The President's annual message at the commencement of the session 1843-'44, contained an elaborated paragraph on the subject of Texas and Mexico, which, to those not in the secret, was a complete mystification: to others, and especially to those who had been observant of signs, it foreshadowed a design to interfere in the war between those parties, and to take Texas under the protection of the Union, and to make her cause our own. A scheme of annexation was visible in the studied picture presented of homogeniality between that country and theUnited States, geographically and otherwise; and which homogeniality was now sufficient to risk a war with Great Britain and Mexico (for the message squinted at war with both), to get Texas back, although it had not been sufficient when the country was ceded to Spain to prevent Mr. Tyler from sanctioning the cession—as he did as a member of the House in 1820 in voting against Mr. Clay's resolution, disapproving and condemning that cession. This enigmatical paragraph was, in fact, intended to break the way for the production of a treaty of annexation, covertly conceived and carried on with all the features of an intrigue, and in flagrant violation of the principles and usages of the government. Acquisitions of territory had previously been made by legislation, and by treaty, as in the case of Louisiana in 1803, and of Florida in 1819; but these treaties were founded upon legislative acts—upon the consent of Congress previously obtained—and in which the treaty-making power was but the instrument of the legislative will. This previous consent and authorization of Congress had not been obtained—on the contrary, had been eschewed and ignored by the secrecy with which the negotiation had been conducted; and was intended to be kept secret until the treaty was concluded, and then to force its adoption for the purpose of increasing the area of slave territory, or to make its rejection a cause for the secession of the Southern States; and in either event, and in all cases, to make the question of annexation a controlling one in the nomination of presidential candidates, and also in the election itself.
The complication of this vast scheme, leading to a consummation so direful as foreign war and domestic disunion, and having its root in personal ambition, and in scrip and land speculation, and spoliation claims—the way it was carried on, and the way it was defeated—altogether present one of the most instructive lessons which the working of our government exhibits; and the more so as the two prominent actors in the scheme had reversed their positions since Texas had been retroceded to Spain. Mr. Calhoun was then in favor of curtailing the area of slave territory, and as a member of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, counselled the establishment of the Missouri compromise line, which abolished slavery in all the upper half of the great province of Louisiana; and, as a member of the same cabinet, counselled the retrocession of Texas to Spain, which extinguished all the slave territory south of the compromise line. Mr. Calhoun was then against slavery extension, and so much in favor of extinguishing slave territory as to be a favorite in the free States, and beat Mr. Adams himself in those States in the presidential election of 1824—receiving more of their votes for Vice-President than Mr. Adams did for President. After the failure in 1833 to unite the slave States against the free ones on the Tariff agitation, he took up the slavery agitation—pursuing it during his life, and leaving it at his death as a legacy to the disciples in his political school. Mr. Tyler was a follower in these amputations and extinction of slave territory in 1819-'20: he was now a follower in the slavery agitation to get back the province which was then given away, or to make it the means of a presidential election, or of Southern dismemberment. This scheme had been going on for two years before it appeared above the political horizon; and the right understanding of the Texas annexation movement in 1844, requires the hidden scheme to be uncovered from its source, and laid open through its long and crooked course: which will be the subject of the next chapter, as shown at the time in a speech from Senator Benton.
Mr. Benton.The President, upon our call, sends us a map and a memoir from the Topographical bureau to show the Senate the boundaries of the country he proposes to annex. This memoir is explicit in presenting the Rio Grande del Norte in its whole extent as a boundary of the republic of Texas, and that in conformity to the law of the Texian Congress establishing its boundaries. The boundaries on the map conform to those in the memoir: each takes for the western limit the Rio Grande from head to mouth; and a law of the Texian Congress is copied into the margin of the map, to show the legal, and the actual, boundaries at the sametime. From all this it results that the treaty before us, besides the incorporation of Texas proper, also incorporates into our Union the left bank of the Rio Grande, in its whole extent from its head spring in theSierra Verde(Green Mountain), near the South Pass in the Rocky Mountains, to its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico, four degrees south of New Orleans, in latitude 26°. It is a "grand and solitary river," almost without affluents or tributaries. Its source is in the region of eternal snow; its outlet in the clime of eternal flowers. Its direct course is 1,200 miles; its actual run about 2,000. This immense river, second on our continent to the Mississippi only, and but little inferior to it in length, is proposed to be added in the whole extent of its left bank to the American Union! and that by virtue of a treaty for there-annexation of Texas! Now, the real Texas which we acquired by the treaty of 1803, and flung away by the treaty of 1819, never approached the Rio Grande except near its mouth! while the whole upper part was settled by the Spaniards, and great part of it in the year 1694—just one hundred years before La Salle first saw Texas!—all this upper part was then formed into provinces, on both sides of the river, and has remained under Spanish, or Mexican authority ever since. These former provinces of the Mexican viceroyalty, now departments of the Mexican republic, lying on both sides of the Rio Grande from its head to its mouth, we now propose to incorporate, so far as they lie on the left bank of the river, into our Union, by virtue of a treaty ofre-annexation with Texas. Let us pause and look at our new and important proposed acquisitions in this quarter. First: there is the department, formerly the province of New Mexico, lying on both sides of the river from its head spring to near the Paso del Norte—that is to say, half down the river. This department is studded with towns and villages—is populated—well cultivated—and covered with flocks and herds. On its left bank (for I only speak of the part which we propose tore-annex) is, first, the frontier village Taos, 3,000 souls, and where the custom-house is kept at which the Missouri caravans enter their goods. Then comes Santa Fé, the capital, 4,000 souls—then Albuquerque, 6,000 souls—then some scores of other towns and villages—all more or less populated, and surrounded by flocks and fields. Then come the departments of Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas, without settlements on the left bank of the river, but occupying the right bank, and commanding the left. All this—being parts of four Mexican departments—now under Mexican governors and governments—is permanently reannexed to this Union, if this treaty is ratified; and is actually reannexed from the moment of the signature of the treaty, according to the President's last message, to remain so until the acquisition is rejected by rejecting the treaty! The one-half of the department of New Mexico, with its capital, becomes a territory of the United States: an angle of Chihuahua, at the Paso del Norte, famous for its wine, also becomes ours: a part of the department of Coahuila, not populated on the left bank, which we take, but commanded from the right bank by Mexican authorities: the same of Tamaulipas, the ancient Nuevo San Tander (New St. Andrew), and which covers both sides of the river from its mouth for some hundred miles up, and all the left bank of which is in the power and possession of Mexico. These, in addition to the old Texas; these parts of four States—these towns and villages—these people and territory—these flocks and herds—thissliceof the republic of Mexico, two thousand miles long, and some hundred broad—all this our President has cut off from its mother empire, and presents to us, and declares it is ours till the Senate rejects it! He calls it Texas! and the cutting off he callsre-annexation! Humboldt calls it New Mexico, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Nuevo San Tander (now Tamaulipas); and the civilized world may qualify thisre-annexation by the application of some odious and terrible epithet. Demosthenes advised the people of Athens not to take, but tore-take a certain city; and in thatrelaid the virtue which saved the act from the character of spoliation and robbery. Will it be equally potent with us? and will there, prefixed to the annexation, legitimate the seizure of two thousand miles of a neighbor's dominion, with whom we have treaties of peace, and friendship, and commerce? Will it legitimate this seizure, made by virtue of a treaty with Texas, when no Texian force—witness the disastrous expeditions to Mier and to Santa Fé—have been seen near it without being killedor taken, to the last man?
The treaty, in all that relates to the boundary of the Rio Grande, is an act of unparalleled outrage on Mexico. It is the seizure of two thousand miles of her territory without a word of explanation with her, and by virtue of a treaty with Texas, to which she is no party. Our Secretary of State (Mr. Calhoun) in his letter to the United States chargé in Mexico, and seven days after the treaty was signed, and after the Mexican minister had withdrawn from our seat of government, shows full well that he was conscious of the enormity of this outrage; knew it was war; and proffered volunteer apologies to avert the consequences which he knew he had provoked.
The President, in his special message of Wednesday last, informs us that we have acquired a title to the ceded territories by his signature to the treaty, wanting only the action of the Senate to perfect it; and that, in the mean time, he will protect it from invasion, and for that purpose has detached all the disposable portions of the army and navy to the scene of action. This is a caper about equal to the mad freaks with which the unfortunate emperor Paul, of Russia, was accustomed to astonish Europe about forty years ago. By this declaration the thirty thousand Mexicans in the left half of the valley of the Rio del Norte are our citizens, and standing, in the language of the President's message, in a hostile attitude towards us, and subject to be repelled as invaders. Taos, the seat of the custom-house, where our caravans enter their goods, is ours: Santa Fé, the capital of New Mexico, is ours: Governor Armijo is our governor, and subject to be tried for treason if he does not submit to us: twenty Mexican towns and villages are ours; and their peaceful inhabitants, cultivating their fields and tending their flocks, are suddenly converted, by a stroke of the President's pen, into American citizens, or American rebels. This is too bad: and, instead of making themselves party to its enormities, as the President invites them to do, I think rather that it is the duty of the Senate to wash its hands of all this part of the transaction by a special disapprobation. The Senate is the constitutional adviser of the President, and has the right, if not the duty, to give him advice when the occasion requires it. I therefore propose, as an additional resolution, appliable to the Rio del Norte boundary only—the one which I will read and send to the Secretary's table—stamping as a spoliation this seizure of Mexican territory—and on which, at the proper time, I shall ask the vote of the Senate.
I now proceed a step further, and rise a step higher, Mr. President, in unveiling the designs and developing the conduct of our administration in this hot and secret pursuit after Texas. It is my business now to show that war with Mexico is a design and an object with it from the beginning, and that the treaty-making power was to be used for that purpose. I know the responsibility of a senator—I mean his responsibility to the moral sense of his country and the world—in attributing so grave a culpability to this administration. I know the whole extent of this responsibility, and shall therefore be careful to proceed upon safe and solid ground. I shall say nothing but upon proof—upon the proof furnished by the President himself—and ask for my opinions no credence beyond the strict letter of these proofs. For this purpose I have recourse to the messages and correspondence which the President has sent us, and begin with the message of the 22d of April—the one which communicated the treaty to the Senate. That message, after a strange and ominous declaration that no sinister means have been used—no intrigue set on foot—to procure the consent of Texas to the annexation, goes on to show exactly the contrary, and to betray the President's design to protect Texas by receiving her into our Union and adopting her war with Mexico.
I proceed to another piece of evidence to the same effect—namely, the letter of the present Secretary of State to Mr. Benjamin Green, our chargé at Mexico, under date of the 19th of April past. The letter has been already referred to, and will be only read now in the sentence which declares that the treaty has been made in the full view of war! for that alone can be the meaning of this sentence:
"It has taken the step (to wit, the step of making the treaty) in full view of all possible consequences, but not without a desire and a hope that a full and fair disclosure of the causes which induced it to do so, would prevent the disturbance of the harmony subsisting between the two countries, which the United States is anxious to preserve."
"It has taken the step (to wit, the step of making the treaty) in full view of all possible consequences, but not without a desire and a hope that a full and fair disclosure of the causes which induced it to do so, would prevent the disturbance of the harmony subsisting between the two countries, which the United States is anxious to preserve."
This is part of the despatch which communicates to Mexico the fact of the conclusion of the treaty of annexation—that treaty, the conclusion of which the formal and reiterated declarations of the Mexican government informed our administration, during its negotiation, would be war. I will quote one of these declarations, the last one made by General Almonte, the Mexican minister, and in reply to the letter of our Secretary who considered the previous declarations asthreats. General Almonte disclaims the idea of athreat—repeats his asseveration that it is anoticeonly, and that in a case in which it was the right and the duty of Mexico to give thenoticewhich would apprise us of the consequences of carrying the treaty of annexation to a conclusion.
After receiving this notification from the Mexican minister, the letter of our present Secretary, of the 19th instant, just quoted, directing our chargé to inform the Mexican government of the conclusion of the treaty of annexation, must be considered as an official notification to Mexico that the war has begun! and so indeed it has! and as much to our astonishment as to that of the Mexicans! Who among us can ever forget the sensations produced in this chamber, on Wednesday last, when the marching and the sailing orders were read! and still more, when the message was read which had set the army and navy in motion!
These orders and the message, after having been read in this chamber, were sent to the printer, and have not yet returned: I can only refer to them as I heard them read, and from a brief extract which I took of the message; and must refer to others to do them justice. From all that I could hear, the war is begun; and begun by orders issued by the President before the treaty was communicated to the Senate! We are informed of a squadron, and an army of "observation," sent to the Mexican ports, and Mexican frontier, with orders to watch, remonstrate, and report; and to communicate with President Houston! Now, what is an army ofobservation, but an army in the field for war? It is an army whose name is known, and whose character is defined, and which is incident to war alone. It is to watch theENEMY! and can never be made to watch aFRIEND! Friends cannot be watched by armed men, either individually or nationally, without open enmity. Let an armed man take a position before your door, show himself to your family, watch your movements, and remonstrate with you, and report upon you, if he judged your movements equivocal: let him do this, and what is it but an act of hostility and of outrage which every feeling of the heart, and every law of God and man, require you to resent and repulse? This would be the case with the mere individual; still more with nations, and when squadrons and armies are the watchers and remonstrants. Let Great Britain send an army and navyto lie in waitupon our frontiers, and before our cities, and then see what a cry of war would be raised in our country. The same of Mexico. She must feel herself outraged and attacked; she must feel our treaties broken; all our citizens within her dominions alien enemies; their commerce to be instantly ruined, and themselves expelled from the country. This must be our condition, unless the Senate (or Congress) saves the country. We are at war with Mexico now; and the message which covers the marching and sailing orders is still more extraordinary than they. The message assumes the republic of Texas to be part of the American Union by the mere signature of the treaty, and to remain so until the treaty is rejected, if rejected at all; and, in the mean time, the President is to use the army and the navy to protect the acquired country from invasion, like any part of the existing Union, and to treat as hostile all adverse possessors or intruders. According to this, besides what may happen at Vera Cruz, Tampico, Matamoros, and other ports, and besides what may happen on the frontiers of Texas proper, the Mexican population in New Mexico, and Governor Armijo, or in his absence the governorad interim, Don Mariano Chaves, may find themselves pursued as rebels and traitors to the United States.
The war with Mexico, and its unconstitutionality, is fully shown: its injustice remains to be exhibited, and that is an easy task. What is done in violation of treaties, in violation of neutrality, in violation of an armistice, must be unjust. All this occurs in this case, and a great deal more. Mexico is our neighbor. We are at peace with her. Social, commercial, and diplomatic relations subsist between us, and the interest of the two nations requires these relations to continue. We want a country which was once ours, but which, by treaty, we haveacknowledged to be hers. That country has revolted. Thus far it has made good its revolt, and not a doubt rests upon my mind that she will make it good for ever. But the contest is not over. An armistice, duly proclaimed, and not revoked, strictly observed by each in not firing a gun, though inoperative thus far in the appointment of commissioners to treat for peace: this armistice, only determinable upon notice, suspends the war. Two thousand miles of Texian frontier is held in the hands of Mexico, and all attempts to conquer that frontier have signally failed: witness the disastrous expeditions to Mier and to Santa Fé. We acknowledge the right—the moral and political right—of Mexico to resubjugate this province, if she can. We declare our neutrality: we profess friendship: we proclaim our respect for Mexico. In the midst of all this, we make a treaty with Texas for transferring herself to the United States, and that without saying a word to Mexico, while receiving notice from her that such transfer would be war. Mexico is treated as a nullity; and the province she is endeavoring to reconquer is suddenly, by the magic of a treaty signature, changed into United States domain. We want the country; but instead of applying to Mexico, and obtaining her consent to the purchase, or waiting a few months for the events which would supersede the necessity of Mexican consent—instead of this plain and direct course, a secret negotiation was entered into with Texas, in total contempt of the acknowledged rights of Mexico, and without saying a word to her until all was over. Then a messenger is despatched in furious haste to this same Mexico, the bearer of volunteer apologies, of deprecatory excuses, and of an offer of ten millions of dollars for Mexican acquiescence in what Texas has done. Forty days are allowed for the return of the messenger; and the question is, will he bring back the consent? That question is answered in the Mexican official notice of war, if the treaty of annexation was made! and it is answered in the fact of not applying to her for her consent before the treaty was made. The wrong to Mexico is confessed in the fact of sending this messenger, and in the terms of the letter of which he was the bearer. That letter of Mr. Secretary Calhoun, of the 19th of April, to Mr. Benjamin Green, the United States chargé in Mexico, is the most unfortunate in the annals of human diplomacy! By the fairest implications, it admits insult and injury to Mexico, and violation of her territorial boundaries! it admits that we should have had her previous consent—should have had her concurrence—that we have injured her as little as possible—and that we did all this in full view of all possible consequences! that is to say, in full view of war! in plain English, that we have wronged her, and will fight her for it. As an excuse for all this, the imaginary designs of a third power, which designs are four times solemnly disavowed, are brought forward as a justification of our conduct; and an incomprehensible terror of immediate destruction is alleged as the cause of not applying to her for her "previous consent" during the eight months that the negotiation continued, and during the whole of which time we had a minister in Mexico, and Mexico had a minister in Washington. This letter is surely the most unfortunate in the history of human diplomacy. It admits the wrong, and tenders war. It is a confession throughout, by the fairest implication, of injustice to Mexico. It is a confession that her "concurrence" and "her previous consent" were necessary.
It is now my purpose, Mr. President, to show that all this movement, which is involving such great and serious consequences, and drawing upon us the eyes of the civilized world, is bottomed upon a weak and groundless pretext, discreditable to our government, and insulting and injurious to Great Britain. We want Texas—that is to say, the Texas of La Salle; and we want it for great national reasons, obvious as day, and permanent as nature. We want it because it is geographically appurtenant to our division of North America, essential to our political, commercial, and social system, and because it would be detrimental and injurious to us to have it fall into the hands or to sink under the domination of any foreign power. For these reasons, I was against sacrificing the country when it was thrown away—and thrown away by those who are now so suddenly possessed of a fury to get it back. For these reasons, I am for getting it back whenever it can be done with peace and honor, or even at the price of just war against any intrusive European power: but I am against all disguise and artifice—against all pretexts—and especiallyagainst weak and groundless pretexts, discreditable to ourselves, offensive to others, too thin and shallow not to be seen through by every beholder, and merely invented to cover unworthy purposes. I am against the inventions which have been brought forward to justify the secret concoction of this treaty, and its sudden explosion upon us, like a ripened plot, and a charged bomb, forty days before the conventional nomination of a presidential candidate. In looking into this pretext, I shall be governed by the evidence alone which I find upon the face of the papers, regretting that the resolution which I have laid upon the table for the examination of persons at the bar of the Senate, has not yet been adopted. That resolution is in these words:
"Resolved, That theAUTHORof the 'private letter' from London, in the summer of 1843 (believed to be Mr. Duff Green), addressed to the American Secretary of State (Mr. Upshur), and giving him the first intelligence of the (imputed) British anti-slavery designs upon Texas, and the contents of which 'private letter' were made the basis of the Secretary's leading despatch of the 8th of August following, to our chargé in Texas, for procuring the annexation of Texas to the United States, beSUMMONEDto appear at the bar of the Senate, to answer on oath to all questions in relation to the contents of said 'private letter,' and of any others in relation to the same subject: and also to answer all questions, so far as he shall be able, in relation to the origin and objects of the treaty for the annexation of Texas, and of all the designs, influences, and interests which led to the formation thereof."Resolved, also, That the Senate will examine at its bar, or through a committee, such other persons as shall be deemed proper in relation to their knowledge of any, or all, of the foregoing points of inquiry."
"Resolved, That theAUTHORof the 'private letter' from London, in the summer of 1843 (believed to be Mr. Duff Green), addressed to the American Secretary of State (Mr. Upshur), and giving him the first intelligence of the (imputed) British anti-slavery designs upon Texas, and the contents of which 'private letter' were made the basis of the Secretary's leading despatch of the 8th of August following, to our chargé in Texas, for procuring the annexation of Texas to the United States, beSUMMONEDto appear at the bar of the Senate, to answer on oath to all questions in relation to the contents of said 'private letter,' and of any others in relation to the same subject: and also to answer all questions, so far as he shall be able, in relation to the origin and objects of the treaty for the annexation of Texas, and of all the designs, influences, and interests which led to the formation thereof.
"Resolved, also, That the Senate will examine at its bar, or through a committee, such other persons as shall be deemed proper in relation to their knowledge of any, or all, of the foregoing points of inquiry."
I hope, Mr. President, this resolution will be adopted. It is due to the gravity of the occasion that we should have facts and good evidence before us. We are engaged in a transaction which concerns the peace and the honor of the country; and extracts from private letters, and letters themselves, with or without name, and, it may be, from mistaken or interested persons, are not the evidence on which we should proceed. Dr. Franklin was examined at the bar of the British House of Commons before the American war, and I see no reason why those who wish to inform the Senate, and others from whom the Senate could obtain information, should not be examined at our bar, or at that of the House, before the Senate or Congress engages in the Mexican war. It would be a curious incident in the Texas drama if it should turn out to be a fact that the whole annexation scheme was organized before the reason for it was discovered in London! and if, from the beginning, the abolition plot was to be burst upon us, under a sudden and overwhelming sense of national destruction, exactly forty days before the national convention at Baltimore! I know nothing about these secrets; but, being called upon to act, and to give a vote which may be big with momentous consequences, I have a right to know the truth; and shall continue to ask for it, until fully obtained, or finally denied. I know not what the proof will be, if the examination is had. I pretend to no private knowledge; but I have my impressions; and if they are erroneous, let them be effaced—if correct, let them be confirmed.
In the absence of the evidence which this responsible and satisfactory examination might furnish, I limit myself to the information which appears upon the face of the papers—imperfect, defective, disjointed, and fixed up for the occasion, as those papers evidently are. And here I must remark upon the absence of all the customary information which sheds light upon the origin, progress, and conclusion of treaties. No minutes of conferences—no protocols—no propositions, or counter-propositions—no inside view of the nascent and progressive negotiation. To supply all this omission, the Senate is driven to the tedious process of calling on the President, day by day, for some new piece of information; and the endless necessity for these calls—the manner in which they are answered—and the often delay in getting any answer at all—become new reasons for the adoption of my resolution, and for the examination of persons at the bar of the Senate.
The first piece of testimony I shall use in making good the position I have assumed, is the letter of Mr. Upshur, our Secretary of State, to Mr. Murphy, our chargé in Texas dated the 8th day of August, in the year 1843. It is the first one, so far as we are permitted to see, that begins the business of the Texas annexation; and has all the appearance of beginning it in the middle, so far as the United States are concerned, and upon grounds previously well considered: for this letter of the 8th of August,1843, contains every reason on which the whole annexation movement has been defended, or justified. And, here, I must repeat what I have already said: in quoting these letters of the secretaries, I use the name of the writer to discriminate the writer, but not to impute it to him. The President is the author: the secretary only his head clerk, writing by his command, and having no authority to write any thing but as he commands. This important letter, the basis of all Texian "immediate" annexation, opens thus:
"Sir: A private letter from a citizen of Maryland, then in London, contains the following passage:"'I learn from a source entitled to the fullest confidence, that there is now here a Mr. Andrews, deputed by the abolitionists of Texas to negotiate with the British government. That he has seen Lord Aberdeen, and submitted his project for the abolition of slavery in Texas, which is, that there shall be organized a company in England, who shall advance a sum sufficient to pay for the slaves now in Texas, and receive in payment Texas lands; that the sum thus advanced shall be paid over as an indemnity for the abolition of slavery; and I am authorized by the Texian minister to say to you, that Lord Aberdeen has agreed that the British government will guarantee the payment of the interest on this loan, upon condition that the Texian government will abolish slavery.'"The writer professes to feel entire confidence in the accuracy of this information. He is a man of great intelligence, and well versed in public affairs. Hence I have every reason to confide in the correctness of his conclusions."
"Sir: A private letter from a citizen of Maryland, then in London, contains the following passage:
"'I learn from a source entitled to the fullest confidence, that there is now here a Mr. Andrews, deputed by the abolitionists of Texas to negotiate with the British government. That he has seen Lord Aberdeen, and submitted his project for the abolition of slavery in Texas, which is, that there shall be organized a company in England, who shall advance a sum sufficient to pay for the slaves now in Texas, and receive in payment Texas lands; that the sum thus advanced shall be paid over as an indemnity for the abolition of slavery; and I am authorized by the Texian minister to say to you, that Lord Aberdeen has agreed that the British government will guarantee the payment of the interest on this loan, upon condition that the Texian government will abolish slavery.'
"The writer professes to feel entire confidence in the accuracy of this information. He is a man of great intelligence, and well versed in public affairs. Hence I have every reason to confide in the correctness of his conclusions."
The name of the writer is not given, but he is believed to be Mr. Duff Green—a name which suggests a vicarious relation to our Secretary of State—which is a synonym for intrigue—and a voucher for finding in London whatever he was sent to bring back—who is the putative recipient of the Gilmer letter to a friend in Maryland, destined for General Jackson—and whose complicity with this Texas plot is a fixed fact. Truly this "inhabitant of Maryland," who lived in Washington, and whose existence was as ubiquitous as hisrôlewas vicarious, was a very indispensable agent in all this Texas plot.
The letter then goes on, through a dozen elaborate paragraphs, to give every reason for the annexation of Texas, founded on the apprehension of British views there and the consequent danger to the slave property of the South, and other injuries to the United States, which have been so incontinently reproduced, and so tenaciously adhered to ever since.
Thus commenced the plan for the immediate annexation of Texas to the United States, as the only means of saving that country from British domination, and from the anti-slavery schemes attributed to her by Mr. Duff Green. Unfortunately, it was not deemed necessary to inquire into the truth of this gentleman's information; and it was not until four months afterwards, and until after the most extraordinary efforts to secure annexation had been made by our government, that it was discovered that the information given by Mr. Green was entirely mistaken and unfounded! The British minister (the Earl of Aberdeen) and the Texian chargé in London (Mr. Ashbel Smith), both of whom were referred to by Mr. Green, being informed in the month of November of the use which had been made of their names, availed themselves of the first opportunity to contradict the whole story to our minister, Mr. Everett. This minister immediately communicated these important contradictions to his own government, and we find them in the official correspondence transmitted to us by Mr. Everett, under dates of the 3d and 16th of November, 1843. I quote first from that of the 3d of November:
(Here was read Mr. Everett's account of his first conversation with the Earl of Aberdeen on this subject.)
I quote copiously, and with pleasure, Mr. President, from this report of Lord Aberdeen's conversation with Mr. Everett; it is frank and friendly, equally honorable to the minister as a man and a statesman, and worthy of the noble spirit of the great William Pitt. Nothing could dissipate more completely, and extinguish more utterly, the insidious designs imputed to Great Britain; nothing could be more satisfactory and complete; nothing more was wanting to acquit the British government of all the alarming designs imputed to her. It was enough; but the Earl of Aberdeen, in the fulness of his desire to leave the American government no ground for suspicion or complaint on this head, voluntarily returned to the topic a few days afterwards; and, on the 6th of November, again disclaims in the strongest terms the offensive designs imputed to his government. Mr. Everett thus relates, in his letter of the 16th of November, the substance of these renewed declarations:
(Here the letter giving an account of the second interview was read.)
Thus, twice, in three days, the British minister fully, formally, and in the broadest manner contradicted the whole story upon the faith of which our President had commenced (so far as the papers show the commencement of it) his immediate annexation project, as the only means of counteracting the dangerous designs of Great Britain! But this was not all. There was another witness in London who had been referred to by Mr. Duff Green; and it remained for this witness to confirm or contradict his story. This was the Texian chargé (Mr. Ashbel Smith): and the same letter from Mr. Everett, of the 16th of November, brought his contradiction in unequivocal terms. Mr. Everett thus recites it:
(The passage was read.)
Such was the statement of Mr. Ashbel Smith! and the story of Mr. Duff Green, which had been made the basis of the whole scheme forimmediateannexation, being now contradicted by two witnesses—the two which he himself had named—it might have been expected that some halt or pause would have taken place, to give an opportunity for consideration and reflection, and for consulting the American people, and endeavoring to procure the consent of Mexico. This might have been expected: but not so the fact. On the contrary, theimmediateannexation was pressed more warmly than ever, and the administration papers became more clamorous and incessant in their accusations of Great Britain. Seeing this, and being anxious (to use his own words) to put a stop to these misrepresentations, and to correct the errors of the American government, the Earl of Aberdeen, in a formal despatch to Mr. Pakenham, the new British minister at Washington, took the trouble of a third contradiction, and a most formal and impressive one, to all the evil designs in relation to Texas, and, through Texas, upon the United States, which were thus perseveringly attributed to his government. This paper, destined to become a great landmark in this controversy, from the frankness and fulness of its disavowals, and from the manner in which detached phrases, picked out of it, have been used by our Secretary of State [Mr.Calhoun] since the treaty was signed, to justify its signature, deserves to be read in full, and to be made a corner-stone in the debate on this subject. I therefore, quote it in full, and shall read it at length in the body of my speech. This is it:
(The whole letter read.)
This was intended to stop the misrepresentations which were circulated, and to correct the errors of the government in relation to Great Britain and Texas. It was a reiteration, and that for the third time, and voluntarily, of denial of all the alarming designs attributed to Great Britain, and by means of which a Texas agitation was getting up in the United States. Besides the full declaration made to our federal government, as head of the Union, a special assurance was given to the slaveholding States, to quiet their apprehensions, the truth and sufficiency of which must be admitted by every person who cannot furnish proof to the contrary. I read this special assurance a second time, that its importance may be more distinctly and deeply felt by every senator:
"And the governments of the slaveholding States may be assured, that, although we shall not desist from those open and honest efforts which we have constantly made for procuring the abolition of slavery throughout the world, we shall neither openly nor secretly resort to any measures which can tend to disturb their internal tranquillity, or thereby to affect the prosperity of the American Union."
"And the governments of the slaveholding States may be assured, that, although we shall not desist from those open and honest efforts which we have constantly made for procuring the abolition of slavery throughout the world, we shall neither openly nor secretly resort to any measures which can tend to disturb their internal tranquillity, or thereby to affect the prosperity of the American Union."
It was on the 26th day of February that this noble despatch was communicated to the (then) American Secretary of State. That gentleman lost his life by an awful catastrophe on the 28th, and it seems to be understood, and admitted all around, that the treaty of annexation was agreed upon, and virtually concluded before his death. Nothing, then, in Lord Aberdeen's declaration, could have had any effect upon its formation or conclusion. Yet, six days after the actual signature of the treaty by the present Secretary of State—namely, on the 18th day of April—this identical despatch of Lord Aberdeen is seized upon, in a letter to Mr. Pakenham, to justify the formation of the treaty, and to prove the necessity for theimmediateannexation of Texas to the United States, as a measure of self-defence, and as the only means of saving our Union! Listen to the two or three first paragraphs of that letter: it is the long one filled with those negro statistics of which Mr. Pakenham declines the controversy. The secretary says:
(Here the paragraphs were read, and the Senate heard with as much amazement as Mr. Pakenham could have done, that comparative statement of the lame, blind, halt, idiotic, pauper and jail tenants of the free and the slave blacks, which the letter to the British minister contained, with a view to prove that slavery was their best condition.)
It is evident, Mr. President, that the treaty was commenced, carried on, formed, and agreed upon, so far as the documents show its origin, in virtue of the information given in the private letter of Mr. Duff Green, contradicted as that was by the Texian and British ministers, to whom it referred. It is evident from all the papers that this was the case. The attempt to find in Lord Aberdeen's letter a subsequent pretext for what had previously been done, is evidently an afterthought, put to paper, for the first time, just six days after the treaty had been signed! The treaty was signed on the 12th of April: the afterthought was committed to paper, in the form of a letter to Mr. Pakenham, on the 18th! and on the 19th the treaty was sent to the Senate! having been delayed seven days to admit of drawing up, and sending in along with it, thisex post factodiscovery of reasons to justify it. The letter of Mr. Calhoun was sent in with the treaty: the reply of Mr. Pakenham to it, though brief and prompt, being written on the same day (the 19th of April), was not received by the Senate until ten days thereafter—to wit: on the 29th of April; and when received, it turns out to be a fourth disavowal, in the most clear and unequivocal terms, of this new discovery of the old designs imputed to Great Britain, and which had been three times disavowed before. Here is the letter of Mr. Pakenham, giving this fourth contradiction to the old story, and appealing to the judgment of the civilized world for its opinion on the whole transaction. I read an extract from this letter; the last one, it is presumed, that Mr. Pakenham can write till he hears from his government, to which he had immediately transmitted Mr. Calhoun'sex post factoletter of the 18th.
(It was read.)
Now what will the civilized world, to whose good opinion we must all look: what will Christendom, now so averse to war, and pretexted war: what will the laws of reason and honor, so just in their application to the conduct of nations and individuals: what will this civilized world, this Christian world, these just laws—what will they all say that our government ought to have done, under this accumulation of peremptory denials of all the causes which we had undertaken to find in the conduct of Great Britain for our "immediate" annexation of Texas, and war with Mexico? Surely these tribunals will say:First, That the disavowals should have been received as sufficient;or Secondly, They should be disproved, if not admitted to be true;or Thirdly, That reasonable time should be allowed for looking further into their truth.
One of these things should have been done: our President does neither. He concludes the treaty—retains it a week—sends it to the Senate—and his Secretary of State obtains a promise from the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr.Archer] to delay all action upon it—not to take it up for forty days—the exact time that would cover the sitting of the Baltimore democratic convention for the nomination of presidential candidates! This promise was obtained under the assurance that a special messenger had been despatched to Mexico for her consent to the treaty; and the forty days was the time claimed for the execution of his errand, and at the end of which he was expected to return with the required consent. Bad luck again! This despatch of the messenger, and delay for his return, and thereasonshe was understood to be able to have offered for the consent of Mexico, were felt by all as an admission that the consent of Mexico must be obtained, cost what millions it might. This admission was fatal! and it became necessary to take another tack, and do it away! This was attempted in a subsequent message of the President, admitting, to be sure, that the messenger was sent, and sent to operate upon Mexico in relation to the treaty; but taking a fine distinction between obtaining her consent to it, and preventing her from being angry at it! This message will receive justice at the hands of others; I only heard it as read, and cannot quote it in its own words. But the substance of it was, that the messenger was sent to prevent Mexico from going to war with us on account of the treaty! as if there was any difference between getting her to consent to the treaty, and getting her not to dissent! But, here again, more bad luck. Besides the declarations of the chairman of Foreign Relations, showing what this messenger was sent for, there is a copy ofthe letter furnished to us of which he was the bearer, and which shows that the "concurrence" of Mexico was wanted, and that apologies are offered for not obtaining her "previous consent." But, of this hereafter. I go on with the current of events. The treaty was sent in, and forty days' silence upon it was demanded of the Senate. Now why send it in, if the Senate was not to touch it for forty days? Why not retain it in the Department of State until the lapse of these forty days, when the answer from Mexico would have been received, and a fifth disavowal arrived from Great Britain! if, indeed, it is possible for her to reiterate a disavowal already four times made, and not received? Why not retain the treaty during these forty days of required silence upon it in the Senate, and when that precious time might have been turned to such valuable account in interchanging friendly explanations with Great Britain and Mexico? Why not keep the treaty in the Secretary of State's office, as well as in the Secretary of the Senate's office, during these forty days? Precisely because the Baltimore convention was to sit in thirty-eight days from that time! and forty days would give time for the "Texas bomb" to burst and scatter its fragments all over the Union, blowing up candidates for the presidency, blowing up thetongue-tiedSenate itself for not ratifying the treaty, and furnishing a new Texas candidate, anointed with gunpowder, for the presidential chair. This was the reason, and as obvious as if written at the head of every public document. In the mean time, all these movements give fresh reason for an examination of persons at the bar of the Senate. The determination of the President to conclude the treaty, before the Earl of Aberdeen's despatch was known to him—that is to say, before the 26th of February, 1844: the true nature of the messenger's errand to Mexico, and many other points, now involved in obscurity, may be cleared up in these examinations, to the benefit and well being of the Union. Perhaps it may chance to turn out in proof, that the secretary, who found his reasons for making the treaty and hastening the immediate annexation, had determined upon all that long before he heard of Lord Aberdeen's letter.
But to go on. Instead of admitting, disproving, or taking time to consider the reiterated disavowals of the British government, the messenger to Mexico is charged with our manifesto of war against that government, on account of the imputed designs of Great Britain, and in which they are all assumed to be true! and not only true, but fraught with such sudden, irresistible, and irretrievable ruin to the United States, that there was no time for an instant of delay, nor any way to save the Union from destruction but by the "immediate" annexation of Texas. Here is the letter. It is too important to be abridged; and though referred to several times, will now be read in full. Hear it:
(The letter read.)
This letter was addressed to Mr. Benjamin Green, the son of Mr. Duff Green; so that the beginning and the ending of this "immediate" annexation scheme, so far as the invention of the pretext, and the inculpation of Great Britain is concerned, is in the hands of father and son—a couple, of whom it may be said, in the language of Gil Blas, "These two make a pair." The letter itself is one of the most unfortunate that the annals of diplomacy ever exhibited. It admits the wrong to Mexico, and offers to fight her for that wrong; and not for any thing that she has done to the United States, but because of some supposed operation of Great Britain upon Texas. Was there ever such a comedy of errors, or, it may be, tragedy of crimes! Let us analyze this important letter; let us examine it, paragraph by paragraph.
The first paragraph enjoins the strongest assurances to be given to Mexico of our indisposition to wound the dignity or honor of Mexico in making this treaty, and of our regret if she should consider it otherwise. This admits that we have done something to outrage Mexico, and that we owe her a volunteer apology, to soften her anticipated resentment.
The same paragraph states that we have been driven to this step in self-defence, and to counteract the "policy adopted," and the "efforts made" by Great Britain to abolish slavery in Texas. This is an admission that we have done what may be offensive and injurious to Mexico, not on account of any thing she has done to us, but for what we fear Great Britain may do to Texas. And as for this plea of self-defence, it is an invasion of the homicidal criminal's prerogative, to plead it. All the murders committed in our country, are done in self-defence—a few through insanity. The choice of the defencelies between them, and it is often a nice guess for counsel to say which to take. And so it might have been in this case; and insanity would have been an advantage in the plea, being more honorable, and not more false.
The same paragraph admits that the United States has made this treaty in full view of war with Mexico; for the words "all possible consequences," taken in connection with the remaining words of the sentence, and with General Almonte's notice filed by order of his government at the commencement of this negotiation, can mean nothing else but war! and that to be made by the treaty-making power.
The second paragraph directs the despatch of Lord Aberdeen to be read to the Mexican Secretary of State, to show him our cause of complaint against Great Britain. This despatch is to be read—not delivered, not even a copy of it—to the Mexican minister. He may take notes of it during the reading, but not receive a copy, because it is a document to be sent to the Senate! Surely the Senate would have pardoned a departure frometiquettein a case where war was impending, and where the object was to convince the nation we were going to fight! that we had a right to fight her for fear of something which a third power might do to a fourth. To crown this scene, the reading is to be of a document in the English language, to a minister whose language is Spanish; and who may not know what is read, except through an interpreter.
The third paragraph of this pregnant letter admits that questions are to grow out of this treaty, for the settlement of which a minister will be sent by us to Mexico. This is a most grave admission. It is a confession that we commit such wrong upon Mexico by this treaty, that it will take another treaty to redress it; and that, as the wrong doer, we will volunteer an embassy to atone for our misconduct. Boundary is named as one of these things to be settled, and with reason; for we violate 2,000 miles of Mexican boundary which is to become ours by the ratification of this treaty, and to remain ours till restored to its proper owner by another treaty. Is this right? Is it sound in morals? Is it safe in policy? Would we take 2,000 miles of the Canadas in the same way? I presume not. And why not? why not treat Great Britain and Mexico alike? why not march up to "Fifty-Four Forty" as courageously as we march upon the Rio Grande? Because Great Britain is powerful, and Mexico weak—a reason which may fail in policy as much as in morals. Yes, sir! Boundary will have to be adjusted, and that of the Rio Grande; and until adjusted, we shall be aggressors, by our own admission, on the undisputed Mexican territory on the Rio Grande.
The last paragraph is the most significant of the whole. It is a confession, by the clearest inferences, that our whole conduct to Mexico has been tortuous and wrongful, and that she has "rights," to the settlement of which Mexico must be a party. The great admissions are, the want of the concurrence of Mexico; the want of her previous consent to this treaty; its objectionableness to her; the violation of her boundary; the "rights" of each, and of course the right of Mexico to settle questions of security and interest which are unsettled by the present treaty. The result of the whole is, that the war, in full view of which the treaty was made, was an unjust war upon Mexico.
Thus admitting our wrong in injuring Mexico, in not obtaining her concurrence; in not securing her previous consent; in violating her boundary; in proceeding without her in a case where her rights, security, and interests are concerned; admitting all this, what is the reason given to Mexico for treating her with the contempt of a total neglect in all this affair? And here strange scenes rise up before us. This negotiation began, upon the record, in August last. We had a minister in Mexico with whom we could communicate every twenty days. Mexico had a minister here, with whom we could communicate every hour in the day. Then why not consult Mexico before the treaty? Why not speak to her during these eight months, when in such hot haste to consult her afterwards, and so anxious to stop our action on the treaty till she was heard from, and so ready to volunteer millions to propitiate her wrath, or to conciliate her consent? Why this haste after the treaty, when there was so much time before? It was because the plan required the "bomb" to be kept back till forty days before the Baltimore convention, and then a storm to be excited.
The reason given for this great haste after so long delay, is that the safety of the United States was at stake: that the British would abolish slavery in Texas, and then in the United States, and so destroy the Union. Giving tothis imputed design, for the sake of the argument, all the credit due to an uncontradicted scheme, and still it is a preposterous excuse for not obtaining the previous consent of Mexico. It turns upon the idea that this abolition of slavery in Texas is to be sudden, irresistible, irretrievable! and that not a minute was to be lost in averting the impending ruin! But this is not the case. Admitting what is charged—that Great Britain has adopted a policy, and made efforts to abolish slavery in Texas, with a view to its abolition in the United States—yet this is not to be done by force, or magic. The Duke of Wellington is not to land at the head of some 100,000 men to set the slaves free. No gunpowder plot, like that intended by Guy Fawkes, is to blow the slaves out of the country. No magic wand is to be waved over the land, and to convert it into the home of the free. No slips of magic carpet in the Arabian Nights is to be slipped under the feet of the negroes to send them all whizzing, by a wish, ten thousand miles through the air. None of these sudden, irresistible, irretrievable modes of operating is to be followed by Great Britain. She wishes to see slavery abolished in Texas, as elsewhere; but this wish, like all other human wishes, is wholly inoperative without works to back it: and these Great Britain denies. She denies that she will operate by works, only by words where acceptable. But admit it. Admit that she has now done what she never did before—denied her design!admit all this, and you still have to confess that she is a human power and has to work by human means, and in this case to operate upon the minds of people and of nations—upon Mexico, Texas, the United States, and slaves within the boundaries of these two latter countries. She has to work by moral means; that is to say, by operating on the mind and will. All this is a work of time—a work of years—the work of a generation! Slavery is in the constitution of Texas, and in the hearts, customs, and interests of the people; and cannot be got out in many years, if at all. And are we to be told that there was no time to consult Mexico? or, in the vague language of the letter, thatcircumstancesdid not permit the consultation, and that without disclosing what these circumstances were? It was last August that the negotiation began. Was there fear that Mexico would liberate Texian slaves if she found out the treaty before it was made? Alas! sir, she refused to have any thing to do with the scheme! Great Britain proposed to her to make emancipation of slaves the condition of acknowledging Texian independence. She utterly refused it; and of this our government was officially informed by the Earl of Aberdeen. No, sir, no! There is no reason in the excuse. I profess to be a man that can understand reason, and could comprehend the force of the circumstances which would show that the danger of delay was so imminent that nothing butimmediateannexation could save the United States from destruction. But none such are named, or can be named; and the true reason is, that the Baltimore convention was to sit on the 27th of May.
Great Britain avows all she intends, and that is—a wish—TO SEE—slavery abolished in Texas; and she declares all the means which she means to use, and that is, advice where it is acceptable.
It will be a strange spectacle, in the nineteenth century, to behold the United States at war with Mexico, because Great Britain wishes—TO SEE—the abolition of slavery in Texas.
So far from being a just cause of war, I hold that the expression of such a wish is not even censurable by us, since our naval alliance with Great Britain for the suppression of the slave trade—since our diplomatic alliance with her to close the markets of the world against the slave trade—and since the large effusion of mawkish sentimentality on the subject of slavery, in which our advocates of the aforesaid diplomatic and naval alliance indulged themselves at the time of its negotiation and conclusion. Since that time, I think we have lost the right (if we ever possessed it) of fighting Mexico, because Great Britain says she wishes—TO SEE—slavery abolished in Texas, as elsewhere throughout the world.
The civilized world judges the causes of war, and discriminates between motives and pretexts: the former are respected when true and valid—the latter are always despised and exposed. Every Christian nation owes it to itself, as well as to the family of Christian nations, to examine well its grounds of war, before it begins one, and to hold itself in a condition to justify its act in the eyes of God and man. Not satisfied of either the truth or validity of the causefor our war with Mexico, in the alleged interference of Great Britain in Texian affairs, I feel myself bound to oppose it, and not the less because it is deemed a small war. Our constitution knows no difference between wars. The declaration of all wars is given to Congress—not to the President and Senate—much less to the President alone. Besides, a war is an ungovernable monster, and there is no knowing into what proportions even a small one may expand! especially when the interference of one large power may lead to the interference of another.
Great Britain disavows (and that four times over) all the designs upon Texas attributed to her. She disavows every thing. I believe I am as jealous of the encroaching and domineering spirit of that power, as any reasonable man ought to be; but these disavowals are enough for me. That government is too proud to lie! too wise to criminate its future conduct by admitting the culpability which the disavowal implies. Its fault is on the other side of the account—in its arrogance in avowing, and even overstating, its pretensions. Copenhagen is her style! I repeat it, then, the disavowal of all design to interfere with Texian Independence, or with the existence of slavery in Texas, is enough for me. I shall believe in it until I see it disproved by evidence, or otherwise falsified. Would to God that our administration could get the same disavowal in all the questions of real difference between the two countries! that we could get it in the case of the Oregon—the claim of search—the claim of visitation—the claim of impressment—the practice of liberating our fugitive and criminal slaves—the repetition of the Schlosser invasion of our territory and murder of our citizens—the outrage of the Comet, Encomium, Enterprise, and Hermosa cases!
And here, without regard to the truth or falsehood of this imputed design of British intentions to abolish slavery in Texas, a very awkward circumstance crosses our path in relation to its validity, if true: for, it so happens that we did that very thing ourselves! By the Louisiana treaty of 1803, Texas, and all the country, between the Red River and Arkansas, became ours, and was subject to slavery: by the treaty of 1819, made, as Mr. Adams assures us, by the majority of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, who were Southern men, this Texas, and a hundred thousand square miles of other territory between the Red River and Arkansas, were dismembered from our Union, and added to Mexico, a non-slaveholding empire. By that treaty of 1819, slavery was actually abolished in all that region in which we now only fear, contrary to the evidence, that there is a design to abolish it! and the confines of a non-slaveholding empire were then actually brought to the boundaries of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri! the exact places which we now so greatly fear to expose to the contact of a non-slaveholding dominion. All this I exposed at the time the treaty of 1819 was made, and pointed out as one of the follies or crimes, of that unaccountable treaty; and now recur to it in my place here to absolve Mr. Adams, the negotiator of the treaty of 1819, from the blame which I then cast upon him. His responsible statement on the floor of the House of Representatives has absolved him from that blame, and transferred it to the shoulders of the majority of Mr. Monroe's cabinet. On seeing the report of his speech in the papers, I deemed it right to communicate with Mr. Adams, through a senator from his State, now in my eye, and who hears what I say (looking at Mr.Bates, of Massachusetts), and through him received the confirmation of the reported speech, that he (Mr. Adams) was the last of Mr. Monroe's cabinet to yield our true boundaries in that quarter. [Here Mr. Bates nodded assent.] Southern men deprived us of Texas, and made it non-slaveholding in 1819. Our present Secretary of State was a member of that cabinet, and counselled that treaty: our present President was a member of the House, and sanctioned it in voting against Mr. Clay's condemnatory resolution. They did a great mischief then: they should be cautious not to err again in themannerof getting it back.
I have shown you, Mr. President, that the ratification of this treaty would be war with Mexico—that it would be unjust war, unconstitutionally made—and made upon a weak and groundless pretext. It is not my purpose to show for what object this war is made—why these marching and sailing orders have been given—and why our troops and ships, as squadrons and corps of observation, are now in the Gulf of Mexico, watching Mexican cities; or onthe Red River, watching Mexican soldiers. I have not told the reasons for this war, and warlike movements, nor is it necessary to do so. The purpose of the whole is plain and obvious. It is in every body's mouth. It is in the air, and we can see and feel it. Mr. Tyler wants to be President; and, different from the perfumed fop of Shakspeare, to whom the smell of gunpowder was so offensive, he not only wants to smell that compound, but also to smell of it. He wants an odor of the "villanous compound" upon him. He has become infected with the modern notion that gunpowder popularity is the passport to the presidency; and he wants that passport. He wants to play Jackson; but let him have a care. From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step; and, in heroic imitations, there is no middle ground. The hero missed, the harlequin appears; and hisses salute the ears which were itching for applause. Jackson was no candidate for the presidency when he acted the real, not the mock hero. He staked himself for his country—did nothing but what was just—and eschewed intrigue. His elevation to the presidency was the act of his fellow-citizens—not the machination of himself.
The senator from South Carolina (Mr. McDuffie) assumes it for certain, that the great meeting projected for Nashville is to take place: and wishes to know who are to be my bedfellows in that great gathering: and I on my part, would wish to know who are to be his! Misery, says the proverb, makes strange bedfellows: and political combinations sometimes make them equally strange. The fertile imagination of Burke has presented us with a view of one of these strange sights; and the South Carolina procession at Nashville (if nothing occurs to balk it) may present another. Burke has exhibited to us the picture of a cluster of old political antagonists (it was after the formation of Lord North's broad bottomed administration, and after the country's good and love of office had smothered old animosities)—all sleeping together in one truckle-bed: to use his own language, all pigging together (that is, lying like pigs, heads and tails, and as many together) in the same truckle-bed: and a queer picture he made of it! But if things go on as projected here, never did misery, or political combination, or the imagination of Burke, present such a medley of bedfellows as will be seen at Nashville. All South Carolina is to be there: of course General Jackson will be there, and will be good and hospitable to all. But let the travellers take care who goes to bed to him. If he should happen to find old tariff disunion, disguised as Texas disunion, lying by his side! then woe to the hapless wight that has sought such a lodging. Preservation of the Federal Union is as strong in the old Roman's heart now as ever: and while, as a Christian, he forgives all that is past (if it were past!), yet, no old tricks under new names. Texas disunion will be to him the same as tariff disunion: and if he detects a Texas disunionist nestling into his bed, I say again, woe to the luckless wight! Sheets and blankets will be no salvation. The tiger will not be toothless—the senator understands the allusion—nor clawless either. Teeth and claws he will have, and sharp use he will make of them! Not only skin and fur, but blood and bowels may fly, and double-quick time scampering may clear that bed! I shall not be there: even if the scheme goes on (which I doubt after this day's occurrences); if it should go on, and any thing should induce me to go so far out of my line, it would be to have a view of the senator from South Carolina, and the friends for whom he speaks, and their new bedfellows, or fellows in bed, as the case may be, all pigging together in one truckle-bed at Nashville.
But I advise the contrivers to give up this scheme. Polk and Texas are strong, and can carry a great deal, but not every thing. The oriental story informs us that it was the last ounce which broke the camel's back? What if a mountain had been put first on the poor animal's back? Nullification is a mountain! Disunion is a mountain! and what could Polk and Texas do with two mountains on their backs? And here, Mr. President, I must speak out. The time has come for those to speak out who neither fear nor count consequences whentheir country is in danger. Nullification and disunion are revived, and revived under circumstances which menace more danger than ever, since coupled with a popular question which gives to the plotters the honest sympathies of the patriotic millions. I have often intimated it before, but now proclaim it. Disunion is at the bottom of this long-concealed Texas machination. Intrigue and speculation co-operate; but disunion is at the bottom, and I denounce it to the American people. Under the pretext of getting Texas into the Union, the scheme is to get the South out of it. A separate confederacy, stretching from the Atlantic to the Californias (and hence the secret of the Rio Grande del Norte frontier), is the cherished vision of disappointed ambition; and for this consummation every circumstance has been carefully and artfully contrived. A secret and intriguing negotiation, concealed from Congress and the people: an abolition quarrel picked with Great Britain to father an abolition quarrel at home: a slavery correspondence to outrage the North: war with Mexico: the clandestine concentration of troops and ships in the southwest: the secret compact with the President of Texas, and the subjection of American forces to his command: the flagrant seizure of the purse and the sword: the contradictory and preposterous reasons on which the detected military and naval movement was defended—all these announce the prepared catastrophe; and the inside view of the treaty betrays its design. The whole annexed country is to be admitted as one territory, with a treaty-promise to be admitted as States, when we all know that Congress alone can admit new States, and that the treaty-promise, without a law of Congress to back it, is void. The whole to be slave States (and with the boundary to the Rio Grande there may be a great many); and the correspondence, which is the key to the treaty, and shows the design of its framers, wholly directed to the extension of slavery and the exasperation of the North. What else could be done to get up Missouri controversies and make sure of the non-admission of these States? Then the plot is consummated: and Texas without the Union, sooner than the Union without Texas (already the premonitory chorus of so many resolves), receives its practical application in the secession of the South, and its adhesion to the rejected Texas. Even without waiting for the non-admission of the States, so carefully provided for in the treaty and correspondence, secession and confederation with the foreign Texas is already the scheme of the subaltern disunionists. The subalterns, charged too high by their chiefs, are ready for this; but the more cunning chiefs, want Texas in as a territory—in by treaty—the supreme law of the land—with a void promise for admission as States. Then non-admission can be called a breach of the treaty. Texas can be assumed to be a part of the Union; and secession and conjunction with her becomes the rightful remedy. This is the design, and I denounce it; and blind is he who, occupying a position at this capitol, does not behold it!
I mention secession as the more cunning method of dissolving the Union. It is disunion, and the more dangerous because less palpable. Nullification begat it, and if allowed there is an end to the Union. For a few States to secede, without other alliances, would only put the rest to the trouble of bringing them back; but with Texas and California to retire upon, the Union would have to go.Many persons would secede on the non-admission of Texian States who abhor disunion now.To avoid all these dangers, and to make sure of Texas, pass my bill! which gives the promise of Congress for the admission of the new States—neutralizes the slave question—avoids Missouri controversies—pacifies Mexico—and harmonizes the Union.
The senator from South Carolina complains that I have been arrogant and overbearing in this debate, and dictatorial to those who were opposed to me. So far as this reproach is founded, I have to regret it, and to ask pardon of the Senate and of its members. I may be in some fault. I have, indeed, been laboring under deep feeling; and while much was kept down, something may have escaped. I marked the commencement of this Texas movement long before it was visible to the public eye; and always felt it to be dangerous, because it gave to the plotters the honest sympathies of the millions. I saw men who never cared a straw about Texas—one of whom gave it away—another of whom voted against saving it—and all of whom were silent and indifferent while the true friends of the sacrificed country were laboring to get it back: I saw these men lay theirplot in the winter of 1842-'43, and told every person with whom I talked every step they were to take in it. All that has taken place, I foretold: all that is intended, I foresee. The intrigue for the presidency was the first act in the drama; the dissolution of the Union the second. And I, who hate intrigue, and love the Union, can only speak of intriguers and disunionists with warmth and indignation. The oldest advocate for the recovery of Texas, I must be allowed to speak in just terms of the criminal politicians who prostituted the question of its recovery to their own base purposes, and delayed its success by degrading and disgracing it. A western man, and coming from a State more than any other interested in the recovery of this country so unaccountably thrown away by the treaty of 1819, I must be allowed to feel indignant at seeing Atlantic politicians seizing upon it, and making it a sectional question, for the purposes of ambition and disunion. I have spoken warmly of these plotters and intriguers; but I have not permitted their conduct to alter my own, or to relax my zeal for the recovery of the sacrificed country. I have helped to reject the disunion treaty; and that obstacle being removed, I have brought in the bill which will insure the recovery of Texas (with peace, and honor, and with the Union) as soon as the exasperation has subsided which the outrageous conduct of this administration has excited in every Mexican breast. No earthly power but Mexico has a right to say a word. Civil treatment and consultation beforehand would have conciliated her; but the seizure of two thousand miles of her undisputed territory, an insulting correspondence, breach of the armistice, secret negotiations with Texas, and sending troops and ships to waylay and attack her, have excited feelings of resentment which must be allayed before any thing can be done.
The senator from South Carolina compares the rejected treaty to the slain Cæsar, and gives it a ghost, which is to meet me at some future day, as the spectre met Brutus at Philippi. I accept the comparison, and thank the senator for it. It is both classic and just; for as Cæsar was slain for the good of his country, so has been this treaty; and as the spectre appeared at Philippi on the side of the ambitious Antony and the hypocrite Octavius, and against the patriot Brutus, so would the ghost of this poor treaty, when it comes to meet me, appear on the side of the President and his secretary, and against the man who was struggling to save his country from their lawless designs. But here the comparison must stop; for I can promise the ghost and his backers that if the fight goes against me at this new Philippi, with which I am threatened, and the enemies of the American Union triumph over me as the enemies of Roman liberty triumphed over Brutus and Cassius, I shall not fall upon my sword, as Brutus did, though Cassius be killed, and run it through my own body; but I shall save it, and save myself for another day, and for another use—for the day when the battle of the disunion of these States is to be fought—not with words, but with iron—and for the hearts of the traitors who appear in arms against their country.
The comparison is just. Cæsar was rightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not he that destroyed the liberties of Rome. That work was done by the profligate politicians, without him, and before his time; and his death did not restore the republic. There were no more elections. Rotten politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew of Cæsar, as heir to his uncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary succession.
And here, Mr. President, History appears in her grand and instructive character, as Philosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her warning voice. Superficial readers believe it was the military men who destroyed the Roman republic. No such thing! It was the politicians who did it! factious, corrupt, intriguing, politicians! destroying public virtue in their mad pursuit after office! destroying their rivals by crime! deceiving and debauching the people for votes! and bringing elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were conducted. From the time of the Gracchi there were no elections that could bear the name. Confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold the consulship. Intrigue, and the dagger, disposed of rivals. Fraud, violence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury, commanded votes. The people had no choice: and long before the time of Cæsar nothing remained of republican government, but the name, and the abuse. Read Plutarch. In the life of Cæsar, and not three pages before the crossing of the Rubicon, hepaints the ruined state of the elections—shows that all elective government was gone—that the hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the corrupt—and that in choosing between Pompey and Cæsar, many preferred Pompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they thought he would make the milder king. Even arms were but a small part of Cæsar's reliance when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than the sword, was his dependence: and he sent forward the accumulated treasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into the laps of rotten politicians. There was no longer a popular government; and in taking all power to himself, he only took advantage of the state of things which profligate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, and paid the forfeit with his life; but in contemplating his fate, let us never forget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic, before he came to seize and to master it.