FOOTNOTES:

London, Published March 15th 1866 by Day & Son, Limited Lithogrs Gate Str, Lincoln's Inn Fields. Day & Son, Limited, Lith. VIEW FROM THE SUMMIT OF A MOUNTAIN IN THE WESTERN TUNG-SHAN DISTRICT ON THE NORTHERN SHORE OF THE TA-HOO LAKE, PROVINCE OF KEANG-SULondon, Published March 15th 1866 by Day & Son, LimitedLithogrs Gate Str, Lincoln's Inn Fields.Day & Son, Limited, Lith.VIEW FROM THE SUMMIT OF A MOUNTAIN IN THE WESTERN TUNG-SHAN DISTRICT ONTHE NORTHERN SHORE OF THE TA-HOO LAKE, PROVINCE OF KEANG-SU

Passing on to the Western Tung-shan district, we reached the wildest and most imposing region I have seen, either in China or any other part of the world. Far removed from the noisy haunts of men, and peopled with but a few solitary hamlets, it reposed in its romantic beauty, undisturbed save by the voice of Nature, and undefiled by the hand of man. Drawing our boat on to a long sandy beach, I wandered through the wild and lonely region for some hours with my dark companion, who I found could appreciate Nature's beauties more truly than many with a whiter skin. I rambled through the silent valleys and almost impenetrable forests of the Tung-shan, impressed with the solemn feeling that I trod where mortal foot had not fallen before. The landscape was most varied in its nature: massive mountains, peaceful valleys; wild and desolate cliffs; foaming cataracts, and then the calm and shaded waters of the lake; while the waving of the thick forest, the verdant and featherybamboos; the water-lilies stretching wide on the surface of the lake; the wild orange-trees, and sweetly-perfumed shrubs and flowers blooming around, completed an almost unrivalled picture. After leaving this exquisite scenery, and just before entering the creek by which we were to reach Soo-chow, we passed underneath a great natural arch of rock, projecting some 90 feet into the lake, with a height of nearly 150, and joined to a second small arch on the outside.

This singular formation of rock lies on the border of the Ta-hoo, about forty miles to the north-west of Soo-chow, and is an object particularly noticed in the legendary lore of the superstitious natives.

After leaving the lake, our journey lay through a complete network of those interminable creeks, lagoons, and canals intersecting the whole of south and central China. Some were broad and river-like, spanned by handsome, many-arched bridges, the banks covered with fine houses and regular pathways; others were narrow, tortuous, almost hidden by rank vegetation and long drooping osiers, and crossed by bridges composed of a rough slab of granite laid horizontally upon the ends of two upright blocks, and elevated scarcely six feet from the water. Wherever we passed, the country people complained bitterly of the foreign soldiers (meaning Gordon's, D'Aguibelle's, and other mercenary legions) coming to fight the Ti-pings; they were all long-haired and happy under the newrégime; they were naturally averse to lose their heads because the British Government chose to support the oppressive and merciless Manchoo; and many of the finest grain-producing districts having been captured by the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo forces, together with a number of the principal Ti-ping granaries, a vast influx of destitute refugees added considerably to the daily increasing distress caused by the scarcity and exorbitant price of food.

When at last, after threading miles of creek and canal,I reached Soo-chow, I found that I had arrived at the moment of an important crisis—no less an event, indeed, than the dissolution of the short-lived Americo-Ti-ping contingent. This, however, was a matter of no surprise to me, as I had never placed the slightest faith in the composition and motives of the force, nor felt the least hope from its formation. Burgevine, its originator and commander, like Gordon, the uncommissionedGeneralof the Anglo-Manchoo force, was essentially a mercenary and filibuster; the only principle of either seems to have been an absorbing selfishness and care for personal interest, doubtless a very natural sentiment upon the part of the cosmopolitan adventurer, but not a trait to be admired in the character of the British officer. Such a principle, when supported by the material power of the British Government, succeeded very well with those who allied themselves with the Manchoo, simply because the latter were treacherous, thoroughly mercenary, hated foreigners with a bitter intensity, and would naturally enough have suspected anyapparentlydisinterested assistance, as a means of rendering any of them liable to distasteful obligations. The British authorities took particular care to prevent any mistake with regard to their motives, for they always stated that they were solely interfering in their own interest, so the Manchoo rejoicingly obtained a large revenue from the foreign merchants, and then handed back a portion to pay the British indemnity, which has proved the salvation of their dynasty, by in a great measure causing the alliance against the Ti-ping.

Upon reaching the west gate of Soo-chow, we were very kindly welcomed by the guard, and were furnished with an escort to the commandant's palace. The city I found to be strongly garrisoned by veteran troops; new flanking stone works were being built against the outer face of the high walls; handsome buildings were being erected inside; provisions were very plentiful; the soldiery and civilians seemed in high spirits, and quite ridiculedthe idea of losing their city; in fact, excepting the distant report of artillery, Soo-chow had no more the aspect of a besieged place than London has at the present moment, neither did its capture by the enemy thundering at its defences seem even probable.

When we arrived at the commandant Mo-wang's palace, a number of wounded Europeans belonging to Burgevine's contingent were being carried inside. These men proved to be the survivors of a series of accidents that had occurred two days previously, when the whole force, accompanied by a division of Ti-pings under the Chung-wang, and the little steamerKa-joor, which Burgevine had seized from the Imperialists and carried off to Soo-chow, had attacked a position of the enemy established about twenty miles to the east of the city. The expedition was at first successful, having turned the flank of the Imperialist stockades and captured a flotilla of twenty-six large gunboats; but, almost immediately afterwards, by the carelessness—some say drunkenness—of the Europeans working theKa-joor'spivot-gun, her magazine was ignited, the explosion blowing the fore part of the vessel to pieces, and badly wounding several of the crew.

Soon after this catastrophe,GeneralBurgevine landed a battery from the gunboats accompanying him (the principal way of communication being by water), and opened fire on the stockades, held by a force of disciplined Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries commanded byColonelRhode,[50]and a number of Imperialistbraves. The enemy were just being driven out of their intrenchments, and a storming party advancing to take them, when the largest of the prizes—a gunboat, full of powder, shells, &c., and mounting six cannon, and in which the wounded from the steamer had been placed—blew up; the fire from her explosion communicating with four more of the captured vessels, they were also blown to pieces, killing outright twelve, and dangerously wounding seventeen of the sixtyor seventy Europeans present. These disasters were caused by the free use of the liquors taken from the wreck of theKa-joor—officers and men alike indulging, and the whole affair forcibly illustrating therowdy, disorderly nature of the Americo-Ti-ping legion. It is stated, and not without strong reason, that Burgevine himself was in a state of intoxication; still he has this excuse—the pain and debilitating effect produced by an old and terrible wound (received in the service of the ungrateful Manchoo), rendered the use of stimulants necessary.

After the accidents we have just noticed, the attack upon the Imperialist position was abandoned, and the force retired upon Soo-chow, carrying off the wounded and the remainder of the prizes.

As the Mo-wang was outside the city, and Burgevine had not returned with the wounded men, I proceeded to one of the gates with a party of the latter's officers, in order to go to the front of the Ti-ping outworks, where it was expected they would be found. When we had arrived at the gate, however, we were not allowed to pass by the soldiers on guard. This was the first intimation I received that affairs were going wrong with the auxiliary force, and that the Ti-pings were suspicious of their foreign allies. At night, it appeared, they were not without reason for their want of confidence, for, after Burgevine and the Mo-wang had returned,ColonelMorton, the second in command of the contingent, was reported absent against orders, with all the Europeans outside the city. When this fact was ascertained, Burgevine and the officers with him seemed certain that the absentees had gone over to the enemy; in fact, I soon understood that the intention for the whole force to desert had been on thetapisfor some little time, only Morton and his companions had, however, taken the opportunity to get clear themselves and leave their co-adjutors in the lurch.

Previous to this report I had obtained an interviewwith the Mo-wang, and then dined with him. He informed me that the Chung-wang was encamped with an army outside the city; he also gave me to understand the nature of his suspicions against Burgevine, in all of which I entirely agreed with him. After explaining the caution rendered necessary in all dealings with foreigners, because of the treachery and bad faith with which they had always acted towards the Ti-pings—as particularly exemplified by the English breaches of guaranteed neutrality, non-observance of the pledge to prevent Manchoo expeditions equipping at Shanghae, capture of Ningpo by the British, French, and piratical flotilla, &c.—he proceeded to specify his reasons for dissatisfaction with the foreign contingent.

In the first place, he spoke about the extraordinary conduct of Burgevine himself, who, he declared, had made numerous promises, none of which had been fulfilled. That officer had guaranteed to obtain men, arms, and co-operation from Shanghae; large sums of money had been supplied for the purpose, but the only return had been many cases of brandy, brought by him after several visits to that city, and with which both officers and men were made incapable. All the money had been squandered or mysteriously lost, and not a single musket had been shown for the large expenditure. Then it appeared that Burgevine and many of his officers continued to wear the uniform of the Ward force, which they had only left shortly before joining the Ti-pings; while, to place themselves in a still more suspicious position, they made a practice of visiting at night their old friends in the hostile lines occupied by Gordon's troops. This conduct made the chiefs distrust the loyalty of their auxiliaries and fear some organized treachery. Another ground of suspicion was the fact that Burgevine kept his men aloof and distinct from the people he came to serve, at the same time striving to induce the chiefs to sanction his formation of an independent force. This was certainly a bad way togain the confidence of men so often deceived by foreigners, so accustomed to community of interests, and so much imbued with the religious and patriotic enthusiasm of their cause. Moreover, the Ti-ping leaders had quickly penetrated the selfish and mercenary motives of their unsatisfactory allies, and naturally felt but little faith in their services; neither were they mean enough to desire the support of such ignoble assistance, nor pander to it after the style of their more unscrupulous antagonists.

Regardless of all principles of honour and chivalry, directly the Americo-Ti-ping legionaries found that they could not reckon upon external support, large pay, and much booty, they were not a little disappointed; having no heart in the service they had suddenly adopted, they became discontented and anxious to desert a failing cause for some more congenial andprofitableemployment.Theywere certainly not Quixotic enough to fight for honour, glory, or the freedom and religious liberty of a vast empire without some substantial pecuniary recompense.

Out of a strength of 125 Europeans, not more than twenty were of any use to the revolutionists; these few comprised men who were able to drill and organize a disciplined force, and others who were good artillerists; the remainder being sailors and vagrants, totally unacquainted with the smell of powder, and not so useful in the field as the worst coolie spearmen of the Ti-ping army; these facts were also inimical to the existence of the force.

When, added to the circumstances just reviewed, the paroxysms of temporary insanity (during an attack of which he wounded one of his best officers), or the natural extravagance and obliquity of character of the commanding officer himself, and the dissensions among his subordinates, are considered, the failure of Burgevine's enterprise is fully accounted for.[51]

In the evening, after Morton's absence had been reported, the Mo-wang, accompanied by several of his chiefs, proceeded to Burgevine's quarters and spent several hours in conversation with him. I was present during this interview, and was favourably impressed by the magnanimous and friendly temper of the commandant, who, despite the ample provocation he had received from the suspicious and unsatisfactory conduct of the auxiliaries, declared his intention to supply them with money on the succeeding day, and to make any arrangements which would tend to harmonize, gratify, or prosper the future welfare of the force. That these promises would have been faithfully executed by the Mo-wang, Burgevine has himself testified.

After the departure of the commandant, Burgevine, with some of his favourite officers, talked over their proposed desertion from the Ti-pings, as a long-arranged and premeditated affair, their motive for this determination being the fact that their present service did not seem likely to prove so easy and advantageous as they had expected. In the course of conversation theGeneralpersonally informed me that his intention had been to raise a large body of disciplined and well-armed Ti-pings, and then to convert them into an independent force, acting upon his private account; that is to say, he joined the revolution with the intention of ultimately deserting it, and proceeding upon a career of filibusting through China. This wild scheme he also mentioned toGeneralGordon, of the Imperialist mercenaries, proposing that they should mutually desert their colours, join forces, and commence a system of independent conquest.Whether this and other equally extravagant notions were caused by mental derangement, consequent upon the effects of his wound and the stimulants he used, or may be attributed to his natural character, seems doubtful; but whatever may have been the cause ofGeneralBurgevine's reckless conduct, it is quite certain that he sacrificed a splendid opportunity to insure the success of the Ti-ping revolution. Had he at first heartily espoused the movement, and unreservedly amalgamated his men with its members, he would infallibly have obtained the confidence of the chiefs. He could then have organized a disciplined and foreign-officered force far superior in material to the Imperialist auxiliary legions, and these latter were the only forces of the enemy that the Ti-pings had the slightest occasion to dread.

On the morning of the day succeeding my arrival at Soo-chow, intelligence came into the city to the effect that, at about 4.30 a.m.,ColonelMorton had deserted with the detachment of Europeans under his command, and gone over to the enemy, Morton shooting two soldiers of an outlying picket who came to warn him of his vicinity to the Imperialist lines. By this act of cowardly treachery, deserting his own colleagues and the wounded in the city, he placed them in much jeopardy, and caused the Mo-wang to feel very great exasperation, and strongly to suspect further treachery from the remainder of the contingent. However, he proved himself to be a more noble-minded and merciful man than any of the traitors left behind imagined, by offering free passes and boats to any and all who might wish to leave the city; at the same time he expressed great disgust and contempt at the mean, dastardly conduct of Morton and his followers, because he had always made the fact public, that any foreigner wishing to leave Soo-chow had simply to express the desire, when everything necessary in the way of boats, passes, &c., would be furnished to the confines of the Ti-ping territory.

Whenthe fact ofColonelMorton's desertion became established, I must confess that, well as I thought I understood the noble character of the Ti-ping chiefs, I feared the remainder of the traitors might meet with condign punishment. In consequence, I at once sought an audience with the Mo-wang, and having obtained it, requested that he would not wreak any vengeance upon Burgevine and his companions. To my surprise, although the inferior chiefs and officers were greatly excited about the treachery of their foreign allies, the commandant instantly gave me to understand that my fear was groundless. "Puh pa! puh pa!" (do not fear, do not fear), he said. "These men joined me willingly and with clean faces" (i.e.honour); "they can leave if they wish to do so, in like manner; but if they sneak away to the Imps, they will lose face, and so shall I."

Just at this moment Burgevine's interpreter came into the hall and informed the Mo-wang that he was commissioned to ask liberty for the remainder of the force to depart from the city and return to Shanghae. The chief readily professed his compliance with this request, but said that he could not definitively settle anything until the arrival of his superior, the Chung-wang, whom he expected in the city towards evening to consult upon the affair.

Meanwhile, with the exception of a dozen who were old adherents of the Ti-ping king, the foreigners were in a great state of ferment, for they fully expected the momentary appearance of executioners to cut off their heads. Some were drinkingsamshooto encourage themselves; others proposed fortifying their quarters; while a few of the boldest advocated sallying forth and attempting to force their way out of the city. The groans of more than twenty wounded men, some horribly burnt by the late explosion of the steamer and the gunboats, rendered pathetic an otherwise ridiculous scene.

Early in the evening the Chung-wang arrived, escortedby 1,000 men of his body-guard, and at once proceeded to a council with the Mo-wang and other chiefs. When their deliberations were concluded, I presented myself to the Chung-wang, who, together with the Sze, Le, and Foo-wangs (they having accompanied him from Nankin), received me with great manifestations of pleasure, having all concluded that I had been killed at the disastrous loss of the outer Nankin forts. I have hitherto forgotten to mention that my faithful interpreter, A-ling, was still with me. He also met with a very kind reception from the chiefs, for they appreciated his services, and knew that he was warmly attached to their cause.

Immediately upon my arrival at Soo-chow, I had determined, if possible, to raise another body of Europeans, with whom to form a disciplined Ti-ping force, for I saw that the dissolution of Burgevine's legion was near at hand. Still, after the irritation the chiefs must have felt at the treachery of their present foreign auxiliaries, I could not think the time appropriate to submit the subject to them. I was pleasantly surprised when, during the course of the evening, the Chung-wang proposed that I should undertake the very work I was myself anxious to perform. He stated that his confidence had never been placed in Burgevine, and he expressed much satisfaction at the prospect of the early departure of that leader of mercenaries with his men.

About this period the small steamers attached toGeneralGordon's force were being used with great success in the daily attacks upon the Ti-ping stockades outside Soo-chow; consequently, the Chung-wang proposed that I should not only endeavour to raise a contingent of disciplined troops, but a flotilla of two or three steamers to operate with them. He also expressed a great desire to capture Gordon's vessels, upon which I told A-ling to obtain a separate commission to cut out any of them I might find an opportunity to seize. The Chung-wang made a practice never to sleep inside thewalls of any beleaguered city, his tactics being to relieve them by an army of co-operation under his own command. It may be that he pursued such a plan as a safeguard against treachery; but whatever the cause, he was always to be found encamped outside. As the night advanced, he therefore made ready to leave Soo-chow, after passing an edict and signing a special commission written for me by his own secretary.[52]As I was well known to four or five of the Wangs present, they were much pleased when I accepted the authority to raise a new force; and before we separated, they became quite enthusiastic about the anticipated results.

The designation of the proposed contingent was decided by the Commander-in-Chief to be "the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion," a title closely assimilating to his own, Chung-sin-wang, which may be translated as the "Middle Heart Prince,"i.e.the loyal or faithful prince. The terms of organization agreed upon were: the force to be commanded by myself, or any European I might see fit to appoint, and subject only to the orders of the Chung-wang. The Europeans engaged to be solely officers, two hundred in number, each captain of a company to receive 200 taels per mensem (nearly £70), others to be paid proportionately, and lodging found for all. Myself and principal officers to receive no pay, but serve as commissioned volunteers, a position which I had always maintained for myself. Two steam gunboats to be obtained, similar to theHyson, in the service of the enemy; these to be attached to the land force, not to be used for any other purpose. The governorship of the first city recaptured from the enemy to be placed in my hands, while the revenue of the place would constitute a reserve fund for the legion (including pension to disabled men, expenses for sick and wounded, &c.), my own head to be pledged for the loyalty of the Europeans engaged, each ofwhom were to become "Ti-ping brethren," and be entitled to every consideration as citizens.[53]The rules of European warfare to be strictly those of the legion, and, moreover, to be observed by any Ti-ping force acting in conjunction with it. Many other regulations were drawn up, but these are some of the principal.

Upon the conclusion of the agreement to raise the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, the Chung-wang left Soo-chow and proceeded to his intrenched camp nine miles distant. On the following day passes and boats were provided for Burgevine and the remainder of his men. Among the Europeans were twelve who had served in the Ti-ping army some time previous to the advent of Burgevine, but had been placed under his orders upon his arrival at Soo-chow. These men, and fifteen others, who were not quite so mercenary as their fugitive comrades, and felt more attachment to the cause, refused to desert their colours, and volunteered to remain under command of oneCaptainSmith, formerly a brave non-commissioned officer of the British Marine Artillery. He was almost the only unwounded man on board Admiral Hope's flag-ship at the disastrous attack on the Peiho forts. The volunteers were all attached to the Mo-wang's command, but the Chung-wang promised that, upon the formation of the legion, they should, if required, become members, some of them being good artillery-men or drill-instructors.

All these arrangements were carefully concealed from every European except myself, few of those in Soo-chow being at all trustworthy, and the few exceptions not being particularly attractive as objects of confidential communication. In consequence of the daily increasing strength of the forces besieging Soo-chow, time was precious and not to be wasted in commencing my undertaking; I therefore departed from the city on the third eveningafter my arrival, and proceeded to Shanghae as fast as possible, going part of the way in company with some of the late Americo-Ti-ping legion.

We were enabled to travel by a much shorter route than that by which I had reached the city, in consequence of a great victory achieved within the last few days by a Ti-ping army before the walled town Wo-kong, which freed from the presence of the enemy a more direct road. The battle was fought against Imperialists unassisted by foreign artillery and disciplined troops, who were, therefore, according to the almost infallible rule in such cases, utterly defeated, and Wo-kong would have been recaptured in a very short time had not Gordon moved from Soo-chow to its defence, when artillery decided the unfair fortune of war against the Ti-pings. The force engaged had been brought up from Kar-sing-foo by the Chung-wang's orders, and should have formed a junction with another body of troops advancing from the city of Hoo-chow-foo, the combined forces being destined to operate against the left flank of the Soo-chow besiegers, while the Chung-wang himself acted against their right. Unfortunately, the impetuosity of the leader of the first division (the Yoong-wang) led him to commence hostilities before effecting a junction with his allies from Hoo-chow, and, although at first eminently successful, his rashness led to his subsequent defeat by Gordon's disciplined troops and artillery, and also to the repulse of the second division, each corps being compelled to fall back upon the cities from which they had advanced, and of which they constituted the garrisons.

The heroic determination with which the Ti-pings disputed the irresistible odds the enemy possessed by their artillery may be seen by the following extract from "How the Taipings were driven out of the Provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang. From Notes kept by an Officer under Ward, Burgevine, Holland, and Gordon."

"The rebels again attempted,from Kar-sing-foo and Ping-bong, to capture Wo-kong. Again, therefore, a detachment was sent down there, and they were driven back, while the artillery made terrible havoc amongst them. But we must give them their due. They fought this day like demons, advancing up to the muzzles of the guns, where they of course met with death."—Friend of China, June 27, 1865.

Immediately upon reaching Shanghae I commenced engaging men for my force, and within a few days obtained about a dozen. These were all of good character and particularly promising for drill-instructors. Among them were seven non-commissioned officers, formerly of the French army: Major Moreno, of the Sardinian army, who had seen much service in Asia, Italy, and the Crimea; a Frenchman named Lavery or Labourais (once first sergeant of the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique), who had served the Ti-pings for more than a year, but had been carried off against his will by the deserters underColonelMorton; and my friend George White, who had lately been introduced to me as a Ti-ping well-wisher, though formerly a captain in the Franco-Chinese contingent at Ningpo, a service he had resigned in disgust. Besides these, I obtained the services of several men who had served their time in a British regiment and had received their discharges; while many others promised to join me as soon as they were able. This, for a beginning, was not so bad; and, to favour my object still more, Major Moreno obtained the guarantee of certain European ordnance officials to supply me with any quantity of war material. Their sudden desire to assist the Ti-pings was caused, I believe, entirely through jealousy of the British operations conducted by General Brown,GeneralGordon, &c.; at all events, their aid would have proved substantial, for a sample case of French rifles and bayonets was escorted through Shanghae by French soldiers, and safely deposited with my colleague.

Within two weeks I was enabled to send fourteen good men—all soldiers—under the command of Labourais, toSoo-chow, one of the number being a bugler of the French regiment stationed at Shanghae. Unfortunately, the last seven recruits left just one day too soon, thereby causing me no little trouble during the execution of an enterprise within twenty-four hours after their departure, and for which I was obliged to engage half a dozen strangers, who subsequently proved to be of worthless and disreputable character.

Besides A-ling, who held a Ti-ping commission, I was accompanied from Soo-chow by two officers who had shaved their heads and assumed the Imperialist; their object being to assist me in capturing one of the enemy's steamers, if a chance offered, and to pilot us into the Ti-ping territory, while their presence would incontestably prove the belligerent nature of the act, should we be fortunate enough to cut out a vessel. These officers were provided with a special commission for the purpose.

On the morning of the day following the departure of the last batch of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, an Imperialist war-steamer arrived from before Soo-chow, and anchored abreast of a training camp some two miles above Shanghae. A-ling had engaged two Canton men, members of the Triad Association, one of whom was always kept on the watch for such an arrival; consequently the steamer was scarcely anchored before I received information to that effect. I at once decided to attempt her capture. Major Moreno was to remain at Shanghae, where he was acquainted with many French officers who were willing to serve the revolutionists, and, as he spoke Hindoostanee perfectly well, he had managed to ingratiate himself with native officers of the 22nd B. N. I. and Beloochee regiment, some of whom had promised to join him; it was, therefore, agreed that he should continue his present work, and await the result of the capture of the steamer and the receipt of instructions from myself. I decided to take W—— as my comrade and lieutenant during the proposed operations.I had soon ascertained the firmness of his principles and the sincerity of his attachment to the Ti-ping cause, and therefore gave him a document, somewhat similar to my own special commission, which I had obtained from the Chung-wang for the purpose of duly authorizing whomever I might choose as my deputy and assistant. Major Moreno, who had held field rank in several armies, I wished to place in supreme military command of the legion (when raised), because his education as a soldier was complete, and it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to find a man so thoroughly qualified in China. Both W—— and Moreno were men of honour—far different from Gordon, D'Aguibelle, Cook, and the other mercenaries hired by the Manchoo—and willingly, as I did, tendered their gratuitous services in the Ti-ping cause. This coincided very agreeably with my intentions, and caused me to reflect how superior would have been a force so organized to the Imperialist legions constituted upon a basis of blood-money! We had sufficient means to live; we would not increase them by taking wages to kill our fellow-men, even though the British Government had given an example, by authorizing its naval and military officers to fight in the ranks of a barbarous Asiatic despot, and to take reward for so doing.

As the Imperialist steamer was under orders to return to the front on the same day of her arrival at Shanghae, I had but little time to make my plans. One of the Canton men who had joined me was formerly employed on board our destined prize. I now sent him off in a boat with the view to ascertain the strength of her crew, whether steam was kept up ready for a start, how many Europeans were on board, &c. In a short time he returned with the favourable announcement that only two foreign officers were in charge, the others having gone ashore; also, that two of the quartermasters (Manilla-men) were absent, besides some of the Chinese soldiers.

My followerswere only six in number—W—— and the five Cantonese. It was my only chance to seize the vessel. Yet success seemed doubtful; but I knew full well that the boldness of a sudden enterprise would prove more effective than numbers, and felt sure that a well-managed surprise would give us an easy victory. The people of the steamer being at Shanghae, in the very heart of the Manchoo power, surrounded and protected by their British and French allies, would, I imagined, be too much astounded at the sudden attack by Ti-ping partisans to offer much resistance.

Myself and comrade were soon ready for the attempt, our baggage being confined to a tooth-brush each, our revolvers, and a good-sized piece of soap; the Canton men took little besides their formidable short Chinese swords, and a supply of those huge double-barrelled pistols in which their countrymen delight.

Proceeding to one of the Shanghae wharves, I engaged a boat, embarked with my men, and in a moment we were proceeding as fast as possible towards the vessel of the enemy.

We started in broad daylight; in fact, but a short time after noon. About one o'clock we were close up to the steamer. Sculling against the ebb tide, our boat was slowly worked past the enemy, while, having observed all that could be seen from outside, I made arrangements to board. My plan was to drop alongside the steamer's bow, get on board with W——, and then engage the Europeans in conversation, until I decided upon the instant for ourcoup de main, which would be signalled to A-ling (who was to hold fast the boat and watch every movement) by a wave of my arm, who was then to rush on board with the other Cantonese. Myself, W——, and one man, were to seize and secure the two European officers; the other three, under A-ling's orders, were to overpower any resistance from the Chinese soldiers and crew, and then cut the vessel adrift; while their leader,who had been brought up as an engineer, and understood the duties of one, took charge of the engines and set them going ahead at full speed.

Three of our men now hid themselves behind the mat cover of the boat. When we got alongside, A-ling and another held fast to the steamer in such a position that they could observe the movements of myself and W—— in the after part of the vessel. Proceeding from bow to stern, and looking fore and aft the deck, we were able to notice that the crew on board consisted of twelve or fourteen soldiers, one Manilla-man, six or eight Chinese—employed as firemen, &c.—and two Europeans. With my comrade I walked right up to the officers of the ship, and engaged in conversation with regard to my taking a passage to Quin-san with them. Their positions were respectively those of gunner and chief mate. They informed me that their trip to Shanghae was for the purpose of obtaining stores, and to deliver over to the Manchoo Governor several unfortunate Ti-ping chiefs, captured by them on the Ta-hoo Lake. This statement, given with a would-be air of conviction as to the glory and heroism of their achievement, made me quite determined to attempt the capture of the steamer at every risk, rather than lose a chance to prevent future acts of such cold-blooded atrocity. The flotilla, with which she had acted on the Ta-hoo, was commanded by one Macartney, formerly surgeon of Her Majesty's 99th regiment, but who left his honourable profession to take service under Li, the Manchoo Governor of the province. This man, having made prisoners of the chiefs, set off in the steamer for Shanghae, where he quickly sought the presence of his Asiatic master, delivering up to him the miserable Ti-pings, who suffered merciless torture and a cruel death, while this noble-minded Englishman felt no compunction at becoming the recipient of Manchoo patronage. A more dastardly act than thus giving over vanquished enemies to certain death I never heard of, though it was theordinary practice of the Europeans in Imperialist pay. The case in question decided the fate of the steamer, and made the Imps pay dear enough for the satisfaction of torturing to death one or two helpless patriots.

The narrators had just finished the history of their gallant exploit against unarmed boats, peaceable villages, and powerless captives, when I decided to make my attempt. I stood close to the mate, while W—— was ready at the side of the gunner; I had just waved my arm to A-ling, and turned to seize my man, when, fortunately casting a glance astern, I observed two boats making for the steamer, and scarcely fifty yards distant. Quickly giving A-ling the signal to retreat, I managed to avoid giving any alarm, or even to excite the least suspicion in the minds of our two interlocutors, who believed that I intended to proceed up country with them as correspondent for a certain paper. The nearest boat contained seven Manilla-men, including two quartermasters belonging to the vessel, and their friends; the other, the engineer, captain, and another European, who was engaged to take command upon reaching the lines before Soo-chow. It was, indeed, fortunate that I happened to notice the approaching boats before commencing operations; otherwise we would certainly have succumbed to numbers within a few minutes. When the captain arrived on board, I requested a passage to Quin-san. This was arranged, and I then took my departure.

Having ascertained that the steamer would not leave until late at night, I fully determined to make another effort to capture her for the Ti-pings. I found that it was imperative, however, before making the attempt, to have some addition to the number of my followers. Besides the complement of four European officers, three Manilla-men quartermasters, twenty soldiers, and eight or nine other Chinese, it was expected thatGeneralDoctor Macartney, with anaide-de-camp, and the intendedfuture captain, would be present. Consequently, directly we reached the shore, W—— and myself proceeded to find a few Europeans whom we could engage for the service. Late in the evening we met at my house, and found that we could muster five recruits. The character of these men was far more than questionable; their social position was among the genusrowdy. However, we had not time to pick and choose; a reinforcement was essential to afford any prospect of a favourable issue to our enterprise; therowdieswere therefore engaged on the spot, simply to assist in the capture of an Imperialist vessel, for which service myself and lieutenant guaranteed to pay them well. We would not have had them in our young legion.

A VIEW ON THE JOURNEY TO SOO-CHOW, OF A PORTION OF COUNTRY NEAR THE CITY OF WU-SEE, LATELY DESOLATED BY IMPERIALISTS. See p. 638.A VIEW ON THE JOURNEY TO SOO-CHOW, OF A PORTION OFCOUNTRY NEAR THE CITY OF WU-SEE, LATELY DESOLATED BY IMPERIALISTS.See p.638.

FOOTNOTES:[49]In theFriend of China, March 10, 1865, and subsequent numbers, the following advertisement appears:—"The SteamerDonnington.—The undersigned" (H. Evans), "in consequence of the determination of the provincial authorities not to permit the navigation of inner waters for tradal purposesby vessels of the above class, being thus disappointed in the purpose for which he had her constructed, is desirous of disposing of her."This direct violation of the last treaty is one effect of the Manchoo restoration to power, by British means, in the Kiang-su province.[50]Now in the service of the Ti-pings.[51]In the mutual recriminations between the leaders of the force, upon their arrival at Shanghae, Captain Jones states (referring to Burgevine):—"He further accuses us of trying to make out a good case against him, thinking he would never return to Shanghae. To this I answer, that he and I were the instigators of the defection from the Ti-ping cause, for I confess I at once fell into his plans, glad of the opportunity to escape from what appeared likely to turn outunprofitable, and having, besides, for some time before lost confidence in his capacity to command."—VideBlue Book on China, No. 3 (1864), p. 179.[52]See Frontispiece.[53]The want of some such clause in Burgevine's arrangements originally excited the suspicion of the Ti-ping chiefs.

[49]In theFriend of China, March 10, 1865, and subsequent numbers, the following advertisement appears:—"The SteamerDonnington.—The undersigned" (H. Evans), "in consequence of the determination of the provincial authorities not to permit the navigation of inner waters for tradal purposesby vessels of the above class, being thus disappointed in the purpose for which he had her constructed, is desirous of disposing of her."This direct violation of the last treaty is one effect of the Manchoo restoration to power, by British means, in the Kiang-su province.

[49]In theFriend of China, March 10, 1865, and subsequent numbers, the following advertisement appears:—

"The SteamerDonnington.—The undersigned" (H. Evans), "in consequence of the determination of the provincial authorities not to permit the navigation of inner waters for tradal purposesby vessels of the above class, being thus disappointed in the purpose for which he had her constructed, is desirous of disposing of her."

This direct violation of the last treaty is one effect of the Manchoo restoration to power, by British means, in the Kiang-su province.

[50]Now in the service of the Ti-pings.

[51]In the mutual recriminations between the leaders of the force, upon their arrival at Shanghae, Captain Jones states (referring to Burgevine):—"He further accuses us of trying to make out a good case against him, thinking he would never return to Shanghae. To this I answer, that he and I were the instigators of the defection from the Ti-ping cause, for I confess I at once fell into his plans, glad of the opportunity to escape from what appeared likely to turn outunprofitable, and having, besides, for some time before lost confidence in his capacity to command."—VideBlue Book on China, No. 3 (1864), p. 179.

[51]In the mutual recriminations between the leaders of the force, upon their arrival at Shanghae, Captain Jones states (referring to Burgevine):—

"He further accuses us of trying to make out a good case against him, thinking he would never return to Shanghae. To this I answer, that he and I were the instigators of the defection from the Ti-ping cause, for I confess I at once fell into his plans, glad of the opportunity to escape from what appeared likely to turn outunprofitable, and having, besides, for some time before lost confidence in his capacity to command."—VideBlue Book on China, No. 3 (1864), p. 179.

[52]See Frontispiece.

[53]The want of some such clause in Burgevine's arrangements originally excited the suspicion of the Ti-ping chiefs.

Renewed Attempt.—Its Success.—Narrow Escape.—British Interference.—How explained.—Its Failure.—TheCoup de Mainsucceeds.—Groundless Alarm.—Route to Soo-chow.—Its Difficulties.—Generous Conduct.—Arrival at Wu-see.—Prize-Money.—Treachery.—Preparations for an Attack.—Manœuvering.—The Attack.—Warm Reception.—The Enemy repulsed.—The Result.—Wu-see evacuated.—Return to Shanghae.—Last Interview with the Chung-wang.—Manchoo Cruelty.—Result of British Interference.—Evidence thereof.—Newspaper Extracts.—Further Extracts.—England's Policy.—Its Consequences.—Its Inconsistency.—Her Policy in Japan.—Religious Character of the Ti-pings.—Their Christianity.

As the steamer was expected to get under weigh about 1 a.m., I started with my men a little before midnight. Upon this occasion the very elements seemed to favour our design. The tide ran slack; the moon, after shrouding herself within a bank of silvery-edged clouds, retired below the horizon to rest; while even the never-setting stars were partially hidden by the volume of damp, misty vapour hanging over the surface of the river, and almost concealing our two small boats.

In little more than half an hour from the time we left the shore, we were right alongside our destined prize. With the exception of a sentry at each gangway, everything on board seemed silent and unprepared for an attack, although by the symptoms from the funnel and steam-pipe it was evident that the engines were in readiness. I decided to attempt cutting the vessel out immediately, as it seemed to me that her crew were probably turned in, and if so, not a moment should be lost in taking advantage of the opportunity, or they might beroused out to get under weigh, in which case we would hardly be able to effect the capture without loss of life.

Dividing my followers equally between the two boats, one being under my lieutenant's charge, and assigning to each man his duty in the attack, I gave the word to pull alongside, my own party to board on the starboard bow, the others on the port.

Another second and we were grappling at the sides of the steamer, and scrambling over her bulwarks, sword or pistol in hand. The Chinese sentinels on guard, and a Manilla-man who appeared on deck, were secured without either resistance or alarming those below. In fact, the Chinamen, directly they perceived the danger, seemed suddenly inspired with a strong determination to take no notice, but to be very diligent in marching up and down, and carefully employing themselves by intently gazing somewhere else. The calmness and attentive inattention with which they acted throughout the capture were really charming to behold. They betrayed neither surprise, fear, sympathy,esprit de corps, nor any other feeling. I then placed a guard over the hatches, set a party to slip the cable, and sent A-ling into the engine-room to get steam up; while, with four Europeans, I proceeded into the cabin and secured the officers. These comprised the intended captain, the mate, and the gunner, the others being still on shore. They submitted very quietly, gave up their arms, and were altogether too much confounded to attempt any resistance. Just as the vessel was entirely in our possession and I had given the order to go ahead full speed (the cable being slipped), the engineer came alongside in asan-pan, only to find himself a prisoner when he got on board. Directly the capture was accomplished, I produced the commission the Chung-wang had given for the purpose, and showed it to the senior officer of the steamer, informing him that we were Ti-ping partisans, and that we would endeavour to pass himself and brother captives from Soo-chow into Gordon's lines as prisoners of war.

Meanwhile,steam had been got up by A-ling, and we were carried along in the direction of the Ti-ping territory as fast as possible. During the capture, one of the Manilla quartermasters had jumped overboard and swam towards the shore. Fearing that this man would raise the alarm and bring a swarm of Impish Manchoos down upon us, I was compelled to lose no time in making good our escape, otherwise I might have managed to capture something more than the one steamer. A few days afterwards I was much vexed by ascertaining that I might have taken Macartney prisoner, and with him a large sum of sycee destined to pay Gordon's mercenaries. It appeared, from the information given by the former officers of the steamer, when too late to take advantage of it, that the redoubtableGeneralwas to come off in a boat with the dollars and be picked up abreast of the Fu-tai's camp. If I had known this on the same night, I could easily have taken measures to effect his capture. Aggravated by the infamous manner in which Macartney carried on hostilities against my friends, I would most assuredly have given him up to the Ti-pings, and he would have been justly punished for his cruelty to his unfortunate prisoners, if they had treated him by the strictest law of retaliation; but of this he would have been in little danger, the mad forbearance of the Ti-pings causing them to suicidally avoid the only means by which they might have saved themselves from slaughter by British means, viz., by proclaiming, and byexecutingthe promise, that if any British help were given the Manchoo, either directly or indirectly, they would retaliate by destroying the silk and tea trade (totally in their power), and by generally making war upon British interests. As for the soundness of such policy upon the part of the revolutionists, it could not possibly have done them any injury, and it offered the only chance of arresting foreign hostility.

Some hours after the capture of the steamer, the Manilla-man, as I expected at the time, made his way to theFu-tai's camp and reported the circumstance. The Manchoo official had no sooner received the information than he sent off couriers to his very good servants and allies, the British authorities. Those devoted personages immediately made ready one of their national gunboats, and, placing a number of English soldiers on board, despatched her to overhaul and bring back the missing vessel to Shanghae.

Naturally enough my readers may be inclined to wonder what business the British officials had to interfere with the capture of an Imperialist craft by the Ti-pings, they must therefore have an explanation.

All the English admirals, generals, consuls, and others, who were fighting upon the side of the Manchoo, chose, with an amazing amount of injustice and arrogance, to assume that they and their disreputable allies were alone entitled to belligerent rights and privileges. Every act of their enemy was very indignantly branded as either atrociously piratical or a form of bloodthirsty brigandage. They alone were virtuous; they alone had any right to kill, burn, and otherwise destroy! In consequence of this very comfortable state of self-conceit, and in order to succour the dearly beloved Manchoo, some experimental warrior or statesman among the British officials, according to their enlightenedex partediplomacy, did me the honour to designate my humble exploit a piratical outrage. This of course justified their praiseworthy efforts to capture the scoundrel who dared to differ from their immaculate selves, by presuming to prefer and assist the rebels instead of the Imperialists. Besides, is not the vile pirate an enemy of all mankind? And who would be so oblivious of merit as not to do them reverence when they caught him? Unfortunately for their visionary laurels, though fortunately for the pirate, they did not succeed in catching him.

Now, as even at the period referred to, the Ti-ping revolution included a population and a territory, theformer at least equal in number, and the latter in extent, to the people and soil of England; and as they were not only recognised as a belligerent power, but as constituting the Governmentde factothroughout the large tract of country under their control, I cannot understand how the military service of such a Power, with an army of several hundred thousand men in the field, and an organized administration ruling their possessions, was termed piracy and brigandage.

I was not only duly commissioned by the Chung-wang, the proper Ti-ping authority, but also acted upon a special commission issued against the vessels of the enemy. If, therefore, the capture of the steamer could be termed an act of piracy, what should be the language used to express the raids and seizure of Ti-ping craft by Admiral Hope, Generals Staveley, Brown, Michel, &c.? when it is remembered that they performed such acts entirely without authority from their own Government or any one else. Some pirates might feel flattered by finding themselves in the same boat with such worthy people; but the author of this work begs most respectfully to decline the doubtful honour. There is another point connected with this employment of defamatory epithets. If I, holding authority direct from the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief (whose acts were authorized by his king), were a pirate, then what can have been thestatusof Major Gordon, R.E., the commander of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, who held no commission whatever from Imperial authority, but was simply employed by alocalChinese mandarin?

The British gunboat did not overtake my party, though, if she had been handled a little smarter, it would have been an easy matter, for we lost our way several times among the labyrinth of creeks in the interior. If it had not been prevented by the delay from taking wrong courses (thereby affording time for the seizure of the vessel to be made known to the enemy before Soo-chow), and from the fact that only one of the men I had engagedat Shanghae could be depended upon, I should have proceeded straight through the Imperialist lines and made an attempt to seize one of their two other steamers. However, I was obliged to be contented with my single prize. She mounted a capital pivot 32-pounder in the bow, a good 12-pounder howitzer in the stern, was well provided with the best description of ammunition, and she would probably prove very serviceable in the defence of Soo-chow.

In consequence of the impossibility of forcing a passage through the enemy's lines, it became necessary to follow some such route as that by which I had last reached Soo-chow, however difficult it might be to find a channel large enough to carry the steamer so great a distance.

After losing our course for the last time, and very nearly steaming into Gordon's head-quarters at Quin-san, we managed to reach the first Ti-ping position at San-le-jow. Directly we appeared, or rather, directly the funnel became visible above the dense growth of rush and bamboo lining the banks of the creek, the garrison of the fort rushed to arms and made ready to defend themselves against the supposed and dreaded enemy. The terror inspired by the appearance of the small steam-vessels acting with the Imperialist mercenaries was at all times excessive. From a distance the helpless Ti-pings were generally mowed down with perfect impunity, and heavy artillery carried destruction throughout their ranks, while the ships, white painted and low in the water, were almost invisible, and were able to maintain their advantage by retreating or advancing whenever it was desirable, at the same time retaining a position from which shrapnel, Moorsom, and other infernally destructive, though ingeniously contrived shell, could be thrown with deadly accuracy.

It was no wonder that as we suddenly hove in sight, with a volume of thick smoke puffing up from our high-pressure engines, the soldiers and civilians about San-le-jowwere dreadfully alarmed. They were well aware that small mercy was ever shown by the "foreign brethren" in charge of the irresistible "hoo-lung paou-chwan," for, fighting or harmless, they were shot down whenever a gun could be brought to bear, and so long as the missiles could be made to reach them. The rowdy bravoes of the Imperialist flotilla being unacquainted with the principles of military honour, seemed to believe that their sole mission was to kill, burn, and destroy; as for extending mercy to those who were unable to resist their appliances of modern warfare, or treating the vanquished with magnanimity, they never entertained such ideas.

Fortunately for the people we came upon so suddenly, the steamer was under Ti-ping colours; therefore, their alarm presented only the most ludicrous character, unaccompanied by the tragic and heretofore inseparable consequences of such an event. From their isolated cottages the poor villagers rushed forth, carrying the most valued of their homely effects; men, women, and children ran frantically in the direction of the fort; some were laden with agricultural implements (for even these were often destroyed by the victorious Imperialists); others with household goods; while here and there a few noble labourers were observed trudging along with their aged fathers or mothers on their backs. Whenever the edge of a canal was reached, without a moment's hesitation, the fugitives would plunge right into the water, and give cause for merriment by the wild efforts they made to regain dry land, often rolling back, and floundering helplessly through the soft mud.

When I perceived the alarm our appearance had created, and that the soldiers were making ready to fire upon us with a few heavy gingalls mounted on their fort, I stopped our vessel's way and brought up alongside the bank, and then going ashore with A-ling, proceeded to the fort to satisfy the commandant as to our friendly character. When it was made known that we were inthe Ti-ping service, the soldiers and people loudly professed their gratification. The chief was a bronzed and hardy veteran; and although his garrison did not muster nearly 100 men, he was quite determined to defend his post to the last, had we proved to be enemies. The answer he made when I asked him whether he would not have acted with discretion by retreating from the steamer if she had been still in Manchoo interest, closely resembled that given by a brave Ti-ping officer (who had charge of a most dangerous and exposed position near Ningpo) to a friend of mine, when the latter inquired why he did not abandon so precarious an outpost, which was nearly surrounded by the enemy; he replied, "Puh pa! laou Tien-ping tung shao" (No fear! an old Ti-ping soldier knows how to die).

Passing through San-le-jow, we soon reached the small town of Pimbong, barely twenty-five miles distant from Soo-chow, and also situated on the Grand Canal. At this place we were very kindly received by the chief, who, after seeing my commission, supplied me with provisions, coals, firewood, and other necessaries. Pimbong was almost the last Ti-ping position in the neighbourhood, as immediately beyond came the lines of the enemy besieging Soo-chow. Here our pilots ceased to be of service, and the chief sent on board a man well acquainted with the country, to guide us through the largest creeks. After trying every channel branching off from the Grand Canal, and finding them all too small for the passage of the steamer, we were compelled to proceed on to Kar-sing-foo, a city nearly twenty miles from Pimbong. Had the creeks we explored been available, we could have reached Soo-chow by adétourof not more than forty miles, but by going to Kar-sing the distance would be doubled at least.

After a short run down the splendid Grand Canal, we came to off the city, and sent messengers to apprise the governor of our arrival. In a little while that functionary,who proved to be the Yoong-wang, visited the steamer in great state; he met me with much friendliness, and declared himself delighted with the acquisition of the vessel so well known and dreaded. Two Europeans were with the chief; they had formerly belonged to the Franco-Manchoo contingent; and as my lieutenant had known them to be of good character—one had been a captain in the force—I expressed my wish that they should join me, and the Yoong-wang very kindly consented.

As time was precious for the success of my plans, we only remained a few hours at Kar-sing-foo, and then started away with a new pilot on board, who was instructed to take us to the largest creeks leading to the Ta-hoo Lake, which it would be necessary to cross in order to reach Soo-chow.

From Pimbong everywhere we traversed a most beautiful country; and although, from the rumours of approaching war, the influx of fugitives, and the scarcity of provisions, no little distress was prevalent, the people were far more happy, prosperous, and improved than Imperialists ever have been, or seem likely to be.

Directly we steamed away from Kar-sing our troubles began. Every creek we attempted to navigate proved either too small, or the bridges were too narrow and low for the steamer to pass them. After getting, perhaps, fifteen miles up a creek, and destroying several bridges by the way, the water would suddenly shallow to less than our draught, or the channel would narrow to less than our beam; of course, in such cases our only plan was to get back stern foremost and try some other canal. Fortunately the vessel was built of iron, so that her progress overland—for often we were obliged to pass a place not more than four feet deep, while the steamer drew five—did no further injury than bending or indenting her pliant sides.

At last, after spending a week exploring the principalwater communication of what seemed in every respect a free and Christian country, we approached the sea, and it was only when within fourteen miles of Hang-chow that we managed to find an available creek. Even to take advantage of it we were compelled to destroy many bridges; and, upon several occasions, clear the bottom of the channel, while the work of removing stakes and barriers was incessant. Had it not been for the willing assistance we received from the Ti-pings, we should never have been able to get through.

Eventually, after a passage no one would ever have believed the steamer could have effected against so many obstacles, we arrived at the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, situated just at the southern end of the Ta-hoo. At this place the commandant, Tow-wang, and the Luk-wang—whose nephew, the Mo-wang, was commandant of Soo-chow—came out and received us in state. Upon leaving them, after having dined with the chiefs in the city, I managed to reach the Ta-hoo after knocking down an obstructive bridge with a few Moorsom shells. Before proceeding to cross the lake, I obtained a dozen good men from the chiefs, and put the paddle-wheels (which had become much dilapidated during the passage of the creeks) in good repair; for I knew that ifGeneralGordon, of the Manchoo mercenary service, had sufficient sense, he could easily intercept me with two, or even three, of the steamers attached to his force. However, fortunately for me, Gordon did not send his ships until too late; for had they overhauled their former consort, she would have fallen an easy prize, as I had not more than two or three Europeans and half a dozen Chinese on whom I could depend.

As I understood there were only two channels by which Soo-chow could be reached from the lake by a vessel drawing so much water as the steamer, and as one of these—viâthe Tung-shan hills and city of Wo-kong—was already in Impish hands, I adopted the onlyremaining course—a creek leading from the northern end of the Ta-hoo to the city of Wu-see; from whence, to Soo-chow, the Grand Canal afforded an easy passage.

While stopping at a small Ti-ping position on the west side of the lake, I was much pleased by witnessing the kind behaviour of the soldiers to a number of destitute country people, who had fled from the advance of the Imperialists down the Yang-tze-kiang towards Nankin. There were not more than 150 soldiers at the station, and from theirown rations, which consisted solely of rice and dried fish, they charitably relieved more than 500 starving people. This is no idle assertion, for the whole of my confederates were present, and saw the distribution of rice. I went over the five gunboats belonging to the troops, and found that their stores of food were nearly exhausted. The chief told me that, when all was used, he would be obliged to abandon the place, and leave the unfortunate people to starve. I supplied him with a couple of bags of rice, and then bade him farewell; although I have never seen him since, I have not forgotten his praiseworthy conduct. Who has ever seen an Imperialist official do the like?

At length we found the creek leading to Wu-see, and on the same afternoon arrived at the city, greatly to the delight of the garrison, who were much harassed by a formidable flotilla operating against their lines of communication. Soon after our arrival, the commandant, Saou-wang, returned to the city with his army, having beaten the enemy after a sharp fight in the morning. The troops had marched upwards of forty miles to and from the battle-field, and directly they came to the creek encircling Wu-see, they threw down their arms on the bank, and plunged into the cooling water in dense masses, clothes and all; so that in a few minutes the surface was literally covered with them.

The Saou-wang having informed me that the Commander-in-Chief was encamped at a place named Ma-tang-chiao—onthe shore of the Ta-hoo, and a place of strategic importance—equidistant from Wu-see and Soo-chow, I at once requested him to despatch messengers to inform his superior of my arrival. While awaiting their return, the commandant set a number of men to work pulling down a very heavy stone bridge, which it was necessary to remove before the steamer could be taken into the Grand Canal. At this city I saw upwards of 6,000 poor people, who were supported by the garrison. They had been driven from their homes by the progress of the Anglo-Manchoos in the neighbourhood, and were perfectly destitute. Every day one of the principal officers of the city came to superintend the distribution of rice, and the ravenous manner in which the people struggled for their food was something fearful to contemplate, especially when it was considered that such great misery was caused entirely by the unjustifiable intervention of my countrymen.

Upon this occasion I had not much time to notice the distress caused by the approach of the allied English and Manchoo devastators, messengers from the Chung-wang on the following morning bringing orders for me to proceed back into the Ta-hoo Lake, and take the steamer to Ma-tang-chiao. When I reached this place, the Chung-wang, attended by the Sz, Le, and several other Wangs, came on board, and appeared to be overjoyed with my successful enterprise and the appearance of the steamer. A-ling, the two Ti-ping officers, and the two Cantonese were instantly promoted; and the chiefs took off their own pearl ornaments to decorate them. The Chung-wang then took me ashore with him, and, upon reaching his head-quarters, confirmed my lieutenant's appointment, and declared that he would give 20,000 dollars prize-money for the capture of the steamer. This I considered amply sufficient for so small a service, and I determined to divide it equally among all who had assisted at the seizure—including the five rowdies who only came for money—besides giving a portion to some ofthe former crew, who had kept to their work and assisted me since the capture.

The encampment was formed around a large straggling village; and the people, like those of the neighbouring hamlets, appeared more happy, better fed, and less depressed than those of more distant parts of Ti-pingdom. This was always the result of the Chung-wang's presence in any locality, for he was not only the most able general, but also the most talented organizer and pacificator among the chiefs.

At Ma-tang-chiao the Chung-wang was concentrating an army of relief for Soo-chow; and, with the object of enabling the steamer to participate in the same movement, men were employed to remove several bridges and other obstructions on a creek by which she could reach the Grand Canal. This work was hardly commenced, when two or three fugitives, shortly followed by many others, from the suburbs of Soo-chow, arrived with the disastrous intelligence that the city was in the hands of the enemy. How it had fallen they could not say, further than by stating that it had not been captured by fighting, but by some treachery. The Chung-wang seemed much affected by the report, for Soo-chow was not only the most important and best fortified city, the most abundantly supplied and strongest garrisoned, but the commandant, Mo-wang, was his oldest and bravest brother in arms.

Orders were at once given to break camp and march upon Wu-see; and while the troops were so engaged, I returned with the steamer to the same city. On the following day the bad news became confirmed by the arrival of some hundreds of the garrison of Soo-chow. These men stated that the second in command, Nar-wang, with several other principal chiefs, had assassinated the commandant and then surrendered the city to the enemy. A great number of the Mo-wang's men were massacred by the followers of the other leaders, who commanded about 20,000 troops, while the Cantonese portion of the garrison—some 5,000 strong, and unconnected with the treachery—were compelled to fight their way out of the city. These latter, having placed their wives and children in the centre, proceeded to force the west gate. Unable, however, to effect the narrow passage with their helpless families against the incessant attack by overwhelming numbers of Imperialist and renegade soldiery, they were driven to the horrible extreme of killing their own women and children to save them from the worse fate of degradation and torture, if captured by the enemy. Scarcely a third of the men succeeded in cutting their way through, and of these many were wounded, many were covered with the blood of their wives and little ones, while others had become raving maniacs.

The Chinese nature, although apparently so apathetic, is yet capable of the wildest frenzy of passion; in fact, no people have a more paradoxical and anomalous character. It is a well-known fact that Chinese non-combatants will commit wholesale suicide upon the approach of enemies; but few Europeans would credit the fearful acts which the Soo-chow fugitives were driven in desperation to commit, or the frantic excitement leading to such deeds, and to the insanity of many of the perpetrators. I shall never forget the terrible appearance of the madmen stained with the blood of their own dearest relatives, whom they had themselves killed. They rushed into Wu-see at an immense speed, passed the city, and came to the encampment outside, and then, yelling, shouting, and crying, threw themselves, in paroxysms of grief and frenzy, on the ground before the Chung-wang. Several attempted to drown themselves in a neighbouring creek; and one, a young chief, stabbed himself to death before he could be prevented. The unfortunate men were at last secured and taken into the city.

With the remnant of the Soo-chow garrison came seven Europeans. These men had been sent from the city to join my legion, by order of the Chung-wang, and havingproceeded to Ma-tang-chiao, when they changed their route for Wu-see, they were overtaken by the fugitives, and came on with them. These seven men were not a portion of those whom I had sent from Shanghae; all the latter (with the exception of the brave Labourais, who was killed during a night attack on some stockades by the enemy only a few days previously) being within Soo-chow when that city was betrayed, and many of them there perishing. Three of the Europeans had straggled, and did not arrive for some days. Among the four who joined me wereCaptainSmith, and an engineer (for the steamer) who had hitherto been employed casting shell, guns, and executing other important work at Soo-chow.

As it was absolutely necessary for the increase and establishment of my legion that I should return to Shanghae, I wished to leave as soon as the Chung-wang reached Wu-see, particularly as both I and my lieutenant were in a very bad state of health, and urgently required medical assistance; but the Chung-wang having requested that I would join him in an attack upon the Imperialist force threatening Wu-see and Chang-chow-foo, I was obliged to defer leaving until after the battle. The enemy were intrenched in great strength within fifteen miles of Wu-see, and were assisted by a powerful flotilla of gunboats, which gave them entire command of the water communications of the city. It was to drive away or destroy this fleet that an attack was decided upon.

At last all obstructions in the way of enabling the steamer—now named theTi-ping, and flying the Chung-wang's standard—to participate in the engagement were removed; and I joined the Commander-in-Chief's consultation held before commencing operations on the following morning. One thousand men, composing theéliteof the Chung-wang's guards, and the first division of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, were placed under my orders, together with fifteen gunboats, which were to co-operate with the steamer. With this force Iwas ordered to attack the hostile flotilla, the Chung-wang himself disposing of his troops so as to prevent a junction between the enemy and their vessels. About midnight the army marched to take up its position, and at daylight I advanced with the steamer and gunboats, the men of my legion accompanying me in two divisions, one on each bank of the canal.

The morning was thick and foggy, so that we were enabled to take up a position within cannon-range of the enemy without either attracting their attention or discerning them ourselves. The place I chose for a halt until the fog cleared away was at a large stone bridge, parallel to the Grand Canal, up which we were proceeding, and over a creek leading direct into a small lake, about a mile and a half distant, on which the enemy's flotilla was stationed.

My plan of action was soon formed. I sent the gunboats in advance beyond the bridge, with orders to attack the enemy at the entrance of the lake, and then to retreat in confusion. By this manœuvre I hoped to draw the hostile gunboats into the creek, when I should be able to attack them with the steamer to an advantage. On the creek not more than a dozen boats could form abreast and work their guns, but on the lake the whole number, estimated at 60 to 70, would be able to open a concentrated fire on our advance; and one well-aimed shot could sink the lightly-builtTi-ping, or pierce her boilers.

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