdraw his motion for friend or foe. The resolve was laid upon the table by a vote of 27 to 20. The exulting speech of Mr. Webster restored me to my courage—made a man of me again; and the moment the vote was over, I rose and submitted the original resolution over again, with the detested word in it—to stand for the second week of the next session—with the peremptory declaration that I would never yield it again to the solicitations of friend or foe.
The bill had been reported upon the proposition of Mr. Waggaman, senator from Louisiana, and was earnestly and perseveringly opposed by Mr. Clay. He moved its indefinite postponement, and contended that the mint at Philadelphia was fully competent to do all the coinage which the country required. He denied the correctness of the argument, that the mint at New Orleans was necessary to prevent the transportation of the bullion to Philadelphia. It would find its way to the great commercial marts of the country whether coined or not. He considered it unwise and injudicious to establish these branches. He supposed it would gratify the pride of the States of North Carolina and Georgia to have them there; but when the objections to the measure were so strong, he could not consent to yield his opposition to it. He moved the indefinite postponement of the bill, and asked the yeas and nays on his motion; which were ordered.—Mr. Mangum regretted the opposition of the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), and thought it necessary to multiply the number of American coins, and bring the mints to the places of production. There was an actual loss of near four per cent. in transporting the gold bullion from the Georgia and North Carolina mines to Philadelphia for coinage. With respect to gratifying the pride of the Southern States, it was a misconception; for those States had no pride to gratify. He saw no evil in the multiplication of these mints. It was well shown by the senator from Missouri, when the bill was up before, that, in the commentaries on the constitution itwas understood that branches might be multiplied.—Mr. Frelinghuysen thought that the object of having a mint was mistaken. The mint was established for the accommodation of the government, and he thought the present one sufficient. Why put an additional burden upon the government because the people in the South have been so fortunate as to find gold?—Mr. Bedford Brown of North Carolina, said the senator from New Jersey, asked why we apply to Congress to relieve us from the burden of transporting our bullion to be coined, when the manufacturers of the North did not ask to be paid for transporting their material. He said it was true the manufacturers had not asked for this transportation assistance, but they asked for what was much more valuable, and got it—protection. The people of the South ask no protection; they rely on their own exertions; they ask but a simple act of justice—for their rights, under the power granted by the States to Congress to regulate the value of coin, and to make the coin itself. It has the exclusive privilege of Congress, and he wished to see it exercised in the spirit in which it was granted; and which was to make the coinage general for the benefit of all the sections of the Union, and not local to one section. The remark of the gentlemen is founded in mistake. What are the facts? Can the gold bullion of North Carolina be circulated as currency? We all know it cannot; it is only used as bullion, and carried to Philadelphia at a great loss. Another reason for the passage of the bill, and one which Mr. Brown hoped would not be less regarded by senators on the other side of the House, was that the measure would be auxiliary to the restoration of the metallic currency, and bring the government back to that currency which was the only one contemplated by the constitution.
Mr. Benton took the high ground of constitutional right to the establishment of these branches, and as many more as the interests of the States required. He referred to the Federalist, No. 44, written by Mr. Madison, that in surrendering the coining power to the federal government, the States did not surrender their right to have local mints. He read the passage from the number which he mentioned, and which was the exposition of the clause in the constitution relative to the coining power. It was express, and clear in the assertion, that the States were not to be put to the expense and trouble of sending their bullion and foreign coins to a central mint to be recoined; but that, as many local mints would be established under the authority of the general government as should be necessary. Upon this exposition of the meaning of the constitution, Mr. B. said, the States accepted the constitution; and it would be a fraud on them now to deny branches where they were needed. He referred to the gold mines in North Carolina, and the delay with which that State accepted the constitution, and inquired whether she would have accepted it at all, without an amendment to secure her rights, if she could have foreseen the great discoveries of gold within her limits, and the present opposition to granting her a local mint. That State, through her legislature, had applied for a branch of the mint years ago, and all that was said in her favor was equally applicable to Georgia. Mr. B. said, the reasons in the Federalist for branch mints were infinitely stronger now than when Mr. Madison wrote in 1788. Then, the Southern gold region was unknown, and the acquisition of Louisiana not dreamed of. New Orleans, and the South, now require branch mints, and claim the execution of the constitution as expounded by Mr. Madison.
Mr. B. claimed the right to the establishment of these branches as an act of justice to the people of the South and the West. Philadelphia could coin, but not diffuse the coin among them. Money was attracted to Philadelphia from the South and West, but not returned back again to those regions. Local mints alone could supply them. France had ten branch mints; Mexico had eight; the United States not one. The establishment of branches was indispensable to the diffusion of a hard-money currency, especially gold; and every friend to that currency should promote the establishment of branches.
Mr. B. said, there were six hundred machines at work coining paper money—he alluded to the six hundred banks in the United States; and only one machine at work coining gold and silver. He believed there ought to be five or six branch mints in the United States; that is, two or three more than provided for in this bill; one at Charleston, South Carolina, one at Norfolk or Richmond, Virginia, and one at New-York or Boston. The United States Bank had twenty-fourbranches; give the United States Mint five or six branches; and the name of that bank would cease to be urged upon us. Nobody would want her paper when they could get gold.
Mr. B. scouted the idea of expense on such an object as this. The expense was but inconsiderable in itself, and was nothing compared to its object. For the object was to supply the country with a safe currency,—with a constitutional currency; and currency was a thing which concerned every citizen. It was a point at which the action of government reached every human being, and bore directly upon his property, upon his labor, and upon his daily bread. The States had a good currency when this federal government was formed; it was gold and silver for common use, and large bank notes for large operations. Now the whole land is infested with a vile currency of small paper: and every citizen was more or less cheated. He himself had but two bank notes in the world, and they were both counterfeits, on the United States Bank, with St. Andrew's cross drawn through their faces. He used nothing but gold and silver since the gold bill passed.
In reply to Mr. Frelinghuysen, who asked where was the gold currency? He would answer, far the greatest part of it was in the vaults of the Bank of the United States, and its branches, to be sold or shipped to Europe; or at all events, to be kept out of circulation, to enable the friends of the bank to ask, where is the gold currency? and then call the gold bill a humbug. But he would tell the gentleman where a part of the gold was; it was in the Metropolis Bank in this city, and subject to his check to the full amount of his pay and mileage. Yes, said Mr. B., now, for the first time, Congress is paid in gold, and it is every member's own fault if he does not draw it and use it.
Mr. B. said this question concerned the South and West, and he would hope to see the representatives from these two sections united in support of the bill. He saw with pleasure, that several gentlemen from the north of the Potomac, and from New England were disposed to support it. Their help was most acceptable on a subject so near and so dear to the South and West. Every inhabitant of the South and West was personally interested in the success of the bill. From New Orleans, the new coin would ascend the Mississippi River, scatter itself all along its banks, fill all its towns, cities, and villages, branch off into the interior of the country, ascend all the tributary streams, and replenish and refresh the whole face of the land. From the Southern mints, the new gold would come into the West, and especially into Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, by the stock drivers, being to them a safe and easy remittance, and to the country a noble accession to their currency; enabling them quickly to dispense with their small notes.
It was asked, Mr. B. said, what loss has the Western People now sustained for want of gold? He would answer that the whole West was full of counterfeit paper; that counterfeit paper formed a large part of the actual circulation, especially of the United States branch drafts; that sooner or later all these counterfeits must stop in somebody's hands; and they would be sure to stop in the hands of those who were least able to bear the loss. Every trader down the Mississippi, Mr. B. said, was more or less imposed upon with counterfeit paper; some lost nearly their whole cargoes. Now if there was a branch mint in New Orleans every one would get new gold. He could get it direct from the mint; or have his gold examined there before he received it. Mr. B. said that one great object of establishing branch mints was to prevent and detect counterfeiting. Such establishments would detect every counterfeit piece, and enable every body to have recourse to a prompt and safe standard for ascertaining what was genuine and what not. This was a great reason for the ten branches in France.
Mr. B. was against the paper system. He was against all small notes. He was against all paper currency for common use; and being against it he was in favor of the measures that would put down small paper and put up gold and silver. The branching of the mint was one of the indispensable measures for accomplishing that object, and therefore he was for it. He was in favor of practical measures. Speeches alone would not do. A gentleman might make a fine speech in favor of hard money; but unless he gave votes in favor of measures to accomplish it, the speech would be inoperative. Mr. B. held the French currency to be the best in the world, where there was no bank note under 500 francs (near $100), and where, in consequence, there was a gold and silver circulation of upwards of fivehundred millions of dollars; a currency which had lately stood two revolutions and one conquest, without the least fluctuation in its quantity or value.
New Orleans, he said, occupied the most felicitous point in America for a mint. It was at the point of reception and diffusion. The specie of Mexico came there; and when there, it ascended the river into the whole West. It was the market city—the emporium of the Great Valley; and from that point every exporter of produce could receive his supply and bring it home. Mr. B. reiterated that this was a question of currency; of hard money against paper; of gold against United States Bank notes. It was a struggle with the paper system. He said the gold bill was one step; the branching the mint would be the second step; the suppression of all notes under twenty dollars would be the third step towards getting a gold and silver currency. The States could do much towards putting down small notes; the federal government could put them down, by putting the banks which issued them under theban; or, what was better, and best of all, returning to the act of 1789, which enacted that the revenues of the federal government should be received in gold and silver coin only.
The question was then put on Mr. Clay's motion for indefinite postponement—and failed—16 yeas to 27 nays. Further strenuous exertion was made to defeat the bill. Mr. Clay moved to postpone it to the ensuing week—which, being near the end of the session, would be a delay which might be fatal to it; but it came near passing—20 yeas to 22 nays. A motion was made by Mr. Clay to recommit the bill to the Committee of Finance—a motion equivalent to its abandonment for the session, which failed. Mr. Calhoun gave the bill an earnest support. He said it was a question of magnitude, and of vital importance to the South, and deserved the most serious consideration. Yet, he was sorry to say, he had seen more persevering opposition made to it than to any other measure for the last two years. It was a sectional question, but one intended to extend equal benefits to all the States—Mr. Clay said, if there had been resistance on one side, there had also been a most unparalleled, and he must say, unbounded perseverance on the other. He would repeat that in whatever light he had received the proposed measure, he had been unable to come to any other conclusion than this, that it was, in his humble judgment, delusive, uncalled for, calculated to deceive the people—to hold out ideas which would never be realized;—and as utterly unworthy of the consideration of the Senate.—Mr. Calhoun was astonished at the warmth of Mr. Clay on this question—a question as much sectional in one point of view, as a measure could be, but national in another. Let senators say what they would, this government was bound, in his opinion, to establish the mints which had been asked for. Finally, the question was taken, and carried—24 to 19—the yeas being: Messrs. Benton, Bibb, Brown, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Hendricks, Kane, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Leigh, Linn, Mangum, Morris, Porter, Preston, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster, White, Wright. The nays were: Messrs. Bell of New Hampshire, Black of Mississippi, Buchanan, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Goldsborough, Isaac Hill, Knight, McKean, Naudain, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Swift, Tipton, Tomlinson. The bill was immediately carried to the House of Representatives; and there being a large majority there in favor of the hard money policy of the administration, it was taken up and acted upon, although so near the end of the session; and easily passed.
The President had recommended to Congress the passage of an act to regulate the custody of the public moneys in the local banks, intrusted with their keeping. It was a renewal of the same recommendation made at the time of their removal, and in conformity to which the House of Representatives had passed the bill which had been defeated in the Senate. The same bill was sent up to the Senate again, and passed by a large majority: twenty-eight to twelve. The yeas were: Messrs. Benton, Black of Mississippi, Calhoun, Clayton of Delaware, Cuthbert of Georgia, Ewing of Ohio, Frelinghuysen, Goldsborough,Kent, Knight, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Mangum, Moore, Alexander Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Smith, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster, Wright. The nays were: Messrs. Bibb, Brown, Buchanan, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Morris of Ohio, Poindexter, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge. And thus, the complaint ceased which had so long prevailed against the President, on the alleged illegality of the State bank custody of the public moneys. These banks were taken as a necessity, and as a half-way house between the Bank of the United States and an Independent treasury. After a brief sojourn in the intermediate abode, they passed on to the Independent treasury—there, it is hoped, to remain for ever.
The President in his annual message at the commencement had communicated to Congress the state of our relations with France, and especially the continued failure to pay the indemnities stipulated by the treaty of 1831; and had recommended to Congress measures of reprisal against the commerce of France. The recommendation, in the House of Representatives, was referred to the committee of foreign relations, which through their chairman, Mr. Cambreling, made a report adverse to immediate resort to reprisals, and recommending contingent preparation to meet any emergency which should grow out of a continued refusal on the part of France to comply with her treaty, and make the stipulated payment. In conformity with this last recommendation, and at the suggestion of Mr. John Quincy Adams, it was resolved unanimously upon yeas and nays, or rather upon yeas, their being no nays, and 212 members voting—"That in the opinion of this House, the treaty of the 4th of July 1831 with France be maintained, and its execution insisted upon:" and, with the like unanimity it was resolved—"That preparations ought to be made to meet any emergency growing out of our relations with France." These two resolutions showed the temper of the House, and that it intended to vindicate the rights of our citizens, if necessary at the expense of war. Accordingly an appropriation of three millions of dollars was inserted by the House in the general fortification bill to enable the President to make such military and naval preparations during the recess of Congress as the state of our relations with France might require. This appropriation was zealously voted by the House: in the Senate it met with no favor; and was rejected. The House insisted on its appropriation: the Senate "adhered" to its vote: and that brought the disagreement to a committee of conference, proposed by the House. In the mean time Congress was in the expiring moments of its session; and eventually the whole appropriation for contingent preparation, and the whole fortification bill, was lost by the termination of the Congress. It was a most serious loss; and it became a question which House was responsible for such a misfortune—regrettable at all times, but particularly so in the face of our relations with France. The starting point in the road which led to this loss was the motion made by Mr. Webster to "adhere"—a harsh motion, and more calculated to estrange than to unite the two Houses. Mr. King, of Alabama, immediately took up the motion in that sense; and said:
"He very much regretted that the senator from Massachusetts should have made such a motion; it had seldom or never been resorted to until other and more gentle means had failed to produce a unity of action between the two Houses. At this stage of the proceeding it would be considered (and justly) harsh in its character; and, he had no doubt, if sanctioned by the Senate, would greatly exasperate the other House, and probably endanger the passage of the bill altogether. Are gentlemen, said Mr. K., prepared for this? Will they, at this particular juncture, in the present condition of things, take upon themselves such a fearful responsibility as the rejection of this bill might involve? For himself, if your forts are to be left unarmed, your ships unrepaired and out of commission, and your whole sea-coast exposed without defences of any kind, the responsibility should not rest upon his shoulders. It is as well, said Mr. K., to speak plainly on this subject. Our position with regard to France was known to all who heard him to be of such a character as would not, in his opinion, justify prudent men, men who look to the preservation of the rights and the honor of the nation, in withholding the means, the most ample means, to maintain those rights and preserve unimpaired that honor."Mr. K. said, while he was free to confess that the proposed appropriation was not in its terms altogether as specific as he could have wished it, he could not view it in the light which had, or seemed to have, so much alarmed the senator from Massachusetts, and others who had spoken on the subject. We are told, said Mr. K., that the adoption of the amendment made by the House will prostrate the fortress of the constitution and bury under its ruins the liberties of the people. He had too long been accustomed to the course of debate here, particularly in times of high party excitement, to pay much attention to bold assertion or violent denunciation. In what, he asked, does it violate the constitution? Does it give to the President the power of declaring war? You have been told, and told truly, by my friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. Buchanan], that this power alone belongs to Congress; nor does this bill in the slightest degree impair it. Does it authorize the raising of armies? No, not one man can be enlisted beyond the number required to fill up the ranks of your little army; and whether you pass this amendment or not, that power is already possessed under existing laws. Is it, said Mr. K., even unprecedented and unusual? A little attention to the history of our government must satisfy all who heard him, that it is neither the one nor the other."During the whole period of the administrations of General Washington and the elder Adams, all appropriations were general, applying a gross sum for the expenditure of the different departments of the government, under the direction of the President; and it was not till Mr. Jefferson came into office, that, at his recommendation, specific appropriations were adopted. Was the constitution violated, broken down, and destroyed, under the administration of the father of his country? Or did the fortress to which the senator from Massachusetts, on this occasion, clings so fondly, tumble into ruin, when millions were placed in the hands of Mr. Jefferson himself, to be disposed of for a designated object, but, in every thing else, subject to his unlimited discretion? No, said Mr. K., our liberties remained unimpaired; and, he trusted in God, would so remain for centuries yet to come. He would not urge his confidence in the distinguished individual at the head of the government as a reason why this amendment should pass; he was in favor of limiting executive discretion as far as practicable; but circumstances may present themselves, causes may exist, which would place it out of the power of Congress promptly to meet the emergency. To whom, then, should they look? Surely to the head of the government—to the man selected by the people to guard their rights and protect their interests. He put it to senators to say whether, in a possible contingency, which all would understand, our forts should not be armed, or ships put in commission? None will venture to gainsay it. Yet the extent to which such armament should be carried must, from the very necessity of the case, be left to the sound discretion of the President. From the position he occupies, no one can be so competent to form a correct judgment, and he could not, if he would, apply the money to other objects than the defences of the country. Mr. K. said he would not, at this last moment of the session, when time was so very precious, further detain the Senate than to express his deep apprehension, his alarm, lest this most important bill should be lost by this conflict between the two Houses. He would beg of senators to reflect on the disastrous consequences which might ensue. He would again entreat the senator from Massachusetts to withdraw his motion, and ask a conference, and thus leave some reasonable ground for hope of ultimate agreement on this most important subject."
"He very much regretted that the senator from Massachusetts should have made such a motion; it had seldom or never been resorted to until other and more gentle means had failed to produce a unity of action between the two Houses. At this stage of the proceeding it would be considered (and justly) harsh in its character; and, he had no doubt, if sanctioned by the Senate, would greatly exasperate the other House, and probably endanger the passage of the bill altogether. Are gentlemen, said Mr. K., prepared for this? Will they, at this particular juncture, in the present condition of things, take upon themselves such a fearful responsibility as the rejection of this bill might involve? For himself, if your forts are to be left unarmed, your ships unrepaired and out of commission, and your whole sea-coast exposed without defences of any kind, the responsibility should not rest upon his shoulders. It is as well, said Mr. K., to speak plainly on this subject. Our position with regard to France was known to all who heard him to be of such a character as would not, in his opinion, justify prudent men, men who look to the preservation of the rights and the honor of the nation, in withholding the means, the most ample means, to maintain those rights and preserve unimpaired that honor.
"Mr. K. said, while he was free to confess that the proposed appropriation was not in its terms altogether as specific as he could have wished it, he could not view it in the light which had, or seemed to have, so much alarmed the senator from Massachusetts, and others who had spoken on the subject. We are told, said Mr. K., that the adoption of the amendment made by the House will prostrate the fortress of the constitution and bury under its ruins the liberties of the people. He had too long been accustomed to the course of debate here, particularly in times of high party excitement, to pay much attention to bold assertion or violent denunciation. In what, he asked, does it violate the constitution? Does it give to the President the power of declaring war? You have been told, and told truly, by my friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. Buchanan], that this power alone belongs to Congress; nor does this bill in the slightest degree impair it. Does it authorize the raising of armies? No, not one man can be enlisted beyond the number required to fill up the ranks of your little army; and whether you pass this amendment or not, that power is already possessed under existing laws. Is it, said Mr. K., even unprecedented and unusual? A little attention to the history of our government must satisfy all who heard him, that it is neither the one nor the other.
"During the whole period of the administrations of General Washington and the elder Adams, all appropriations were general, applying a gross sum for the expenditure of the different departments of the government, under the direction of the President; and it was not till Mr. Jefferson came into office, that, at his recommendation, specific appropriations were adopted. Was the constitution violated, broken down, and destroyed, under the administration of the father of his country? Or did the fortress to which the senator from Massachusetts, on this occasion, clings so fondly, tumble into ruin, when millions were placed in the hands of Mr. Jefferson himself, to be disposed of for a designated object, but, in every thing else, subject to his unlimited discretion? No, said Mr. K., our liberties remained unimpaired; and, he trusted in God, would so remain for centuries yet to come. He would not urge his confidence in the distinguished individual at the head of the government as a reason why this amendment should pass; he was in favor of limiting executive discretion as far as practicable; but circumstances may present themselves, causes may exist, which would place it out of the power of Congress promptly to meet the emergency. To whom, then, should they look? Surely to the head of the government—to the man selected by the people to guard their rights and protect their interests. He put it to senators to say whether, in a possible contingency, which all would understand, our forts should not be armed, or ships put in commission? None will venture to gainsay it. Yet the extent to which such armament should be carried must, from the very necessity of the case, be left to the sound discretion of the President. From the position he occupies, no one can be so competent to form a correct judgment, and he could not, if he would, apply the money to other objects than the defences of the country. Mr. K. said he would not, at this last moment of the session, when time was so very precious, further detain the Senate than to express his deep apprehension, his alarm, lest this most important bill should be lost by this conflict between the two Houses. He would beg of senators to reflect on the disastrous consequences which might ensue. He would again entreat the senator from Massachusetts to withdraw his motion, and ask a conference, and thus leave some reasonable ground for hope of ultimate agreement on this most important subject."
The motion was persisted in, and the "adherence" carried by a vote of twenty-nine to seventeen. The yeas and nays were:
Yeas.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Leigh, Mangum, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster, White.—29.Nays.—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Buchanan, Cuthbert, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, McKean, Ruggles, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, Wright.—17.
Yeas.—Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Leigh, Mangum, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster, White.—29.
Nays.—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Buchanan, Cuthbert, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, McKean, Ruggles, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, Wright.—17.
Upon being notified of this vote, the House took the conciliatory step of "insisting;" and asked a "conference." The Senate agreed to the request—appointed a committee on its part, which was met by another on the part of the House, which could not agree about the three millions; and while engaged in these attempts at concord, the existence of the Congress terminated. It was after midnight; the morning of the fourth of March had commenced; many members said their power was at an end—others that it would continue till twelve o'clock, noon; for it was that hour, on the 3d of March, 1789, that the first Congress commenced its existence, and that day should only be counted half, and the half of the next day taken to make out two complete years for each Congress. To this it was answered that, in law, there are no fractions of a day; that the whole day counted in a legal transaction: in the birth of a measure or of a man. The first day that the first Congress sat was the day of its birth, without looking to the hour at which it formed a quorum; the day a man was born was the day of his birth, and he countedfrom the beginning of the day, and the whole day, and not from the hour and minute at which he entered the world—a rule which would rob all the afternoon-born children of more or less of the day on which they were born, and postpone their majority until the day after their birthday. While these disquisitions were going on, many members were going off; and the Senate hearing nothing from the House, dispatched a message to it, on the motion of Mr. Webster, "respectfully to remind it" of the disagreement on the fortification bill; on receiving which message, Mr. Cambreleng, chairman of conference, on the part of the House, stood up and said:
"That the committee of conference of the two Houses had met, and had concurred in an amendment which was very unsatisfactory to him. It proposed an unconditional appropriation of three hundred thousand dollars for arming the fortifications, and five hundred thousand dollars for repairs of and equipping our vessels of war—an amount totally inadequate, if it should be required, and more than was necessary, if it should not be. When he came into the House from the conference, they were calling the ayes and noes on the resolution to pay the compensation due the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Letcher). He voted on that resolution, but there was no quorum voting. On a subsequent proposition to adjourn, the ayes and noes were called, and again there was no quorum voting. Under such circumstances, and at two o'clock in the morning, he did not feel authorized to present to the House an appropriation of eight hundred thousand dollars. He regretted the loss, not only of the appropriation for the defence of the country, but of the whole fortification bill; but let the responsibility fall where it ought—on the Senate of the United States. The House had discharged its duty to the country. It had sent the fortification bill to the Senate, with an additional appropriation, entirely for the defence of the country. The Senate had rejected that appropriation, without even deigning to propose any amendment whatever, either in form or amount. The House sent it a second time; and a second time no amendment was proposed, but the reverse; the Senate adhered, without condescending to ask even a conference. Had that body asked a conference, in the first instance, some provision would have been made for defence, and the fortification bill would have been saved before the hour arrived which terminated the existence of the present House of Representatives. As it was, the committees did not concur till this House had ceased to exist—the ayes and noes had been twice taken without a quorum—the bill was evidently lost, and the Senate must take the responsibility of leaving the country defenceless. He could not feel authorized to report the bill to the House, situated as it was, and at this hour in the morning; but if any other member of the committee of conference proposed to do it, he should make no objection, though he believed such a proposition utterly ineffectual at this hour; for no member could, at this hour in the morning, be compelled to vote."
"That the committee of conference of the two Houses had met, and had concurred in an amendment which was very unsatisfactory to him. It proposed an unconditional appropriation of three hundred thousand dollars for arming the fortifications, and five hundred thousand dollars for repairs of and equipping our vessels of war—an amount totally inadequate, if it should be required, and more than was necessary, if it should not be. When he came into the House from the conference, they were calling the ayes and noes on the resolution to pay the compensation due the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Letcher). He voted on that resolution, but there was no quorum voting. On a subsequent proposition to adjourn, the ayes and noes were called, and again there was no quorum voting. Under such circumstances, and at two o'clock in the morning, he did not feel authorized to present to the House an appropriation of eight hundred thousand dollars. He regretted the loss, not only of the appropriation for the defence of the country, but of the whole fortification bill; but let the responsibility fall where it ought—on the Senate of the United States. The House had discharged its duty to the country. It had sent the fortification bill to the Senate, with an additional appropriation, entirely for the defence of the country. The Senate had rejected that appropriation, without even deigning to propose any amendment whatever, either in form or amount. The House sent it a second time; and a second time no amendment was proposed, but the reverse; the Senate adhered, without condescending to ask even a conference. Had that body asked a conference, in the first instance, some provision would have been made for defence, and the fortification bill would have been saved before the hour arrived which terminated the existence of the present House of Representatives. As it was, the committees did not concur till this House had ceased to exist—the ayes and noes had been twice taken without a quorum—the bill was evidently lost, and the Senate must take the responsibility of leaving the country defenceless. He could not feel authorized to report the bill to the House, situated as it was, and at this hour in the morning; but if any other member of the committee of conference proposed to do it, he should make no objection, though he believed such a proposition utterly ineffectual at this hour; for no member could, at this hour in the morning, be compelled to vote."
Many members said the time was out, and that there had been no quorum for two hours. A count was had, and a quorum not found. The members were requested to pass through tellers, and did so: only eight-two present. Mr. John Y. Mason informed the House that the Senate had adjourned; then the House did the same—making the adjournment in due form, after a vote of thanks to the speaker, and hearing his parting address in return.
Propositions for distributing the public land revenue among the States, had become common, to be succeeded by others to distribute the lands themselves, and finally the Custom House revenue, as well as that of the lands. The progress of distribution was natural and inevitable in that direction, when once begun. Mr. Calhoun and his friends had opposed these proposed distributions as unconstitutional, as well as demoralizing but after his junction with Mr. Clay, he began to favor them; but still with the salvo of an amendment to the constitution. With this view, in the latter part of the session of 1835, he moved a resolution of inquiry into the extent of executive patronage, the increase of public expenditure, and the increase of the number of persons employed or fed by the federal government; and he asked for a select committee of six to report upon his resolution. Both motions were granted by the Senate; and, according to parliamentary law, and the principles of fair legislation (which always accord a committee favorable to the object proposed), the members of the committee were appointed upon the selection of the six which he wished. They were: Messrs. Webster, Southard, Bibb, King of Georgia, and Benton—which, with himself, would make six. Mr. Webster declined, and Mr. Poindexter was appointed in his place; Mr. Southarddid not act; and the committee, consisting of five, stood, politically, three against the administration—two for it; and was thus a frustration of Mr. Calhoun's plan of having an impartial committee, taken equally from the three political parties. He had proposed the committee upon the basis of three political parties in the Senate, desiring to have two members from each party; giving as a reason for that desire, that he wished to go into the examination of the important inquiry proposed, with a committee free from all prejudice, and calculated to give it an impartial consideration. This division into three parties was not to the taste of all the members; and hence the refusal of some to serve upon it. It was the first time that the existence of three parties was proposed to be made the basis of senatorial action, and did not succeed. The actual committee classed democratically, but with the majority opposed to the administration.
At the first meeting a sub-committee of three was formed—Mr. Calhoun of course at its head—to draw up a report for the consideration of the full committee: and of this sub-committee a majority was against the administration. Very soon the committee was assembled to hear the report read. I was surprised at it—both at the quickness of the preparation and the character of the paper. It was an elaborate, ingenious and plausible attack upon the administration, accusing it of having doubled the expenses of the government—of having doubled the number of persons employed or supported by it—of holding the public moneys in illegal custody—of exercising a patronage tending to corruption—the whole the result of an over full treasury, which there was no way to deplete but by a distribution of the surplus revenue among the States; for which purpose an amendment of the constitution would be necessary; and was proposed. Mr. Benton heard the reading in silence; and when finished declared his dissent to it: said he should make no minority report—a kind of reports which he always disliked; but when read in the Senate he should rise in his place and oppose it. Mr. King, of Georgia, sided with Mr. Benton; and thus the report went in. Mr. Calhoun read it himself at the secretary's table, and moved its printing. Mr. Poindexter moved an extra number of 30,000 copies; and spoke at length in support of his motion, and in favor of the report. Mr. King, of Georgia, followed him against the report: and Mr. Benton followed Mr. King on the same side. On the subject of the increase of expenditures doubled within the time mentioned, he showed that it came from extraordinary objects, not belonging to the expenses of the government, but temporary in their nature and transient in their existence; namely, the expenses of removing the Indians, the Indian war upon the Mississippi, and the pension act of 1832; which carried up the revolutionary pensions from $355,000 per annum to $3,500,000—just tenfold—and by an act which the friends of the administration opposed. He showed also that the increase in the number of persons employed, or supported by the government, came in a great degree from the same measure which carried up the number of pensioners from 17,000 to 40,000. On the subject of the illegal custody of the public moneys, it was shown, in the first place, that the custody was not illegal; and, in the second, that the deposit regulation bill had been defeated in the Senate by the opponents of the administration. Having vindicated the administration from the charge of extravagance, and the illegal custody of the public moneys, Mr. Benton came to the main part of the report—the surplus in the treasury, its distribution for eight years among the States (just the period to cover two presidential elections); and the proposed amendment to the constitution to permit that distribution to be made: and here it is right that the report should be allowed to speak for itself. Having assumed the annual surplus to be nine millions for eight years—until the compromise of 1833 worked out its problem;—that this surplus was inevitable, and that there was no legitimate object of federal care on which it could be expended, the report brought out distribution as the only practical depletion of the treasury, and the only remedy for the corruptions which an exuberant treasury engendered. It proceeded thus:
"But if no subject of expenditure can be selected on which the surplus can be safely expended, and if neither the revenue nor expenditure can, under existing circumstances, be reduced, the next inquiry is, what is to be done with the surplus, which, as has been shown, will probably equal, on an average, for the next eight years, the sum of $9,000,000 beyond the just wants of the government? A surplus of which, unless some safe disposition can be made, all other means of reducing the patronage of the Executive must prove ineffectual."Your committee are deeply sensible of the great difficulty of finding any satisfactory solution of this question; but believing that the very existence of our institutions, and with them the liberty of the country, may depend on the success of their investigation, they have carefully explored the whole ground, and the result of their inquiry is, that but one means has occurred to them holding out any reasonable prospect of success. A few preliminary remarks will be necessary to explain their views."Amidst all the difficulties of our situation, there is one consolation: that the danger from Executive patronage, as far as it depends on excess of revenue, must be temporary. Assuming that the act of 2d of March, 1833, will be left undisturbed, by its provisions the income, after the year 1842, is to be reduced to the economical wants of the government. The government, then, is in a state of passage from one where the revenue is excessive, to another in which, at a fixed and no distant period, it will be reduced to its proper limits. The difficulty in the intermediate time is, that the revenue cannot be brought down to the expenditure, nor the expenditure, without great danger, raised to the revenue, for reasons already explained. How is this difficulty to be overcome? It might seem that the simple and natural means would be, to vest the surplus in some safe and profitable stock, to accumulate for future use; but the difficulty in such a course will, on examination, be found insuperable."At the very commencement, in selecting the stock, there would be great, if not insurmountable, difficulties. No one would think of investing the surplus in bank stock, against which there are so many and such decisive reasons that it is not deemed necessary to state them; nor would the objections be less decisive against vesting in the stock of the States, which would create the dangerous relation of debtor and creditor between the government and the members of the Union. But suppose this difficulty surmounted, and that some stock perfectly safe was selected, there would still remain another that could not be surmounted. There cannot be found a stock, with an interest in its favor sufficiently strong to compete with the interests which, with a large surplus revenue, will be ever found in favor of expenditures. It must be perfectly obvious to all who have the least experience, or who will duly reflect on the subject, that were a fund selected in which to vest the surplus revenue for future use, there would be found in practice a constant conflict between the interest in favor of some local or favorite scheme of expenditure, and that in favor of the stock. Nor can it be less obvious that, in point of fact, the former would prove far stronger than the latter. The result is obvious. The surplus, be it ever so great, would be absorbed by appropriations, instead of being vested in the stock; and the scheme, of course, would, in practice, prove an abortion; which brings us back to the original inquiry, how is the surplus to be disposed of until the excess shall be reduced to the just and economical wants of the government?"After bestowing on this question, on the successful solution of which so much depends, the most deliberate attention, your committee, as they have already stated, can advise but one means by which it can be effected; and that is, an amendment of the constitution, authorizing the temporary distribution of the surplus revenue among the States till the year 1843; when, as has been shown, the income and expenditure will be equalized."Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the distribution of the surplus revenue among the States, considered as a part of the ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as great as can well be imagined. The proposition itself, that the government should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a surplus for the purpose of perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation; and yet what would be when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply disordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition; just as some potent medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Distribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of perpetuating a system of duties or taxes; but a temporary measure to dispose of an unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and which cannot be otherwise disposed of, without greatly aggravating a disease that threatens the most dangerous consequences; and which holds out hope, not only of arresting its further progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a state of health and vigor. The truth of this assertion a few observations will suffice to illustrate."It must be obvious, on a little reflection, that the effects of distribution of the surplus would be to place the interests of the States, on all questions of expenditure, in opposition to expenditure, as every reduction of expense would necessarily increase the sum to be distributed among the States. The effect of this would be convert them, through their interests, into faithful and vigilant sentinels on the side of economy and accountability in the expenditures of this government; and would thus powerfully tend to restore the government, in its fiscal action, to the plain and honest simplicity of former days."It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution among the States would bring to bear against the expenditure and its consequent tendency to retrenchthe disbursements of the government, would be so strong, as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the useful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence, if the process were too long continued; but in the present irregular and excessive action of the system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this government will be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the government, its effect would be like that of some powerful alterative medicine operating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character."But it may be objected that, though the distribution might reduce all useless expenditure, it would at the same time give additional power to the interest in favor of taxation. It is not denied that such would be its tendency; and, if the danger from increased duties or taxes was at this time as great as that from a surplus revenue, the objection would be fatal; but it is confidently believed that such is not the case. On the contrary, in proposing the measure, it is assumed that the act of March 2, 1833, will remain undisturbed. It is on the strength of this assumption that the measure is proposed, and, as it is believed, safely proposed."It may, however, be said that the distribution may create, on the part of the States, an appetite in its favor which may ultimately lead to its adoption as a permanent measure. It may indeed tend to excite such an appetite, short as is the period proposed for its operation; but it is obvious that this danger is far more than countervailed by the fact that the proposed amendment to the constitution to authorize the distribution would place the power beyond the reach of legislative construction; and thus effectually prevent the possibility of its adoption as a permanent measure; as it cannot be conceived that three-fourths of the States will ever assent to an amendment of the constitution to authorize a distribution, except as an extraordinary measure, applicable to some extraordinary condition of the country like the present."Giving, however, to these and other objections which may be urged, all the force that can be claimed for them, it must be remembered the question is not whether the measure proposed is or is not liable to this or that objection, but whether any other less objectionable can be devised; or rather, whether there is any other, which promises the least prospect of relief, that can be applied. Let not the delusion prevail that the disease, after running through its natural course, will terminate of itself, without fatal consequences. Experience is opposed to such anticipations. Many and striking are the examples of free States perishing under that excess of patronage which now afflicts ours. It may, in fact, be said with truth, that all or nearly all diseases which afflict free governments may be traced directly or indirectly to excess of revenue and expenditure; the effect of which is to rally around the government a powerful, corrupt, and subservient corps—a corps ever obedient to its will, and ready to sustain it in every measure, whether right or wrong; and which, if the cause of the disease be not eradicated, must ultimately render the government stronger than the people."What progress this dangerous disease has already made in our country it is not for your committee to say; but when they reflect on the present symptoms; on the almost unbounded extent of executive patronage, wielded by a single will; the surplus revenue, which cannot be reduced within proper limits in less than seven years—a period which covers two presidential elections, on both of which all this mighty power and influence will be brought to bear; and when they consider that, with the vast patronage and influence of this government, that of all the States acting in concert with it will be combined, there are just grounds to fear that the fate which has befallen so many other free governments must also befall ours, unless, indeed, some effectual remedy be forthwith applied. It is under this impression that your committee have suggested the one proposal; not as free from all objections, but as the only one of sufficient power to arrest the disease and to restore the body politic to a sound condition; and they have accordingly reported a resolution so to amend the constitution that the money remaining in the treasury at the end of each year till the 1st of January, 1843, deducting therefrom the sum of $2,000,000 to meet current and contingent expenses, shall annually be distributed among the States and Territories, including the District of Columbia; and, for that purpose, the sum to be distributed to be divided into as many shares as there are senators and representatives in Congress, adding two for each territory and two for the District of Columbia; and that there shall be allotted to each State a number of shares equal to its representation in both Houses, and to the territories, including the District of Columbia, two shares each. Supposing the surplus to be distributed should average $9,000,000 annually, as estimated, it would give to each share $30,405; which multiplied by the number of senators and representatives from a State will show the amount to which any State will be entitled."
"But if no subject of expenditure can be selected on which the surplus can be safely expended, and if neither the revenue nor expenditure can, under existing circumstances, be reduced, the next inquiry is, what is to be done with the surplus, which, as has been shown, will probably equal, on an average, for the next eight years, the sum of $9,000,000 beyond the just wants of the government? A surplus of which, unless some safe disposition can be made, all other means of reducing the patronage of the Executive must prove ineffectual.
"Your committee are deeply sensible of the great difficulty of finding any satisfactory solution of this question; but believing that the very existence of our institutions, and with them the liberty of the country, may depend on the success of their investigation, they have carefully explored the whole ground, and the result of their inquiry is, that but one means has occurred to them holding out any reasonable prospect of success. A few preliminary remarks will be necessary to explain their views.
"Amidst all the difficulties of our situation, there is one consolation: that the danger from Executive patronage, as far as it depends on excess of revenue, must be temporary. Assuming that the act of 2d of March, 1833, will be left undisturbed, by its provisions the income, after the year 1842, is to be reduced to the economical wants of the government. The government, then, is in a state of passage from one where the revenue is excessive, to another in which, at a fixed and no distant period, it will be reduced to its proper limits. The difficulty in the intermediate time is, that the revenue cannot be brought down to the expenditure, nor the expenditure, without great danger, raised to the revenue, for reasons already explained. How is this difficulty to be overcome? It might seem that the simple and natural means would be, to vest the surplus in some safe and profitable stock, to accumulate for future use; but the difficulty in such a course will, on examination, be found insuperable.
"At the very commencement, in selecting the stock, there would be great, if not insurmountable, difficulties. No one would think of investing the surplus in bank stock, against which there are so many and such decisive reasons that it is not deemed necessary to state them; nor would the objections be less decisive against vesting in the stock of the States, which would create the dangerous relation of debtor and creditor between the government and the members of the Union. But suppose this difficulty surmounted, and that some stock perfectly safe was selected, there would still remain another that could not be surmounted. There cannot be found a stock, with an interest in its favor sufficiently strong to compete with the interests which, with a large surplus revenue, will be ever found in favor of expenditures. It must be perfectly obvious to all who have the least experience, or who will duly reflect on the subject, that were a fund selected in which to vest the surplus revenue for future use, there would be found in practice a constant conflict between the interest in favor of some local or favorite scheme of expenditure, and that in favor of the stock. Nor can it be less obvious that, in point of fact, the former would prove far stronger than the latter. The result is obvious. The surplus, be it ever so great, would be absorbed by appropriations, instead of being vested in the stock; and the scheme, of course, would, in practice, prove an abortion; which brings us back to the original inquiry, how is the surplus to be disposed of until the excess shall be reduced to the just and economical wants of the government?
"After bestowing on this question, on the successful solution of which so much depends, the most deliberate attention, your committee, as they have already stated, can advise but one means by which it can be effected; and that is, an amendment of the constitution, authorizing the temporary distribution of the surplus revenue among the States till the year 1843; when, as has been shown, the income and expenditure will be equalized.
"Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the distribution of the surplus revenue among the States, considered as a part of the ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as great as can well be imagined. The proposition itself, that the government should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a surplus for the purpose of perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation; and yet what would be when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply disordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition; just as some potent medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Distribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of perpetuating a system of duties or taxes; but a temporary measure to dispose of an unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and which cannot be otherwise disposed of, without greatly aggravating a disease that threatens the most dangerous consequences; and which holds out hope, not only of arresting its further progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a state of health and vigor. The truth of this assertion a few observations will suffice to illustrate.
"It must be obvious, on a little reflection, that the effects of distribution of the surplus would be to place the interests of the States, on all questions of expenditure, in opposition to expenditure, as every reduction of expense would necessarily increase the sum to be distributed among the States. The effect of this would be convert them, through their interests, into faithful and vigilant sentinels on the side of economy and accountability in the expenditures of this government; and would thus powerfully tend to restore the government, in its fiscal action, to the plain and honest simplicity of former days.
"It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution among the States would bring to bear against the expenditure and its consequent tendency to retrenchthe disbursements of the government, would be so strong, as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the useful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence, if the process were too long continued; but in the present irregular and excessive action of the system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this government will be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the government, its effect would be like that of some powerful alterative medicine operating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character.
"But it may be objected that, though the distribution might reduce all useless expenditure, it would at the same time give additional power to the interest in favor of taxation. It is not denied that such would be its tendency; and, if the danger from increased duties or taxes was at this time as great as that from a surplus revenue, the objection would be fatal; but it is confidently believed that such is not the case. On the contrary, in proposing the measure, it is assumed that the act of March 2, 1833, will remain undisturbed. It is on the strength of this assumption that the measure is proposed, and, as it is believed, safely proposed.
"It may, however, be said that the distribution may create, on the part of the States, an appetite in its favor which may ultimately lead to its adoption as a permanent measure. It may indeed tend to excite such an appetite, short as is the period proposed for its operation; but it is obvious that this danger is far more than countervailed by the fact that the proposed amendment to the constitution to authorize the distribution would place the power beyond the reach of legislative construction; and thus effectually prevent the possibility of its adoption as a permanent measure; as it cannot be conceived that three-fourths of the States will ever assent to an amendment of the constitution to authorize a distribution, except as an extraordinary measure, applicable to some extraordinary condition of the country like the present.
"Giving, however, to these and other objections which may be urged, all the force that can be claimed for them, it must be remembered the question is not whether the measure proposed is or is not liable to this or that objection, but whether any other less objectionable can be devised; or rather, whether there is any other, which promises the least prospect of relief, that can be applied. Let not the delusion prevail that the disease, after running through its natural course, will terminate of itself, without fatal consequences. Experience is opposed to such anticipations. Many and striking are the examples of free States perishing under that excess of patronage which now afflicts ours. It may, in fact, be said with truth, that all or nearly all diseases which afflict free governments may be traced directly or indirectly to excess of revenue and expenditure; the effect of which is to rally around the government a powerful, corrupt, and subservient corps—a corps ever obedient to its will, and ready to sustain it in every measure, whether right or wrong; and which, if the cause of the disease be not eradicated, must ultimately render the government stronger than the people.
"What progress this dangerous disease has already made in our country it is not for your committee to say; but when they reflect on the present symptoms; on the almost unbounded extent of executive patronage, wielded by a single will; the surplus revenue, which cannot be reduced within proper limits in less than seven years—a period which covers two presidential elections, on both of which all this mighty power and influence will be brought to bear; and when they consider that, with the vast patronage and influence of this government, that of all the States acting in concert with it will be combined, there are just grounds to fear that the fate which has befallen so many other free governments must also befall ours, unless, indeed, some effectual remedy be forthwith applied. It is under this impression that your committee have suggested the one proposal; not as free from all objections, but as the only one of sufficient power to arrest the disease and to restore the body politic to a sound condition; and they have accordingly reported a resolution so to amend the constitution that the money remaining in the treasury at the end of each year till the 1st of January, 1843, deducting therefrom the sum of $2,000,000 to meet current and contingent expenses, shall annually be distributed among the States and Territories, including the District of Columbia; and, for that purpose, the sum to be distributed to be divided into as many shares as there are senators and representatives in Congress, adding two for each territory and two for the District of Columbia; and that there shall be allotted to each State a number of shares equal to its representation in both Houses, and to the territories, including the District of Columbia, two shares each. Supposing the surplus to be distributed should average $9,000,000 annually, as estimated, it would give to each share $30,405; which multiplied by the number of senators and representatives from a State will show the amount to which any State will be entitled."
The report being here introduced to speak for itself, the reply also is introduced as delivered upon the instant, and found in the Congress register of debates, thus: