CHAPTER XCVII.

The futility of this resolve was made manifest soon after its passage. It was nugatory, and remained naked. It required nothing to be done, and nothing was done under it. It became ridiculous. And eventually, and near the end of the session, Mr. Clay proposed it over again, with another resolve attached, directing the return of the deposits to the Bank of the United States; and making it joint, so as to require the consent of both houses, and thus lead to legislative action. In submitting his resolution in this new form he took occasion to allude to their fate in the other branch of the legislature, where rejection was certain, and to intimate censure upon the President for not conforming to the opinion of the Senate in its resolves; as if the adverse opinion of the House (from its recent election, its superior numbers, and its particular charge of the revenue), was not more than a counterpoise to the opinion of the Senate. In this sense, he stood up, and said:

"Whatever might be the fate of these resolutions at the other end of the capitol, or in another building, that consideration ought to have no influence on the course of this body. The Senate owed it to its own character, and to the country, to proceed in the discharge of its duties, and to leave it to others, whether at the other end of the capitol or in another building, to perform their own obligations to the country, according to their own sense of their duty, and their own convictions of responsibility. To them it ought to be left to determine what was their duty, and to discharge that duty as they might think best. For himself, he should be ashamed to return to his constituents without having made every lawful effort in his power to cause the restoration of the public deposits to the United States Bank. While a chance yet remained of effecting the restoration of the reign of the constitution and the laws, he felt that he should not have discharged this duty if he failed to make every effort to accomplish that desirable object."The Senate, after passing the resolution which they had already passed, and waiting two months to see whether the Executive would conform his course to the views expressed by this branch of the legislature; after waiting all this time, and perceiving that the error, as the Senate had declared it to be, was still persevered in, and seeing the wide and rapid sweep of ruin over every section of the country, there was still one measure left which might arrest the evil, and that was in the offering of these resolutions—to present them to this body; and, if they passed here, to send them to the other House; and, should they pass them, to present to the President the plain question, if he will return to the constitutional track; or, in opposition to the expressed will of the legislature, retain the control over the millions of public money which are already deposited in the local banks, and which are still coming in there."

"Whatever might be the fate of these resolutions at the other end of the capitol, or in another building, that consideration ought to have no influence on the course of this body. The Senate owed it to its own character, and to the country, to proceed in the discharge of its duties, and to leave it to others, whether at the other end of the capitol or in another building, to perform their own obligations to the country, according to their own sense of their duty, and their own convictions of responsibility. To them it ought to be left to determine what was their duty, and to discharge that duty as they might think best. For himself, he should be ashamed to return to his constituents without having made every lawful effort in his power to cause the restoration of the public deposits to the United States Bank. While a chance yet remained of effecting the restoration of the reign of the constitution and the laws, he felt that he should not have discharged this duty if he failed to make every effort to accomplish that desirable object.

"The Senate, after passing the resolution which they had already passed, and waiting two months to see whether the Executive would conform his course to the views expressed by this branch of the legislature; after waiting all this time, and perceiving that the error, as the Senate had declared it to be, was still persevered in, and seeing the wide and rapid sweep of ruin over every section of the country, there was still one measure left which might arrest the evil, and that was in the offering of these resolutions—to present them to this body; and, if they passed here, to send them to the other House; and, should they pass them, to present to the President the plain question, if he will return to the constitutional track; or, in opposition to the expressed will of the legislature, retain the control over the millions of public money which are already deposited in the local banks, and which are still coming in there."

Mr. Benton replied to Mr. Clay, showing the propriety of these resolutions if offered at the commencement of the session—their inutility now, so near its end; and the indelicacy in the Senate, in throwing itself between the bank and the House of Representatives, at a moment when the bank directors were standing out in contempt against the House, refusing to be examined by its committee, and a motion actually depending to punish them for this contempt. For this was then the actual condition of the corporation; and, for the Senate to pass a resolution to restore the deposits in these circumstances, was to take the part of the bank against the House—to justify its contumacy—and to express an opinion in favor of its re-charter; as all admitted that restoration of the deposits was wrong unless a re-charter was granted. Mr. B. said:

"He deemed the present moment to be the most objectionable time that could have been selected for proposing to restore the public deposits to the United States Bank. Such a proposition might have been a proper proceeding at the commencement of the session. A joint resolution, at that time, would have been the proper mode; it could have been followed by action; and, if constitutionally passed, would have compelled the restoration of these deposits. But the course was different. A separate resolution was brought in, and passed the Senate; and there it stopped. It was a nugatory resolution, leading to no action. It was such a one as a State legislature, or a public meeting, might adopt, because they had no power to legislate on the subject. But the Senate had the power of legislation; and, six months ago, when the separate resolution was brought in, the Senate, if it intended to act legislatively on the subject at all, ought to have proceeded by joint resolution, or by bill, at that time. But it thought otherwise. The separate resolution was adopted; after adoption, no instruction was given to a committee to bring in a bill; nothing was done to give legislative effect to the decision of the Senate; and now, at the end of six months, the first attempt is made to move in our legislative capacity, and to pass a joint resolution—equivalent to a statute—to compel the restoration of these deposits. This is the state of the proceeding; and, Mr. B. must be permittedto say, and to give his reasons for saying, that the time selected for this first step, in our legislative capacity, in a case so long depending, is most inappropriate and objectionable. Mr. B. would not dwell upon the palpable objections to this proceeding, which must strike every mind. The advanced stage of the session—the propositions to adjourn—the quantity of business on hand—the little probability that the House and the President would concur with the Senate, or that two thirds of the two Houses could be brought to pass the resolution, if the President declined to give it his approbation. These palpable objections must strike every mind and make it appear to be a useless consumption of time for the Senate to pass the resolution."Virtually, it included a proposition to re-charter the bank; for the most confidential friends of that institution admitted that it was improper to restore the deposits, unless the bank charter was to be continued. The proposition to restore them, virtually included the proposition to re-charter; and that was a proposition which, after having been openly made on this floor, and leave asked to bring in a bill to that effect, had been abandoned, under the clear conviction that the measure could not pass. Passing from these palpable objections, Mr. B. proceeded to state another reason, of a different kind, and which he held to be imperative of the course which the Senate should now pursue: he alluded to the state of the questions at this moment depending between the Bank of the United States and the House of Representatives, and the nature of which exacted from the Senate the observance of a strict neutrality, and an absolute non-interference between those two bodies. The House of Representatives had ordered an inquiry into the affairs and conduct of the bank. The points of inquiry indicated misconduct of the gravest import, and had been ordered by the largest majority, not less than three or four to one. That inquiry was not yet finished; it was still depending; the committee appointed to conduct it remains organized, and has only reported in part. That report is before the Senate and the public; and shows that the directors of the Bank of the United States have resisted the authority of the House—have made an issue of power between itself and the House—for the trial of which issue a resolution is now depending in the House, and is made the order of the day for Tuesday next."Here, then, are two questions depending between the House and the bank; the first, an inquiry into the misconduct of the bank; the second, a proposition to compel the bank to submit to the authority of the House. Was it right for the Senate to interpose between those bodies, while these questions were depending? Was it right to interfere on the part of the bank? Was it right for the Senate to leap into the arena, throw itself between the contending parties, take sides with the bank, and virtually declare to the American people that there was no cause for inquiry into the conduct of the bank, and no ground of censure for resisting the authority of the House? Such would, doubtless, be the effect of the conduct of the Senate, if it should entertain the proposition which is now submitted to it. That proposition is one of honor and confidence to the bank. It proceeds upon the assumption that the bank is right, and the House is wrong, in the questions now depending between them; that the bank has done nothing to merit inquiry, or to deserve censure; and that the public moneys ought to be restored to her keeping, without waiting the end of the investigation which the House has ordered, or the decision of the resolution which affirms that the bank has resisted the authority of the House, and committed a contempt against it. This is the full and fair interpretation—the clear and speaking effect—of the measure now proposed to the Senate. Is it right to treat the House thus? Will the Senate, virtually, intelligibly, and practically, acquit the bank, when the bank will not acquit itself?—will not suffer its innocence to be tested by the recorded voice of its own books, and the living voice of its own directors? These directors have refused to testify; they have refused to be sworn; they have refused to touch the book; because, being directors and corporators, and therefore parties, they cannot be required to give evidence against themselves. And this refusal, the public is gravely told, is made upon the advice of eminent counsel. What counsel? The counsel of the law, or of fear? Certainly, no lawyer—not even a junior apprentice to the law—could give such advice. The right to stand mute, does not extend to the privilege of refusing to be sworn. The right does not attach until after the oath is taken, and is then limited to the specific question, the answer to which might inculpate the witness, and which he may refuse to answer, because he will say, upon his oath, that the answer will criminate himself. But these bank directors refuse to be sworn at all. They refuse to touch the book; and, in that refusal, commit a flagrant contempt against the House of Representatives, and do an act for which any citizen would be sent to jail by any justice of the peace, in America. And is the Senate to justify the directors for this contempt? to get between them and the House? to adopt a resolution beforehand—before the day fixed for the decision of the contempt, which shall throw the weight of the Senate into the scale of the directors against the House, and virtually declare that they are right in refusing to be sworn?"

"He deemed the present moment to be the most objectionable time that could have been selected for proposing to restore the public deposits to the United States Bank. Such a proposition might have been a proper proceeding at the commencement of the session. A joint resolution, at that time, would have been the proper mode; it could have been followed by action; and, if constitutionally passed, would have compelled the restoration of these deposits. But the course was different. A separate resolution was brought in, and passed the Senate; and there it stopped. It was a nugatory resolution, leading to no action. It was such a one as a State legislature, or a public meeting, might adopt, because they had no power to legislate on the subject. But the Senate had the power of legislation; and, six months ago, when the separate resolution was brought in, the Senate, if it intended to act legislatively on the subject at all, ought to have proceeded by joint resolution, or by bill, at that time. But it thought otherwise. The separate resolution was adopted; after adoption, no instruction was given to a committee to bring in a bill; nothing was done to give legislative effect to the decision of the Senate; and now, at the end of six months, the first attempt is made to move in our legislative capacity, and to pass a joint resolution—equivalent to a statute—to compel the restoration of these deposits. This is the state of the proceeding; and, Mr. B. must be permittedto say, and to give his reasons for saying, that the time selected for this first step, in our legislative capacity, in a case so long depending, is most inappropriate and objectionable. Mr. B. would not dwell upon the palpable objections to this proceeding, which must strike every mind. The advanced stage of the session—the propositions to adjourn—the quantity of business on hand—the little probability that the House and the President would concur with the Senate, or that two thirds of the two Houses could be brought to pass the resolution, if the President declined to give it his approbation. These palpable objections must strike every mind and make it appear to be a useless consumption of time for the Senate to pass the resolution.

"Virtually, it included a proposition to re-charter the bank; for the most confidential friends of that institution admitted that it was improper to restore the deposits, unless the bank charter was to be continued. The proposition to restore them, virtually included the proposition to re-charter; and that was a proposition which, after having been openly made on this floor, and leave asked to bring in a bill to that effect, had been abandoned, under the clear conviction that the measure could not pass. Passing from these palpable objections, Mr. B. proceeded to state another reason, of a different kind, and which he held to be imperative of the course which the Senate should now pursue: he alluded to the state of the questions at this moment depending between the Bank of the United States and the House of Representatives, and the nature of which exacted from the Senate the observance of a strict neutrality, and an absolute non-interference between those two bodies. The House of Representatives had ordered an inquiry into the affairs and conduct of the bank. The points of inquiry indicated misconduct of the gravest import, and had been ordered by the largest majority, not less than three or four to one. That inquiry was not yet finished; it was still depending; the committee appointed to conduct it remains organized, and has only reported in part. That report is before the Senate and the public; and shows that the directors of the Bank of the United States have resisted the authority of the House—have made an issue of power between itself and the House—for the trial of which issue a resolution is now depending in the House, and is made the order of the day for Tuesday next.

"Here, then, are two questions depending between the House and the bank; the first, an inquiry into the misconduct of the bank; the second, a proposition to compel the bank to submit to the authority of the House. Was it right for the Senate to interpose between those bodies, while these questions were depending? Was it right to interfere on the part of the bank? Was it right for the Senate to leap into the arena, throw itself between the contending parties, take sides with the bank, and virtually declare to the American people that there was no cause for inquiry into the conduct of the bank, and no ground of censure for resisting the authority of the House? Such would, doubtless, be the effect of the conduct of the Senate, if it should entertain the proposition which is now submitted to it. That proposition is one of honor and confidence to the bank. It proceeds upon the assumption that the bank is right, and the House is wrong, in the questions now depending between them; that the bank has done nothing to merit inquiry, or to deserve censure; and that the public moneys ought to be restored to her keeping, without waiting the end of the investigation which the House has ordered, or the decision of the resolution which affirms that the bank has resisted the authority of the House, and committed a contempt against it. This is the full and fair interpretation—the clear and speaking effect—of the measure now proposed to the Senate. Is it right to treat the House thus? Will the Senate, virtually, intelligibly, and practically, acquit the bank, when the bank will not acquit itself?—will not suffer its innocence to be tested by the recorded voice of its own books, and the living voice of its own directors? These directors have refused to testify; they have refused to be sworn; they have refused to touch the book; because, being directors and corporators, and therefore parties, they cannot be required to give evidence against themselves. And this refusal, the public is gravely told, is made upon the advice of eminent counsel. What counsel? The counsel of the law, or of fear? Certainly, no lawyer—not even a junior apprentice to the law—could give such advice. The right to stand mute, does not extend to the privilege of refusing to be sworn. The right does not attach until after the oath is taken, and is then limited to the specific question, the answer to which might inculpate the witness, and which he may refuse to answer, because he will say, upon his oath, that the answer will criminate himself. But these bank directors refuse to be sworn at all. They refuse to touch the book; and, in that refusal, commit a flagrant contempt against the House of Representatives, and do an act for which any citizen would be sent to jail by any justice of the peace, in America. And is the Senate to justify the directors for this contempt? to get between them and the House? to adopt a resolution beforehand—before the day fixed for the decision of the contempt, which shall throw the weight of the Senate into the scale of the directors against the House, and virtually declare that they are right in refusing to be sworn?"

The resolutions were, nevertheless, adopted, and by the fixed majority of twenty-eight to eighteen, and sent to the House of Representatives for concurrence, where they met the fate which all knew they were to receive. The House did not even take them up for consideration,but continued the course which it had began at the commencement of the session; and which was in exact conformity to the legislative course, and exactly contrary to the course of the Senate. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the memorial of the bank, and that of the government directors, were all referred to the Committee of Ways and Means; and by that committee a report was made, by their chairman, Mr. Polk, sustaining the action of the Secretary, and concluding with the four following resolutions:

"1.Resolved, That the Bank of the United States ought not to be re-chartered."2.Resolved, That the public deposits ought not to be restored to the Bank of the United States."3.Resolved, That the State banks ought to be continued as the places of deposit of the public money, and that it is expedient for Congress to make further provision by law, prescribing the mode of selection, the securities to be taken, and the manner and terms on which they are to be employed."4.Resolved, That, for the purpose of ascertaining, as far as practicable, the cause of the commercial embarrassment and distress complained of by numerous citizens of the United States, in sundry memorials which have been presented to Congress at the present session, and of inquiring whether the charter of the Bank of the United States has been violated; and, also, what corruptions and abuses have existed in its management; whether it has used its corporate power or money to control the press, to interfere in politics, or influence elections; and whether it has had any agency, through its management or money, in producing the existing pressure; a select committee be appointed to inspect the books and examine into the proceedings of the said bank, who shall report whether the provisions of the charter have been violated or not; and, also, what abuses, corruptions, or malpractices have existed in the management of said bank; and that the said committee be authorized to send for persons and papers, and to summon and examine witnesses, on oath, and to examine into the affairs of the said bank and branches; and they are further authorized to visit the principal bank, or any of its branches, for the purpose of inspecting the books, correspondence, accounts, and other papers connected with its management or business; and that the said committee be required to report the result of such investigation, together with the evidence they may take, at as early a day as practicable."

"1.Resolved, That the Bank of the United States ought not to be re-chartered.

"2.Resolved, That the public deposits ought not to be restored to the Bank of the United States.

"3.Resolved, That the State banks ought to be continued as the places of deposit of the public money, and that it is expedient for Congress to make further provision by law, prescribing the mode of selection, the securities to be taken, and the manner and terms on which they are to be employed.

"4.Resolved, That, for the purpose of ascertaining, as far as practicable, the cause of the commercial embarrassment and distress complained of by numerous citizens of the United States, in sundry memorials which have been presented to Congress at the present session, and of inquiring whether the charter of the Bank of the United States has been violated; and, also, what corruptions and abuses have existed in its management; whether it has used its corporate power or money to control the press, to interfere in politics, or influence elections; and whether it has had any agency, through its management or money, in producing the existing pressure; a select committee be appointed to inspect the books and examine into the proceedings of the said bank, who shall report whether the provisions of the charter have been violated or not; and, also, what abuses, corruptions, or malpractices have existed in the management of said bank; and that the said committee be authorized to send for persons and papers, and to summon and examine witnesses, on oath, and to examine into the affairs of the said bank and branches; and they are further authorized to visit the principal bank, or any of its branches, for the purpose of inspecting the books, correspondence, accounts, and other papers connected with its management or business; and that the said committee be required to report the result of such investigation, together with the evidence they may take, at as early a day as practicable."

These resolutions were long and vehemently debated, and eventually, each and every one, adopted by decided, and some by a great majority. The first one, being that upon the question of the recharter, was carried by a majority of more than fifty votes—134 to 82; showing an immense difference to the prejudice of the bank since the veto session of 1832. The names of the voters on this great question, so long debated in every form in the halls of Congress, the chambers of the State legislatures, and in the forum of the people, deserve to be commemorated—and are as follows:

"Yeas.—Messrs. John Adams, William Allen, Anthony, Archer, Beale, Bean, Beardsley, Beaumont, John Bell, John Blair, Bockee, Boon, Bouldin, Brown, Bunch, Bynum, Cambreleng, Campbell, Carmichael, Carr, Casey, Chaney, Chinn, Claiborne, Samuel Clark, Clay, Clayton, Clowney, Coffee, Connor, Cramer, W. R. Davis, Davenport, Day, Dickerson, Dickinson, Dunlap, Felder, Forester, Foster, W. K. Fuller, Fulton, Galbraith, Gholson, Gillet, Gilmer, Gordon, Grayson, Griffin, Jos. Hall, T. H. Hall, Halsey, Hamer, Hannegan, Jos. M. Harper, Harrison, Hathaway, Hawkins, Hawes, Heath, Henderson, Howell, Hubbard, Abel Huntington, Inge, Jarvis, Richard M. Johnson, Noadiah Johnson, Cave Johnson, Seaborn Jones, Benjamin Jones, Kavanagh, Kinnard, Lane, Lansing, Laporte, Lawrence, Lay, Luke Lea, Thomas Lee, Leavitt, Loyall, Lucas, Lyon, Lytle, Abijah Mann, Joel K. Mann, Mardis, John Y. Mason, Moses Mason, McIntire, McKay, McKinley, McLene McVean, Miller, Henry Mitchell, Robert Mitchell, Muhlenberg, Murphy, Osgood, Page, Parks, Parker, Patterson, D. J. Pearce, Peyton, Franklin Pierce, Pierson, Pinckney, Plummer, Polk, Rencher, Schenck, Schley, Shinn, Smith, Speight, Standifer, Stoddert, Sutherland, William Taylor, Wm. P. Taylor, Francis Thomas, Thomson, Turner, Turrill, Vanderpoel, Wagener, Ward, Wardwell, Wayne, Webster, Whallon.—134."Nays.—Messrs. John Quincy Adams, John J. Allen, Heman Allen, Chilton Allan, Ashley, Banks, Barber, Barnitz, Barringer, Baylies Beaty, James M. Bell, Binney, Briggs, Bull, Burges, Cage, Chambers, Chilton, Choate, William Clark, Corwin, Coulter, Crane, Crockett, Darlington, Amos Davis, Deberry, Deming, Denny, Dennis, Dickson, Duncan, Ellsworth, Evans, Edward Everett, Horace Everett, Fillmore, Foot, Philo C. Fuller, Graham, Grennel, Hiland Hall, Hard, Hardin, James Harper, Hazeltine, Jabez W. Huntington, Jackson, William C. Johnson, Lincoln, Martindale, Marshall, McCarty, McComas, McDuffie, McKennan, Mercer, Milligan, Moore, Pope, Potts, Reed, William B. Shepherd, Aug. H. Shepperd, William Slade, Charles Slade, Sloane, Spangler Philemon Thomas, Tompkins, Tweedy, Vance, Vinton, Watmough, Edward D. White, Frederick Whittlesey, Elisha Whittlesey, Wilde, Williams, Wilson, Young.—82."

"Yeas.—Messrs. John Adams, William Allen, Anthony, Archer, Beale, Bean, Beardsley, Beaumont, John Bell, John Blair, Bockee, Boon, Bouldin, Brown, Bunch, Bynum, Cambreleng, Campbell, Carmichael, Carr, Casey, Chaney, Chinn, Claiborne, Samuel Clark, Clay, Clayton, Clowney, Coffee, Connor, Cramer, W. R. Davis, Davenport, Day, Dickerson, Dickinson, Dunlap, Felder, Forester, Foster, W. K. Fuller, Fulton, Galbraith, Gholson, Gillet, Gilmer, Gordon, Grayson, Griffin, Jos. Hall, T. H. Hall, Halsey, Hamer, Hannegan, Jos. M. Harper, Harrison, Hathaway, Hawkins, Hawes, Heath, Henderson, Howell, Hubbard, Abel Huntington, Inge, Jarvis, Richard M. Johnson, Noadiah Johnson, Cave Johnson, Seaborn Jones, Benjamin Jones, Kavanagh, Kinnard, Lane, Lansing, Laporte, Lawrence, Lay, Luke Lea, Thomas Lee, Leavitt, Loyall, Lucas, Lyon, Lytle, Abijah Mann, Joel K. Mann, Mardis, John Y. Mason, Moses Mason, McIntire, McKay, McKinley, McLene McVean, Miller, Henry Mitchell, Robert Mitchell, Muhlenberg, Murphy, Osgood, Page, Parks, Parker, Patterson, D. J. Pearce, Peyton, Franklin Pierce, Pierson, Pinckney, Plummer, Polk, Rencher, Schenck, Schley, Shinn, Smith, Speight, Standifer, Stoddert, Sutherland, William Taylor, Wm. P. Taylor, Francis Thomas, Thomson, Turner, Turrill, Vanderpoel, Wagener, Ward, Wardwell, Wayne, Webster, Whallon.—134.

"Nays.—Messrs. John Quincy Adams, John J. Allen, Heman Allen, Chilton Allan, Ashley, Banks, Barber, Barnitz, Barringer, Baylies Beaty, James M. Bell, Binney, Briggs, Bull, Burges, Cage, Chambers, Chilton, Choate, William Clark, Corwin, Coulter, Crane, Crockett, Darlington, Amos Davis, Deberry, Deming, Denny, Dennis, Dickson, Duncan, Ellsworth, Evans, Edward Everett, Horace Everett, Fillmore, Foot, Philo C. Fuller, Graham, Grennel, Hiland Hall, Hard, Hardin, James Harper, Hazeltine, Jabez W. Huntington, Jackson, William C. Johnson, Lincoln, Martindale, Marshall, McCarty, McComas, McDuffie, McKennan, Mercer, Milligan, Moore, Pope, Potts, Reed, William B. Shepherd, Aug. H. Shepperd, William Slade, Charles Slade, Sloane, Spangler Philemon Thomas, Tompkins, Tweedy, Vance, Vinton, Watmough, Edward D. White, Frederick Whittlesey, Elisha Whittlesey, Wilde, Williams, Wilson, Young.—82."

The second and third resolutions were carried by good majorities, and the fourth overwhelm overwhelmingly—175 to 42. Mr. Polk immediately moved the appointment of the committee, and that it consist of seven members. It was appointed accordingly, and consisted of Messrs. Francis Thomas of Maryland, chairman; Everett of Massachusetts; Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania; John Y. Mason of Virginia; Ellsworth of Connecticut; Mann of New-York; and Lytle of Ohio. The proceedings of this committee, and the reception it met with from the bank, will be the subject of a future and separate chapter. Under the third resolution the Committee of Ways and Means soon brought in a bill in conformity to its provisions, which was passed by a majority of 22, that is to say, by 112 votes against 90. And thus all the conduct of the President in relation to the bank, received the full sanction of the popular representation; and presented the singular spectacle of full support in one House, and that one specially charged with the subject, while meeting condemnation in the other.

In the first days of the session Mr. Clay submitted a resolution, calling on the President to inform the Senate whether the "paper," published as alleged by his authority, and purporting to have been read to the cabinet in relation to the removal of the deposits, "be genuine or not;" and if it be "genuine," requesting him to cause a copy of it to be laid before the Senate. Mr. Forsyth considered this an unusual call, and wished to know for what purpose it was made. He presumed no one had any doubt of the authenticity of the published copy. He certainly had not. Mr. Clay justified his call on the ground that the "paper" had been published—had become public—and was a thing of general notoriety. If otherwise, and it had remained a confidential communication to his cabinet, he certainly should not ask for it; but not answering as to the use he proposed to make of it, Mr. Forsyth returned to that point, and said he could imagine that one branch of the legislature under certain circumstances might have a right to call for it; but the Senate was not that branch. If the paper was to be the ground of a criminal charge against the President, and upon which he is to be brought to trial, it should come from the House of Representatives, with the charges on which he was to be tried. Mr. Clay rejoined, that as to the uses which were to be made of this "paper" nothing seemed to run in the head of the Senator from Georgia but an impeachment. This seemed to be the only idea he could connect with the call. But there were many other purposes for which it might be used, and he had never intended to make it the ground of impeachment. It might show who was the real author of the removal of the deposits—whether the President, or the Secretary of the Treasury? and whether this latter might not have been a mere automaton. Mr. Benton said there was no parliamentary use that could be made of it, and no such use had been, or could be specified. Only two uses can be made of a paper that may be rightfully called for—one for legislation; the other for impeachment; and not even in the latter case when self-crimination was intended. No legislative use is intimated for this one; and the criminal use is disavowed, and is obliged to be, as the Senate is the tribunal to try, not the inquest to originate impeachments. But this paper cannot be rightfully called for. It is a communication to a cabinet; and communications to the cabinet are the same whether in writing, or in a speech. It is all parol. Could the copy of a speech made to the cabinet be called for? Could an account of the President's conversation with his cabinet be called for? Certainly not! and there is no difference between the written and the spoken communication—between the set speech and a conversation—between a thing made public, or kept secret. The President may refuse to give the copy; and certainly will consult his rights and his self-respect by so refusing. As for the contents of the paper, he has given them to the country, and courts the judgment of the country upon it. He avows his act—gives his reasons—and leaves it to all to judge. He is not a man of concealments, or of irresponsibility. He gave the paper to the public instantly, and authentically, with his name fully signed to it; and any one can say what they please of it. Ifit is wanted for an invective, or philippic, there it is! ready for use, and seeking no shelter for want of authenticity. It is given to the world, and is expected to stand the test of all examination. Mr. Forsyth asked the yeas and nays on Mr. Clay's call; they were ordered; and the resolution passed by 23 to 18. The next day the President replied to it, and to the effect that was generally foreseen. He declared the Executive to be a co-ordinate branch of the government, and denied the right of the Senate to call upon him for any copies of his communications to his cabinet—either written or spoken. Feeling his responsibility to the American people, he said he should be always ready to explain to them his conduct; knowing the constitutional rights of the Senate, he should never withhold from it any information in his power to give, and necessary to the discharge of its duties. This was the end of the call; and such an end was the full proof that it ought not to have been made. No act could be predicated upon it—no action taken on its communication—none upon the refusal, either of censure or coercion. The President stood upon his rights; and the Senate could not, and did not, say that he was wrong. The call was a wrong step, and gave the President an easy and a graceful victory.

In the year 1783, Mr. Fox, the great parliamentary debater, was in the zenith of his power and popularity, and the victorious leader in the House of Commons. He gave offence to the King, and was dismissed from the ministry, and immediately formed a coalition with Lord North; and commenced a violent opposition to the acts of the government. Patriotism, love of liberty, hatred of misrule and oppression, were the avowed objects of his attacks; but every one saw (to adopt the language of history), that the real difficulty was his own exclusion from office; and that his coalition with his old enemy and all these violent assaults, were only to force himself back into power: and this being seen, his efforts became unavailing, and distasteful to the public; and he lost his power and influence with the people, and sunk his friends with him. More than one hundred and sixty of his supporters in the House of Commons, lost their places at the ensuing election, and were sportively called "Fox's Martyrs;" and when they had a procession in London, wearing the tails of foxes in their hats, and some one wondered where so many tails of that animal had come from, Mr. Pitt slyly said a great many foxes had been lately taken: one, upon an average, in every borough. Mr. Fox, young at that time, lived to recover from this prostration; but his mistake was one of those of which history is full and the lesson of which is in vain read to succeeding generations. Public men continue to attack their adversaries in power, and oppose their measures, while having private griefs of their own to redress, and personal ends of their own to accomplish; and the instinctive sagacity of the people always sees the sinister motive, and condemns the conduct founded upon it.

Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, and Mr. Webster were now all united against General Jackson, with all their friends, and the Bank of the United States. The two former had their private griefs: Mr. Clay in the results of the election, and Mr. Calhoun in the quarrel growing out of the discovery of his conduct in Mr. Monroe's cabinet, and it would have been difficult so to have conducted their opposition, and attack, as to have avoided the imputation of a personal motive. But they so conducted it as to authorize and suggest that imputation. Their movements all took a personal and vindictive, instead of a legislative and remedial, nature. Mr. Taney's reasons for removing the deposits were declared to be "unsatisfactory and insufficient"—being words of reproach, and no remedy; nor was the remedy of restoration proposed until driven into it. The resolution, in relation to Gen. Jackson, was still more objectionable. The Senate had nothing to do with him personally, yet a resolve was proposed, against him entirely personal, charging him with violating the laws and the constitution; and proposing no remedy for this imputed violation, nor for the act of which it was the subject. It was purely and simply a personal censure—a personal condemnation that was proposed; and, to aggravate the proposition, it camefrom the suggestion of the bank directors' memorial to Congress.

The combination was formidable. The bank itself was a great power, and was able to carry distress into all the business departments of the country; the political array against the President was unprecedented in point of number, and great in point of ability. Besides the three eminent chiefs, there were, in the Senate: Messrs. Bibb of Kentucky; Ezekiel Chambers of Maryland; Clayton of Delaware; Ewing of Ohio; Frelinghuysen of New Jersey; Watkins Leigh of Virginia; Mangum of North Carolina; Poindexter of Mississippi; Alexander Porter of Louisiana; William C. Preston of South Carolina; Southard of New Jersey; Tyler of Virginia. In the House of Representatives, besides the ex-President, Mr. Adams, and the eminent jurist from Pennsylvania, Mr. Horace Binney, there was a long catalogue of able speakers: Messrs. Archer of Virginia; Bell of Tennessee; Burgess of Rhode Island; Rufus Choate of Massachusetts; Corwin of Ohio; Warren R. Davis of South Carolina; John Davis of Massachusetts; Edward Everett of Massachusetts; Millard Fillmore of New-York, afterwards President; Robert P. Letcher of Kentucky; Benjamin Hardin of Kentucky; McDuffie of South Carolina; Peyton of Tennessee; Vance of Ohio; Wilde of Georgia; Wise of Virginia: in all, above thirty able speakers, many of whom spoke many times; besides many others of good ability, but without extensive national reputations. The business of the combination was divided—distress and panic the object—and the parts distributed, and separately cast to produce the effect. The bank was to make the distress—a thing easy for it to do, from its own moneyed power, and its power over other moneyed institutions and money dealers; also to get up distress meetings and memorials, and to lead the public press: the politicians were to make the panic, by the alarms which they created for the safety of the laws, of the constitution, the public liberty, and the public money: and most zealously did each division of the combination perform its part, and for the long period of three full months. The decision of the resolution condemning General Jackson, on which all this machinery of distress and panic was hung, required no part of that time. There was the same majority to vote it the first day as the last; but the time was wanted to get up the alarm and the distress; and the vote, when taken, was not from any exhaustion of the means of terrifying and agonizing the country, but for the purpose of having the sentence of condemnation ready for the Virginia elections—ready for spreading over Virginia at the approach of the April elections. The end proposed to themselves by the combined parties, was, for the bank, a recharter and the restoration of the deposits; for the politicians, an ascent to power upon the overthrow of Jackson.

The friends of General Jackson saw the advantages which were presented to them in the unhallowed combination between the moneyed and a political power—in the personal and vindictive character which they gave to the proceedings—the private griefs of the leading assailants—the unworthy objects to be attained—and the cruel means to be used for their attainment. These friends were also numerous, zealous, able, determined; and animated by the consciousness that they were on the side of their country. They were, in the Senate:—Messrs. Forsyth of Georgia; Grundy of Tennessee; Hill of New Hampshire; Kane of Illinois; King of Alabama; Rives of Virginia; Nathaniel Tallmadge of New York; Hugh L. White of Tennessee; Wilkins of Pennsylvania; Silas Wright of New-York; and the author of thisThirty Years' View. In the House, were:—Messrs. Beardsley of New-York; Cambreleng of New-York; Clay of Alabama; Gillett of New-York; Hubbard of New Hampshire; McKay of North Carolina; Polk of Tennessee; Francis Thomas of Maryland; Vanderpoel of New-York; and Wayne of Georgia.

Mr. Clay opened the debate in a prepared speech, commencing in the style which the rhetoricians callex abruptu—being the style of opening which the occasion required—that of rousing and alarming the passions. It will be found (its essential parts) in the next chapter.

"Mr. Clay addressed the Senate as follows: We are, said he, in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of the government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one man. The powers of Congress are paralyzed, except when exerted in conformity with his will, by frequent and an extraordinary exercise of the executive veto, not anticipated by the founders of the constitution, and not practised by any of the predecessors of the present Chief Magistrate. And, to cramp them still more, a new expedient is springing into use, of withholding altogether bills which have received the sanction of both Houses of Congress, thereby cutting off all opportunity of passing them, even if, after their return, the members should be unanimous in their favor. The constitutional participation of the Senate in the appointing power is virtually abolished, by the constant use of the power of removal from office without any known cause, and by the appointment of the same individual to the same office, after his rejection by the Senate. How often have we, senators, felt that the check of the Senate, instead of being, as the constitution intended, a salutary control, was an idle ceremony? How often, when acting on the case of the nominated successor, have we felt the injustice of the removal? How often have we said to each other, well, what can we do? the office cannot remain vacant without prejudice to the public interests; and, if we reject the proposed substitute, we cannot restore the displaced, and perhaps some more unworthy man may be nominated."The judiciary has not been exempted from the prevailing rage for innovation. Decisions of the tribunals, deliberately pronounced, have been contemptuously disregarded, and the sanctity of numerous treaties openly violated. Our Indian relations, coeval with the existence of the government, and recognized and established by numerous laws and treaties, have been subverted; the rights of the helpless and unfortunate aborigines trampled in the dust, and they brought under subjection to unknown laws, in which they have no voice, promulgated in an unknown language. The most extensive and most valuable public domain that ever fell to the lot of one nation is threatened with a total sacrifice. The general currency of the country, the life-blood of all its business, is in the most imminent danger of universal disorder and confusion. The power of internal improvement lies crushed beneath the veto. The system of protection of American industry was snatched from impending destruction at the last session; but we are now coolly told by the Secretary of the Treasury, without a blush, 'that it is understood to beconceded on all handsthat a tariff for protection merely is to be finally abandoned.' By the 3d of March, 1837, if the progress of innovation continue, there will be scarcely a vestige remaining of the government and its policy as they existed prior to the 3d of March, 1829. In a term of years, a little more than equal to that which was required to establish our liberties, the government will have been transformed into an elective monarchy—the worst of all forms of government."Such is a melancholy but faithful picture of the present condition of our public affairs. It is not sketched or exhibited to excite, here or elsewhere, irritated feeling; I have no such purpose. I would, on the contrary, implore the Senate and the people to discard all passion and prejudice, and to look calmly but resolutely upon the actual state of the constitution and the country. Although I bring into the Senate the same unabated spirit, and the same firm determination, which have ever guided me in the support of civil liberty, and the defence of our constitution, I contemplate the prospect before us with feelings of deep humiliation and profound mortification."It is not among the least unfortunate symptoms of the times, that a large proportion of the good and enlightened men of the Union, of all parties, are yielding to sentiments of despondency. There is, unhappily, a feeling of distrust and insecurity pervading the community. Many of our best citizens entertain serious apprehensions that our Union and our institutions are destined to a speedy overthrow. Sir, I trust that the hopes and confidence of the country will revive. There is much occasion for manly independence and patriotic vigor, but none for despair. Thank God, we are yet free; and, if we put on the chains which are forging for us, it will be because we deserve to wear them. We should never despair of the republic. If our ancestors had been capable of surrendering themselves to such ignoble sentiments, our independence and our liberties would never have been achieved. The winter of 1776-'77, was one of the gloomiest periods of our revolution; but on this day, fifty-seven years ago, the father of his country achieved a glorious victory, which diffused joy, and gladness, and animation throughout the States. Let us cherish the hope that, since he has gone from among us, Providence, in the dispensation of his mercies, has near at hand, in reserve for us, though yet unseen by us, some sure and happy deliverance from all impending dangers."When we assembled here last year, we were full of dreadful forebodings. On the one hand, we were menaced with a civil war, which, lighting up in a single State, might spread its flames throughout one of the largest sections of theUnion. On the other, a cherished system of policy, essential to the successful prosecution of the industry of our countrymen, was exposed to imminent danger of destruction. Means were happily applied by Congress to avert both calamities, the country was reconciled, and our Union once more became a band of friends and brothers. And I shall be greatly disappointed, if we do not find those who were denounced as being unfriendly to the continuance of our confederacy, among the foremost to fly to its preservation, and to resist all executive encroachments."Mr. President, when Congress adjourned at the termination of the last session, there was one remnant of its powers—that over the purse—left untouched. The two most important powers of civil government are those of the sword and purse; the first, with some restrictions, is confided by the constitution to the Executive, and the last to the legislative department. If they are separate, and exercised by different responsible departments, civil liberty is safe; but if they are united in the hands of the same individual, it is gone. That clear-sighted and revolutionary orator and patriot, Patrick Henry, justly said, in the Virginia convention, in reply to one of his opponents, 'Let him candidly tell me where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up from the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the sword and the purse. Can you prove, by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe without one of them? If you give them up, you are gone.'"Up to the period of the termination of the last session of Congress, the exclusive constitutional power of Congress over the treasury of the United States had never been contested. Among its earliest acts was one to establish the treasury department, which provided for the appointment of a treasurer, who was required to give bond and security, in a very large amount, 'to receive and keep the moneys of the United States, and disburse the same upon warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, countersigned by the Comptroller, recorded by the Register, and not otherwise.' Prior to the establishment of the present Bank of the United States, no treasury or place had been provided or designated by law for the safe keeping of the public moneys, but the treasurer was left to his own discretion and responsibility. When the existing bank was established, it was provided that the public moneys should be deposited with it, and, consequently, that bank became the treasury of the United States; for, whatever place is designated by law for the keeping of the public money of the United States, under the care of the treasurer of the United States, is, for the time being, the treasury. Its safety was drawn in question by the Chief Magistrate, and an agent was appointed a little more than a year ago to investigate its ability. He reported to the Executive that it was perfectly safe. His apprehensions of its solidity were communicated by the President to Congress, and a committee was appointed to examine the subject; they, also, reported in favor of its security. And, finally, among the last acts of the House of Representatives, prior to the close of the last session, was the adoption of a resolution, manifesting its entire confidence in the ability and solidity of the bank."After all these testimonies to the perfect safety of the public moneys in the place appointed by Congress, who could have supposed that the place would have been changed? Who could have imagined that, within sixty days of the meeting of Congress, and, as it were, in utter contempt of its authority, the change should have been ordered? Who would have dreamed that the treasurer should have thrown away the single key to the treasury, over which Congress held ample control, and accepted, in lieu of it, some dozens of keys, over which neither Congress nor he has any adequate control? Yet, sir, all this has been done; and it is now our solemn duty to inquire, 1st. By whose authority it has been ordered; and, 2d. Whether the order has been given in conformity with the constitution and laws of the United States."I agree, sir, and I am very happy whenever I can agree with the President, as to the immense importance of these questions. He says, in the paper which I hold in my hand, that he looks upon the pending question as involving higher considerations than the 'mere transfer of a sum of money from one bank to another. Its decision may affect the character of our government for ages to come.' And, with him. I view it as 'of transcendent importance, both in the principles and the consequences it involves.' It is a question of all time, for posterity as well as for us—of constitutional government or monarchy—of liberty or slavery. As I regard it, I hold the bank as nothing, as perfectly insignificant, faithful as it has been in the performance of all its duties. I hold a sound currency as nothing, essential as it is to the prosperity of every branch of business, and to all conditions of society, and efficient as the agency of the bank has been in providing the country with a currency as sound as ever existed, and unsurpassed by any in Christendom. I consider even the public faith, sacred and inviolable as it ever should be, as comparatively nothing. All these questions are merged in the greater and mightier question of the constitutional distribution of the powers of the government, as affected by the recent executive innovation. The real inquiry is, shall all the barriers which have been erected by the caution and wisdom of our ancestors, for the preservation of civil liberty, be prostrated and trodden under foot, and the sword and the purse be at once united in the hands of one man? Shallthe power of Congress over the treasury of the United States, hitherto never contested, be wrested from its possession, and be henceforward wielded by the Chief Magistrate? Entertaining these views of the magnitude of the question before us, I shall not, at least to-day, examine the reasons which the President has assigned for his act. If he has no power to perform it, no reasons, however cogent, can justify the deed. None can sanctify an illegal or unconstitutional act."The question is, by virtue of whose will, power, dictation, was the removal of the deposits effected? By whose authority and determination were they transferred from the Bank of the United States, where they were required by the law to be placed, and put in banks which the law had never designated? And I tell gentlemen opposed to me, that I am not to be answered by the exhibition of a formal order bearing the signature of R. B. Taney, or any one else. I want to know, not the amanuensis or clerk who prepared or signed the official form, but the authority or the individual who dictated or commanded it; not the hangman who executes the culprit, but the tribunal which pronounced the sentence. I want to know that power in the government, that original and controlling authority, which required and commanded the removal of the deposits. And, I repeat the question, is there a senator, or intelligent man in the whole country, who entertains a solitary doubt?"Hear what the President himself says in his manifesto read to his cabinet: 'The President deems it his duty to communicate in this manner to his cabinet the final conclusions of his own mind, and the reasons on which they are founded.' And, at the conclusion of this paper, what does he say? 'The President again repeats that he begs his cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or principle. Its responsibility has been assumed, after the most mature deliberation and reflection, as necessary to preserve the morals of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity of the elective franchise, without which all will unite in saying that the blood and treasure expended by our forefathers, in the establishment of our happy system of government, will have been vain and fruitless. Under these convictions, he feels that a measure so important to the American people cannot be commenced too soon; and he therefore names the 1st day of October next as a period proper for the change of the deposits, or sooner, provided the necessary arrangements with the State banks can be made.' Sir, is there a senator here who will now tell me that the removal was not the measure and the act of the President?"Thus is it evident that the President, neither by the act creating the treasury department, nor by the bank charter, has any power over the public treasury. Has he any by the constitution? None, none. We have already seen that the constitution positively forbids any money from being drawn from the treasury but in virtue of a previous act of appropriation. But the President himself says that 'upon him has been devolved, by the constitution, and the suffrages of the American people, the duty of superintending the operation of the executive departments of the government, and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.' If there existed any such double source of executive power, it has been seen that the treasury department is not an executive department; but that, in all that concerns the public treasury, the Secretary is the agent or representative of Congress, acting in obedience to their will, and maintaining a direct intercourse with them. By what authority does the President derive power from the mere result of an election? In another part of this same cabinet paper he refers to the suffrages of the people as a source of power independent of a system in which power has been most carefully separated, and distributed between three separate and independent departments. We have been told a thousand times, and all experience assures us, that such a division is indispensable to the existence and preservation of freedom. We have established and designated offices, and appointed officers in each of those departments, to execute the duties respectively allotted to them. The President, it is true, presides over the whole; specific duties are often assigned by particular laws to him alone, or to other officers under his superintendence. His parental eye is presumed to survey the whole extent of the system in all its movements; but has he power to come into Congress, and to say such laws only shall you pass; to go into the courts, and prescribe the decisions which they may pronounce; or even to enter the offices of administration, and, where duties are specifically confided to those officers, to substitute his will to their duty? Or, has he a right, when those functionaries, deliberating upon their own solemn obligations to the people, have moved forward in their assigned spheres, to arrest their lawful progress, because they have dared to act contrary to his pleasure? No, sir; no, sir. His is a high and glorious station, but it is one of observation and superintendence. It is to see that obstructions in the forward movement of government, unlawfully interposed, shall be abated by legitimate and competent means."Such are the powers on which the President relies to justify his seizure of the treasury of the United States. I have examined them, one by one, and they all fail, utterly fail, to bear out the act. We are brought irresistibly to the conclusions, 1st, That the invasion of the public treasury has been perpetrated by the removal of one Secretary of the Treasury, who would not violate his conscientious obligations, and by the appointment of another, who stood readyto subscribe his name to the orders of the President; and, 2dly, That the President has no color of authority in the constitution or laws for the act which he has thus caused to be performed."And now let us glance at some of the tremendous consequences which may ensue from this high-handed measure. If the President may, in a case in which the law has assigned a specific duty exclusively to a designated officer, command it to be executed, contrary to his own judgment, under the penalty of an expulsion from office, and, upon his refusal, may appoint some obsequious tool to perform the required act, where is the limit to his authority? Has he not the same right to interfere in every other case, and remove from office all that he can remove, who hesitate or refuse to do his bidding contrary to their own solemn convictions of their duty? There is no resisting this inevitable conclusion. Well, then, how stands the matter of the public treasury? It has been seen that the issue of warrants upon the treasury is guarded by four independent and hitherto responsible checks, each controlling every other, and all bound by the law, but all holding their offices, according to the existing practice of the government, at the pleasure of the President. The Secretary signs, the Comptroller countersigns, the Register records, and the Treasurer pays the warrant. We have seen that the President has gone to the first and highest link in the chain, and coerced a conformity to his will. What is to prevent, whenever he desires to draw money from the public treasury, his applying the same penalty of expulsion, under which Mr. Duane suffered, to every link of the chain, from the Secretary of the Treasury down, and thus to obtain whatever he demands? What is to prevent a more compendious accomplishment of his object, by the agency of transfer drafts, drawn on the sole authority of the Secretary, and placing the money at once wherever, or in whatsoever hands, the President pleases?"What security have the people against the lawless conduct of any President? Where is the boundary to the tremendous power which he has assumed? Sir, every barrier around the public treasury is broken down and annihilated. From the moment that the President pronounced the words, 'This measure is my own; I take upon myself the responsibility of it,' every safeguard around the treasury was prostrated, and henceforward it might as well be at the Hermitage. The measure adopted by the President is without precedent. I beg pardon—there is one; but we must go down for it to the commencement of the Christian era. It will be recollected by those who are conversant with Roman history, that, after Pompey was compelled to retire to Brundusium, Cæsar, who had been anxious to give him battle, returned to Rome, 'having reduced Italy,' says the venerable biographer, 'in sixty days—[the exact period between the day of the removal of the deposits and that of the commencement of the present session of Congress, without the usual allowance of any days of grace]—in sixty days, without bloodshed.' The biographer proceeds:"'Finding the city in a more settled condition than he expected, and many senators there, he addressed them in a mild and gracious manner [as the President addressed his late Secretary of the Treasury], and desired them to send deputies to Pompey with an offer of honorable terms of peace,' &c. As Metellus, the tribune, opposed his taking money out of the public treasury, and cited some laws against it—[such, Sir, I suppose, as I have endeavored to cite on this occasion]—Cæsar said 'Arms and laws do not flourish together. If you are not pleased at what I am about, you have only to withdraw. [Leave the office, Mr. Duane!] War, indeed, will not tolerate much liberty of speech. When I say this, I am renouncing my own right; for you, and all those whom I have found exciting a spirit of faction against me, are at my disposal.' Having said this, he approached the doors of the treasury, and, as the keys were not produced, he sent for workmen to break them open. Metellus again opposed him, and gained credit with some for his firmness; but Cæsar, with an elevated voice, threatened to put him to death if he gave him any further trouble. 'And you know very well, young man,' said he, 'that this is harder for me to say than to do.' Metellus, terrified by the menace, retired; and Cæsar was afterwards easily and readily supplied with every thing necessary for that war."Mr. President (said Mr. C.) the people of the United States are indebted to the President for the boldness of this movement; and as one, among the humblest of them, I profess my obligations to him. He has told the Senate, in his message refusing an official copy of his cabinet paper, that it has been published for the information of the people. As a part of the people, the Senate, if not in their official character, have a right to its use. In that extraordinary paper he has proclaimed that the measure ishisown and thathehastakenupon himself the responsibility of it. In plain English, he has proclaimed an open, palpable and daring usurpation!"For more than fifteen years, Mr. President, I have been struggling to avoid the present state of things. I thought I perceived, in some proceedings, during the conduct of the Seminole war, a spirit of defiance to the constitution and to all law. With what sincerity and truth—with what earnestness and devotion to civil liberty, I have struggled, the Searcher of all human hearts best knows. With what fortune, the bleeding constitution of my country now fatally attests."I have, nevertheless, persevered; and, under every discouragement, during the short time that I expect to remain in the public councils, I will persevere. And if a bountiful Providence would allow an unworthy sinner to approach the throne of grace, I would beseech Him, asthe greatest favor He could grant to me here below, to spare me until I live to behold the people, rising in their majesty, with a peaceful and constitutional exercise of their power, to expel the Goths from Rome; to rescue the public treasury from pillage, to preserve the constitution of the United States; to uphold the Union against the danger of the concentration and consolidation ofallpower in the hands of the Executive; and to sustain the liberties of the people of this country against the imminent perils to which they now stand exposed."And now, Mr. President, what, under all these circumstances, is it our duty to do? Is there a senator who can hesitate to affirm, in the language of the resolutions, that the President has assumed a dangerous power over the treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the constitution and the laws; and that the reasons assigned for the act by the Secretary of the Treasury are insufficient and unsatisfactory?"The eyes and the hopes of the American people are anxiously turned to Congress. They feel that they have been deceived and insulted; their confidence abused; their interests betrayed; and their liberties in danger. They see a rapid and alarming concentration of all power in one man's hands. They see that, by the exercise of the positive authority of the Executive, and his negative power exerted over Congress, the will of one man alone prevails, and governs the republic. The question is no longer what laws will Congress pass, but what will the Executive not veto? The President, and not Congress, is addressed for legislative action. We have seen a corporation, charged with the execution of a great national work, dismiss an experienced, faithful, and zealous president, afterwards testify to his ability by a voluntary resolution, and reward his extraordinary services by a large gratuity, and appoint in his place an executive favorite, totally inexperienced and incompetent, to propitiate the President. We behold the usual incidents of approaching tyranny. The land is filled with spies and informers, and detraction and denunciation are the orders of the day. People, especially official incumbents in this place, no longer dare speak in the fearless tones of manly freemen, but in the cautious whispers of trembling slaves. The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; and if Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die—ignobly die—base, mean, and abject slaves; the scorn and contempt of mankind; unpitied, unwept, unmourned!"

"Mr. Clay addressed the Senate as follows: We are, said he, in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of the government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one man. The powers of Congress are paralyzed, except when exerted in conformity with his will, by frequent and an extraordinary exercise of the executive veto, not anticipated by the founders of the constitution, and not practised by any of the predecessors of the present Chief Magistrate. And, to cramp them still more, a new expedient is springing into use, of withholding altogether bills which have received the sanction of both Houses of Congress, thereby cutting off all opportunity of passing them, even if, after their return, the members should be unanimous in their favor. The constitutional participation of the Senate in the appointing power is virtually abolished, by the constant use of the power of removal from office without any known cause, and by the appointment of the same individual to the same office, after his rejection by the Senate. How often have we, senators, felt that the check of the Senate, instead of being, as the constitution intended, a salutary control, was an idle ceremony? How often, when acting on the case of the nominated successor, have we felt the injustice of the removal? How often have we said to each other, well, what can we do? the office cannot remain vacant without prejudice to the public interests; and, if we reject the proposed substitute, we cannot restore the displaced, and perhaps some more unworthy man may be nominated.

"The judiciary has not been exempted from the prevailing rage for innovation. Decisions of the tribunals, deliberately pronounced, have been contemptuously disregarded, and the sanctity of numerous treaties openly violated. Our Indian relations, coeval with the existence of the government, and recognized and established by numerous laws and treaties, have been subverted; the rights of the helpless and unfortunate aborigines trampled in the dust, and they brought under subjection to unknown laws, in which they have no voice, promulgated in an unknown language. The most extensive and most valuable public domain that ever fell to the lot of one nation is threatened with a total sacrifice. The general currency of the country, the life-blood of all its business, is in the most imminent danger of universal disorder and confusion. The power of internal improvement lies crushed beneath the veto. The system of protection of American industry was snatched from impending destruction at the last session; but we are now coolly told by the Secretary of the Treasury, without a blush, 'that it is understood to beconceded on all handsthat a tariff for protection merely is to be finally abandoned.' By the 3d of March, 1837, if the progress of innovation continue, there will be scarcely a vestige remaining of the government and its policy as they existed prior to the 3d of March, 1829. In a term of years, a little more than equal to that which was required to establish our liberties, the government will have been transformed into an elective monarchy—the worst of all forms of government.

"Such is a melancholy but faithful picture of the present condition of our public affairs. It is not sketched or exhibited to excite, here or elsewhere, irritated feeling; I have no such purpose. I would, on the contrary, implore the Senate and the people to discard all passion and prejudice, and to look calmly but resolutely upon the actual state of the constitution and the country. Although I bring into the Senate the same unabated spirit, and the same firm determination, which have ever guided me in the support of civil liberty, and the defence of our constitution, I contemplate the prospect before us with feelings of deep humiliation and profound mortification.

"It is not among the least unfortunate symptoms of the times, that a large proportion of the good and enlightened men of the Union, of all parties, are yielding to sentiments of despondency. There is, unhappily, a feeling of distrust and insecurity pervading the community. Many of our best citizens entertain serious apprehensions that our Union and our institutions are destined to a speedy overthrow. Sir, I trust that the hopes and confidence of the country will revive. There is much occasion for manly independence and patriotic vigor, but none for despair. Thank God, we are yet free; and, if we put on the chains which are forging for us, it will be because we deserve to wear them. We should never despair of the republic. If our ancestors had been capable of surrendering themselves to such ignoble sentiments, our independence and our liberties would never have been achieved. The winter of 1776-'77, was one of the gloomiest periods of our revolution; but on this day, fifty-seven years ago, the father of his country achieved a glorious victory, which diffused joy, and gladness, and animation throughout the States. Let us cherish the hope that, since he has gone from among us, Providence, in the dispensation of his mercies, has near at hand, in reserve for us, though yet unseen by us, some sure and happy deliverance from all impending dangers.

"When we assembled here last year, we were full of dreadful forebodings. On the one hand, we were menaced with a civil war, which, lighting up in a single State, might spread its flames throughout one of the largest sections of theUnion. On the other, a cherished system of policy, essential to the successful prosecution of the industry of our countrymen, was exposed to imminent danger of destruction. Means were happily applied by Congress to avert both calamities, the country was reconciled, and our Union once more became a band of friends and brothers. And I shall be greatly disappointed, if we do not find those who were denounced as being unfriendly to the continuance of our confederacy, among the foremost to fly to its preservation, and to resist all executive encroachments.

"Mr. President, when Congress adjourned at the termination of the last session, there was one remnant of its powers—that over the purse—left untouched. The two most important powers of civil government are those of the sword and purse; the first, with some restrictions, is confided by the constitution to the Executive, and the last to the legislative department. If they are separate, and exercised by different responsible departments, civil liberty is safe; but if they are united in the hands of the same individual, it is gone. That clear-sighted and revolutionary orator and patriot, Patrick Henry, justly said, in the Virginia convention, in reply to one of his opponents, 'Let him candidly tell me where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up from the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the sword and the purse. Can you prove, by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe without one of them? If you give them up, you are gone.'

"Up to the period of the termination of the last session of Congress, the exclusive constitutional power of Congress over the treasury of the United States had never been contested. Among its earliest acts was one to establish the treasury department, which provided for the appointment of a treasurer, who was required to give bond and security, in a very large amount, 'to receive and keep the moneys of the United States, and disburse the same upon warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, countersigned by the Comptroller, recorded by the Register, and not otherwise.' Prior to the establishment of the present Bank of the United States, no treasury or place had been provided or designated by law for the safe keeping of the public moneys, but the treasurer was left to his own discretion and responsibility. When the existing bank was established, it was provided that the public moneys should be deposited with it, and, consequently, that bank became the treasury of the United States; for, whatever place is designated by law for the keeping of the public money of the United States, under the care of the treasurer of the United States, is, for the time being, the treasury. Its safety was drawn in question by the Chief Magistrate, and an agent was appointed a little more than a year ago to investigate its ability. He reported to the Executive that it was perfectly safe. His apprehensions of its solidity were communicated by the President to Congress, and a committee was appointed to examine the subject; they, also, reported in favor of its security. And, finally, among the last acts of the House of Representatives, prior to the close of the last session, was the adoption of a resolution, manifesting its entire confidence in the ability and solidity of the bank.

"After all these testimonies to the perfect safety of the public moneys in the place appointed by Congress, who could have supposed that the place would have been changed? Who could have imagined that, within sixty days of the meeting of Congress, and, as it were, in utter contempt of its authority, the change should have been ordered? Who would have dreamed that the treasurer should have thrown away the single key to the treasury, over which Congress held ample control, and accepted, in lieu of it, some dozens of keys, over which neither Congress nor he has any adequate control? Yet, sir, all this has been done; and it is now our solemn duty to inquire, 1st. By whose authority it has been ordered; and, 2d. Whether the order has been given in conformity with the constitution and laws of the United States.

"I agree, sir, and I am very happy whenever I can agree with the President, as to the immense importance of these questions. He says, in the paper which I hold in my hand, that he looks upon the pending question as involving higher considerations than the 'mere transfer of a sum of money from one bank to another. Its decision may affect the character of our government for ages to come.' And, with him. I view it as 'of transcendent importance, both in the principles and the consequences it involves.' It is a question of all time, for posterity as well as for us—of constitutional government or monarchy—of liberty or slavery. As I regard it, I hold the bank as nothing, as perfectly insignificant, faithful as it has been in the performance of all its duties. I hold a sound currency as nothing, essential as it is to the prosperity of every branch of business, and to all conditions of society, and efficient as the agency of the bank has been in providing the country with a currency as sound as ever existed, and unsurpassed by any in Christendom. I consider even the public faith, sacred and inviolable as it ever should be, as comparatively nothing. All these questions are merged in the greater and mightier question of the constitutional distribution of the powers of the government, as affected by the recent executive innovation. The real inquiry is, shall all the barriers which have been erected by the caution and wisdom of our ancestors, for the preservation of civil liberty, be prostrated and trodden under foot, and the sword and the purse be at once united in the hands of one man? Shallthe power of Congress over the treasury of the United States, hitherto never contested, be wrested from its possession, and be henceforward wielded by the Chief Magistrate? Entertaining these views of the magnitude of the question before us, I shall not, at least to-day, examine the reasons which the President has assigned for his act. If he has no power to perform it, no reasons, however cogent, can justify the deed. None can sanctify an illegal or unconstitutional act.

"The question is, by virtue of whose will, power, dictation, was the removal of the deposits effected? By whose authority and determination were they transferred from the Bank of the United States, where they were required by the law to be placed, and put in banks which the law had never designated? And I tell gentlemen opposed to me, that I am not to be answered by the exhibition of a formal order bearing the signature of R. B. Taney, or any one else. I want to know, not the amanuensis or clerk who prepared or signed the official form, but the authority or the individual who dictated or commanded it; not the hangman who executes the culprit, but the tribunal which pronounced the sentence. I want to know that power in the government, that original and controlling authority, which required and commanded the removal of the deposits. And, I repeat the question, is there a senator, or intelligent man in the whole country, who entertains a solitary doubt?

"Hear what the President himself says in his manifesto read to his cabinet: 'The President deems it his duty to communicate in this manner to his cabinet the final conclusions of his own mind, and the reasons on which they are founded.' And, at the conclusion of this paper, what does he say? 'The President again repeats that he begs his cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or principle. Its responsibility has been assumed, after the most mature deliberation and reflection, as necessary to preserve the morals of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity of the elective franchise, without which all will unite in saying that the blood and treasure expended by our forefathers, in the establishment of our happy system of government, will have been vain and fruitless. Under these convictions, he feels that a measure so important to the American people cannot be commenced too soon; and he therefore names the 1st day of October next as a period proper for the change of the deposits, or sooner, provided the necessary arrangements with the State banks can be made.' Sir, is there a senator here who will now tell me that the removal was not the measure and the act of the President?

"Thus is it evident that the President, neither by the act creating the treasury department, nor by the bank charter, has any power over the public treasury. Has he any by the constitution? None, none. We have already seen that the constitution positively forbids any money from being drawn from the treasury but in virtue of a previous act of appropriation. But the President himself says that 'upon him has been devolved, by the constitution, and the suffrages of the American people, the duty of superintending the operation of the executive departments of the government, and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed.' If there existed any such double source of executive power, it has been seen that the treasury department is not an executive department; but that, in all that concerns the public treasury, the Secretary is the agent or representative of Congress, acting in obedience to their will, and maintaining a direct intercourse with them. By what authority does the President derive power from the mere result of an election? In another part of this same cabinet paper he refers to the suffrages of the people as a source of power independent of a system in which power has been most carefully separated, and distributed between three separate and independent departments. We have been told a thousand times, and all experience assures us, that such a division is indispensable to the existence and preservation of freedom. We have established and designated offices, and appointed officers in each of those departments, to execute the duties respectively allotted to them. The President, it is true, presides over the whole; specific duties are often assigned by particular laws to him alone, or to other officers under his superintendence. His parental eye is presumed to survey the whole extent of the system in all its movements; but has he power to come into Congress, and to say such laws only shall you pass; to go into the courts, and prescribe the decisions which they may pronounce; or even to enter the offices of administration, and, where duties are specifically confided to those officers, to substitute his will to their duty? Or, has he a right, when those functionaries, deliberating upon their own solemn obligations to the people, have moved forward in their assigned spheres, to arrest their lawful progress, because they have dared to act contrary to his pleasure? No, sir; no, sir. His is a high and glorious station, but it is one of observation and superintendence. It is to see that obstructions in the forward movement of government, unlawfully interposed, shall be abated by legitimate and competent means.

"Such are the powers on which the President relies to justify his seizure of the treasury of the United States. I have examined them, one by one, and they all fail, utterly fail, to bear out the act. We are brought irresistibly to the conclusions, 1st, That the invasion of the public treasury has been perpetrated by the removal of one Secretary of the Treasury, who would not violate his conscientious obligations, and by the appointment of another, who stood readyto subscribe his name to the orders of the President; and, 2dly, That the President has no color of authority in the constitution or laws for the act which he has thus caused to be performed.

"And now let us glance at some of the tremendous consequences which may ensue from this high-handed measure. If the President may, in a case in which the law has assigned a specific duty exclusively to a designated officer, command it to be executed, contrary to his own judgment, under the penalty of an expulsion from office, and, upon his refusal, may appoint some obsequious tool to perform the required act, where is the limit to his authority? Has he not the same right to interfere in every other case, and remove from office all that he can remove, who hesitate or refuse to do his bidding contrary to their own solemn convictions of their duty? There is no resisting this inevitable conclusion. Well, then, how stands the matter of the public treasury? It has been seen that the issue of warrants upon the treasury is guarded by four independent and hitherto responsible checks, each controlling every other, and all bound by the law, but all holding their offices, according to the existing practice of the government, at the pleasure of the President. The Secretary signs, the Comptroller countersigns, the Register records, and the Treasurer pays the warrant. We have seen that the President has gone to the first and highest link in the chain, and coerced a conformity to his will. What is to prevent, whenever he desires to draw money from the public treasury, his applying the same penalty of expulsion, under which Mr. Duane suffered, to every link of the chain, from the Secretary of the Treasury down, and thus to obtain whatever he demands? What is to prevent a more compendious accomplishment of his object, by the agency of transfer drafts, drawn on the sole authority of the Secretary, and placing the money at once wherever, or in whatsoever hands, the President pleases?

"What security have the people against the lawless conduct of any President? Where is the boundary to the tremendous power which he has assumed? Sir, every barrier around the public treasury is broken down and annihilated. From the moment that the President pronounced the words, 'This measure is my own; I take upon myself the responsibility of it,' every safeguard around the treasury was prostrated, and henceforward it might as well be at the Hermitage. The measure adopted by the President is without precedent. I beg pardon—there is one; but we must go down for it to the commencement of the Christian era. It will be recollected by those who are conversant with Roman history, that, after Pompey was compelled to retire to Brundusium, Cæsar, who had been anxious to give him battle, returned to Rome, 'having reduced Italy,' says the venerable biographer, 'in sixty days—[the exact period between the day of the removal of the deposits and that of the commencement of the present session of Congress, without the usual allowance of any days of grace]—in sixty days, without bloodshed.' The biographer proceeds:

"'Finding the city in a more settled condition than he expected, and many senators there, he addressed them in a mild and gracious manner [as the President addressed his late Secretary of the Treasury], and desired them to send deputies to Pompey with an offer of honorable terms of peace,' &c. As Metellus, the tribune, opposed his taking money out of the public treasury, and cited some laws against it—[such, Sir, I suppose, as I have endeavored to cite on this occasion]—Cæsar said 'Arms and laws do not flourish together. If you are not pleased at what I am about, you have only to withdraw. [Leave the office, Mr. Duane!] War, indeed, will not tolerate much liberty of speech. When I say this, I am renouncing my own right; for you, and all those whom I have found exciting a spirit of faction against me, are at my disposal.' Having said this, he approached the doors of the treasury, and, as the keys were not produced, he sent for workmen to break them open. Metellus again opposed him, and gained credit with some for his firmness; but Cæsar, with an elevated voice, threatened to put him to death if he gave him any further trouble. 'And you know very well, young man,' said he, 'that this is harder for me to say than to do.' Metellus, terrified by the menace, retired; and Cæsar was afterwards easily and readily supplied with every thing necessary for that war.

"Mr. President (said Mr. C.) the people of the United States are indebted to the President for the boldness of this movement; and as one, among the humblest of them, I profess my obligations to him. He has told the Senate, in his message refusing an official copy of his cabinet paper, that it has been published for the information of the people. As a part of the people, the Senate, if not in their official character, have a right to its use. In that extraordinary paper he has proclaimed that the measure ishisown and thathehastakenupon himself the responsibility of it. In plain English, he has proclaimed an open, palpable and daring usurpation!

"For more than fifteen years, Mr. President, I have been struggling to avoid the present state of things. I thought I perceived, in some proceedings, during the conduct of the Seminole war, a spirit of defiance to the constitution and to all law. With what sincerity and truth—with what earnestness and devotion to civil liberty, I have struggled, the Searcher of all human hearts best knows. With what fortune, the bleeding constitution of my country now fatally attests.

"I have, nevertheless, persevered; and, under every discouragement, during the short time that I expect to remain in the public councils, I will persevere. And if a bountiful Providence would allow an unworthy sinner to approach the throne of grace, I would beseech Him, asthe greatest favor He could grant to me here below, to spare me until I live to behold the people, rising in their majesty, with a peaceful and constitutional exercise of their power, to expel the Goths from Rome; to rescue the public treasury from pillage, to preserve the constitution of the United States; to uphold the Union against the danger of the concentration and consolidation ofallpower in the hands of the Executive; and to sustain the liberties of the people of this country against the imminent perils to which they now stand exposed.

"And now, Mr. President, what, under all these circumstances, is it our duty to do? Is there a senator who can hesitate to affirm, in the language of the resolutions, that the President has assumed a dangerous power over the treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the constitution and the laws; and that the reasons assigned for the act by the Secretary of the Treasury are insufficient and unsatisfactory?

"The eyes and the hopes of the American people are anxiously turned to Congress. They feel that they have been deceived and insulted; their confidence abused; their interests betrayed; and their liberties in danger. They see a rapid and alarming concentration of all power in one man's hands. They see that, by the exercise of the positive authority of the Executive, and his negative power exerted over Congress, the will of one man alone prevails, and governs the republic. The question is no longer what laws will Congress pass, but what will the Executive not veto? The President, and not Congress, is addressed for legislative action. We have seen a corporation, charged with the execution of a great national work, dismiss an experienced, faithful, and zealous president, afterwards testify to his ability by a voluntary resolution, and reward his extraordinary services by a large gratuity, and appoint in his place an executive favorite, totally inexperienced and incompetent, to propitiate the President. We behold the usual incidents of approaching tyranny. The land is filled with spies and informers, and detraction and denunciation are the orders of the day. People, especially official incumbents in this place, no longer dare speak in the fearless tones of manly freemen, but in the cautious whispers of trembling slaves. The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; and if Congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die—ignobly die—base, mean, and abject slaves; the scorn and contempt of mankind; unpitied, unwept, unmourned!"

Mr. Clay had spoken on three successive days, being the last days of the year 1833. Mr. Benton followed him,—and seeing the advantage which was presented in the character of the resolve, and that of the speech in support of it, all bearing the impress of a criminal proceeding, without other result than to procure a sentence of condemnation against the President for violating the laws and the constitution, endangering the public liberty and establishing a tyranny,—he took up the proceeding in that sense; and immediately turned all the charges against the resolution itself and its mover, as a usurpation of the rights of the House of Representatives in originating an impeachment, and a violation of law and constitution in trying itex parte; and said:

"The first of these resolutions contained impeachable matter, and was in fact, though not in form, a direct impeachment of the President of the United States. He recited the constitutional provision, that the President might be impeached—1st, for treason; 2d, for bribery; 3d, for high crimes; 4th, for misdemeanors; and said that the first resolution charged both a high crime and a misdemeanor upon the President; a high crime, in violating the laws and constitution, to obtain a power over the public treasure, to the danger of the liberties of the people; and a misdemeanor, in dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury from office. Mr. B. said that the terms of the resolution were sufficiently explicit to define a high crime, within the meaning of the constitution, without having recourse to the arguments and declarations used by the mover in illustration of his meaning; but, if any doubt remained on that head, it would be removed by the whole tenor of the argument, and especially that part of it which compared the President's conduct to that of Cæsar, in seizing the public treasure, to aid him in putting an end to the liberties of his country; and every senator, in voting upon it, would vote as directly upon the guilt or innocence of the President, as if he was responding to the question of guilty or not guilty, in the concluding sentence of a formal impeachment."We are, then, said Mr. B., trying an impeachment! But how? The constitution gives to the House of Representatives the sole power to originate impeachments; yet we originate this impeachment ourselves. The constitution gives the accused a right to be present; but heis not here. It requires the Senate to be sworn as judges; but we are not so sworn. It requires the Chief Justice of the United States to preside when the President is tried; but the Chief Justice is not presiding. It gives the House of Representatives a right to be present, and to manage the prosecution; but neither the House nor its managers are here. It requires the forms of criminal justice to be strictly observed; yet all these forms are neglected and violated. It is a proceeding in which the First Magistrate of the republic is to be tried without being heard, and in which his accusers are to act as his judges!"Mr. B. called upon the Senate to consider well what they did before they proceeded further in the consideration of this resolution. He called upon them to consider what was due to the House of Representatives, whose privilege was invaded, and who had a right to send a message to the Senate, complaining of the proceeding, and demanding its abandonment. He conjured them to consider what was due to the President, who was thus to be tried in his absence for a most enormous crime; what was due to the Senate itself, in thus combining the incompatible characters of accusers and judges, and which would itself be judged by Europe and America. He dwelt particularly on the figure which the Senate would make in going on with the consideration of this resolution. It accused the President of violating the constitution; and itself committed twenty violations of the same constitution in making the accusation! It accused him of violating a single law, and itself violated all the laws of criminal justice in prosecuting him for it. It charged him with designs dangerous to the liberties of the citizens, and immediately trampled upon the rights of all citizens, in the person of their Chief Magistrate."Mr. B. descanted upon the extraordinary organization of the Senate, and drew an argument from it in favor of the reserve and decorum of their proceedings. The Senate were lawgivers, and ought to respect the laws already made; they were the constitutional advisers of the President, and should observe, as nearly as possible, the civil relations which the office of adviser presumes; they might be his judges, and should be the last in the world to stir up an accusation against him, to prejudge his guilt, or to attack his character with defamatory language. Decorum, the becoming ornament of every functionary, should be the distinguishing trait of an American senator, who combines, in his own office, the united dignities of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial character. In his judicial capacity especially, he should sacrifice to decorum and propriety; and shun, as he would the contagious touch of sin and pestilence, the slightest approach to the character of prosecutor. He referred to British parliamentary law to show that the Lords could not join in an accusation, because they were to try it; but here the Senate was sole accuser, and had nothing from the House of Representatives to join; but made the accusation out and out, and tried it themselves. He said the accusation was a double one—for a high crime and a misdemeanor—and the latter a more flagrant proceeding than the former; for it assumed to know for what cause the President had dismissed his late Secretary, and undertook to try the President for a thing which was not triable or impeachable."From the foundation of the government, it had been settled that the President's right to dismiss his secretaries resulted from his constitutional obligation to see that the laws were faithfully executed. Many Presidents had dismissed secretaries, and this was the first time that the Senate had ever undertaken to found an impeachment upon it, or had assumed to know the reasons for which it was done."Mr. B. said that two other impeachments seemed to be going on, at the same time, against two other officers, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer; so that the Senate was brimful of criminal business. The Treasurer and the Secretary of the Treasury were both civil officers, and were both liable to impeachment for misdemeanors in office; and great misdemeanors were charged upon them. They were, in fact, upon trial, without the formality of a resolution; and, if hereafter impeached by the House of Representatives, the Senate, if they believed what they heard, would be ready to pronounce judgment and remove them from office, without delay or further examination."Mr. B. then addressed himself to the Vice-President (Mr. Van Buren), upon the novelty of the scene which was going on before him, and the great change which had taken place since he had served in the Senate. He commended the peculiar delicacy and decorum of the Vice-President himself, who, in six years' service, in high party times, and in a decided opposition, never uttered a word, either in open or secret session, which could have wounded the feelings of a political adversary, if he had been present and heard it. He extolled the decorum of the opposition to President Adams' administration. If there was one brilliant exception, the error was redeemed by classic wit, and the heroic readiness with which a noble heart bared its bosom to the bullets of those who felt aggrieved. Still addressing himself to the Vice-President, Mr. B. said that if he should receive some hits in the place where he sat, without the right to reply, he must find consolation in the case of his most illustrious predecessor, the great apostle of American liberty (Mr. Jefferson), who often told his friends of the manner in which he had been cut at when presiding over the Senate, and personally annoyed by the inferior—no, young and inconsiderate—members of the federal party."Mr. B. returned to the point in debate. The President, he repeated, was on trial for a high crime, in seizing the public treasure in violationof the laws and the constitution. Was the charge true? Does the act which he has done deserve the definition which has been put upon it? He had made up his own mind that the public deposits ought to be removed from the Bank of the United States. He communicated that opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary refused to remove them; the President removed him, and appointed a Secretary who gave the order which he thought the occasion required. All this he did in virtue of his constitutional obligation to see the laws faithfully executed; and in obedience to the same sense of duty which would lead him to dismiss a Secretary of War, or of the Navy, who would refuse to give an order for troops to march, or a fleet to sail. True, it is made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the removal of the deposits; but the constitution makes it the duty of the President to see that the Secretary performs his duty; and the constitution is as much above law as the President is above the Secretary."The President is on trial for a misdemeanor—for dismissing his Secretary without sufficient cause. To this accusation there are ready answers: first, that the President may dismiss his Secretaries without cause; secondly, that the Senate has no cognizance of the case; thirdly, that the Senate cannot assume to know for what cause the Secretary in question was dismissed."The Secretary of the Treasury is on trial. In order to get at the President, it was found necessary to get at a gentleman who had no voice on this floor. It had been found necessary to assail the Secretary of the Treasury in a manner heretofore unexampled in the history of the Senate. His religion, his politics, his veracity, his understanding, his Missouri restriction vote, had all been arraigned. Mr. B. said he would leave his religion to the constitution of the United States, Catholic as he was, and although 'the Presbyterian might cut off his head the first time he went to mass;' for he could see no other point to the anecdote of Cromwell and the capitulating Catholics, to whom he granted the free exercise of their religion, only he would cut off their heads if they went to mass. His understanding he would leave to himself. The head which could throw the paper which was taken for a stone on this floor, but which was, in fact, a double-headed chain-shot fired from a forty-eight pounder, carrying sails, masts, rigging, all before it, was a head that could take care of itself. His veracity would be adjourned to the trial which was to take place for misquoting a letter of Secretary Crawford, and he had no doubt would end as the charge did for suppressing a letter which was printedin extensoamong our documents, and withholding the name and compensation of an agent; when that name and the fact of no compensation was lying on the table. The Secretary of the Treasury was arraigned for some incidental vote on the Missouri restriction, when he was a member of the Maryland legislature. Mr. B. did not know what that vote was; but he did know that a certain gentleman, who lately stood in the relation ofsergeantto another gentleman, in a certain high election, was the leader of the forces which deforced Missouri of her place in the Union for the entire session which he first attended (not served) in the Congress of the United States. His politics could not be severely tried in the time of the alien and sedition law, when he was scarce of age; but were well tried during the late war, when he sided with his country, and received the constant denunciations of that great organ of federalism, the Federal Republican newspaper. For the rest, Mr. B. admitted that the Secretary had voted for the elder Adams to be President of the United States, but denied the right of certain persons to make that an objection to him. Mr. B. dismissed these personal charges, for the present, and would adjourn their consideration until his (Mr. Taney's) trial came on, for which the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), stood pledged; and after the trial was over, he had no doubt but that the Secretary of the Treasury, although a Catholic and a federalist, would be found to maintain his station in the first rank of American gentlemen and American patriots."Mr. B. took up the serious charges against the Secretary: that of being the mere instrument of the President in removing the deposits, and violating the constitution and laws of the land. How far he was this mere instrument, making up his mind, in three days, to do what others would not do at all, might be judged by every person who would refer to the opposition papers for the division in the cabinet about the removal of the deposits; and which constantly classed Mr. Taney, then the Attorney General, on the side of removal. This classification was correct, and notorious, and ought to exempt an honorable man, if any thing could exempt him, from the imputation of being a mere instrument in a great transaction of which he was a prime counsellor. The fact is, he had long since, in his character of legal adviser to the President, advised the removal of these deposits; and when suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to take the office which would make it his duty to act upon his own advice, he accepted it from the single sense of honor and duty; and that he might not seem to desert the President in flinching from the performance of what he had recommended. His personal honor was clean; his personal conduct magnanimous; his official deeds would abide the test of law and truth."Mr. B. said he would make short work of long accusations, and demolish, in three minutes, what had been concocting for three months, and delivering for three days in the Senate. He would call the attention of the Senate to certain clauses of law, and certain treasury instructions which had been left out of view, but which were decisive of the accusation against the Secretary.The first was the clause in the bank charter, which invested the Secretary with the power of transferring the public funds from place to place. It was the 15th section of the charter: he would read it. It enacted that whenever required by the Secretary of the Treasury, the bank should give the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds from place to place, within the United States, or territories thereof; and for distributing the same in payment of the public creditors, &c."Here is authority to the Secretary to transfer the public moneys from place to place, limited only by the bounds of the United States and its territories; and this clause of three lines of law puts to flight all the nonsense about the United States Bank being the treasury, and the Treasurer being the keeper of the public moneys, with which some politicians and newspaper writers have been worrying their brains for the last three months. In virtue of this clause, the Secretary of the Treasury gave certain transfer drafts to the amount of two millions and a quarter; and his legal right to give the draft was just as clear, under this clause of the bank charter, as his right to remove the deposits was under another clause of it. The transfer is made by draft; a payment out of the treasury is made upon a warrant; and the difference between a transfer draft and a treasury warrant was a thing necessary to be known by every man who aspired to the office of illuminating a nation, or of conducting a criminal prosecution, or even of understanding what he is talking about. They have no relation to each other. The warrant takes the money out of the treasury: the draft transfers it from point to point, for the purpose of making payment: and all this attack upon the Secretary of the Treasury is simply upon the blunder of mistaking the draft for the warrant."The senator from Kentucky calls upon the people to rise, and drive the Goths from the capital. Who are those Goths? They are General Jackson and the democratic party,—he just elected President over the senator himself, and the party just been made the majority in the House—all by the vote of the people. It is their act that has put these Goths in possession of the capital to the discomfiture of the senator and his friends; and he ought to be quite sure that he felt no resentment at an event so disastrous to his hopes, when he has indulged himself with so much license in vituperating those whom the country has put over him."The senator from Kentucky says the eyes and the hopes of the country are now turned upon Congress. Yes, Congress is his word, and I hold him to it. And what do they see? They see one House of Congress—the one to which the constitution gives the care of the purse, and the origination of impeachments, and which is fresh from the popular elections: they see that body with a majority of above fifty in favor of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, and approving the act which the senator condemns. They see that popular approbation in looking at one branch of Congress, and the one charged by the constitution with the inquisition into federal grievances. In the other branch they see a body far removed from the people, neglecting its proper duties, seizing upon those of another branch, converting itself into a grand inquest, and trying offences which itself prefers; and in a spirit which bespeaks a zeal quickened by the sting of personal mortification. He says the country feels itself deceived and betrayed—insulted and wronged—its liberties endangered—and the treasury robbed: the representatives of the people in the other House, say the reverse of all this—that the President has saved the country from the corrupt dominion of a great corrupting bank, by taking away from her the public money which she was using in bribing the press, subsidizing members, purchasing the venal, and installing herself in supreme political power."The senator wishes to know what we are to do? What is our duty to do? I answer, to keep ourselves within our constitutional duties—to leave this impeachment to the House of Representatives—leave it to the House to which it belongs, and to those who have no private griefs to avenge—and to judges, each of whom should retire from the bench, if he happened to feel in his heart the spirit of a prosecutor instead of a judge. The Senate now tries General Jackson; it is subject to trial itself—to be tried by the people, and to have its sentence reversed."

"The first of these resolutions contained impeachable matter, and was in fact, though not in form, a direct impeachment of the President of the United States. He recited the constitutional provision, that the President might be impeached—1st, for treason; 2d, for bribery; 3d, for high crimes; 4th, for misdemeanors; and said that the first resolution charged both a high crime and a misdemeanor upon the President; a high crime, in violating the laws and constitution, to obtain a power over the public treasure, to the danger of the liberties of the people; and a misdemeanor, in dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury from office. Mr. B. said that the terms of the resolution were sufficiently explicit to define a high crime, within the meaning of the constitution, without having recourse to the arguments and declarations used by the mover in illustration of his meaning; but, if any doubt remained on that head, it would be removed by the whole tenor of the argument, and especially that part of it which compared the President's conduct to that of Cæsar, in seizing the public treasure, to aid him in putting an end to the liberties of his country; and every senator, in voting upon it, would vote as directly upon the guilt or innocence of the President, as if he was responding to the question of guilty or not guilty, in the concluding sentence of a formal impeachment.

"We are, then, said Mr. B., trying an impeachment! But how? The constitution gives to the House of Representatives the sole power to originate impeachments; yet we originate this impeachment ourselves. The constitution gives the accused a right to be present; but heis not here. It requires the Senate to be sworn as judges; but we are not so sworn. It requires the Chief Justice of the United States to preside when the President is tried; but the Chief Justice is not presiding. It gives the House of Representatives a right to be present, and to manage the prosecution; but neither the House nor its managers are here. It requires the forms of criminal justice to be strictly observed; yet all these forms are neglected and violated. It is a proceeding in which the First Magistrate of the republic is to be tried without being heard, and in which his accusers are to act as his judges!

"Mr. B. called upon the Senate to consider well what they did before they proceeded further in the consideration of this resolution. He called upon them to consider what was due to the House of Representatives, whose privilege was invaded, and who had a right to send a message to the Senate, complaining of the proceeding, and demanding its abandonment. He conjured them to consider what was due to the President, who was thus to be tried in his absence for a most enormous crime; what was due to the Senate itself, in thus combining the incompatible characters of accusers and judges, and which would itself be judged by Europe and America. He dwelt particularly on the figure which the Senate would make in going on with the consideration of this resolution. It accused the President of violating the constitution; and itself committed twenty violations of the same constitution in making the accusation! It accused him of violating a single law, and itself violated all the laws of criminal justice in prosecuting him for it. It charged him with designs dangerous to the liberties of the citizens, and immediately trampled upon the rights of all citizens, in the person of their Chief Magistrate.

"Mr. B. descanted upon the extraordinary organization of the Senate, and drew an argument from it in favor of the reserve and decorum of their proceedings. The Senate were lawgivers, and ought to respect the laws already made; they were the constitutional advisers of the President, and should observe, as nearly as possible, the civil relations which the office of adviser presumes; they might be his judges, and should be the last in the world to stir up an accusation against him, to prejudge his guilt, or to attack his character with defamatory language. Decorum, the becoming ornament of every functionary, should be the distinguishing trait of an American senator, who combines, in his own office, the united dignities of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial character. In his judicial capacity especially, he should sacrifice to decorum and propriety; and shun, as he would the contagious touch of sin and pestilence, the slightest approach to the character of prosecutor. He referred to British parliamentary law to show that the Lords could not join in an accusation, because they were to try it; but here the Senate was sole accuser, and had nothing from the House of Representatives to join; but made the accusation out and out, and tried it themselves. He said the accusation was a double one—for a high crime and a misdemeanor—and the latter a more flagrant proceeding than the former; for it assumed to know for what cause the President had dismissed his late Secretary, and undertook to try the President for a thing which was not triable or impeachable.

"From the foundation of the government, it had been settled that the President's right to dismiss his secretaries resulted from his constitutional obligation to see that the laws were faithfully executed. Many Presidents had dismissed secretaries, and this was the first time that the Senate had ever undertaken to found an impeachment upon it, or had assumed to know the reasons for which it was done.

"Mr. B. said that two other impeachments seemed to be going on, at the same time, against two other officers, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer; so that the Senate was brimful of criminal business. The Treasurer and the Secretary of the Treasury were both civil officers, and were both liable to impeachment for misdemeanors in office; and great misdemeanors were charged upon them. They were, in fact, upon trial, without the formality of a resolution; and, if hereafter impeached by the House of Representatives, the Senate, if they believed what they heard, would be ready to pronounce judgment and remove them from office, without delay or further examination.

"Mr. B. then addressed himself to the Vice-President (Mr. Van Buren), upon the novelty of the scene which was going on before him, and the great change which had taken place since he had served in the Senate. He commended the peculiar delicacy and decorum of the Vice-President himself, who, in six years' service, in high party times, and in a decided opposition, never uttered a word, either in open or secret session, which could have wounded the feelings of a political adversary, if he had been present and heard it. He extolled the decorum of the opposition to President Adams' administration. If there was one brilliant exception, the error was redeemed by classic wit, and the heroic readiness with which a noble heart bared its bosom to the bullets of those who felt aggrieved. Still addressing himself to the Vice-President, Mr. B. said that if he should receive some hits in the place where he sat, without the right to reply, he must find consolation in the case of his most illustrious predecessor, the great apostle of American liberty (Mr. Jefferson), who often told his friends of the manner in which he had been cut at when presiding over the Senate, and personally annoyed by the inferior—no, young and inconsiderate—members of the federal party.

"Mr. B. returned to the point in debate. The President, he repeated, was on trial for a high crime, in seizing the public treasure in violationof the laws and the constitution. Was the charge true? Does the act which he has done deserve the definition which has been put upon it? He had made up his own mind that the public deposits ought to be removed from the Bank of the United States. He communicated that opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary refused to remove them; the President removed him, and appointed a Secretary who gave the order which he thought the occasion required. All this he did in virtue of his constitutional obligation to see the laws faithfully executed; and in obedience to the same sense of duty which would lead him to dismiss a Secretary of War, or of the Navy, who would refuse to give an order for troops to march, or a fleet to sail. True, it is made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the removal of the deposits; but the constitution makes it the duty of the President to see that the Secretary performs his duty; and the constitution is as much above law as the President is above the Secretary.

"The President is on trial for a misdemeanor—for dismissing his Secretary without sufficient cause. To this accusation there are ready answers: first, that the President may dismiss his Secretaries without cause; secondly, that the Senate has no cognizance of the case; thirdly, that the Senate cannot assume to know for what cause the Secretary in question was dismissed.

"The Secretary of the Treasury is on trial. In order to get at the President, it was found necessary to get at a gentleman who had no voice on this floor. It had been found necessary to assail the Secretary of the Treasury in a manner heretofore unexampled in the history of the Senate. His religion, his politics, his veracity, his understanding, his Missouri restriction vote, had all been arraigned. Mr. B. said he would leave his religion to the constitution of the United States, Catholic as he was, and although 'the Presbyterian might cut off his head the first time he went to mass;' for he could see no other point to the anecdote of Cromwell and the capitulating Catholics, to whom he granted the free exercise of their religion, only he would cut off their heads if they went to mass. His understanding he would leave to himself. The head which could throw the paper which was taken for a stone on this floor, but which was, in fact, a double-headed chain-shot fired from a forty-eight pounder, carrying sails, masts, rigging, all before it, was a head that could take care of itself. His veracity would be adjourned to the trial which was to take place for misquoting a letter of Secretary Crawford, and he had no doubt would end as the charge did for suppressing a letter which was printedin extensoamong our documents, and withholding the name and compensation of an agent; when that name and the fact of no compensation was lying on the table. The Secretary of the Treasury was arraigned for some incidental vote on the Missouri restriction, when he was a member of the Maryland legislature. Mr. B. did not know what that vote was; but he did know that a certain gentleman, who lately stood in the relation ofsergeantto another gentleman, in a certain high election, was the leader of the forces which deforced Missouri of her place in the Union for the entire session which he first attended (not served) in the Congress of the United States. His politics could not be severely tried in the time of the alien and sedition law, when he was scarce of age; but were well tried during the late war, when he sided with his country, and received the constant denunciations of that great organ of federalism, the Federal Republican newspaper. For the rest, Mr. B. admitted that the Secretary had voted for the elder Adams to be President of the United States, but denied the right of certain persons to make that an objection to him. Mr. B. dismissed these personal charges, for the present, and would adjourn their consideration until his (Mr. Taney's) trial came on, for which the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), stood pledged; and after the trial was over, he had no doubt but that the Secretary of the Treasury, although a Catholic and a federalist, would be found to maintain his station in the first rank of American gentlemen and American patriots.

"Mr. B. took up the serious charges against the Secretary: that of being the mere instrument of the President in removing the deposits, and violating the constitution and laws of the land. How far he was this mere instrument, making up his mind, in three days, to do what others would not do at all, might be judged by every person who would refer to the opposition papers for the division in the cabinet about the removal of the deposits; and which constantly classed Mr. Taney, then the Attorney General, on the side of removal. This classification was correct, and notorious, and ought to exempt an honorable man, if any thing could exempt him, from the imputation of being a mere instrument in a great transaction of which he was a prime counsellor. The fact is, he had long since, in his character of legal adviser to the President, advised the removal of these deposits; and when suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to take the office which would make it his duty to act upon his own advice, he accepted it from the single sense of honor and duty; and that he might not seem to desert the President in flinching from the performance of what he had recommended. His personal honor was clean; his personal conduct magnanimous; his official deeds would abide the test of law and truth.

"Mr. B. said he would make short work of long accusations, and demolish, in three minutes, what had been concocting for three months, and delivering for three days in the Senate. He would call the attention of the Senate to certain clauses of law, and certain treasury instructions which had been left out of view, but which were decisive of the accusation against the Secretary.The first was the clause in the bank charter, which invested the Secretary with the power of transferring the public funds from place to place. It was the 15th section of the charter: he would read it. It enacted that whenever required by the Secretary of the Treasury, the bank should give the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds from place to place, within the United States, or territories thereof; and for distributing the same in payment of the public creditors, &c.

"Here is authority to the Secretary to transfer the public moneys from place to place, limited only by the bounds of the United States and its territories; and this clause of three lines of law puts to flight all the nonsense about the United States Bank being the treasury, and the Treasurer being the keeper of the public moneys, with which some politicians and newspaper writers have been worrying their brains for the last three months. In virtue of this clause, the Secretary of the Treasury gave certain transfer drafts to the amount of two millions and a quarter; and his legal right to give the draft was just as clear, under this clause of the bank charter, as his right to remove the deposits was under another clause of it. The transfer is made by draft; a payment out of the treasury is made upon a warrant; and the difference between a transfer draft and a treasury warrant was a thing necessary to be known by every man who aspired to the office of illuminating a nation, or of conducting a criminal prosecution, or even of understanding what he is talking about. They have no relation to each other. The warrant takes the money out of the treasury: the draft transfers it from point to point, for the purpose of making payment: and all this attack upon the Secretary of the Treasury is simply upon the blunder of mistaking the draft for the warrant.

"The senator from Kentucky calls upon the people to rise, and drive the Goths from the capital. Who are those Goths? They are General Jackson and the democratic party,—he just elected President over the senator himself, and the party just been made the majority in the House—all by the vote of the people. It is their act that has put these Goths in possession of the capital to the discomfiture of the senator and his friends; and he ought to be quite sure that he felt no resentment at an event so disastrous to his hopes, when he has indulged himself with so much license in vituperating those whom the country has put over him.

"The senator from Kentucky says the eyes and the hopes of the country are now turned upon Congress. Yes, Congress is his word, and I hold him to it. And what do they see? They see one House of Congress—the one to which the constitution gives the care of the purse, and the origination of impeachments, and which is fresh from the popular elections: they see that body with a majority of above fifty in favor of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, and approving the act which the senator condemns. They see that popular approbation in looking at one branch of Congress, and the one charged by the constitution with the inquisition into federal grievances. In the other branch they see a body far removed from the people, neglecting its proper duties, seizing upon those of another branch, converting itself into a grand inquest, and trying offences which itself prefers; and in a spirit which bespeaks a zeal quickened by the sting of personal mortification. He says the country feels itself deceived and betrayed—insulted and wronged—its liberties endangered—and the treasury robbed: the representatives of the people in the other House, say the reverse of all this—that the President has saved the country from the corrupt dominion of a great corrupting bank, by taking away from her the public money which she was using in bribing the press, subsidizing members, purchasing the venal, and installing herself in supreme political power.

"The senator wishes to know what we are to do? What is our duty to do? I answer, to keep ourselves within our constitutional duties—to leave this impeachment to the House of Representatives—leave it to the House to which it belongs, and to those who have no private griefs to avenge—and to judges, each of whom should retire from the bench, if he happened to feel in his heart the spirit of a prosecutor instead of a judge. The Senate now tries General Jackson; it is subject to trial itself—to be tried by the people, and to have its sentence reversed."

The corner-stone of Mr. Clay's whole argument was, that the Bank of the United States was the treasury of the United States. This was his fundamental position, and utterly unfounded, and shown to be so by the fourteenth article of what was called the constitution of the bank. It was the article which provided for the establishment of branches of the mother institution, and all of which except the branch at Washington city, were to be employed, or not employed, as the directors pleased, as depositories of the public money; and consequently were not made so by any law of Congress. The article said:

"The directors of said corporation shall establish a competent office of discount and deposit in the District of Columbia, whenever any law of the United States shall require such an establishment; also one such office of discount and deposit in any State in which two thousand shares shall have been subscribed, or may be held, whenever, upon application of the legislature of such State, Congress may, by law, require the same: Provided, The directors aforesaid shall not be bound to establish such office before the whole of the capital of the bank shallhave been paid up. And it shall be lawful for the directors of the said corporation to establish offices of discount and deposit wheresoever they shall think fit, within the United States or the territories thereof, to such persons, and under such regulations, as they shall deem proper, not being contrary to law, or the constitution of the bank. Or, instead of establishing such offices, it shall be lawful for the directors of the said corporation, from time to time, to employ any other bank or banks, to be first approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, at any place or places that they may deem safe and proper, to manage and transact the business proposed as aforesaid, other than for the purposes of discount, to be managed and transacted by such officers, under such agreements, and subject to such regulations, as they shall deem just and proper."Mr. B. went on to remark upon this article, that it placed the establishment of but one branch in the reach or power of Congress, and that one was in the District of Columbia—in a district of ten miles square—leaving the vast extent of twenty-four States, and three Territories, to obtain branches for themselves upon contingencies not dependent upon the will or power of Congress; or requiring her necessities, or even her convenience, to be taken into the account. A law of Congress could obtain a branch in this district; but with respect to every State, the establishment of the branch depended, first, upon the mere will and pleasure of the bank; and, secondly, upon the double contingency of a subscription, and a legislative act, within the State. If then, the mother bank does not think fit, for its own advantage, to establish a branch; or, if the people of a State do not acquire 2,000 shares of the stock of the bank, and the legislature, therefore, demand it, no branch will be established in any State, or any Territory of the Union. Congress can only require a branch, in any State, after two contingencies have happened in the State; neither of them having the slightest reference to the necessities, or even convenience, of the federal government."Here, then, said Mr. B., is the Treasury established for the United States! A Treasury which is to have an existence but at the will of the bank, or the will of a State legislature, and a few of its citizens, enough to own 2,000 shares of stock worth $100 a share! A Treasury which Congress has no hand in establishing, and cannot preserve after it is established; for the mother bank, after establishing her branches, may shut them up, or withdraw them. Such a thing has already happened. Branches in the West have been, some shut up, some withdrawn; and, in these cases, the Treasury was broken up, according to the new-fangled conception of a national Treasury. No! said Mr. B., the Federal bank is no more the Treasury of the United States than the State banks are. One is just as much the Treasury as the other; and made so by this very 14th fundamental article of the constitution of the bank. Look at it! Look at the alternative! Where branches are not established, the State banks are to be employed!"The Bank of the United States is to select the State bank; the Secretary of the Treasury is to approve the selection; and if he does so the State bank so selected, and so approved becomes the keeper of the public moneys; it becomes the depository of the public moneys; it transfers them; it pays them out; it does every thing except make discounts for the mother bank and issue notes; it does everything which the federal government wants done; and that is nothing but what a bank of deposit can do. The government makes no choice between State banks and branch banks. They are all one to her. They stand equal in her eyes; they stand equal in the charter of the bank itself; and the horror that has now broken out against the State banks is a thing of recent conception—a very modern impulsion; which is rebuked and condemned by the very authority to which it traces its source. Mr. B. said, the State banks were just as much made the federal treasury by the bank charter, as the United States Bank itself was: and that was sufficient to annihilate the argument which now sets up the federal bank for the federal treasury. But the fact was, that neither was made the Treasury; and it would be absurd to entertain such an idea for an instant; for the federal bank may surrender her charter, and cease to exist—it can do so at any moment it pleases—the State banks may expire upon their limitation; they may surrender; they may be dissolved in many ways, and so cease to exist; and then there would be no Treasury! What an idea, that the existence of the Treasury of this great republic is to depend, not upon itself, but upon corporations, which may cease to exist, on any day, by their own will, or their own crimes."

"The directors of said corporation shall establish a competent office of discount and deposit in the District of Columbia, whenever any law of the United States shall require such an establishment; also one such office of discount and deposit in any State in which two thousand shares shall have been subscribed, or may be held, whenever, upon application of the legislature of such State, Congress may, by law, require the same: Provided, The directors aforesaid shall not be bound to establish such office before the whole of the capital of the bank shallhave been paid up. And it shall be lawful for the directors of the said corporation to establish offices of discount and deposit wheresoever they shall think fit, within the United States or the territories thereof, to such persons, and under such regulations, as they shall deem proper, not being contrary to law, or the constitution of the bank. Or, instead of establishing such offices, it shall be lawful for the directors of the said corporation, from time to time, to employ any other bank or banks, to be first approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, at any place or places that they may deem safe and proper, to manage and transact the business proposed as aforesaid, other than for the purposes of discount, to be managed and transacted by such officers, under such agreements, and subject to such regulations, as they shall deem just and proper.

"Mr. B. went on to remark upon this article, that it placed the establishment of but one branch in the reach or power of Congress, and that one was in the District of Columbia—in a district of ten miles square—leaving the vast extent of twenty-four States, and three Territories, to obtain branches for themselves upon contingencies not dependent upon the will or power of Congress; or requiring her necessities, or even her convenience, to be taken into the account. A law of Congress could obtain a branch in this district; but with respect to every State, the establishment of the branch depended, first, upon the mere will and pleasure of the bank; and, secondly, upon the double contingency of a subscription, and a legislative act, within the State. If then, the mother bank does not think fit, for its own advantage, to establish a branch; or, if the people of a State do not acquire 2,000 shares of the stock of the bank, and the legislature, therefore, demand it, no branch will be established in any State, or any Territory of the Union. Congress can only require a branch, in any State, after two contingencies have happened in the State; neither of them having the slightest reference to the necessities, or even convenience, of the federal government.

"Here, then, said Mr. B., is the Treasury established for the United States! A Treasury which is to have an existence but at the will of the bank, or the will of a State legislature, and a few of its citizens, enough to own 2,000 shares of stock worth $100 a share! A Treasury which Congress has no hand in establishing, and cannot preserve after it is established; for the mother bank, after establishing her branches, may shut them up, or withdraw them. Such a thing has already happened. Branches in the West have been, some shut up, some withdrawn; and, in these cases, the Treasury was broken up, according to the new-fangled conception of a national Treasury. No! said Mr. B., the Federal bank is no more the Treasury of the United States than the State banks are. One is just as much the Treasury as the other; and made so by this very 14th fundamental article of the constitution of the bank. Look at it! Look at the alternative! Where branches are not established, the State banks are to be employed!

"The Bank of the United States is to select the State bank; the Secretary of the Treasury is to approve the selection; and if he does so the State bank so selected, and so approved becomes the keeper of the public moneys; it becomes the depository of the public moneys; it transfers them; it pays them out; it does every thing except make discounts for the mother bank and issue notes; it does everything which the federal government wants done; and that is nothing but what a bank of deposit can do. The government makes no choice between State banks and branch banks. They are all one to her. They stand equal in her eyes; they stand equal in the charter of the bank itself; and the horror that has now broken out against the State banks is a thing of recent conception—a very modern impulsion; which is rebuked and condemned by the very authority to which it traces its source. Mr. B. said, the State banks were just as much made the federal treasury by the bank charter, as the United States Bank itself was: and that was sufficient to annihilate the argument which now sets up the federal bank for the federal treasury. But the fact was, that neither was made the Treasury; and it would be absurd to entertain such an idea for an instant; for the federal bank may surrender her charter, and cease to exist—it can do so at any moment it pleases—the State banks may expire upon their limitation; they may surrender; they may be dissolved in many ways, and so cease to exist; and then there would be no Treasury! What an idea, that the existence of the Treasury of this great republic is to depend, not upon itself, but upon corporations, which may cease to exist, on any day, by their own will, or their own crimes."

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