It is seen, then, by these extracts, that the opposers of the resolutions did not charge upon them, nor their supporters in any manner contend for, any principle like that of nullification; that, on the contrary, the supporters of the resolutions, so far from the absurd proposition that each State could, for itself, annul the acts of Congress, and to that extent stop the operation of the federal government, they did not recognize that power in a majority of the States, nor even in all the States together, by any extra-constitutional combination or process, or to annul a law otherwise than through the prescribed forms of legislative repeal, or constitutional amendment.
The resolutions were, however, vigorously assailed by the federal party throughout the Union, especially in the responses of several of the States; and at the ensuing session of the Virginia legislature, those State responses were sent to a committee, who made an elaborate examination of the resolutions, and of the objections that had been made to them, concluding by a justification of them in all particulars, and reiterating their declarations. This report was adopted by the general assembly and is a part of the contemporaneous and authentic interpretation of the resolutions. The report says:
"A declaration that proceedings of the federal government are not warranted by the constitution, is a novelty neither among the citizens, nor among the legislatures of the States."Nor can the declarations of either, whether affirming or denying the constitutionality of measures of the federal government, or whether made before or after judicial decisions thereon, be deemed, in any point of view, an assumption of the office of judge. The declarations, in such cases, are expressions of opinion, unaccompanied by any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection. The expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried into immediate effect by force."Again: "In the example given by the State, of declaring the alien and sedition acts to be unconstitutional, and of communicating the declaration to other States, no trace of improper means has appeared. And if the other States had concurred in making a like declaration, supported too, by the numerous applications flowing immediately from the people, it can scarcely be doubted, that these simple means would have been as sufficient, as they are unexceptionable."It is no less certain that other means might have been employed, which are strictly within the limits of the constitution. The legislatures of the States might have made a direct representation to Congress, with a view to obtain a rescinding of the two offensive acts; or they might have represented to their respective senators in Congress their wish, that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the constitution; or two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their option, might, by an application to Congress, have obtained a convention for the same object."These several means, though not equally eligible in themselves, nor probably to the States, were all constitutionally open for consideration. And if the general assembly, after declaring the two acts to be unconstitutional, the first and most obvious proceeding on the subject, did not undertake to point out to the other States a choice among the farther measures that might become necessary and proper, the resource will not be misconstrued by liberal minds into any culpable imputation."
"A declaration that proceedings of the federal government are not warranted by the constitution, is a novelty neither among the citizens, nor among the legislatures of the States.
"Nor can the declarations of either, whether affirming or denying the constitutionality of measures of the federal government, or whether made before or after judicial decisions thereon, be deemed, in any point of view, an assumption of the office of judge. The declarations, in such cases, are expressions of opinion, unaccompanied by any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection. The expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried into immediate effect by force."
Again: "In the example given by the State, of declaring the alien and sedition acts to be unconstitutional, and of communicating the declaration to other States, no trace of improper means has appeared. And if the other States had concurred in making a like declaration, supported too, by the numerous applications flowing immediately from the people, it can scarcely be doubted, that these simple means would have been as sufficient, as they are unexceptionable.
"It is no less certain that other means might have been employed, which are strictly within the limits of the constitution. The legislatures of the States might have made a direct representation to Congress, with a view to obtain a rescinding of the two offensive acts; or they might have represented to their respective senators in Congress their wish, that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the constitution; or two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their option, might, by an application to Congress, have obtained a convention for the same object.
"These several means, though not equally eligible in themselves, nor probably to the States, were all constitutionally open for consideration. And if the general assembly, after declaring the two acts to be unconstitutional, the first and most obvious proceeding on the subject, did not undertake to point out to the other States a choice among the farther measures that might become necessary and proper, the resource will not be misconstrued by liberal minds into any culpable imputation."
These extracts are valuable, not only for their positive testimony that the Resolution of 1798, nor their authors, had ever contemplated such a doctrine as Nullification; butalso for their precise definition and enumeration of the powers which, in the premises, were really claimed for the States, by the State-Rights Republicans of that day. They are all distinctly laid down:
1. By a solemn declaration of opinion, calculated to operate on the public sentiment, and to induce the co-operation of other States in like declarations.
2. To make a direct representation to Congress, with a view to obtain a repeal of the acts complained of.
3. To represent to their respective senators their wish that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the constitution.
4. By the concurrence of two-thirds of the States to cause Congress to call a convention for the same object.
These are the entire list of the remedial powers suspected, by the Resolutions of 1798, and their author and adopters, to exist in the States with reference to federal enactments. Their variant character from the peremptory arrest of acts of Congress proposed by nullification, is well illustrated in the comparison made in the report between expressions of opinion like those of the resolutions, and the compulsory operation of a judicial process. Supposing, says the report, "that it belongs to the judiciary of the United States, and not the State legislatures, to declare the meaning of the federal constitution," yet the declarations either of a State, or the people, "whether affirming or denying the constitutionality of measures of the federal government, or whether made before or after judicial decisions thereon," cannot "be deemed in any point of view an assumption of the office of the judge;" because, "the declarations in such cases are expressions of opinions unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection;"—whereas, "the expositions of the judiciary are carried into immediate effect by force."
The Republicans who adopted the Resolutions of 1798, never contemplated carrying their expositions into effect by force; never contemplated imparting to them the character of decisions, or decrees, or the legal determination of a question; or of arresting by means of them the operation of the acts they condemned. The worst the enemies of the resolutions undertook to say of them, was that they were intemperate, and might mislead the people into disobedience of the laws. This was successfully combated; but had it been true—had the authors of the resolutions even intended any thing so base, it would still have been nothing comparable to the crime of State nullification; of placing the State itself in hostile array to the federal government. Insubordination of individuals may usually be overcome by ordinary judicial process, or by theposseof the county where it occurs; or even if so extensive as to require the peace-officers to be aided by the military, it is still but a matter of police, and in our country cannot endanger the existence of the government. But the array of aStateof the Union against the federal authority, iswar—a war between powers—both sovereign in their respective spheres—and that could only terminate in the destruction of the one, or the subjugation and abasement of the other.
But neither the one or the other of these crimes was contemplated by the authors of the Resolutions of 1798. The remedies they claimed a right to exercise are all pointed out in the constitution itself; capable of application without disturbing the processes of the law, or suggesting an idea of insubordination; remedies capable of saving the liberties of the people and the rights of the States, and bringing back the federal government to its constitutional track, without a jar or a check to its machinery; remedies felt to be sufficient, and by crowning experience soon proven to be so. It is due to the memory of those men and those times that their acts should no longer be misconstrued to cover a doctrine synonymous with disorganization and civil war. The conduct both of the government, and the people, on the occasion of these resolutions, show how far they were from any nullifying or insubordinate intention; and this furnishes us with another convincing proof of the contemporaneous interpretation of the resolutions. So far (as Mr. Madison justly says,)[6]was the State of Virginia from countenancing the nullifying doctrine, that the occasion was viewed as a proper one for exemplifying its devotion to public order, and acquiescence in laws which it deemed unconstitutional, while those laws were not repealed. The language of the Governor ofthe State (Mr. James Monroe), in a letter to Mr. Madison, in May and June of 1800, will attest the principles and feelings which dictated the course pursued on the occasion, and whether the people understood the resolutions in any inflammatory or vicious sense.
On the 15th May, 1800, Governor Monroe writes to Mr. Madison as follows:
"Besides, I think there is cause to suspect the sedition law will be carried into effect in this State at the approaching federal court, and I ought to be there (Richmond) to aid in preventing trouble.... I think it possible an idea may be entertained of opposition, and by means whereof the fair prospect of the republican party may be overcast. But in this they are deceived, as certain characters in Richmond and some neighboring counties are already warned of their danger, so that an attempt to excite a hot-water insurrection will fail."
"Besides, I think there is cause to suspect the sedition law will be carried into effect in this State at the approaching federal court, and I ought to be there (Richmond) to aid in preventing trouble.... I think it possible an idea may be entertained of opposition, and by means whereof the fair prospect of the republican party may be overcast. But in this they are deceived, as certain characters in Richmond and some neighboring counties are already warned of their danger, so that an attempt to excite a hot-water insurrection will fail."
And on the 4th of June, 1800, he wrote again, as follows:
"The conduct of the people on this occasion was exemplary, and does them the highest honor. They seemed aware that the crisis demanded of them a proof of their respect for law and order, and resolved to show they were equal to it. I am satisfied a different conduct was expected from them, for every thing that could was done to provoke it. It only remains that this business be closed on the part of the people, as it has been so far acted; that the judge, after finishing his career, go off in peace, without experiencing the slightest insult from any one; and that this will be the case I have no doubt."
"The conduct of the people on this occasion was exemplary, and does them the highest honor. They seemed aware that the crisis demanded of them a proof of their respect for law and order, and resolved to show they were equal to it. I am satisfied a different conduct was expected from them, for every thing that could was done to provoke it. It only remains that this business be closed on the part of the people, as it has been so far acted; that the judge, after finishing his career, go off in peace, without experiencing the slightest insult from any one; and that this will be the case I have no doubt."
Governor Monroe was correct in the supposition that the sedition law would be carried into effect, at the approaching session of the federal court, and he was also right in the anticipation that the people would know how to distinguish between the exercise of means to procure the repeal of an act, and the exercise of violence to stop its operation. The act was enforced; was "carried into effect" in their midst, and a fellow-citizen incarcerated under its odious provisions, without a suggestion of official or other interference. Thus we have the contemporaneous interpretation of the resolutions exemplified and set at rest, by the most powerful of arguments: by the impressive fact, that when the public indignation was at its height, subsequent to the resolutions of 1798, and subsequent to the report of '99, and when both had been universally disseminated and read, and they had had, with the debates upon them, their entire influence on the public mind; that at that moment, the act of Congress against which the resolutions were chiefly aimed, and the indignation of the community chiefly kindled, was then and there carried into execution, and that in a form—the unjust deprivation of a citizen of his liberty—the most obnoxious to a free people, and the most likely to rouse their opposition; yet quietly and peaceably done, by the simple, ordinary process of the federal court. This fact, so creditable to the people of Virginia, is thus noted in the annual message of Governor Monroe, to the general assembly, at their next meeting, December, 1800:
"In connection with this subject [of the resolutions] it is proper to add, that, since your last session, the sedition law, one of the acts complained of, has been carried into effect in this commonwealth by the decision of a federal court. I notice this event, not with a view of censuring or criticising it. The transaction has gone to the world, and the impartial will judge of it as it deserves. I notice it for the purpose of remarking that the decision was executed with the same order and tranquil submission on the part of the people, as could have been shown by them on a similar occasion, to any the most necessary, constitutional and popular acts of the government."
"In connection with this subject [of the resolutions] it is proper to add, that, since your last session, the sedition law, one of the acts complained of, has been carried into effect in this commonwealth by the decision of a federal court. I notice this event, not with a view of censuring or criticising it. The transaction has gone to the world, and the impartial will judge of it as it deserves. I notice it for the purpose of remarking that the decision was executed with the same order and tranquil submission on the part of the people, as could have been shown by them on a similar occasion, to any the most necessary, constitutional and popular acts of the government."
Governor Monroe then adds his official and personal testimony to the proper intent and character of the proceedings of '98, '9, as follows:
"The general assembly and the good people of this commonwealth have acquitted themselves to their own consciences, and to their brethren in America, in support of a cause which they deem a national one, by the stand which they made, and the sentiments they expressed of these acts of the general government; but they have looked for a change in that respect, to a change in the public opinion, which ought to be free; not to measures of violence, discord and disunion, which they abhor."
"The general assembly and the good people of this commonwealth have acquitted themselves to their own consciences, and to their brethren in America, in support of a cause which they deem a national one, by the stand which they made, and the sentiments they expressed of these acts of the general government; but they have looked for a change in that respect, to a change in the public opinion, which ought to be free; not to measures of violence, discord and disunion, which they abhor."
Vindicated upon their words, and upon contemporaneous interpretation, another vindication, superfluous in point of proof, but due to those whose work has been perverted, awaits these resolutions, derived from the words oftheir author (after seeing their perversion); and to absolve himself and his associates from the criminal absurdity attributed to them.
The contemporary opponents of the Resolutions of 1798 said all the evil of them, and represented them in every odious light, that persevering, keen and enlightened opposition could discover or imagine. Their defenders successfully repelled the charges then made against them; but could not vindicate them from intending the modern doctrine of Nullification, because that doctrine had not then been invented, and the ingenuity of their adversaries did not conceive of that ground of attack. Their venerable author, however—the illustriousMadison[7]—was still alive, when this new perversion of his resolutions had been invented, and when they were quoted to sustain doctrines synonymous with disorganization and disunion. He was still alive, in retirement on his farm. His modesty and sense of propriety hindered him from carrying the prestige and influence of his name into the politics of the day; but his vigorous mind still watched with anxious and patriotic interest the current of public affairs, and recoiled with instinctive horror both from the doctrine and attempted practice of Nullification, and the attempted connection of his name and acts with the origination of it. He held aloof from the public contest; but his sentiments were no secret. His private correspondence, embracing in its range distinguished men of all sections of the Union and of all parties, was full of the subject, from the commencement of the Nullification excitement down to the time of his death: sometimes at length, and argumentatively; sometimes with a brief indignant disclaimer; always earnestly and unequivocally. Some of these letters, although private, were published during Mr. Madison's lifetime, especially an elaborate one to Mr. Edward Everett; and many of the remainder have recently been put into print, through the liberality of a patriotic citizen of Washington (Mr. J. Maguire), but only for private distribution, and hence not accessible to the public. They are a complete storehouse of material, not only for the vindication of Madison and his compeers, from the doctrine of Nullification, but of argument and reasons against Nullification and every kindred suggestion.
From the letter to Mr. Everett, published in the North American Review, shortly after it was written (August, 1830), the following extracts are taken:
"It (the constitution of the United States) was formed by the States, that is, by the people in each of the States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed consequently by the same authority which formed the State constitutions."Being thus derived from the same source as the constitutions of the States, it has, within each State, the same authority as the constitution of the State, and is as much a constitution in the strict sense of the term within its prescribed sphere, as the constitutions of the States are within their respective spheres; but with this obvious and essential difference, that being a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the constitution of a State may be at its individual will.""Nor is the government of the United States, created by the constitution, less a government in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers, than the governments created by the constitutions of the States are, within their several spheres. It is like them organized into legislative, executive and judiciary departments. It operates, like them, directly on persons and things. And, like them, it has at command a physical force for executing the powers committed to it."Between these different constitutional governments, the one operating in all the States, the others operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of government divided between them, it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction.""That to have left a final decision, in such cases, to each of the States, could not fail to make the constitution and laws of the United States different in different States, was obvious, and not less obvious that this diversity of independent decisions, must altogether distract the government of the Union, and speedily put an end to the Union itself.""To have made the decision under the authority of the individual States, co-ordinate in all cases, with decisions under the authority of the United States, would unavoidably produce collisions incompatible with the peace of society.""To have referred every clashing decision, under the two authorities, for a final decision, tothe States as parties to the constitution, would be attended with delays, with inconveniences and expenses, amounting to a prohibition of the expedient.""To have trusted to 'negotiation' for adjusting disputes between the government of the United States and the State governments, as between independent and separate sovereignties, would have lost sight altogether of a constitution and government of the Union, and opened a direct road, from a failure of that resort, to theultima ratio, between nations wholly independent of, and alien to each other.... Although the issue of negotiation might sometimes avoid this extremity, how often would it happen among so many States, that an unaccommodating spirit in some would render that resource unavailing?"
"It (the constitution of the United States) was formed by the States, that is, by the people in each of the States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed consequently by the same authority which formed the State constitutions.
"Being thus derived from the same source as the constitutions of the States, it has, within each State, the same authority as the constitution of the State, and is as much a constitution in the strict sense of the term within its prescribed sphere, as the constitutions of the States are within their respective spheres; but with this obvious and essential difference, that being a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the constitution of a State may be at its individual will."
"Nor is the government of the United States, created by the constitution, less a government in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers, than the governments created by the constitutions of the States are, within their several spheres. It is like them organized into legislative, executive and judiciary departments. It operates, like them, directly on persons and things. And, like them, it has at command a physical force for executing the powers committed to it.
"Between these different constitutional governments, the one operating in all the States, the others operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of government divided between them, it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction."
"That to have left a final decision, in such cases, to each of the States, could not fail to make the constitution and laws of the United States different in different States, was obvious, and not less obvious that this diversity of independent decisions, must altogether distract the government of the Union, and speedily put an end to the Union itself."
"To have made the decision under the authority of the individual States, co-ordinate in all cases, with decisions under the authority of the United States, would unavoidably produce collisions incompatible with the peace of society."
"To have referred every clashing decision, under the two authorities, for a final decision, tothe States as parties to the constitution, would be attended with delays, with inconveniences and expenses, amounting to a prohibition of the expedient."
"To have trusted to 'negotiation' for adjusting disputes between the government of the United States and the State governments, as between independent and separate sovereignties, would have lost sight altogether of a constitution and government of the Union, and opened a direct road, from a failure of that resort, to theultima ratio, between nations wholly independent of, and alien to each other.... Although the issue of negotiation might sometimes avoid this extremity, how often would it happen among so many States, that an unaccommodating spirit in some would render that resource unavailing?"
After thus stating, with other powerful reasons, why all those fanciful and impracticable theories were rejected in the constitution, the letter proceeds to show what the constitution does adopt and rely on, "as a security of the rights and powers of the States," namely:
"1. The responsibility of the senators and representatives in the legislature of the United States to the legislatures and people of the States; 2. The responsibility of the President to the people of the United States; and, 3. The liability of the executive and judicial functionaries of the United States to impeachment by the representatives of the people of the States in one branch of the legislature of the United States, and trial by the representatives of the States, in the other branch."
"1. The responsibility of the senators and representatives in the legislature of the United States to the legislatures and people of the States; 2. The responsibility of the President to the people of the United States; and, 3. The liability of the executive and judicial functionaries of the United States to impeachment by the representatives of the people of the States in one branch of the legislature of the United States, and trial by the representatives of the States, in the other branch."
And then, in order to mark how complete these provisions are for the security of the States, shows that while the States thus hold the functionaries of the United States to these several responsibilities, the State functionaries, on the other hand, in their appointment and responsibility, are "altogether independent of the agency or authority of the United States."
Of the doctrine of nullification, "the expedient lately advanced," the letter says:
"The distinguished names and high authorities which appear to have asserted and given a practical scope to this doctrine, entitle it to a respect which it might be difficult otherwise to feel for it.""The resolutions of Virginia, as vindicated in the report on them, will be found entitled to an exposition, showing a consistency in their parts, and an inconsistency of the whole with the doctrine under consideration.""That the legislature could not have intended to sanction any such doctrine is to be inferred from the debates in the House of Delegates. The tenor of the debates, which were ably conducted, discloses no reference whatever to a constitutional right in an individual State to arrest by force a law of the United States.""If any further light on the subject could be needed, a very strong one is reflected in the answers to the resolutions, by the States which protested against them.... Had the resolutions been regarded as avowing and maintaining a right, in an individual State, to arrest by force the execution of a law of the United States, it must be presumed that it would have been a conspicuous object of their denunciation."
"The distinguished names and high authorities which appear to have asserted and given a practical scope to this doctrine, entitle it to a respect which it might be difficult otherwise to feel for it."
"The resolutions of Virginia, as vindicated in the report on them, will be found entitled to an exposition, showing a consistency in their parts, and an inconsistency of the whole with the doctrine under consideration."
"That the legislature could not have intended to sanction any such doctrine is to be inferred from the debates in the House of Delegates. The tenor of the debates, which were ably conducted, discloses no reference whatever to a constitutional right in an individual State to arrest by force a law of the United States."
"If any further light on the subject could be needed, a very strong one is reflected in the answers to the resolutions, by the States which protested against them.... Had the resolutions been regarded as avowing and maintaining a right, in an individual State, to arrest by force the execution of a law of the United States, it must be presumed that it would have been a conspicuous object of their denunciation."
In a letter to Mr. Joseph C. Cabell, May 31, 1830, Mr. Madison says:
"I received yesterday yours of the 26th. Having never concealed my opinions of the nullifying doctrines of South Carolina, I did not regard the allusion to it in theWhig, especially as the manner of the allusion showed that I did not obtrude it.... I have latterly been drawn into a correspondence with an advocate of the doctrine, which led me to a review of it to some extent, and particularly to a vindication of the proceedings of Virginia in 1798, '99, against the misuse made of them. That you may see the views I have taken of the aberrations of South Carolina, I enclose you an extract."
"I received yesterday yours of the 26th. Having never concealed my opinions of the nullifying doctrines of South Carolina, I did not regard the allusion to it in theWhig, especially as the manner of the allusion showed that I did not obtrude it.... I have latterly been drawn into a correspondence with an advocate of the doctrine, which led me to a review of it to some extent, and particularly to a vindication of the proceedings of Virginia in 1798, '99, against the misuse made of them. That you may see the views I have taken of the aberrations of South Carolina, I enclose you an extract."
And in a letter to Mr. Daniel Webster, written a few days previously, he uses nearly the same language; as also in a letter in February, 1830, to Mr. Trist.
To Mr. James Robertson, March 27, 1831, Mr. Madison writes as follows:
"The veil which was originally over the draft of the resolutions offered in 1798 to the Virginia Assembly having been long since removed, I may say, in answer to your inquiries, that it was penned by me.""With respect to the terms following the term 'unconstitutional,' viz., 'not law, but null, void, and of no force or effect,' which were stricken out of the seventh resolution, my memory cannot say positively whether they were or were not in the original draft, and no copy of it appears to have been retained. On the presumption that they were in the draft as it went from me, I am confident that they must have been regarded only as giving accumulated emphasis to the declaration, that the alien and sedition acts had, in the opinion of the assembly, violated the constitution of the United States, and not that the addition of them could annul the acts or sanction a resistance of them. The resolution was expresslydeclaratory, and, proceeding from the legislature only, which was not even a party to the constitution, could be declaratory of opinion only."
"The veil which was originally over the draft of the resolutions offered in 1798 to the Virginia Assembly having been long since removed, I may say, in answer to your inquiries, that it was penned by me."
"With respect to the terms following the term 'unconstitutional,' viz., 'not law, but null, void, and of no force or effect,' which were stricken out of the seventh resolution, my memory cannot say positively whether they were or were not in the original draft, and no copy of it appears to have been retained. On the presumption that they were in the draft as it went from me, I am confident that they must have been regarded only as giving accumulated emphasis to the declaration, that the alien and sedition acts had, in the opinion of the assembly, violated the constitution of the United States, and not that the addition of them could annul the acts or sanction a resistance of them. The resolution was expresslydeclaratory, and, proceeding from the legislature only, which was not even a party to the constitution, could be declaratory of opinion only."
To Joseph C. Cabell, Sept. 16, 1831:
"I congratulate you on the event which restores you to the public councils, where your services will be valuable, particularly in defending the constitution and Union against the false doctrines which assail them. That of nullification seems to be generally abandoned in Virginia, by those who had most leaning towards it. But it still flourishes in the hot-bed where it sprung up.""I know not whence the idea could proceed that I concurred in the doctrine, that although a State could not nullify a law of the Union, it had a right to secede from the Union. Both spring from the same poisonous root."
"I congratulate you on the event which restores you to the public councils, where your services will be valuable, particularly in defending the constitution and Union against the false doctrines which assail them. That of nullification seems to be generally abandoned in Virginia, by those who had most leaning towards it. But it still flourishes in the hot-bed where it sprung up."
"I know not whence the idea could proceed that I concurred in the doctrine, that although a State could not nullify a law of the Union, it had a right to secede from the Union. Both spring from the same poisonous root."
To Mr. N. P. Trist, December, 1831:
"I cannot see the advantage of this perseverance of South Carolina in claiming the authority of the Virginia proceedings in 1798, '99, as asserting a right in a single State to nullify an act of the United States. Where, indeed, is the fairness of attempting to palm on Virginia an intention which is contradicted by such a variety of contradictory proofs; which has at no intervening period, received the slightest countenance from her, and which with one voice she now disclaims?""To view the doctrine in its true character, it must be recollected that it asserts a right in a single State to stop the execution of a federal law, until a convention of the States could be brought about by a process requiring an uncertain time; and, finally, in the convention, when formed, a vote of seven States, if in favor of the veto, to give it a prevalence over the vast majority of seventeen States. For this preposterous and anarchical pretension there is not a shadow of countenance in the constitution; and well that there is not, for it is certain that, with such a deadly poison in it, no constitution could be sure of lasting a year."
"I cannot see the advantage of this perseverance of South Carolina in claiming the authority of the Virginia proceedings in 1798, '99, as asserting a right in a single State to nullify an act of the United States. Where, indeed, is the fairness of attempting to palm on Virginia an intention which is contradicted by such a variety of contradictory proofs; which has at no intervening period, received the slightest countenance from her, and which with one voice she now disclaims?"
"To view the doctrine in its true character, it must be recollected that it asserts a right in a single State to stop the execution of a federal law, until a convention of the States could be brought about by a process requiring an uncertain time; and, finally, in the convention, when formed, a vote of seven States, if in favor of the veto, to give it a prevalence over the vast majority of seventeen States. For this preposterous and anarchical pretension there is not a shadow of countenance in the constitution; and well that there is not, for it is certain that, with such a deadly poison in it, no constitution could be sure of lasting a year."
To Mr. C. E. Haynes, August 26, 1832:
"In the very crippled and feeble state of my health, I cannot undertake an extended answer to your inquiries, nor should I suppose it necessary if you have seen my letter to Mr. Everett, in August, 1830, in which the proceedings of Virginia, in 1798-'99, were explained, and the novel doctrine of nullification adverted to."The distinction is obvious between such interpositions on the part of the States against unjustifiable acts of the federal government as are within the provisions and forms of the constitution. These provisions and forms certainly do not embrace the nullifying process proclaimed in South Carolina, which begins with a single State, and ends with the ascendency of a minority of States over a majority; of seven over seventeen; a federal law, during the process, being arrested within the nullifying State; and, if a revenue law, frustrated through all the States."
"In the very crippled and feeble state of my health, I cannot undertake an extended answer to your inquiries, nor should I suppose it necessary if you have seen my letter to Mr. Everett, in August, 1830, in which the proceedings of Virginia, in 1798-'99, were explained, and the novel doctrine of nullification adverted to.
"The distinction is obvious between such interpositions on the part of the States against unjustifiable acts of the federal government as are within the provisions and forms of the constitution. These provisions and forms certainly do not embrace the nullifying process proclaimed in South Carolina, which begins with a single State, and ends with the ascendency of a minority of States over a majority; of seven over seventeen; a federal law, during the process, being arrested within the nullifying State; and, if a revenue law, frustrated through all the States."
To Mr. Trist, December 23, 1832:
"If one State can, at will, withdraw from the others, the others can, at will, withdraw from her, and turn hernolentem volentemout of the Union. Until of late, there is not a State that would have abhorred such a doctrine more than South Carolina, or more dreaded an application of it to herself. The same may be said of the doctrine of nullification which she now preaches as the only faith by which the Union can be saved."
"If one State can, at will, withdraw from the others, the others can, at will, withdraw from her, and turn hernolentem volentemout of the Union. Until of late, there is not a State that would have abhorred such a doctrine more than South Carolina, or more dreaded an application of it to herself. The same may be said of the doctrine of nullification which she now preaches as the only faith by which the Union can be saved."
In a letter to Mr. Joseph C. Cabell, December 28, 1832:
"It is not probable that (in the adoption of the resolutions of 1798), such an idea as the South Carolina nullification had ever entered the thoughts of a single member, or even that of a citizen of South Carolina herself."
"It is not probable that (in the adoption of the resolutions of 1798), such an idea as the South Carolina nullification had ever entered the thoughts of a single member, or even that of a citizen of South Carolina herself."
To Andrew Stevenson, February 4, 1833:
"I have received your communication of the 29th ultimo, and have read it with much pleasure. It presents the doctrine of nullification and secession in lights that must confound, if failing to convince their patrons. You have done well in rescuing the proceedings of Virginia in 1798-'99, from the many misconstructions and misapplications of them.""Of late, attempts are observed to shelter the heresy of secession under the case of expatriation, from which it essentially differs. The expatriating party removes only his person and his movable property, and does not incommode those whom he leaves. A seceding State mutilates the domain, and disturbs the whole system from which it separates itself. Pushed to the extent in which the right is sometimes asserted, it might break into fragments every single community."
"I have received your communication of the 29th ultimo, and have read it with much pleasure. It presents the doctrine of nullification and secession in lights that must confound, if failing to convince their patrons. You have done well in rescuing the proceedings of Virginia in 1798-'99, from the many misconstructions and misapplications of them."
"Of late, attempts are observed to shelter the heresy of secession under the case of expatriation, from which it essentially differs. The expatriating party removes only his person and his movable property, and does not incommode those whom he leaves. A seceding State mutilates the domain, and disturbs the whole system from which it separates itself. Pushed to the extent in which the right is sometimes asserted, it might break into fragments every single community."
To Mr. Stevenson, February 10, 1833, in reference to the South Carolina nullifying ordinance:
"I consider a successful resistance to the laws as now attempted, if not immediately mortal to the Union, as at least a mortal wound to it."
"I consider a successful resistance to the laws as now attempted, if not immediately mortal to the Union, as at least a mortal wound to it."
To "a Friend of the Union and State rights," 1833:
"It is not usual to answer communications without proper names to them. But the ability and motives disclosed in the essays induce me to say, in compliance with the wish expressed, that I do not consider the proceedings of Virginia, in 1798-'99, as countenancing the doctrine that a State may, at will, secede from its constitutional compact with the other States."
"It is not usual to answer communications without proper names to them. But the ability and motives disclosed in the essays induce me to say, in compliance with the wish expressed, that I do not consider the proceedings of Virginia, in 1798-'99, as countenancing the doctrine that a State may, at will, secede from its constitutional compact with the other States."
To Mr. Joseph C. Cabell, April 1, 1833:
"The attempt to prove me a nullifier, by a misconstruction of the resolutions of 1798-'99,though so often and so lately corrected, was, I observe, renewed some days ago in the 'Richmond Whig,' by an inference from an erasure in the House of Delegates from one of those resolutions, of the words 'are null, void and of no effect,' which followed the word 'unconstitutional.' These words, though synonymous with 'unconstitutional,' were alleged by the critic to mean nullification; and being, of course, ascribed to me, I was, of course, a nullifier. It seems not to have occurred, that if the insertion of the words could convict me of being a nullifier, the erasure of them (unanimous, I believe), by the legislature, was the strongest of protests against the doctrine.... The vote, in that case seems not to have engaged the attention due to it. It not merely deprives South Carolina of the authority of Virginia, on which she has relied and exulted so much in support of her cause, but turns that authority pointedly against her."
"The attempt to prove me a nullifier, by a misconstruction of the resolutions of 1798-'99,though so often and so lately corrected, was, I observe, renewed some days ago in the 'Richmond Whig,' by an inference from an erasure in the House of Delegates from one of those resolutions, of the words 'are null, void and of no effect,' which followed the word 'unconstitutional.' These words, though synonymous with 'unconstitutional,' were alleged by the critic to mean nullification; and being, of course, ascribed to me, I was, of course, a nullifier. It seems not to have occurred, that if the insertion of the words could convict me of being a nullifier, the erasure of them (unanimous, I believe), by the legislature, was the strongest of protests against the doctrine.... The vote, in that case seems not to have engaged the attention due to it. It not merely deprives South Carolina of the authority of Virginia, on which she has relied and exulted so much in support of her cause, but turns that authority pointedly against her."
From a memorandum "On Nullification," written in 1835-'36:
"Although the legislature of Virginia declared, at a late session, almost unanimously, that South Carolina was not supported in her doctrine of nullification by the resolutions of 1798, it appears that those resolutions are still appealed to as expressly or constructively favoring the doctrine.""And what is the text in the proceedings of Virginia which this spurious doctrine of nullification claims for its patronage? It is found in the third of the resolutions of 1798.""Now is there any thing here from which a 'single' State can infer a right to arrest or annul an act of the general government, which it may deem unconstitutional? So far from it, that the obvious and proper inference precludes such a right.""In a word, the nullifying claims, if reduced to practice, instead of being the conservative principle of the constitution, would necessarily, and it may be said, obviously, be a deadly poison.""The true question, therefore, is, whether there be a 'constitutional' right in a single State to nullify a law of the United States? We have seen the absurdity of such a claim, in its naked and suicidal form. Let us turn to it, as modified by South Carolina, into a right in every State to resist within itself the execution of a federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional, and to demand a convention of the States to decide the question of constitutionality, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent unless three fourths of the States concur in overruling the annulment."Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results would be the same as those proceeding from an unqualified nullification, and the result of a convention might be that seven out of twenty-four States might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the United States whatever, and give to the constitution, constructively, any shape they pleased, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen.[8]Every feature of the constitution might thus be successively changed; and after a scene of unexampled confusion and distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not, as a whole, be agreed to by a single party."
"Although the legislature of Virginia declared, at a late session, almost unanimously, that South Carolina was not supported in her doctrine of nullification by the resolutions of 1798, it appears that those resolutions are still appealed to as expressly or constructively favoring the doctrine."
"And what is the text in the proceedings of Virginia which this spurious doctrine of nullification claims for its patronage? It is found in the third of the resolutions of 1798."
"Now is there any thing here from which a 'single' State can infer a right to arrest or annul an act of the general government, which it may deem unconstitutional? So far from it, that the obvious and proper inference precludes such a right."
"In a word, the nullifying claims, if reduced to practice, instead of being the conservative principle of the constitution, would necessarily, and it may be said, obviously, be a deadly poison."
"The true question, therefore, is, whether there be a 'constitutional' right in a single State to nullify a law of the United States? We have seen the absurdity of such a claim, in its naked and suicidal form. Let us turn to it, as modified by South Carolina, into a right in every State to resist within itself the execution of a federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional, and to demand a convention of the States to decide the question of constitutionality, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent unless three fourths of the States concur in overruling the annulment.
"Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results would be the same as those proceeding from an unqualified nullification, and the result of a convention might be that seven out of twenty-four States might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the United States whatever, and give to the constitution, constructively, any shape they pleased, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen.[8]Every feature of the constitution might thus be successively changed; and after a scene of unexampled confusion and distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not, as a whole, be agreed to by a single party."
To this graphic picture of the disorders which even the first stages of nullification would necessarily produce, drawn when the graphic limner was in the eighty-sixth and last year of his life, the following warning pages, written only a few months earlier, may be properly appended:
"What more dangerous than nullification, or more evident than the progress it continues to make, either in its original shape or in the disguises it assumes? Nullification has the effect of putting powder under the constitution and Union, and a match in the hand of every party to blow them up, at pleasure. And for its progress, hearken to the tone in which it is now preached; cast your eyes on its increasing minorities in most of the Southern States, without a decrease in any one of them. Look at Virginia herself, and read in the gazettes, and in the proceedings of popular meetings, the figure which the anarchical principle now makes, in contrast with the scouting reception given to it but a short time ago."It is not probable that this offspring of the discontents of South Carolina will ever approach success in a majority of the States. But a susceptibility of the contagion in the Southern States is visible; and the danger not to be concealed, that the sympathy arising from known causes, and the inculcated impression of a permanent incompatibility of interests between the South and the North, may put it in the power of popular leaders, aspiring to the highest stations, to unite the South, on some critical occasion, in a course that will end in creating a new theatre of great though inferior extent. In pursuing this course, the first and most obvious step is nullification, the next, secession, and the last, a farewell separation. How near has this course been lately exemplified! and the danger of its recurrence, in the same or some other quarter, may be increased by an increase of restless aspirants, and by the increasing impracticabilityof retaining in the Union a large and cemented section against its will. It may, indeed, happen, that a return of danger from abroad, or a revived apprehension of danger at home, may aid in binding the States in one political system, or that the geographical and commercial ligatures may have that effect, or that the present discord of interests between the North and the South may give way to a less diversity in the application of labor, or to the mutual advantage of a safe and constant interchange of the different products of labor in different sections. All this may happen, and with the exception of foreign hostility, hoped for. But, in the mean time, local prejudices and ambitious leaders may be but too successful in finding or creating occasions for the nullifying experiment of breaking a more beautiful China vase[9]than the British empire ever was, into parts which a miracle only could reunite."
"What more dangerous than nullification, or more evident than the progress it continues to make, either in its original shape or in the disguises it assumes? Nullification has the effect of putting powder under the constitution and Union, and a match in the hand of every party to blow them up, at pleasure. And for its progress, hearken to the tone in which it is now preached; cast your eyes on its increasing minorities in most of the Southern States, without a decrease in any one of them. Look at Virginia herself, and read in the gazettes, and in the proceedings of popular meetings, the figure which the anarchical principle now makes, in contrast with the scouting reception given to it but a short time ago.
"It is not probable that this offspring of the discontents of South Carolina will ever approach success in a majority of the States. But a susceptibility of the contagion in the Southern States is visible; and the danger not to be concealed, that the sympathy arising from known causes, and the inculcated impression of a permanent incompatibility of interests between the South and the North, may put it in the power of popular leaders, aspiring to the highest stations, to unite the South, on some critical occasion, in a course that will end in creating a new theatre of great though inferior extent. In pursuing this course, the first and most obvious step is nullification, the next, secession, and the last, a farewell separation. How near has this course been lately exemplified! and the danger of its recurrence, in the same or some other quarter, may be increased by an increase of restless aspirants, and by the increasing impracticabilityof retaining in the Union a large and cemented section against its will. It may, indeed, happen, that a return of danger from abroad, or a revived apprehension of danger at home, may aid in binding the States in one political system, or that the geographical and commercial ligatures may have that effect, or that the present discord of interests between the North and the South may give way to a less diversity in the application of labor, or to the mutual advantage of a safe and constant interchange of the different products of labor in different sections. All this may happen, and with the exception of foreign hostility, hoped for. But, in the mean time, local prejudices and ambitious leaders may be but too successful in finding or creating occasions for the nullifying experiment of breaking a more beautiful China vase[9]than the British empire ever was, into parts which a miracle only could reunite."
Incidentally, Mr. Madison, in these letters, vindicates also his compeers, Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Monroe. In the letter to Mr. Cabell, of May 31, 1830, he says:
"You will see, in vol. iii., page 429, of Mr. Jefferson's Correspondence, a letter to W. C. Nicholas, proving that he had nothing to do with the Kentucky resolutions, of 1799, in which the word 'nullification' is found. The resolutions of that State, in 1798, which were drawn by him, and have been republished with the proceedings of Virginia, do not contain this or any equivalent word."
"You will see, in vol. iii., page 429, of Mr. Jefferson's Correspondence, a letter to W. C. Nicholas, proving that he had nothing to do with the Kentucky resolutions, of 1799, in which the word 'nullification' is found. The resolutions of that State, in 1798, which were drawn by him, and have been republished with the proceedings of Virginia, do not contain this or any equivalent word."
In the letter to Mr. Trist, of December, 1831, after developing at some length the inconsistencies and fatuity of the "nullification prerogative," Mr. Madison says:
"Yet this has boldly sought a sanction, under the name of Mr. Jefferson, because, in his letter to Mr. Cartwright, he held out a convention of the States as, with us, a peaceful remedy, in cases to be decided in Europe by intestine wars. Who can believe that Mr. Jefferson referred to a convention summoned at the pleasure of a single State, with an interregnum during its deliberations; and, above all, with a rule of decision subjecting nearly three fourths to one fourth? No man's creed was more opposed to such an inversion of the republican order of things."
"Yet this has boldly sought a sanction, under the name of Mr. Jefferson, because, in his letter to Mr. Cartwright, he held out a convention of the States as, with us, a peaceful remedy, in cases to be decided in Europe by intestine wars. Who can believe that Mr. Jefferson referred to a convention summoned at the pleasure of a single State, with an interregnum during its deliberations; and, above all, with a rule of decision subjecting nearly three fourths to one fourth? No man's creed was more opposed to such an inversion of the republican order of things."
In a letter to Mr. Townsend of South Carolina, December 18, 1831:
"You ask 'whether Mr. Jefferson was really the author of the Kentucky resolutions, of 1799;' [in which the word 'nullify' is used, though not in the sense of South Carolina nullification.] The inference that he was not is as conclusive as it is obvious, from his letter to Col. Wilson Cary Nicholas, of September 5, 1799, in which he expressly declines, for reasons stated, preparing any thing for the legislature of that year."That he (Mr. Jefferson) ever asserted a right in a single State to arrest the execution of an act of Congress—the arrest to be valid and permanent, unless reversed by three fourths of the States—is countenanced by nothing known to have been said or done by him. In his letter to Major Cartwright, he refers to a convention as a peaceable remedy for conflicting claims of power in our compound government; but, whether he alluded to a convention as prescribed by the constitution, or brought about by any other mode, his respect for the will of majorities, as the vital principle of republican government, makes it certain that he could not have meant a convention in which a minority of seven States was to prevail over seventeen, either in amending or expounding the constitution."
"You ask 'whether Mr. Jefferson was really the author of the Kentucky resolutions, of 1799;' [in which the word 'nullify' is used, though not in the sense of South Carolina nullification.] The inference that he was not is as conclusive as it is obvious, from his letter to Col. Wilson Cary Nicholas, of September 5, 1799, in which he expressly declines, for reasons stated, preparing any thing for the legislature of that year.
"That he (Mr. Jefferson) ever asserted a right in a single State to arrest the execution of an act of Congress—the arrest to be valid and permanent, unless reversed by three fourths of the States—is countenanced by nothing known to have been said or done by him. In his letter to Major Cartwright, he refers to a convention as a peaceable remedy for conflicting claims of power in our compound government; but, whether he alluded to a convention as prescribed by the constitution, or brought about by any other mode, his respect for the will of majorities, as the vital principle of republican government, makes it certain that he could not have meant a convention in which a minority of seven States was to prevail over seventeen, either in amending or expounding the constitution."
In the letter (before quoted) to Mr. Trist, December 23, 1832:
"It is remarkable how closely the nullifiers, who make the name of Mr. Jefferson the pedestal for their colossal heresy, shut their eyes and lips whenever his authority is ever so clearly and emphatically against them. You have noticed what he says in his letters to Monroe and Carrington, pages 43 and 302, vol. ii., with respect to the powers of the old Congress to coerce delinquent States, and his reasons for preferring for the purpose a naval to a military force; and, moreover, that it was not necessary to find a right to coerce in the federal articles, that being inherent in the nature of a compact."
"It is remarkable how closely the nullifiers, who make the name of Mr. Jefferson the pedestal for their colossal heresy, shut their eyes and lips whenever his authority is ever so clearly and emphatically against them. You have noticed what he says in his letters to Monroe and Carrington, pages 43 and 302, vol. ii., with respect to the powers of the old Congress to coerce delinquent States, and his reasons for preferring for the purpose a naval to a military force; and, moreover, that it was not necessary to find a right to coerce in the federal articles, that being inherent in the nature of a compact."
In another letter to Mr. Trist, dated August 25, 1834:
"The letter from Mr. Monroe to Mr. Jefferson, of which you inclose an extract, is important. I have one from Mr. Monroe, on the same occasion, more in detail, and not less emphatic in its anti-nullifying language."
"The letter from Mr. Monroe to Mr. Jefferson, of which you inclose an extract, is important. I have one from Mr. Monroe, on the same occasion, more in detail, and not less emphatic in its anti-nullifying language."
In the notes "On Nullification," written in 1835-'6:
"The amount of this modified right of nullification is, that a single State may arrest the operation of a law of the United States, and institute a process which is to terminate in the ascendency of a minority over a large majority. And this new-fangled theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, the apostle of republicanism, and whose own words declare, that 'acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it.' Well may the friends of Mr. Jefferson disclaim any sanction to it, or to any constitutional right of nullification from his opinions."
"The amount of this modified right of nullification is, that a single State may arrest the operation of a law of the United States, and institute a process which is to terminate in the ascendency of a minority over a large majority. And this new-fangled theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, the apostle of republicanism, and whose own words declare, that 'acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it.' Well may the friends of Mr. Jefferson disclaim any sanction to it, or to any constitutional right of nullification from his opinions."
In a paper drawn by Mr. Madison, in September, 1829, when his anxieties began first to be disturbed by the portentous approach of the nullification doctrine, he concludes with this earnest admonition, appropriate to the time when it was written, and not less so to the present time, and to posterity:
"In all the views that may be taken of questions between the State governments and the general government, the awful consequences of a final rupture and dissolution of the Union should never for a moment be lost sight of. Such a prospect must be deprecated—must be shuddered at by every friend of his country, to liberty, to the happiness of man. For, in the event of a dissolution of the Union, an impossibility of ever renewing it is brought home to every mind by the difficulties encountered in establishing it. The propensity of all communities to divide, when not pressed into a unity by external dangers, is a truth well understood. There is no instance of a people inhabiting even a small island, if remote from foreign danger, and sometimes in spite of that pressure, who are not divided into alien, rival, hostile tribes. The happy union of these States is a wonder; their constitution a miracle; their example the hope of liberty throughout the world. Wo to the ambition that would meditate the destruction of either."
"In all the views that may be taken of questions between the State governments and the general government, the awful consequences of a final rupture and dissolution of the Union should never for a moment be lost sight of. Such a prospect must be deprecated—must be shuddered at by every friend of his country, to liberty, to the happiness of man. For, in the event of a dissolution of the Union, an impossibility of ever renewing it is brought home to every mind by the difficulties encountered in establishing it. The propensity of all communities to divide, when not pressed into a unity by external dangers, is a truth well understood. There is no instance of a people inhabiting even a small island, if remote from foreign danger, and sometimes in spite of that pressure, who are not divided into alien, rival, hostile tribes. The happy union of these States is a wonder; their constitution a miracle; their example the hope of liberty throughout the world. Wo to the ambition that would meditate the destruction of either."
These extracts, voluminous as they are, are far from exhausting the abundant material which these admirable writings of Mr. Madison contain, on the topic of nullification. They come to us, for our admonition and guidance, with the solemnity of a voice from the grave; and I leave them, without comment, to be pondered in the hearts of his countrymen. Notwithstanding the advanced age and growing bodily infirmities of Mr. Madison, at the time when these letters were written, his mind was never more vigorous nor more luminous. Every generous mind must sympathize with him, in this necessity, in which he felt himself in his extreme age, and when done, not only with the public affairs of the country, but nearly done with all the affairs of the world, to defend himself and associates from the attempt to fasten upon him and them, in spite of his denials, a criminal and anarchical design—wicked in itself, and subversive of the government which he had labored so hard to found, and utterly destructive to that particular feature considered the crowning merit of the constitution; and which wise men and patriotic had specially devised to save our Union from the fate of all leagues. We sympathize with him in such a necessity. We should feel for any man, in the most ordinary case, to whose words a criminal intention should be imputed in defiance of his disclaimers; but, in the case of Mr. Madison—a man so modest, so pure, so just—of such dignity and gravity, both for his age, his personal qualities, and the exalted offices which he had held; and in a case which went to civil war, and to the destruction of a government of which he was one of the most faithful and zealous founders—in such a case, an attempt to force upon such a man a meaning which he disavows, becomes not only outrageous and odious, but criminal and impious. And if, after the authentic disclaimers which he has made in his advanced age, and which are now published, any one continues to attribute this heresy to him, such a person must be viewed by the public as having a mind that has lost its balance! or, as having a heart void of social duty, and fatally bent on a crime, the guilt of which must be thrown upon the tenants of the tomb—speechless, but not helpless! for, every just man must feel their cause his own! and rush to a defence which public duty, private honor, patriotism, filial affection, and gratitude to benefactors impose on every man (born wheresoever he may have been) that enjoys the blessings of the government which their labors gave us.
I do not discuss these resolutions at this time. That discussion is no part of my present object. I speak of the pledge which they contain, and call it a mistake; and say, that whatever may be the wishes or the opinions of the people of Missouri on the subject of the extension or non-extention of slavery to the Territories, they have no idea of resisting any act of Congress on the subject. They abide the law, when it comes, be it what it may, subject to the decision of the ballot-box and the judiciary.
I concur with the people of Missouri in this view of their duty, and believe it to be the onlycourse consistent with the terms and intention of our constitution, and the only one which can save this Union from the fate of all the confederacies which have successively appeared and disappeared in the history of nations. Anarchy among the members, and not tyranny in the head, has been the rock on which all such confederacies have split. The authors of our present form of government knew the danger of this rock, and they endeavored to provide against it. They formed a Union—not a league—a federal legislature to act upon persons, not upon States; and they provided peaceful remedies for all the questions which could arise between the people and the government. They provided a federal judiciary to execute the federal laws when found to be constitutional; and popular elections to repeal them when found to be bad. They formed a government in which the law and the popular will, and not the sword, was to decide questions; and they looked upon the first resort to the sword for the decision of such questions as the death of the Union.
The old confederation was a league, with a legislature acting upon sovereignties, without power to enforce its decrees, and without union except at the will of the parties. It was powerless for government, and a rope of sand for union. It was to escape from that helpless and tottering government that the present constitution was formed; and no less than ten numbers of the federalist—from the tenth to the twentieth—were devoted to this defect of the old system, and the necessity of the new one. I will read some extracts from these numbers—the joint product of Hamilton and Madison—to show the difference between the league which we abandoned and the Union which we formed—the dangers of the former and the benefits of the latter—that it may be seen that the resolutions of the general assembly of Missouri, if carried out to their conclusions, carry back this Union to the league of the confederation—make it a rope of sand, and the sword the arbiter between the federal head and its members.
Mr. B. then read as follows:
"The great and radical vice, in the structure of the existing confederation, is in the principle of legislation for States or governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contra-distinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it prevades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction, or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways—by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the coercion of the magistracy, or by the coercion of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident there is no process of a court by which their observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it."
Of the certain destruction of the Union when the sword is once drawn between the members of a Union and their head, they speak thus:
"When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States, against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union."
Of the advantage and facility of the working of the federal system, and its peaceful, efficient, and harmonious operation—if the federal laws are made to operate upon citizens, and not upon States—they speak in these terms:
"But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not require the interventionof the State legislatures; if they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion of unconstitutional power. They would be obliged to act, and in such manner as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its own defence, and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not merely a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the courts of justice, and of the body of the people. If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land, unconstitutional and void. If the people were not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives, they, as the natural guardians of the constitution, would throw their weight into the national scale, and give it a decided preponderance in the contest."
Of the ruinous effects of these civil wars among the members of a republican confederacy, and their disastrous influence upon the cause of civil liberty itself throughout the world, they thus speak:
"It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of disgust and horror at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept continually vibrating between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. From the disorders which disfigure the annals of those republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans."
And again they say:
"It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislation; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice."
After reading these extracts, Mr. B. said: It was to get rid of the evils of the old confederation that the present Union was formed; and, having formed it, they who formed it undertook to make it perpetual, and for that purpose had recourse to all the sanctions held sacred among men—commands, prohibitions, oaths. The States were forbid to form compacts or agreements with each other; the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, were declared to be the supreme law of the land; and all authorities, State and federal, legislative, executive, and judicial, were to be sworn to support it. The resolutions which have been read contradict all this; and the General Assembly mistook their own powers as much as they mistook the sentiments of the people of Missouri when they adopted them.
Mr. Clay renewed, at this session, 1832-'33, the bill which he had brought in the session before, and which had passed the Senate, to divide the net proceeds of the sales of public lands among the States, to be applied to such purposes as the legislatures of the respective States should think proper. His principal arguments, in favor of the bill, were:first, the aid which the distribution would give to the States, in developing their resources and promoting their prosperity;secondly, the advantage to the federal government, in settling the question of the mode of disposing of the public lands. He explained his bill, which, at first, contained a specification of the objects to which the States should apply the dividends they received, which was struck out, in the progress of the bill, and stated its provisions to be:
"To set apart, for the benefit of the new States, twelve and a half per cent., out of the aggregate proceeds, in addition to the five per cent., which was now allowed to them by compact, before any division took place among theStates generally. It was thus proposed to assign, in the first place, seventeen and a half per cent. to the new States, and then to divide the whole of the residue among the twenty-four States. And, in order to do away any inequality among the new States, grants are specifically made by the bill to those who had not received, heretofore, as much lands as the rest of the new States, from the general government, so as to put all the new States on an equal footing. This twelve and a half per cent., to the new States, to be at their disposal, for either education or internal improvement, and the residue to be at the disposition of the States, subject to no other limitation than this: that it shall be at their option to apply the amount received either to the purposes of education, or the colonization of free people of color, or for internal improvements, or in debts which may have been contracted for internal improvements. And, with respect to the duration of this scheme of distribution proposed by the bill, it is limited to five years, unless hostilities shall occur between the United States and any foreign power; in which event, the proceeds are to be applied to the carrying on such war, with vigor and effect, against any common enemy with whom we may be brought in contact. After the conclusion of peace, and after the discharge of the debt created by any such war, the aggregate funds to return to that peaceful destination to which it was the intention of the bill that they should now be directed, that is, to the improvement of the moral and physical condition of the country, and the promotion of the public happiness and prosperity."
"To set apart, for the benefit of the new States, twelve and a half per cent., out of the aggregate proceeds, in addition to the five per cent., which was now allowed to them by compact, before any division took place among theStates generally. It was thus proposed to assign, in the first place, seventeen and a half per cent. to the new States, and then to divide the whole of the residue among the twenty-four States. And, in order to do away any inequality among the new States, grants are specifically made by the bill to those who had not received, heretofore, as much lands as the rest of the new States, from the general government, so as to put all the new States on an equal footing. This twelve and a half per cent., to the new States, to be at their disposal, for either education or internal improvement, and the residue to be at the disposition of the States, subject to no other limitation than this: that it shall be at their option to apply the amount received either to the purposes of education, or the colonization of free people of color, or for internal improvements, or in debts which may have been contracted for internal improvements. And, with respect to the duration of this scheme of distribution proposed by the bill, it is limited to five years, unless hostilities shall occur between the United States and any foreign power; in which event, the proceeds are to be applied to the carrying on such war, with vigor and effect, against any common enemy with whom we may be brought in contact. After the conclusion of peace, and after the discharge of the debt created by any such war, the aggregate funds to return to that peaceful destination to which it was the intention of the bill that they should now be directed, that is, to the improvement of the moral and physical condition of the country, and the promotion of the public happiness and prosperity."
He then spoke of the advantages of settling the question of the manner of disposing of the public lands, and said:
"The first remark which seemed to him to be called for, in reference to this subject, was as to the expediency, he would say the necessity, of its immediate settlement. On this point, he was happy to believe that there was a unanimous concurrence of opinion in that body. However they might differ as to the terms on which the distribution of these lands should be made, they all agreed that it was a question which ought to be promptly and finally, he hoped amicably, adjusted. No time more favorable than the present moment could be selected for the settlement of this question. The last session was much less favorable for the accomplishment of this object; and the reasons were sufficiently obvious, without any waste of time in their specification. If the question were not now settled, but if it were to be made the subject of an annual discussion, mixing itself up with all the measures of legislation, it would be felt in its influence upon all, would produce great dissensions both in and out of the House, and affect extensively all the great and important objects which might be before that body. They had had, in the several States, some experience on that subject; and, without going into any details on the subject, he would merely state that it was known, that, for a long period, the small amount of the public domain possessed by some of the States, in comparison with the quantity possessed by the general government, had been a cause of great agitation in the public mind, and had greatly influenced the course of legislation. Persons coming from the quarter of the State in which the public land was situated, united in sympathy and interest, constituted always a body who acted together, to promote their common object, either by donations to settlers, or reduction in the price of the public lands, or the relief of those who are debtors for the public domain; and were always ready, as men always will be, to second all those measures which look towards the accomplishment of the main object which they have in view. So, if this question were not now settled, it would be a source of inexpressible difficulty hereafter, influencing all the great interests of the country, in Congress, affecting great events without, and perhaps adding another to those unhappy causes of division, which unfortunately exist at this moment."
"The first remark which seemed to him to be called for, in reference to this subject, was as to the expediency, he would say the necessity, of its immediate settlement. On this point, he was happy to believe that there was a unanimous concurrence of opinion in that body. However they might differ as to the terms on which the distribution of these lands should be made, they all agreed that it was a question which ought to be promptly and finally, he hoped amicably, adjusted. No time more favorable than the present moment could be selected for the settlement of this question. The last session was much less favorable for the accomplishment of this object; and the reasons were sufficiently obvious, without any waste of time in their specification. If the question were not now settled, but if it were to be made the subject of an annual discussion, mixing itself up with all the measures of legislation, it would be felt in its influence upon all, would produce great dissensions both in and out of the House, and affect extensively all the great and important objects which might be before that body. They had had, in the several States, some experience on that subject; and, without going into any details on the subject, he would merely state that it was known, that, for a long period, the small amount of the public domain possessed by some of the States, in comparison with the quantity possessed by the general government, had been a cause of great agitation in the public mind, and had greatly influenced the course of legislation. Persons coming from the quarter of the State in which the public land was situated, united in sympathy and interest, constituted always a body who acted together, to promote their common object, either by donations to settlers, or reduction in the price of the public lands, or the relief of those who are debtors for the public domain; and were always ready, as men always will be, to second all those measures which look towards the accomplishment of the main object which they have in view. So, if this question were not now settled, it would be a source of inexpressible difficulty hereafter, influencing all the great interests of the country, in Congress, affecting great events without, and perhaps adding another to those unhappy causes of division, which unfortunately exist at this moment."
In his arguments in support of his bill, Mr. Clay looked to the lands as a source of revenue to the States or the federal government, from their sale, and not from their settlement and cultivation, and the revenue to be derived from the wealth and population to which their settlement would give rise; and, concluding with an encomium on his bill under the aspect of revenue from sales, he said:
"He could not conceive a more happy disposition of the proceeds of the public lands, than that which was provided by this bill. It was supposed that five years would be neither too long nor too short a period for a fair experiment. In case a war should break out, we may withdraw from its peaceful destination a sum of from two and a half to three and a half millions of dollars per annum, and apply it to a vigorous prosecution of the war—a sum which would pay the interest on sixty millions of dollars, which might be required to sustain the war, and a sum which is constantly and progressively increasing. It proposes, now that the general government has no use for the money, now that the surplus treasure is really a source of vexatious embarrassment to us, and gives rise to a succession of projects, to supply for a short time a fund to the States which want our assistance, to advance to them that which we do not want, and which they will apply to great beneficial national purposes; and, should war take place, to divert it to the vigorous support of the war; and, when it ceases, to apply it again to its peaceful purposes. And thus we may grow, from time totime, with a fund which will endure for centuries, and which will augment with the growth of the nation, aiding the States in seasons of peace, and sustaining the general government in periods of war."
"He could not conceive a more happy disposition of the proceeds of the public lands, than that which was provided by this bill. It was supposed that five years would be neither too long nor too short a period for a fair experiment. In case a war should break out, we may withdraw from its peaceful destination a sum of from two and a half to three and a half millions of dollars per annum, and apply it to a vigorous prosecution of the war—a sum which would pay the interest on sixty millions of dollars, which might be required to sustain the war, and a sum which is constantly and progressively increasing. It proposes, now that the general government has no use for the money, now that the surplus treasure is really a source of vexatious embarrassment to us, and gives rise to a succession of projects, to supply for a short time a fund to the States which want our assistance, to advance to them that which we do not want, and which they will apply to great beneficial national purposes; and, should war take place, to divert it to the vigorous support of the war; and, when it ceases, to apply it again to its peaceful purposes. And thus we may grow, from time totime, with a fund which will endure for centuries, and which will augment with the growth of the nation, aiding the States in seasons of peace, and sustaining the general government in periods of war."
Mr. Calhoun deprecated this distribution of the land money as being dangerous in itself and unconstitutional, and as leading to the distribution of other revenue—in which he was prophetic. He said:
"He could not yield his assent to the mode which this bill proposed to settle the agitated question of the public lands. In addition to several objections of a minor character, he had an insuperable objection to the leading principle of the bill, which proposed to distribute the proceeds of the lands among the States. He believed it to be both dangerous and unconstitutional. He could not assent to the principle, that Congress had a right to denationalize the public funds. He agreed that the objection was not so decided in case of the proceeds of lands, as in that of revenue collected from taxes or duties. The senator from Ohio had adduced evidence from the deed of cession, which certainly countenanced the idea that the proceeds of the lands might be subject to the distribution proposed in the bill; but he was far from being satisfied that the argument was solid or conclusive. If the principle of distribution could be confined to the proceeds of the lands, he would acknowledge that his objection to the principle would be weakened."He dreaded the force of precedent, and he foresaw that the time would come when the example of the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands would be urged as a reason for distributing the revenue derived from other sources. Nor would the argument be devoid of plausibility. If we, of the Atlantic States, insist that the revenue of the West, derived from lands, should be equally distributed among all the States, we must not be surprised if the interior States should, in like manner, insist to distribute the proceeds of the customs, the great source of revenue in the Atlantic States. Should such a movement be successful, it must be obvious to every one, who is the least acquainted with the workings of the human heart, and the nature of government, that nothing would more certainly endanger the existence of the Union. The revenue is the power of the State, and to distribute its revenue is to dissolve its power into its original elements."
"He could not yield his assent to the mode which this bill proposed to settle the agitated question of the public lands. In addition to several objections of a minor character, he had an insuperable objection to the leading principle of the bill, which proposed to distribute the proceeds of the lands among the States. He believed it to be both dangerous and unconstitutional. He could not assent to the principle, that Congress had a right to denationalize the public funds. He agreed that the objection was not so decided in case of the proceeds of lands, as in that of revenue collected from taxes or duties. The senator from Ohio had adduced evidence from the deed of cession, which certainly countenanced the idea that the proceeds of the lands might be subject to the distribution proposed in the bill; but he was far from being satisfied that the argument was solid or conclusive. If the principle of distribution could be confined to the proceeds of the lands, he would acknowledge that his objection to the principle would be weakened.
"He dreaded the force of precedent, and he foresaw that the time would come when the example of the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands would be urged as a reason for distributing the revenue derived from other sources. Nor would the argument be devoid of plausibility. If we, of the Atlantic States, insist that the revenue of the West, derived from lands, should be equally distributed among all the States, we must not be surprised if the interior States should, in like manner, insist to distribute the proceeds of the customs, the great source of revenue in the Atlantic States. Should such a movement be successful, it must be obvious to every one, who is the least acquainted with the workings of the human heart, and the nature of government, that nothing would more certainly endanger the existence of the Union. The revenue is the power of the State, and to distribute its revenue is to dissolve its power into its original elements."
Attempts were made to postpone the bill to the next session, which failed; and it passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 20.
Yeas.—Messrs. Bell, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Dallas, Dickerson, Dudley, Ewing, Foot, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Holmes, Johnston, Knight, Poindexter, Prentiss, Robbins, Ruggles, Seymour, Silsbee, Sprague, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Wilkins—24.Nays.—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buckner, Calhoun, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King, Mangum, Miller, Moore, Rives, Robinson, Smith, Tipton, Tyler, White, Wright—20.
Yeas.—Messrs. Bell, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Dallas, Dickerson, Dudley, Ewing, Foot, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Holmes, Johnston, Knight, Poindexter, Prentiss, Robbins, Ruggles, Seymour, Silsbee, Sprague, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Wilkins—24.
Nays.—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buckner, Calhoun, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King, Mangum, Miller, Moore, Rives, Robinson, Smith, Tipton, Tyler, White, Wright—20.
The bill went to the House and received amendments, which did not obtain the concurrence of the Senate until midnight of the first of March, which, being the short session, was within twenty-four hours of the constitutional termination of the Congress, which was limited to the 3d—which falling this year on Sunday, the Congress would adjourn at midnight of the 2nd. Further efforts were made to postpone it, and upon the ground that, in a bill of that magnitude and novelty, the President was entitled to the full ten days for the consideration of it which the constitution allowed him, and he would have but half a day; for if passed that night it could only reach him in the forenoon of the next day—leaving him but half a day for his consideration of the measure, where the constitution allowed him ten; and that half day engrossed with all crowded business of an expiring session. The next evening, the President attended, as usual, in a room adjoining the Senate chamber, to be at hand to sign bills and make nominations. It was some hours in the night when the President sent for me, and withdrawing into the recess of a window, told me that he had a veto message ready on the land bill, but doubted about sending it in, lest there should not be a full Senate; and intimated his apprehension that Mr. Calhoun and some of his friends might be absent, and endanger the bill: and wished to consult me upon that point. I told him I would go and reconnoitre the chamber, and adjacent rooms; did so—found that Mr. Calhoun and his immediate friends were absent—returned and informed him, when he said he would keep the bill until the next session, and then return it with a fully considered message—his present one being brief, and not such as to show his views fully. I told him I thought he ought to do so—that such a measure ought not to be passed in the last hours of a session, in a thin Senate, and upon an imperfect view of his objections; and that the public good required it to be held up. It was so; and during the long vacation of nine months which intervened before the next session, the opposition pressesand orators kept the country filled with denunciations of the enormity of his conduct in "pocketing" the hill—as if it had been a case of "flat burglary," instead of being the exercise of a constitutional right, rendered most just and proper under the extraordinary circumstances which had attended the passage, and intended return of the bill. At the commencement of the ensuing session he returned the bill, with his well-considered objections, in an ample message, which, after going over a full history of the derivation of the lands, came to the following conclusions:
"1. That one of the fundamental principles, on which the confederation of the United States was originally based, was, that the waste lands of the West, within their limits, should be the common property of the United States."2. That those lands were ceded to the United States by the States which claimed them, and the cessions were accepted, on the express condition that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States, according to their respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other purpose whatsoever."3. That, in execution of these solemn compacts, the Congress of the United States did, under the confederation, proceed to sell these lands, and put the avails into the common treasury; and, under the new constitution, did repeatedly pledge them for the payment of the public debt of the United States, by which pledge each State was expected to profit in proportion to the general charge to be made upon it for that object."These are the first principles of this whole subject, which, I think, cannot be contested by any one who examines the proceedings of the revolutionary Congress, the sessions of the several States, and the acts of Congress, under the new constitution. Keeping them deeply impressed upon the mind, let us proceed to examine how far the objects of the cessions have been completed, and see whether those compacts are not still obligatory upon the United States."The debt, for which these lands were pledged by Congress, may be considered as paid, and they are consequently released from that lien. But that pledge formed no part of the compacts with the States, or of the conditions upon which the cessions were made. It was a contract between new parties—between the United States and their creditors. Upon payment of the debt, the compacts remain in full force, and the obligation of the United States to dispose of the lands for the common benefit, is neither destroyed nor impaired. As they cannot now be executed in that mode, the only legitimate question which can arise is, in what other way are these lands to be hereafter disposed of for the common benefit of the several States, 'according to their respective and usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure?' The cessions of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, in express terms, and all the rest impliedly, not only provide thus specifically the proportion, according to which each State shall profit by the proceeds of the land sales, but they proceed to declare that they shall be 'faithfully andbona fidedisposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever.' This is the fundamental law of the land, at this moment, growing out of compacts which are older than the constitution, and formed the corner stone on which the Union itself was erected."In the practice of the government, the proceeds of the public lands have not been set apart as a separate fund for the payment of the public debt, but have been, and are now, paid into the treasury, where they constitute a part of the aggregate of revenue, upon which the government draws, as well for its current expenditures as for payment of the public debt. In this manner, they have heretofore, and do now, lessen the general charge upon the people of the several States, in the exact proportions stipulated in the compacts."These general charges have been composed, not only of the public debt and the usual expenditures attending the civil and military administrations of the government, but of the amounts paid to the States, with which these compacts were formed; the amounts paid the Indians for their right of possession; the amounts paid for the purchase of Louisiana and Florida; and the amounts paid surveyors, registers, receivers, clerks, &c., employed in preparing for market, and selling, the western domain. From the origin of the land system, down to the 30th September, 1832, the amount expended for all these purposes has been about $49,701,280 and the amount received from the sales, deducting payments on account of roads, &c., about $38,386,624. The revenue arising from the public lands, therefore, has not been sufficient to meet the general charges on the treasury, which have grown out of them, by about $11,314,656. Yet, in having been applied to lessen those charges, the conditions of the compacts have been thus far fulfilled, and each State has profited according to its usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure. The annual proceeds of land sales have increased, and the charges have diminished; so that, at a reduced price, those lands would now defray all current charges growing out of them, and save the treasury from further advances on their account. Their original intent and object, therefore, would be accomplished, as fully as it has hitherto been, by reducing the price, and hereafter, as heretofore, bringing the proceeds into the treasury. Indeed, as this is the only mode in which the objects of the original compact can be attained, it may be considered, for all practical purposes, that it is one of their requirements."The bill before me begins with an entire subversion of every one of the compacts by which the United States became possessed of their western domain, and treats the subject as if they never had existence, and as if the United States were the original and unconditional owners of all the public lands. The first section directs—"'That, from and after the 31st day of December, 1832, there shall be allowed and paid to each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, over and above what each of the said States is entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered into between them, respectively, upon their admission into the Union and the United States, the sum of twelve and a half per centum upon the net amount of the sales of the public lands, which, subsequent to the day aforesaid, shall be made within the several limits of the said States; which said sum of twelve and a half per centum shall be applied to some object or objects of internal improvement or education, within the said States, under the direction of their several legislatures.'"This twelve and a half per centum is to be taken out of the net proceeds of the land sales, before any apportionment is made; and the same seven States, which are first to receive this proportion, are also to receive their due proportion of the residue, according to the ratio of general distribution."Now, waiving all considerations of equity or policy, in regard to this provision, what more need be said to demonstrate its objectionable character, than that it is in direct and undisguised violation of the pledge given by Congress to the States, before a single cession was made; that it abrogates the condition upon which some of the States came into the Union; and that it sets at nought the terms of cession spread upon the face of every grant under which the title to that portion of the public land is held by the federal government?"In the apportionment of the remaining seven eighths of the proceeds, this bill, in a manner equally undisguised, violates the conditions upon which the United States acquired title to the ceded lands. Abandoning altogether the ratio of distribution, according to the general charge and expenditure provided by the compacts, it adopts that of the federal representative population. Virginia, and other States, which ceded their lands upon the express condition that they should receive a benefit from their sales, in proportion to their part of the general charge, are, by the bill, allowed only a portion of seven eighths of their proceeds, and that not in the proportion of general charge and expenditure, but in the ratio of their federal representative population."The constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that nothing in it 'shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State,' it virtually provides that these compacts, and the rights they secure, shall remain untouched by the legislative power, which shall only make all 'needful rules and regulations' for carrying them into effect. All beyond this, would seem to be an assumption of undelegated power."These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of virtue, patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the price that great States, which had won liberty, were willing to pay for that Union, without which, they plainly saw, it could not be preserved. It was not for territory or State power that our revolutionary fathers took up arms; it was for individual liberty, and the right of self-government. The expulsion, from the continent, of British armies and British power was to them a barren conquest, if, through the collisions of the redeemed States, the individual rights for which they fought should become the prey of petty military tyrannies established at home. To avert such consequences, and throw around liberty the shield of union, States, whose relative strength, at the time, gave them a preponderating power, magnanimously sacrificed domains which would have made them the rivals of empires, only stipulating that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of themselves and the other confederated States. This enlightened policy produced union, and has secured liberty. It has made our waste lands to swarm with a busy people, and added many powerful States to our confederation. As well for the fruits which these noble works of our ancestors have produced, as for the devotedness in which they originated, we should hesitate before we demolish them."But there are other principles asserted in the bill, which would have impelled me to withhold my signature, had I not seen in it a violation of the compacts by which the United States acquired title to a large portion of the public lands. It reasserts the principle contained in the bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, from which I was compelled to withhold my consent, for reasons contained in my message of the 27th May 1830, to the House of Representatives. The leading principle, then asserted, was, that Congress possesses no constitutional power to appropriate any part of the moneys of the United States for objects of a local character within the States. That principle, I cannot be mistaken in supposing, has received the unequivocal sanction of the American people, and all subsequent reflection has but satisfied me more thoroughly that the interests of our people, and the purity of our government, if not its existence, depend on its observance. The public lands are the common property of the United States, and the moneys arising from their sales are a part of the public revenue. This bill proposes to raise from,and appropriate a portion of, this public revenue to certain States, providing expressly that it shall 'be applied to objects of internal improvement or education within those States,' and then proceeds to appropriate the balance to all the States, with the declaration that it shall be applied 'to such purposes as the legislatures of the said respective States shall deem proper.' The former appropriation is expressly for internal improvements or education, without qualification as to the kind of improvements, and, therefore, in express violation of the principle maintained in my objections to the turnpike road bill, above referred to. The latter appropriation is more broad, and gives the money to be applied to any local purpose whatsoever. It will not be denied, that, under the provisions of the bill, a portion of the money might have been applied to making the very road to which the bill of 1830 had reference, and must, of course, come within the scope of the same principle. If the money of the United States cannot be applied to local purposes through its own agents, as little can it be permitted to be thus expended through the agency of the State governments."It has been supposed that, with all the reductions in our revenue which could be speedily effected by Congress, without injury to the substantial interests of the country, there might be, for some years to come, a surplus of moneys in the treasury; and that there was, in principle, no objection to returning them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal accomplishment of such an object is obviously impracticable, it was thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to it, to hand them over to the State governments, the more immediate representatives of the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they properly belonged. The principle and the object was, to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by them under a system which could not at once be abandoned; but even this resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to save the general government from grasping unlimited power over internal improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality."But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire proceeds of one source of revenue, and sets them apart as a surplus, making it necessary to raise the money for supporting the government, and meeting the general charges, from other sources. It even throws the entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the public lands a perpetual charge upon the treasury. It does not return to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the government by which they are not wanted; but compels the people to pay moneys into the treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for distribution to their State governments. If this principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to perceive to what consequences it may lead. Already this bill, by throwing the land system on the revenues from imports for support, virtually distributes among the States a part of those revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time, without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the State governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from the treasury of the United States; or, if a sufficient supply should be obtained by some States and not by others, the deficient States might complain, and, to put an end to all further difficulty, Congress, without assuming any new principle, need go but one step further, and put the salaries of all the State governors, judges, and other officers, with a sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill."It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised. Money is power, and in that government which pays all the public officers of the States, will all political power be substantially concentrated. The State governments, if governments they might be called, would lose all their independence and dignity. The economy which now distinguishes them would be converted into a profusion, limited only by the extent of the supply. Being the dependants of the general government, and looking to its treasury as the source of all their emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would, in effect, be the mere stipendaries and instruments of the central power."I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several States will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their State governments, and vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they have no control. They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the tax-gatherer and paymaster of all their State governments, thus amalgamating all their officers into one mass of common interest and common feeling. It is too obvious that such a course would subvert our well-balanced system of government, and ultimately deprive us of the blessings now derived from our happy union."However willing I might be that any unavoidable surplus in the treasury should be returned to the people through their State governments, I cannot assent to the principle that a surplus may be created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill as, in effect, assuming the right not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the treasury among the States without limitation, from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate money for the support of every State government and institution, as well as for making everylocal improvement, however trivial, I cannot give it my assent."It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to the old States or the new from the system of distribution which this bill proposes, if it were otherwise unobjectionable. It requires no argument to prove, that if three millions of dollars a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out of the treasury by this bill for distribution, it must be replaced by the same sum collected from the people through some other means. The old States will receive annually a sum of money from the treasury, but they will pay in a larger sum, together with the expenses of collection and distribution. It is only their proportion of seven eights of the proceeds of land sales which they are to receive, but they must pay their due proportion of the whole. Disguise it as we may, the bill proposes to them a dead loss in the ratio of eight to seven, in addition to expenses and other incidental losses. This assertion is not the less true because it may not at first be palpable. Their receipts will be in large sums, but their payments in small ones. The governments of the States will receive seven dollars, for which the people of the States will pay eight. The large sums received will be palpable to the senses; the small sums paid, it requires thought to identify. But a little consideration will satisfy the people that the effect is the same as if seven hundred dollars were given them from the public treasury, for which they were at the same time required to pay in taxes, direct or indirect, eight hundred."I deceive myself greatly if the new States would find their interests promoted by such a system as this bill proposes. Their true policy consists in the rapid settling and improvement of the waste lands within their limits. As a means of hastening those events, they have long been looking to a reduction in the price of public lands upon the final payment of the national debt. The effect of the proposed system would be to prevent that reduction. It is true, the bill reserves to Congress the power to reduce the price, but the effect of its details, as now arranged, would probably be forever to prevent its exercise."With the just men who inhabit the new States, it is a sufficient reason to reject this system, that it is in violation of the fundamental laws of the republic and its constitution. But if it were a mere question of interest or expediency, they would still reject it. They would not sell their bright prospect of increasing wealth and growing power at such a price. They would not place a sum of money to be paid into their treasuries, in competition with the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of their population. They would not consider a small or large annual sum to be paid to their governments, and immediately expended, as an equivalent for that enduring wealth which is composed of flocks and herds, and cultivated farms. No temptation will allure them from that object of abiding interest, the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of a hardy race of free citizens, their glory in peace and their defence in war."On the whole, I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in my annual message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the public lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source of revenue, except for the payment of those general charges which grow out of the acquisition of the lands, their survey, and sale. Although these expenses have not been met by the proceeds of sales heretofore, it is quite certain they will be hereafter, even after a considerable reduction in the price. By meeting in the treasury so much of the general charge as arises from that source, they will be hereafter, as they have been heretofore, disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, according to the compacts of cession. I do not doubt that it is the real interest of each and all the States in the Union, and particularly of the new States, that the price of these lands shall be reduced and graduated; and that, after they have been offered for a certain number of years, the refuse, remaining unsold, shall be abandoned to the States, and the machinery of our land system entirely withdrawn. It cannot be supposed the compacts intended that the United States should retain forever a title to lands within the States, which are of no value; and no doubt is entertained that the general interest would be best promoted by surrendering such lands to the States."This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no principle, violates no compact, and deranges no system. Already has the price of those lands been reduced from two dollars per acre to one dollar and a quarter; and upon the will of Congress, it depends whether there shall be a further reduction. While the burdens of the East are diminishing by the reduction of the duties upon imports, it seems but equal justice that the chief burden of the West should be lightened in an equal degree at least. It would be just to the old States and the new, conciliate every interest, disarm the subject of all its dangers, and add another guaranty to the perpetuity of our happy Union."
"1. That one of the fundamental principles, on which the confederation of the United States was originally based, was, that the waste lands of the West, within their limits, should be the common property of the United States.
"2. That those lands were ceded to the United States by the States which claimed them, and the cessions were accepted, on the express condition that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States, according to their respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other purpose whatsoever.
"3. That, in execution of these solemn compacts, the Congress of the United States did, under the confederation, proceed to sell these lands, and put the avails into the common treasury; and, under the new constitution, did repeatedly pledge them for the payment of the public debt of the United States, by which pledge each State was expected to profit in proportion to the general charge to be made upon it for that object.
"These are the first principles of this whole subject, which, I think, cannot be contested by any one who examines the proceedings of the revolutionary Congress, the sessions of the several States, and the acts of Congress, under the new constitution. Keeping them deeply impressed upon the mind, let us proceed to examine how far the objects of the cessions have been completed, and see whether those compacts are not still obligatory upon the United States.
"The debt, for which these lands were pledged by Congress, may be considered as paid, and they are consequently released from that lien. But that pledge formed no part of the compacts with the States, or of the conditions upon which the cessions were made. It was a contract between new parties—between the United States and their creditors. Upon payment of the debt, the compacts remain in full force, and the obligation of the United States to dispose of the lands for the common benefit, is neither destroyed nor impaired. As they cannot now be executed in that mode, the only legitimate question which can arise is, in what other way are these lands to be hereafter disposed of for the common benefit of the several States, 'according to their respective and usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure?' The cessions of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, in express terms, and all the rest impliedly, not only provide thus specifically the proportion, according to which each State shall profit by the proceeds of the land sales, but they proceed to declare that they shall be 'faithfully andbona fidedisposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever.' This is the fundamental law of the land, at this moment, growing out of compacts which are older than the constitution, and formed the corner stone on which the Union itself was erected.
"In the practice of the government, the proceeds of the public lands have not been set apart as a separate fund for the payment of the public debt, but have been, and are now, paid into the treasury, where they constitute a part of the aggregate of revenue, upon which the government draws, as well for its current expenditures as for payment of the public debt. In this manner, they have heretofore, and do now, lessen the general charge upon the people of the several States, in the exact proportions stipulated in the compacts.
"These general charges have been composed, not only of the public debt and the usual expenditures attending the civil and military administrations of the government, but of the amounts paid to the States, with which these compacts were formed; the amounts paid the Indians for their right of possession; the amounts paid for the purchase of Louisiana and Florida; and the amounts paid surveyors, registers, receivers, clerks, &c., employed in preparing for market, and selling, the western domain. From the origin of the land system, down to the 30th September, 1832, the amount expended for all these purposes has been about $49,701,280 and the amount received from the sales, deducting payments on account of roads, &c., about $38,386,624. The revenue arising from the public lands, therefore, has not been sufficient to meet the general charges on the treasury, which have grown out of them, by about $11,314,656. Yet, in having been applied to lessen those charges, the conditions of the compacts have been thus far fulfilled, and each State has profited according to its usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure. The annual proceeds of land sales have increased, and the charges have diminished; so that, at a reduced price, those lands would now defray all current charges growing out of them, and save the treasury from further advances on their account. Their original intent and object, therefore, would be accomplished, as fully as it has hitherto been, by reducing the price, and hereafter, as heretofore, bringing the proceeds into the treasury. Indeed, as this is the only mode in which the objects of the original compact can be attained, it may be considered, for all practical purposes, that it is one of their requirements.
"The bill before me begins with an entire subversion of every one of the compacts by which the United States became possessed of their western domain, and treats the subject as if they never had existence, and as if the United States were the original and unconditional owners of all the public lands. The first section directs—
"'That, from and after the 31st day of December, 1832, there shall be allowed and paid to each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, over and above what each of the said States is entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered into between them, respectively, upon their admission into the Union and the United States, the sum of twelve and a half per centum upon the net amount of the sales of the public lands, which, subsequent to the day aforesaid, shall be made within the several limits of the said States; which said sum of twelve and a half per centum shall be applied to some object or objects of internal improvement or education, within the said States, under the direction of their several legislatures.'
"This twelve and a half per centum is to be taken out of the net proceeds of the land sales, before any apportionment is made; and the same seven States, which are first to receive this proportion, are also to receive their due proportion of the residue, according to the ratio of general distribution.
"Now, waiving all considerations of equity or policy, in regard to this provision, what more need be said to demonstrate its objectionable character, than that it is in direct and undisguised violation of the pledge given by Congress to the States, before a single cession was made; that it abrogates the condition upon which some of the States came into the Union; and that it sets at nought the terms of cession spread upon the face of every grant under which the title to that portion of the public land is held by the federal government?
"In the apportionment of the remaining seven eighths of the proceeds, this bill, in a manner equally undisguised, violates the conditions upon which the United States acquired title to the ceded lands. Abandoning altogether the ratio of distribution, according to the general charge and expenditure provided by the compacts, it adopts that of the federal representative population. Virginia, and other States, which ceded their lands upon the express condition that they should receive a benefit from their sales, in proportion to their part of the general charge, are, by the bill, allowed only a portion of seven eighths of their proceeds, and that not in the proportion of general charge and expenditure, but in the ratio of their federal representative population.
"The constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that nothing in it 'shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State,' it virtually provides that these compacts, and the rights they secure, shall remain untouched by the legislative power, which shall only make all 'needful rules and regulations' for carrying them into effect. All beyond this, would seem to be an assumption of undelegated power.
"These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of virtue, patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the price that great States, which had won liberty, were willing to pay for that Union, without which, they plainly saw, it could not be preserved. It was not for territory or State power that our revolutionary fathers took up arms; it was for individual liberty, and the right of self-government. The expulsion, from the continent, of British armies and British power was to them a barren conquest, if, through the collisions of the redeemed States, the individual rights for which they fought should become the prey of petty military tyrannies established at home. To avert such consequences, and throw around liberty the shield of union, States, whose relative strength, at the time, gave them a preponderating power, magnanimously sacrificed domains which would have made them the rivals of empires, only stipulating that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of themselves and the other confederated States. This enlightened policy produced union, and has secured liberty. It has made our waste lands to swarm with a busy people, and added many powerful States to our confederation. As well for the fruits which these noble works of our ancestors have produced, as for the devotedness in which they originated, we should hesitate before we demolish them.
"But there are other principles asserted in the bill, which would have impelled me to withhold my signature, had I not seen in it a violation of the compacts by which the United States acquired title to a large portion of the public lands. It reasserts the principle contained in the bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, from which I was compelled to withhold my consent, for reasons contained in my message of the 27th May 1830, to the House of Representatives. The leading principle, then asserted, was, that Congress possesses no constitutional power to appropriate any part of the moneys of the United States for objects of a local character within the States. That principle, I cannot be mistaken in supposing, has received the unequivocal sanction of the American people, and all subsequent reflection has but satisfied me more thoroughly that the interests of our people, and the purity of our government, if not its existence, depend on its observance. The public lands are the common property of the United States, and the moneys arising from their sales are a part of the public revenue. This bill proposes to raise from,and appropriate a portion of, this public revenue to certain States, providing expressly that it shall 'be applied to objects of internal improvement or education within those States,' and then proceeds to appropriate the balance to all the States, with the declaration that it shall be applied 'to such purposes as the legislatures of the said respective States shall deem proper.' The former appropriation is expressly for internal improvements or education, without qualification as to the kind of improvements, and, therefore, in express violation of the principle maintained in my objections to the turnpike road bill, above referred to. The latter appropriation is more broad, and gives the money to be applied to any local purpose whatsoever. It will not be denied, that, under the provisions of the bill, a portion of the money might have been applied to making the very road to which the bill of 1830 had reference, and must, of course, come within the scope of the same principle. If the money of the United States cannot be applied to local purposes through its own agents, as little can it be permitted to be thus expended through the agency of the State governments.
"It has been supposed that, with all the reductions in our revenue which could be speedily effected by Congress, without injury to the substantial interests of the country, there might be, for some years to come, a surplus of moneys in the treasury; and that there was, in principle, no objection to returning them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal accomplishment of such an object is obviously impracticable, it was thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to it, to hand them over to the State governments, the more immediate representatives of the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they properly belonged. The principle and the object was, to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by them under a system which could not at once be abandoned; but even this resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to save the general government from grasping unlimited power over internal improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality.
"But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire proceeds of one source of revenue, and sets them apart as a surplus, making it necessary to raise the money for supporting the government, and meeting the general charges, from other sources. It even throws the entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the public lands a perpetual charge upon the treasury. It does not return to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the government by which they are not wanted; but compels the people to pay moneys into the treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for distribution to their State governments. If this principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to perceive to what consequences it may lead. Already this bill, by throwing the land system on the revenues from imports for support, virtually distributes among the States a part of those revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time, without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the State governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from the treasury of the United States; or, if a sufficient supply should be obtained by some States and not by others, the deficient States might complain, and, to put an end to all further difficulty, Congress, without assuming any new principle, need go but one step further, and put the salaries of all the State governors, judges, and other officers, with a sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill.
"It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised. Money is power, and in that government which pays all the public officers of the States, will all political power be substantially concentrated. The State governments, if governments they might be called, would lose all their independence and dignity. The economy which now distinguishes them would be converted into a profusion, limited only by the extent of the supply. Being the dependants of the general government, and looking to its treasury as the source of all their emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would, in effect, be the mere stipendaries and instruments of the central power.
"I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several States will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their State governments, and vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they have no control. They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the tax-gatherer and paymaster of all their State governments, thus amalgamating all their officers into one mass of common interest and common feeling. It is too obvious that such a course would subvert our well-balanced system of government, and ultimately deprive us of the blessings now derived from our happy union.
"However willing I might be that any unavoidable surplus in the treasury should be returned to the people through their State governments, I cannot assent to the principle that a surplus may be created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill as, in effect, assuming the right not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the treasury among the States without limitation, from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate money for the support of every State government and institution, as well as for making everylocal improvement, however trivial, I cannot give it my assent.
"It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to the old States or the new from the system of distribution which this bill proposes, if it were otherwise unobjectionable. It requires no argument to prove, that if three millions of dollars a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out of the treasury by this bill for distribution, it must be replaced by the same sum collected from the people through some other means. The old States will receive annually a sum of money from the treasury, but they will pay in a larger sum, together with the expenses of collection and distribution. It is only their proportion of seven eights of the proceeds of land sales which they are to receive, but they must pay their due proportion of the whole. Disguise it as we may, the bill proposes to them a dead loss in the ratio of eight to seven, in addition to expenses and other incidental losses. This assertion is not the less true because it may not at first be palpable. Their receipts will be in large sums, but their payments in small ones. The governments of the States will receive seven dollars, for which the people of the States will pay eight. The large sums received will be palpable to the senses; the small sums paid, it requires thought to identify. But a little consideration will satisfy the people that the effect is the same as if seven hundred dollars were given them from the public treasury, for which they were at the same time required to pay in taxes, direct or indirect, eight hundred.
"I deceive myself greatly if the new States would find their interests promoted by such a system as this bill proposes. Their true policy consists in the rapid settling and improvement of the waste lands within their limits. As a means of hastening those events, they have long been looking to a reduction in the price of public lands upon the final payment of the national debt. The effect of the proposed system would be to prevent that reduction. It is true, the bill reserves to Congress the power to reduce the price, but the effect of its details, as now arranged, would probably be forever to prevent its exercise.
"With the just men who inhabit the new States, it is a sufficient reason to reject this system, that it is in violation of the fundamental laws of the republic and its constitution. But if it were a mere question of interest or expediency, they would still reject it. They would not sell their bright prospect of increasing wealth and growing power at such a price. They would not place a sum of money to be paid into their treasuries, in competition with the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of their population. They would not consider a small or large annual sum to be paid to their governments, and immediately expended, as an equivalent for that enduring wealth which is composed of flocks and herds, and cultivated farms. No temptation will allure them from that object of abiding interest, the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of a hardy race of free citizens, their glory in peace and their defence in war.
"On the whole, I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in my annual message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the public lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source of revenue, except for the payment of those general charges which grow out of the acquisition of the lands, their survey, and sale. Although these expenses have not been met by the proceeds of sales heretofore, it is quite certain they will be hereafter, even after a considerable reduction in the price. By meeting in the treasury so much of the general charge as arises from that source, they will be hereafter, as they have been heretofore, disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, according to the compacts of cession. I do not doubt that it is the real interest of each and all the States in the Union, and particularly of the new States, that the price of these lands shall be reduced and graduated; and that, after they have been offered for a certain number of years, the refuse, remaining unsold, shall be abandoned to the States, and the machinery of our land system entirely withdrawn. It cannot be supposed the compacts intended that the United States should retain forever a title to lands within the States, which are of no value; and no doubt is entertained that the general interest would be best promoted by surrendering such lands to the States.
"This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no principle, violates no compact, and deranges no system. Already has the price of those lands been reduced from two dollars per acre to one dollar and a quarter; and upon the will of Congress, it depends whether there shall be a further reduction. While the burdens of the East are diminishing by the reduction of the duties upon imports, it seems but equal justice that the chief burden of the West should be lightened in an equal degree at least. It would be just to the old States and the new, conciliate every interest, disarm the subject of all its dangers, and add another guaranty to the perpetuity of our happy Union."