Brooks says regarding the same point: "To train the powers of observation we should practice observing minutely. We should analyze the objects which we look at into their parts, and notice these parts. Objects present themselves to us as wholes; our definite knowledge of them is gained by analysis, by separating them into the elements which compose them. We should therefore give attention to the details of whatever we are considering; and thus cultivate the habit of observing with minuteness.... It is related of a teacher that if, when hearing a class, some one rapped at the door, he would look up as the visitor entered and from a single glance could tellhis appearance and dress, the kind of hat he wore, kind of necktie, collar, vest, coat, shoes, etc. The skillful banker, also, in counting money with wondrous rapidity, will detect and throw from his pile of bills the counterfeits which, to the ordinary eye, seem to be without spot or blemish."
One of the best methods of developing and cultivating the faculty of Perception is to take up some study in which the perceptive facultiesmust beemployed. Botany, physics, geology, natural history give splendid exercise in Perception, providing the student engages in actual experimental work, and actual observation, instead of confining himself to the textbooks. A careful scientific study and examination ofany kind of objects, in a manner calculated to bring out the various points of resemblance and difference, will do most to develop the Perception. Training of this kind will develop these powers to a high degree, in the case of small children.
Drawing is also a great help to the development of Perception. In order to draw a thing correctly we must of necessity examine it in detail; otherwise we will not be able to drawit correctly. In fact, many authorities use the test of drawing to prove the degree of attention and Perception that the student has bestowed upon an object which he has been studying. Others place an object before the pupil for a few minutes, and then withdraw it, the pupil then being required to draw the object roughly but with attention to its leading peculiarities and features. Then the object is again placed before the pupil for study, and he is then again required to draw from memory the additional details he has noticed in it. This process is repeated over and over again, until the pupil has proved that he hasobservedevery possible detail of interest in the object. This exercise has resulted in the cultivation of a high degree of perception in many students, and its simplicity should not detract from its importance. Any person may practice this exercise by himself; or, better still, two or more students may combine and endeavor to excel each other in friendly rivalry, each endeavoring to discover the greatest number of details in the object considered. So rapidly do students improve under this exercise, that a daily record will show a steadyadvance. Simple exercises in drawing are found in the reproduction, from memory, of geography maps, leaves of trees, etc.
Similar exercises may be found in the practice of taking a hasty look at a person, animal or building, and then endeavoring to reproduce in writing the particular points about the person or thing observed. This exercise will reveal rapid progress if persisted in. Or, it may be varied by endeavoring to write out the contents of a room through which one has walked.
The majority of our readers remember the familiar story of Houdin, who so cultivated the faculty of Perception that he was able to pass by a shop-window and afterward state in detail every object in the window. He acquired this power by gradual development, beginning with the observation of a single article in the window, then two, then three and so on. Others have followed his method with great success. Speaking of Houdin's wonderful Perception, Halleck says: "A wide-awake eagle would probably see more of a thing at one glance than would a drowsy lizard in a quarter of an hour. Extreme rapidity of Perception, due to careful training, was one of the factors enabling Houdin and his son to astonish everybody and to amass a fortune. He placed a domino before the boy, and instead of allowing him to count the spots, required him to give the sum total at once. This exercise was continued until each could give instantaneously the sum of the spots on a dozen dominoes. The sum was given just as accurately as if five minutes had been consumed in adding." Houdin, in his Memoirs relating the above facts regarding his own methods, states with due modesty, that many women far excel him in this respect. He says: "I can safely assert that a lady seeing another pass at full speed in a carriage will have had time to analyze her toilette from her bonnet to her shoes, and be able to describe not only the fashion and quality of the stuffs, but also say if the lace be real or only machine made."
There are a number of games played by children which tend to the cultivation of the Perception, and which might well be adapted for the use of older people. These games are based on the general principle of the variousparticipants taking a brief view of a number of objects displayed in one's hand, on a table, in a box, etc., and then stating what he or she has seen. There will be noticed a wonderful difference in the degree of Perception manifested by the various participants. And, equally interesting will be the degrees of progress noted after playing this game over several times, allowing time for rest between the series of games. It is a fact well known in police circles that thieves often train boys in this way, following this course by another in which the lads are expected to take in the contents of a room, the windows, locks, etc., at a glance. They are then graduated into spies looking out the details of the scenes of future robberies.
In our volume of this series, devoted to the consideration of the Memory, we have related a number of exercises and methods, similar to those given above, by which the Perception may be cultivated. Perception plays a most important place in memory, for upon the clearness of the percepts depends to a great degree the clearness of the impressions made upon the memory. So close is the connection between Memory and Perception that the cultivation of one tends to develop the other. For instance, the cultivation of the Memory necessitates the sharpening of the Perception in the direction of obtaining clear original impressions; while the cultivation of Perception naturally develops the Memory by reason of the fact that the latter is used in testing and proving the clearness and degree of Perception. This being the case, those who find that the exercises and methods given above are too arduous may substitute the simple exercise of remembering as many details as possible of things they see. This effort to impress the memory will involuntarily bring into action the perceptive faculties in the acquirement of the original impressions, so that in the end the Perception will be found to have developed.
Teachers and those having to do with children should realize the great value of the cultivation of Perception in the young, and thus establishing valuable habits of observation among them. The experience and culture thus acquired will prove of great value in their after life. As Brooks well says on this subject: "Teachers should appreciate the value of the culture of the perceptive powers, and endeavor to do something to afford this culture. Let it be remembered that by training the powers of observation of pupils, we lead them to acquire definite ideas of things, enable them to store their minds with fresh and interesting knowledge, lay the foundation for literary or business success, and thus do much to enhance their happiness in life and add to the sum of human knowledge."
REPRESENTATION
Sensation and Perception, as considered in the preceding chapter, are what are called by psychologists "Processes of Presentation." By Presentation is meant the direct offering to the consciousness of mental images or objects of thought. If there were no faculty of the mind capable of retaining andre-presenting to the consciousness the impression or record of Perception, we could never progress in knowledge, for each percept would be new each time it was presented and there would be no recognition of it as having been previously perceived, nor would there be any power to voluntarily recall any percept previously acquired. In short, we would be without that power of the mind called Memory.
But, fortunately for us as thinkers, we possess the power of Representation; that is, of reproducing past perceptions and experiences in the shape ofmental imagesor pictures, "in the mind's eye," so to speak, which relievesus of the necessity of directly and immediately perceiving an object each time we desire or are required to think of it. The processes whereby this becomes possible are called the processes of Representation, for the reason that by them past experiences of Perception arere-presented to the consciousness.
The subject of Representation is closely bound up with that of Memory. Strictly speaking, Representation may be said to be one phase of Memory; Association of Ideas another; and the authorities prefer to treat the whole subject under the general head of Memory. We have written a work on "Memory" which forms one of the volumes of the present series, and we have no intention, or desire, to repeat here the information given in that work. But we must consider the subject of Representation at this point in order to maintain the logical unity of the present general subject of Thought-Culture. The student will also notice, of course, the close relation between the processes of Representation and those of the Imagination, which we shall consider in other chapters of this work.
Memory has several phases, the usual classification of which is as follows: (1) Impression; (2) Retention; (3) Recollection; (4) Representation, and (5) Recognition. Each phase requires the operation of special mental processes.Impressionis the process whereby the impressions of Perception are recorded or stamped upon the subconscious field of mentality, as the impress of the die upon the wax.Retentionis the process whereby the subconsciousnessretainsor holds the impressions so received.Recollectionis the process by which the mindre-collectsthe impressions retained in the subconsciousness, bringing them again into consciousness as objects of knowledge.Representationis the process whereby the impressions so re-collected arepictured or imagedin the mind.Recognitionis the process whereby the mindrecognizesthe mental image or picture so re-presented to it as connected with its past experience.
As we have stated, we have considered the general subject of Memory in another volume of this series and, therefore, shall not attempt to enter into a discussion of its general subject at this place. We shall, accordingly, limitourselves here to a brief consideration of the phase of Representation and its cultivation.
Representation, of course, depends upon the preceding phases of Memory known as Impression, Retention and Recollection. Unless the Impression is clear; unless the Retention is normal, there can be no Representation. And unless onerecollectsthere can be no Representation. Recollection (which is really a re-collection of percepts) must precede Representation in the shape of mental images or pictures. Recollection re-collects the mental materials out of which the image is to be constructed. But, as Brooks says: "It is not to be assumed that knowledge is retained as a picture; but that it isrecreatedin the form of a picture or some other mental product when it is recalled." The process is analogous to the transmutation of the sound-waves entering the receiver of a telephone, into electrical-waves which are transmitted to the receiver, where they are in turn re-transmuted to sound-waves which enter the ear of the listener. It will be seen at once that there is the closest possible relation between the processes of Representation and those of Memory—in fact, it is quite difficult to draw a clear line of division between them. Some make the distinction that Representation furnishes us with an exact reproduction ofthe past; while Imagination combines our mental images intonew products. That is, Representation merelyreproduces; while Imaginationcreatesby forming new combinations; or Representation deals with a reproduction of the Actual; while Imagination deals with the Ideal.
Wundt speaking of this difficult distinction says: "Psychologists are accustomed to definememory imagesas ideas whichexactly reproducesome previous perception, andfancy imagesas ideas consisting of a combination of elements taken from a whole number of perceptions. Now memory images in the sense of this definition simply do not exist.... Try, for instance, to draw from memory some landscape picture which you have only once seen, and then compare your copy with the original. You will expect to find plenty of mistakes and omissions; but you will also invariably find that you have put in a great deal which was not in the original, butwhich comes from landscape pictures which you have seen somewhere else."
While we generally speak of Representationpicturingthe recollected percepts, still, we must not make the mistake of supposing that it is concerned with, or limited to, only mental pictures. We are able torepresentnot only visual percepts but also sounds, smells, tastes or feelings, often so vividly that they appear as almost actually existent. We may also evenrepresent, symbolically the processes of reasoning, mathematical operations, etc. In short nearly, if not all experiences which are possible in Presentation are also possible in Representation.
The phase of Representation, in the processes of Memory, is of course subject to the general laws of the Cultivation of Memory which we have stated in detail in our previous volume on that subject. But there are some special points of development and cultivation which may be considered briefly in this place. In the first place the importance of Attention and clear Perception, as necessary precedents for clear Representation, may be emphasized. In order to form clear mental images of athing we must have perceived it clearly in the first place. The advice regarding the use of the Attention and Perception given in preceding chapters need not be repeated here, but special attention should be directed toward them in connection with the processes of Representation. If we wish to cultivate the Representative faculties, we must begin by cultivating the Presentative faculties.
Then again we must remember what we have said elsewhere about the facts of development through (1) Use; and (2) Nourishment, in all mental faculties. We must begin tousethe faculties of Representation in order to exercise them. We must give themnourishmentin the shape of objects of mental food. That is to say we must furnish these faculties withmaterialswith which they may grow and develop, and with exercise in order to strengthen the mental-muscle and also to give the faculties the opportunity to "acquire the knack." The exercises and methods recommended in our chapter on Perception will furnish goodmaterialfor the Representative faculties' growing requirements. Byperceivingthe details of things, one is able to reproduce clear mental images of them. In studying an object, always carry in your mind the fact that you wish toreproduceit in your mind later. In fact, if you have the opportunity, let your mind "repeat it to itself" as soon as possible after the actual occurrence and experience. Just as you often murmur to yourself, or else write down, the name of a person or place which you have just heard, in order that you may recollect it the better thereafter, so it will be well for you to "mentally repeat" to yourself the experiences upon which you wish to exercise your Representative faculties.
As to the matter of development and cultivation by Use, we would advise that you begin gradually to train your mind toreproducethe experiences of the day or week or month, at intervals, until you feel that you are developing a new power in that direction. Tonight, if you try you will find that you can reproduce but a very small part of today's happenings with any degree of clearness. How clearly can you image the places you have been, the appearances of the people you have met, the various details of persons and things whichyou perceived during the experiences of the day? Not very clearly, we dare say. Try again, and you will find that you will be able to add new details. Keep it up until you feel tired or think that you have exhausted all the possibilities of the task. Tomorrow, try it again, and you will find that the second day's experiences are more clearly reproduced in your mind. Each day should find you a little more advanced, until you get to a place where the normal degree of power is attained, when the advance will be slower.
Then, at the end of the week, review its experiences. Do the same the following week. At the end of the month, take a hasty mental trip over the month's experiences. And so on. Exercise, in moderation, along these lines will work wonders for you. Not only will it develop the Representation, but your powers of observation and your general memory will be found to be improved. And, moreover, in "chewing the mental cud" you will think of many things of interest and importance in connection with your work, etc., and your general mental efficiency will be increased for the faculties of the mind are interdependent and share benefits with each other.
ABSTRACTION
As we have seen, the first stage or step in the process of Thought is that called Perception, which we have considered in the preceding chapter. Perception, as we have seen, is the process by which we gain our first knowledge of the external world as reported to us by the channels of sense. The Perceptive faculties interpret the material which is presented to us by the senses. Following upon Perception we find the processes resulting from the exercise of the group of faculties which are classified under the general head of Understanding.
Understanding is the faculty, or faculties, of the mind by means of which we intelligently examine and compare the variouspercepts, either separating them by analysis, or else combining them by synthesis, or both, and thus securing our general ideas, principles, laws, classes, etc. There are several sub-phases of Understanding which are known topsychologists and logicians as: (1) Abstraction; (2) Conception or Generalization; (3) Judgment, and (4) Reasoning, respectively. In this chapter we shall consider the first of these sub-phases or steps of Understanding, which is known as "Abstraction."
Abstraction is that faculty of the mind by which we abstract or "draw off," and then consider apart, the particular qualities, properties, or attributes of an object, and thus are able to considerthemas "things" or objects of thought. In order to formconceptsor general ideas, from ourperceptsor particular ideas, we must consider and examine two common points or qualities which go to make updifferences and resemblances. The special examination or consideration of these common points or qualities result in the exercise of Abstraction. In the process of Abstraction we mentally "draw away" a quality of an object and then consider it as a distinct object of thought. Thus in considering a flower we mayabstractits qualities of fragrance, color, shape, etc., and think of these as things independent of the flower itself from which they were derived. We think ofredness,fragrance,etc., not only in connection with the particular flower but asgeneral qualities. Thus the qualities of redness, sweetness, hardness, softness, etc., lead us to the abstract terms,red,sweet,hard,soft,etc.In the same way courage, cowardice, virtue, vice, love, hate, etc., are abstract terms. No one ever saw one of these things—they are known only in connection with objects, or else as "abstract terms" in the processes of Thought. They may be known as qualities, and expressed as predicates; or they may be considered as abstract things and expressed as nouns.
In the general process of Abstraction we first draw off and set aside all the qualities which arenot commonto the general class under consideration, for the concept or general idea must comprise only the qualities common to its class. Thus in the case of the general idea of horse, size and color must be abstracted as non-essentials, for horses are of various colors and sizes. But on the other hand, there are certain qualities whichare common to all horses, and these must be abstracted and used in making up the concept or general idea.
So, you see, in general Abstraction we form two classes: (1) the unlike and not-general qualities; and (2) the like or common qualities. As Halleck says: "In the process of Abstraction, we draw our attention away from a mass of confusing details, unimportant at the time, and attend only to qualities common to the class. Abstraction is little else than centering the power of attention on some qualities to the exclusion of others.... While we are forming concepts, we abstract or draw off certain qualities, either to leave them out of view or to consider them by themselves. Our dictionaries contain such words as purity, whiteness, sweetness, industry, courage, etc. No one ever touched, tasted, smelled, heard, or saw purity or courage. We do not, therefore, gain our knowledge of these through the senses. We have seen pure persons, pure snow, pure honey; we have breathed pure air, tasted pure coffee. From all these different objects we have abstracted the only like quality, the quality of being pure. We then say we have an idea ofpurity, and that idea is an abstract one. It exists only in the mind which formed it. No one ever sawwhiteness. He may have seen white clouds, snow, cloth, blossoms, houses, paper, horses, but he never sawwhitenessby itself. He simply abstracted that quality from various white objects."
In Abstraction we may either (1) abstract a quality and set it aside and apart from the other qualities under consideration, as being non-essential and not necessary; or we may (2) abstract a quality and hold it in the mind as essential and necessary for the concept which we are forming. Likewise, we may abstract (1) all the qualities of an objectexcept one, and set them aside that we may consider theonequality by itself; or we may (2) abstract the one particular quality and consider it to the exclusion of all its associated qualities. In all of these aspects we have the same underlying process of considering a quality apart from its object, and apart from its associated qualities. The mind more commonly operates in the direction of abstracting one quality and viewing it apart from object and associated qualities.
The importance of correct powers of Abstraction is seen when we realize that all concepts or general ideas are but combinations of abstract qualities or ideas. As Halleck says: "The difference between anabstract ideaand aconceptis that a concept may consist of a bundle of abstract ideas. If the class contains more than one common quality, so must the concept; it must contain as many of these abstracted qualities as are common to the class. The concept of the classwhalewould embody a large number of such qualities." As Brooks says: "If we could not abstract, we could notgeneralize, for abstraction is a condition of generalization." The last-mentioned authority also cleverly states the idea as follows: "The products of Abstraction areabstract ideas, that is, ideas of qualities in the abstract. Such ideas are calledAbstracts. Thus my idea of some particular color, or hardness, or softness, is an abstract. Abstract ideas have been wittily called 'the ghosts of departed qualities.' They may more appropriately be regarded as the spirits of which the objects from which they are derived are the bodies. In other words, they are, figuratively speaking, 'the disembodied spirits of material things.'"
The cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction depends very materially, in the first place, upon the exercise of Attention and Perception. Mill holds that Abstraction is primarily a result of Attention. Others hold that it is merely the mental process by which the attention is directed exclusively to the consideration of one of several qualities, properties, attributes, parts, etc. Hamilton says: "Attention and Abstraction then are only the same process viewed in different relations. They are, as it were, the positive and negative poles of the same act." The cultivation of Attention is really a part of the process of the cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction. Unless the Attention be directed toward the object and its qualities we will be unable to perceive, set aside, and separately consider the abstract quality contained within it. In this process, as indeed in all other mental processes, Attention is a prerequisite. Therefore, here, as in many other places, we say to you: "Begin by cultivating Attention."
Moreover, the cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction depends materially upon the cultivation of Perception. Not only must wesensethe existence of the various qualities inan object, but we must alsoperceivethem in consciousness, just as we perceive the object itself. In fact, the perception of the object is merely a perception of its various qualities, attributes and properties, for the object itself is merely a composite of these abstract things, at least so far as its perception in consciousness is concerned. Try to think ofa horse, without considering its qualities, attributes and properties, and the result is merelyan abstract horse—something which belongs to the realm of unreality. Try to think ofa rosewithout considering its color, odor, shape, size, response to touch, etc., and you have simplyan ideal rosewhich when analyzed is seen to be anothing. Take away the qualities, properties and attributes of anything, and you have leftmerely a name, or else a transcendental, idealistic, something apart from our world of sense knowledge. Thus it follows that in order toknowthe qualities of a thing in order to classify it, or to form a general idea of it, wemustuse the Perception in order to interpret or translate the sense-impressions we have received regarding them. Consequently the greater our power of Perceptionthe greater must be the possibility of our power of Abstraction.
Beyond the cultivation, use and exercise of the Attention and the Perception, there are but few practical methods for cultivating the faculty of Abstraction. Of course,exerciseof the faculty will develop it; andthe furnishing of material for its activitieswill give it the "nourishment" of which we have spoken elsewhere. Practice in distinguishing the various qualities, attributes and properties of objects will give a valuable training to the faculty.
Let the student take any object and endeavor to analyze it into its abstract qualities, etc. Let him try to discover qualities hidden from first sight. Let him make a list of these qualities, and write them down; then try to add to the list. Two or more students engaging in a friendly rivalry will stimulate the efforts of each other. In children the exercise may be treated as a game.Analysis of objects into their component qualities, attributes and qualities—the effort to extract as many adjectives applicable to the object—this is the first step. The second step consists intransforming these adjectives into their corresponding nouns. As for instance, in a rose we perceive thequalitieswhich we call "redness," "fragrance," etc. We speak of the rose as being "red" or "fragrant"—then we think of "redness," or "fragrance" as abstract qualities, or things, which we express as nouns. Exercise and practice along these lines will tend to cultivate the faculty of Abstraction. By knowing qualities, we know the things possessing them.
ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
Having formed general ideas, or Concepts, it is important that we associate them with other general ideas. In order to fullyunderstanda general idea we must know its associations and relations. The greater the known associations or relations of an idea, the greater is our degree of understanding of that idea. If we simply know many thousands of separated general ideas, without also knowing their associations and relations, we are in almost as difficult a position as if we merely knew thousands of individual percepts without being able to classify them in general concepts. It is necessary to develop the faculty of associating ideas into groups, according to their relations, just as we group particular ideas in classes. The difference, however, is that these group-ideas do not form classes of a genus, but depend solely upon associations of several kinds, as we shall see in a moment.
Halleck says: "All ideas have certain definite associations with other ideas, and they come up in groups. There is always an association between our ideas, although there are cases when we cannot trace it.... Even when we find no association between our ideas, we may be sure that it exists.... An idea, then, never appears in consciousness unless there is a definite reason why this idea should appear in preference to others." Brooks says: "One idea or feeling in the mind calls up some other idea or feeling with which it is in some way related. Our ideas seem, as it were, to be tied together by the invisible thread of association, so that as one comes out of unconsciousness, it draws another with it. Thoughts seem to exist somewhat in clusters like the grapes of a bunch, so that in bringing out one, we bring the entire cluster with it. The law of association is thus the tie, the thread, the golden link by which our thoughts are united in an act of reproduction."
The majority of writers confine their consideration of Association of Ideas to its relation to Memory. It is true that the Laws of Association play an important part in Memory Culture, but Association of Ideas alsoform an important part of the general subject of Thought-Culture, and especially in the phase of the latter devoted to the development of the Understanding. The best authorities agree upon this idea and state it positively. Ribot says: "The most fundamental law which regulates psychological phenomena is the Law of Association. In its comprehensive character it is comparable to the law of attraction in the physical world." Mill says: "That which the law of gravitation is to astronomy, that which the elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, the Law of Association of Ideas is to psychology."
There are two general principles, or laws, operative in the processes of Association of Ideas, known as (1) Association by Contiguity; and (2) Association by Similarity, respectively.
Association by Contiguity manifests particularly in the processes of memory. In its two phases of (1) Contiguity of Time; and (2) Contiguity of Space, respectively, it brings together before the field of consciousness ideas associated with each by reason of their time or space relations. Thus, if we remember a certain thing, we find it easy to remember things which occurred immediately before, or immediately after that particular thing. Verbal memory depends largely upon the contiguity of time, as for instance, our ability to repeat a poem, or passage from a book, if we can recall the first words thereof. Children often possess this form of memory to a surprising degree; and adults with only a limited degree of understanding may repeat freely long extracts from speeches they have heard, or even arbitrary jumbles of words. Visual memory depends largely upon contiguity of space, as for instance our ability to recall the details of scenes, when starting from a given point. In both of these forms of association by contiguity the mental operation is akin to that of unwinding a ball of yarn, the ideas, thus associated in the sequence of time or place, following each other into the field of consciousness. Association by Contiguity, while important in itself, properly belongs to the general subject of Memory, and as we have considered it in the volume of this series devoted to the last mentioned subject, we shall not speak of it further here.
Association by Similarity, however, possesses a special interest to students of the particular subject of the culture of the Understanding. If we were compelled to rely upon the association of contiguity for our understanding of things, we would understand a thing merely in its relations to that which went before or came after it; or by the things which were near it in space—we would have to unwind the mental ball of time and space relations in order to bring into consciousness the associated relations of anything. The Association of Similarity, however, remedies this defect, and gives us a higher and broader association. Speaking of Association of Similarity, Kay says: "It is of the utmost importance to us in forming a judgment of things, or in determining upon a particular line of conduct, to be able to bring together before the mind a number of instances of asimilarkind, recent or long past, which may aid us in coming to a right determination. Thus, we may judge of the nature or quality of an article, and obtain light and leading in regard to any subject that may be before us. In this way we arrange and classify and reason byinduction.This is known as rational or philosophical association."
Halleck says: "An eminent philosopher has said that man is completely at the mercy of the association of his ideas. Every new object is seen in the light of its associated ideas.... It is not the business of the psychologist to state what power the association of ideasoughtto have. It is for him to ascertain what power itdoeshave. When we think of the bigotry of past ages, of the stake for the martyr and the stoning of witches, we can realize the force of Prof. Ziehen's statement: 'We cannot think as wewill, but wemustthink as just those associations which happen to be present prescribe.' While this is not literally true, it may serve to emphasize a deflecting factor which is usually underestimated."
Locke says: "The connection in our minds of ideas, in themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so great force, to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that, perhaps, there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after." Stewart says: "Thebulk of mankind, being but little accustomed to reflect and to generalize, associate their ideas chiefly according to their more obvious relations, and above all to the casual relations arising from contiguity in time and place; whereas, in the mind of a philosopher ideas are commonly associated according to those relations which are brought to light in consequence of particular efforts of attention, such as the relations of cause and effect, or of premises and conclusion. Hence, it must necessarily happen that when he has occasion to apply to use his acquired knowledge, time and reflection will be requisite to enable him to recollect it."
This Association by Similarity, or the "rational and philosophical association of ideas," may be developed and cultivated by a little care and work. The first principle is that oflearning the true relations of an idea—its various logical associations. Perhaps the easiest and best method is that adopted and practiced by Socrates, the old Greek philosopher, often called "the Socratic method"—the Method of Questioning. By questioning oneself, or others, regarding athing, the mind of the person answering tends to unfold its stores of information, and to make new and true associations. Kays says: "Socrates, Plato, and others among the ancients and some moderns, have been masters of this art. The principle of asking questions and obtaining answers to them may be said to characterize all intellectual effort.... The great thing is to ask the right questions, and to obtain the right answers." Meiklejohn says: "This art of questioning possessed by Dr. Hodgson was something wonderful and unique, and was to the minds of most of his pupils a truly obstetric art. He told them little or nothing, but showed them how to find out for themselves. 'The Socratic method,' he said, 'is the true one, especially with the young.'"
But this questioning must be done logically, and orderly, and not in a haphazard way. As Fitch says: "In proposing questions it is very necessary to keep in view the importance of arranging them in the exact order in which the subject would naturally develop itself in the mind of a logical and systematic thinker." A number of systems have been formulatedby different writers on the subject, all of which have much merit. The following System of Analysis, designed for the use of students desiring to acquire correct associations, was given in the volume of this series, entitled "Memory," and is reproduced here because it is peculiarly adapted to the cultivation and development of the faculty of discovering and forming correct associations and relations between ideas:
When you wish to discover what you reallyknowregarding a thing, ask yourself the following questions about it, examining each point in detail, and endeavoring to bring before the mindyour full knowledgeregarding that particular point. Fill in the deficiencies by reading some good work of reference, an encyclopedia for instance; or consulting a good dictionary, or both:
The following "Query Table," from the same volume, may be found useful in the same direction. It is simpler and less complicated than the system given above. It has well been called a "Magic Key of Knowledge," and it opens many a mental door:
QUERY TABLE
Ask yourself the following questions regarding the thing under consideration. It will draw out many bits of information and associated knowledge in your mind:
I. What?II. Whence?III. Where?IV. When?V. How?VI. Why?VII. Whither?
Remember, always, that the greater the number of associated and related ideas that you are able to group around a concept, the richer, fuller and truer does that concept become to you. The concept is ageneral idea, and its attributes of "generality" depend upon the associated facts and ideas related to it. The greater the number of the view points from which a concept may be examined and considered, the greater is the degree of knowledge concerning that concept. It is held that everything in the universe is related to every other thing, so that if we knewallthe associated ideas and facts concerning a thing, we would not only know that particular thingabsolutely, but would, besides, knoweverythingin the universe. The chain of Association is infinite in extent.
GENERALIZATION
We have seen that Sensation is translated or interpreted into Perception; and that from the Percepts so created we may "draw off," or separate, various qualities, attributes and properties by the analytical process we call Abstraction. Abstraction, we have seen, thus constitutes the first step in the process of what is called Understanding. The second step is called Generalization or Conception.
Generalization, or Conception, is that faculty of the mind by which we are able to combine and group together several particular ideas into one general idea. Thus when we find a number of particular objects possessing the same general qualities, attributes or properties, we proceed toclassifythem by the process of Generalization. For instance, in a number of animals possessing certain general and common qualities we form a concept of a class comprising those particular animals. Thus in the concept of cow, we includeall cows—we know them to be cows because of their possession of certain general class qualities which we include in our concept ofcow. The particular cows may vary greatly in size, color and general appearance, but they possess the common general qualities which we group together in our general concept ofcow. Likewise by reason of certain common and general qualities we include in our concept of "Man,"all men, black, white, brown, red or yellow, of all races and degrees of physical and mental development. From this generic concept we may make race concepts, dividing men into Indians, Caucasians, Malays, Negroes, Mongolians, etc. These concepts in turn may be divided into sub-races. These sub-divisions result from an analysis of the great concept. The great concept is built up by synthesis from the individuals, through the sub-divisions of minor concepts. Or, again, we may form a concept of "Napoleon Bonaparte" from the various qualities and characteristics which went to make up that celebrated man.
The product of Generalization or Conception is called aConcept. A Concept is expressed in a word, or words, called "A Term."A Concept is more than a mereword—it isa general idea. And a Term is more than a mere word—it isthe expression of a general idea.
AConceptis built up from the processes of Perception, Abstraction, Comparison and Generalization. We must first perceive; then analyze or abstract qualities; then compare qualities; then synthesize or classify according to the result of the comparison of qualities. By perceiving and comparing the qualities of various individual things, we notice their points of resemblance and difference—the points wherein they agree or disagree—wherein they are alike or unlike. Eliminating by abstraction the points in which they differ and are unlike; and, again by abstraction, retaining in consideration the points in which they resemble and are alike; we are able to group, arrange or classify these "alike things" intoa class-idealarge enough to embrace them all. This class-idea is what is known as a General Idea or a Concept. This Concept we give a general name, which is called a Term. In grammar our particular ideas arising from Percepts are usually denoted by proper nouns—our general ideas arising from Concepts are usually denoted by common nouns. Thus "John Smith" (particular; proper noun) and "Man" (general; common noun). Or "horse" (general; common), and "Dobbin" (particular; proper).
It will be seen readily that there must be lower and higher concepts. Every class contains within itself lower classes. And every class is, itself, but a lower class in a higher one. Thus the high concept of "animal" may be analyzed into "mammal," which in turn is found to contain "horse," which in turn may be sub-divided into special kinds of horses. The concept "plant" may be sub-divided many times before the concept "rose" is obtained, and the latter is capable of sub-division into varieties and sub-varieties, until at last a particular flower is reached. Jevons says: "We classify things together whenever we observe that they are like each other in any respect and, therefore, think of them together.... In classifying a collection of objects, we do not merely put together into groups those which resemble each other, but we also divide each class into smaller ones in whichthe resemblance is more complete. Thus the class ofwhite substancesmay be divided into those which are solid and those which are fluid, so that we get the two minor classes of solid-white, and fluid-white substances. It is desirable to have names by which to show that one class is contained in another and, accordingly, we call the class which is divided into two or more smaller ones, theGenus; and the smaller ones into which it is divided, theSpecies."
Every Genus is a Species of the class next higher than itself; and every Species is a Genus of the classes lower than itself. Thus it would seem that the extension in either direction would be infinite. But, for the purposes of finite thought, the authorities teach that there must be a Highest Genus, which cannot be the Species of a higher class, and which is called theSummum Genus. TheSummum Genusis expressed by terms such as the following: "Being;" "Existence;" "The Absolute;" "Something;" "Thing;" "The Ultimate Reality," or some similar term denoting the state of beingultimate. Likewise, at the lowest end of the scale we findwhat are called the Lowest Species, orInfima Species. The Infima Species are alwaysindividuals. Thus we have theindividualat one end of the scale; andThe Absoluteat the other. Beyond these limits the mind of man cannot travel.
There has been much confusion in making classifications and some ingenious plans have been evolved for simplifying the process. That of Jevons is perhaps the simplest, when understood. This authority says: "All these difficulties are avoided in theperfect logical method of dividing each Genus into two Species, and not more than two, so that one species possesses a particular quality, and the other does not. Thus if I divide dwelling-houses into those which are made of brick and those which are not made of brick, I am perfectly safe and nobody can find fault with me.... Suppose, for instance, that I divide dwelling-houses as below:
"The evident objection will at once be made, that houses may be built of other materialsthan those here specified. In Australia, houses are sometimes made of the bark of gum-trees; the Esquimaux live in snow houses; tents may be considered as canvas houses, and it is easy to conceive of houses made of terra-cotta, paper, straw, etc. All logical difficulties will, however, be avoidedif I never make more than two species at each step, in the following way:—
"It is quite certain that I must in this division have left a place for every possible kind of house; for if a house is not made of brick, nor stone, nor wood, nor iron, it yet comes under the species at the right hand, which is not-iron, not-wooden, not-stone, and not-brick.... This manner of classifying things may seem to be inconvenient, but it is in reality the only logical way."
The student will see that the process of Classification is two-fold. The first is by Analysis, in which the Genus is divided into Species by reason ofdifferences. The second is by Synthesis, in which individuals are grouped into Species, and Species into the Genus, by reason ofresemblances. Moreover, in building up general classes, which is known as Generalization, we must firstanalyzethe individual in order to ascertain itsqualities, attributes and properties, and thensynthesizethe individual with other individuals possessing like qualities, properties or attributes.
Brooks says of Generalization: "The mind now takes the materials that have been furnished and fashioned by comparison and analysis and unites them into one single mental product, giving us the general notion or concept. The mind, as it were, brings together these several attributes into a bunch or package and then ties a mental string around it, as we would bunch a lot of roses or cigars.... Generalization is anascendingprocess.The broader concept is regarded as higher than the narrower concept; a concept is considered as higher than percept; a general idea stands above a particular idea. We thus go up from particulars to generals; from percepts to concepts; from lower concepts to higher concepts. Beginning down with particular objects, we rise from them to the general idea of their class. Having formed a number of lower classes, we compare them as we did individuals and generalize them into higher classes. We perform the same process with these higher classes and thus proceed until we are at last arrested in the highest class, that of Being. Having reached the pinnacle of Generalization, we may descend the ladder by reversing the process through which we ascend."
A Concept, then, is seen to be ageneral idea. It is a general thought that embracesall the individualsof its own class and has in it all that is common to its own class, while it resemblesnoparticular individual of its class inallrespects. Thus, a concept ofanimalcontains within itself the minor concepts ofall animalsand the animal-quality of all animals—yet it differs from theperceptof any one particular animal and the minor concepts of minor classes of animals. Consequently a concept or general idea cannot beimagedor mentally pictured. We may picture a percept of any particular thing, but we cannot picture a general idea or concept because the latter does not partake of theparticularqualities of any of its class, but embraces all the general qualities of the class. Try to picture the general idea, or concept, of Man. You will find that any attempt to do so will result in the production of merelya man—some particular man. If you give the picture dark hair, it will fail to include the light-haired men; if you give it white skin, it will slight the darker-skinned races. If you picture a stout man, the thin ones are neglected. And so on in every feature. It is impossible to form a correct general class picture unless we include every individual in it. The best we can do is to form a sort ofcompositeimage, which at the best is in the nature of a symbol representative of the class—an ideal image to make easier theideaof the general class or term.
From the above we may see the fundamental differences between a Percept and a Concept. The Percept is the mental image of a real object—a particular thing. The Concept is merely ageneral idea, or general notion, of the common attributes of a class of objects or things. A Percept arises directly from sense-impressions, while a Concept is, in a sense, a pure thought—an abstract thing—a mental creation—an ideal.
A Concrete Concept is a concept embodying the common qualities of a class of objects, as for instance, the concrete concept oflion, in which the general class qualities of all lions are embodied. An Abstract Concept is a concept embodying merely some one quality generally diffused, as for instance, the quality offiercenessin the general class of lions.Roseis a concrete concept;red, orredness, is an abstract concept. It will aid you in remembering this distinction to memorize Jevons' rule: "A Concrete Term is the name of a Thing;an Abstract Term is the name of a Quality of a Thing."
A Concrete Concept, including all the particular individuals of a class, must also contain all the common qualities of those individuals. Thus, such a concept is composed of the ideas of the particular individuals and of their common qualities, in combination and union. From this arises the distinctive terms known as thecontent,extensionandintensionof concepts, respectively.
Thecontentof a concept isall that it includes—its full meaning. Theextensionof a concept depends upon itsquantityaspect—it is its property of including numbers of individual objects within its content. Theintensionof a concept depends upon itsqualityaspect—it is its property of including class or common qualities, properties or attributes within its content.
Thus, theextensionof the concepthorsecovers all individual horses; while itsintensionincludes all qualities, attributes, and properties common to all horses—class qualities possessed by all horses in common, and which qualities, etc., make the particular animalshorses, as distinguished from other animals.
It follows that the larger the number of particular objects in a class, the smaller must be the number of general class qualities—qualities common to all in the class. And, that the larger the number of common class qualities, the smaller must be the number of individuals in the class. As the logicians express it, "the greater the extension, the less the intension; the greater the intension, the less the extension." Thus,animalis narrow in intension, but very broad in extension; for while there are many animals there are but very few qualities common toallanimals. And,horseis narrower in extension, but broader in intension; for while there are comparatively few horses, the qualities common to all horses are greater.
The cultivation of the faculty of Generalization, or Conception, of course, depends largely uponexerciseandmaterial, as does the cultivation of every mental faculty, as we have seen. But there are certain rules, methods and ideas which may be used to advantage in developing this faculty in the direction of clear and capable work. This faculty is developed by all of the general processes of thought, for it forms an important part of all thought. But the logical processes known as Analysis and Synthesis give to this facultyexercise and employment particularly adapted to its development and cultivation. Let us briefly consider these processes.
Logical Analysisis the process by which we examine and unfold the meaning of Terms. A Term, you remember, is the verbal expression of a Concept. In such analysis we endeavor to unfold and discover thequality-aspectand thequantity-aspectof the content of the concept. We seek, thereby, to discover the particular general idea expressed; the number of particular individuals included therein; and the properties of the class or generalization. Analysis depends upon division and separation. Development in the process of Logical Analysis tends toward clearness, distinctness, and exactness in thought and expression. Logical Analysis has two aspects or phases, as follows: (1)Division, or the separation of a concept according to itsextension, as for instance the analysis of a genus into its various species; and (2)Partition, or the separation of a concept into its component qualities, properties and attributes, as for instance, the analysis of the conceptironinto its several qualities of color, weight, hardness, malleability, tenacity, utility, etc.
There are certain rules of Division which should be observed, the following being a simple statement of the same:
I.The division should be governed by a uniform principle.For instance it would be illogical to first divide men into Caucasians, Mongolians, etc., and then further sub-divide them into Christians, Pagans, etc., for the first division would be according to the principle of race, and the second according to the principle of religion. Observing the rule of the "uniform principle" we may divide men into races, and sub-races, and so on, without regard to religion; and we may likewise divide men according to their respective religions, and then into minor denominations and sects, without regard to race or nationality. The above rule is frequently violated by careless thinkers and speakers.
II.The division should be complete and exhaustive.For instance, the analysis of a genus should extend to every known species of it, upon the principle thatthe genus is merely the sum of its several species. A textbook illustration of a violation of this rule is given in the case of the conceptactions, when divided intogood-actionsandbad-actions, but omitting the very important species ofindifferent-actions. Carelessness in observance of this rule leads to fallacious reasoning and cloudy thinking.
III.The division should be in logical sequence.It is illogical to skip or pass over intermediate divisions, as for instance, when we divideanimalsintohorses,trout and swallows, omitting the intermediate division intomammals,fish and birds. The more perfect the sequence, the clearer the analysis and the thought resulting therefrom.
IV.The division should be exclusive.That is, the various species divided from a genus, should be reciprocally exclusive—should exclude one another. Thus to dividemankindintomale,men and women, would be illogical, because the classmaleincludesmen. The division should be either: "male and female;" or else: "men, women, boys, girls."
The exercise of Division along these lines, and according to these rules, will tend to improve one's powers of conception and analysis. Any class of objects—any general concept—may be used for practice. A trial will show you the great powers of unfoldment contained within this simple process. It tends to broaden and widen one's conception of almost any class of objects.
There are also several rules for Partition which should be observed, as follows:
I.The partition should be complete and exhaustive.That is, it should unfold the full meaning of the term or concept, so far as is concerned its several general qualities, properties and attributes. But this applies only to the qualities, properties and attributes which arecommonto the class or concept, and not to the minor qualities which belong solely to the various sub-divisions composing the class; nor to the accidental or individual qualities belonging to the separate individuals in any sub-class. The qualities should beessentialand notaccidental—general, not particular. A famous violation of this rule was had in the case of the ancient Platonic definition of "Man" as: "A two-legged animal without feathers," which Diogenes rendered absurd by offering a plucked chicken as a "man" according to the definition. Clearness in thought requires the recognition of the distinction between the general qualities and the individual, particular or accidental qualities. Red-hair is an accidental quality of a particular man and not a general quality of the classman.
II.The partition should consider the qualities, properties and attributes, according to the classification of logical division. That is, the various qualities, properties and attributes should be considered in the form of genus and species, as in Division. In this classification, the rules of Division apply.
It will be seen that there is a close relationship existing between Partition and Definition. Definition is really a statement of the various qualities, attributes, and properties of a concept, either stated in particular or else in concepts of other and larger classes. There is perhaps no better exercise for the cultivation of clear thought and conception than Definition. In order to define, one must exercise his power of analysis to a considerable extent. Brooks says: "Exercises in logical definition are valuable in unfolding our conception.Logical definition, including both the genus and the specific difference, gives clearness, definiteness and adequacy to our conceptions. It separates a conception from all other conceptions by fixing upon and presenting the essential and distinctive property or properties of the conception defined. The value of exercises in logical definition is thus readily apparent."
If the student will select some familiar term and endeavor to define it correctly, writing down the result, and will then compare the latter with the definition given in some standard dictionary, he will see a new light regarding logical definition. Practice in definition, conducted along these lines, will cultivate the powers of analysis and conception and will, at the same time, tend toward the acquiring of correct and scientific methods of thought and clear expression.
Hyslop gives the following excellent Rules of Logical Definition, which should be followed by the student in his exercises:
"I. A definition should state the essential attributes of the species defined.
"II. A definition must not contain the nameor word defined. Otherwise the definition is calleda circulus in definiendo(defining in a circle).
"III. The definition must be exactly equivalent to the species defined.
"IV. A definition should not be expressed in obscure, figurative or ambiguous language.
"V. A definition must not be negative when it can be affirmative."
Logical Synthesisis the exact opposite of Logical Analysis. In the latter we strive to separate and take apart; in the former we strive to bind together and combine the particulars into the general. Beginning with individual things and comparing them with each other according to observed points of resemblance, we proceed to group them into species or narrow classes. These classes, or species, we then combine with similar ones, into a larger class or genus; and then, according to the same process, into broader classes as we have shown in the first part of this chapter.
The process of Synthesis is calculated to develop and cultivate the mind in several directions and exercises along these lines will give a new habit and sense of orderly arrangement, which will be most useful to the student in his every-day life. Halleck says: "Whenever a person is comparing a specimen to see whether it may be put in the same class with other specimens, he isthinking. Comparison is an absolutely essential factor of thought, and classification demands comparison. The man who has not properly classified the myriad individual objects with which he has to deal, must advance like a cripple. He, only, can travel with seven-league boots, who has thought out the relations existing between these stray individuals and put them into their proper classes. In a minute a business man may put his hand on any one of ten thousand letters if they are properly classified. In the same way, the student of history, sociology or any other branch, can, if he studies the subjects aright, have all his knowledge classified and speedily available for use.... In this way, we may make our knowledge of the world more minutely exact. We cannot classify without seeing things under a new aspect."
The study of Natural History, in any or all of its branches, will do much to cultivate the power of Classification. But one may practice classification with the objects around him in his every-day life. Arranging things mentally, into small classes, and these into larger, one will soon be able to form a logical connection between particular ideas and general ideas; particular objects and general classes. The practice of classification gives to the mind a constructive turn—a "building-up" tendency, which is most desirable in these days of construction and development. Regarding some of the pitfalls of classification, Jevons says:
"In classifying things, we must take great care not to be misled by outward resemblances. Things may seem to be very much like each other which are not so. Whales, porpoises, seals and several other animals live in the sea exactly like fish; they have a similar shape and are usually classed among fish. People are said to go whale-fishing. Yet these animals are not really fish at all, but are much more like dogs and horses and other quadrupeds than they are like fish. They cannot live entirely under water and breathe the air contained in the water like fish, but they have to come up to the surface at intervals to takebreath. Similarly, we must not class bats with birds because they fly about, although they have what would be called wings; these wings are not like those of birds and in truth bats are much more like rats and mice than they are like birds. Botanists used at one time to classify plants according to their size, as trees, shrubs or herbs, but we now know that a great tree is often more similar in its character to a tiny herb than it is to other great trees. A daisy has little resemblance to a great Scotch thistle; yet the botanist regards them as very similar. The lofty growing bamboo is a kind of grass, and the sugarcane also belongs to the same class with wheat and oats."
Remember that analysis of a genus into its component species is accomplished by a separation according todifferences; and species are built up by synthesis into a genus because ofresemblances. The same is true regarding individual and species, building up in accordance to points of resemblance, while analysis or separation is according to points of difference.