CHAPTER LXX.

These remarks, conveying a general imputation upon the minority senators of factious conduct in delaying the public business, and thwarting the will of the people, justified an answer from any one of them to whom it was applicable: and first received it from Mr. Calhoun.

Mr. Calhoun was not surprised at the impatience of the senator from Kentucky, though he was at his attributing to this side of the chamber the delays and obstacles thrown in the way of his favorite measure. How many days did the senator himself spend in amending his own bill? The bill had been twelve days before the Senate, and eight of those had been occupied by the friends of the bill. That delay did not originate on this side of the House; but now that the time which was cheerfully accorded to him and his friends is to be reciprocated, before half of it is over, the charge of factious delay is raised. Surely the urgency and impatience of the senator and his friends cannot be so very great that the minority must not be allowed to employ as many days in amending their bill as they took themselves to alter it. The senator from Kentucky says he is afraid, if we go on in this way, we will not get through the measures of this session till the last of autumn. Is not the fault in himself, and in the nature of the measures he urges so impatiently? These measures are such as the senators in the minority are wholly opposed to on principle—such as they conscientiously believe are unconstitutional—and is it not then right to resist them, and prevent, if they can, all invasions of the constitution? Why does he build upon such unreasonable expectations as to calculate on carrying measures of this magnitude and importance with a few days of hasty legislation on each? What are the measures proposed by the senator? They comprise the whole federal system, which it took forty years, from 1789 to 1829, to establish—but which are now, happily for the country, prostrate in the dust. And it is these measures, fraught with such important results that are now sought to be hurried through in one extra session; measures which, without consuming one particle of useless time to discuss fully, would require, instead of an extra session of Congress, four or five regular sessions. The senator said the country was in agony, crying for "action," "action." He understood whence that cry came—it came from the holders of State stocks, the men who expected another expansion, to relieve themselves at the expense of government. "Action"—"action," meant nothing but "plunder," "plunder," "plunder;" and he assured the gentleman, that he could not be more anxious in urging on a system of plunder than he (Mr. Calhoun) would be in opposing it. He so understood the senator, and he inquired of him, whether he called this an insidious amendment?

This was a sharp reply, just in its retort, spirited in its tone, judicious in expanding the basis of the new debate that was to come on; and greatly irritated Mr. Clay. He immediately felt that he had no right to impeach the motives of senators, and catching up Mr. Calhoun on that point, and strongly contesting it, brought on a rapid succession of contradictory asseverations: Thus:

"Mr.Clay. I said no such thing, sir; I did not say any thing about themotivesof senators."Mr.Calhounsaid he understood the senator's meaning to be that the motives of the opposition were factious and frivolous."Mr.Clay. I said no such thing, sir."Mr.Calhoun. It was so understood."Mr.Clay. No, sir; no, sir."Mr.Calhoun. Yes, sir, yes; it could be understood in no other way."Mr.Clay. What I did say, was, that theeffectof such amendments, and of consuming time in debating them, would be a waste of that time from the business of the session; and, consequently, would produce unnecessary delay and embarrassment. I said nothing ofmotives—I only spoke of the practicaleffectand result."Mr.Calhounsaid he understood it had been repeated for the second time that there could be no other motive or object entertained by the senators in the opposition, in making amendments and speeches on this bill, than to embarrass the majority by frivolous and vexatious delay."Mr.Clayinsisted that he made use of no assertions as tomotives."Mr.Calhoun. If the senator means to say that he does not accuse this side of the House of bringing forward propositions for the sake of delay, he wished to understand him."Mr.Clay. I intended that."Mr.Calhounrepeated that he understood the senator to mean that the senators in the opposition were spinning out the time for no otherpurpose but that of delaying and embarrassing the majority."Mr.Clayadmitted that was his meaning, though not thus expressed."

"Mr.Clay. I said no such thing, sir; I did not say any thing about themotivesof senators.

"Mr.Calhounsaid he understood the senator's meaning to be that the motives of the opposition were factious and frivolous.

"Mr.Clay. I said no such thing, sir.

"Mr.Calhoun. It was so understood.

"Mr.Clay. No, sir; no, sir.

"Mr.Calhoun. Yes, sir, yes; it could be understood in no other way.

"Mr.Clay. What I did say, was, that theeffectof such amendments, and of consuming time in debating them, would be a waste of that time from the business of the session; and, consequently, would produce unnecessary delay and embarrassment. I said nothing ofmotives—I only spoke of the practicaleffectand result.

"Mr.Calhounsaid he understood it had been repeated for the second time that there could be no other motive or object entertained by the senators in the opposition, in making amendments and speeches on this bill, than to embarrass the majority by frivolous and vexatious delay.

"Mr.Clayinsisted that he made use of no assertions as tomotives.

"Mr.Calhoun. If the senator means to say that he does not accuse this side of the House of bringing forward propositions for the sake of delay, he wished to understand him.

"Mr.Clay. I intended that.

"Mr.Calhounrepeated that he understood the senator to mean that the senators in the opposition were spinning out the time for no otherpurpose but that of delaying and embarrassing the majority.

"Mr.Clayadmitted that was his meaning, though not thus expressed."

So ended this keen colloquy in which the pertinacity, and clear perceptions of Mr. Calhoun brought out the admission that the impeachment of motives was intended, but not expressed. Having got this admission Mr. Calhoun went on to defy the accusation of faction and frivolity, and to declare a determination in the minority to continue in their course; and put a peremptory question to Mr. Clay.

"Mr. Calhoun observed that to attempt, by such charges of factious and frivolous motives, to silence the opposition, was wholly useless. He and his friends had principles to contend for that were neither new nor frivolous, and they would here now, and at all times, and in all places, maintain them against those measures, in whatever way they thought most efficient. Did the senator from Kentucky mean to apply to the Senate the gag law passed in the other branch of Congress? If he did, it was time he should know that he (Mr. Calhoun), and his friends were ready to meet him on that point."

This question, and the avowed readiness to meet the gagging attempt, were not spoken without warrant. The democratic senators having got wind of what was to come, had consulted together and taken their resolve to defy and to dare it—to resist its introduction, and trample upon the rule, if voted: and in the mean time to gain an advantage with the public by rendering odious their attempt. Mr. Clay answered argumentatively for the rule, and that the people were for it:

"Let those senators go into the country, and they will find the whole body of the people complaining of the delay and interruption of the national business, by their long speeches in Congress; and if they will be but admonished by the people, they will come back with a lesson to cut short their debating, and give their attention more to action than to words. Who ever heard that the people would be dissatisfied with the abridgment of speeches in Congress? He had never heard the shortness of speeches complained of. Indeed, he should not be surprised if the people would got up remonstrances against lengthy speeches in Congress."

With respect to the defiance, Mr. Clay returned it, and declared his determination to bring forward the measure.

"With regard to the intimation of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.Calhoun], he understood him and his course perfectly well, and told him and his friends that, for himself, he knew not how his friends would act; he was ready at any moment to bring forward and support a measure which should give to the majority the control of the business of the Senate of the United States. Let them denounce it as much as they pleased in advance: unmoved by any of their denunciations and threats, standing firm in the support of the interests which he believed the country demands, for one, he was ready for the adoption of a rule which would place the business of the Senate under the control of a majority of the Senate."

Mr. Clay was now committed to bring forward the measure; and was instantly and defyingly invited to do so.

"Mr.Calhounsaid there was no doubt of the senator's predilection for a gag law. Let him bring on that measure as soon as ever he pleases."Mr.Benton. Come on with it."

"Mr.Calhounsaid there was no doubt of the senator's predilection for a gag law. Let him bring on that measure as soon as ever he pleases.

"Mr.Benton. Come on with it."

Without waiting for any thing further from Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun proceeded to show him, still further, how little his threat was heeded and taunted him with wishing to revive the spirit of the alien and sedition laws:

"Mr.Calhounsaid it must be admitted that if the senator was not acting on the federal side, he would find it hard to persuade the American people of the fact, by showing them his love of gag laws, and strong disposition to silence both the national councils and the press. Did he not remember something about an alien and sedition law, and can he fail to perceive the relationship with the measure he contemplates to put down debate here? What is the difference, in principle, between his gag law and the alien and sedition law? We are gravely told that the speaking of the representatives of the people, which is to convey to them full information on the subjects of legislation in their councils, is worse than useless, and must be abated. Who consumed the time of last Congress in long speeches, vexatious and frivolous attempts to embarrass and thwart the business of the country, and useless opposition, tending to no end but that out of doors, the presidential election? Who but the senator and his party, then in the minority? But now, when they are in the majority, and the most important measures ever pressed forward together in one session, he is the first to threaten a gag law, to choke off debate, and deprive the minority even of the poor privilege of entering their protest."

Of all the members of the Senate, one of the mildest and most amicable—one of the gentlest language, and firmest purpose—was Dr. Linn, of Missouri. The temper of the minority senators may be judged by the tone and tenor of hisremarks.

"He (Mr.Linn) would for his part, make a few remarks here, and in doing so he intended to be as pointed as possible, for he had now, he found, to contend for liberty of speech; and while any of that liberty was left, he would give his remarks the utmost bounds consistent with his own sense of what was due to himself, his constituents, and the country. The whigs, during the late administration, had brought to bear a system of assault against the majority in power, which might justly be characterized as frivolous and vexatious, and nothing else; yet they had always been treated by the majority with courtesy and forbearance; and the utmost latitude of debate had been allowed them without interruption. In a session of six months, they consumed the greater part of the time in speeches for electioneering effect, so that only twenty-eight bills were passed. These electioneering speeches, on all occasions that could be started, whether the presentation of a petition, motion, or a resolution, or discussion of a bill, were uniformly and studiously of the most insulting character to the majority, whose mildest form of designation was "collar men;" and other epithets equally degrading. How often had it been said of the other branch of Congress, "What could be expected from a House so constituted?" Trace back the course of that party, step by step, to 1834, and it may be tracked in blood. The outrages in New York in that year are not forgotten. The fierce and fiendish spirit of strife and usurpation which prompted the seizure of public arms, to turn them against those who were their fellow-citizens, is yet fresh as ever, and ready to win its way to what it aims at. What was done then, under the influence and shadow of the great money power, may be done again. He (Mr.Linn) had marked them, and nothing should restrain him from doing his duty and standing up in the front rank of opposition to keep them from the innovations they meditated. Neither the frown nor menace of any leader of that party—no lofty bearing, or shaking of the mane—would deter him from the fearless and honest discharge of those obligations which were due to his constituents and to the country. He next adverted to the conduct of the whig party when the sub-treasury was under discussion, and reminded the present party in power of the forbearance with which they had been treated, contrasting that treatment with the manifestations now made to the minority. We are now, said Mr. Linn in conclusion, to be checked; but I tell the senator from Kentucky, and any other senator who chooses to tread in his steps, that he is about to deal a double handed game at which two can play. He is welcome to try his skill. But I would expect that some on that side are not prepared to go quite so far; and that there is yet among them sufficient liberality to counterbalance political feeling, and induce them not to object to our right of spending as much time in trying to improve their bill as they have taken themselves to clip and pare and shape it to their own fancies."

Here this irritating point rested for the day—and for three days, when it was revived by the reproaches and threats of Mr. Clay against the minority.

"The House (he said) had been treading on the heels of the Senate, and at last had got the start of it a long way in advance of the business of this session. The reason was obvious. The majority there is for action, and has secured it. Some change was called for in this chamber. The truth is that the minority here control the action of the Senate, and cause all the delay of the public business. They obstruct the majority in the dispatch of all business of importance to the country, and particularly those measures which the majority is bound to give to the country without further delay. Did not this reduce the majority to the necessity of adopting some measure which would place the control of the business of the session in their hands? It was impossible to do without it: it must be resorted to."

To this Mr. Calhoun replied:

"The senator from Kentucky tells the Senate the other House has got before it. How has the other House got before the Senate? By a despotic exercise of the power of a majority. By destroying the liberties of the people in gagging their representatives. By preventing the minority from its free exercise of its right of remonstrance. This is the way the House has got before the Senate. And now there was too much evidence to doubt that the Senate was to be made to keep up with the House by the same means."

Mr. Clay, finding such undaunted opposition to the hour rule, replied in a way to let it be seen that the threat of that rule was given up, and that a measure of a different kind, but equally effective, was to be proposed; and would be certainly adopted. He said:

"If he did not adopt the same means which had proved so beneficial in the other House, he would have something equally efficient to offer. He had no doubt of the cheerful adoption of such a measure when it should come before the Senate. So far from the rule being condemned, he would venture to say that it would be generally approved. It was the means of controlling the business, abridging long and unnecessary speeches, and would be every way hailed as one of the greatest improvements of the age."

This glimpse of another measure, confirmed the minority in the belief of what they hadheard—that several whig senators had refused to go with Mr. Clay for the hour rule, and forced him to give it up; but they had agreed to go for the previous question, which he held to be equally effective; and was, in fact, more so—as it cut off debate at any moment. It was just as offensive as the other. Mr. King, of Alabama, was the first to meet the threat, under this new form, and the Register of Debates shows this scene:

"Mr. King said the senator from Kentucky complained of three weeks and a half having been lost in amendments to his bill. Was not the senator aware that it was himself and his friends had consumed most of that time? But now that the minority had to take it up, the Senate is told there must be a gag law. Did he understand that it was the intention of the senator to introduce that measure?"Mr.Clay. I will, sir; I will!"Mr.King. I tell the senator, then, that he may make his arrangements at his boarding-house for the winter."Mr.Clay. Very well, sir."Mr.Kingwas truly sorry to see the honorable senator so far forgetting what is due to the Senate, as to talk of coercing it by any possible abridgment of its free action. The freedom of debate had never yet been abridged in that body, since the foundation of this government. Was it fit or becoming, after fifty years of unrestrained liberty, to threaten it with a gag law? He could tell the senator that, peaceable a man as he (Mr.King) was, whenever it was attempted to violate that sanctuary, he, for one, would resist that attempt even unto the death."

"Mr.Clay. I will, sir; I will!

"Mr.King. I tell the senator, then, that he may make his arrangements at his boarding-house for the winter.

"Mr.Clay. Very well, sir.

"Mr.Kingwas truly sorry to see the honorable senator so far forgetting what is due to the Senate, as to talk of coercing it by any possible abridgment of its free action. The freedom of debate had never yet been abridged in that body, since the foundation of this government. Was it fit or becoming, after fifty years of unrestrained liberty, to threaten it with a gag law? He could tell the senator that, peaceable a man as he (Mr.King) was, whenever it was attempted to violate that sanctuary, he, for one, would resist that attempt even unto the death."

The issue was now made up, and the determination on both sides declared—on the part of Mr. Clay, speaking in the name of his party, to introduce the previous question in the Senate, for the purpose of cutting off debate and amendments; on the part of the minority, to resist the rule—not only its establishment, but its execution. This was a delicate step, and required justification before the public, before a scene of resistance to the execution—involving disorder, and possibly violence—should come on. The scheme had been denounced, and defied; but the ample reasons against it had not been fully stated; and it was deemed best that a solid foundation of justification for whatever might happen, should be laid beforehand in a reasoned and considered speech. The author of this View, was required to make that speech; and for that purpose followed Mr. King.

"Mr. Benton would take this opportunity to say a word on this menace, so often thrown out, of a design to stifle debate, and stop amendments to bills in this chamber. He should consider such an attempt as much a violation of the constitution, and of the privileges of the chamber, as it would be for a military usurper to enter upon us, at the head of his soldiery, and expel us from our seats."It is not in order, continued Mr. B.—it is not in order, and would be a breach of the privilege of the House of Representatives, to refer to any thing which may have taken place in that House. My business is with our own chamber, and with the threat which has so often been uttered on this floor, during this extra session, of stifling debate, and cutting off amendments, by the introduction of the previous question."With respect to debates, senators have a constitutional right to speak; and while they speak to the subject before the House, there is no power any where to stop them. It is a constitutional right. When a member departs from the question, he is to be stopped: it is the duty of the Chair—your duty, Mr. President, to stop him—and it is the duty of the Senate to sustain you in the discharge of this duty. We have rules for conducting the debates, and these rules only require to be enforced in order to make debates decent and instructive in their import, and brief and reasonable in their duration. The government has been in operation above fifty years, and the freedom of debate has been sometimes abused, especially during the last twelve years, when those out of power made the two houses of Congress the arena of political and electioneering combat against the democratic administration in power. The liberty of debate was abused during this time; but the democratic majority would not impose gags and muzzles on the mouths of the minority; they would not stop their speeches; considering, and justly considering, that the privilege of speech was inestimable and inattackable—that some abuse of it was inseparable from its enjoyment—and that it was better to endure a temporary abuse than to incur a total extinction of this great privilege."But, sir, debate is one thing, and amendments another. A long speech, wandering off from the bill, is a very different thing from a short amendment, directed to the texture of the bill itself, and intended to increase its beneficial, or to diminish its prejudicial action. These amendments are the point to which I now speak, and to the nature of which I particularly invoke the attention of the Senate."By the constitution of the United States, each bill is to receive three readings, and each reading represents a different stage of proceeding, and a different mode of action under it. The first reading is for information only; it is to let the House know what the bill is for, what its contents are; and then neither debate nor amendment is expected, and never occurs, except in extraordinary cases. The second reading is foramendments and debate, and this reading usually takes place in Committee of the Whole in the House of Representatives, and inquasicommittee in the Senate. The third reading, after the bill is engrossed, is for passage; and then it cannot be amended, and is usually voted upon with little or no debate. Now, it is apparent that the second reading of the bill is the important one—that it is the legislative—the law-making—reading; the one at which the collective wisdom of the House is concentrated upon it, to free it from defects, and to improve it to the utmost—to illustrate its nature, and trace its consequences. The bill is drawn up in a committee; or it is received from a department in the form of aprojet de loi, and reported by a committee; or it is the work of a single member, and introduced on leave. The bill, before perfected by amendments, is the work of a committee, or of a head of a department, or of a single member; and if amendments are prevented, then the legislative power of the House is annihilated; the edict of a secretary, of a committee, or of a member, becomes the law; and the collected and concentrated wisdom and experience of the House has never been brought to bear upon it."The previous question cuts off amendments; and, therefore, neither in England nor in the United States, until now, in the House of Representatives, has that question ever been applied to bills in Committee of the Whole, on the second reading. This question annihilates legislation, sets at nought the wisdom of the House, and expunges the minority. It is always an invidious question, but seldom enforced in England, and but little used in the earlier periods of our own government. It has never been used in the Senate at all, never at any stage of the bill; in the House of Representatives it has never been used on the second reading of a bill, in Committee of the Whole, until the present session—this session, so ominous in its call and commencement, and which gives daily proof of its alarming tendencies, and of its unconstitutional, dangerous, and corrupting measures. The previous question has never yet been applied in this chamber; and to apply it now, at this ominous session, when all the old federal measures of fifty years ago are to be conglomerated into one huge and frightful mass, and rushed through by one convulsive effort; to apply it now, under such circumstances, is to muzzle the mouths, to gag the jaws, and tie up the tongues of those whose speeches would expose the enormities which cannot endure the light, and present to the people these ruinous measures in the colors in which they ought to be seen."The opinion of the people is invoked—they are said to be opposed to long speeches, and in favor of action. But, do they want action without deliberation, without consideration, without knowing what we are doing? Do they want bills without amendments—without examination of details—without a knowledge of their effect and operation when they are passed? Certainly the people wish no such thing. They want nothing which will not bear discussion. The people are in favor of discussion, and never read our debates with more avidity than at this ominous and critical extraordinary session. But I can well conceive of those who are against those debates, and want them stifled. Old sedition law federalism is against them: the cormorants who are whetting their bills for the prey which the acts of this session are to give them, are against them: and the advocates of these acts, who cannot answer these arguments, and who shelter weakness underdignifiedsilence, they are all weary, sick and tired of a contest which rages on one side only, and which exposes at once the badness of their cause and the defeat of its defenders. Sir, this call for action! action! action! (as it was well said yesterday), comes from those whose cry is, plunder! plunder! plunder!"The previous question, and the old sedition law, are measures of the same character, and children of the same parents, and intended for the same purposes. They are to hide light—to enable those in power to work in darkness—to enable them to proceed unmolested—and to permit them to establish ruinous measures without stint, and without detection. The introduction of this previous question into this body, I shall resist as I would resist its conversion into a bed of justice—Lit de Justice—of the old French monarchy, for the registration of royal edicts. In these beds of justice—the Parliament formed into a bed of justice—the kings before the revolution, caused their edicts to be registered without debate, and without amendment. The king ordered it, and it was done—his word became law. On one occasion, when the Parliament was refractory, Louis XIV. entered the chamber, booted and spurred—a whip in his hand—a horsewhip in his hand—and stood on his feet until the edict was registered. This is what has been done in the way of passing bills without debate or amendment, in France. But, in extenuation of this conduct of Louis the XIV., it must be remembered that he was a very young man when he committed this indiscretion, more derogatory to himself than to the Parliament which was the subject of the indignity. He never repeated it in his riper age, for he was a gentleman as well as a king, and in a fifty years' reign never repeated that indiscretion of his youth. True, no whips may be brought into our legislative halls to enforce the gag and the muzzle, but I go against the things themselves—against the infringement of the right of speech—and against the annihilation of our legislative faculties by annihilating the right of making amendments. I go against these; and say that we shall be nothing but a bed of justice for the registration of presidential, or partisan, or civil chieftain edicts, when debates and amendments are suppressed in this body."Sir, when the previous question shall be brought into this chamber—when it shall be applied to our bills in ourquasicommittee—I am ready to see my legislative life terminated. I want no seat here when that shall be the case. As the Romans held their natural lives, so do I hold my political existence. The Roman carried his life on the point of his sword; and when that life ceased to be honorable to himself, or useful to his country, he fell upon his sword, and died. This made of that people the most warlike and heroic nation of the earth. What they did with their natural lives, I am willing to do with my legislative and political existence: I am willing to terminate it, either when it shall cease to be honorable to myself, or useful to my country; and that I feel would be the case when this chamber, stripped of its constitutional freedom, shall receive the gag and muzzle of the previous question."

"It is not in order, continued Mr. B.—it is not in order, and would be a breach of the privilege of the House of Representatives, to refer to any thing which may have taken place in that House. My business is with our own chamber, and with the threat which has so often been uttered on this floor, during this extra session, of stifling debate, and cutting off amendments, by the introduction of the previous question.

"With respect to debates, senators have a constitutional right to speak; and while they speak to the subject before the House, there is no power any where to stop them. It is a constitutional right. When a member departs from the question, he is to be stopped: it is the duty of the Chair—your duty, Mr. President, to stop him—and it is the duty of the Senate to sustain you in the discharge of this duty. We have rules for conducting the debates, and these rules only require to be enforced in order to make debates decent and instructive in their import, and brief and reasonable in their duration. The government has been in operation above fifty years, and the freedom of debate has been sometimes abused, especially during the last twelve years, when those out of power made the two houses of Congress the arena of political and electioneering combat against the democratic administration in power. The liberty of debate was abused during this time; but the democratic majority would not impose gags and muzzles on the mouths of the minority; they would not stop their speeches; considering, and justly considering, that the privilege of speech was inestimable and inattackable—that some abuse of it was inseparable from its enjoyment—and that it was better to endure a temporary abuse than to incur a total extinction of this great privilege.

"But, sir, debate is one thing, and amendments another. A long speech, wandering off from the bill, is a very different thing from a short amendment, directed to the texture of the bill itself, and intended to increase its beneficial, or to diminish its prejudicial action. These amendments are the point to which I now speak, and to the nature of which I particularly invoke the attention of the Senate.

"By the constitution of the United States, each bill is to receive three readings, and each reading represents a different stage of proceeding, and a different mode of action under it. The first reading is for information only; it is to let the House know what the bill is for, what its contents are; and then neither debate nor amendment is expected, and never occurs, except in extraordinary cases. The second reading is foramendments and debate, and this reading usually takes place in Committee of the Whole in the House of Representatives, and inquasicommittee in the Senate. The third reading, after the bill is engrossed, is for passage; and then it cannot be amended, and is usually voted upon with little or no debate. Now, it is apparent that the second reading of the bill is the important one—that it is the legislative—the law-making—reading; the one at which the collective wisdom of the House is concentrated upon it, to free it from defects, and to improve it to the utmost—to illustrate its nature, and trace its consequences. The bill is drawn up in a committee; or it is received from a department in the form of aprojet de loi, and reported by a committee; or it is the work of a single member, and introduced on leave. The bill, before perfected by amendments, is the work of a committee, or of a head of a department, or of a single member; and if amendments are prevented, then the legislative power of the House is annihilated; the edict of a secretary, of a committee, or of a member, becomes the law; and the collected and concentrated wisdom and experience of the House has never been brought to bear upon it.

"The previous question cuts off amendments; and, therefore, neither in England nor in the United States, until now, in the House of Representatives, has that question ever been applied to bills in Committee of the Whole, on the second reading. This question annihilates legislation, sets at nought the wisdom of the House, and expunges the minority. It is always an invidious question, but seldom enforced in England, and but little used in the earlier periods of our own government. It has never been used in the Senate at all, never at any stage of the bill; in the House of Representatives it has never been used on the second reading of a bill, in Committee of the Whole, until the present session—this session, so ominous in its call and commencement, and which gives daily proof of its alarming tendencies, and of its unconstitutional, dangerous, and corrupting measures. The previous question has never yet been applied in this chamber; and to apply it now, at this ominous session, when all the old federal measures of fifty years ago are to be conglomerated into one huge and frightful mass, and rushed through by one convulsive effort; to apply it now, under such circumstances, is to muzzle the mouths, to gag the jaws, and tie up the tongues of those whose speeches would expose the enormities which cannot endure the light, and present to the people these ruinous measures in the colors in which they ought to be seen.

"The opinion of the people is invoked—they are said to be opposed to long speeches, and in favor of action. But, do they want action without deliberation, without consideration, without knowing what we are doing? Do they want bills without amendments—without examination of details—without a knowledge of their effect and operation when they are passed? Certainly the people wish no such thing. They want nothing which will not bear discussion. The people are in favor of discussion, and never read our debates with more avidity than at this ominous and critical extraordinary session. But I can well conceive of those who are against those debates, and want them stifled. Old sedition law federalism is against them: the cormorants who are whetting their bills for the prey which the acts of this session are to give them, are against them: and the advocates of these acts, who cannot answer these arguments, and who shelter weakness underdignifiedsilence, they are all weary, sick and tired of a contest which rages on one side only, and which exposes at once the badness of their cause and the defeat of its defenders. Sir, this call for action! action! action! (as it was well said yesterday), comes from those whose cry is, plunder! plunder! plunder!

"The previous question, and the old sedition law, are measures of the same character, and children of the same parents, and intended for the same purposes. They are to hide light—to enable those in power to work in darkness—to enable them to proceed unmolested—and to permit them to establish ruinous measures without stint, and without detection. The introduction of this previous question into this body, I shall resist as I would resist its conversion into a bed of justice—Lit de Justice—of the old French monarchy, for the registration of royal edicts. In these beds of justice—the Parliament formed into a bed of justice—the kings before the revolution, caused their edicts to be registered without debate, and without amendment. The king ordered it, and it was done—his word became law. On one occasion, when the Parliament was refractory, Louis XIV. entered the chamber, booted and spurred—a whip in his hand—a horsewhip in his hand—and stood on his feet until the edict was registered. This is what has been done in the way of passing bills without debate or amendment, in France. But, in extenuation of this conduct of Louis the XIV., it must be remembered that he was a very young man when he committed this indiscretion, more derogatory to himself than to the Parliament which was the subject of the indignity. He never repeated it in his riper age, for he was a gentleman as well as a king, and in a fifty years' reign never repeated that indiscretion of his youth. True, no whips may be brought into our legislative halls to enforce the gag and the muzzle, but I go against the things themselves—against the infringement of the right of speech—and against the annihilation of our legislative faculties by annihilating the right of making amendments. I go against these; and say that we shall be nothing but a bed of justice for the registration of presidential, or partisan, or civil chieftain edicts, when debates and amendments are suppressed in this body.

"Sir, when the previous question shall be brought into this chamber—when it shall be applied to our bills in ourquasicommittee—I am ready to see my legislative life terminated. I want no seat here when that shall be the case. As the Romans held their natural lives, so do I hold my political existence. The Roman carried his life on the point of his sword; and when that life ceased to be honorable to himself, or useful to his country, he fell upon his sword, and died. This made of that people the most warlike and heroic nation of the earth. What they did with their natural lives, I am willing to do with my legislative and political existence: I am willing to terminate it, either when it shall cease to be honorable to myself, or useful to my country; and that I feel would be the case when this chamber, stripped of its constitutional freedom, shall receive the gag and muzzle of the previous question."

Mr. Clay again took the floor. He spoke mildly, and coaxingly—reminded the minority of their own course when in power—gave a hint about going into executive business—but still felt it his duty to give the majority the control of the public business, notwithstanding the threatened resistance of the minority.

"He (Mr.Clay) would, however, say that after all, he thought the gentlemen on the other side would find it was better to go on with the public business harmoniously and good humoredly together, and all would get along better. He would remind the gentlemen of their own course when in power, and the frequent occasions on which the minority then acted with courtesy in allowing their treasury note bills to pass, and on various other occasions. He thought it was understood that they were to go into executive session, and afterwards take up the loan bill. He should feel it his duty to take measures to give the majority the control of the business, maugre all the menaces that had been made."

Here was a great change of tone, and the hint about going into executive business was a sign of hesitation, faintly counterbalanced by the reiteration of his purpose under a sense of duty. It was still the morning hour—the hour for motions, before the calendar was called: the hour for the motion he had been expected to make. That motion was evidently deferred. The intimation of going into executive business, was a surprise. Such business was regularly gone into towards the close of the day's session—after the day's legislative work was done; and this course was never departed from except in emergent cases—cases which would consume a whole day, or could not wait till evening: and no such cases were known to exist at present. This was a pause, and losing a day in the carrying along of those very measures, for hastening which the new rule was wanted. Mr. Calhoun, to take advantage of the hesitation which he perceived, and to increase it, by daring the threatened measure, instantly rose. He was saluted with cries that "the morning hour was out:" "not yet!" said he: "it lacks one minute of it; and I avail myself of that minute:" and then went on for several minutes.

"He thought this business closely analogous to the alien and sedition laws. Here was a palpable attempt to infringe the right of speech. He would tell the senator that the minority had rights under the constitution which they meant to exercise, and let the senator try when he pleased to abridge those rights, he would find it no easy job. When had that (our) side of the Senate ever sought to protract discussion unnecessarily? [Cries of 'never! never!'] Where was there a body that had less abused its privileges? If the gag-law was attempted to be put in force, he would resist it to the last. As judgment had been pronounced, he supposed submission was expected. The unrestrained liberty of speech, and freedom of debate, had been preserved in the Senate for fifty years. But now the warning was given that the yoke was to be put on it which had already been placed on the other branch of Congress. There never had been a body in this or any other country, in which, for such a length of time, so much dignity and decorum of debate had been maintained. It was remarkable for the fact, the range of discussion was less discursive than in any other similar body known. Speeches were uniformly confined to the subject under debate. There could be no pretext for interference. There was none but that of all despotisms. He would give the senator from Kentucky notice to bring on his gag measure as soon as he pleased. He would find it no such easy matter as he seemed to think."

Mr. Linn, of Missouri, rose the instant Mr. Calhoun stopped, and inquired of the Chair if the morning hour was out. The presidentpro temporeanswered that it was. Mr. Linn said, he desired to say a few words. The chair referred him to the Senate, in whose discretion it was, to depart from the rule. Mr. Linn appealed to the Senate: it gave him leave: and he stood up and said:

"It was an old Scottish proverb, that threatened people live longest. He hoped the liberties of the Senate would yet outlive the threats of the senator from Kentucky. But, if the lash was to be applied, he would rather it was applied at once, than to be always threatened withit. There is great complaint of delay; but who was causing the delay now growing out of this threat? Had it not been made, there would be no necessity for repelling it. He knew of no disposition on the part of his friends to consume the time that ought to be given to the public business. He had never known his friends, while in the majority, to complain of discussion. He knew very well, and could make allowances, that the senator from Kentucky was placed in a very trying situation. He knew, also, that his political friends felt themselves to be in a very critical condition. If he brought forward measures that were questionable, he had to encounter resistance. But he was in the predicament that he had pledged himself to carry those measures, and, if he did not, it would be his political ruin. He had every thing on the issue, hence his impatience to pronounce judgment against the right of the minority to discuss his measures."

Mr. Clay interrupted Mr. Linn, to say that he had not offered to pronounce judgment. Mr. Linn gave his words "that if the Senate was disposed to do as he thought it ought to do, they would adopt the same rule as the other House." Mr. Clay admitted the words; and Mr. Linn claimed their meaning as pronouncing judgment on the duty of the Senate, and said:

"Very well; if the senator was in such a critical condition as to be obliged to say he cannot get his measures through without cutting off debates, why does he not accept the proposition of taking the vote on his bank bill on Monday? If he brings forward measures that have been battled against successfully for a quarter of a century, is it any wonder that they should be opposed, and time should be demanded to discuss them? The senator is aware that whiggery is dying off in the country, and that there is no time to be lost: unless he and his friends pass these measures they are ruined. All he should say to him was, pass them if he could. If, in order to do it, he is obliged to come on with his gag law, he (Mr.Linn) would say to his friends, let them meet him like men. He was not for threatening, but if he was obliged to meet the crisis, he would do it as became him."

Mr. Berrien, apparently acting on the hint of Mr. Clay, moved to go into the consideration of executive business. A question of order was raised upon that motion by Mr. Calhoun. The Chair decided in its favor. Mr. Calhoun demanded what was the necessity for going into executive business? Mr. Berrien did not think it proper to discuss that point: so the executive session was gone into: and when it was over, the Senate adjourned for the day.

Here, then, was a day lost for such pressing business—the bill, which was so urgent, and the motion, which was intended to expedite it. Neither of them touched: and the omission entirely the fault of the majority. There was evidently a balk. This was the 15th of July. The 16th came, and was occupied with the quiet transaction of business: not a word said about the new rules. The 17th came, and as soon as the Senate met, Mr. Calhoun took the floor; and after presenting some resolutions from a public meeting in Virginia, condemning the call of the extra session, and all its measures, he passed on to correct an erroneous idea that had got into the newspapers, that he himself, in 1812, at the declaration of war against Great Britain, being acting chairman of the committee of foreign relations, who had reported the war bill, had stifled discussion—had hurried the bill through, and virtually gagged the House. He gave a detail of circumstances, which showed the error of this report—that all the causes of war had been discussed before—that there was nothing new to be said, nor desire to speak: and that, for one hour before the vote was taken, there was a pause in the House, waiting for a paper from the department; and no one choosing to occupy any part of it with a speech, for or against the war, or on any subject. He then gave a history of the introduction of the previous question into the House of Representatives.

"It had been never used before the 11th Congress (1810-12). It was then adopted, as he always understood, in consequence of the abuse of the right of debate by Mr. Gardinier of New York, remarkable for his capacity for making long speeches. He could keep the floor for days. The abuse was considered so great, that the previous question was introduced to prevent it; but so little was it in favor with those who felt themselves forced to adopt it, that he would venture to say without having looked at the journals, that it was not used half a dozen times during the whole war, with a powerful and unscrupulous opposition, and that in a body nearly two-thirds the size of the present House. He believed he might go farther, and assert that it was never used but twice during that eventful period. And now, a measure introduced under such pressing circumstances, and so sparingly used, is to be made the pretext for introducing the gag-law into the Senate, a body so much smaller, and so distinguished for the closeness of its debate and the brevity of its discussion. He would add that from the first introduction of the previous question into the House of Representatives,his impression was that it was not used but four times in seventeen years, that is from 1811 to 1828, the last occasion on the passage of the tariff bill. He now trusted that he had repelled effectually the attempt to prepare the country for the effort to gag the Senate, by a reference to the early history of the previous question in the other House."

Mr. Calhoun then referred to a decision made by Mr. Clay when Speaker of the House, and the benefit of which he claimed argumentatively. Mr. Clay disputed his recollection: Mr. Calhoun reiterated. The senators became heated, Mr. Clay calling out from his seat—"No, sir, No!"—and Mr. Calhoun answering back as he stood—"Yes, sir, yes:" and each giving his own version of the circumstance without convincing the other. He then returned to the point of irritation—the threatened gag;—and said:

"The senator from Kentucky had endeavored to draw a distinction between the gag law and the old sedition law. He (Mr. Calhoun) admitted there was a distinction—the modern gag law was by far the most odious. The sedition law was an attempt to gag the people in their individual character, but the senator's gag was an attempt to gag the representatives of the people, selected as their agents to deliberate, discuss, and decide on the important subjects intrusted by them to this government."

This was a taunt, and senators looked to see what would follow. Mr. Clay rose, leisurely, and surveying the chamber with a pleasant expression of countenance, said:

"The morning had been spent so very agreeably, that he hoped the gentlemen were in a good humor to go on with the loan bill, and afford the necessary relief to the Treasury."

The loan bill was then taken up, and proceeded with in a most business style, and quite amicably. And this was the last that was heard of the hour rule, and the previous question in the Senate: and the secret history of their silent abandonment was afterwards fully learnt. Several whig senators had yielded assent to Mr. Clay's desire for the hour rule under the belief that it would only be resisted parliamentarily by the minority; but when they saw its introduction was to produce ill blood, and disagreeable scenes in the chamber, they withdrew their assent; and left him without the votes to carry it: and that put an end to the project of the hour rule. The previous question was then agreed to in its place, supposing the minority would take it as a "compromise;" but when they found this measure was to be resisted like the former, and was deemed still more odious, hurtful and degrading, they withdrew their assent again: and then Mr. Clay, brought to a stand again for want of voters, was compelled to forego his design; and to retreat from it in the manner which has been shown. He affected a pleasantry, but was deeply chagrined, and the more so for having failed in the House where he acted in person, after succeeding in the other where he acted vicariously. Many of his friends were much dissatisfied. One of them said to me: "He gives your party a great deal of trouble, and his own a great deal more." Thus, the firmness of the minority in the Senate—it may be said, their courage, for their intended resistance contemplated any possible extremity—saved the body from degradation—constitutional legislation from suppression—the liberty of speech from extinction, and the honor of republican government from a disgrace to which the people's representatives are not subjected in any monarchy in Europe. The previous question has not been called in the British House of Commons in one hundred years—and never in the House of Peers.

Such was the title of the bill which was brought into the House of Representatives for an indemnity, as it was explained to be, to the family of the late President for his expenses in the presidential election, and in removing to the seat of government. The bill itself was in these words: "That the Secretary of the Treasury pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Mrs. Harrison, widow of William Henry Harrison, late President of the United States, or in the event of her death before payment, to the legal representatives of the said William Henry Harrison,the sum of $25,000." Mr. John Quincy Adams, as reporter of the bill from the select committee to which had been referred that portion of the President's message relating to the family of his predecessor, explained the motives on which the bill had been founded; and said:

"That this sum ($25,000), as far as he understood, was in correspondence with the prevailing sentiment of the joint committee raised on this subject, and of which the gentleman now in the chair had been a member. There had been some difference of opinion among the members of the committee as to the sum which it would be proper to appropriate, and, also, on the part of one or two gentlemen as to the constitutionality of the act itself in any shape. There had been more objection to the constitutionality than there had been as to the sum proposed. So far as there had been any discussion in the committee, it seemed to be the general sense of those composing it, that some provision ought to be made for the family of the late President, not in the nature of a grant, but as an indemnity for actual expenses incurred by himself first, when a candidate for the presidency. It had been observed in the committee, and it must be known to all members of the House, that, in the situation in which General Harrison had been placed—far from the seat of government, and for eighteen months or two years, while a candidate for the presidency, exposed to a heavy burden of expense which he could not possibly avoid—it was no more than equitable that he should, to a reasonable degree, be indemnified. He had been thus burdened while in circumstances not opulent; but, on the contrary, it had been one ground on which he had received so decided proof of the people's favor, that through a long course of public service he remained poor, which was in itself a demonstrative proof that he had remained pure also. Such had been his condition before leaving home to travel to the seat of government. After his arrival here, he had been exposed to another considerable burden of expense, far beyond any amount he had received from the public purse during the short month he had continued to be President. His decease had left his family in circumstances which would be much improved by this act of justice done to him by the people, through their representatives. The feeling was believed to be very general throughout the country, and without distinction of party, in favor of such a measure."

This bill, on account of its principle, gave rise to a vehement opposition on the part of some members who believed they saw in it a departure from the constitution, and the establishment of a dangerous precedent. Mr. Payne, of Alabama, said:

"As he intended to vote against this proposition it was due to himself to state the reasons which would actuate him. In doing so he was not called to examine either the merits or demerits of General Harrison. They had nothing to do with the question. The question before the House was, not whether General Harrison was or was not a meritorious individual, but whether that House would make an appropriation to his widow and descendants. That being the question, the first inquiry was, had the House a right to vote this money, and, if they had, was it proper to do so? Mr. P. was one of those who believed that Congress had no constitutional right to appropriate the public money for such an object. He quoted the language of the constitution, and then inquired whether this was an appropriation to pay the debts of the Union, to secure the common defence, or to promote the general welfare? He denied that precedents ever ought to be considered as settling a constitutional question. If they could, then the people had no remedy. It was not pretended that this money was to be given as a reward for General Harrison's public services, but to reimburse him for the expense of an electioneering campaign. This was infinitely worse."

Mr. Gilmer, of Virginia, said:

"When he had yesterday moved for the rising of the committee, he had not proposed to himself to occupy much of the time of the House in debate, nor was such his purpose at present. With every disposition to vote for this bill, he had then felt, and he still felt, himself unable to give it his sanction, and that for reasons which had been advanced by many of the advocates in its favor. This was not a place to indulge feeling and sympathy: if it were, he presumed there would be but one sentiment throughout that House and throughout the country, and that would be in favor of the bill. If this were an act of generosity, if the object were to vote a bounty, a gratuity, to the widow or relatives of the late President, it seemed to Mr. G. that they ought not to vote it in the representative capacity, out of the public funds, but privately from their own personal resources. They had no right to be generous with the money of the people. Gentlemen might bestow as much out of their own purses as they pleased; but they were here as trustees for the property of others, and no public agent was at liberty to disregard the trust confided to him under the theory of our government. It was quite needless here to attempt an eulogy on the character of the illustrious dead: history has done and would hereafter do ample justice to the civil and military character of William Henry Harrison. The result of the recent election, a result unparalleled in the annals of this country, spoke the sentiment ofthe nation in regard to his merits, while the drapery of death which shrouded the legislative halls, the general gloom which overspread the nation, spoke that sentiment in accents mournfully impressive. But those rhapsodies in which gentlemen had indulged, might, he thought, better be deferred for some Fourth of July oration, or at least reserved for other theatres than this. They had come up here not to be generous, but to be just. His object now was to inquire whether they could not place this bill on the basis of indisputable justice, so that it might not be carried by a mere partial vote, but might conciliate the support of gentlemen of all parties, and from every quarter of the Union. He wished, if possible, to see the whole House united, so as to give to their act the undivided weight of public sentiment. Mr. G. said he could not bow to the authority of precedent; he should ever act under the light of the circumstances which surrounded him. His wish was, not to furnish an evil precedent to others by his example. He thought the House in some danger of setting one of that character; a precedent which might hereafter be strained and tortured to apply to cases of a very different kind, and objects of a widely different character. He called upon the advocates of the bill to enable all the members of the House, or as nearly all as was practicable (for, after what had transpired yesterday, he confessed his despair of seeing the House entirely united), to agree in voting for the bill."

There was an impatient majority in the House in favor of the passage of the bill, and to that impatience Mr. Gilmer referred as making despair of any unanimity in the House, or of any considerate deliberation. The circumstances were entirely averse to any such deliberation—a victorious party, come into power after a most heated election, seeing their elected candidate dying on the threshold of his administration, poor, and beloved: it was a case for feeling more than of judgment, especially with the political friends of the deceased—but few of whom could follow the counsels of the head against the impulsions of the heart. Amongst these few Mr. Gilmer was one, and Mr. Underwood of Kentucky, another; who said:

"His heart was on one side and his judgment upon the other. If this was a new case, he might be led away by his heart; but as he had heretofore, in his judgment, opposed all such claims he should do so now. He gave his reasons thus at large, because a gentleman from Indiana, on the other side of the House, denounced those who should vote against the bill. He objected, because it was retroactive in its provisions, and because it called into existence legislative discretion, and applied it to past cases—because it provided for the widow of a President for services rendered by her husband while in office, thus increasing the President's compensation after his death. If it applied to the widow of the President, it applied to the widows of military officers. He considered if this bill passed, that Mr. Jefferson's heirs might with equal propriety claim the same compensation."

If the House had been in any condition for considerate legislation there was an amendment proposed by Mr. Gordon of New York, which might have brought it forth. He proposed an indemnity equal to the amount of one quarter's salary, $6,250. He proposed it, but got but little support for his proposition, the majority calling for the question, and some declaring themselves for $50,000, and some for $100,000. The vote was taken, and showed 66 negatives, comprehending the members who were best known to the country as favorable to a strict construction of the constitution, and an economical administration of the government. The negatives were:

Archibald H. Arrington, Charles G. Atherton, Linn Banks, Henry W. Beeson, Linn Boyd, David P. Brewster, Aaron V. Brown, Charles Brown, Edmund Burke, William O. Butler, Green W. Caldwell, Patrick C. Caldwell, John Campbell, George B. Cary, Reuben Chapman, Nathan Clifford, James G. Clinton, Walter Coles, John R. J. Daniel, Richard D. Davis, William Doan, Andrew W. Doig, Ira A. Eastman, John C. Edwards, Joseph Egbert, John G. Floyd, Charles A. Floyd, James Gerry, William O. Goode, Samuel Gordon, Amos Gustine, William A. Harris, Samuel L. Hays, George W. Hopkins, Jacob Houck, jr., Edmund W. Hubard, Robert M. T. Hunter, Cave Johnson, John W. Jones, George M. Keim, Andrew Kennedy, Joshua A. Lowell, Abraham McClellan, Robert McClellan, James J. McKay, Albert G. Marchand, Alfred Marshall, John Thompson Mason, James Mathews, William Medill, John Miller, Peter Newhard, William W. Payne, Francis W. Pickens, Arnold Plumer, John R. Reding, James Rogers, Romulus M. Saunders, Tristram Shaw, John Snyder, Lewis Steenrod, Hopkins L. Turney, Joseph R. Underwood, Harvey M. Watterson, John B. Weller, James W. Williams.

Carried to the Senate for its concurrence, the bill continued to receive there a determined opposition from a considerable minority. Mr. Calhoun said:

"He believed no government on earth leaned more than ours towards all the corruptions of an enormous pension list. Not even the aristocratic government of Great Britain has a stronger tendency to it than this government. This is no new thing. It was foreseen from the beginning, and the great struggle then was, to keep out the entering wedge. He recollected very well, when he was at the head of the War Department, and the military pension bill passed, that while it was under debate, it was urged as a very small matter—only an appropriation of something like $150,000 to poor and meritorious soldiers of the Revolution, who would not long remain a burden on the Treasury. Small as the sum was, and indisputable as were the merits of the claimants, it was with great difficulty the bill passed. Why was this difficulty—this hesitation on such an apparently irresistible claim? Because it was wisely argued, and with a spirit of prophecy since fulfilled, that it would prove an entering wedge, which, once admitted, would soon rend the pillar of democracy. And what has been the result of that trifling grant? It is to be found in the enormous pension list of this government at the present day."He asked to have any part of the Constitution pointed out in which there was authority for making such an appropriation as this. If the authority exists in the Constitution at all, it exists to a much greater extent than has yet been acted upon, and it is time to have the fact known. If the Constitution authorizes Congress to make such an appropriation as this for a President of the United States, it surely authorizes it to make an appropriation of like nature for a doorkeeper of the Senate of the United States, or for any other officer of the government. There can be no distinction drawn. Pass this act, and the precedent is established for the family of every civil officer in the government to be placed on the pension list. Is not this the consummation of the tendency so long combated? But the struggle is in vain—there is not, he would repeat, a government on the face of the earth, in which there is such a tendency to all the corruptions of an aristocratic pension list as there is in this."

"He asked to have any part of the Constitution pointed out in which there was authority for making such an appropriation as this. If the authority exists in the Constitution at all, it exists to a much greater extent than has yet been acted upon, and it is time to have the fact known. If the Constitution authorizes Congress to make such an appropriation as this for a President of the United States, it surely authorizes it to make an appropriation of like nature for a doorkeeper of the Senate of the United States, or for any other officer of the government. There can be no distinction drawn. Pass this act, and the precedent is established for the family of every civil officer in the government to be placed on the pension list. Is not this the consummation of the tendency so long combated? But the struggle is in vain—there is not, he would repeat, a government on the face of the earth, in which there is such a tendency to all the corruptions of an aristocratic pension list as there is in this."

Mr. Woodbury said:

"This was the first instance within his (Mr. W.'s) knowledge, of an application to pension a civil officer being likely to succeed; and a dangerous innovation, he felt convinced, it would prove. Any civil officer, by the mere act of taking possession of his office for a month, ought to get his salary for a year, on the reasoning adopted by the senator from Delaware, though only performing a month's service. If that can be shown to be right, he (Mr. W.) would go for this, and all bills of the kind. But it must first be shown satisfactorily. If this lady was really poor, there would be some plea for sympathy, at least. But he could point to hundreds who have that claim, and not on account of civil, but military service, who yet have obtained no such grant, and never will. He could point to others in the civil service, who had gone to great expense in taking possession of office and then died, but no claim of this kind was encouraged, though their widows were left in most abject poverty. All analogy in civil cases was against going beyond the death of the incumbent in allowing either salary or gratuity."

Mr. Pierce said:

"Without any feelings adverse to this claim, political or otherwise, he protested against any legislation based upon oursympathies—he protested against the power and dominion of that 'inward arbiter,' which in private life was almost sure to lead us right; but, as public men, and as the dispensers of other men's means—other men's contributions—was quite as sure to lead us wrong. It made a vast difference whether we paid the money from our own pockets, or drew it from the pockets of our constituents. He knew his weakness on this point,personally, but it would be his steady purpose, in spite of taunts and unworthy imputations, to escape from it, as the representative of others. But he was departing from the object which induced him, for a moment, to trespass upon the patience of the Senate. This claim did not come from the family. No gentleman understood on what ground it was placed. The indigence of the family had not even been urged: he believed they were not only in easy circumstances, but affluent. It was not for loss of limb, property, or life, in the military service. If for any thing legitimate, in any sense, or by any construction, it was for the civil services of the husband; and, in this respect, was a broad and dangerous precedent."

In saying that the claim did not come from the family of General Harrison, Mr. Pierce spoke the words which all knew to be true. Where then did it come from? It came, as was well known at the time, from persons who had advanced moneys to the amount of about $22,000, for the purposes mentioned in the bill; and who had a claim upon the estate to that amount.

Mr. Benton moved to recommit the bill with instructions to prefix a preamble, or insert an amendment showing upon what ground the grant was motived. The bill itself showed no grounds for the grant. It was, on its face, a simple legislative donation of money to a lady, describing her as the widow of the late President; but in no way connecting either herself, or her deceased husband, with any act or fact as the alleged ground of the grant. The grant is without consideration: the donee is merelydescribed, to prevent the donation from going to a wrong person. It was to go to Mrs. Harrison. What Mrs. Harrison? Why, the widow of the late President Harrison. This was descriptive, and sufficiently descriptive; for it would carry the money to the right person. But why carry it? That was the question which the bill had not answered; for there is nothing in the mere fact of being the widow of a President which could entitle the widow to a sum of public money. This was felt by the reporter of the bill, and endeavored to be supplied by an explanation, that it was not a "grant" but an "indemnity;" and an indemnity for "actual expenses incurred when he was a candidate for the presidency;" and for expenses incurred after his "arrival at the seat of government;" and as "some provision for his family;" and because he was "poor." Now why not put these reasons into the bill? Was the omission oversight, or design? If oversight, it should be corrected; if design, it should be thwarted. The law should be complete in itself. It cannot be helped out by a member's speech. It was not oversight which caused the omission. The member who reported the bill is not a man to commit oversights. It was design! and because such reasons could not be put on the face of the bill! could not be voted upon by yeas and nays! and therefore must be left blank, that every member may vote upon what reasons he pleases, without being committed to any. This is not the way to legislate; and, therefore, the author of this View moved the re-commitment, with instructions to put a reason on the face of the bill itself, either in the shape of a preamble, or of an amendment—leaving the selection of the reasons to the friends of the bill, who constituted the committee to which it would be sent. Mr. Calhoun supported the motion for re-commitment, and said:

"Is it an unreasonable request to ask the committee for a specific report of the grounds on which they have recommended this appropriation? No; and the gentlemen know it is not unreasonable; but they will oppose it not on that account; they will oppose it because they know such a report would defeat their bill. It could not be sustained in the face of their own report. Not that there would be no ground assumed, but because those who now support the bill do so on grounds as different as any possibly can be; and, if the committee was fastened down to one ground, those who support the others would desert the standard."

The vote was taken on the question, and negatived. The yeas were: Messrs. Allen, Benton, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Fulton, King of Alabama, Linn, McRoberts, Pierce, Sevier Smith of Connecticut, Tappan, Williams of Maine, Woodbury, Wright, Young of Illinois. To the argument founded on the alleged poverty of General Harrison, Mr. Benton replied:

"Look at the case of Mr. Jefferson, a man than whom no one that ever existed on God's earth were the human family more indebted to. His furniture and his estate were sold to satisfy his creditors. His posterity was driven from house and home, and his bones now lay in soil owned by a stranger. His family are scattered; some of his descendants are married in foreign lands. Look at Monroe—the amiable, the patriotic Monroe, whose services were revolutionary, whose blood was spilt in the war of Independence, whose life was worn out in civil service, and whose estate has been sold for debt, his family scattered, and his daughter buried in a foreign land. Look at Madison, the model of every virtue, public or private, and he would only mention in connection with this subject, his love of order, his economy, and his systematic regularity in all his habits of business. He, when his term of eight years had expired, sent a letter to a gentleman (a son of whom is now upon this floor) [Mr.Preston], enclosing a note for five thousand dollars, which he requested him to endorse, and raise the money in Virginia, so as to enable him to leave this city, and return to his modest retreat—his patrimonial inheritance—in that State. General Jackson drew upon the consignee of his cotton crop in New Orleans for six thousand dollars to enable him to leave the seat of government without leaving creditors behind him. These were honored leaders of the republican party. They had all been Presidents. They had made great sacrifices, and left the presidency deeply embarrassed; and yet the republican party who had the power and the strongest disposition to relieve their necessities, felt they had no right to do so by appropriating money from the public Treasury. Democracy would not do this. It was left for the era of federal rule and federal supremacy—who are now rushing the country with steam power into all the abuses and corruptions of a monarchy, with its pensioned aristocracy—and to entail upon the country a civil pension list."To the argument founded on the expense of removing to the seat of government, Mr. Benton replied that there was something in it, and if the bill was limited to indemnity for that expense,and a rule given to go by in all cases, it might find claims to a serious consideration. Such a bill would have principle and reason in it—the same principle and the same reason which allows mileage to a member going to and returning from Congress. The member was supposed during that time to be in the public service (he was certainly out of his own service): he was at expense: and for these reasons he was allowed a compensation for his journeys. But, it was by a uniform rule, applicable to all members, and the same at each session. The same reason and principle with foreign ministers. They received an out-fit before they left home, and an in-fit to return upon. A quarter's salary, was the in-fit: the out-fit was a year's salary, because it included the expense of setting up a house after the minister arrived at his post. The President finds a furnished house on his arrival at the seat of government, so that the principle and reason of the case would not give to him, as to a minister to a foreign court, a full year's salary. The in-fit would be the proper measure; and that rule applied to the coming of the President elect, and to his going when he retires, would give him $6,250 on each occasion. For such an allowance he felt perfectly clear that he could vote as an act of justice; and nearly as clear that he could do it constitutionally. But it would have to be for a general and permanent act."

"To the argument founded on the expense of removing to the seat of government, Mr. Benton replied that there was something in it, and if the bill was limited to indemnity for that expense,and a rule given to go by in all cases, it might find claims to a serious consideration. Such a bill would have principle and reason in it—the same principle and the same reason which allows mileage to a member going to and returning from Congress. The member was supposed during that time to be in the public service (he was certainly out of his own service): he was at expense: and for these reasons he was allowed a compensation for his journeys. But, it was by a uniform rule, applicable to all members, and the same at each session. The same reason and principle with foreign ministers. They received an out-fit before they left home, and an in-fit to return upon. A quarter's salary, was the in-fit: the out-fit was a year's salary, because it included the expense of setting up a house after the minister arrived at his post. The President finds a furnished house on his arrival at the seat of government, so that the principle and reason of the case would not give to him, as to a minister to a foreign court, a full year's salary. The in-fit would be the proper measure; and that rule applied to the coming of the President elect, and to his going when he retires, would give him $6,250 on each occasion. For such an allowance he felt perfectly clear that he could vote as an act of justice; and nearly as clear that he could do it constitutionally. But it would have to be for a general and permanent act."

The bill was passed by a bare quorum, 28 affirmatives out of 52. The negatives were 16: so that 18 senators—being a greater number than voted against the bill—were either absent, or avoided the vote. The absentees were considered mostly of that class who were willing to see the bill pass, but not able to vote for it themselves. The yeas and nays were:

Yeas—Messrs. Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Buchanan, Choate, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton, Dixon, Evans, Graham, Huntington, Mangum, Merrick, Miller, Morehead, Phelps, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rives, Simmons, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Tallmadge, Walker, White, Woodbridge.Nays—Messrs. Allen, Benton, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Fulton, King, Linn, McRoberts, Nicholson, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Surgeon, Tappan, Williams, Woodbury, Wright, Young.

Nays—Messrs. Allen, Benton, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Fulton, King, Linn, McRoberts, Nicholson, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Surgeon, Tappan, Williams, Woodbury, Wright, Young.

It was strenuously opposed by the stanch members of the democratic party, and elaborately resisted in a speech from the writer of this View—of which an extract is given in the next chapter.

Mr. Benton said he was opposed to this bill—opposed to it on high constitutional grounds, and upon grounds of high national policy—and could not suffer it to be carried through the Senate without making the resistance to it which ought to be made against a new, dangerous, and unconstitutional measure.

It was a bill to make a grant of money—twenty-five thousand dollars—out of the common Treasury to the widow of a gentleman who had died in a civil office, that of President of the United States; and was the commencement of that system of civil pensions, and support for families, which, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, has divided England, and other European countries into two classes—the tax payers and the tax consumers—and which sends the laboring man supperless to bed.

It is a new case—the first of the kind upon our statute book—and should have been accompanied by a report from a committee, or preceded by a preamble to the bill, or interjected with a declaration, showing the reason for which this grant is made. It is a new case, and should have carried its justification along with it. But nothing of this is done. There is no report from a committee—from the two committees in fact—which sat upon the case. There is no preamble to it, setting forth the reason for the grant. There is no declaration in the body of the bill, showing the reason why this money is voted to this lady. It is simply a bill granting to Mrs. Harrison, widow of William H. Harrison, late President of the United States, the sum of $25,000. Now, all this is wrong, and contrary to parliamentary practice. Reason tells us there should be a report from a committee in such a case. In fact, we have reports every day in every case, no matter how inconsiderable, which even pays a small sum of money to an individual. It is our daily practice, and yet two committees have shrunk from that practice in this new and important case. They would not make a report, though urged to do it. I speak advisedly, for I was of the committee, and know what was done. No report could be obtained;and why? because it was difficult, if not impossible, for any committee to agree upon a reason which would satisfy the constitution, and satisfy public policy, for making this grant. Gentlemen could agree to give the money—they could agree to vote—but they could not agree upon the reason which was to be left upon the record as a justification for the gift and the vote. Being no report, the necessity became apparent for a preamble; but we have none of that. And, worse than all, in the absence of report and preamble, the bill itself is silent on the motive of the grant. It does not contain the usual clause in money bills to individuals, stating, in a few words, for what reason the grant or payment is made. All this is wrong; and I point it out now, both as an argument against the bill, and as a reason for having it recommitted, and returned with a report, or a preamble, or a declaratory clause.

We were told at the last session that a new set of books were to be opened—that the new administration would close up the old books, and open new ones; and truly we find it to be the case. New books of all kinds are opened, as foreign to the constitution and policy of the country, as they are to the former practice of the government, and to the late professions of these new patriots. Many new books are opened, some by executive and some by legislative authority; and among them is this portentous volume of civil pensions, and national recompenses, for the support of families. Military pensions we have always had, and they are founded upon a principle which the mind can understand, the tongue can tell, the constitution can recognize, and public policy can approve. They are founded upon the principle of personal danger and suffering in the cause of the country—upon the loss of life or limb in war. This is reasonable. The man who goes forth, in his country's cause, to be shot at for seven dollars a month, or for forty dollars a month, or even for one or two hundred, and gets his head or his limbs knocked off, is in a very different case from him who serves the same country at a desk or a table, with a quill or a book in his hand, who may quit his place when he sees the enemy coming; and has no occasion to die except in his tranquil and peaceful bed. The case of the two classes is wholly different, and thus far the laws of our country have recognized and maintained the difference. Military pensions have been granted from the foundation of the government—civil pensions, never; and now, for the first time, the attempt is to be made to grant them. A grant of money is to be made to the widow of a gentleman who has not been in the army for near thirty years—who has since that time, been much employed in civil service, and has lately died in a civil office. A pension, or a grant of a gross sum of money, under such circumstances, is a new proceeding under our government, and which finds no warrant in the constitution, and is utterly condemned by high considerations of public policy.

The federal constitution differs in its nature—and differs fundamentally from those of the States. The States, being original sovereignties, may do what they are not prohibited from doing; the federal government, being derivative, and carved out of the States, is like a corporation, the creature of the act which creates it, and can only do what it can show a grant for doing. Now the moneyed power of the federal government is contained in a grant from the States, and that grant authorizes money to be raised either by loans, duties or taxes, for the purpose of paying the debts, supporting the government, and providing for the common defence of the Union. These are the objects to which money may be applied, and this grant to Mrs. Harrison can come within neither of them.

But, gentlemen say this is no pension—it is not an annual payment, but a payment in hand. I say so, too, and that it is so much the more objectionable on that account. A pension must have some rule to go by—so much a month—and generally a small sum, the highest on our pension roll being thirty dollars—and it terminates in a reasonable time, usually five years, and at most for life. A pension granted to Mrs. Harrison on this principle, could amount to no great sum—to a mere fraction, at most, of these twenty-five thousand dollars. It is not a pension, then, but a gift—a gratuity—a large present—a national recompense; and the more objectionable for being so. Neither our constitution, nor the genius of our government, admits of such benefactions. National recompenses are high rewards, and require express powers to grant them in every limited government. TheFrench Consular Constitution of the year 1799, authorized such recompenses; ours does not, and it has not yet been attempted, even in military cases. We have not yet voted a fortune to an officer's or a soldier's family, to lift them from poverty to wealth. These recompenses are worse than pensions: they are equally unfounded in the constitution, more incapable of being governed by any rule, and more susceptible of great and dangerous abuse. We have no rule to go by in fixing the amount. Every one goes by feeling—by his personal or political feeling—or by a cry got up at home, and sent here to act upon him. Hence the diversity of the opinions as to the proper sum to be given. Some gentlemen are for the amount in the bill; some are for double that amount; and some are for nothing. This diversity itself is an argument against the measure. It shows that it has no natural foundation—nothing to rest upon—nothing to go by; no rule, no measure, no standard, by which to compute or compare it. It is all guess-work—the work of the passions or policy—of faction or of party.

By our constitution, the persons who fill offices are to receive a compensation for their services; and, in many cases, this compensation is neither to be increased nor diminished during the period for which the person shall have been elected; and in some there is a prohibition against receiving presents either from foreign States, or from the United States, or from the States of the Union. The office of President comes under all these restrictions, and shows how jealous the framers of the constitution were, of any moneyed influence being brought to bear upon the Chief Magistrate of the Union. All these limitations are for obvious and wise reasons. The President's salary is not to be diminished during the time for which he was elected, lest his enemies, if they get the upper hand of him in Congress, should deprive him of his support, and starve him out of office. It is not to be increased, lest his friends, if they get the upper hand, should enrich him at the public expense; and he is not to receive "any other emolument," lest the provision against an increase of salary should be evaded by the grant of gross sums. These are the constitutional provisions; but to what effect are they, if the sums can be granted to the officer's family, which cannot be granted to himself?—if his widow—his wife—his children can receive what he cannot? In this case, the term for which General Harrison was elected, is not out. It has not expired; and Congress cannot touch his salary or bestow upon him or his, any emolument without a breach of the constitution.

It is in vain to look to general clauses of the constitution. Besides the general spirit of the instrument, there is a specific clause upon the subject of the President's salary and emoluments. It forbids him any compensation, except at stated times, for services rendered; it forbids increase or diminution; and it forbids all emolument. To give salary or emolument to his family, is a mere evasion of this clause. His family is himself—so far as property is concerned, a man's family is himself. And many persons would prefer to have money or property conveyed to his family, or some member of it, because it would then receive the destination which his will would give it, and would be free from the claims or contingencies to which his own property—that in his own name—would be subject. There is nothing in the constitution to warrant this proceeding, and there is much in it to condemn it. It is condemned by all the clauses which relate to the levy, and the application of money; and it is specially condemned by the precise clause which regulates the compensation of the President, and which clause would control any other part of the constitution which might come in conflict with it. Condemned upon the constitutional test, how stands this bill on the question of policy and expediency? It is condemned—utterly condemned, and reprobated, upon that test! The view which I have already presented of the difference between military and naval services (and I always include the naval when I speak of the military) shows that the former are proper subjects for pensions—the latter not. The very nature of the service makes the difference. Differing in principle, as the military and civil pensions do, they differ quite as much when you come to details, and undertake to administer the two classes of rewards. The military has something to go by—some limit to it—and provides for classes of individuals—not for families or for individuals—one by one. Though subject to great abuse, yet the military pensions have some limit—someboundary—to their amount placed upon them. They are limited at least to the amount of armies, and the number of wars. Our armies are small, and our wars few and far between. We have had but two with a civilized power in sixty years. Our navy, also, is limited; and compared to the mass of the population, the army and navy must be always small. Confined to their proper subjects, and military and naval pensions have limits and boundaries which confine them within some bounds; and then the law is the same for all persons of the same rank. The military and naval pensioners are not provided for individually, and therefore do not become a subject of favoritism, of party, or of faction. Not so with civil pensions. There is no limit upon them. They may apply to the family of every person civilly employed—that is, to almost every body—and this without intermission of time; for civil services go on in peace and war, and the claims for them will be eternal when once begun. Then again civil pensions and grants of money are given individually, and not by classes, and every case is governed by the feeling of the moment, and the predominance of the party to which the individual belonged. Every case is the sport of party, of faction, of favoritism; and of feelings excited and got up for the occasion. Thus it is in England, and thus it will be here. The English civil pension list is dreadful, both for the amount paid, and the nature of the services rewarded; but it required centuries for England to ripen her system. Are we to begin it in the first half century of our existence? and begin it without rule or principle to go by? Every thing to be left to impulse and favor—by the politics of the individual, his party affinities, and the political complexion of the party in power.

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